

IPCC SR15

GLOBAL WARMING OF 1,5 °C



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an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty

Summary for Policymakers

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Summary for Policymakers

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Introduction

This report responds to the invitation for IPCC ‘... to provide a Special Report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways’ contained in the Decision of the 21st Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to adopt the Paris Agreement.¹

The IPCC accepted the invitation in April 2016, deciding to prepare this Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.

This Summary for Policy Makers (SPM) presents the key findings of the Special Report, based on the assessment of the available scientific, technical and socio-economic literature² relevant to global warming of 1.5°C and for the comparison between global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The level of confidence associated with each key finding is reported using the IPCC calibrated language.³ The underlying scientific basis of each key finding is indicated by references provided to chapter elements. In the SPM, knowledge gaps are identified associated with the underlying chapters of the report.

¹ Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 21.

² The assessment covers literature accepted for publication by 15 May 2018.

³ Each finding is grounded in an evaluation of underlying evidence and agreement. A level of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high and very high, and typeset in italics, for example, *medium confidence*. The following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: virtually certain 99–100% probability, very likely 90–100%, likely 66–100%, about as likely as not 33–66%, unlikely 0–33%, very unlikely 0–10%, exceptionally unlikely 0–1%. Additional terms (extremely likely 95–100%, more likely than not >50–100%, more unlikely than likely 0–<50%, extremely unlikely 0–5%) may also be used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, for example, *very likely*. This is consistent with AR5.

A. Understanding Global Warming of 1.5°C⁴

A1. Human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming⁵ above pre-industrial levels, with a *likely* range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C. Global warming is *likely* to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate. (*high confidence*) {1.2, Figure SPM.1}

A1.1. Reflecting the long-term warming trend since pre-industrial times, observed global mean surface temperature (GMST) for the decade 2006–2015 was 0.87°C (*likely* between 0.75°C and 0.99°C)⁶ higher than the average over the 1850–1900 period (*very high confidence*). Estimated anthropogenic global warming matches the level of observed warming to within ±20% (*likely* range). Estimated anthropogenic global warming is currently increasing at 0.2°C (*likely* between 0.1°C and 0.3°C) per decade due to past and ongoing emissions (*high confidence*). {1.2.1, Table 1.1, 1.2.4}

A1.2. Warming greater than the global annual average is being experienced in many land regions and seasons, including two to three times higher in the Arctic. Warming is generally higher over land than over the ocean. (*high confidence*) {1.2.1, 1.2.2, Figure 1.1, Figure 1.3, 3.3.1, 3.3.2}

A1.3. Trends in intensity and frequency of some climate and weather extremes have been detected over time spans during which about 0.5°C of global warming occurred (*medium confidence*). This assessment is based on several lines of evidence, including attribution studies for changes in extremes since 1950. {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3}

A.2. Warming from anthropogenic emissions from the pre-industrial period to the present will persist for centuries to millennia and will continue to cause further long-term changes in the climate system, such as sea level rise, with associated impacts (*high confidence*), but these emissions alone are *unlikely* to cause global warming of 1.5°C (*medium confidence*) {1.2, 3.3, Figure 1.5, Figure SPM.1}

A2.1. Anthropogenic emissions (including greenhouse gases, aerosols and their precursors) up to the present are *unlikely* to cause further warming of more than 0.5°C over the next two to three decades (*high confidence*) or on a century time scale (*medium confidence*). {1.2.4, Figure 1.5}

⁴ SPM BOX.1: Core Concepts

⁵ Present level of global warming is defined as the average of a 30-year period centered on 2017 assuming the recent rate of warming continues.


⁶ This range spans the four available peer-reviewed estimates of the observed GMST change and also accounts for additional uncertainty due to possible short-term natural variability. {1.2.1, Table 1.1}

A2.2. Reaching and sustaining net-zero global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions and declining net non-CO₂ radiative forcing would halt anthropogenic global warming on multi-decadal timescales (*high confidence*). The maximum temperature reached is then determined by cumulative net global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions up to the time of net zero CO₂ emissions (*high confidence*) and the level of non-CO₂ radiative forcing in the decades prior to the time that maximum temperatures are reached (*medium confidence*). On longer timescales, sustained net negative global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions and/or further reductions in non-CO₂ radiative forcing may still be required to prevent further warming due to Earth system feedbacks and reverse ocean acidification (*medium confidence*) and will be required to minimise sea level rise (*high confidence*). {Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, Figure 1.4, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 3.4.4.8, 3.4.5.1, 3.6.3.2}


Cumulative emissions of CO₂ and future non-CO₂ radiative forcing determine the probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C

a) Observed global temperature change and modeled responses to stylized anthropogenic emission and forcing pathways


Global warming relative to 1850-1900 (°C)




b) Stylized net global CO₂ emission pathways
Billion tonnes CO₂ per year (GtCO₂/yr)



c) Cumulative net CO₂ emissions
Billion tonnes CO₂ (GtCO₂)



d) Non-CO₂ radiative forcing pathways
Watts per square metre (W/m²)



Faster immediate CO₂ emission reductions limit cumulative CO₂ emissions shown in panel (c).

Maximum temperature rise is determined by cumulative net CO₂ emissions and net non-CO₂ radiative forcing due to methane, nitrous oxide, aerosols and other anthropogenic forcing agents.

Figure SPM.1: Panel a: Observed monthly global mean surface temperature (GMST) change grey line up to 2017, from the HadCRUT4, GISTEMP, Cowtan–Way, and NOAA datasets) and estimated anthropogenic global warming (solid orange line up to 2017, with orange shading indicating assessed *likely* range). Orange dashed arrow and horizontal orange error bar show respectively central estimate and *likely* range of the time at which 1.5°C is reached if the current rate of warming continues. The grey plume on the right of Panel a) shows the *likely* range of warming responses, computed with a simple climate model, to a stylized pathway (hypothetical future) in which net CO₂ emissions (grey line in panels b and c) decline in a straight line from 2020 to reach net zero in 2055 and net non-CO₂ radiative forcing (grey line in panel d) increases to 2030 and then declines. The blue plume in panel a) shows the response to faster CO₂ emissions reductions (blue line in panel b), reaching net zero in 2040, reducing cumulative CO₂ emissions (panel c). The purple plume shows the response to net CO₂ emissions declining to zero in 2055, with net non-CO₂ forcing remaining constant after 2030. The vertical error bars on right of panel a) show the *likely* ranges (thin lines) and central terciles (33rd – 66th percentiles, thick lines) of the estimated distribution of warming in 2100 under these three stylized pathways. Vertical dotted error bars in panels b, c and d show the *likely* range of historical annual and cumulative global net CO₂ emissions in 2017 (data from the Global Carbon Project) and of net non-CO₂ radiative forcing in 2011 from AR5, respectively. Vertical axes in panels c and d are scaled to represent approximately equal effects on GMST. {1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 2.3, Chapter 1 Figure 1.2 & Chapter 1 Supplementary Material, Cross-Chapter Box 2}

A3. Climate-related risks for natural and human systems are higher for global warming of 1.5°C than at present, but lower than at 2°C (*high confidence*). These risks depend on the magnitude and rate of warming, geographic location, levels of development and vulnerability, and on the choices and implementation of adaptation and mitigation options (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.2). {1.3, 3.3, 3.4, 5.6}

A3.1. Impacts on natural and human systems from global warming have already been observed (*high confidence*). Many land and ocean ecosystems and some of the services they provide have already changed due to global warming (*high confidence*). {1.4, 3.4, 3.5, Figure SPM.2}

A3.2. Future climate-related risks depend on the rate, peak and duration of warming. In the aggregate they are larger if global warming exceeds 1.5°C before returning to that level by 2100 than if global warming gradually stabilizes at 1.5°C, especially if the peak temperature is high (e.g., about 2°C) (*high confidence*). Some impacts may be long-lasting or irreversible, such as the loss of some ecosystems (*high confidence*). {3.2, 3.4.4, 3.6.3, Cross-Chapter Box 8}

A3.3. Adaptation and mitigation are already occurring (*high confidence*). Future climate-related risks would be reduced by the upscaling and acceleration of far-reaching, multi-level and cross-sectoral climate mitigation and by both incremental and transformational adaptation (*high confidence*). {1.2, 1.3, Table 3.5, 4.2.2, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Box 4.2, Box 4.3, Box 4.6, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.3.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.5.3}

B. Projected Climate Change, Potential Impacts and Associated Risks

B1. Climate models project robust⁷ differences in regional climate characteristics between present-day and global warming of 1.5°C,⁸ and between 1.5°C and 2°C.⁸ These differences include increases in: mean temperature in most land and ocean regions (*high confidence*), hot extremes in most inhabited regions (*high confidence*), heavy precipitation in several regions (*medium confidence*), and the probability of drought and precipitation deficits in some regions (*medium confidence*). {3.3}

B1.1. Evidence from attributed changes in some climate and weather extremes for a global warming of about 0.5°C supports the assessment that an additional 0.5°C of warming compared to present is associated with further detectable changes in these extremes (*medium confidence*). Several regional changes in climate are assessed to occur with global warming up to 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels, including warming of extreme temperatures in many regions (*high confidence*), increases in frequency, intensity, and/or amount of heavy precipitation in several regions (*high confidence*), and an increase in intensity or frequency of droughts in some regions (*medium confidence*). {3.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, Table 3.2}

B1.2. Temperature extremes on land are projected to warm more than GMST (*high confidence*): extreme hot days in mid-latitudes warm by up to about 3°C at global warming of 1.5°C and about

⁷ Robust is here used to mean that at least two thirds of climate models show the same sign of changes at the grid point scale, and that differences in large regions are statistically significant.

⁸ Projected changes in impacts between different levels of global warming are determined with respect to changes in global mean surface air temperature.

4°C at 2°C, and extreme cold nights in high latitudes warm by up to about 4.5°C at 1.5°C and about 6°C at 2°C (*high confidence*). The number of hot days is projected to increase in most land regions, with highest increases in the tropics (*high confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3}

B1.3. Risks from droughts and precipitation deficits are projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C global warming in some regions (*medium confidence*). Risks from heavy precipitation events are projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C global warming in several northern hemisphere high-latitude and/or high-elevation regions, eastern Asia and eastern North America (*medium confidence*). Heavy precipitation associated with tropical cyclones is projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C global warming (*medium confidence*). There is generally *low confidence* in projected changes in heavy precipitation at 2°C compared to 1.5°C in other regions. Heavy precipitation when aggregated at global scale is projected to be higher at 2.0°C than at 1.5°C of global warming (*medium confidence*). As a consequence of heavy precipitation, the fraction of the global land area affected by flood hazards is projected to be larger at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global warming (*medium confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.6}

B2. By 2100, global mean sea level rise is projected to be around 0.1 metre lower with global warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C (*medium confidence*). Sea level will continue to rise well beyond 2100 (*high confidence*), and the magnitude and rate of this rise depends on future emission pathways. A slower rate of sea level rise enables greater opportunities for adaptation in the human and ecological systems of small islands, low-lying coastal areas and deltas (*medium confidence*). {3.3, 3.4, 3.6 }

B2.1. Model-based projections of global mean sea level rise (relative to 1986-2005) suggest an indicative range of 0.26 to 0.77 m by 2100 for 1.5°C global warming, 0.1 m (0.04-0.16 m) less than for a global warming of 2°C (*medium confidence*). A reduction of 0.1 m in global sea level rise implies that up to 10 million fewer people would be exposed to related risks, based on population in the year 2010 and assuming no adaptation (*medium confidence*). {3.4.4, 3.4.5, 4.3.2}

B2.2. Sea level rise will continue beyond 2100 even if global warming is limited to 1.5°C in the 21st century (*high confidence*). Marine ice sheet instability in Antarctica and/or irreversible loss of the Greenland ice sheet could result in multi-metre rise in sea level over hundreds to thousands of years. These instabilities could be triggered around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming (*medium confidence*). {3.3.9, 3.4.5, 3.5.2, 3.6.3, Box 3.3, Figure SPM.2}

B2.3. Increasing warming amplifies the exposure of small islands, low-lying coastal areas and deltas to the risks associated with sea level rise for many human and ecological systems, including increased saltwater intrusion, flooding and damage to infrastructure (*high confidence*). Risks associated with sea level rise are higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C. The slower rate of sea level rise at global warming of 1.5°C reduces these risks enabling greater opportunities for adaptation including managing and restoring natural coastal ecosystems, and infrastructure reinforcement (*medium confidence*). {3.4.5, Figure SPM.2, Box 3.5}

B3. On land, impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems, including species loss and extinction, are projected to be lower at 1.5°C of global warming compared to 2°C. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C is projected to lower the impacts on terrestrial, freshwater, and coastal ecosystems and to retain more of their services to humans (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.2) {3.4, 3.5, Box 3.4, Box 4.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3}

B3.1. Of 105,000 species studied,⁹ 6% of insects, 8% of plants and 4% of vertebrates are projected to lose over half of their climatically determined geographic range for global warming of 1.5°C, compared with 18% of insects, 16% of plants and 8% of vertebrates for global warming of 2°C (*medium confidence*). Impacts associated with other biodiversity-related risks such as forest fires, and the spread of invasive species, are lower at 1.5°C compared to 2°C of global warming (*high confidence*). {3.4.3, 3.5.2}

B3.2. Approximately 4% (interquartile range 2–7%) of the global terrestrial land area is projected to undergo a transformation of ecosystems from one type to another at 1°C of global warming, compared with 13% (interquartile range 8–20%) at 2°C (*medium confidence*). This indicates that the area at risk is projected to be approximately 50% lower at 1.5°C compared to 2°C (*medium confidence*). {3.4.3.1, 3.4.3.5}

B3.3. High-latitude tundra and boreal forests are particularly at risk of climate change-induced degradation and loss, with woody shrubs already encroaching into the tundra (*high confidence*) and will proceed with further warming. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C is projected to prevent the thawing over centuries of a permafrost area in the range of 1.5 to 2.5 million km² (*medium confidence*). {3.3.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.5}

B4. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C is projected to reduce increases in ocean temperature as well as associated increases in ocean acidity and decreases in ocean oxygen levels (*high confidence*). Consequently, limiting global warming to 1.5°C is projected to reduce risks to marine biodiversity, fisheries, and ecosystems, and their functions and services to humans, as illustrated by recent changes to Arctic sea ice and warm water coral reef ecosystems (*high confidence*). {3.3, 3.4, 3.5, Boxes 3.4, 3.5}

B4.1. There is *high confidence* that the probability of a sea-ice-free Arctic Ocean during summer is substantially lower at global warming of 1.5°C when compared to 2°C. With 1.5°C of global warming, one sea ice-free Arctic summer is projected per century. This likelihood is increased to at least one per decade with 2°C global warming. Effects of a temperature overshoot are reversible for Arctic sea ice cover on decadal time scales (*high confidence*). {3.3.8, 3.4.4.7}

B4.2. Global warming of 1.5°C is projected to shift the ranges of many marine species, to higher latitudes as well as increase the amount of damage to many ecosystems. It is also expected to drive the loss of coastal resources, and reduce the productivity of fisheries and aquaculture (especially at low latitudes). The risks of climate-induced impacts are projected to be higher at 2°C than those at global warming of 1.5°C (*high confidence*). Coral reefs, for example, are projected to decline by a further 70–90% at 1.5°C (*high confidence*) with larger losses (>99%) at 2°C (*very high confidence*). The risk of irreversible loss of many marine and coastal ecosystems increases with global warming, especially at 2°C or more (*high confidence*). {3.4.4, Box 3.4}

B4.3. The level of ocean acidification due to increasing CO₂ concentrations associated with global warming of 1.5°C is projected to amplify the adverse effects of warming, and even further at 2°C,

⁹ Consistent with earlier studies, illustrative numbers were adopted from one recent meta-study.

impacting the growth, development, calcification, survival, and thus abundance of a broad range of species, e.g., from algae to fish (*high confidence*). {3.3.10, 3.4.4}

B4.4. Impacts of climate change in the ocean are increasing risks to fisheries and aquaculture via impacts on the physiology, survivorship, habitat, reproduction, disease incidence, and risk of invasive species (*medium confidence*) but are projected to be less at 1.5°C of global warming than at 2°C. One global fishery model, for example, projected a decrease in global annual catch for marine fisheries of about 1.5 million tonnes for 1.5°C of global warming compared to a loss of more than 3 million tonnes for 2°C of global warming (*medium confidence*). {3.4.4, Box 3.4}

B5. Climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security, and economic growth are projected to increase with global warming of 1.5°C and increase further with 2°C. (Figure SPM.2) {3.4, 3.5, 5.2, Box 3.2, Box 3.3, Box 3.5, Box 3.6, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, 5.2}

B5.1. Populations at disproportionately higher risk of adverse consequences of global warming of 1.5°C and beyond include disadvantaged and vulnerable populations, some indigenous peoples, and local communities dependent on agricultural or coastal livelihoods (*high confidence*). Regions at disproportionately higher risk include Arctic ecosystems, dryland regions, small-island developing states, and least developed countries (*high confidence*). Poverty and disadvantages are expected to increase in some populations as global warming increases; limiting global warming to 1.5°C, compared with 2°C, could reduce the number of people both exposed to climate-related risks and susceptible to poverty by up to several hundred million by 2050 (*medium confidence*). {3.4.10, 3.4.11, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, 4.2.2.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.6.3}

B5.2. Any increase in global warming is projected to affect human health, with primarily negative consequences (*high confidence*). Lower risks are projected at 1.5°C than at 2°C for heat-related morbidity and mortality (*very high confidence*) and for ozone-related mortality if emissions needed for ozone formation remain high (*high confidence*). Urban heat islands often amplify the impacts of heatwaves in cities (*high confidence*). Risks from some vector-borne diseases, such as malaria and dengue fever, are projected to increase with warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, including potential shifts in their geographic range (*high confidence*). {3.4.7, 3.4.8, 3.5.5.8}

B5.3. Limiting warming to 1.5°C, compared with 2°C, is projected to result in smaller net reductions in yields of maize, rice, wheat, and potentially other cereal crops, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central and South America; and in the CO₂ dependent, nutritional quality of rice and wheat (*high confidence*). Reductions in projected food availability are larger at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming in the Sahel, southern Africa, the Mediterranean, central Europe, and the Amazon (*medium confidence*). Livestock are projected to be adversely affected with rising temperatures, depending on the extent of changes in feed quality, spread of diseases, and water resource availability (*high confidence*). {3.4.6, 3.5.4, 3.5.5, Box 3.1, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}

B5.4. Depending on future socioeconomic conditions, limiting global warming to 1.5°C, compared to 2°C, may reduce the proportion of the world population exposed to a climate-change induced increase in water stress by up to 50%, although there is considerable variability between regions (*medium confidence*). Many small island developing states would experience lower water stress as a

result of projected changes in aridity when global warming is limited to 1.5°C, as compared to 2°C (*medium confidence*). {3.3.5, 3.4.2, 3.4.8, 3.5.5, Box 3.2, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}

B5.5. Risks to global aggregated economic growth due to climate change impacts are projected to be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C by the end of this century¹⁰ (*medium confidence*). This excludes the costs of mitigation, adaptation investments and the benefits of adaptation. Countries in the tropics and Southern Hemisphere subtropics are projected to experience the largest impacts on economic growth due to climate change should global warming increase from 1.5°C to 2 °C (*medium confidence*). {3.5.2, 3.5.3}

B5.6. Exposure to multiple and compound climate-related risks increases between 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming, with greater proportions of people both so exposed and susceptible to poverty in Africa and Asia (*high confidence*). For global warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, risks across energy, food, and water sectors could overlap spatially and temporally, creating new and exacerbating current hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities that could affect increasing numbers of people and regions (*medium confidence*). {Box 3.5, 3.3.1, 3.4.5.3, 3.4.5.6, 3.4.11, 3.5.4.9}


B5.7. There are multiple lines of evidence that since the AR5 the assessed levels of risk increased for four of the five Reasons for Concern (RFCs) for global warming to 2°C (*high confidence*). The risk transitions by degrees of global warming are now: from high to very high between 1.5°C and 2°C for RFC1 (Unique and threatened systems) (*high confidence*); from moderate to high risk between 1.0°C and 1.5°C for RFC2 (Extreme weather events) (*medium confidence*); from moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2°C for RFC3 (Distribution of impacts) (*high confidence*); from moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2.5°C for RFC4 (Global aggregate impacts) (*medium confidence*); and from moderate to high risk between 1°C and 2.5°C for RFC5 (Large-scale singular events) (*medium confidence*). (Figure SPM.2) {3.4.13; 3.5, 3.5.2}

¹⁰ Here, impacts on economic growth refer to changes in GDP. Many impacts, such as loss of human lives, cultural heritage, and ecosystem services, are difficult to value and monetize.


How the level of global warming affects impacts and/or risks associated with the Reasons for Concern (RFCs) and selected natural, managed and human systems

Five Reasons For Concern (RFCs) illustrate the impacts and risks of different levels of global warming for people, economies and ecosystems across sectors and regions.

Impacts and risks associated with the Reasons for Concern (RFCs)



Impacts and risks for selected natural, managed and human systems



Confidence level for transition: L=Low, M=Medium, H=High and VH=Very high

Figure SPM.2: Five integrative reasons for concern (RFCs) provide a framework for summarizing key impacts and risks across sectors and regions, and were introduced in the IPCC Third Assessment Report. RFCs illustrate the implications of global warming for people, economies, and ecosystems. Impacts and/or risks for each RFC are based on assessment of the new literature that has appeared. As in the AR5, this literature was used to make expert judgments to assess the levels of global warming at which levels of impact and/or risk are undetectable, moderate, high or very high. The selection of impacts and risks to natural, managed and human systems in the lower panel is illustrative and is not intended to be fully comprehensive. **RFC1 Unique and threatened systems:** ecological and human systems that have restricted geographic ranges constrained by climate related conditions and have high endemism or other distinctive properties. Examples include coral reefs, the Arctic and its indigenous people, mountain glaciers, and biodiversity hotspots. **RFC2 Extreme weather events:** risks/impacts to human health, livelihoods, assets, and ecosystems from extreme weather events such as heat waves, heavy rain, drought and associated wildfires, and coastal flooding. **RFC3 Distribution of impacts:** risks/impacts that disproportionately affect particular groups due to uneven distribution of physical climate change hazards, exposure or vulnerability. **RFC4 Global aggregate impacts:** global monetary damage, global scale degradation and loss of ecosystems and biodiversity. **RFC5 Large-scale singular events:** are relatively large, abrupt and sometimes irreversible changes in systems that are caused by global warming. Examples include disintegration of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets. {3.4, 3.5, 3.5.2.1, 3.5.2.2, 3.5.2.3, 3.5.2.4, 3.5.2.5, 5.4.1 5.5.3, 5.6.1, Box 3.4}

B6. Most adaptation needs will be lower for global warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C (*high confidence*). There are a wide range of adaptation options that can reduce the risks of climate change (*high confidence*). There are limits to adaptation and adaptive capacity for some human and natural systems at global warming of 1.5°C, with associated losses (*medium confidence*). The number and availability of adaptation options vary by sector (*medium confidence*). {Table 3.5, 4.3, 4.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5}

B6.1. A wide range of adaptation options are available to reduce the risks to natural and managed ecosystems (e.g., ecosystem-based adaptation, ecosystem restoration and avoided degradation and deforestation, biodiversity management, sustainable aquaculture, and local knowledge and indigenous knowledge), the risks of sea level rise (e.g., coastal defence and hardening), and the risks to health, livelihoods, food, water, and economic growth, especially in rural landscapes (e.g., efficient irrigation, social safety nets, disaster risk management, risk spreading and sharing, community-based adaptation) and urban areas (e.g., green infrastructure, sustainable land use and planning, and sustainable water management) (*medium confidence*). {4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.5, 4.5.3, 4.5.4, 5.3.2, Box 4.2, Box 4.3, Box 4.6, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}.

B6.2. Adaptation is expected to be more challenging for ecosystems, food and health systems at 2°C of global warming than for 1.5°C (*medium confidence*). Some vulnerable regions, including small islands and Least Developed Countries, are projected to experience high multiple interrelated climate risks even at global warming of 1.5°C (*high confidence*). {3.3.1, 3.4.5, Box 3.5, Table 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, 5.6, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, Box 5.3}

B6.3. Limits to adaptive capacity exist at 1.5°C of global warming, become more pronounced at higher levels of warming and vary by sector, with site-specific implications for vulnerable regions, ecosystems, and human health (*medium confidence*) {Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, Box 3.5, Table 3.5}

C. Emission Pathways and System Transitions Consistent with 1.5°C Global Warming

C1. In model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic CO₂ emissions decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 (40–60% interquartile range), reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range). For limiting global warming to below 2°C¹¹ CO₂ emissions are projected to decline by about 20% by 2030 in most pathways (10–30% interquartile range) and reach net zero around 2075 (2065–2080 interquartile range). Non-CO₂ emissions in pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C show deep reductions that are similar to those in pathways limiting warming to 2°C. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.3a) {2.1, 2.3, Table 2.4}

C1.1. CO₂ emissions reductions that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot can involve different portfolios of mitigation measures, striking different balances between lowering energy and resource intensity, rate of decarbonization, and the reliance on carbon dioxide removal. Different portfolios face different implementation challenges, and potential synergies and trade-offs with sustainable development. (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.3b) {2.3.2, 2.3.4, 2.4, 2.5.3}

¹¹ References to pathways limiting global warming to 2°C are based on a 66% probability of staying below 2°C.

C1.2. Modelled pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot involve deep reductions in emissions of methane and black carbon (35% or more of both by 2050 relative to 2010). These pathways also reduce most of the cooling aerosols, which partially offsets mitigation effects for two to three decades. Non-CO₂ emissions¹² can be reduced as a result of broad mitigation measures in the energy sector. In addition, targeted non-CO₂ mitigation measures can reduce nitrous oxide and methane from agriculture, methane from the waste sector, some sources of black carbon, and hydrofluorocarbons. High bioenergy demand can increase emissions of nitrous oxide in some 1.5°C pathways, highlighting the importance of appropriate management approaches. Improved air quality resulting from projected reductions in many non-CO₂ emissions provide direct and immediate population health benefits in all 1.5°C model pathways. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.3a) {2.2.1, 2.3.3, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, 4.3.6, 5.4.2}

C1.3. Limiting global warming requires limiting the total cumulative global anthropogenic emissions of CO₂ since the preindustrial period, i.e. staying within a total carbon budget (*high confidence*).¹³ By the end of 2017, anthropogenic CO₂ emissions since the preindustrial period are estimated to have reduced the total carbon budget for 1.5°C by approximately 2200 ± 320 GtCO₂ (*medium confidence*). The associated remaining budget is being depleted by current emissions of 42 ± 3 GtCO₂ per year (*high confidence*). The choice of the measure of global temperature affects the estimated remaining carbon budget. Using global mean surface air temperature, as in AR5, gives an estimate of the remaining carbon budget of 580 GtCO₂ for a 50% probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C, and 420 GtCO₂ for a 66% probability (*medium confidence*).¹⁴ Alternatively, using GMST gives estimates of 770 and 570 GtCO₂, for 50% and 66% probabilities,¹⁵ respectively (*medium confidence*). Uncertainties in the size of these estimated remaining carbon budgets are substantial and depend on several factors. Uncertainties in the climate response to CO₂ and non-CO₂ emissions contribute ±400 GtCO₂ and the level of historic warming contributes ±250 GtCO₂ (*medium confidence*). Potential additional carbon release from future permafrost thawing and methane release from wetlands would reduce budgets by up to 100 GtCO₂ over the course of this century and more thereafter (*medium confidence*). In addition, the level of non-CO₂ mitigation in the future could alter the remaining carbon budget by 250 GtCO₂ in either direction (*medium confidence*). {1.2.4, 2.2.2, 2.6.1, Table 2.2, Chapter 2 Supplementary Material}

C1.4. Solar radiation modification (SRM) measures are not included in any of the available assessed pathways. Although some SRM measures may be theoretically effective in reducing an overshoot, they face large uncertainties and knowledge gaps as well as substantial risks,

¹² Non-CO₂ emissions included in this report are all anthropogenic emissions other than CO₂ that result in radiative forcing. These include short-lived climate forcers, such as methane, some fluorinated gases, ozone precursors, aerosols or aerosol precursors, such as black carbon and sulphur dioxide, respectively, as well as long-lived greenhouse gases, such as nitrous oxide or some fluorinated gases. The radiative forcing associated with non-CO₂ emissions and changes in surface albedo is referred to as non-CO₂ radiative forcing. {x.y}

¹³ There is a clear scientific basis for a total carbon budget consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C. However, neither this total carbon budget nor the fraction of this budget taken up by past emissions were assessed in this report.

¹⁴ Irrespective of the measure of global temperature used, updated understanding and further advances in methods have led to an increase in the estimated remaining carbon budget of about 300 GtCO₂ compared to AR5. (*medium confidence*) {x.y}

¹⁵ These estimates use observed GMST to 2006–2015 and estimate future temperature changes using near surface air temperatures.


institutional and social constraints to deployment related to governance, ethics, and impacts on sustainable development. They also do not mitigate ocean acidification. (*medium confidence*). {4.3.8, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 4}

Global emissions pathway characteristics

General characteristics of the evolution of anthropogenic net emissions of CO₂, and total emissions of methane, black carbon, and nitrous oxide in model pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. Net emissions are defined as anthropogenic emissions reduced by anthropogenic removals. Reductions in net emissions can be achieved through different portfolios of mitigation measures illustrated in Figure SPM3B.


Global total net CO₂ emissions

Billion tonnes of CO₂/yr



Timing of net zero CO₂


Line widths depict the 5-95th percentile and the 25-75th percentile of scenarios




Non-CO₂ emissions relative to 2010

Emissions of non-CO₂ forcers are also reduced or limited in pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with **no or limited overshoot**, but they do not reach zero globally.

Methane emissions



Black carbon emissions



Nitrous oxide emissions





Figure SPM.3a: Global emissions pathway characteristics. The main panel shows global net anthropogenic CO₂ emissions in pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited (less than 0.1°C) overshoot and pathways with higher overshoot. The shaded area shows the full range for pathways analysed in this report. The panels on the right show non-CO₂ emissions ranges for three compounds with large historical forcing and a substantial portion of emissions coming from sources distinct from those central to CO₂ mitigation. Shaded areas in these panels show the 5–95% (light shading) and interquartile (dark shading) ranges of pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. Box and whiskers at the bottom of the figure show the timing of pathways reaching global net zero CO₂ emission levels, and a comparison with pathways limiting global warming to 2°C with at least 66% probability. Four illustrative model pathways are highlighted in the main panel and are labelled P1, P2, P3 and P4, corresponding to the LED, S1, S2, and S5 pathways assessed in Chapter 2. Descriptions and characteristics of these pathways are available in Figure SPM3b. {2.1, 2.2, 2.3, Figure 2.5, Figure 2.10, Figure 2.11}

Characteristics of four illustrative model pathways

Different mitigation strategies can achieve the net emissions reductions that would be required to follow a pathway that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. All pathways use Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR), but the amount varies across pathways, as do the relative contributions of Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and removals in the Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) sector. This has implications for the emissions and several other pathway characteristics.

Breakdown of contributions to global net CO₂ emissions in four illustrative model pathways

● Fossil fuel and industry ● AFOLU ● BECCS



P1: A scenario in which social, business, and technological innovations result in lower energy demand up to 2050 while living standards rise, especially in the global South. A down-sized energy system enables rapid decarbonisation of energy supply. Afforestation is the only CDR option considered; neither fossil fuels with CCS nor BECCS are used.

P2: A scenario with a broad focus on sustainability including energy intensity, human development, economic convergence and international cooperation, as well as shifts towards sustainable and healthy consumption patterns, low-carbon technology innovation, and well-managed land systems with limited societal acceptability for BECCS.

P3: A middle-of-the-road scenario in which societal as well as technological development follows historical patterns. Emissions reductions are mainly achieved by changing the way in which energy and products are produced, and to a lesser degree by reductions in demand.

P4: A resource and energy-intensive scenario in which economic growth and globalization lead to widespread adoption of greenhouse-gas intensive lifestyles, including high demand for transportation fuels and livestock products. Emissions reductions are mainly achieved through technological means, making strong use of CDR through the deployment of BECCS.

Global indicators	P1	P2	P3	P4	Interquartile range
Pathway classification	No or low overshoot	No or low overshoot	No or low overshoot	High overshoot	No or low overshoot
CO ₂ emission change in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-58	-47	-41	4	(-59,-40)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-93	-95	-91	-97	(-104,-91)
Kyoto-GHG emissions* in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-50	-49	-35	-2	(-55,-38)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-82	-89	-78	-80	(-93,-81)
Final energy demand** in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-15	-5	17	39	(-12, 7)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-32	2	21	44	(-11, 22)
Renewable share in electricity in 2030 (%)	60	58	48	25	(47, 65)
↳ in 2050 (%)	77	81	63	70	(69, 87)
Primary energy from coal in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-78	-61	-75	-59	(-78, -59)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-97	-77	-73	-97	(-95, -74)
from oil in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-37	-13	-3	86	(-34,3)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-87	-50	-81	-32	(-78,-31)
from gas in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-25	-20	33	37	(-26,21)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-74	-53	21	-48	(-56,6)
from nuclear in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	59	83	98	106	(44,102)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	150	98	501	468	(91,190)
from biomass in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-11	0	36	-1	(29,80)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-16	49	121	418	(123,261)
from non-biomass renewables in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	430	470	315	110	(243,438)
↳ in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	832	1327	878	1137	(575,1300)
Cumulative CCS until 2100 (GtCO ₂)	0	348	687	1218	(550, 1017)
↳ of which BECCS (GtCO ₂)	0	151	414	1191	(364, 662)
Land area of bioenergy crops in 2050 (million hectare)	22	93	283	724	(151, 320)
Agricultural CH ₄ emissions in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	-24	-48	1	14	(-30,-11)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	-33	-69	-23	2	(-46,-23)
Agricultural N ₂ O emissions in 2030 (% rel to 2010)	5	-26	15	3	(-21,4)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)	6	-26	0	39	(-26,1)

NOTE: Indicators have been selected to show global trends identified by the Chapter 2 assessment. National and sectoral characteristics can differ substantially from the global trends shown above.

* Kyoto-gas emissions are based on SAR GWP-100

** Changes in energy demand are associated with improvements in energy efficiency and behaviour change

Figure SPM.3b: Characteristics of four illustrative model pathways in relation to global warming of 1.5°C introduced in Figure SPM3a. These pathways were selected to show a range of potential mitigation approaches and vary widely in their projected energy and land use, as well as their assumptions about future socioeconomic developments, including economic and population growth, equity and sustainability. A breakdown of the global net anthropogenic CO₂ emissions into the contributions in terms of CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel and industry, agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU), and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is shown. AFOLU estimates reported here are not necessarily comparable with countries' estimates. Further characteristics for each of these pathways are listed below each pathway. These pathways illustrate relative global differences in mitigation strategies, but do not represent central estimates, national strategies, and do not indicate requirements. For comparison, the right-most column shows the interquartile ranges across pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C. Pathways P1, P2, P3 and P4, correspond to the LED, S1, S2, and S5 pathways assessed in Chapter 2. (Figure SPM.3a) {2.2.1, 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6, Figure 2.9, Figure 2.10, Figure 2.11, Figure 2.14, Figure 2.15, Figure 2.16, Figure 2.17, Figure 2.24, Figure 2.25, Table 2.4, Table 2.6, Table 2.7, Table 2.9, Table 4.1}

C2. Pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems (*high confidence*). These systems transitions are unprecedented in terms of scale, but not necessarily in terms of speed, and imply deep emissions reductions in all sectors, a wide portfolio of mitigation options and a significant upscaling of investments in those options (*medium confidence*). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5}

C2.1. Pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot show system changes that are more rapid and pronounced over the next two decades than in 2°C pathways (*high confidence*). The rates of system changes associated with limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot have occurred in the past within specific sectors, technologies and spatial contexts, but there is no documented historic precedent for their scale (*medium confidence*). {2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4, 2.5, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}

C2.2. In energy systems, modelled global pathways (considered in the literature) limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (for more details see Figure SPM.3b), generally meet energy service demand with lower energy use, including through enhanced energy efficiency, and show faster electrification of energy end use compared to 2°C (*high confidence*). In 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot, low-emission energy sources are projected to have a higher share, compared with 2°C pathways, particularly before 2050 (*high confidence*). In 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot, renewables are projected to supply 70–85% (interquartile range) of electricity in 2050 (*high confidence*). In electricity generation, shares of nuclear and fossil fuels with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) are modelled to increase in most 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot. In modelled 1.5°C pathways with limited or no overshoot, the use of CCS would allow the electricity generation share of gas to be approximately 8% (3–11% interquartile range) of global electricity in 2050, while the use of coal shows a steep reduction in all pathways and would be reduced to close to 0% (0–2%) of electricity (*high confidence*). While acknowledging the challenges, and differences between the options and national circumstances, political, economic, social and technical feasibility of solar energy, wind energy and electricity storage technologies have substantially improved over the past few years (*high confidence*). These improvements signal a potential system transition in electricity generation (Figure SPM.3b) {2.4.1, 2.4.2, Figure 2.1, Table 2.6, Table 2.7, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, 4.2.1, 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.5.2}

C2.3. CO₂ emissions from industry in pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot are projected to be about 75–90% (interquartile range) lower in 2050 relative to 2010, as compared to 50–80% for global warming of 2°C (*medium confidence*). Such reductions can be achieved through combinations of new and existing technologies and practices, including electrification, hydrogen, sustainable bio-based feedstocks, product substitution, and carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS). These options are technically proven at various scales but their large-scale deployment may be limited by economic, financial, human capacity and institutional constraints in specific contexts, and specific characteristics of large-scale industrial installations. In industry, emissions reductions by energy and process efficiency by themselves are insufficient for limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (*high confidence*). {2.4.3, 4.2.1, Table 4.1, Table 4.3, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.5.2}

C2.4. The urban and infrastructure system transition consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot would imply, for example, changes in land and urban planning practices, as well as deeper emissions reductions in transport and buildings compared to pathways that limit global warming below 2°C (see 2.4.3; 4.3.3; 4.2.1) (*medium confidence*). Technical

measures and practices enabling deep emissions reductions include various energy efficiency options. In pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, the electricity share of energy demand in buildings would be about 55–75% in 2050 compared to 50–70% in 2050 for 2°C global warming (*medium confidence*). In the transport sector, the share of low-emission final energy would rise from less than 5% in 2020 to about 35–65% in 2050 compared to 25–45% for 2°C global warming (*medium confidence*). Economic, institutional and socio-cultural barriers may inhibit these urban and infrastructure system transitions, depending on national, regional and local circumstances, capabilities and the availability of capital (*high confidence*). {2.3.4, 2.4.3, 4.2.1, Table 4.1, 4.3.3, 4.5.2}.

C2.5. Transitions in global and regional land use are found in all pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, but their scale depends on the pursued mitigation portfolio. Model pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot project the conversion of 0.5–8 million km² of pasture and 0–5 million km² of non-pasture agricultural land for food and feed crops into 1–7 million km² for energy crops and a 1 million km² reduction to 10 million km² increase in forests by 2050 relative to 2010 (*medium confidence*).¹⁶ Land use transitions of similar magnitude can be observed in modelled 2°C pathways (*medium confidence*). Such large transitions pose profound challenges for sustainable management of the various demands on land for human settlements, food, livestock feed, fibre, bioenergy, carbon storage, biodiversity and other ecosystem services (*high confidence*). Mitigation options limiting the demand for land include sustainable intensification of land use practices, ecosystem restoration and changes towards less resource-intensive diets (*high confidence*). The implementation of land-based mitigation options would require overcoming socio-economic, institutional, technological, financing and environmental barriers that differ across regions (*high confidence*). {2.4.4, Figure 2.24, 4.3.2, 4.5.2, Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3}

C2.6 Total annual average energy-related mitigation investment for the period 2015 to 2050 in pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C is estimated to be around 900 billion USD₂₀₁₅ (range of 180 billion to 1800 billion USD₂₀₁₅ across six models¹⁷). This corresponds to total annual average energy supply investments of 1600 to 3800 billion USD₂₀₁₅ and total annual average energy demand investments of 700 to 1000 billion USD₂₀₁₅ for the period 2015 to 2050, and an increase in total energy-related investments of about 12% (range of 3% to 23%) in 1.5°C pathways relative to 2°C pathways. Average annual investment in low-carbon energy technologies and energy efficiency are upscaled by roughly a factor of five (range of factor of 4 to 5) by 2050 compared to 2015 (*medium confidence*). {2.5.2, Box 4.8, Figure 2.27}

C2.7. Modelled pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot project a wide range of global average discounted marginal abatement costs over the 21st century. They are roughly 3-4 times higher than in pathways limiting global warming to below 2°C (*high confidence*). The economic literature distinguishes marginal abatement costs from total mitigation costs in the economy. The literature on total mitigation costs of 1.5°C mitigation pathways is limited and was not assessed in this report. Knowledge gaps remain in the integrated assessment of the economy wide costs and benefits of mitigation in line with pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C. {2.5.2; 2.6; Figure 2.26}

¹⁶ The projected land use changes presented are not deployed to their upper limits simultaneously in a single pathway.

¹⁷ Including two pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot and four pathways with high overshoot.

C3. All pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot project the use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) on the order of 100–1000 GtCO₂ over the 21st century. CDR would be used to compensate for residual emissions and, in most cases, achieve net negative emissions to return global warming to 1.5°C following a peak (*high confidence*). CDR deployment of several hundreds of GtCO₂ is subject to multiple feasibility and sustainability constraints (*high confidence*). Significant near-term emissions reductions and measures to lower energy and land demand can limit CDR deployment to a few hundred GtCO₂ without reliance on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) (*high confidence*). {2.3, 2.4, 3.6.2, 4.3, 5.4}

C3.1. Existing and potential CDR measures include afforestation and reforestation, land restoration and soil carbon sequestration, BECCS, direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS), enhanced weathering and ocean alkalization. These differ widely in terms of maturity, potentials, costs, risks, co-benefits and trade-offs (*high confidence*). To date, only a few published pathways include CDR measures other than afforestation and BECCS. {2.3.4, 3.6.2, 4.3.2, 4.3.7}

C3.2. In pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot, BECCS deployment is projected to range from 0–1, 0–8, and 0–16 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ in 2030, 2050, and 2100, respectively, while agriculture, forestry and land-use (AFOLU) related CDR measures are projected to remove 0–5, 1–11, and 1–5 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ in these years (*medium confidence*). The upper end of these deployment ranges by mid-century exceeds the BECCS potential of up to 5 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ and afforestation potential of up to 3.6 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ assessed based on recent literature (*medium confidence*). Some pathways avoid BECCS deployment completely through demand-side measures and greater reliance on AFOLU-related CDR measures (*medium confidence*). The use of bioenergy can be as high or even higher when BECCS is excluded compared to when it is included due to its potential for replacing fossil fuels across sectors (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.3b) {2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.2, 3.6.2, 4.3.1, 4.2.3, 4.3.2, 4.3.7, 4.4.3, Table 2.4}

C3.3. Pathways that overshoot 1.5°C of global warming rely on CDR exceeding residual CO₂ emissions later in the century to return to below 1.5°C by 2100, with larger overshoots requiring greater amounts of CDR (Figure SPM.3b). (*high confidence*). Limitations on the speed, scale, and societal acceptability of CDR deployment hence determine the ability to return global warming to below 1.5°C following an overshoot. Carbon cycle and climate system understanding is still limited about the effectiveness of net negative emissions to reduce temperatures after they peak (*high confidence*). {2.2, 2.3.4, 2.3.5, 2.6, 4.3.7, 4.5.2, Table 4.11}

C3.4. Most current and potential CDR measures could have significant impacts on land, energy, water, or nutrients if deployed at large scale (*high confidence*). Afforestation and bioenergy may compete with other land uses and may have significant impacts on agricultural and food systems, biodiversity and other ecosystem functions and services (*high confidence*). Effective governance is needed to limit such trade-offs and ensure permanence of carbon removal in terrestrial, geological and ocean reservoirs (*high confidence*). Feasibility and sustainability of CDR use could be enhanced by a portfolio of options deployed at substantial, but lesser scales, rather than a single option at very large scale (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.3b). {2.3.4, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, 2.6, 3.6.2, 4.3.2, 4.3.7, 4.5.2, 5.4.1, 5.4.2; Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in Chapter 3, Table 4.11, Table 5.3, Figure 5.3}

C3.5. Some AFOLU-related CDR measures such as restoration of natural ecosystems and soil carbon sequestration could provide co-benefits such as improved biodiversity, soil quality, and local

food security. If deployed at large scale, they would require governance systems enabling sustainable land management to conserve and protect land carbon stocks and other ecosystem functions and services (*medium confidence*). (Figure SPM.4) {2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.2, 2.4.4, 3.6.2, 5.4.1, Cross-Chapter Boxes 3 in Chapter 1 and 7 in Chapter 3, 4.3.2, 4.3.7, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, Table 2.4}

D. Strengthening the Global Response in the Context of Sustainable Development and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty

D1. Estimates of the global emissions outcome of current nationally stated mitigation ambitions as submitted under the Paris Agreement would lead to global greenhouse gas emissions¹⁸ in 2030 of 52–58 GtCO₂eq yr⁻¹ (*medium confidence*). Pathways reflecting these ambitions would not limit global warming to 1.5°C, even if supplemented by very challenging increases in the scale and ambition of emissions reductions after 2030 (*high confidence*). Avoiding overshoot and reliance on future large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) can only be achieved if global CO₂ emissions start to decline well before 2030 (*high confidence*). {1.2, 2.3, 3.3, 3.4, 4.2, 4.4, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}

D1.1. Pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot show clear emission reductions by 2030 (*high confidence*). All but one show a decline in global greenhouse gas emissions to below 35 GtCO₂eq yr⁻¹ in 2030, and half of available pathways fall within the 25–30 GtCO₂eq yr⁻¹ range (interquartile range), a 40–50% reduction from 2010 levels (*high confidence*). Pathways reflecting current nationally stated mitigation ambition until 2030 are broadly consistent with cost-effective pathways that result in a global warming of about 3°C by 2100, with warming continuing afterwards (*medium confidence*). {2.3.3, 2.3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4, 5.5.3.2}

D1.2. Overshoot trajectories result in higher impacts and associated challenges compared to pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (*high confidence*). Reversing warming after an overshoot of 0.2°C or larger during this century would require upscaling and deployment of CDR at rates and volumes that might not be achievable given considerable implementation challenges (*medium confidence*). {1.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, 3.3, 4.3.7, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}

D1.3. The lower the emissions in 2030, the lower the challenge in limiting global warming to 1.5°C after 2030 with no or limited overshoot (*high confidence*). The challenges from delayed actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions include the risk of cost escalation, lock-in in carbon-emitting infrastructure, stranded assets, and reduced flexibility in future response options in the medium to long-term (*high confidence*). These may increase uneven distributional impacts between countries at different stages of development (*medium confidence*). {2.3.5, 4.4.5, 5.4.2}

D2. The avoided climate change impacts on sustainable development, eradication of poverty and reducing inequalities would be greater if global warming were limited to 1.5°C rather than 2°C, if mitigation and adaptation synergies are maximized while trade-offs are minimized (*high confidence*). {1.1, 1.4, 2.5, 3.3, 3.4, 5.2, Table 5.1}

¹⁸ GHG emissions have been aggregated with 100-year GWP values as introduced in the IPCC Second Assessment Report

D2.1. Climate change impacts and responses are closely linked to sustainable development which balances social well-being, economic prosperity and environmental protection. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, provide an established framework for assessing the links between global warming of 1.5°C or 2°C and development goals that include poverty eradication, reducing inequalities, and climate action (*high confidence*) {Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1, 1.4, 5.1}

D2.2. The consideration of ethics and equity can help address the uneven distribution of adverse impacts associated with 1.5°C and higher levels of global warming, as well as those from mitigation and adaptation, particularly for poor and disadvantaged populations, in all societies (*high confidence*). {1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.4.3, 2.5.3, 3.4.10, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1, Cross-Chapter Boxes 6 and 8 in Chapter 3, and Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5}

D2.3. Mitigation and adaptation consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C are underpinned by enabling conditions, assessed in SR1.5 across the geophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional dimensions of feasibility. Strengthened multi-level governance, institutional capacity, policy instruments, technological innovation and transfer and mobilization of finance, and changes in human behaviour and lifestyles are enabling conditions that enhance the feasibility of mitigation and adaptation options for 1.5°C consistent systems transitions. (*high confidence*) {1.4, Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1, 4.4, 4.5, 5.6}

D3. Adaptation options specific to national contexts, if carefully selected together with enabling conditions, will have benefits for sustainable development and poverty reduction with global warming of 1.5°C, although trade-offs are possible (*high confidence*). {1.4, 4.3, 4.5}

D3.1. Adaptation options that reduce the vulnerability of human and natural systems have many synergies with sustainable development, if well managed, such as ensuring food and water security, reducing disaster risks, improving health conditions, maintaining ecosystem services and reducing poverty and inequality (*high confidence*). Increasing investment in physical and social infrastructure is a key enabling condition to enhance the resilience and the adaptive capacities of societies. These benefits can occur in most regions with adaptation to 1.5°C of global warming (*high confidence*). {1.4.3, 4.2.2, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.5.3, 5.3.1, 5.3.2}

D3.2. Adaptation to 1.5°C global warming can also result in trade-offs or maladaptations with adverse impacts for sustainable development. For example, if poorly designed or implemented, adaptation projects in a range of sectors can increase greenhouse gas emissions and water use, increase gender and social inequality, undermine health conditions, and encroach on natural ecosystems (*high confidence*). These trade-offs can be reduced by adaptations that include attention to poverty and sustainable development (*high confidence*). {4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.5.4, 5.3.2; Cross-Chapter Boxes 6 and 7 in Chapter 3}

D3.3. A mix of adaptation and mitigation options to limit global warming to 1.5°C, implemented in a participatory and integrated manner, can enable rapid, systemic transitions in urban and rural areas (*high confidence*). These are most effective when aligned with economic and sustainable development, and when local and regional governments and decision makers are supported by national governments (*medium confidence*) {4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.2}

D3.4. Adaptation options that also mitigate emissions can provide synergies and cost savings in most sectors and system transitions, such as when land management reduces emissions and disaster

risk, or when low carbon buildings are also designed for efficient cooling. Trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation, when limiting global warming to 1.5°C, such as when bioenergy crops, reforestation or afforestation encroach on land needed for agricultural adaptation, can undermine food security, livelihoods, ecosystem functions and services and other aspects of sustainable development. (*high confidence*) {3.4.3, 4.3.2, 4.3.4, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.4}

D4. Mitigation options consistent with 1.5°C pathways are associated with multiple synergies and trade-offs across the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). While the total number of possible synergies exceeds the number of trade-offs, their net effect will depend on the pace and magnitude of changes, the composition of the mitigation portfolio and the management of the transition. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.4) {2.5, 4.5, 5.4}

D4.1. 1.5°C pathways have robust synergies particularly for the SDGs 3 (health), 7 (clean energy), 11 (cities and communities), 12 (responsible consumption and production), and 14 (oceans) (*very high confidence*). Some 1.5°C pathways show potential trade-offs with mitigation for SDGs 1 (poverty), 2 (hunger), 6 (water), and 7 (energy access), if not carefully managed (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.4). {5.4.2; Figure 5.4, Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in Chapter 3}

D4.2. 1.5°C pathways that include low energy demand (e.g., see P1 in Figure SPM.3a and SPM.3b), low material consumption, and low GHG-intensive food consumption have the most pronounced synergies and the lowest number of trade-offs with respect to sustainable development and the SDGs (*high confidence*). Such pathways would reduce dependence on CDR. In modelled pathways sustainable development, eradicating poverty and reducing inequality can support limiting warming to 1.5°C. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.3b, Figure SPM.4) {2.4.3, 2.5.1, 2.5.3, Figure 2.4, Figure 2.28, 5.4.1, 5.4.2, Figure 5.4}

D4.3. 1.5°C and 2°C modelled pathways often rely on the deployment of large-scale land-related measures like afforestation and bioenergy supply, which, if poorly managed, can compete with food production and hence raise food security concerns (*high confidence*). The impacts of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) options on SDGs depend on the type of options and the scale of deployment (*high confidence*). If poorly implemented, CDR options such as BECCS and AFOLU options would lead to trade-offs. Context-relevant design and implementation requires considering people's needs, biodiversity, and other sustainable development dimensions (*very high confidence*). {Figure SPM.4, 5.4.1.3, Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3}

D4.4. Mitigation consistent with 1.5°C pathways creates risks for sustainable development in regions with high dependency on fossil fuels for revenue and employment generation (*high confidence*). Policies that promote diversification of the economy and the energy sector can address the associated challenges (*high confidence*). {5.4.1.2, Box 5.2}

D4.5. Redistributive policies across sectors and populations that shield the poor and vulnerable can resolve trade-offs for a range of SDGs, particularly hunger, poverty and energy access. Investment needs for such complementary policies are only a small fraction of the overall mitigation investments in 1.5°C pathways. (*high confidence*) {2.4.3, 5.4.2, Figure 5.5}

Indicative linkages between mitigation options and sustainable development using SDGs (The linkages do not show costs and benefits)

Mitigation options deployed in each sector can be associated with potential positive effects (synergies) or negative effects (trade-offs) with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The degree to which this potential is realized will depend on the selected portfolio of mitigation options, mitigation policy design, and local circumstances and context. Particularly in the energy-demand sector, the potential for synergies is larger than for trade-offs. The bars group individually assessed options by level of confidence and take into account the relative strength of the assessed mitigation-SDG connections.

Length shows strength of connection

Shades show level of confidence





Figure SPM.4: Potential synergies and trade-offs between the sectoral portfolio of climate change mitigation options and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs serve as an analytical framework for the assessment of the different sustainable development dimensions, which extend beyond the time frame of the 2030 SDG targets. The assessment is based on literature on mitigation options that are considered relevant for 1.5°C. The assessed strength of the SDG interactions is based on the qualitative and quantitative assessment of individual mitigation options listed in Table 5.2. For each mitigation option, the strength of the SDG-connection as well as the associated confidence of the underlying literature (shades of green and red) was assessed. The strength of positive connections (synergies) and negative connections (trade-offs) across all individual options within a sector (see Table 5.2) are aggregated into sectoral potentials for the whole mitigation portfolio. The (white) areas outside the bars, which indicate no interactions, have *low confidence* due to the uncertainty and limited number of studies exploring indirect effects. The strength of the connection considers only the effect of mitigation and does not include benefits of avoided impacts. SDG 13 (climate action) is not listed because mitigation is being considered in terms of interactions with SDGs and not vice versa. The bars denote the strength of the connection, and do not consider the strength of the impact on the SDGs. The energy demand sector comprises behavioural responses, fuel switching and efficiency options in the transport, industry and building sector as well as carbon capture options in the industry sector. Options assessed in the energy supply sector comprise biomass and non-biomass renewables, nuclear, CCS with bio-energy, and CCS with fossil fuels. Options in the land sector comprise agricultural and forest options, sustainable diets & reduced food waste, soil sequestration, livestock & manure management, reduced deforestation, afforestation & reforestation, responsible sourcing. In addition to this figure, options in the ocean sector are discussed in the underlying report. {5.4, Table 5.2, Figure 5.2}

Statement for knowledge gap:

Information about the net impacts of mitigation on sustainable development in 1.5°C pathways is available only for a limited number of SDGs and mitigation options. Only a limited number of studies have assessed the benefits of avoided climate change impacts of 1.5°C pathways for the SDGs, and the co-effects of adaptation for mitigation and the SDGs. The assessment of the indicative mitigation potentials in Figure SPM.4 is a step further from AR5 towards a more comprehensive and integrated assessment in the future.

D5. Limiting the risks from global warming of 1.5°C in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication implies system transitions that can be enabled by an increase of adaptation and mitigation investments, policy instruments, the acceleration of technological innovation and behaviour changes (*high confidence*). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.2, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6}

D5.1. Directing finance towards investment in infrastructure for mitigation and adaptation could provide additional resources. This could involve the mobilization of private funds by institutional investors, asset managers and development or investment banks, as well as the provision of public funds. Government policies that lower the risk of low-emission and adaptation investments can facilitate the mobilization of private funds and enhance the effectiveness of other public policies. Studies indicate a number of challenges including access to finance and mobilisation of funds (*high confidence*) {2.5.2, 4.4.5}

D5.2. Adaptation finance consistent with global warming of 1.5°C is difficult to quantify and compare with 2°C. Knowledge gaps include insufficient data to calculate specific climate resilience-enhancing investments, from the provision of currently underinvested basic infrastructure. Estimates of the costs of adaptation might be lower at global warming of 1.5°C than for 2°C. Adaptation needs have typically been supported by public sector sources such as national and subnational government budgets, and in developing countries together with support from development assistance, multilateral development banks, and UNFCCC channels (*medium confidence*). More recently there is a growing understanding of the scale and increase in NGO and private funding in some regions (*medium confidence*). Barriers include the scale of adaptation financing, limited capacity and access to adaptation finance (*medium confidence*). {4.4.5, 4.6}

D5.3. Global model pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C are projected to involve the annual average investment needs in the energy system of around 2.4 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ between 2016 and 2035 representing about 2.5% of the world GDP (*medium confidence*). {2.5.2, 4.4.5, Box 4.8}

D5.4. Policy tools can help mobilise incremental resources, including through shifting global investments and savings and through market and non-market based instruments as well as accompanying measures to secure the equity of the transition, acknowledging the challenges related with implementation including those of energy costs, depreciation of assets and impacts on international competition, and utilizing the opportunities to maximize co-benefits (*high confidence*) {1.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3 and 11 in Chapter 4, 4.4.5, 5.5.2}

D5.5. The systems transitions consistent with adapting to and limiting global warming to 1.5°C include the widespread adoption of new and possibly disruptive technologies and practices and enhanced climate-driven innovation. These imply enhanced technological innovation capabilities, including in industry and finance. Both national innovation policies and international cooperation can contribute to the development, commercialization and widespread adoption of mitigation and adaptation technologies. Innovation policies may be more effective when they combine public support for research and development with policy mixes that provide incentives for technology diffusion. (*high confidence*) {4.4.4, 4.4.5}.

D5.6. Education, information, and community approaches, including those that are informed by Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge, can accelerate the wide scale behaviour changes consistent with adapting to and limiting global warming to 1.5°C. These approaches are more

effective when combined with other policies and tailored to the motivations, capabilities, and resources of specific actors and contexts (*high confidence*). Public acceptability can enable or inhibit the implementation of policies and measures to limit global warming to 1.5°C and to adapt to the consequences. Public acceptability depends on the individual’s evaluation of expected policy consequences, the perceived fairness of the distribution of these consequences, and perceived fairness of decision procedures (*high confidence*). {1.1, 1.5, 4.3.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, Box 4.3, 5.5.3, 5.6.5}

D6. Sustainable development supports, and often enables, the fundamental societal and systems transitions and transformations that help limit global warming to 1.5°C. Such changes facilitate the pursuit of climate-resilient development pathways that achieve ambitious mitigation and adaptation in conjunction with poverty eradication and efforts to reduce inequalities (*high confidence*). {Box 1.1, 1.4.3, Figure 5.1, 5.5.3, Box 5.3}

D6.1. Social justice and equity are core aspects of climate-resilient development pathways that aim to limit global warming to 1.5°C as they address challenges and inevitable trade-offs, widen opportunities, and ensure that options, visions, and values are deliberated, between and within countries and communities, without making the poor and disadvantaged worse off (*high confidence*). {5.5.2, 5.5.3, Box 5.3, Figure 5.1, Figure 5.6, Cross-Chapter Boxes 12 and 13 in Chapter 5}

D6.2. The potential for climate-resilient development pathways differs between and within regions and nations, due to different development contexts and systemic vulnerabilities (*very high confidence*). Efforts along such pathways to date have been limited (*medium confidence*) and enhanced efforts would involve strengthened and timely action from all countries and non-state actors (*high confidence*). {5.5.1, 5.5.3, Figure 5.1}

D6.3. Pathways that are consistent with sustainable development show fewer mitigation and adaptation challenges and are associated with lower mitigation costs. The large majority of modelling studies could not construct pathways characterized by lack of international cooperation, inequality and poverty that were able to limit global warming to 1.5°C. (*high confidence*) {2.3.1, 2.5.3, 5.5.2}

D7. Strengthening the capacities for climate action of national and sub-national authorities, civil society, the private sector, indigenous peoples and local communities can support the implementation of ambitious actions implied by limiting global warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). International cooperation can provide an enabling environment for this to be achieved in all countries and for all people, in the context of sustainable development. International cooperation is a critical enabler for developing countries and vulnerable regions (*high confidence*). {1.4, 2.3, 2.5, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5, Box 4.1, Box 4.2, Box 4.7, Box 5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in Chapter 5}

D7.1. Partnerships involving non-state public and private actors, institutional investors, the banking system, civil society and scientific institutions would facilitate actions and responses consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C (*very high confidence*). {1.4, 4.4.1, 4.2.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.5, 4.5.3, 5.4.1, 5.6.2, Box 5.3}.

D7.2. Cooperation on strengthened accountable multilevel governance that includes non-state actors such as industry, civil society and scientific institutions, coordinated sectoral and cross-sectoral

policies at various governance levels, gender-sensitive policies, finance including innovative financing and cooperation on technology development and transfer can ensure participation, transparency, capacity building, and learning among different players (*high confidence*). {2.5.2, 4.2.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, 5.3.1, 4.4.5, 5.5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in Chapter 5, 5.6.1, 5.6.3}

D7.3. International cooperation is a critical enabler for developing countries and vulnerable regions to strengthen their action for the implementation of 1.5°C-consistent climate responses, including through enhancing access to finance and technology and enhancing domestic capacities, taking into account national and local circumstances and needs (*high confidence*). {2.3.1, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 5.4.1 5.5.3, 5.6.1, Box 4.1, Box 4.2, Box 4.7}.

D7.4. Collective efforts at all levels, in ways that reflect different circumstances and capabilities, in the pursuit of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, taking into account equity as well as effectiveness, can facilitate strengthening the global response to climate change, achieving sustainable development and eradicating poverty (*high confidence*). {1.4.2, 2.3.1, 2.5.2, 4.2.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.5.3, 5.3.1, 5.4.1, 5.5.3, 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3}

Box SPM 1: Core Concepts Central to this Special Report

Global mean surface temperature (GMST): Estimated global average of near-surface air temperatures over land and sea-ice, and sea surface temperatures over ice-free ocean regions, with changes normally expressed as departures from a value over a specified reference period. When estimating changes in GMST, near-surface air temperature over both land and oceans are also used.¹⁹ {1.2.1.1}

Pre-industrial: The multi-century period prior to the onset of large-scale industrial activity around 1750. The reference period 1850–1900 is used to approximate pre-industrial GMST. {1.2.1.2}

Global warming: The estimated increase in GMST averaged over a 30-year period, or the 30-year period centered on a particular year or decade, expressed relative to pre-industrial levels unless otherwise specified. For 30-year periods that span past and future years, the current multi-decadal warming trend is assumed to continue. {1.2.1}

Net zero CO₂ emissions: Net-zero carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions are achieved when anthropogenic CO₂ emissions are balanced globally by anthropogenic CO₂ removals over a specified period.

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR): Anthropogenic activities removing CO₂ from the atmosphere and durably storing it in geological, terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in products. It includes existing and potential anthropogenic enhancement of biological or geochemical sinks and direct air capture and storage, but excludes natural CO₂ uptake not directly caused by human activities.

Total carbon budget: Estimated cumulative net global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions from the preindustrial period to the time that anthropogenic CO₂ emissions reach net zero that would result, at some probability, in limiting global warming to a given level, accounting for the impact of other anthropogenic emissions. {2.2.2}

Remaining carbon budget: Estimated cumulative net global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions from a given start date to the time that anthropogenic CO₂ emissions reach net zero that would result, at some probability, in limiting global warming to a given level, accounting for the impact of other anthropogenic emissions. {2.2.2}

Temperature overshoot: The temporary exceedance of a specified level of global warming.

Emission pathways: In this Summary for Policymakers, the modelled trajectories of global anthropogenic emissions over the 21st century are termed emission pathways. Emission pathways are classified by their temperature trajectory over the 21st century: pathways giving at least 50% probability based on current knowledge of limiting global warming to below 1.5°C are classified as ‘no overshoot’; those limiting warming to below 1.6°C and returning to 1.5°C by 2100 are classified as ‘1.5°C limited-overshoot’; while those exceeding 1.6°C but still returning to 1.5°C by 2100 are classified as ‘higher-overshoot’.

¹⁹ Past IPCC reports, reflecting the literature, have used a variety of approximately equivalent metrics of GMST change.

Impacts: Effects of climate change on human and natural systems. Impacts can have beneficial or adverse outcomes for livelihoods, health and well-being, ecosystems and species, services, infrastructure, and economic, social and cultural assets.

Risk: The potential for adverse consequences from a climate-related hazard for human and natural systems, resulting from the interactions between the hazard and the vulnerability and exposure of the affected system. Risk integrates the likelihood of exposure to a hazard and the magnitude of its impact. Risk also can describe the potential for adverse consequences of adaptation or mitigation responses to climate change.

Climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs): Trajectories that strengthen sustainable development at multiple scales and efforts to eradicate poverty through equitable societal and systems transitions and transformations while reducing the threat of climate change through ambitious mitigation, adaptation, and climate resilience.

Global Warming of 1.5 °C an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty

Headline Statements

A. Understanding Global Warming of 1.5°C

A1. Human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels, with a likely range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C. Global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate (*high confidence*).

A2. Warming from anthropogenic emissions from the pre-industrial period to the present will persist for centuries to millennia and will continue to cause further long-term changes in the climate system, such as sea level rise, with associated impacts (*high confidence*), but these emissions alone are unlikely to cause global warming of 1.5°C (*medium confidence*).

A3. Climate-related risks for natural and human systems are higher for global warming of 1.5°C than at present, but lower than at 2°C (*high confidence*). These risks depend on the magnitude and rate of warming, geographic location, levels of development and vulnerability, and on the choices and implementation of adaptation and mitigation options (*high confidence*).

B. Projected Climate Change, Potential Impacts and Associated Risks

B1. Climate models project robust differences in regional climate characteristics between present-day and global warming of 1.5°C, and between 1.5°C and 2°C. These differences include increases in: mean temperature in most land and ocean regions (*high confidence*), hot extremes in most inhabited regions (*high confidence*), heavy precipitation in several regions (*medium confidence*), and the probability of drought and precipitation deficits in some regions (*medium confidence*).

B2. By 2100, global mean sea level rise is projected to be around 0.1 metre lower with global warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C (*medium confidence*). Sea level will continue to rise well beyond 2100 (*high confidence*), and the magnitude and rate of this rise depends on future emission pathways. A slower rate of sea level rise enables greater opportunities for adaptation in the human and ecological systems of small islands, low-lying coastal areas and deltas (*medium confidence*).

B3. On land, impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems, including species loss and extinction, are projected to be lower at 1.5°C of global warming compared to 2°C. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C is projected to lower the impacts on terrestrial, freshwater, and coastal ecosystems and to retain more of their services to humans (*high confidence*).

B4. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C is projected to reduce increases in ocean temperature as well as associated increases in ocean acidity and decreases in ocean oxygen levels (*high confidence*). Consequently, limiting global

warming to 1.5°C is projected to reduce risks to marine biodiversity, fisheries, and ecosystems, and their functions and services to humans, as illustrated by recent changes to Arctic sea ice and warm water coral reef ecosystems (*high confidence*).

B5. Climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security, and economic growth are projected to increase with global warming of 1.5°C and increase further with 2°C.

B6. Most adaptation needs will be lower for global warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C (*high confidence*). There are a wide range of adaptation options that can reduce the risks of climate change (*high confidence*). There are limits to adaptation and adaptive capacity for some human and natural systems at global warming of 1.5°C, with associated losses (*medium confidence*). The number and availability of adaptation options vary by sector (*medium confidence*).

C. Emission Pathways and System Transitions Consistent with 1.5°C Global Warming

C1. In model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic CO₂ emissions decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 (40–60% interquartile range), reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range). For limiting global warming to below 2°C, CO₂ emissions are projected to decline by about 20% by 2030 in most pathways (10–30% interquartile range) and reach net zero around 2075 (2065–2080 interquartile range). Non-CO₂ emissions in pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C show deep reductions that are similar to those in pathways limiting warming to 2°C (*high confidence*).

C2. Pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems (*high confidence*). These systems transitions are unprecedented in terms of scale, but not necessarily in terms of speed, and imply deep emissions reductions in all sectors, a wide portfolio of mitigation options and a significant upscaling of investments in those options (*medium confidence*).

C3. All pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot project the use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) on the order of 100–1000 GtCO₂ over the 21st century. CDR would be used to compensate for residual emissions and, in most cases, achieve net negative emissions to return global warming to 1.5°C following a peak (*high confidence*). CDR deployment of several hundreds of GtCO₂ is subject to multiple feasibility and sustainability constraints (*high confidence*). Significant near-term emissions reductions and measures to lower energy and land demand can limit CDR deployment to a few hundred GtCO₂ without reliance on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) (*high confidence*).

D. Strengthening the Global Response in the Context of Sustainable Development and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty

D1. Estimates of the global emissions outcome of current nationally stated mitigation ambitions as submitted under the Paris Agreement would lead to global greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 of 52–58 GtCO₂eq yr⁻¹ (*medium confidence*). Pathways

reflecting these ambitions would not limit global warming to 1.5°C, even if supplemented by very challenging increases in the scale and ambition of emissions reductions after 2030 (*high confidence*). Avoiding overshoot and reliance on future largescale deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) can only be achieved if global CO₂ emissions start to decline well before 2030 (*high confidence*).

D2. The avoided climate change impacts on sustainable development, eradication of poverty and reducing inequalities would be greater if global warming were limited to 1.5°C rather than 2°C, if mitigation and adaptation synergies are maximized while trade-offs are minimized (*high confidence*).

D3. Adaptation options specific to national contexts, if carefully selected together with enabling conditions, will have benefits for sustainable development and poverty reduction with global warming of 1.5°C, although trade-offs are possible (*high confidence*).

D4. Mitigation options consistent with 1.5°C pathways are associated with multiple synergies and trade-offs across the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). While the total number of possible synergies exceeds the number of trade-offs, their net effect will depend on the pace and magnitude of changes, the composition of the mitigation portfolio and the management of the transition (*high confidence*).

D5. Limiting the risks from global warming of 1.5°C in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication implies system transitions that can be enabled by an increase of adaptation and mitigation investments, policy instruments, the acceleration of technological innovation and behaviour changes (*high confidence*).

D6. Sustainable development supports, and often enables, the fundamental societal and systems transitions and transformations that help limit global warming to 1.5°C. Such changes facilitate the pursuit of climate-resilient development pathways that achieve ambitious mitigation and adaptation in conjunction with poverty eradication and efforts to reduce inequalities (*high confidence*).

D7. Strengthening the capacities for climate action of national and sub-national authorities, civil society, the private sector, indigenous peoples and local communities can support the implementation of ambitious actions implied by limiting global warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). International cooperation can provide an enabling environment for this to be achieved in all countries and for all people, in the context of sustainable development. International cooperation is a critical enabler for developing countries and vulnerable regions (*high confidence*).

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TS1: Framing and Context

This chapter frames the context, knowledge-base and assessment approaches used to understand the impacts of 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, building on the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.

Human-induced warming reached approximately 1°C ($\pm 0.2^\circ\text{C}$ likely range) above pre-industrial levels in 2017, increasing at 0.2°C ($\pm 0.1^\circ\text{C}$) per decade (*high confidence*). Global warming is defined in this report as an increase in combined surface air and sea surface temperatures averaged over the globe and a 30-year period. Unless otherwise specified, warming is expressed relative to the period 1850-1900, used as an approximation of pre-industrial temperatures in AR5. For periods shorter than 30 years, warming refers to the estimated average temperature over the 30 years centered on that shorter period, accounting for the impact of any temperature fluctuations or trend within those 30 years. Accordingly, warming up to the decade 2006-2015 is assessed at 0.87°C ($\pm 0.12^\circ\text{C}$ likely range). Since 2000, the estimated level of human-induced warming has been equal to the level of observed warming with a likely range of $\pm 20\%$ accounting for uncertainty due to contributions from solar and volcanic activity over the historical period (*high confidence*). {1.2.1}

Warming greater than the global average has already been experienced in many regions and seasons, with average warming over land higher than over the ocean (*high confidence*). Most land regions are experiencing greater warming than the global average, while most ocean regions are warming at a slower rate. Depending on the temperature dataset considered, 20-40% of the global human population live in regions that, by the decade 2006-2015, had already experienced warming of more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial in at least one season (*medium confidence*). {1.2.1 & 1.2.2}

Past emissions alone are unlikely to raise global-mean temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels but past emissions do commit to other changes, such as further sea level rise (*high confidence*). If all anthropogenic emissions (including aerosol-related) were reduced to zero immediately, any further warming beyond the 1°C already experienced would likely be less than 0.5°C over the next two to three decades (*high confidence*), and likely less than 0.5°C on a century timescale (*medium confidence*), due to the opposing effects of different climate processes and drivers. A warming greater than 1.5°C is therefore not geophysically unavoidable: whether it will occur depends on future rates of emission reductions. {1.2.3, 1.2.4}

1.5°C-consistent emission pathways are defined as those that, given current knowledge of the climate response, provide a one-in-two to two-in-three chance of warming either remaining below 1.5°C, or returning to 1.5°C by around 2100 following an overshoot. Overshoot pathways are characterized by the peak magnitude of the overshoot, which may have implications for impacts. All 1.5°C-consistent pathways involve limiting cumulative emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide, and substantial reductions in other climate forcers (*high confidence*). Limiting cumulative emissions requires either reducing net global emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases to zero before the cumulative limit is reached, or net negative global emissions (anthropogenic removals) after the limit is exceeded. {1.2.3, 1.2.4, Cross-Chapter Boxes 1 and 2}

This report assesses projected impacts at a global average warming of 1.5°C and higher levels of warming. Global warming of 1.5°C is associated with global average surface temperatures fluctuating naturally on either side of 1.5°C, together with warming substantially greater than 1.5°C in

many regions and seasons (*high confidence*), all of which must be taken into account in the assessment of impacts. Impacts at 1.5°C of warming also depend on the emission pathway to 1.5°C. Very different impacts result from pathways that remain below 1.5°C versus pathways that return to 1.5°C after a substantial overshoot, and when temperatures stabilize at 1.5°C versus a transient warming past 1.5°C. (*medium confidence*) {1.2.3, 1.3}

Ethical considerations, and the principle of equity in particular, are central to this report, recognising that many of the impacts of warming up to and beyond 1.5°C, and some potential impacts of mitigation actions required to limit warming to 1.5°C, fall disproportionately on the poor and vulnerable (*high confidence*). Equity has procedural and distributive dimensions and requires fairness in burden sharing, between generations, and between and within nations. In framing the objective of holding the increase in the global average temperature rise to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C, the Paris Agreement associates the principle of equity with the broader goals of poverty eradication and sustainable development, recognising that effective responses to climate change require a global collective effort that may be guided by the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. {1.1.1}

Climate adaptation refers to the actions taken to manage impacts of climate change by reducing vulnerability and exposure to its harmful effects and exploiting any potential benefits.

Adaptation takes place at international, national and local levels. Subnational jurisdictions and entities, including urban and rural municipalities, are key to developing and reinforcing measures for reducing weather- and climate-related risks. Adaptation implementation faces several barriers including unavailability of up-to-date and locally-relevant information, lack of finance and technology, social values and attitudes, and institutional constraints (*high confidence*). Adaptation is more likely to contribute to sustainable development when policies align with mitigation and poverty eradication goals (*medium confidence*) {1.1, 1.4}

Ambitious mitigation actions are indispensable to limit warming to 1.5°C while achieving sustainable development and poverty eradication (*high confidence*). Ill-designed responses, however, could pose challenges especially—but not exclusively—for countries and regions contending with poverty and those requiring significant transformation of their energy systems. This report focuses on ‘climate-resilient development pathways’, which aim to meet the goals of sustainable development, including climate adaptation and mitigation, poverty eradication and reducing inequalities. But any feasible pathway that remains within 1.5°C involves synergies and trade-offs (*high confidence*). Significant uncertainty remains as to which pathways are more consistent with the principle of equity. {1.1.1, 1.4}

Multiple forms of knowledge, including scientific evidence, narrative scenarios and prospective pathways, inform the understanding of 1.5°C. This report is informed by traditional evidence of the physical climate system and associated impacts and vulnerabilities of climate change, together with knowledge drawn from the perceptions of risk and the experiences of climate impacts and governance systems. Scenarios and pathways are used to explore conditions enabling goal-oriented futures while recognizing the significance of ethical considerations, the principle of equity, and the societal transformation needed. {1.2.3, 1.5.2}

There is no single answer to the question of whether it is feasible to limit warming to 1.5°C and adapt to the consequences. Feasibility is considered in this report as the capacity of a system as a whole to achieve a specific outcome. The global transformation that would be needed to limit warming to 1.5°C requires enabling conditions that reflect the links, synergies and trade-offs between mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development. These enabling conditions have many systemic dimensions—geophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional—that may be considered through the unifying lens of the Anthropocene, acknowledging

profound, differential but increasingly geologically significant human influences on the Earth system as a whole. This framing also emphasises the global interconnectivity of past, present and future human–environment relations, highlighting the need and opportunities for integrated responses to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. {1.1, Cross-Chapter Box 1}

TS2: Mitigation pathways compatible with 1.5°C in the context of sustainable development

This chapter assesses mitigation pathways consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. In doing so, it explores the following key questions: What role do CO₂ and non-CO₂ emissions play? {2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6} To what extent do 1.5°C pathways involve overshooting and returning below 1.5°C during the 21st century? {2.2, 2.3} What are the implications for transitions in energy, land use and sustainable development? {2.3, 2.4, 2.5} How do policy frameworks affect the ability to limit warming to 1.5°C? {2.3, 2.5} What are the associated knowledge gaps? {2.6}

The assessed pathways describe integrated, quantitative evolutions of all emissions over the 21st century associated with global energy and land use, and the world economy. The assessment is contingent upon available integrated assessment literature and model assumptions, and is complemented by other studies with different scope, for example those focusing on individual sectors. In recent years, integrated mitigation studies have improved the characterizations of mitigation pathways. However, limitations remain, as climate damages, avoided impacts, or societal co-benefits of the modelled transformations remain largely unaccounted for, while concurrent rapid technological changes, behavioural aspects, and uncertainties about input data present continuous challenges. (*high confidence*) {2.1.3, 2.3, 2.5.1, 2.6, Technical Annex 2}

The chances of limiting warming to 1.5°C and the requirements for urgent action

1.5°C-consistent pathways can be identified under a range of assumptions about economic growth, technology developments and lifestyles. However, lack of global cooperation, lack of governance of the energy and land transformation, and growing resource-intensive consumption are key impediments for achieving 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Governance challenges have been related to scenarios with high inequality and high population growth in the 1.5°C pathway literature. {2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.5}

Under emissions in line with current pledges under the Paris Agreement (known as Nationally-Determined Contributions or NDCs), global warming is expected to surpass 1.5°C, even if they are supplemented with very challenging increases in the scale and ambition of mitigation after 2030 (*high confidence*). This increased action would need to achieve net zero CO₂ emissions in less than 15 years. Even if this is achieved, temperatures remaining below 1.5°C would depend on the geophysical response being towards the low end of the currently-estimated uncertainty range. Transition challenges as well as identified trade-offs can be reduced if global emissions peak before 2030 and already achieve marked emissions reductions by 2030 compared to today.¹ {2.2, 2.3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}

Limiting warming to 1.5°C depends on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over the next decades, where lower GHG emissions in 2030 lead to a higher chance of peak warming being kept to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). Available pathways that aim for no or limited (0–0.2°C) overshoot of 1.5°C keep GHG emissions in 2030 to 25–30 GtCO_{2e} yr⁻¹ in 2030 (interquartile range). This contrasts with median estimates for current NDCs of 50–58 GtCO_{2e} yr⁻¹ in 2030. Pathways that aim for limiting

¹ FOOTNOTE: Kyoto-GHG emissions in this statement are aggregated with GWP-100 values of the IPCC Second Assessment Report.

warming to 1.5°C by 2100 after a temporary temperature overshoot rely on large-scale deployment of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) measures, which are uncertain and entail clear risks. {2.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.5, 2.5.3, Cross-Chapter Boxes 6 in Chapter 3 and 9 in Chapter 4, 4.3.7}

Limiting warming to 1.5°C implies reaching net zero CO₂ emissions globally around 2050 and concurrent deep reductions in emissions of non-CO₂ forcers, particularly methane (*high confidence*). Such mitigation pathways are characterized by energy-demand reductions, decarbonisation of electricity and other fuels, electrification of energy end use, deep reductions in agricultural emissions, and some form of CDR with carbon storage on land or sequestration in geological reservoirs. Low energy demand and low demand for land- and GHG-intensive consumption goods facilitate limiting warming to as close as possible to 1.5°C. {2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}.

In comparison to a 2°C limit, required transformations to limit warming to 1.5°C are qualitatively similar but more pronounced and rapid over the next decades (*high confidence*). 1.5°C implies very ambitious, internationally cooperative policy environments that transform both supply and demand (*high confidence*). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5}

Policies reflecting a high price on emissions are necessary in models to achieve cost-effective 1.5°C-consistent pathways (*high confidence*). Other things being equal, modelling suggests the price of emissions for limiting warming to 1.5°C being about three four times higher compared to 2°C, with large variations across models and socioeconomic assumptions. A price on carbon can be imposed directly by carbon pricing or implicitly by regulatory policies. Other policy instruments, like technology policies or performance standards, can complement carbon pricing in specific areas. {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.4.5}

Limiting warming to 1.5°C requires a marked shift in investment patterns (*limited evidence, high agreement*). Investments in low-carbon energy technologies and energy efficiency would need to approximately double in the next 20 years, while investment in fossil-fuel extraction and conversion decrease by about a quarter. Uncertainties and strategic mitigation portfolio choices affect the magnitude and focus of required investments. {2.5.2}

Future emissions in 1.5°C-consistent pathways

Mitigation requirements can be quantified using carbon budget approaches that relate cumulative CO₂ emissions to global-mean temperature increase. Robust physical understanding underpins this relationship, but uncertainties become increasingly relevant as a specific temperature limit is approached. These uncertainties relate to the transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE), non-CO₂ emissions, radiative forcing and response, potential additional Earth-system feedbacks (such as permafrost thawing), and historical emissions and temperature. {2.2.2, 2.6.1}

Cumulative CO₂ emissions are kept within a budget by reducing global annual CO₂ emissions to net-zero. This assessment suggests a remaining budget for limiting warming to 1.5°C with a two-thirds chance of about 550 GtCO₂, and of about 750 GtCO₂ for an even chance (*medium confidence*). The remaining carbon budget is defined here as cumulative CO₂ emissions from the start of 2018 until the time of net-zero global emissions. Remaining budgets applicable to 2100, would approximately be 100 GtCO₂ lower than this to account for permafrost thawing and potential methane release from wetlands in the future. These estimates come with an additional geophysical uncertainty of at least ±50%, related to non-CO₂ response and TCRE distribution. In addition, they can vary by ±250 GtCO₂ depending on non-CO₂ mitigation strategies as found in available pathways. {2.2.2,

2.6.1 }

Staying within a remaining carbon budget of 750 GtCO₂ implies that CO₂ emissions reach carbon neutrality in about 35 years, reduced to 25 years for a 550 GtCO₂ remaining carbon budget (*high confidence*). The $\pm 50\%$ geophysical uncertainty range surrounding a carbon budget translates into a variation of this timing of carbon neutrality of roughly ± 15 – 20 years. If emissions do not start declining in the next decade, the point of carbon neutrality would need to be reached at least two decades earlier to remain within the same carbon budget. {2.2.2, 2.3.5}

Non-CO₂ emissions contribute to peak warming and thus affect the remaining carbon budget. The evolution of methane and sulphur dioxide emissions strongly influences the chances of limiting warming to 1.5°C. In the near-term, a weakening of aerosol cooling would add to future warming, but can be tempered by reductions in methane emissions (*high confidence*).

Uncertainty in radiative forcing estimates (particularly aerosol) affects carbon budgets and the certainty of pathway categorizations. Some non-CO₂ forcers are emitted alongside CO₂, particularly in the energy and transport sectors, and can be largely addressed through CO₂ mitigation. Others require specific measures, for example to target agricultural N₂O and CH₄, some sources of black carbon, or hydrofluorocarbons (*high confidence*). In many cases, non-CO₂ emissions reductions are similar in 2°C pathways, indicating reductions near their assumed maximum potential by integrated assessment models. Emissions of N₂O and NH₃ increase in some pathways with strongly increased bioenergy demand. {2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.2, 2.5.3}

The role of Carbon-Dioxide Removal (CDR)

All analysed 1.5°C-consistent pathways use CDR to some extent to neutralize emissions from sources for which no mitigation measures have been identified and, in most cases, also to achieve net-negative emissions that allow temperature to return to 1.5°C following an overshoot (*high confidence*). The longer the delay in reducing CO₂ emissions towards zero, the larger the likelihood of exceeding 1.5°C, and the heavier the implied reliance on net-negative emissions after mid-century to return warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). The faster reduction of net CO₂ emissions in 1.5°C- compared to 2°C-consistent pathways is predominantly achieved by measures that result in less CO₂ being produced and emitted, and only to a smaller degree through additional CDR. Limitations on the speed, scale, and societal acceptability of CDR deployment also limit the conceivable extent of temperature overshoot. Limits to our understanding of how the carbon cycle responds to net negative emissions increase the uncertainty about the effectiveness of CDR to decline temperatures after a peak. {2.2, 2.3, 2.6, 4.3.7}

CDR deployed at scale is unproven and reliance on such technology is a major risk in the ability to limit warming to 1.5°C. CDR is needed less in pathways with particularly strong emphasis on energy efficiency and low demand. The scale and type of CDR deployment varies widely across 1.5°C-consistent pathways, with different consequences for achieving sustainable development objectives (*high confidence*). Some pathways rely more on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), while others rely more on afforestation, which are the two CDR methods most often included in integrated pathways. Trade-offs with other sustainability objectives occur predominantly through increased land, energy, water and investment demand. Bioenergy use is substantial in 1.5°C-consistent pathways with or without BECCS due to its multiple roles in decarbonizing energy use. {2.3.1, 2.5.3, 2.6, 4.3.7}

Properties of energy transitions in 1.5°C-consistent pathways

The share of primary energy from renewables increases while coal usage decreases across 1.5°C-consistent pathways (*high confidence*). By 2050, renewables (including bioenergy, hydro,

wind and solar, with direct-equivalence method) supply a share of 49–67% (interquartile range) of primary energy in 1.5°C-consistent pathways; while the share from coal decreases to 1–7% (interquartile range), with a large fraction of this coal use combined with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). From 2020 to 2050 the primary energy supplied by oil declines in most pathways (–32 to –74% interquartile range). Natural gas changes by –13% to –60% (interquartile range), but some pathways show a marked increase albeit with widespread deployment of CCS. The overall deployment of CCS varies widely across 1.5°C-consistent pathways with cumulative CO₂ stored through 2050 ranging from zero up to 460 GtCO₂ (minimum-maximum range), of which zero up to 190 GtCO₂ stored from biomass. Primary energy supplied by bioenergy ranges from 40–310 EJ yr⁻¹ in 2050 (minimum-maximum range), and nuclear from 3–120 EJ/yr (minimum-maximum range). These ranges reflect both uncertainties in technological development and strategic mitigation portfolio choices. {2.4.2}

1.5°C-consistent pathways include a rapid decline in the carbon intensity of electricity and an increase in electrification of energy end use (*high confidence*). By 2050, the carbon intensity of electricity decreases to –92 to +11 gCO₂/MJ (minimum-maximum range) from about 140 gCO₂/MJ in 2020, and electricity covers 34–71% (minimum-maximum range) of final energy across 1.5°C-consistent pathways from about 20% in 2020. By 2050, the share of electricity supplied by renewables increases to 36–97% (minimum-maximum range) across 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Pathways with higher chances of holding warming to below 1.5°C generally show a faster decline in the carbon intensity of electricity by 2030 than pathways that temporarily overshoot 1.5°C. {2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3}

Demand-side mitigation and behavioural changes

Demand-side measures are key elements of 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Lifestyle choices lowering energy demand and the land- and GHG-intensity of food consumption can further support achievement of 1.5°C-consistent pathways (*high confidence*). By 2030 and 2050, all end-use sectors (including building, transport, and industry) show marked energy demand reductions in modelled 1.5°C-consistent pathways, comparable and beyond those projected in 2°C-consistent pathways. Sectorial models support the scale of these reductions. {2.3.4, 2.4.3}

Links between 1.5°C-consistent pathways and sustainable development

Choices about mitigation portfolios for limiting warming to 1.5°C can positively or negatively impact the achievement of other societal objectives, such as sustainable development (*high confidence*). In particular, demand-side and efficiency measures, and lifestyle choices that limit energy, resource, and GHG-intensive food demand support sustainable development (*medium confidence*). Limiting warming to 1.5°C can be achieved synergistically with poverty alleviation and improved energy security and can provide large public health benefits through improved air quality, preventing millions of premature deaths. However, specific mitigation measures, such as bioenergy, may result in trade-offs that require consideration. {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3}

TS3: Impacts of 1.5°C global warming on natural and human systems

This chapter builds on findings of the AR5 and assesses new scientific evidence of changes in the climate system and the associated impacts on natural and human systems, with a specific focus on the magnitude and pattern of risks for global warming of 1.5°C above the pre-industrial period. Chapter 3 explores observed impacts and projected risks for a range of natural and human systems with a focus on how risk levels change at 1.5°C and 2°C. The chapter also revisits major categories of risk (Reasons for Concern) based on the assessment of the new knowledge available since the AR5.

1.5°C and 2°C warmer worlds

The global climate has changed relative to the preindustrial period with multiple lines of evidence that these changes have had impacts on organisms and ecosystems, as well as human systems and well-being (*high confidence*). The increase in global mean surface temperature (GMST), which reached 0.87°C in 2006-2015 relative to 1850-1900, has increased the frequency and magnitude of impacts (*high confidence*), strengthening evidence of how increasing GMST to 1.5°C or higher could impact natural and human systems (1.5°C versus 2°C) {3.3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, Cross-Chapter Boxes 6, 7 and 8 in this Chapter}.

Human-induced global warming has already caused multiple observed changes in the climate system (*high confidence*). In particular this includes increases in both land and ocean temperatures, as well as more frequent heatwaves in most land regions (*high confidence*). There is also *high confidence* that it has caused an increase in the frequency and duration of marine heatwaves. Further, there is evidence that global warming has led to an increase in the frequency, intensity and/or amount of heavy precipitation events at global scale (*medium confidence*), as well as having increased the risk of drought in the Mediterranean region (*medium confidence*) {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4}.

Changes in temperature extremes and heavy precipitation indices are detectable in observations for the 1991-2010 period compared with 1960-1979, when a global warming of approximately 0.5°C occurred (*high confidence*). The observed tendencies over that time frame are consistent with attributed changes since the mid-20th century (*high confidence*) {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3}.

There is no single ‘1.5°C warmer world’ (*high confidence*). Important aspects to consider (beside that of global temperature) are the possible occurrence of an overshoot and its associated peak warming and duration, how stabilization of global surface temperature at 1.5°C is achieved, how policies might be able to influence the resilience of human and natural systems, and the nature of the regional and sub-regional risks (*high confidence*). Overshooting poses large risks for natural and human systems, especially if the temperature at peak warming is high, because some risks may be long-lasting and irreversible, such as the loss of many ecosystems (*high confidence*). The rate of change for several types of risks may also have relevance with potentially large risks in case of a rapid rise to overshooting temperatures, even if a decrease to 1.5°C may be achieved at the end of the 21st century or later (*medium confidence*). If overshoot is to be minimized, the remaining equivalent CO₂ budget available for emissions is very small, which implies that large, immediate, and unprecedented global efforts to mitigate greenhouse gases are required (*high confidence*) {Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this Chapter; Sections 3.2 and 3.6.2}.

Substantial global differences in temperature and extreme events are expected if GMST reaches 1.5°C versus 2°C above the preindustrial period (*high confidence*). Regional surface temperature means and extremes are higher at 2°C as compared to 1.5°C for oceans (*high confidence*). Temperature means and extremes are higher at 2°C as compared to 1.5°C global warming in most land regions, and display in some regions 2-3 times greater increases when compared to GMST (*high confidence*). There are also substantial increases in temperature means and extremes at 1.5°C versus present (*high confidence*) {3.3.1, 3.3.2}.

Substantial changes in regional climate occur between 1.5°C and 2°C (*high confidence*), depending on the variable and region in question (*high confidence*). Particularly large differences are found for temperature extremes (*high confidence*). Hot extremes display the strongest warming in mid-latitudes in the warm season (with increases of up to 3°C at 1.5°C of warming, i.e. a factor of two) and at high-latitudes in the cold season (with increases of up to 4.5°C at 1.5°C of warming, i.e. a factor of three) (*high confidence*). The strongest warming of hot extremes is found in Central and Eastern North America, Central and Southern Europe, the Mediterranean region

(including Southern Europe, Northern Africa and the near-East), Western and Central Asia, and Southern Africa (*medium confidence*). The number of highly unusual hot days increase the most in the tropics, where inter-annual temperature variability is lowest; the emergence of extreme heatwaves is thus earliest in these regions, where they become already widespread at 1.5°C global warming (*high confidence*). Limiting global warming to 1.5°C instead of 2°C could result in around 420 million fewer people being frequently exposed to extreme heatwaves, and about 65 million fewer people being exposed to exceptional heatwaves, assuming constant vulnerability (*medium confidence*) {3.3.1, 3.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this Chapter}.

Limiting global warming to 1.5°C limits risks of increases in heavy precipitation events in several regions (*high confidence*). The regions with the largest increases in heavy precipitation events for 1.5°C to 2°C global warming include several high-latitude regions such as Alaska/Western Canada, Eastern Canada/Greenland/Iceland, Northern Europe, northern Asia; mountainous regions (e.g. Tibetan Plateau); as well as Eastern Asia (including China and Japan) and in Eastern North America (*medium confidence*). {3.3.3}. Tropical cyclones are projected to increase in intensity (with associated increases in heavy precipitation) although not in frequency (*low confidence, limited evidence*) {3.3.3, 3.3.6}.

Limiting global warming to 1.5°C is expected to substantially reduce the probability of drought and risks associated with water availability (i.e. water stress) in some regions (*medium confidence*). In particular, risks associated with increases in drought frequency and magnitude are substantially larger at 2°C than at 1.5°C in the Mediterranean region (including Southern Europe, Northern Africa, and the Near-East) and Southern Africa (*medium confidence*) {3.3.3, 3.3.4, Box 3.1, Box 3.2}.

Risks to natural and human systems are lower at 1.5°C than 2°C (*high confidence*). This is owing to the smaller rates and magnitudes of climate change, including reduced frequencies and intensities of temperature-related extremes. Reduced rates of change enhance the ability of natural and human systems to adapt, with substantial benefits for a range of terrestrial, wetland, coastal and ocean ecosystems (including coral reefs and wetlands), freshwater systems, as well as food production systems, human health, tourism, energy systems, and transportation {3.3.1, 3.4}.

Some regions are projected to experience multiple compound climate-related risks at 1.5°C that will increase with warming of 2°C and higher (*high confidence*). Some regions are projected to be affected by collocated and/or concomitant changes in several types of hazards. Multi-sector risks are projected to overlap spatially and temporally, creating new (and exacerbating current) hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities that will affect increasing numbers of people and regions with additional warming. Small island states and economically disadvantaged populations are particularly at risk. {Box 3.5, 3.3.1, 3.4.5.3, 3.4.5.6, 3.4.11, 3.5.4.9}.

There is *medium confidence* that a global warming of 2°C would lead to an expansion of areas with significant increases in runoff as well as those affected by flood hazard, as compared to conditions at 1.5°C global warming. A global warming of 1.5°C would also lead to an expansion of the global land area with significant increases in runoff (*medium confidence*) as well as an increase in flood hazard in some regions (*medium confidence*) when compared to present-day conditions {3.3.5}.

There is *high confidence* that the probability of a sea-ice-free Arctic Ocean during summer is substantially higher at 2°C when compared to 1.5°C. It is *very likely* that there will be at least one sea-ice-free Arctic summer out of 10 years for warming at 2°C, with the frequency decreasing to one sea-ice-free Arctic summer every 100 years at 1.5°C. There is also *high confidence* that an intermediate temperature overshoot will have no long-term consequences for Arctic sea-ice coverage and that hysteresis behaviour is not expected {3.3.8, 3.4.4.7}.

Global mean sea level rise will be around 0.1 m less by the end of the century in a 1.5°C world as compared to a 2°C warmer world (*medium confidence*). Reduced sea level rise could mean that

up to 10.4 million fewer people (based on the 2010 global population and assuming no adaptation) are exposed to the impacts of sea level globally in 2100 at 1.5°C as compared to 2°C {3.4.5.1}. A slower rate of sea level rise enables greater opportunities for adaptation (*medium confidence*) {3.4.5.7}. There is *high confidence* that sea level rise will continue beyond 2100. Instabilities exist for both the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets that could result in multi-meter rises in sea level on centennial to millennial timescales. There is medium confidence that these instabilities could be triggered under 1.5° to 2°C of global warming {3.3.9, 3.6.3}.

The ocean has absorbed about 30% of the anthropogenic carbon dioxide, resulting in ocean acidification and changes to carbonate chemistry that are unprecedented in 65 million years at least (*high confidence*). Risks have been identified for the survival, calcification, growth, development, and abundance of a broad range of taxonomic groups (i.e. from algae to fish) with substantial evidence of predictable trait-based sensitivities. Multiple lines of evidence reveal that ocean warming and acidification (corresponding to global warming of 1.5°C of global warming) is expected to impact a wide range of marine organisms, ecosystems, as well as sectors such as aquaculture and fisheries (*high confidence*) {3.3.10, 3.4.4}.

There are larger risks at 1.5°C than today for many regions and systems, with adaptation being required now and up to 1.5°C. There are, however, greater risks and effort needed for adaptation to 2°C (*high confidence*) {3.4, Box 3.4, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this Chapter}.

Future risks at 1.5°C will depend on the mitigation pathway and on the possible occurrence of a transient overshoot (*high confidence*). The impacts on natural and human systems would be greater where mitigation pathways temporarily overshoot 1.5°C and return to 1.5°C later in the century, as compared to pathways that stabilize at 1.5°C without an overshoot. The size and duration of an overshoot will also affect future impacts (e.g. loss of ecosystems, *medium confidence*). Changes in land use resulting from mitigation choices could have impacts on food production and ecosystem diversity {Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, Cross-Chapter boxes 7 and 8 in this Chapter}.

Climate change risks for natural and human systems

Terrestrial and Wetland Ecosystems

Risks of local species losses and, consequently, risks of extinction are much less in a 1.5°C versus a 2°C warmer world (*medium confidence*). The number of species projected to lose over half of their climatically determined geographic range (about 18% of insects, 16% of plants, 8% of vertebrates) is reduced by 50% (plants, vertebrates) or 66% (insects) at 1.5°C versus 2°C of warming (*high confidence*). Risks associated with other biodiversity-related factors such as forest fires, extreme weather events, and the spread of invasive species, pests, and diseases, are also reduced at 1.5°C versus 2°C of warming (*high confidence*), supporting greater persistence of ecosystem services {3.4.3.2, 3.5.2}.

Constraining global warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C and higher has strong benefits for terrestrial and wetland ecosystems and for the preservation of their services to humans (*high confidence*). Risks for natural and managed ecosystems are higher on drylands compared to humid lands. The terrestrial area affected by ecosystem transformation (13%) at 2°C, which is approximately halved at 1.5°C global warming (*high confidence*). Above 1.5°C, an expansion of desert and arid vegetation would occur in the Mediterranean biome (*medium confidence*), causing changes unparalleled in the last 10,000 years (*medium confidence*) {3.3.2.2, 3.4.3.5, 3.4.6.1., 3.5.5.10, Box 4.2}.

Many impacts are projected to be larger at higher latitudes due to mean and cold-season warming rates above the global average (*medium confidence*). High-latitude tundra and boreal

forest are particularly at risk, and woody shrubs are already encroaching into tundra (*high confidence*). Further warming is projected to cause greater effects in a 2°C world than a 1.5°C world, for example, constraining warming to 1.5°C would prevent the melting of an estimated permafrost area of 2 million km² over centuries compared to 2°C (*high confidence*) {3.3.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.4}.

Ocean ecosystems

Ocean ecosystems are experiencing large-scale changes, with critical thresholds expected to be reached at 1.5°C and above (*high confidence*). In the transition to 1.5°C, changes to water temperatures will drive some species (e.g. plankton, fish) to relocate to higher latitudes and for novel ecosystems to appear (*high confidence*). Other ecosystems (e.g. kelp forests, coral reefs) are relatively less able to move, however, and will experience high rates of mortality and loss (*very high confidence*). For example, multiple lines of evidence indicate that the majority of warmer water coral reefs that exist today (70-90%) will largely disappear when global warming exceeds 1.5°C (*very high confidence*) {3.4.4, Box 3.4}.

Current ecosystem services from the ocean will be reduced at 1.5°C, with losses being greater at 2°C (*high confidence*). The risks of declining ocean productivity, shifts of species to higher latitudes, damage to ecosystems (e.g. coral reefs, and mangroves, seagrass and other wetland ecosystems), loss of fisheries productivity (at low latitudes), and changing ocean chemistry (e.g., acidification, hypoxia, dead zones), however, are projected to be substantially lower when global warming is limited to 1.5°C (*high confidence*) {3.4.4, Box 3.4}.

Water Resources

The projected frequency and magnitude of floods and droughts in some regions are smaller under a 1.5°C versus 2°C of warming (*medium confidence*). Human exposure to increased flooding is projected to be substantially lower at 1.5°C as compared to 2°C of global warming, although projected changes create regionally differentiated risks (*medium confidence*). The differences in the risks among regions are strongly influenced by local socio-economic conditions (*medium confidence*) {3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.4.2}.

Risks to water scarcity are greater at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming in some regions (*medium confidence*). Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would approximately halve the fraction of world population expected to suffer water scarcity as compared to 2°C, although there is considerable variability between regions (*medium confidence*). Socioeconomic drivers, however, are expected to have a greater influence on these risks than the changes in climate (*medium confidence*) {3.3.5, 3.4.2, Box 3.5}.

Land Use, Food Security and Food Production Systems

Global warming of 1.5°C (as opposed to 2°C) is projected to reduce climate induced impacts on crop yield and nutritional content in some regions (*high confidence*). Affected areas include Sub-Saharan Africa (West Africa, Southern Africa), South-East Asia, and Central and South America. A loss of 7-10% of rangeland livestock globally is projected for approximately 2°C of warming with considerable economic consequences for many communities and regions {3.6, 3.4.6, Box 3.1, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this Chapter}.

Risks of food shortages are lower in the Sahel, southern Africa, the Mediterranean, central Europe, and the Amazon at 1.5°C of global warming when compared to 2°C (*medium confidence*). This suggests a transition from medium to high risk of regionally differentiated impacts between 1.5 and 2°C for food security (*medium confidence*). International food trade is *likely* to be a

potential adaptation response for alleviating hunger in low- and middle-income countries {Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this Chapter}.

Fisheries and aquaculture are important to global food security but are already facing increasing risks from ocean warming and acidification (*medium confidence*), which will increase at 1.5°C global warming. Risks are increasing for marine aquaculture and many fisheries at warming and acidification at 1.5°C (e.g., many bivalves such as oysters, and fin fish; *medium confidence*), especially at low latitudes (*medium confidence*). Small-scale fisheries in tropical regions, which are very dependent on habitat provided by coastal ecosystems such as coral reefs, mangroves, seagrass and kelp forests, are at a high risk at 1.5°C due to loss of habitat (*medium confidence*). Risks of impacts and decreasing food security become greater as warming and acidification increase, with substantial losses likely for coastal livelihoods and industries (e.g. fisheries, aquaculture) as temperatures increase beyond 1.5°C (*medium to high confidence*). {3.4.4, 3.4.5, 3.4.6, Box 3.1, Box 3.4, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this Chapter}

Land use and land-use change emerge as a critical feature of virtually all mitigation pathways that seek to limit global warming to 1.5°C (*robust evidence, high agreement*). Most least-cost mitigation pathways to limit peak or end-of-century warming to 1.5°C make use of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR), predominantly employing significant levels of Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and/or Afforestation and Reforestation (AR) in their portfolio of mitigation measures (*robust evidence, high agreement*) {Cross-Chapter Box 7 in this Chapter}.

Large-scale, deployment of BECCS and/or AR would have a far-reaching land and water footprint (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Whether this footprint results in adverse impacts, for example on biodiversity or food production, depends on the existence and effectiveness of measures to conserve land carbon stocks, measures to limit agricultural expansion so as to protect natural ecosystems, and the potential to increase agricultural productivity (*high agreement, medium evidence*). In addition, BECCS and/or AR would also have substantial direct effects on regional climate through biophysical feedbacks, which are generally not included in Integrated Assessments Models (*high confidence*). {Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in this Chapter, Section 3.6.2}

The impacts of large-scale CDR deployment can be greatly reduced if a wider portfolio of CDR options is deployed, a holistic policy for sustainable land management is adopted and if increased mitigation effort strongly limits demand for land, energy and material resources, including through lifestyle and dietary change (*medium agreement, medium evidence*). In particular, reforestation may be associated with significant co-benefits if implemented so as to restore natural ecosystems (*high confidence*) {Cross-Chapter Box 7 in this Chapter}

Human Systems: Human Health, Well-Being, Cities, and Poverty

Any increase in global warming (e.g., +0.5°C) will affect human health (*high confidence*). Risks will be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C for heat-related morbidity and mortality (*very high confidence*), particularly in urban areas because of urban heat islands (*high confidence*). Risks also will be greater for ozone-related mortality if the emissions needed for the formation of ozone remain the same (*high confidence*), and for undernutrition (*medium confidence*). Risks are projected to change for some vector-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever (*high confidence*), with positive or negative trends depending on the disease, region, and extent of change (*high confidence*). Incorporating estimates of adaptation into projections reduces the magnitude of risks (*high confidence*) {3.4.7, 3.4.7.1}.

Global warming of 2°C is expected to pose greater risks to urban areas than global warming of 1.5°C (*medium confidence*). The extent of risk depends on human vulnerability and the effectiveness of adaptation for regions (coastal and non-coastal), informal settlements, and infrastructure sectors (energy, water, and transport) (*high confidence*) {3.4.5, 3.4.8}.

Poverty and disadvantage have increased with recent warming (about 1°C) and are expected to increase in many populations as average global temperatures increase from 1°C to 1.5°C and beyond (*medium confidence*). Outmigration in agricultural-dependent communities is positively and statistically significantly associated with global temperature (*medium confidence*). Our understanding of the linkages of 1.5°C and 2°C on human migration are limited and represent an important knowledge gap {3.4.10, 3.4.11, 5.2.2, Table 3.5}.

Key Economic Sectors and Services

Globally, the projected impacts on economic growth in a 1.5°C warmer world are larger than those of the present-day (about 1°C), with the largest impacts expected in the tropics and the Southern Hemisphere subtropics (*limited evidence, low confidence*). At 2°C substantially lower economic growth is projected for many developed and developing countries (*limited evidence, medium confidence*), with the potential to also limit economic damages at 1.5°C of global warming. {3.5.2, 3.5.3}.

The largest reductions in growth at 2°C compared to 1.5 °C of warming are projected for low- and middle-income countries and regions (the African continent, southeast Asia, India, Brazil and Mexico) (*limited evidence, medium confidence*){3.5}.

Global warming has affected tourism and increased risks are projected for specific geographic regions and the seasonality of sun, beach, and snow sports tourism under warming of 1.5°C (*very high confidence*). Risks will be lower for tourism markets that are less climate sensitive, such as non-environmental (e.g., gaming) or large hotel-based activities (*high confidence*) {3.4.9.1}. Risks for coastal tourism, particularly in sub-tropical and tropical regions, will increase with temperature-related degradation (e.g. heat extremes, storms) or loss of beach and coral reef assets (*high confidence*) {3.4.9.1, 3.4.4.12; 3.3.6, Box 3.4}.

Small islands, and coastal and low-lying areas

Small islands are projected to experience multiple inter-related risks at 1.5°C that will increase with warming of 2°C and higher (*high confidence*). Climate hazards at 1.5°C are lower compared to 2°C (*high confidence*). Long term risks of coastal flooding and impacts on population, infrastructure and assets (*high confidence*), freshwater stress (*medium confidence*), and risks across marine ecosystems (*high confidence*), and critical sectors (*medium confidence*) increase at 1.5°C as compared to present and further increase at 2°C, limiting adaptation opportunities and increasing loss and damage (*medium confidence*). Migration in small islands (internally and internationally) occurs due to multiple causes and for multiple purposes, mostly for better livelihood opportunities (*high confidence*) and increasingly due to sea level rise (*medium confidence*). {3.3.2.2, 3.3.6-9, 3.4.3.2, 3.4.4.2, 3.4.4.5, 3.4.4.12, 3.4.5.3, 3.4.7.1, 3.4.9.1, 3.5.4.9, Box 3.4, Box 3.5}.

Impacts associated with sea level rise and changes to the salinity of coastal groundwater, increased flooding and damage to infrastructure, are critically important in sensitive environments such as small islands, low lying coasts and deltas at global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C (*high confidence*). Localised subsidence and changes to river discharge can potentially exacerbate these effects {3.4.5.4}. Adaptation is happening today (*high confidence*) and remains important over multi-centennial timescales {3.4.5.3, 3.4.5.7, Box 3.5, 5.4.5.4}.

Existing and restored natural coastal ecosystems may be effective in reducing the adverse

impacts of rising sea levels and intensifying storms by protecting coastal and deltaic regions. Natural sedimentation rates are expected to be able to offset the effect of rising sea levels given the slower rates of sea-level rise associated with 1.5°C of warming (*medium confidence*). Other feedbacks, such as landward migration of wetlands and the adaptation of infrastructure, remain important (*medium confidence*) {3.4.4.12, 3.4.5.4, 3.4.5.7}

Increased reasons for concern

There are multiple lines of evidence that there has been a substantial increase since AR5 in the levels of risk associated with four of the five Reasons for Concern (RFCs) for global warming levels of up to 2°C (*high confidence*). Constraining warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C avoids risk reaching a ‘very high’ level in RFC1 (Unique and Threatened Systems) (*high confidence*), and avoids risk reaching a ‘high’ level in RFC3 (Distribution of Impacts) (*high confidence*) and RFC4 (Global Aggregate Impacts) (*medium confidence*). It also reduces risks associated with RFC2 (Extreme Weather Events) and RFC5 (Large scale singular events) (*high confidence*) {3.5.2}.

In “Unique and Threatened Systems” (RFC1) the transition from high to very high risk is located between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming as opposed to at 2.6°C global warming in AR5, owing to new and multiple lines of evidence for changing risks for coral reefs, the Arctic, and biodiversity in general (*high confidence*) {3.5}.

1. **In “Extreme Weather Events” (RFC2) the transition from moderate to high risk is located between 1.0°C and 1.5°C global warming,** which is very similar to the AR5 assessment but there is greater confidence in the assessment (*medium confidence*). The impact literature contains little information about the potential for human society to adapt to extreme weather events and hence it has not been possible to locate the transition from 'high' (red) to 'very high' risk within the context of assessing impacts at 1.5°C versus 2°C global warming. There is thus *low confidence* in the level at which global warming could lead to very high risks associated with extreme weather events in the context of this report {3.5}.
2. **In “Distribution of impacts” (RFC3) a transition from moderate to high risk is now located between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming as compared with between 1.6°C and 2.6°C global warming in AR5,** due to new evidence about regionally differentiated risks to food security, water resources, drought, heat exposure, and coastal submergence (*high confidence*) {3.5}.
3. **In “Global aggregate impacts” (RFC4) a transition from moderate to high levels of risk now occurs between 1.5°C and 2.5°C global warming** as opposed to at 3°C warming in AR5, owing to new evidence about global aggregate economic impacts and risks to the earth’s biodiversity (*medium confidence*) {3.5}.
4. **In “Large scale singular events” (RFC5), moderate risk is located at 1°C global warming and high risks are located at 2.5°C global warming,** as opposed to 1.9°C (moderate) and 4°C global warming (high) risk in AR5 because of new observations and models of the West Antarctic ice sheet (*medium confidence*) {3.3.9, 3.5.2, 3.6.3}

TS4: Strengthening and implementing the global response

Limiting warming to 1.5°C would require transformative systemic change, integrated with sustainable development. Such change would require the upscaling and acceleration of the implementation of far-reaching, multi-level and cross-sectoral climate mitigation and addressing barriers. Such systemic change would need to be linked to complementary adaptation actions, including transformational adaptation, especially for pathways that temporarily overshoot 1.5°C {Chapter 2, Chapter 3, 4.2.1, 4.4.5, 4.5} (*medium evidence, high*

agreement). Current national pledges on mitigation and adaptation are not enough to stay below the Paris Agreement temperature limits and achieve its adaptation goals. While transitions in energy efficiency, carbon intensity of fuels, electrification and land use change are underway in various countries, limiting warming to 1.5°C will require a greater scale and pace of change to transform energy, land, urban and industrial systems globally. {4.3, 4.4, Cross-Chapter Box CB9 in this Chapter}

Although multiple communities around the world are demonstrating the possibility of implementation consistent with 1.5°C pathways {Boxes 4.1-4.10}, very few countries, regions, cities, communities or businesses can currently make such a claim (*high confidence*). To strengthen the global response, almost all countries would need to significantly raise their level of ambition. Implementation of this raised ambition would require enhanced institutional capabilities in all countries, including building the capability to utilise Indigenous and local knowledge (*medium evidence, high agreement*). In developing countries and for poor and vulnerable people, implementing the response would require financial, technological and other forms of support to build capacity, for which additional local, national and international resources would need to be mobilised (*high confidence*). However, public, financial, institutional and innovation capabilities currently fall short of implementing far-reaching measures at scale in all countries (*high confidence*). Transnational networks that support multi-level climate action are growing, but challenges in their scale-up remain. {4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, Box 4.1, Box 4.2, Box 4.7}

Adaptation needs will be lower in a 1.5°C world compared to a 2°C world (*high confidence*) {Chapter 3; Cross-Chapter Box CB11 in this Chapter}. Learning from current adaptation practices and strengthening them through adaptive governance {4.4.1}, lifestyle and behavioural change {4.4.3} and innovative financing mechanisms {4.4.5} can help their mainstreaming within sustainable development practices. Preventing maladaptation, drawing on bottom-up approaches {Box 4.6} and using Indigenous knowledge {Box 4.3} would effectively engage and protect vulnerable people and communities. While adaptation finance has increased quantitatively, significant further expansion would be needed to adapt to 1.5°C. Qualitative gaps in the distribution of adaptation finance, readiness to absorb resources and monitoring mechanisms undermine the potential of adaptation finance to reduce impacts. {Chapter 3, 4.4.2, 4.4.5, 4.6}

System transitions

The energy system transition that would be required to limit global warming to 1.5°C is underway in many sectors and regions around the world (*medium evidence, high agreement*). The political, economic, social and technical feasibility of solar energy, wind energy and electricity storage technologies has improved dramatically over the past few years, while that of nuclear energy and Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS) in the electricity sector have not shown similar improvements. {4.3.1}

Electrification, hydrogen, bio-based feedstocks and substitution, and in several cases carbon dioxide capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS), would lead to the deep emissions reductions required in energy-intensive industry to limit warming to 1.5°C. However, those options are limited by institutional, economic and technical constraints, which increase financial risks to many incumbent firms (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Energy efficiency in industry is more economically feasible and an enabler of industrial system transitions but would have to be complemented with Greenhouse Gas (GHG)-neutral processes or Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) to make energy-intensive industry consistent with 1.5°C (*high confidence*). {4.3.1, 4.3.4}

Global and regional land-use and ecosystems transitions and associated changes in behaviour that would be required to limit warming to 1.5°C can enhance future adaptation and land-based

agricultural and forestry mitigation potential. Such transitions could, however, carry consequences for livelihoods that depend on agriculture and natural resources {4.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box CB6 in chapter 3}. Alterations of agriculture and forest systems to achieve mitigation goals could affect current ecosystems and their services and potentially threaten food, water and livelihood security. While this could limit the social and environmental feasibility of land-based mitigation options, careful design and implementation could enhance their acceptability and support sustainable development objectives (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). {4.3.2, 4.5.3}

Changing agricultural practices can be an effective climate adaptation strategy. A diversity of adaptation options exists, including mixed crop-livestock production systems which can be a cost-effective adaptation strategy in many global agriculture systems (*robust evidence, medium agreement*). Improving irrigation efficiency could effectively deal with changing global water endowments, especially if achieved via farmers adopting new behaviour and water-efficient practices rather than through large-scale infrastructure (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Well-designed adaptation processes such as community-based adaptation can be effective depending upon context and levels of vulnerability. {4.3.2, 4.5.3}

Improving the efficiency of food production and closing yield gaps have the potential to reduce emissions from agriculture, reduce pressure on land and enhance food security and future mitigation potential (*high confidence*). Improving productivity of existing agricultural systems generally reduces the emissions intensity of food production and offers strong synergies with rural development, poverty reduction and food security objectives, but options to reduce absolute emissions are limited unless paired with demand-side measures. Technological innovation including biotechnology, with adequate safeguards, could contribute to resolving current feasibility constraints and expand the future mitigation potential of agriculture. {4.3.2, 4.4.4}

Dietary choices towards foods with lower emissions and requirements for land, along with reduced food loss and waste, could reduce emissions and increase adaptation options (*high confidence*). Decreasing food loss and waste and behavioural change around diets could lead to effective mitigation and adaptation options (*high confidence*) by reducing both emissions and pressure on land, with significant co-benefits for food security, human health and sustainable development {4.3.2, 4.4.5, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 5.4.2}, but evidence of successful policies to modify dietary choices remains limited.

Mitigation and Adaptation Options and other Measures

A mix of mitigation and adaptation options implemented in a participatory and integrated manner can enable rapid, systemic transitions in urban and rural areas that are necessary elements of an accelerated transition to 1.5°C worlds. Such options and changes are most effective when aligned with economic and sustainable development, and when local and regional governments are supported by national governments {4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.3}, Various mitigation options are expanding rapidly across many geographies. Although many have development synergies, not all income groups have so far benefited from them. Electrification, end-use energy efficiency and increased share of renewables, amongst other options, are lowering energy use and decarbonising energy supply in the built environment, especially in buildings. Other rapid changes needed in urban environments include demotorisation and decarbonisation of transport, including the expansion of electric vehicles, and greater use of energy-efficient appliances (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Technological and social innovations can contribute to limiting warming to 1.5°C, e.g. by enabling the use of smart grids, energy storage technologies and general-purpose technologies, such as Information and Communication Technology (ICT) that can be deployed to help reduce emissions. Feasible adaptation options include green infrastructure, resilient water and urban ecosystem services, urban and peri-urban agriculture, and adapting buildings and land use through regulation and planning

(*medium evidence, medium to high agreement*). {4.3.3}

Synergies can be achieved across systemic transitions through several overarching adaptation options in rural and urban areas. Investments in health, social security and risk sharing and spreading are cost-effective adaptation measures with high potential for scaling-up (*medium evidence, medium to high agreement*). Disaster risk management and education-based adaptation have lower prospects of scalability and cost-effectiveness (*medium evidence, high agreement*) but are critical for building adaptive capacity. {4.3.5, 4.5.3}

Converging adaptation and mitigation options can lead to synergies and potentially increase cost effectiveness, but multiple trade-offs can limit the speed of and potential for scaling up. Many examples of synergies and trade-offs exist in all sectors and system transitions. For instance, sustainable water management (*high evidence, medium agreement*) and investment in green infrastructure (*medium evidence, high agreement*) to deliver sustainable water and environmental services and to support urban agriculture are less cost-effective but can help build climate resilience. Achieving the governance, finance and social support required to enable these synergies and to avoid trade-offs is often challenging, especially when addressing multiple objectives, and appropriate sequencing and timing of interventions. {4.3.2, 4.3.4, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.4}

Though CO₂ dominates long-term warming, the reduction of warming Short-Lived Climate Forcers (SLCFs), such as methane and black carbon, can in the short term contribute significantly to limiting warming to 1.5°C. Reductions of black carbon and methane would have substantial co-benefits (*high confidence*), including improved health due to reduced air pollution. This, in turn, enhances the institutional and socio-cultural feasibility of such actions. Reductions of several warming SLCFs are constrained by economic and social feasibility (*low evidence, high agreement*). As they are often co-emitted with CO₂, achieving the energy, land and urban transitions necessary to limit warming to 1.5°C would see emissions of warming SLCFs greatly reduced. {2.3.3.2, 4.3.6}

Most CDR options face multiple feasibility constraints, that differ between options, limiting the potential for any single option to sustainably achieve the large-scale deployment in 1.5°C-consistent pathways in Chapter 2 (*high confidence*). Those 1.5°C pathways typically rely on Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), Afforestation and Reforestation (AR), or both, to neutralise emissions that are expensive to avoid, or to draw down CO₂ emissions in excess of the carbon budget {Chapter 2}. Though BECCS and AR may be technically and geophysically feasible, they face partially overlapping yet different constraints related to land use. The land footprint per tonne CO₂ removed is higher for AR than for BECCS, but in the light of low current deployment, the speed and scales required for limiting warming to 1.5°C pose a considerable implementation challenge, even if the issues of public acceptance and missing economic incentives were to be resolved (*high agreement, medium evidence*). The large potentials of afforestation and their co-benefits if implemented appropriately (e.g. on biodiversity, soil quality) will diminish over time, as forests saturate (*high confidence*). The energy requirements and economic costs of Direct Air Carbon Capture and Storage (DACCS) and enhanced weathering remain high (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). At the local scale, soil carbon sequestration has co-benefits with agriculture and is cost-effective even without climate policy (*high confidence*). Its potential global feasibility and cost effectiveness appears to be more limited. {4.3.7}

Uncertainties surrounding Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) measures constrain their potential deployment. These uncertainties include: technological immaturity; limited physical understanding about their effectiveness to limit global warming; and a weak capacity to govern, legitimise, and scale such measures. Some recent model-based analysis suggests SRM would be

effective but that it is too early to evaluate its feasibility. Even in the uncertain case that the most adverse side-effects of SRM can be avoided, public resistance, ethical concerns and potential impacts on sustainable development could render SRM economically, socially and institutionally undesirable (*low agreement, medium evidence*). {4.3.8, Cross-Chapter Box CB10 in this Chapter}

Enabling Rapid and Far-reaching Change

The speed and scale of transitions and of technological change required to limit warming to 1.5°C has been observed in the past within specific sectors and technologies {4.2.2.1}. But the geographical and economic scales at which the required rates of change in the energy, land, urban, infrastructure and industrial systems would need to take place, are larger and have no documented historic precedent (*limited evidence, medium agreement*). To reduce inequality and alleviate poverty, such transformations would require more planning and stronger institutions (including inclusive markets) than observed in the past, as well as stronger coordination and disruptive innovation across actors and scales of governance. {4.3, 4.4}

Governance consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C and the political economy of adaptation and mitigation can enable and accelerate systems transitions, behavioural change, innovation and technology deployment (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). For 1.5°C-consistent actions, an effective governance framework would include: accountable multi-level governance that includes non-state actors such as industry, civil society and scientific institutions; coordinated sectoral and cross-sectoral policies that enable collaborative multi-stakeholder partnerships; strengthened global-to-local financial architecture that enables greater access to finance and technology; and addresses climate-related trade barriers; improved climate education and greater public awareness; arrangements to enable accelerated behaviour change; strengthened climate monitoring and evaluation systems; and reciprocal international agreements that are sensitive to equity and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). System transitions can be enabled by enhancing the capacities of public, private and financial institutions to accelerate climate change policy planning and implementation, along with accelerated technological innovation, deployment and upkeep. {4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4}

Behaviour change and demand-side management can significantly reduce emissions, substantially limiting the reliance on CDR to limit warming to 1.5°C {Chapter 2, 4.4.3}. Political and financial stakeholders may find climate actions more cost-effective and socially acceptable, if multiple factors affecting behaviour are considered, including aligning them with people's core values (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Behaviour- and lifestyle-related measures and demand-side management have already led to emission reductions around the world and can enable significant future reductions (*high confidence*). Social innovation through bottom-up initiatives can result in greater participation in the governance of systems transitions and increase support for technologies, practices and policies that are part of the global response to 1.5°C. {Chapter 2, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, Figure 4.3}

This rapid and far-reaching response required to keep warming below 1.5°C and enhance the adaptive capacity to climate risks needs large investments in low-emission infrastructure and buildings that are currently underinvested, along with a redirection of financial flows towards low-emission investments (*robust evidence, high agreement*). An estimated annual incremental investment of 1% to 1.5% of global Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) for the energy sector is indicated; and 1.7% to 2.5% of global GFCF for other development infrastructure that could also address SDG implementation. Though quality policy design and effective implementation may enhance efficiency, they cannot substitute for these investments. {2.5.2, 4.2.1}

Enabling this investment requires the mobilisation and better integration of a range of policy instruments that include: the reduction of socially inefficient fossil fuel subsidy regimes and

innovative price and non-price national and international policy instruments and would need to be complemented by de-risking financial instruments and the emergence of long-term low-emission assets. These instruments would aim to reduce the demand for carbon-intensive services and shift market preferences away from fossil fuel-based technology. Evidence and theory suggest that carbon pricing alone, in the absence of sufficient transfers to compensate their unintended distributional cross-sector, cross-nation effects, cannot reach the levels needed to trigger system transitions (*robust evidence, medium agreement*). But, embedded in consistent policy-packages, they can help mobilise incremental resources and provide flexible mechanisms that help reduce the social and economic costs of the triggering phase of the transition (*robust evidence, medium agreement*). {4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5}

Increasing evidence suggests that a climate-sensitive realignment of savings and expenditure towards low-emission, climate-resilient infrastructure and services requires an evolution of global and national financial systems. Estimates suggest that, in addition to climate-friendly allocation of public investments, a potential redirection of 5% to 10% of the annual capital revenues² is necessary {4.4.5, Table 1 in Box 4.8}. This could be facilitated by a change of incentives for private day-to-day expenditure and the redirection of savings from speculative and precautionary investments, towards long-term productive low-emission assets and services. This implies the mobilisation of institutional investors and mainstreaming of climate finance within financial and banking system regulation. Access by developing countries to low-risk and low-interest finance through multilateral and national development banks would have to be facilitated (*medium evidence, high agreement*). New forms of public-private partnerships may be needed with multilateral, sovereign and sub-sovereign guarantees to de-risk climate-friendly investments, support new business models for small-scale enterprises and help households with limited access to capital. Ultimately, the aim is to promote a portfolio shift towards long-term low-emission assets, that would help redirect capital away from potential stranded assets (*medium evidence, medium agreement*).{4.4.5}

Knowledge Gaps

Knowledge gaps around implementing and strengthening the global response to climate change would need to be urgently resolved if the transition to 1.5°C worlds is to become reality.

Remaining questions include: how much can be realistically expected from innovation, behaviour and systemic political and economic change in improving resilience, enhancing adaptation and reducing GHG emissions? How can rates of changes be accelerated and scaled up? What is the outcome of realistic assessments of mitigation and adaptation land transitions that are compliant with sustainable development, poverty eradication and addressing inequality? What are life-cycle emissions and prospects of early-stage CDR options? How can climate and sustainable development policies converge, and how can they be organised within a global governance framework and financial system, based on principles of justice and ethics (including Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC)), reciprocity and partnership? To what extent limit warming to 1.5°C needs a harmonisation of macro-financial and fiscal policies, that could include financial regulators such as central banks? How can different actors and processes in climate governance reinforce each other, and hedge against the fragmentation of initiatives? {4.1, 4.4.1, 4.3.7, 4.4.5, 4.6}

TS5: Sustainable Development, Poverty Eradication and Reducing Inequalities

This chapter takes sustainable development as the starting point and focus for analysis. It considers the broad and multifaceted bi-directional interplay between sustainable development, including its focus on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality in their multidimensional aspects, and climate actions in a 1.5°C warmer world. These fundamental connections are embedded in the Sustainable

² FOOTNOTE: Annual capital revenues are the paid interests plus the increase of the asset value.

Development Goals (SDGs). The chapter also examines synergies and trade-offs of adaptation and mitigation options with sustainable development and the SDGs and offers insights into possible pathways, especially climate-resilient development pathways toward a 1.5°C warmer world.

Sustainable Development, Poverty, and Inequality in a 1.5°C Warmer World

Limiting global warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C would make it markedly easier to achieve many aspects of sustainable development, with greater potential to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Impacts avoided with the lower temperature limit could reduce the number of people exposed to climate risks and vulnerable to poverty by 62 to 457 million, and lessen the risks of poor people to experience food and water insecurity, adverse health impacts, and economic losses, particularly in regions that already face development challenges (*medium evidence, medium agreement*) {5.2.2, 5.2.3}. Avoided impacts between 1.5°C and 2°C warming would also make it easier to achieve certain SDGs, such as those that relate to poverty, hunger, health, water and sanitation, cities, and ecosystems (SDGs 1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 14, and 15) (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.2.3, Table 5.3 available as a supplementary pdf }.

Compared to current conditions, 1.5°C of global warming would nonetheless pose heightened risks to eradicating poverty, reducing inequalities and ensuring human and ecosystem well-being (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Warming of 1.5°C is not considered ‘safe’ for most nations, communities, ecosystems and sectors and poses significant risks to natural and human systems as compared to current warming of 1°C (*high confidence*) {Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5}. The impacts of 1.5°C would disproportionately affect disadvantaged and vulnerable populations through food insecurity, higher food prices, income losses, lost livelihood opportunities, adverse health impacts, and population displacements (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.2.1}. Some of the worst impacts on sustainable development are expected to be felt among agricultural and coastal dependent livelihoods, indigenous people, children and the elderly, poor labourers, poor urban dwellers in African cities, and people and ecosystems in the Arctic and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.2.1 Box 5.3, Chapter 3 Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}.

Climate Adaptation and Sustainable Development

Prioritisation of sustainable development and meeting the SDGs is consistent with efforts to adapt to climate change (*high confidence*). Many strategies for sustainable development enable transformational adaptation for a 1.5°C warmer world, provided attention is paid to reducing poverty in all its forms and to promoting equity and participation in decision-making (*medium evidence, high agreement*). As such, sustainable development has the potential to significantly reduce systemic vulnerability, enhance adaptive capacity, and promote livelihood security for poor and disadvantaged populations (*high confidence*) {5.3.1}.

Synergies between adaptation strategies and the SDGs are expected to hold true in a 1.5°C warmer world, across sectors and contexts (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Synergies between adaptation and sustainable development are significant for agriculture and health, advancing SDGs 1 (extreme poverty), 2 (hunger), 3 (healthy lives and well-being), and 6 (clean water) (*robust evidence, medium agreement*) {5.3.2}. Ecosystem- and community-based adaptation, along with the incorporation of indigenous and local knowledge, advances synergies with SDGs 5 (gender equality), 10 (reducing inequalities), and 16 (inclusive societies), as exemplified in drylands and the Arctic (*high evidence, medium agreement*) {5.3.2, Box 5.1, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 4}.

Adaptation strategies can result in trade-offs with and among the SDGs (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Strategies that advance one SDG may create negative consequences for other SDGs, for

instance SDGs 3 versus 7 (health and energy consumption) and agricultural adaptation and SDG 2 (food security) versus SDGs 3, 5, 6, 10, 14, and 15 (*medium evidence, medium agreement*) {5.3.2}.

Pursuing place-specific adaptation pathways toward a 1.5°C warmer world has the potential for significant positive outcomes for well-being, in countries at all levels of development (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Positive outcomes emerge when adaptation pathways (i) ensure a diversity of adaptation options based on people’s values and trade-offs they consider acceptable, (ii) maximise synergies with sustainable development through inclusive, participatory, and deliberative processes, and (iii) facilitate equitable transformation. Yet, such pathways would be difficult to achieve without redistributive measures to overcome path dependencies, uneven power structures, and entrenched social inequalities (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.3.3}.

Mitigation and Sustainable Development

The deployment of mitigation options consistent with 1.5°C pathways leads to multiple synergies across a range of sustainable development dimensions. At the same time, the rapid pace and magnitude of change that would be required to limit warming to 1.5°C, if not carefully managed, would lead to trade-offs with some sustainable development dimensions (*high confidence*). The number of synergies between mitigation response options and sustainable development exceeds the number of trade-offs in energy demand and supply sectors, Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) and for oceans (*very high confidence*) {Figure 5.3, Table 5.3 available as a supplementary pdf }. 1.5°C pathways indicate robust synergies particularly for the SDGs 3 (health), 7 (energy), 12 (responsible consumption and production), and 14 (oceans) (*very high confidence*) {5.4.2, Figure 5.4}. For SDGs 1 (poverty), 2 (hunger), 6 (water), and 7 (energy), there is a risk of trade-offs or negative side-effects from stringent mitigation actions compatible with 1.5°C (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.4.2}.

Appropriately designed mitigation actions to reduce energy demand can advance multiple SDGs simultaneously. Pathways compatible with 1.5°C that feature low energy demand show the most pronounced synergies and the lowest number of trade-offs with respect to sustainable development and the SDGs (*very high confidence*). Accelerating energy efficiency in all sectors has synergies with SDG 7, 9, 11, 12, 16, 17 {5.4.1, Figure 5.3, Table 5.2} (*robust evidence, high agreement*). Low demand pathways, which would reduce or completely avoid the reliance on Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) in 1.5°C pathways, would result in significantly reduced pressure on food security, lower food prices, and fewer people at risk of hunger (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.4.2, Figure 5.4}.

The impacts of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) options on SDGs depend on the type of options and the scale of deployment (*high confidence*). If poorly implemented, CDR options such as bioenergy, BECCS and AFOLU would lead to trade-offs. Appropriate design and implementation requires considering local people’s needs, biodiversity, and other sustainable development dimensions (*very high confidence*) {5.4.1.3, Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3}.

The design of the mitigation portfolios and policy instruments to limit warming to 1.5°C will largely determine the overall synergies and trade-offs between mitigation and sustainable development (*very high confidence*). Redistributive policies that shield the poor and vulnerable can resolve trade-offs for a range of SDGs (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Individual mitigation options are associated with both positive and negative interactions with the SDGs (*very high confidence*) {5.4.1}. However, appropriate choices across the mitigation portfolio can help to maximize positive side-effects while minimizing negative side-effects (*high confidence*) {5.4.2, 5.5.2}. Investment needs for complementary policies resolving trade-offs with a range of SDGs are only a small fraction of the overall mitigation investments in 1.5°C pathways (*medium evidence, high*

agreement) {5.4.2, Figure 5.5}. Integration of mitigation with adaptation and sustainable development compatible with 1.5°C requires a systems perspective (*high confidence*) {5.4.2, 5.5.2}.

Mitigation measures consistent with 1.5°C create high risks for sustainable development in countries with high dependency on fossil fuels for revenue and employment generation (*high confidence*). These risks are caused by the reduction of global demand affecting mining activity and export revenues and challenges to rapidly decrease high carbon intensity of the domestic economy (*robust evidence, high agreement*) {5.4.1.2, Box 5.2}. Targeted policies that promote diversification of the economy and the energy sector could ease this transition (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.4.1.2, Box 5.2}.

Sustainable Development Pathways to 1.5°C

Sustainable development broadly supports and often enables the fundamental societal and systems transformations that would be required for limiting warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). Simulated pathways that feature the most sustainable worlds (e.g., Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP)1) are associated with relatively lower mitigation and adaptation challenges and limit warming to 1.5°C at comparatively lower mitigation costs. In contrast, development pathways with high fragmentation, inequality and poverty (e.g., SSP3) are associated with comparatively higher mitigation and adaptation challenges. In such pathways, it is not possible to limit warming to 1.5°C for the vast majority of the integrated assessment models (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.5.2}. In all SSPs, mitigation costs substantially increase in 1.5°C pathways compared to 2°C pathways. No pathway in the literature integrates or achieves all 17 SDGs (*high confidence*) {5.5.2}. Real-world experiences at the project level show that the actual integration between adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development is challenging as it requires reconciling trade-offs across sectors and spatial scales (*very high confidence*) {5.5.1}.

Without societal transformation and rapid implementation of ambitious greenhouse gas reduction measures, pathways to limiting warming to 1.5°C and achieving sustainable development will be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to achieve (*high confidence*). The potential for pursuing such pathways differs between and within nations and regions, due to different development trajectories, opportunities, and challenges (*very high confidence*) {5.5.3.2, Figure 5.1}. Limiting warming to 1.5°C would require all countries and non-state actors to strengthen their contributions without delay. This could be achieved through sharing of efforts based on bolder and more committed cooperation, with support for those with the least capacity to adapt, mitigate, and transform (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.5.3.1, 5.5.3.2}. Current efforts toward reconciling low-carbon trajectories and reducing inequalities, including those that avoid difficult trade-offs associated with transformation, are partially successful yet demonstrate notable obstacles (*medium evidence, medium agreement*) {5.5.3.3 Box 5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in this Chapter}.

Social justice and equity are core aspects of climate-resilient development pathways for transformational social change. Addressing challenges and widening opportunities between and within countries and communities would be necessary to achieve sustainable development and limit warming to 1.5°C, without making the poor and disadvantaged worse off (*high confidence*). Identifying and navigating inclusive and socially acceptable pathways toward low-carbon, climate-resilient futures is a challenging yet important endeavour, fraught with moral, practical, and political difficulties and inevitable trade-offs (*very high confidence*) {5.5.2, 5.5.3.3 Box 5.3}. It entails deliberation and problem-solving processes to negotiate societal values, well-being, risks, and resilience and determine what is desirable and fair, and to whom (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Pathways that encompass joint, iterative planning and transformative visions, for instance in Pacific SIDS like Vanuatu and in urban contexts, show potential for liveable and sustainable futures (*high confidence*) {5.5.3.1, 5.5.3.3, Figure 5.6, Box 5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in this

Chapter }.

The fundamental societal and systemic changes to achieve sustainable development, eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities while limiting warming to 1.5°C would require a set of institutional, social, cultural, economic and technological conditions to be met (*high confidence*).

The coordination and monitoring of policy actions across sectors and spatial scales is essential to support sustainable development in 1.5°C warmer conditions (*very high confidence*) {5.6.2, Box 5.3}. External funding and technology transfer better support these efforts when they consider recipients' context-specific needs (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.6.1}. Inclusive processes can facilitate transformations by ensuring participation, transparency, capacity building, and iterative social learning (*high confidence*) {5.5.3.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13, 5.6.3}. Attention to power asymmetries and unequal opportunities for development, among and within countries is key to adopting 1.5°C-compatible development pathways that benefit all populations (*high confidence*) {5.5.3, 5.6.4, Box 5.3}. Re-examining individual and collective values could help spur urgent, ambitious, and cooperative change (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.5.3, 5.6.5}.

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Chapter 1: Framing and Context

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1 **Executive Summary**

2
3 This chapter frames the context, knowledge-base and assessment approaches used to understand the
4 impacts of 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas
5 emission pathways, building on the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), in the context of
6 strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development and efforts
7 to eradicate poverty.
8

9 **Human-induced warming reached approximately 1°C ($\pm 0.2^\circ\text{C}$ likely range) above pre-industrial**
10 **levels in 2017, increasing at 0.2°C ($\pm 0.1^\circ\text{C}$) per decade (*high confidence*).** Global warming is
11 defined in this report as an increase in combined surface air and sea surface temperatures averaged
12 over the globe and a 30-year period. Unless otherwise specified, warming is expressed relative to the
13 period 1850-1900, used as an approximation of pre-industrial temperatures in AR5. For periods
14 shorter than 30 years, warming refers to the estimated average temperature over the 30 years centered
15 on that shorter period, accounting for the impact of any temperature fluctuations or trend within those
16 30 years. Accordingly, warming up to the decade 2006-2015 is assessed at 0.87°C
17 ($\pm 0.12^\circ\text{C}$ likely range). Since 2000, the estimated level of human-induced warming has been equal to
18 the level of observed warming with a likely range of $\pm 20\%$ accounting for uncertainty due to
19 contributions from solar and volcanic activity over the historical period (*high confidence*). {1.2.1}
20

21 **Warming greater than the global average has already been experienced in many regions and**
22 **seasons, with average warming over land higher than over the ocean (*high confidence*).** Most land
23 regions are experiencing greater warming than the global average, while most ocean regions are
24 warming at a slower rate. Depending on the temperature dataset considered, 20-40% of the global
25 human population live in regions that, by the decade 2006-2015, had already experienced warming of
26 more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial in at least one season (*medium confidence*). {1.2.1 & 1.2.2}
27

28 **Past emissions alone are unlikely to raise global-mean temperature to 1.5°C above pre-**
29 **industrial levels but past emissions do commit to other changes, such as further sea level**
30 **rise (*high confidence*).** If all anthropogenic emissions (including aerosol-related) were reduced to zero
31 immediately, any further warming beyond the 1°C already experienced would likely be less than
32 0.5°C over the next two to three decades (*high confidence*), and likely less than 0.5°C on a century
33 timescale (*medium confidence*), due to the opposing effects of different climate processes and drivers.
34 A warming greater than 1.5°C is therefore not geophysically unavoidable: whether it will occur
35 depends on future rates of emission reductions. {1.2.3, 1.2.4}
36

37 **1.5°C-consistent emission pathways are defined as those that, given current knowledge of the**
38 **climate response, provide a one-in-two to two-in-three chance of warming either remaining**
39 **below 1.5°C, or returning to 1.5°C by around 2100 following an overshoot.** Overshoot pathways
40 are characterized by the peak magnitude of the overshoot, which may have implications for impacts.
41 All 1.5°C-consistent pathways involve limiting cumulative emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases,
42 including carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide, and substantial reductions in other climate forcers (*high*
43 *confidence*). Limiting cumulative emissions requires either reducing net global emissions of long-
44 lived greenhouse gases to zero before the cumulative limit is reached, or net negative global emissions
45 (anthropogenic removals) after the limit is exceeded. {1.2.3, 1.2.4, Cross-Chapter Boxes 1 and 2}
46

47 **This report assesses projected impacts at a global average warming of 1.5°C and higher levels of**
48 **warming.** Global warming of 1.5°C is associated with global average surface temperatures
49 fluctuating naturally on either side of 1.5°C, together with warming substantially greater than 1.5°C in
50 many regions and seasons (*high confidence*), all of which must be taken into account in the
51 assessment of impacts. Impacts at 1.5°C of warming also depend on the emission pathway to 1.5°C.
52 Very different impacts result from pathways that remain below 1.5°C versus pathways that return to

1 1.5°C after a substantial overshoot, and when temperatures stabilize at 1.5°C versus a transient
2 warming past 1.5°C. (*medium confidence*) {1.2.3, 1.3}

3
4 **Ethical considerations, and the principle of equity in particular, are central to this report,**
5 **recognising that many of the impacts of warming up to and beyond 1.5°C, and some potential**
6 **impacts of mitigation actions required to limit warming to 1.5°C, fall disproportionately on the**
7 **poor and vulnerable** (*high confidence*). Equity has procedural and distributive dimensions and
8 requires fairness in burden sharing, between generations, and between and within nations. In framing
9 the objective of holding the increase in the global average temperature rise to well below 2°C above
10 pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C, the Paris Agreement associates
11 the principle of equity with the broader goals of poverty eradication and sustainable development,
12 recognising that effective responses to climate change require a global collective effort that may be
13 guided by the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. {1.1.1}

14
15 **Climate adaptation refers to the actions taken to manage impacts of climate change by reducing**
16 **vulnerability and exposure to its harmful effects and exploiting any potential benefits.**

17 Adaptation takes place at international, national and local levels. Subnational jurisdictions and
18 entities, including urban and rural municipalities, are key to developing and reinforcing measures for
19 reducing weather- and climate-related risks. Adaptation implementation faces several barriers
20 including unavailability of up-to-date and locally-relevant information, lack of finance and
21 technology, social values and attitudes, and institutional constraints (*high confidence*). Adaptation is
22 more likely to contribute to sustainable development when policies align with mitigation and poverty
23 eradication goals (*medium confidence*) {1.1, 1.4}

24
25 **Ambitious mitigation actions are indispensable to limit warming to 1.5°C while achieving**
26 **sustainable development and poverty eradication** (*high confidence*). Ill-designed responses,
27 however, could pose challenges especially—but not exclusively—for countries and regions
28 contending with poverty and those requiring significant transformation of their energy systems. This
29 report focuses on ‘climate-resilient development pathways’, which aim to meet the goals of
30 sustainable development, including climate adaptation and mitigation, poverty eradication and
31 reducing inequalities. But any feasible pathway that remains within 1.5°C involves synergies and
32 trade-offs (*high confidence*). Significant uncertainty remains as to which pathways are more
33 consistent with the principle of equity. {1.1.1, 1.4}

34
35 **Multiple forms of knowledge, including scientific evidence, narrative scenarios and prospective**
36 **pathways, inform the understanding of 1.5°C.** This report is informed by traditional evidence of the
37 physical climate system and associated impacts and vulnerabilities of climate change, together with
38 knowledge drawn from the perceptions of risk and the experiences of climate impacts and governance
39 systems. Scenarios and pathways are used to explore conditions enabling goal-oriented futures while
40 recognizing the significance of ethical considerations, the principle of equity, and the societal
41 transformation needed. {1.2.3, 1.5.2}

42
43 **There is no single answer to the question of whether it is feasible to limit warming to 1.5°C and**
44 **adapt to the consequences.** Feasibility is considered in this report as the capacity of a system as a
45 whole to achieve a specific outcome. The global transformation that would be needed to limit
46 warming to 1.5°C requires enabling conditions that reflect the links, synergies and trade-offs between
47 mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development. These enabling conditions have many systemic
48 dimensions—geophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, economic, socio-cultural and
49 institutional—that may be considered through the unifying lens of the Anthropocene, acknowledging
50 profound, differential but increasingly geologically significant human influences on the Earth system
51 as a whole. This framing also emphasises the global interconnectivity of past, present and future

- 1 human–environment relations, highlighting the need and opportunities for integrated responses to
- 2 achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. { 1.1, Cross-Chapter Box 1 }
- 3

1.1 Assessing the knowledge base for a 1.5°C warmer world

Human influence on climate has been the dominant cause of observed warming since the mid-20th century, while global average surface temperature warmed by 0.85°C between 1880 and 2012, as reported in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, or AR5 (IPCC, 2013b). Many regions of the world have already experienced greater regional-scale warming, with 20–40% of the global population (depending on the temperature dataset used) having experienced over 1.5°C of warming in at least one season (Figure 1.1 and Chapter 3 Section 3.3). Temperature rise to date has already resulted in profound alterations to human and natural systems, bringing increases in some types of extreme weather, droughts, floods, sea level rise and biodiversity loss, and causing unprecedented risks to vulnerable persons and populations (IPCC, 2012a, 2014b; Mysiak et al., 2016), Chapter 3 Section 3.4). The most affected people live in low and middle income countries, some of which have already experienced a decline in food security, linked in turn to rising migration and poverty (IPCC, 2012a). Small islands, megacities, coastal regions and high mountain ranges are likewise among the most affected (Albert et al., 2017). Worldwide, numerous ecosystems are at risk of severe impacts, particularly warm-water tropical reefs and Arctic ecosystems (IPCC, 2014d).

This report assesses current knowledge of the environmental, technical, economic, financial, socio-cultural, and institutional dimensions of a 1.5°C warmer world (meaning, unless otherwise specified, a world in which warming has been limited to 1.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels). Differences in vulnerability and exposure arise from numerous non-climatic factors (IPCC, 2014b). Global economic growth has been accompanied by increased life expectancy and income in much of the world - but in addition to environmental degradation and pollution, many regions remain characterised by significant poverty, severe inequity in income distribution and access to resources, amplifying vulnerability to climate change (Dryzek, 2016; Pattberg and Zelli, 2016; Bäckstrand et al., 2017; Lövbrand et al., 2017). World population continues to rise, notably in hazard-prone small and medium-sized cities in low- and moderate-income countries (Birkmann et al., 2016). The spread of fossil-fuel-based material consumption and changing lifestyles is a major driver of global resource use, and the main contributor to rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Fleurbaey et al., 2014).

The overarching context of this report is this: human influence has become a principal agent of change on the planet, shifting the world out of the relatively stable Holocene period into a new geological era, often termed the Anthropocene (Box 1.1). Responding to climate change in the Anthropocene will require approaches that integrate multiple levels of inter-connectivity across the global community.

This chapter is composed of seven sections linked to the remaining four chapters of the report. The introductory section 1.1 situates the basic elements of the assessment within the context of sustainable development, considerations of ethics, equity and human rights, and their link to poverty. Section 1.2 focuses on understanding 1.5°C, global versus regional warming, 1.5°C-consistent pathways and associated emissions. Section 1.3 frames the impacts at 1.5°C and beyond on natural and human systems. The section on strengthening the global response (1.4) frames different responses, governance and implementation, and trade-offs and synergies between mitigation, adaptation and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) under transformation, transformation pathways, and transition. Section 1.5 provides assessment frameworks and emerging methodologies that integrate climate change mitigation and adaptation with sustainable development. Section 1.6 defines approaches used to communicate confidence, uncertainty and risk, while 1.7 presents the storyline of the whole report.




Figure 1.1: Human experience of present-day warming. Colours indicated by the inset histogram show estimated warming for the season that has warmed the most at a given location between the periods 1850-1900 and 2006–2015, during which global average temperatures rose by 0.91°C in this dataset (Cowtan and Way, 2014), and 0.87°C in the multi-dataset average (Table 1.1 and Figure 1.3). The density of dots indicates the population (in 2010) in any 1°x1° grid box. The underlay shows national SDG Global Index Scores indicating performance across the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. Hatching indicates missing SDG index data (e.g., Greenland). The histogram shows the number of people of the 2010 global population living in regions experiencing different levels of warming (at 0.25°C increments). See Supplementary Material 1.SM for further details.

Box 1.1: The Anthropocene: Strengthening the global response to 1.5°C global warming

Introduction

The concept of the Anthropocene can be linked to the aspiration of the Paris Agreement. The abundant empirical evidence of the unprecedented rate and global scale of impact of human influence on the Earth System (Steffen et al., 2016; Waters et al., 2016) has led many scientists to call for an acknowledgement that the Earth has entered a new geological epoch: the Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000; Crutzen, 2002; Gradstein et al., 2012). Although rates of change in the Anthropocene are necessarily assessed over much shorter periods than those used to calculate long-term baseline rates of change, and therefore present challenges for direct comparison, they are nevertheless striking. The rise in global CO₂ concentration since 2000 is about 20 ppm/decade, which is up to 10 times faster than any sustained rise in CO₂ during the past 800,000 years (Lüthi et al., 2008; Bereiter et al., 2015). AR5 found that the last geological epoch with similar atmospheric CO₂ concentration was the Pliocene, 3.3 to 3.0 Ma (Masson-Delmotte et al., 2013). Since 1970 the global average temperature has been rising at a rate of 1.7°C per century, compared to a long-term decline over the past 7,000 years at a baseline rate of 0.01°C per century (NOAA 2016, Marcott et al. 2013). These global-level rates of human-driven change far exceed the rates of change driven by geophysical or biosphere forces that have altered the Earth System trajectory in the past (e.g., Summerhayes 2015; Foster et al. 2017); even abrupt geophysical events do not approach current rates of human-driven change.

The geological dimension of the Anthropocene and 1.5°C global warming

The process of formalising the Anthropocene is on-going (Zalasiewicz et al., 2017), but a strong majority of the Anthropocene Working Group (AWG) established by the Sub-Committee on Quaternary Stratigraphy of the International Commission on Stratigraphy have agreed that: (i) the Anthropocene has a geological merit; (ii) it should follow the Holocene as a formal epoch in the Geological Time Scale; and, that (iii) its onset should be defined as the mid-20th century. Potential markers in the stratigraphic record include an array of novel manufactured materials of human origin, and “these combined signals render the Anthropocene stratigraphically distinct from the Holocene and earlier epochs” (Waters et al., 2016). The Holocene period, which itself was formally adopted in 1885 by geological science community, began 11,700 years ago with a more stable warm climate providing for emergence of human civilisation and growing human-nature interactions that have expanded to give rise to the Anthropocene (Waters et al., 2016).

The Anthropocene and the Challenge of a 1.5° C warmer world

The Anthropocene can be employed as a “boundary concept” (Brondizio et al., 2016) that frames critical insights into understanding the drivers, dynamics and specific challenges in responding to the ambition of keeping global temperature well below 2°C while pursuing efforts towards and adapting to a 1.5°C warmer world. The UNFCCC and its Paris Accord recognize the ability of humans to influence geophysical planetary processes (Chapter 2, Cross-Chapter Box 1 in this Chapter). The Anthropocene offers a structured understanding of the culmination of past and present human–environmental relations and provides an opportunity to better visualize the future to minimize pitfalls (Pattberg and Zelli, 2016; Delanty and Mota, 2017), while acknowledging the differentiated responsibility and opportunity to limit global warming and invest in prospects for climate-resilient sustainable development (Harrington, 2016) (Chapter 5). The Anthropocene also provides an opportunity to raise questions regarding the regional differences, social inequities and uneven capacities and drivers of global social–environmental changes, which in turn inform the search for solutions as explored in Chapter 4 of this report (Biermann et al., 2016). It links uneven influences of human actions on planetary functions to an uneven distribution of impacts (assessed in Chapter 3) as well as the responsibility and response capacity to for example, limiting global warming to no more than a 1.5°C rise above pre-industrial levels. Efforts to curtail greenhouse gas emissions without incorporating the intrinsic interconnectivity and disparities associated with the Anthropocene world may themselves negatively affect the development ambitions of some regions more than others and negate sustainable development efforts (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 5).

1.1.1 Equity and a 1.5°C warmer world

The AR5 suggested that equity, sustainable development, and poverty eradication are best understood as mutually supportive and co-achievable within the context of climate action, and are underpinned by various other international hard and soft law instruments (Denton et al., 2014; Fleurbaey et al., 2014; Klein et al., 2014; Olsson et al., 2014; Porter et al., 2014; Stavins et al., 2014). The aim of the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to ‘pursue efforts to limit’ the rise in global temperatures to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels raises ethical concerns that have long been central to climate debates (Fleurbaey et al., 2014; Kolstad et al., 2014). The Paris Agreement makes particular reference to the principle of equity, within the context of broader international goals of sustainable development and poverty eradication. Equity is a long-standing principle within international law and climate change law in particular (Dinah, 2008; Bodansky et al., 2017).

The AR5 describes equity as having three dimensions: intergenerational (fairness between generations), international (fairness between states), and national (fairness between individuals) (Fleurbaey et al., 2014). The principle is generally agreed to involve both procedural justice (i.e.

1 participation in decision making) and distributive justice (i.e. how the costs and benefits of climate
2 actions are distributed) (Kolstad et al., 2014; Savaresi, 2016; Reckien et al., 2017). Concerns
3 regarding equity have frequently been central to debates around mitigation, adaptation and climate
4 governance (Caney, 2005; Schroeder et al., 2012; Ajibade, 2016; Reckien et al., 2017; Shue, 2018).
5 Hence, equity provides a framework for understanding the asymmetries between the distributions of
6 benefits and costs relevant to climate action (Schleussner et al., 2016; Aaheim et al., 2017).

7 Four key framing asymmetries associated with the conditions of 1.5°C warmer world have been noted
8 (Okereke, 2010; Harlan et al., 2015; Ajibade, 2016; Savaresi, 2016; Reckien et al., 2017) and are
9 reflected in the report’s assessment. The first concerns differential contributions to the problem: the
10 observation that the benefits from industrialization have been unevenly distributed and those who
11 benefited most historically also have contributed most to the current climate problem and so bear
12 greater responsibility (Shue, 2013; Otto et al., 2017; Skeie et al., 2017). The second asymmetry
13 concerns differential impact: the worst impacts tend to fall on those least responsible for the problem,
14 within states, between states, and between generations (Fleurbaey et al., 2014; Shue, 2014; Ionesco et
15 al., 2016). The third is the asymmetry in capacity to shape solutions and response strategies, such that
16 the worst-affected states, groups and individuals are not always well-represented (Robinson and
17 Shine, 2018). Fourth, there is an asymmetry in future response capacity: some states, groups and
18 places are at risk of being left behind as the world progresses to a low-carbon economy (Fleurbaey et
19 al., 2014; Shue, 2014; Humphreys, 2017).

20
21 A sizeable and growing literature exists on how best to operationalize climate equity considerations,
22 drawing on other concepts mentioned in the Paris Agreement, notably its explicit reference to human
23 rights (OHCHR, 2009; Caney, 2010; Adger et al., 2014; Fleurbaey et al., 2014; IBA, 2014; Knox,
24 2015; Duyck et al., 2018; Robinson and Shine, 2018). Human rights comprise internationally agreed
25 norms that align with the Paris ambitions of poverty eradication, sustainable development and the
26 reduction of vulnerability (Caney, 2010; Fleurbaey et al., 2014; OHCHR, 2015). In addition to
27 defining substantive rights (such as to life, health and shelter) and procedural rights (such as to
28 information and participation), human rights instruments prioritise the rights of marginalised,
29 children, vulnerable and indigenous persons, and those discriminated against on grounds such as
30 gender, race, age or disability (OHCHR, 2017). Several international human rights obligations that are
31 relevant to the implementation of climate actions and consonant with UNFCCC undertakings in the
32 areas of mitigation, adaptation, finance, and technology transfer (Knox, 2015; OHCHR, 2015;
33 Humphreys, 2017).

34
35 Much of this literature is still new and evolving (Holz et al., 2017; Dooley et al., 2018; Klinsky and
36 Winkler, 2018), permitting the present report to examine some broader equity concerns raised both by
37 possible failure to limit warming to 1.5°C and by the range of ambitious mitigation efforts that may
38 be undertaken to achieve that limit. Any comparison between 1.5°C and higher levels of warming
39 implies risk assessments and value judgements, and cannot straightforwardly be reduced to a cost-
40 benefit analysis (Kolstad et al., 2014). However, different levels of warming can nevertheless be
41 understood in terms of their different implications for equity – that is, in the comparative distribution
42 of benefits and burdens for specific states, persons or generations, and in terms of their likely impacts
43 on sustainable development and poverty (see especially sections 2.2.2.3, 2.3.3.1, 3.4.5-3.4.11, 3.6,
44 5.4.1, 5.4.2, 5.6 and Cross-Chapter boxes 6 in Chapter 3 and 12 in Chapter 5).

45 46 47 **1.1.2 Eradication of poverty**

48
49 This report assesses the role of poverty and its eradication in the context of strengthening the global
50 response to the threat of climate change and sustainable development. A wide range of definitions for
51 *poverty* exist. The AR5 discussed ‘poverty’ in terms of its multidimensionality, referring to ‘material
52 circumstances’ (e.g. needs, patterns of deprivation, or limited resources), as well as to economic

1 conditions (e.g. standard of living, inequality, or economic position), and/or social relationships (e.g.
2 social class, dependency, lack of basic security, exclusion, or lack of entitlement – Olsson et al.,
3 2014). The UNDP now uses a Multidimensional Poverty Index, and estimates that about 1.5 billion
4 people globally live in multidimensional poverty, especially in rural areas of South Asia and Sub-
5 Saharan Africa, with an additional billion at risk of falling into poverty (UNDP, 2016).

6
7 A large and rapidly growing body of knowledge explores the connections between climate change and
8 poverty. Climatic variability and climate change are widely recognized as factors that may exacerbate
9 poverty, particularly in countries and regions where poverty levels are high (Leichenko and Silva,
10 2014). The AR5 noted that climate change-driven impacts often act as a threat multiplier in that the
11 impacts of climate change compound other drivers of poverty (Olsson et al., 2014). Many vulnerable
12 and poor people are dependent on activities such as agriculture that are highly susceptible to
13 temperature increases and variability in precipitation patterns (Shiferaw et al., 2014; Miyan, 2015).
14 Even modest changes in rainfall and temperature patterns can push marginalized people into poverty
15 as they lack the means to recover from shocks. Extreme events, such as floods, droughts, and heat
16 waves, especially when they occur in series, can significantly erode poor people’s assets and further
17 undermine their livelihoods in terms of labour productivity, housing, infrastructure, and social
18 networks (Olsson et al., 2014).

21 **1.1.3 Sustainable development and a 1.5°C warmer world**

22
23 AR5 noted with *high confidence* that ‘equity is an integral dimension of sustainable development’ and
24 that ‘mitigation and adaptation measures can strongly affect broader sustainable development and
25 equity objectives’ (Fleurbaey et al., 2014). Limiting global warming to 1.5°C will require substantial
26 societal and technological transformations, dependent in turn on global and regional sustainable
27 development pathways. A range of pathways, both sustainable and not, are explored in this report,
28 including implementation strategies to understand the enabling conditions and challenges required for
29 such a transformation. These pathways and connected strategies are framed within the context of
30 sustainable development, and in particular the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
31 Development (UNGA, 2015) and Cross-Chapter Box 4 on SDGs (in this Chapter). The feasibility of
32 staying within 1.5°C depends upon a range of enabling conditions with geophysical, environmental-
33 ecological, technological, economic, socio-cultural, and institutional enabling conditions. Limiting
34 warming to 1.5°C also involves identifying technology and policy levers to accelerate the pace of
35 transformation (see Chapter 4). Some pathways are more consistent than others with the requirements
36 for sustainable development (see Chapter 5). Overall, the three-pronged emphasis on sustainable
37 development, resilience, and transformation provides Chapter 5 an opportunity to assess the
38 conditions of simultaneously reducing societal vulnerabilities, addressing entrenched inequalities, and
39 breaking the circle of poverty.

40
41 The feasibility of any global commitment to a 1.5°C pathway depends, in part, on the cumulative
42 influence of the nationally determined contributions (NDCs), committing nation states to specific
43 GHG emission reductions. The current NDCs, extending only to 2030, do not limit warming to 1.5°C.
44 Depending on mitigation decisions after 2030, they cumulatively track toward a warming of 3-4°C
45 above preindustrial temperatures by 2100, with the potential for further warming thereafter (Rogelj et
46 al., 2016a; UNFCCC, 2016). The analysis of pathways in this report reveals opportunities for greater
47 decoupling of economic growth from GHG emissions. Progress towards limiting warming to 1.5°C
48 requires a significant acceleration of this trend. AR5 (IPCC, 2014a) concluded that climate change
49 constrains possible development paths, that synergies and trade-offs exist between climate responses
50 and socio-economic contexts, and that opportunities for effective climate responses overlap with
51 opportunities for sustainable development, noting that many existing societal patterns of consumption
52 are intrinsically unsustainable (Fleurbaey et al., 2014).

1.2 Understanding 1.5°C: reference levels, probability, transience, overshoot, stabilization

1.2.1 Working definitions of 1.5°C and 2°C warming relative to pre-industrial levels

What is meant by ‘the increase in global average temperature ... above pre-industrial levels’ referred to in the Paris Agreement depends on the choice of pre-industrial reference period, whether 1.5°C refers to total warming or the human-induced component of that warming, and which variables and geographical coverage are used to define global average temperature change. The cumulative impact of these definitional ambiguities (e.g. Hawkins et al., 2017; Pflaederer et al., 2018) is comparable to natural multi-decadal temperature variability on continental scales (Deser et al., 2012) and primarily affects the historical period, particularly that prior to the early 20th century when data is sparse and of less certain quality. Most practical mitigation and adaptation decisions do not depend on quantifying historical warming to this level of precision, but a consistent working definition is necessary to ensure consistency across chapters and figures. We adopt definitions that are as consistent as possible with key findings of AR5 with respect to historical warming.

This report defines ‘warming’, unless otherwise qualified, as an increase in multi-decade global mean surface temperature (GMST) above pre-industrial levels. Specifically, warming at a given point in time is defined as the global average of combined land surface air and sea surface temperatures for a 30-year period centred on that time, expressed relative to the reference period 1850-1900 (adopted for consistency with Box SPM.1 Figure 1 of IPCC (2014e) ‘as an approximation of pre-industrial levels’, excluding the impact of natural climate fluctuations within that 30-year period and assuming any secular trend continues throughout that period, extrapolating into the future if necessary. There are multiple ways of accounting for natural fluctuations and trends (e.g., Foster and Rahmstorf, 2011; Hausteine et al., 2017; Medhaug et al., 2017), but all give similar results. A major volcanic eruption might temporarily reduce observed global temperatures, but would not reduce warming as defined here (Bethke et al., 2017). Likewise, given that the level of warming is currently increasing at 0.3-0.7°C per 30 years (Kirtman et al., 2013), the level of warming in 2017 is 0.15-0.35°C higher than average warming over the 30-year period 1988-2017.

In summary, this report adopts a working definition of ‘1.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels’ that corresponds to global average combined land surface air and sea surface temperatures either 1.5°C warmer than the average of the 51-year period 1850-1900, 0.87°C warmer than the 20-year period 1986–2005, or 0.63°C warmer than the decade 2006–2015. These offsets are based on all available published global datasets, combined and updated, which show that 1986-2005 was 0.63°C ($\pm 0.06^\circ\text{C}$ 5–95% range based on observational uncertainties alone), and 2006-2015 was 0.87°C ($\pm 0.12^\circ\text{C}$ likely range also accounting for the possible impact of natural fluctuations), warmer than 1850–1900. Where possible, estimates of impacts and mitigation pathways are evaluated relative to these more recent periods.


1.2.1.1 Definition of global average temperature

The IPCC has traditionally defined changes in observed GMST as a weighted average of near-surface air temperature (SAT) changes over land and sea surface temperature (SST) changes over the oceans (Morice et al., 2012; Hartmann et al., 2013), while modelling studies have typically used a simple global average SAT. For ambitious mitigation goals, and under conditions of rapid warming, the difference can be significant. Cowtan et al. (2015) and Richardson et al. (2016) show that the use of blended SAT/SST data and incomplete coverage together can give approximately 0.2°C less warming from the 19th century to the present relative to the use of complete global-average SAT (Stocker et al., 2013), Figure TFE8.1 and Figure 1.2). However, Richardson et al. (2018) show that this is primarily an issue for the interpretation of the historical record to date, not for projection of future changes or

1 for estimated emissions budgets consistent with future changes, particularly under ambitious
2 mitigation scenarios.

3
4 The three GMST reconstructions used in AR5 differ in their treatment of missing data. GISTEMP
5 (Hansen et al., 2010) uses interpolation to infer trends in poorly-observed regions like the Arctic
6 (although even this product is spatially incomplete in the early record), while NOAA (Vose et al.,
7 2012) and HadCRUT (Morice et al., 2012) are progressively closer to a simple average of available
8 observations. Since the AR5, considerable effort has been devoted to more sophisticated statistical
9 modelling to account for the impact of incomplete observation coverage (Rohde et al., 2013; Cowtan
10 and Way, 2014; Jones, 2016). The main impact of statistical infilling is to increase estimated warming
11 to date by about 0.1°C (Richardson et al., 2018 and Table 1.1).

12
13 We adopt a working definition of warming over the historical period based on an average of the four
14 available global datasets that are supported by peer-reviewed publications: the three datasets used in
15 the AR5, updated (Karl et al., 2015), together with the Cowtan-Way infilled dataset (Cowtan and
16 Way, 2014). A further two datasets, Berkeley Earth (Rohde et al., 2013) and JMA, are provided in
17 Table 1.1. This working definition provides an updated estimate of 0.86°C for the warming 1880-
18 2012 based on a linear trend that was quoted as 0.85°C in the AR5. Hence the inclusion of the
19 Cowtan-Way dataset does not introduce any inconsistency with the AR5, whereas redefining GMST
20 to represent global SAT could increase this figure by up to 20%, (Table 1.1, Figure 1.2 Richardson et
21 al., 2016).



22
23 **Figure 1.2: Evolution of global mean surface temperature (GMST) over the period of instrumental**
24 **observations.** Grey line shows monthly mean GMST in the HadCRUT4, NOAA, GISTEMP and
25 Cowtan-Way datasets, expressed as departures from 1850–1900, with line thickness indicating
26 inter-dataset range. All observational datasets shown represent GMST as a weighted average of
27 near surface air temperature over land and sea surface temperature over oceans. Human-induced
28 (yellow) and total (human- and naturally-forced, orange) contributions to these GMST changes

1 are shown calculated following Otto et al. (2015) and Haustein et al. (2017). Fractional
2 uncertainty in the level of human-induced warming in 2017 is set equal to $\pm 20\%$. Thin blue lines
3 show the modelled global-mean surface air temperature (dashed) and blended surface air and sea
4 surface temperature accounting for observational coverage (solid) from the CMIP5 historical
5 ensemble average extended with RCP8.5 forcing (Cowtan et al., 2015; Richardson et al., 2018).
6 The pink shading indicates a range for temperature fluctuations over the Holocene (Marcott et al.,
7 2013). Light green plume shows AR5 prediction for average GMST over 2016–2035 (Kirtman et
8 al., 2013). See Supplementary Material 1.SM for further details.
9

11 1.2.1.2 Choice of reference period

12
13 Any choice of reference period used to approximate ‘pre-industrial’ conditions is a compromise
14 between data coverage and representativeness of typical pre-industrial solar and volcanic forcing
15 conditions. This report adopts the 51-year reference period, 1850–1900 inclusive, assessed as an
16 approximation of pre-industrial conditions in AR5 (Box TS.5, Figure 1 of Field et al., 2014). The
17 years 1880–1900 are subject to strong but uncertain volcanic forcing, but in the HadCRUT4 dataset,
18 average temperatures over 1850–1879, prior to the largest eruptions, are less than 0.01°C from the
19 average for 1850–1900. Temperatures rose by $0.0\text{--}0.2^\circ\text{C}$ from 1720–1800 to 1850–1900 (Hawkins et
20 al., 2017), but the anthropogenic contribution to this warming is uncertain (Schurer et al., 2017). The
21 18th century represents a relatively cool period in the context of temperatures since the mid-Holocene
22 (Marcott et al., 2013; Marsicek et al., 2018), as indicated by the pink shaded region in Figure 1.2.
23

24 Projections of responses to emission scenarios, and associated impacts, may use a more recent
25 reference period, offset by historical observations, to avoid conflating uncertainty in past and future
26 changes (e.g. Hawkins et al., 2017; Millar et al., 2017b; Simmons et al., 2017). Two recent reference
27 periods are used in this report: 1986–2005 and 2006–2015. In the latter case, when using a single
28 decade to represent a 30-year average centred on that decade, it is important to consider the potential
29 impact of internal climate variability. The years 2008–2013 were characterised by persistent cool
30 conditions in the Eastern Pacific (Kosaka and Xie, 2013; Medhaug et al., 2017), related to both the El
31 Niño / Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and, potentially, multi-decadal Pacific variability (e.g., England
32 et al., 2014), but these were partially compensated for by El Niño conditions in 2006 and 2015.
33 Likewise, volcanic activity depressed temperatures in 1986–2005, partly offset by the very strong El
34 Niño event in 1998. Figure 1.2 indicates that natural variability (internally generated and externally
35 driven) had little net impact on average temperatures over 2006–2015, in that the average temperature
36 of the decade is similar to the estimated externally-driven warming. When solar, volcanic and ENSO-
37 related variability is taken into account following the procedure of Foster and Rahmstorf (2011), there
38 is no indication of average temperatures in either 1986–2005 or 2006–2015 being substantially biased
39 by short-term variability (see Supplementary Material 1.SM). The temperature difference between
40 these two reference periods ($0.21\text{--}0.27^\circ\text{C}$ over 15 years across available datasets) is also consistent
41 with the AR5 assessment of the current warming rate of $0.3\text{--}0.7^\circ\text{C}$ over 30 years (Kirtman et al.,
42 2013).
43

44 On the definition of warming used here, warming to the decade 2006–2015 comprises an estimate of
45 the 30-year average centered on this decade, or 1996–2025, assuming the current trend continues and
46 that any volcanic eruptions that might occur over the final seven years are corrected for. Given this
47 element of extrapolation, we use the AR5 near-term projection to provide a conservative uncertainty
48 range. Combining the uncertainty in observed warming to 1986–2005 ($\pm 0.06^\circ\text{C}$) with the *likely* range
49 in the current warming trend as assessed by AR5 ($\pm 0.2^\circ\text{C}/30$ years), assuming these are uncorrelated,
50 and using observed warming relative to 1850–1900 to provide the central estimate (no evidence of
51 bias from short-term variability), gives an assessed warming to the decade 2006–2015 of 0.87°C with
52 a $\pm 0.12^\circ\text{C}$ *likely* range. This estimate has the advantage of traceability to the AR5, but more formal
53 methods of quantifying externally-driven warming (e.g., Bindoff et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2016;

1 Haustein et al., 2017; Ribes et al., 2017), which typically give smaller ranges of uncertainty, may be
2 adopted in future.

3
4 **Table 1.1: Observed increase in global average surface temperature in various datasets.** Numbers in
5 square brackets correspond to 5-95% uncertainty ranges from individual datasets, encompassing
6 known sources of observational uncertainty only.
7

Diagnostic / dataset	1850-1900 to (1) 2006-2015	1850-1900 to (2) 1986-2005	1986-2005 to (3) 2006-2015	1850-1900 to (4) 1981-2010	1850-1900 to (5) 1998-2017	trend (6) 1880-2012	trend (6) 1880-2015
HadCRUT4.6	0.84 [0.79–0.89]	0.60 [0.57–0.66]	0.22 [0.21–0.23]	0.62 [0.58–0.67]	0.83 [0.78–0.88]	0.83 [0.77–0.90]	0.88 [0.83–0.95]
NOAA (7)	0.86	0.62	0.22	0.63	0.85	0.85	0.91
GISTEMP (7)	0.89	0.65	0.23	0.66	0.88	0.89	0.94
Cowtan-Way	0.91 [0.85–0.99]	0.65 [0.60–0.72]	0.26 [0.25–0.27]	0.65 [0.60–0.72]	0.88 [0.82–0.96]	0.88 [0.79–0.98]	0.93 [0.85–1.03]
Average (8)	0.87	0.63	0.23	0.64	0.86	0.86	0.92
Berkeley (9)	0.98	0.73	0.25	0.73	0.97	0.97	1.02
JMA (9)	0.82	0.59	0.17	0.60	0.81	0.82	0.87
ERA-Interim	N/A	N/A	0.26	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
JRA-55	N/A	N/A	0.23	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CMIP5 global SAT (10)	0.99 [0.65–1.37]	0.62 [0.38–0.94]	0.38 [0.24–0.62]	0.62 [0.34–0.93]	0.89 [0.62–1.29]	0.81 [0.58–1.31]	0.86 [0.63–1.39]
CMIP5 SAT/SST blend—masked	0.86 [0.54–1.18]	0.50 [0.31–0.79]	0.34 [0.19–0.54]	0.48 [0.26–0.79]	0.75 [0.52–1.11]	0.68 [0.45–1.08]	0.74 [0.51–1.14]

8
9 Notes:

- 10 1) Most recent reference period used in this report.
11 2) Most recent reference period used in AR5.
12 3) Difference between recent reference periods.
13 4) Current WMO standard reference periods.
14 5) Most recent 20-year period.
15 6) Linear trends estimated by a straight-line fit, expressed in degrees yr⁻¹ multiplied by 133 or 135 years
16 respectively, with uncertainty ranges incorporating observational uncertainty only.
17 7) To estimate changes in the NOAA and GISTEMP datasets relative to the 1850–1900 reference period,
18 warming is computed relative to 1850–1900 using the HadCRUT4.6 dataset and scaled by the ratio of the
19 linear trend 1880–2015 in the NOAA or GISTEMP dataset with the corresponding linear trend computed
20 from HadCRUT4.
21 8) Average of diagnostics derived – see (7) – from four peer-reviewed global datasets, HadCRUT4.6, NOAA,
22 GISTEMP & Cowtan-Way. Note that differences between averages may not coincide with average
23 differences because of rounding.
24 9) No peer-reviewed publication available for these global combined land-sea datasets.
25 10) CMIP5 changes estimated relative to 1861–80 plus 0.02°C for the offset in HadCRUT4.6 from 1850–1900.
26 CMIP5 values are the mean of the RCP8.5 ensemble, with 5–95% ensemble range. They are included to
27 illustrate the difference between a complete global surface air temperature record (SAT) and a blended
28 surface air and sea surface temperature (SST) record accounting for incomplete coverage (masked),
29 following Richardson et al. (2016). Note that 1986–2005 temperatures in CMIP5 appear to have been
30 depressed more than observed temperatures by the eruption of Mount Pinatubo.
31
32

33 1.2.1.3 Total versus human-induced warming and warming rates

34
35 Total warming refers to the actual temperature change, irrespective of cause, while human-induced
36 warming refers to the component of that warming that is attributable to human activities. Mitigation
37 studies focus on human-induced warming (that is not subject to internal climate variability), while

1 studies of climate change impacts typically refer to total warming (often with the impact of internal
2 variability minimised through the use of multi-decade averages).

3
4 In the absence of strong natural forcing due to changes in solar or volcanic activity, the difference
5 between total and human-induced warming is small: assessing empirical studies quantifying solar and
6 volcanic contributions to GMST from 1890 to 2010, AR5 (Fig. 10.6 of Bindoff et al., 2013) found
7 their net impact on warming over the full period to be less than $\pm 0.1^\circ\text{C}$. Figure 1.2 shows that the
8 level of human-induced warming has been indistinguishable from total observed warming since 2000,
9 including over the decade 2006–2015. Bindoff et al. (2013) assessed the magnitude of human-induced
10 warming over the period 1951–2010 to be $0.7^\circ\text{C} \pm 0.1^\circ\text{C}$, slightly greater than the 0.65°C observed
11 warming over this period (Figures 10.4 & 10.5) and a *likely* range of $\pm 14\%$. The key surface
12 temperature attribution studies underlying this finding (Gillett et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2013;
13 Ribes and Terray, 2013) used temperatures since the 19th century to constrain human-induced
14 warming, and so their results are equally applicable to the attribution of causes of warming over
15 longer periods. Jones et al. (2016) show (Figure 10) human-induced warming trends over the period
16 1905–2005 to be indistinguishable from the corresponding total observed warming trend accounting
17 for natural variability using spatio-temporal detection patterns from 12 out of 15 CMIP5 models and
18 from the multi-model average. Figures from Ribes and Terray (2013), show the anthropogenic
19 contribution to the observed linear warming trend 1880–2012 in the HadCRUT4 dataset (0.83°C in
20 Table 1.1) to be 0.86°C using a multi-model average global diagnostic, with a 5–95% confidence
21 interval of $0.72\text{--}1.00^\circ\text{C}$. In all cases, since 2000 the estimated combined contribution of solar and
22 volcanic activity to warming relative to 1850–1900 is found to be less than $\pm 0.1^\circ\text{C}$ (Gillett et al.,
23 2013), while anthropogenic warming is indistinguishable from, and if anything slightly greater than,
24 the total observed warming, with 5–95% confidence intervals typically around $\pm 20\%$.

25
26 Haustein et al. (2017) give a 5–95% confidence interval for human-induced warming in 2017 of 0.87--
27 1.22°C , with a best estimate of 1.02°C , based on the HadCRUT4 dataset accounting for observational
28 and forcing uncertainty and internal variability. Applying their method to the average of the 4 datasets
29 shown in figure 1.2 gives an average level of human-induced warming in 2017 of 1.04°C . They also
30 estimate a human-induced warming trend over the past 20 years of 0.17°C ($0.13\text{--}0.33^\circ\text{C}$) per decade,
31 consistent with estimates of the total observed trend of Foster and Rahmstorf (2011)
32 ($0.17 \pm 0.03^\circ\text{C}/\text{decade}$ uncertainty in linear trend only) and Kirtman et al. (2013) ($0.3\text{--}0.7^\circ\text{C}$ over 30
33 years, or $0.1\text{--}0.23^\circ\text{C}/\text{decade}$, *likely* range), and a best-estimate warming rate over the past five years
34 of $0.215^\circ\text{C}/\text{decade}$ (Leach et al., 2018). Drawing on these multiple lines of evidence, human-induced
35 warming is assessed to have reached 1.0°C in 2017, having increased by 0.13°C from the mid-point of
36 2006–2015, with a *likely* range of $\pm 0.2^\circ\text{C}$ (reduced from 5–95% to account for additional forcing and
37 model uncertainty), increasing at 0.2°C ($\pm 0.1^\circ\text{C}$) per decade (estimates of human-induced warming
38 given to 0.1°C precision only).


39
40 Since warming is here defined in terms of a 30-year average, corrected for short-term natural
41 fluctuations, when warming is considered to be at 1.5°C , global temperatures would fluctuate equally
42 on either side of 1.5°C in the absence of a large cooling volcanic eruption (Bethke et al, 2017). Figure
43 1.2 indicates there is a substantial chance of GMST in a single month fluctuating over 1.5°C between
44 now and 2020, but this would not constitute temperatures ‘reaching 1.5°C ’ on our working definition.
45 Rogelj et al. (2017) show limiting the probability of annual GMST exceeding 1.5°C to less than one-
46 year-in-20 would require limiting warming, on the definition used here, to 1.31°C or lower.

47 48 49 **1.2.2 Global versus regional and seasonal warming**

50
51 Warming is not observed or expected to be spatially or seasonally uniform (IPCC, 2013b). A 1.5°C
52 increase in GMST will be associated with warming substantially greater than 1.5°C in many land
53 regions, and less than 1.5°C in most ocean regions. This is illustrated by Figure 1.3, which shows an

1 estimate of the observed change in annual and seasonal average temperatures between the 1850-1900
 2 pre-industrial reference period and the decade 2006–2015 in the Cowtan-Way dataset. These regional
 3 changes are associated with an observed GMST increase of 0.91°C in the dataset shown here, or
 4 0.87°C in the 4-dataset average (Table 1.1). This observed pattern reflects an on-going transient
 5 warming: features such as enhanced warming over land may be less pronounced, but still present, in
 6 equilibrium (IPCC, 2013b). This figure illustrates the magnitude of these differences, with many
 7 locations, particularly in Northern-Hemisphere mid-latitude winter (December–February), already
 8 experiencing regional warming more than double the global average. Individual seasons may be
 9 substantially warmer, or cooler, than these expected long-term average changes.
 10

Regional warming in the decade 2006-2015 relative to preindustrial



11
 12 **Figure 1.3: Spatial and seasonal pattern of present-day warming:** Regional warming for the 2006–2015
 13 decade relative to 1850–1900 for the annual mean (top), the average of December, January and
 14 February (bottom left) and for June, July and August (bottom right). Warming is evaluated by
 15 regressing regional changes in the (Cowtan and Way, 2014) dataset onto the total (combined
 16 human and natural) externally-forced warming (yellow line in Figure 1.2). See Supplementary
 17 Material 1.SM for further details and versions using alternative datasets. The definition of regions
 18 (green boxes and labels in top panel) is adopted from the AR5 (Christensen et al., 2013).
 19
 20

21 **1.2.3 Definition of 1.5°C-consistent pathways: probability, transience, stabilization and** 22 **overshoot**

23
 24 Pathways considered in this report, consistent with available literature on 1.5°C, primarily focus on
 25 the timescale up to 2100, recognising that the evolution of GMST after 2100 is also important. Two
 26 broad categories of 1.5°C-consistent pathways can be used to characterise mitigation options and

1 impacts: pathways in which warming (defined as 30-year averaged GMST relative to pre-industrial
2 levels, see section 1.2.1) remains below 1.5°C throughout the 21st century, and pathways in which
3 warming temporarily exceeds (‘overshoots’) 1.5°C and returns to 1.5°C either before or soon after
4 2100. Pathways in which warming exceeds 1.5°C before 2100, but might return to that level in some
5 future century, are not considered 1.5°C-consistent.

6
7 Because of uncertainty in the climate response, a ‘prospective’ mitigation pathway (see Cross-Chapter
8 Box 1 in this Chapter), in which emissions are prescribed, can only provide a level of probability of
9 warming remaining below a temperature threshold. This probability cannot be quantified precisely
10 since estimates depend on the method used (Rogelj et al., 2016b; Millar et al., 2017b; Goodwin et al.,
11 2018; Tokarska and Gillett, 2018). This report defines a ‘1.5°C-consistent pathway’ as a pathway of
12 emissions and associated possible temperature responses in which the majority of approaches using
13 presently-available information assign a probability in the range of approximately one-in-two to two-
14 in-three to warming remaining below 1.5°C or, in the case of an overshoot pathway, returning to
15 1.5°C by around 2100 or earlier. In Chapter 2, the classification of pathways is based on one
16 modeling approach to avoid ambiguity, but probabilities of exceeding 1.5°C are checked against other
17 approaches to verify that they lie within this approximate range. All these absolute probabilities are
18 imprecise, depend on the information used to constrain them, and hence are expected to evolve in the
19 future. Imprecise probabilities can nevertheless be useful for decision-making, provided the
20 imprecision is acknowledged (Hall et al., 2007; Kriegler et al., 2009; Simpson et al., 2016). Relative
21 and rank probabilities can be assessed much more consistently: approaches may differ on the absolute
22 probability assigned to individual outcomes, but typically agree on which outcomes are more
23 probable.

24
25 Importantly, 1.5°C-consistent pathways allow a substantial (up to one-in-two) chance of warming still
26 exceeding 1.5°C. An ‘adaptive’ mitigation pathway in which emissions are continuously adjusted to
27 achieve a specific temperature outcome (e.g. Millar et al., 2017b) reduces uncertainty in the
28 temperature outcome while increasing uncertainty in the emissions required to achieve it. It has been
29 argued (Otto et al., 2015; Xu and Ramanathan, 2017) that achieving very ambitious temperature goals
30 will require such an adaptive approach to mitigation, but very few studies have been performed taking
31 this approach (e.g. Jarvis et al., 2012).

32
33 Figure 1.4 illustrates these categories of (a) 1.5°C-consistent temperature pathways and associated (b)
34 annual and (c) cumulative emissions of CO₂. It also shows (d) a ‘time-integrated impact’ that
35 continues to increase even after GMST has stabilised, such as sea-level rise. This schematic assumes
36 for illustration that the fractional contribution of non-CO₂ climate forcers to total anthropogenic
37 forcing (which is currently increasing, Myhre et al., 2017) is approximately constant from now on.
38 Consequently, total human-induced warming is proportional to cumulative CO₂ emissions (solid line
39 in c), and GMST stabilises when emissions reach zero. This is only the case in the most ambitious
40 scenarios for non-CO₂ mitigation (Leach et al., 2018). A simple way of accounting for varying non-
41 CO₂ forcing in Figure 1.4 would be to note that every 1 W/m² increase in non-CO₂ forcing between
42 now and the decade or two immediately prior to the time of peak warming reduces cumulative CO₂
43 emissions consistent with the same peak warming by approximately 1200±300 GtCO₂ (using values
44 from AR5: Myhre et al, 2013; Jenkins et al, 2018; Allen et al, 2018; Cross-Chapter Box 2 in this
45 Chapter).

46 47 48 *1.2.3.1 Pathways remaining below 1.5°C*

49
50 In this category of 1.5°C-consistent pathways, human-induced warming either rises monotonically to
51 stabilise at 1.5°C (Figure 1.4, brown lines) or peaks at or below 1.5°C and then declines (yellow
52 lines). Figure 1.4, panel b demonstrates that pathways remaining below 1.5°C require net annual CO₂
53 emissions to peak and decline to near zero or below, depending on the long-term adjustment of the

1 carbon cycle and non-CO₂ emissions (Bowerman et al., 2013; Wigley, 2018). Reducing emissions to
2 zero corresponds to stabilizing cumulative CO₂ emissions (panel c, solid lines) and falling
3 concentrations of CO₂ in the atmosphere (panel c dashed lines) (Matthews and Caldeira, 2008;
4 Solomon et al., 2009), which is required to stabilize GMST if non-CO₂ climate forcings are constant
5 and positive. Stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations would result in continued
6 warming (see Section 1.2.4).

7
8 If starting emission reductions is delayed until temperatures are close to the proposed limit, pathways
9 remaining below 1.5°C necessarily involve much faster rates of net CO₂ emission reductions (Figure
10 1.4, green lines), combined with rapid reductions in non-CO₂ forcing, and also reach 1.5°C earlier.
11 Note that the emissions associated with these schematic temperature pathways may not correspond to
12 feasible emission scenarios, but they do illustrate the fact that the timing of net zero emissions does
13 not in itself determine peak warming: what matters is total cumulative emissions up to that time.
14 Hence every year's delay before initiating emission reductions reduces by approximately two years
15 the remaining time available to reduce emissions to zero on a pathway remaining below 1.5°C (Allen
16 and Stocker, 2013; Leach et al., 2018).


17 18 19 *1.2.3.2 Pathways temporarily exceeding 1.5°C*

20
21 With the pathways in this category, also referred to as overshoot pathways, GMST rises above 1.5°C
22 before peaking and returning to 1.5°C around or before 2100 (Figure 1.4, blue lines), subsequently
23 either stabilising or continuing to fall. This allows initially slower or delayed emission reductions but
24 lowering GMST requires net negative global CO₂ emissions (net anthropogenic removal of CO₂;
25 Figure 1.4, panel b). Cooling, or reduced warming, through sustained reductions of net non-CO₂
26 climate forcing (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in this Chapter) is also required, but their role is limited
27 because emissions of most non-CO₂ forcings cannot be reduced to below zero. Hence the feasibility
28 and availability of large-scale CO₂ removal limits the possible rate and magnitude of temperature
29 decline. In this report, overshoot pathways are referred to as 1.5°C-consistent, but qualified by the
30 amount of the temperature overshoot, which can have a substantial impact on irreversible climate
31 change impacts (Mathesius et al., 2015; Tokarska and Zickfeld, 2015).

32 33 34 *1.2.3.3 Impacts at 1.5°C warming associated with different pathways: transience versus* 35 *stabilisation*

36
37 Figure 1.4 also illustrates timescales associated with different impacts. While many impacts scale
38 with the change in GMST itself, some (such as those associated with ocean acidification) scale with
39 the change in atmospheric CO₂ concentration, indicated by the fraction of cumulative CO₂ emissions
40 remaining in the atmosphere (dotted lines in panel c). Others may depend on the rate of change of
41 GMST, while 'time-integrated impacts', such as sea-level rise, shown in panel (d) continue to
42 increase even after GMST has stabilised.

43
44 Hence impacts that occur when GMST reaches 1.5°C could be very different depending on the
45 pathway to 1.5°C. CO₂ concentrations will be higher as GMST rises past 1.5°C (transient warming)
46 than when GMST has stabilized at 1.5°C while sea level and, potentially, global mean precipitation
47 (Pendergrass et al., 2015) would both be lower (see Figure 1.4). These differences could lead to very
48 different impacts on agriculture, on some forms of extreme weather (e.g., Baker et al., 2018), and on
49 marine and terrestrial ecosystems (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2017,)Box 3.1). Sea level would be higher still
50 if GMST returns to 1.5°C after an overshoot (Figure 1.4, panel d), with potentially significantly
51 different impacts in vulnerable regions. Temperature overshoot could also cause irreversible impacts
52 (see Chapter 3).



1
2
3 **Figure 1.4: Different 1.5°C-consistent pathways¹:** Schematic illustration of the relationship between (a)
4 global mean surface temperature (GMST) change; (b) annual rates of CO₂ emissions, assuming
5 constant fractional contribution of non-CO₂ forcing to total human-induced warming; (c) total
6 cumulative CO₂ emissions (solid lines) and the fraction thereof remaining in the atmosphere
7 (dashed lines; these also indicates changes in atmospheric CO₂ concentrations); and (d) a time-
8 integrated impact, such as sea-level rise, that continues to increase even after GMST has
9 stabilized. Colours indicate different 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Brown: GMST remaining below
10 and stabilizing at 1.5°C in 2100; Green: a delayed start but faster implementation pathway with
11 GMST remaining below and reaching 1.5°C earlier; Blue: a pathway temporarily exceeding
12 1.5°C, with temperatures reduced to 1.5°C by net negative CO₂ emissions after temperatures
13 peak; and Yellow: a pathway peaking at 1.5°C and subsequently declining. Temperatures are
14 anchored to 0.87°C above pre-industrial in 2010; emissions-temperature relationships are
15 computed using a simple climate model (Myhre et al., 2013; Millar et al., 2017a; Jenkins et al.,
16 2018) with a lower value of the Transient Climate Response (TCR) than used in the quantitative
17 pathway assessments in Chapter 2 to illustrate qualitative differences between pathways: this
18 figure is not intended to provide quantitative information. The time-integrated impact is illustrated
19 by the semi-empirical sea-level-rise model of Kopp et al. (2016).

¹ FOOTNOTE: An animated version of Figure 1.4 will be embedded in the web-based version of this Special Report

Cross-Chapter Box 1: Scenarios and Pathways

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Climate change scenarios have been used in IPCC assessments since the First Assessment Report (Leggett et al., 1992). The **SRES scenarios** (named after the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios; IPCC, 2000), published in 2000, consist of four scenarios that do not take into account any future measures to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Subsequently, many policy scenarios have been developed based upon them (Morita et al., 2001). The SRES scenarios are superseded by a set of scenarios based on the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) and Shared Socio-Economic Pathways (SSPs) (Riahi et al., 2017). The RCPs comprise a set of four GHG concentration trajectories that jointly span a large range of plausible human-caused climate forcing ranging from 2.6 W m⁻² (RCP2.6) to 8.5 W m⁻² (RCP8.5) by the end of the 21st century (van Vuuren et al., 2011). They were used to develop climate projections in the 5th Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5; Taylor et al., 2012) and were assessed in the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (AR5). Based on the CMIP5 ensemble, RCP2.6, provides a better than two in three chance of staying below 2°C and a median warming of 1.6°C relative to 1850–1900 in 2100 (Collins et al., 2013).

The SSPs were developed to complement the RCPs with varying socio-economic challenges to adaptation and mitigation. SSP-based scenarios were developed for a range of climate forcing levels, including the end-of-century forcing levels of the RCPs (Riahi et al., 2017) and a level below RCP2.6 to explore pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (Rogelj et al., 2018). The SSP-based 1.5°C-consistent pathways are assessed in Chapter 2 of this report. These scenarios offer an integrated perspective on socio-economic, energy-system (Bauer et al., 2017), land use (Popp et al., 2017), air pollution (Rao et al., 2017) and GHG emissions developments (Riahi et al., 2017). Because of their harmonised assumptions, scenarios developed with the SSPs facilitate the integrated analysis of future climate impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and mitigation.

Scenarios and Pathways in this Report

This report focuses on pathways that could limit the increase of global mean surface temperature (GMST) to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and pathways that align with the goals of sustainable development and poverty eradication. Pace and scale of mitigation and adaptation are assessed in the context of historical evidence to determine where unprecedented change is required (see Chapter 4). Other scenarios are also assessed, primarily as benchmarks for comparison of mitigation, impacts, and/or adaptation requirements. These include baseline scenarios that assume no climate policy; scenarios that assume some kind of continuation of current climate policy trends and plans, many of which are used to assess the implications of the nationally-determined contributions (NDCs); and scenarios holding warming below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. This report assesses the spectrum from global mitigation scenarios to local adaptation choices – complemented by a bottom-up assessment of individual mitigation and adaptation options and their implementation (policies, finance, institutions, governance, see Chapter 4). Regional, national, and local scenarios, as well as decision-making processes over values and difficult trade-offs are important for understanding the challenges of limiting GMST increase to 1.5°C and are thus indispensable when assessing implementation.

Different climate policies result in different temperature pathways, which result in different levels of climate risks and actual climate impacts with associated long-term implications. Temperature pathways are classified into continued warming pathways (in the cases of baseline and reference scenarios), pathways that keep the temperature below a specific limit (like 1.5°C or 2°C), and pathways that temporarily exceed and later fall to a specific limit (overshoot pathways). In the case of a temperature overshoot, net negative CO₂ emissions are required to remove excess CO₂ from the

1 atmosphere.

2
3 In a ‘prospective’ mitigation pathway, emissions (or sometimes concentrations) are prescribed, giving
4 a range of GMST outcomes because of uncertainty in the climate response. Prospective pathways are
5 considered ‘1.5°C-consistent’ in this report if, based current knowledge, the majority of available
6 approaches assign an approximate probability of one-in-two to two-in-three to temperatures either
7 remaining below 1.5°C or returning to 1.5°C either before or around 2100. Most pathways assessed in
8 Chapter 2 are prospective pathways, and therefore even ‘1.5°C-consistent pathways’ are also
9 associated with risks of warming higher than 1.5°C, noting that many risks increase non-linearly with
10 increasing GMST. In contrast, the ‘risks of warming of 1.5°C’ assessed in Chapter 3 refer to risks in a
11 world in which GMST is either passing through (transient) or stabilized at 1.5°C, without considering
12 probabilities of different GMST levels (unless otherwise qualified). To stay below any desired
13 temperature limit, adjusting mitigation measures and strategies would be required as knowledge of the
14 climate response is updated (Millar et al., 2017b; Emori et al., 2018). Such pathways can be called
15 ‘adaptive’ mitigation pathways. Given there is always a possibility of a greater-than-expected climate
16 response (Xu and Ramanathan, 2017), adaptive mitigation pathways are important to minimise
17 climate risks, but need also to consider the risks and feasibility (see Cross-Chapter Box 3 in this
18 Chapter) of faster-than-expected emission reductions. Aligning mitigation and adaptation pathways
19 with sustainable development pathways and transformative visions for the future that would support
20 avoiding negative impacts on the poorest and most disadvantaged populations and vulnerable sectors
21 are assessed in Chapter 5.

22 **Definitions of Scenarios and Pathways**

23 Climate scenarios and pathways are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably, with a wide range
24 of overlapping definitions (Rosenbloom, 2017).

25
26
27 A ‘**scenario**’ is an internally consistent, plausible, and integrated description of a possible future of
28 the human–environment system, including a narrative with qualitative trends and quantitative
29 projections (IPCC, 2000). Climate change scenarios provide a framework for developing and
30 integrating emissions, climate change and climate impact projections, including an assessment of their
31 inherent uncertainties. The long-term and multi–faceted nature of climate change requires climate
32 scenarios to describe how assumptions about inherently uncertain socio-economic trends in the 21st
33 century could influence future energy and land use, resulting in emissions, and climate change as well
34 as human vulnerability and exposure to climate change. Such driving forces include population, GDP,
35 technological innovation, governance, and lifestyles. Climate change scenarios are used for analysing
36 and contrasting climate policy choices.

37
38 The notion of a ‘**pathway**’ can have multiple meanings in the climate literature. It is often used to
39 describe the temporal evolution of a set of scenario features, such as GHG emissions and
40 socioeconomic development. As such, it can describe individual scenario components or sometimes
41 be used interchangeably with the word ‘scenario’. For example, the RCPs describe GHG
42 concentration trajectories (van Vuuren et al., 2011) and the SSPs are a set of narratives of societal
43 futures augmented by quantitative projections of socio-economic determinants such as population,
44 GDP, and urbanization (Kriegler et al., 2012; O’Neill et al., 2014). Socio-economic driving forces
45 consistent with any of the SSPs can be combined with a set of climate policy assumptions (Kriegler et
46 al., 2014) that together would lead to emissions and concentration outcomes consistent with the RCPs
47 (Riahi et al., 2017). This is at the core of the scenario framework for climate change research that
48 aims to facilitate creating scenarios integrating emissions and development pathways dimensions (Ebi
49 et al., 2014; van Vuuren et al., 2014).

50
51 In other parts of the literature, ‘pathway’ implies a solution-oriented trajectory describing a pathway
52 from today’s world to achieving a set of future goals. **Sustainable Development Pathways** describe
53 national and global pathways where climate policy becomes part of a larger sustainability

1 transformation (Shukla and Chaturvedi, 2013; Fleurbaey et al., 2014; van Vuuren et al., 2015). The
2 AR5 presented **climate-resilient pathways** as sustainable development pathways that combine the
3 goals of adaptation and mitigation (Denton et al., 2014), more broadly defined as iterative processes
4 for managing change within complex systems in order to reduce disruptions and enhance
5 opportunities associated with climate change (IPCC, 2014b). The AR5 also introduced the notion of
6 **climate-resilient development pathways**, with a more explicit focus on dynamic livelihoods,
7 multidimensional poverty, structural inequalities, and equity among poor and non-poor people
8 (Olsson et al., 2014). **Adaptation pathways**, understood as a series of adaptation choices involving
9 trade-offs between short-term and long-term goals and values (Reisinger et al., 2014). They are
10 decision-making processes sequenced over time with the purpose of deliberating and identifying
11 socially-salient solutions in specific places (Barnett et al., 2014; Wise et al., 2014; Fazey et al., 2016).
12 There is a range of possible pathways for transformational change, often negotiated through iterative
13 and inclusive processes (Harris et al., 2017; Fazey et al., 2018; Tàbara et al., 2018).

16 *1.2.4 Geophysical warming commitment*

18 It is frequently asked whether limiting warming to 1.5°C is ‘feasible’ (Cross–Chapter Box 3 in this
19 Chapter). There are many dimensions to this question, including the warming ‘commitment’ from
20 past emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosol precursors. Quantifying commitment from past
21 emissions is complicated by the very different behaviour of different climate forcers affected by
22 human activity: emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases such as CO₂ and nitrous oxide (N₂O) have a
23 very persistent impact on radiative forcing (Myhre et al., 2013), lasting from over a century (in the
24 case of N₂O) to hundreds of thousands of years (for CO₂). Short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs) such as
25 methane (CH₄) and aerosols, in contrast, persist for at most about a decade (in the case of methane)
26 down to only a few days. These different behaviours must be taking into account in assessing the
27 implications of any approach to calculating aggregate emissions (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in this
28 Chapter).

30 Geophysical warming commitment is defined as the unavoidable future warming resulting from
31 physical Earth system inertia. Different variants are discussed in the literature, including (i) the
32 ‘constant composition commitment’ (CCC), defined by Meehl et al. (2007) as the further warming
33 that would result if atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and other climate forcers were stabilised at
34 the current level; and (ii) and the ‘zero emissions commitment’ (ZEC), defined as the further warming
35 that would still occur if all future anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosol precursors
36 were eliminated instantaneously (Meehl et al, 2007; Collins et al., 2013).


38 The CCC is primarily associated with thermal inertia of the ocean (Hansen et al., 2005), and has led to
39 the misconception that substantial future warming is inevitable (Matthews and Solomon, 2013). The
40 CCC takes into account the warming from past emissions, but also includes warming from future
41 emissions (declining but still non-zero) that are required to maintain a constant atmospheric
42 composition. It is therefore not relevant to the warming commitment from past emissions alone.

44 The ZEC, although based on equally idealised assumptions, allows for a clear separation of the
45 response to past emissions from the effects of future emissions. The magnitude and sign of the ZEC
46 depend on the mix of GHGs and aerosols considered. For CO₂, which has an effective atmospheric
47 residence time of centuries to millennia (Eby et al., 2009), the multi-century warming commitment
48 from emissions to date is estimated to range from slightly negative (i.e., a slight cooling relative to
49 present-day) to slightly positive (Matthews and Caldeira, 2008; Lowe et al., 2009; Gillett et al., 2011;
50 Collins et al., 2013). Some studies estimate a larger ZEC from CO₂, but for cumulative emissions
51 much higher than those up to present day (Frölicher et al., 2014; Ehlert and Zickfeld, 2017). The ZEC
52 from past CO₂ emissions is small because the continued warming effect from ocean thermal inertia is
53 approximately balanced by declining radiative forcing due to CO₂ uptake by the ocean (Solomon et

1 al., 2009; Williams et al., 2017). Thus, although present-day CO₂-induced warming is irreversible on
2 millennial timescales (without human intervention such as active carbon dioxide removal or solar
3 radiation modification (Section 1.4.1)), past CO₂ emissions do not commit to substantial further
4 warming (Matthews and Solomon, 2013).

5
6 For warming SLCFs, meaning those associated with positive radiative forcing such as methane, the
7 ZEC is negative. Eliminating emissions of these substances (also sometimes referred to as short-lived
8 climate pollutants, see Section 4.3.6) results in an immediate cooling relative to the present
9 (Figure 1.5, magenta line) (Frölicher and Joos, 2010; Matthews and Zickfeld, 2012; Mauritsen and
10 Pincus, 2017). Cooling SLCFs (those associated with negative radiative forcing) such as sulphate
11 aerosols create a positive ZEC, as elimination of these forcers results in rapid warming (Matthews and
12 Zickfeld, 2012; Mauritsen and Pincus, 2017; Samset et al., 2018). Estimates of the warming
13 commitment from eliminating aerosol emissions are affected by large uncertainties in net aerosol
14 radiative forcing (Myhre et al., 2013, 2017). If present-day emissions of all GHGs (short- and long-
15 lived) and aerosols (including sulphate, nitrate and carbonaceous aerosols) are eliminated (Figure 1.5,
16 yellow line) GMST rises over the following decade. This initial warming is followed by a gradual
17 cooling driven by the decline in radiative forcing of short-lived greenhouse gases (Matthews and
18 Zickfeld, 2012; Collins et al., 2013). Peak warming following elimination of all emissions was
19 assessed at a few tenths of a degree in AR5, and century-scale warming was assessed to change only
20 slightly relative to the time emissions are reduced to zero (Collins et al., 2013). New evidence since
21 AR5 suggests a larger methane forcing (Etminan et al., 2016) but no revision in the range of aerosol
22 forcing (although this remains an active field of research, e.g., Myhre et al., 2017). This revised
23 methane forcing estimate results in a smaller peak warming and a faster temperature decline than
24 assessed in AR5 (Figure 1.5, yellow line).

25
26 Expert judgement based on the available evidence (including model simulations, radiative forcing and
27 climate sensitivity) suggests that if all anthropogenic emissions were reduced to zero immediately,
28 any further warming beyond the 1°C already experienced would *likely* be less than 0.5°C over the
29 next two to three decades, and also *likely* less than 0.5°C on a century timescale.



1
2 **Figure 1.5: Different interpretations of warming commitment from past emissions:** Radiative forcing
3 (top) and global mean surface temperature change (bottom) for scenarios with different
4 combinations of greenhouse gas and aerosol precursor emissions reduced to zero in 2020.
5 Variables were calculated using a simple climate–carbon cycle model (Millar et al., 2017a) with a
6 simple representation of atmospheric chemistry (Smith et al., 2018). The bars on the right–hand
7 side indicate the median warming in 2100 and 5–95% uncertainty ranges (also indicated by the
8 plume around the yellow line) taking into account one estimate of uncertainty in climate response,
9 effective radiative forcing, and carbon cycle constraining simple model parameters with response
10 ranges from AR5 combined with historical climate observations (Smith et al., 2018).
11 Temperatures continue to increase slightly after elimination of CO_2 emissions (blue line) due to
12 adjusting to the recent increase in non- CO_2 forcing. The dashed blue line extrapolates one
13 estimate of the current rate of warming, while dotted blue lines show a case where CO_2 emissions
14 are reduced linearly to zero assuming constant non- CO_2 forcing after 2020. Under these highly
15 idealized assumptions, the time to stabilize temperatures at $1.5^{\circ}C$ is approximately double the
16 time remaining to reach $1.5^{\circ}C$ at the current warming rate.
17

1 Since most sources of emissions cannot, in reality, be brought to zero instantaneously due to techno-
2 economic inertia, the current rate of emissions also constitutes a conditional commitment to future
3 emissions and consequent warming depending on achievable rates of emission reductions. The current
4 level and rate of human-induced warming determines both the time left before a temperature threshold
5 is exceeded if warming continues (dashed blue line in Figure 1.5) and the time over which the
6 warming rate must be reduced to avoid exceeding that threshold (approximately indicated by the
7 dotted blue line in Figure 1.5). Leach et al. (2018) use a central estimate of human-induced warming
8 of 1.02°C in 2017 increasing at 0.215°C per decade (Haustein et al., 2017), to argue that it will take
9 13–32 years (one-standard-error range) to reach 1.5°C if the current warming rate continues, allowing
10 25–64 years to stabilise temperatures at 1.5°C if the warming rate is reduced at a constant rate of
11 deceleration starting immediately. Since the rate of human-induced warming is proportional to the
12 rate of CO₂ emissions (Matthews et al., 2009; Zickfeld et al., 2009) plus a term approximately
13 proportional to the rate of increase in non-CO₂ radiative forcing (Gregory and Forster, 2008; Allen et
14 al., 2018; Cross-Chapter Box 2 in this Chapter), these timescales also provide an indication of
15 minimum emission reduction rates required if a warming greater than 1.5°C is to be avoided (see
16 Supplementary Material 1.SM and FAQ 1.2).

19 **Cross-Chapter Box 2: Measuring progress to net zero emissions combining long-lived and** 20 **short-lived climate forcers**

21
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24 (Canada/Germany)

25
26 Emissions of many different climate forcers will affect the rate and magnitude of climate change over
27 the next few decades (Myhre et al., 2013). Since these decades will determine when 1.5°C is reached
28 or whether a warming greater than 1.5°C is avoided, understanding the aggregate impact of different
29 forcing agents is particularly important in the context of 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Paragraph 17 of
30 Decision 1 of the 21st Conference of the Parties on the adoption of the Paris Agreement specifically
31 states that this report is to identify aggregate greenhouse gas emission levels compatible with holding
32 the increase in global average temperatures to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels (see Chapter 2). This
33 request highlights the need to consider the implications of different methods of aggregating emissions
34 of different gases, both for future temperatures and for other aspects of the climate system.

35
36 To date, reporting of GHG emissions under the UNFCCC has used Global Warming Potentials
37 (GWPs) evaluated over a 100-year time horizon (GWP₁₀₀) to combine multiple climate forcers. IPCC
38 Working Group 3 reports have also used GWP₁₀₀ to represent multi-gas pathways (Clarke et al.,
39 2014). For reasons of comparability and consistency with current practice, Chapter 2 in this Special
40 Report continues to use this aggregation method. Numerous other methods of combining different
41 climate forcers have been proposed, such as the Global Temperature-change Potential (GTP; Shine et
42 al., 2005) and the Global Damage Potential (Tol et al., 2012; Deuber et al., 2013).

43
44 Climate forcers fall into two broad categories in terms of their impact on global temperature (Smith et
45 al., 2012): long-lived GHGs, such as CO₂ and nitrous oxide (N₂O), whose warming impact depends
46 primarily on the total cumulative amount emitted over the past century or the entire industrial epoch;
47 and short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs), such as methane and black carbon, whose warming impact
48 depends primarily on current and recent annual emission rates (Reisinger et al., 2012; Myhre et al.,
49 2013; Smith et al., 2013; Strefler et al., 2014). These different dependencies affect the emissions
50 reductions required of individual forcers to limit warming to 1.5°C or any other level.

51
52 Natural processes that remove CO₂ permanently from the climate system are so slow that reducing the
53 rate of CO₂-induced warming to zero requires net zero global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions (Archer

1 and Brovkin, 2008; Matthews and Caldeira, 2008; Solomon et al., 2009), meaning almost all
2 remaining anthropogenic CO₂ emissions must be compensated for by an equal rate of anthropogenic
3 carbon dioxide removal (CDR). Cumulative CO₂ emissions are therefore an accurate indicator of
4 CO₂-induced warming, except in periods of high negative CO₂ emissions (Zickfeld et al., 2016), and
5 potentially in century-long periods of near-stable temperatures (Bowerman et al., 2011; Wigley,
6 2018). In contrast, sustained constant emissions of a SLCF such as methane, would (after a few
7 decades) be consistent with constant methane concentrations and hence very little additional methane-
8 induced warming (Allen et al., 2018; Fuglestedt et al., 2018). Both GWP and GTP would equate
9 sustained SLCF emissions with sustained constant CO₂ emissions, which would continue to
10 accumulate in the climate system, warming global temperatures indefinitely. Hence nominally
11 ‘equivalent’ emissions of CO₂ and SLCFs, if equated conventionally using GWP or GTP, have very
12 different temperature impacts, and these differences are particularly evident under ambitious
13 mitigation characterising 1.5°C-consistent pathways.

14
15 Since the AR5, a revised usage of GWP has been proposed (Lauder et al., 2013; Allen et al., 2016),
16 denoted GWP* (Allen et al., 2018), that addresses this issue by equating a permanently sustained
17 change in the emission *rate* of an SLCF or SLCF-precursor (in tonnes-per-year), or other non-CO₂
18 forcing (in Watts per square metre), with a one-off *pulse* emission (in tonnes) of a fixed amount of
19 CO₂. Specifically, GWP* equates a 1 tonne-per-year increase in emission rate of an SLCF with a
20 pulse emission of $GWP_H \times H$ tonnes of CO₂, where GWP_H is the conventional GWP of that SLCF
21 evaluated over time horizon H . While GWP_H for SLCFs decreases with increasing time horizon H ,
22 $GWP_H \times H$ for SLCFs is less dependent on the choice of time horizon. Similarly, a permanent 1 W/m²
23 increase in radiative forcing has a similar temperature impact as the cumulative emission of
24 $H/AGWP_H$ tonnes of CO₂, where $AGWP_H$ is the Absolute Global Warming Potential of CO₂ (Shine et
25 al., 2005; Myhre et al., 2013; Allen et al., 2018). This indicates approximately how future changes in
26 non-CO₂ radiative forcing affect cumulative CO₂ emissions consistent with any given level of peak
27 warming.


28
29 When combined using GWP*, cumulative aggregate GHG emissions are closely proportional to total
30 GHG-induced warming, while the annual rate of GHG-induced warming is proportional to the annual
31 rate of aggregate GHG emissions (see Cross-Chapter Box 2, Figure 1). This is not the case when
32 emissions are aggregated using GWP or GTP, with discrepancies particularly pronounced when SLCF
33 emissions are falling. Persistent net zero CO₂-equivalent emissions containing a residual positive
34 forcing contribution from SLCFs and aggregated using GWP₁₀₀ or GTP would result in a steady
35 decline of GMST. Net zero global emissions aggregated using GWP* (which corresponds to zero net
36 emissions of CO₂ and other long-lived GHGs like nitrous oxide, combined with constant SLCF
37 forcing – see Figure 1.5) results in approximately stable GMST (Fuglestedt et al., 2018; Allen et al.,
38 2018 and Cross-Chapter Box 2, Figure 1, below).

39
40 Whatever method is used to relate emissions of different greenhouse gases, scenarios achieving stable
41 GMST well below 2°C require both near-zero net emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases and deep
42 reductions in warming SLCFs (Chapter 2), in part to compensate for the reductions in cooling SLCFs
43 that are expected to accompany reductions in CO₂ emissions (Rogelj et al., 2016b; Hienola et al.,
44 2018). Understanding the implications of different methods of combining emissions of different
45 climate forcers is, however, helpful in tracking progress towards temperature stabilisation and
46 ‘balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases’ as
47 stated in Article 4 of the Paris Agreement. Fuglestedt et al. (2018) and Tanaka and O’Neill
48 (2018) show that when, and even whether, aggregate GHG emissions need to reach net zero before
49 2100 to limit warming to 1.5°C depends on the scenario, aggregation method and mix of long-lived
50 and short-lived climate forcers.

51
52 The comparison of the impacts of different climate forcers can also consider more than their effects
53 on GMST (Johansson, 2012; Tol et al., 2012; Deuber et al., 2013; Myhre et al., 2013). Climate

1 impacts arise from both magnitude and rate of climate change, and from other variables such as
 2 precipitation (Shine et al., 2015). Even if GMST is stabilised, sea-level rise and associated impacts
 3 will continue to increase (Sterner et al., 2014), while impacts that depend on CO₂ concentrations such
 4 as ocean acidification may begin to reverse. From an economic perspective, comparison of different
 5 climate forcers ideally reflects the ratio of marginal economic damages if used to determine the
 6 exchange ratio of different GHGs under multi-gas regulation (Tol et al., 2012; Deuber et al., 2013;
 7 Kolstad et al., 2014).

8
 9 Emission reductions can interact with other dimensions of sustainable development (see Chapter 5).
 10 In particular, early action on some SLCFs (including actions that may warm the climate such as
 11 reducing SO₂ emissions) may have considerable societal co-benefits such as reduced air pollution and
 12 improved public health with associated economic benefits (OECD, 2016; Shindell et al., 2016).
 13 Valuation of broadly defined social costs attempts to account for many of these additional non-
 14 climate factors along with climate-related impacts (Shindell, 2015; Sarofim et al., 2017; Shindell et
 15 al., 2017). See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.6, for a discussions of mitigation options, noting that mitigation
 16 priorities for different climate forcers depend on multiple economic and social criteria that vary
 17 between sectors, regions and countries.



19
 20
 21 **Cross Chapter Box 2, Figure 1: Implications of different approaches to calculating aggregate greenhouse**
 22 **gas emissions on a pathway to net zero** (a) Aggregate emissions of well-mixed greenhouse gases (WMGHGs)
 23 under the RCP2.6 mitigation scenario expressed as CO₂-equivalent using GWP₁₀₀ (blue); GTP₁₀₀ (green) and
 24 GWP* (yellow). Aggregate WMGHG emissions appear to fall more rapidly if calculated using GWP* than
 25 using either GWP or GTP, primarily because GWP* equates falling methane emissions with negative CO₂
 26 emissions, as only active CO₂ removal would have the same impact on radiative forcing and GMST as a
 27 reduction in methane emission rates. (b) Cumulative emissions of WMGHGs combined as in panel (a) (blue,
 28 green & yellow lines & left hand axis) and warming response to combined emissions (black dotted line & right
 29 hand axis, Millar et al. (2017a)). The temperature response under ambitious mitigation is closely correlated with
 30 cumulative WMGHG emissions aggregated using GWP*, but with neither emission rate nor cumulative
 31 emissions if aggregated using GWP or GTP.

34 1.3 Impacts at 1.5°C and beyond

36 1.3.1 Definitions

37
 38 Consistent with the AR5 (IPCC, 2014e), ‘impact’ in this report refers to the effects of climate change
 39 on human and natural systems. Impacts may include the effects of changing hazards, such as the

1 frequency and intensity of heat waves. ‘Risk’ refers to potential negative impacts of climate change
2 where something of value is at stake, recognizing the diversity of values. Risks depend on hazards,
3 exposure, vulnerability (including sensitivity and capacity to respond) and likelihood. Climate change
4 risks can be managed through efforts to mitigate climate change forcings, adaptation of impacted
5 systems and remedial measures (Section 1.4.1).

6
7 In the context of this report, *regional* impacts of *global* warming at 1.5°C and 2°C are assessed in
8 Chapter 3. The ‘*warming experience at 1.5°C*’ is that of regional climate change (temperature,
9 rainfall, and other changes) at the time when global average temperatures, as defined in Section 1.2.1,
10 reach 1.5°C above pre-industrial (the same principle applies to impacts at any other global mean
11 temperature). Over the decade 2006-2015, many regions have experienced higher than average levels
12 of warming and some are already now 1.5°C warmer with respect to the pre-industrial period (Figure
13 1.3). At a global warming of 1.5°C, some seasons will be substantially warmer than 1.5°C above pre-
14 industrial (Seneviratne et al., 2016). Therefore, most regional impacts of a global mean warming of
15 1.5°C will be different from those of a regional warming by 1.5°C.

16
17 The impacts of 1.5°C global warming will vary in both space and time (Ebi et al., 2016). For many
18 regions, an increase in global mean temperature by 1.5°C or 2°C implies substantial increases in the
19 occurrence and/or intensity of some extreme events (Fischer and Knutti, 2015; Karmalkar and
20 Bradley, 2017; King et al., 2017), resulting in different impacts (see Chapter 3). By comparing
21 impacts at 1.5°C vs. those at 2°C, this report discusses the ‘avoided impacts’ by maintaining global
22 temperature increase at or below 1.5°C as compared to 2°C, noting that these also depend on the
23 pathway taken to 1.5°C (see Section 1.2.3 and Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3 on 1.5°C warmer
24 worlds). Many impacts take time to observe, and because of the warming trend, impacts over the past
25 20 years were associated with a level of human-induced warming that was, on average, 0.1–0.23°C
26 colder than its present level, based on the AR5 estimate of the warming trend over this period (Section
27 1.2.1 and Kirtman et al., 2013). Attribution studies (e.g., van Oldenborgh et al., 2017) can address this
28 bias, but informal estimates of ‘recent impact experience’ in a rapidly warming world necessarily
29 understate the temperature-related impacts of the current level of warming.

30 31 32 **1.3.2 Drivers of Impacts**

33
34 Impacts of climate change are due to multiple environmental drivers besides rising temperatures, such
35 as rising atmospheric CO₂, shifting rainfall patterns, rising sea levels, increasing ocean acidification,
36 and extreme events, such as floods, droughts, and heat waves (IPCC, 2014e). For example, changes in
37 rainfall affect the hydrological cycle and water availability (Schewe et al., 2014). Several impacts
38 depend on atmospheric composition, for example, increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide levels
39 leading to changes in plant productivity (Forkel et al., 2016), but also to ocean acidification (Hoegh-
40 Guldberg et al., 2007). Other impacts are driven by changes in ocean heat content, for example, the
41 destabilization of coastal ice-sheets and sea-level rise (Bindoff et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2017),
42 whereas impacts due to heat waves depend directly on ambient air or ocean temperature (Matthews et
43 al., 2017). Impacts can be direct, for example, coral bleaching due to ocean warming, and indirect, for
44 example, reduced tourism due to coral bleaching. Indirect impacts can also arise from mitigation
45 efforts such as changed agricultural management (Section 3.6.2) or remedial measures such as solar
46 radiation modification (Section 4.3.8, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 4).

47
48 Impacts may also be triggered by combinations of factors, including ‘impact cascades’ (Cramer et al.,
49 2014) through secondary consequences of changed systems. Changes in agricultural water availability
50 caused by upstream changes in glacier volume are a typical example. Recent studies also identify
51 compound events (e.g., droughts and heat waves), that is, when impacts are induced by the
52 combination of several climate events (AghaKouchak et al., 2014; Leonard et al., 2014; Martius et al.,
53 2016; Zscheischler and Seneviratne, 2017).

1
2 There are now techniques to attribute impacts formally to anthropogenic global warming and
3 associated rainfall changes (Rosenzweig et al., 2008; Cramer et al., 2014; Hansen et al., 2016), taking
4 into account other drivers such as land use change (Oliver and Morecroft, 2014) and pollution (e.g.,
5 tropospheric ozone; Sitch et al., 2007). There are multiple lines of evidence that climate change has
6 observable and often severely negative effects on people, especially where climate-sensitive
7 biophysical conditions and socioeconomic / political constraints on adaptive capacities combine to
8 create high vulnerabilities (IPCC, 2012c; World Bank, 2013; IPCC, 2014e). The character and
9 severity of impacts depend not only on the hazards (e.g. changed climate averages and extremes) but
10 also on the vulnerability (including sensitivities and adaptive capacities) of different communities and
11 their exposure to climate threats. These impacts also affect a range of natural and human systems such
12 as terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems and their services, agricultural production, infrastructure,
13 the built environment, human health and other socio-economic systems (Rosenzweig et al., 2017).

14
15 Sensitivity to changing drivers varies markedly across systems and regions. Impacts of climate change
16 on natural and managed ecosystems can imply loss or increase in growth, biomass or diversity at the
17 level of species populations, interspecific relationships such as pollination, landscapes or entire
18 biomes. Impacts occur in addition to the natural variation in growth, ecosystem dynamics,
19 disturbance, succession and other processes, rendering attribution of impacts at lower levels of
20 warming difficult in certain situations. The same magnitude of warming can be lethal during one
21 phase of the life of an organism and irrelevant during another. Many ecosystems (notably forests,
22 coral reefs and others) undergo long-term successional processes characterised by varying levels of
23 resilience to environmental change over time. Organisms and ecosystems may adapt to environmental
24 change to a certain degree, for example, through changes in physiology, ecosystem structure, species
25 composition or evolution. Large-scale shifts in ecosystems may cause important feedbacks, for
26 example, in terms of changing water and carbon fluxes through impacted ecosystems – these can
27 amplify or dampen atmospheric change at regional to continental scale. For example, of particular
28 concern, is the response of most of the world's forests and seagrass ecosystems, which play key roles
29 as carbon sinks (Settele et al., 2014; Marbà et al., 2015).

30
31 Some ambitious efforts to constrain atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations may themselves
32 impact ecosystems. In particular, changes in land use, potentially required for massively enhanced
33 production of biofuels (either as simple replacement of fossil fuels, or as part of Bioenergy with
34 Carbon Capture and Storage, BECCS) impact all other land ecosystems through competition for land
35 (e.g., Creutzig, 2016) (see Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3, Section 3.6.2.1).

36
37 Human adaptive capacity to a 1.5°C warmer world varies markedly for individual sectors and across
38 sectors such as water supply, public health, infrastructure, ecosystems and food supply. For example,
39 density and risk exposure, infrastructure vulnerability and resilience, governance and institutional
40 capacity all drive different impacts across a range of human settlement types (Dasgupta et al., 2014;
41 Revi et al., 2014; Rosenzweig et al., 2018). Additionally, the adaptive capacity of communities and
42 human settlements in both rural and urban areas, especially in highly populated regions, raises equity,
43 social justice and sustainable development issues. Vulnerabilities due to gender, age, level of
44 education and culture act as compounding factors (Arora-Jonsson, 2011; Cardona et al., 2012;
45 Resurrección, 2013; Olsson et al., 2014; Vincent et al., 2014).

46 47 48 *1.3.3 Uncertainty and non-linearity of impacts*

49
50 Uncertainties in projections of future climate change and impacts come from a variety of different
51 sources, including the assumptions made regarding future emission pathways (Moss et al., 2010), the
52 inherent limitations and assumptions of the climate models used for the projections, including
53 limitations in simulating regional climate variability (James et al., 2017), downscaling and bias-

1 correction methods (Ekström et al., 2015), and in impact models (e.g., Asseng et al., 2013). The
2 evolution of climate change also affects uncertainty with respect to impacts. For example, the impacts
3 of overshooting 1.5°C and stabilization at a later stage, compared to stabilization at 1.5°C without
4 overshoot may differ in magnitude (Schleussner et al., 2016).

5
6 AR5 IPCC (2013b) and World Bank (2013) underscored the non-linearity of risks and impacts as
7 temperature rises from 2°C to 4°C of warming, particularly in relation to water availability, heat
8 extremes, bleaching of coral reefs, and more. Recent studies (Schleussner et al., 2016; James et al.,
9 2017; King et al., 2018) assess the impacts of 1.5°C versus 2°C warming, with the same message of
10 non-linearity. The resilience of ecosystems, meaning their ability either to resist change or to recover
11 after a disturbance, may change, and often decline, in a non-linear way. An example are reef
12 ecosystems, with some studies suggesting that reefs will change, rather than disappear entirely, and
13 particular species showing greater tolerance to coral bleaching than others (Pörtner et al., 2014). A
14 key issue is therefore whether ecosystems such as coral reefs survive an overshoot scenario, and to
15 what extent would they be able to recover after stabilization at 1.5°C or higher levels of warming (see
16 Box 3.4).

17 18 19 **1.4 Strengthening the global response**

20
21 This section frames the implementation options, enabling conditions (discussed further in Cross-
22 Chapter Box 3 on feasibility in this Chapter), capacities and types of knowledge and their availability
23 (Blicharska et al., 2017) that can allow institutions, communities and societies to respond to the 1.5°C
24 challenge in the context of sustainable development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
25 It also addresses other relevant international agreements such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster
26 Risk Reduction. Equity and ethics are recognised as issues of importance in reducing vulnerability
27 and eradicating poverty.

28
29 The connection between the enabling conditions for limiting global warming to 1.5°C and the
30 ambitions of the SDGs are complex across scale and multifaceted (Chapter 5). Climate mitigation-
31 adaptation linkages, including synergies and trade-offs, are important when considering opportunities
32 and threats for sustainable development. The IPCC AR5 acknowledged that ‘adaptation and
33 mitigation have the potential to both contribute to and impede sustainable development, and
34 sustainable development strategies and choices have the potential to both contribute to and impede
35 climate change responses’ (Denton et al., 2014). Climate mitigation and adaptation measures and
36 actions can reflect and enforce specific patterns of development and governance that differ amongst
37 the world’s regions (Gouldson et al., 2015; Termeer et al., 2017). The role of limited adaptation and
38 mitigation capacity, limits to adaptation and mitigation, and conditions of mal-adaptation and mal-
39 mitigation are assessed in this report (Chapters 4 and 5).

40 41 42 **1.4.1 Classifying Response Options**

43
44 Key broad categories of responses to the climate change problem are framed here. **Mitigation** refers
45 to efforts to reduce or prevent the emission of greenhouse gases, or to enhance the absorption of gases
46 already emitted, thus limiting the magnitude of future warming (IPCC, 2014c). Mitigation requires the
47 use of new technologies, clean energy sources, reduced deforestation, improved sustainable
48 agricultural methods, and changes in individual and collective behaviour. Many of these may provide
49 substantial co-benefits for air quality, biodiversity and sustainable development. Mal-mitigation
50 includes changes that could reduce emissions in the short-term but could lock in technology choices
51 or practices that include significant trade-offs for effectiveness of future adaptation and other forms of
52 mitigation (Chapters 2 and 4).

1 **Carbon dioxide removal** (CDR) or ‘negative emissions’ activities are considered a distinct type of
2 mitigation. While most types of mitigation focus on reducing the amount of carbon dioxide or
3 greenhouse gases emitted, CDR aims to reduce concentrations already in the atmosphere.
4 Technologies for CDR are mostly in their infancy despite their importance to ambitious climate
5 change mitigation pathways (Minx et al., 2017). Although some CDR activities such as reforestation
6 and ecosystem restoration are well understood, the feasibility of massive-scale deployment of many
7 CDR technologies remains an open question (IPCC, 2014d; Leung et al., 2014) (Chapters 2 and 4).
8 Technologies for the active removal of other greenhouse gases, such as methane, are even less
9 developed, and are briefly discussed in Chapter 4.

10
11 Climate change **adaptation** refers to the actions taken to manage the impacts of climate change
12 (IPCC, 2014e). The aim is to reduce vulnerability and exposure to the harmful effects of climate
13 change (e.g. sea-level rise, more intense extreme weather events or food insecurity). It also includes
14 exploring the potential beneficial opportunities associated with climate change (for example, longer
15 growing seasons or increased yields in some regions). Different adaptation-pathways can be
16 undertaken. Adaptation can be incremental, or transformational, meaning fundamental attributes of
17 the system are changed (Chapter 3 and 4). There can be limits to ecosystem-based adaptation or the
18 ability of humans to adapt (Chapter 4). If there is no possibility for adaptive actions that can be
19 applied to avoid an intolerable risk, these are referred to as hard adaptation limits, while soft
20 adaptation limits are identified when there are currently no options to avoid intolerable risks, but they
21 are theoretically possible (Chapter 3 and 4). While climate change is a global issue, impacts are
22 experienced locally. Cities and municipalities are at the frontline of adaptation (Rosenzweig et al.,
23 2018), focusing on reducing and managing disaster risks due to extreme and slow-onset weather and
24 climate events, installing flood and drought early warning systems, and improving water storage and
25 use (Chapters 3 and 4 and Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5). Agricultural and rural areas, including
26 often highly vulnerable remote and indigenous communities, also need to address climate-related
27 risks by strengthening and making more resilient agricultural and other natural resource extraction
28 systems.

29
30 **Remedial measures** are distinct from mitigation or adaptation, as the aim is to temporarily reduce or
31 offset warming (IPCC, 2012b). One such measure is Solar Radiation Modification (SRM), also
32 referred to as Solar Radiation Management in the literature, which involves deliberate changes to the
33 albedo of the Earth system, with the net effect of increasing the amount of solar radiation reflected
34 from the Earth to reduce the peak temperature from climate change (The Royal Society, 2009; Smith
35 and Rasch, 2013; Schäfer et al., 2015). It should be noted that while some radiation modification
36 measures, such as cirrus cloud thinning (Kristjánsson et al., 2016), aim at enhancing outgoing long-
37 wave radiation, SRM is used in this report to refer to all direct interventions on the planetary radiation
38 budget. This report does not use the term ‘geo-engineering’ because of inconsistencies in the
39 literature, which uses this term to cover SRM, CDR or both, whereas this report explicitly
40 differentiates between CDR and SRM. Large-scale SRM could potentially be used to supplement
41 mitigation in overshoot scenarios to keep the global mean temperature below 1.5°C and temporarily
42 reduce the severity of near-term impacts (e.g., MacMartin et al., 2018). The impacts of SRM (both
43 biophysical and societal), costs, technical feasibility, governance and ethical issues associated need to
44 be carefully considered (Schäfer et al., 2015; Section 4.3.8 and Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 4).

45 46 47 **1.4.2 Governance, implementation and policies**

48
49 A challenge in meeting the enabling conditions of 1.5°C warmer world is the governance capacity of
50 institutions to develop, implement and evaluate the changes needed within diverse and highly
51 interlinked global social-ecological systems (Busby, 2016) (Chapter 4). Policy arenas, governance
52 structures and robust institutions are key enabling conditions for transformative climate action

1 (Chapter 4). It is through governance that justice, ethics and equity within the adaptation-mitigation-
2 sustainable development nexus can be addressed (Stechow et al., 2016) (Chapter 5).

3
4 Governance capacity includes a wide range of activities and efforts needed by different actors to
5 develop coordinated climate mitigation and adaptation strategies in the context of sustainable
6 development taking into account equity, justice and poverty eradication. Significant governance
7 challenges include the ability to incorporate multiple stakeholder perspectives in the decision-making
8 process to reach meaningful and equitable decisions, interactions and coordination between different
9 levels of government, and the capacity to raise financing and support for both technological and
10 human resource development. For example, Lövbrand et al. (2017), argue that the voluntary pledges
11 submitted by states and non-state actors to meet the conditions of the Paris Agreement will need to be
12 more firmly coordinated, evaluated and upscaled.

13
14 Barriers for transitioning from climate change mitigation and adaptation planning to practical policy
15 implementation include finance, information, technology, public attitudes, social values and practices
16 (Whitmarsh et al., 2011; Corner and Clarke, 2017) and human resource constraints. Institutional
17 capacity to deploy available knowledge and resources is also needed (Mimura et al., 2014).
18 Incorporating strong linkages across sectors, devolution of power and resources to sub-national and
19 local governments with the support of national government and facilitating partnerships among
20 public, civic, private sectors and higher education institutions (Leal Filho et al., 2018) can help in the
21 implementation of identified response options (Chapter 4). Implementation challenges of 1.5°C
22 pathways are larger than for those that are consistent with limiting warming to well below 2°C,
23 particularly concerning scale and speed of the transition and the distributional impacts on ecosystems
24 and socio-economic actors. Uncertainties in climate change at different scales and different capacities
25 to respond combined with the complexities of coupled social and ecological systems point to a need
26 for diverse and adaptive implementation options within and among different regions involving
27 different actors. The large regional diversity between highly carbon-invested economies and emerging
28 economies are important considerations for sustainable development and equity in pursuing efforts to
29 limit warming to 1.5°C. Key sectors, including energy, food systems, health, and water supply, also
30 are critical to understanding these connections.

33 **Cross-Chapter Box 3: Framing feasibility: Key concepts and conditions for limiting global** 34 **temperature increases to 1.5°C**

35
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39
40 This Cross-Chapter Box describes the concept of feasibility in relation to efforts to limit global
41 warming to 1.5°C in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty and
42 draws from the understanding of feasibility emerging within the IPCC (IPCC, 2017). Feasibility can
43 be assessed in different ways, and no single answer exists as to the question of whether it is feasible to
44 limit warming to 1.5°C. This implies that an assessment of feasibility would go beyond a ‘yes’ or a
45 ‘no’. Rather, feasibility provides a frame to understand the different conditions and potential
46 responses for implementing adaptation and mitigation pathways, and options compatible with a 1.5°C
47 warmer world. This report assesses the overall feasibility of a 1.5°C world, and the feasibility of
48 adaptation and mitigation options compatible with a 1.5°C warmer world in six dimensions:

49
50 **Geophysical:** What global emission pathways could be consistent with conditions of a 1.5°C warmer
51 world? What are the physical potentials for adaptation?

1 **Environmental-ecological:** What are the ecosystem services and resources, including geological
2 storage capacity and related rate of needed land use change, available to promote transformations, and
3 to what extent are they compatible with enhanced resilience?

4 **Technological:** What technologies are available to support transformation?

5 **Economic:** What economic conditions could support transformation?

6 **Socio-cultural:** What conditions could support transformations in behaviour and lifestyles? To what
7 extent are the transformations socially acceptable and consistent with equity?

8 **Institutional:** What institutional conditions are in place to support transformations, including multi-
9 level governance, institutional capacity, and political support?

10
11 The report starts by assessing which mitigation pathways would lead to a 1.5°C world, which
12 indicates that rapid and deep deviations from current emission pathways are necessary (Chapter 2). In
13 the case of adaptation, an assessment of feasibility starts from an evaluation of the risks and impacts
14 of climate change (Chapter 3). To mitigate and adapt to climate risks, system-wide technical,
15 institutional and socio-economic transitions would be required, as well as the implementation of a
16 range of specific mitigation and adaptation options. Chapter 4 applies various indicators categorised
17 in these six dimensions to assess the feasibility of illustrative examples of relevant mitigation and
18 adaptation options (Section 4.5.1). Such options and pathways have different effects on sustainable
19 development, poverty eradication and adaptation capacity (Chapter 5).

20
21 The six feasibility dimensions interact in complex, and place-specific ways. Synergies and trade-offs
22 may occur between the feasibility dimensions, and between specific mitigation and adaptation options
23 (Section 4.5.4). The presence or absence of enabling conditions would affect the options that
24 comprise feasibility pathways (Section 4.4), and can reduce trade-offs and amplify synergies between
25 options.

26
27 Sustainable development, eradicating poverty and reducing inequalities are not only preconditions for
28 feasible transformations, but the interplay between climate action (both mitigation and adaptation
29 options) and the development patterns on which they apply may actually enhance the feasibility of
30 particular options (see Chapter 5).

31
32 The connections between the feasibility dimensions can be specified across three types of effects
33 (discussed below). Each of these dimensions presents challenges and opportunities in realizing
34 conditions consistent with a 1.5°C warmer world.

35
36 **Systemic effects:** Conditions that have embedded within them system level functions that could
37 include linear and non-linear connections and feedbacks. For example, the deployment of technology
38 and large installations (e.g., renewable or low carbon energy mega-projects) depends upon economic
39 conditions (costs, capacity to mobilize investments for R&D), social or cultural conditions
40 (acceptability), and institutional conditions (political support; e.g., Sovacool et al., 2015). Case studies
41 can demonstrate system level interactions and positive or negative feedback effects between the
42 different conditions (Jacobson et al., 2015; Loftus et al., 2015). This suggests that each set of
43 conditions and their interactions need to be considered to understand synergies, inequities and
44 unintended consequences.

45
46 **Dynamic effects:** Conditions that are highly dynamic and vary over time, especially under potential
47 conditions of overshoot or no overshoot. Some dimensions might be more time sensitive or sequential
48 than others (i.e., if conditions are such that it is no longer geophysically feasible to avoid overshooting
49 1.5°C, the social and institutional feasibility of avoiding overshoot will be no longer relevant). Path
50 dependencies, risks of legacy locks-ins related to existing infrastructures, and possibilities of
51 acceleration permitted by cumulative effects like learning-by-doing driving dramatic costs decreases
52 are all key features to be captured. The effects can play out over various time scales and thus require
53 understanding the connections between near-term (meaning within the next several years to two

1 decades) and their long-term implications (meaning over the next several decades) when assessing
2 feasibility conditions.

3
4 **Spatial effects:** Conditions that are spatially variable and scale dependent, according to context-
5 specific factors such as regional-scale environmental resource limits and endowment; economic
6 wealth of local populations; social organisation, cultural beliefs, values and worldviews; spatial
7 organisation, including conditions of urbanisation; and financial and institutional and governance
8 capacity. This means that the conditions for achieving the global transformation required for a 1.5°C
9 world will be heterogeneous and vary according to the specific context. On the other hand, the
10 satisfaction of these conditions may depend upon global-scale drivers, such as international flows of
11 finance, technologies or capacities. This points to the need for understanding feasibility to capture the
12 interplay between the conditions at different scales.

13
14 With each effect, the interplay between different conditions influences the feasibility of both
15 pathways (Chapter 2) and options (Chapter 4), which in turn affect the likelihood of limiting warming
16 to 1.5°C. The complexity of these interplays triggers unavoidable uncertainties, requiring
17 transformations that remain robust under a range of possible futures that limit warming to 1.5°C.

18 19 20 **1.4.3 Transformation, transformation pathways, and transition: evaluating trade-offs and** 21 **synergies between mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development goals**

22
23 Embedded in the goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C is the opportunity for intentional societal
24 transformation (see Box 1.1 on the Anthropocene). The form and process of transformation are varied
25 and multifaceted (Pelling, 2011; O'Brien et al., 2012; O'Brien and Selboe, 2015; Pelling et al., 2015).
26 Fundamental elements of 1.5°C-related transformation include a decoupling of economic growth from
27 energy demand and CO₂ emissions, leap-frogging development to new and emerging low-carbon,
28 zero-carbon and carbon-negative technologies, and synergistically linking climate mitigation and
29 adaptation to global scale trends (e.g., global trade and urbanization) that will enhance the prospects
30 for effective climate action, as well as enhanced poverty reduction and greater equity (Tschakert et al.,
31 2013; Rogelj et al., 2015; Patterson et al., 2017) (Chapters 4 and 5). The connection between
32 transformative climate action and sustainable development illustrates a complex coupling of systems
33 that have important spatial and time scale lag effects and implications for process and procedural
34 equity including intergenerational equity and for non-human species (Cross-Chapter Box 4 in this
35 Chapter, Chapter 5). Adaptation and mitigation transition pathways highlight the importance of
36 cultural norms and values, sector specific context, and proximate (i.e. occurrence of an extreme event)
37 drivers that when acting together enhance the conditions for societal transformation (Solecki et al.,
38 2017; Rosenzweig et al., 2018) (Chapters 4 and 5).

39
40 Diversity and flexibility in implementation choices exist for adaptation, mitigation (including carbon
41 dioxide removal, CDR) and remedial measures (such as solar radiation modification, SRM), and a
42 potential for trade-offs and synergies between these choices and sustainable development (IPCC,
43 2014f; Olsson et al., 2014). The responses chosen could act to synergistically enhance mitigation,
44 adaptation and sustainable development or they may result in trade-offs which positively impact some
45 aspects and negatively impact others. Climate change is expected to increase the likelihood of not
46 achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), while some strategies limiting warming
47 towards 1.5°C are expected to significantly lower that risk and provide synergies for climate
48 adaptation and mitigation (Chapter 5).

49
50 Dramatic transformations required to achieve the enabling conditions for a 1.5°C warmer world could
51 impose trade-offs on dimensions of development (IPCC, 2014f; Olsson et al., 2014). Some choices of
52 adaptation methods also could adversely impact development (Olsson et al., 2014). This report
53 recognizes the potential for adverse impacts and focuses on finding the synergies between limiting

1 warming, sustainable development, and eradicating poverty, thus highlighting pathways that do not
2 constrain other goals, such as sustainable development and eradicating poverty.

3
4 The report is framed to address these multiple goals simultaneously and assesses the conditions to
5 achieve a cost-effective and socially acceptable solution, rather than addressing these goals piecemeal
6 (Stechow et al., 2016) (Section 4.5.4 and Chapter 5), although there may be different synergies and
7 trade-offs between a 2°C (Stechow et al., 2016) and 1.5°C warmer world (Kainuma et al., 2017).
8 Climate-resilient development pathways (see Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5 and Glossary) are
9 trajectories that strengthen sustainable development, including mitigating and adapting to climate
10 change and efforts to eradicate poverty while promoting fair and cross-scalar resilience in a changing
11 climate. They take into account dynamic livelihoods, the multiple dimensions of poverty, structural
12 inequalities, and equity between and among poor and non-poor people (Olsson et al., 2014). Climate-
13 resilient development pathways can be considered at different scales, including cities, rural areas,
14 regions or at global level (Denton et al., 2014; Chapter 5).

17 **Cross-Chapter Box 4: Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals**

18
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22
23 Sustainable development is most often defined as ‘development that meets the needs of the present
24 without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987) and
25 includes balancing social wellbeing, economic prosperity and environmental protection. The AR5
26 used this definition and linked it to climate change (Denton et al., 2014). The most significant step
27 since AR5 is the adoption of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and the emergence of literature
28 that links them to climate (von Stechow et al., 2015; Wright et al., 2015; Epstein et al., 2017; Hammill
29 and Price-Kelly, 2017; Kelman, 2017; Lofts et al., 2017; Maupin, 2017; Gomez-Echeverri, 2018).

30
31 In September 2015, the UN endorsed a universal agenda – ‘Transforming our World: the 2030
32 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ – which aims ‘to take the bold and transformative steps which
33 are urgently needed to shift the world onto a sustainable and resilient path’. Based on a participatory
34 process, the resolution in support of the 2030 agenda adopted 17 non-legally-binding Sustainable
35 Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets to support people, prosperity, peace, partnerships and the
36 planet (Kanie and Biermann, 2017).

37
38 The SDGs expanded efforts to reduce poverty and other deprivations under the UN Millennium
39 Development Goals (MDGs). There were improvements under the MDGs between 1990 and 2015,
40 including reducing overall poverty and hunger, reducing infant mortality, and improving access to
41 drinking water (United Nations, 2015). However, greenhouse gas emissions increased by more than
42 50% from 1990 to 2015, and 1.6 billion people were still living in multidimensional poverty with
43 persistent inequalities in 2015 (Alkire et al., 2015).

44
45 The SDGs raise the ambition for eliminating poverty, hunger, inequality and other societal problems
46 while protecting the environment. They have been criticised: as too many and too complex, needing
47 more realistic targets, overly focused on 2030 at the expense of longer term objectives, not embracing
48 all aspects of sustainable development, and even contradicting each other (Horton, 2014; Death and
49 Gabay, 2015; Biermann et al., 2017; Weber, 2017; Winkler and Satterthwaite, 2017).

50
51 Climate change is an integral influence on sustainable development, closely related to the economic,
52 social and environmental dimensions of the SDGs. The IPCC has woven the concept of sustainable
53 development into recent assessments, showing how climate change might undermine sustainable

1 development, and the synergies between sustainable development and responses to climate change
2 (Denton et al., 2014). Climate change is also explicit in the SDGs. SDG13 specifically requires
3 ‘urgent action to address climate change and its impacts’. The targets include strengthening resilience
4 and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters; integrating climate change
5 measures into national policies, strategies and planning; and improving education, awareness-raising
6 and human and institutional capacity.

7
8 Targets also include implementing the commitment undertaken by developed-country parties to the
9 UNFCCC to the goal of mobilizing jointly \$100 billion annually by 2020 and operationalizing the
10 Green Climate Fund, as well as promoting mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate
11 change-related planning and management in least developed countries and Small Island Developing
12 States, including focusing on women, youth and local and marginalised communities. SDG13 also
13 acknowledges that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the
14 primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change.

15
16 Climate change is also mentioned in SDGs beyond SDG13, for example in goal targets 1.5, 2.4, 11.B,
17 12.8.1 related to poverty, hunger, cities and education respectively. The UNFCCC addresses other
18 SDGs in commitments to ‘control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases
19 [...] in all relevant sectors, including the energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste
20 management sectors’ (Art4, 1(c)) and to work towards ‘the conservation and enhancement, as
21 appropriate, of [...] biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine
22 ecosystems’ (Art4, 1(d)). This corresponds to SDGs that seek clean energy for all (Goal 7),
23 sustainable industry (Goal 9) and cities (Goal 11) and the protection of life on land and below water
24 (14 and 15).

25
26 The SDGs and UNFCCC also differ in their time horizons. The SDGs focus primarily on 2030
27 whereas the Paris Agreement sets out that ‘Parties aim [...] to achieve a balance between
28 anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of
29 this century’.

30
31 The IPCC decision to prepare this report of the impacts of 1.5°C and associated emission pathways
32 explicitly asked for the assessment to be in the context of sustainable development and efforts to
33 eradicate poverty. Chapter 1 frames the interaction between sustainable development, poverty
34 eradication and ethics and equity. Chapter 2 assesses how risks and synergies of individual mitigation
35 measures interact with 1.5°C pathways within the context of the SDGs, and how these vary according
36 to the mix of measures in alternative mitigation portfolios (Section 2.5). Chapter 3 examines the
37 impacts of 1.5°C global warming on natural and human systems with comparison to 2°C and provides
38 the basis for considering the interactions of climate change with sustainable development in
39 Chapter 5. Chapter 4 analyses strategies for strengthening the response to climate change, many of
40 which interact with sustainable development. Chapter 5 takes sustainable development, eradicating
41 poverty and reducing inequalities as its focal point for the analysis of pathways to 1.5°C, and
42 discusses explicitly the linkages between achieving SDGs while eradicating poverty and reducing
43 inequality.



1
2 **Cross-Chapter Box 4, Figure 1: Climate action is number 13 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.**
3
4

5 **1.5 Assessment frameworks and emerging methodologies that integrate climate change** 6 **mitigation and adaptation with sustainable development** 7

8 This report employs information and data that are global in scope and include region-scale analysis. It
9 also includes syntheses of municipal, sub-national, and national case studies. Global level statistics
10 including physical and social science data are used, as well as detailed and illustrative case study
11 material of particular conditions and contexts. The assessment provides the state of knowledge,
12 including an assessment of confidence and uncertainty. The main timescale of the assessment is the
13 21st century and the time is separated into the near-, medium-, and long-term. Spatial and temporal
14 contexts are illustrated throughout including: assessment tools that include dynamic projections of
15 emission trajectories and the underlying energy and land transformation (Chapter 2); methods for
16 assessing observed impacts and projected risks in natural and managed ecosystems and at 1.5°C and
17 higher levels of warming in natural and managed ecosystems and human systems (Chapter 3); assess
18 the feasibility of mitigation and adaptation options (Chapter 4); and linkages of the Shared
19 Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Cross-Chapter
20 Boxes 1 and 4 in this Chapter, Chapter 2 and Chapter 5).
21
22

23 **1.5.1 Knowledge sources and evidence used in the report** 24

25 This report is based on a comprehensive assessment of documented evidence of the enabling
26 conditions to pursuing efforts to limit the global average temperature to 1.5°C and adapt to this level
27 of warming in the overarching context of the Anthropocene (Delanty and Mota, 2017). Two sources
28 of evidence are used; peer-reviewed scientific literature and ‘grey’ literature in accordance with
29 procedure on the use of literature in IPCC reports (IPCC, 2013a, Annex 2 to Appendix A), with the
30 former being the dominant source. Grey literature is largely used on key issues not covered in peer-
31 reviewed literature.
32

33 The peer-reviewed literature includes the following sources: 1) knowledge regarding the physical
34 climate system and human-induced changes, associated impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation
35 options, established from work based on empirical evidence, simulations, modelling and scenarios,
36 with emphasis on new information since the publication of the IPCC AR5 to the cut-off date for this

1 report (15th of May 2018); 2) Humanities and social science theory and knowledge from actual
2 human experiences of climate change risks and vulnerability in the context of the social-ecological
3 systems, development, equity, justice, and the role of governance, and from indigenous knowledge
4 systems; and 3) Mitigation pathways based on climate projections into the future.

5
6 The grey literature category extends to empirical observations, interviews, and reports from
7 government, industry, research institutes, conference proceedings and international or other
8 organisations. Incorporating knowledge from different sources, settings and information channels
9 while building awareness at various levels will advance decision making and motivate
10 implementation of context specific responses to 1.5°C warming (Somanathan et al., 2014). The
11 assessment does not assess non-written evidence and does not use oral evidence, media reports, or
12 newspaper publications. With important exceptions, such as China, published knowledge from the
13 most vulnerable parts of the world to climate change is limited (Czerniewicz et al., 2017).

16 *1.5.2 Assessment frameworks and methodologies*

18 *Climate models and associated simulations*

19
20 The multiple sources of climate model information used in this assessment are provided in Chapter 2
21 (Section 2.2) and Chapter 3 (Section 3.2). Results from global simulations, which have also been
22 assessed in previous IPCC reports and that are conducted as part of the World Climate Research
23 Programme (WCRP) Coupled Models Inter-comparison Project (CMIP) are used. The IPCC AR4 and
24 Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation
25 (SREX) reports were mostly based on simulations from the CMIP3 experiment, while the AR5 was
26 mostly based on simulations from the CMIP5 experiment. The simulations of the CMIP3 and CMIP5
27 experiments were found to be very similar (e.g.; Knutti and Sedláček, 2012; Mueller and Seneviratne,
28 2014). In addition to the CMIP3 and CMIP5 experiments, results from coordinated regional climate
29 model experiments (e.g.; the Coordinated Regional Climate Downscaling Experiment, CORDEX)
30 have been assessed, which are available for different regions (Giorgi and Gutowski, 2015). For
31 instance, assessments based on publications from an extension of the IMPACT2C project (Vautard et
32 al., 2014; Jacob and Solman, 2017) are newly available for 1.5°C projections. Recently, simulations
33 from the ‘Half a degree Additional warming, Prognosis and Projected Impacts’ (HAPPI) multi-model
34 experiment have been performed to specifically assess climate changes at 1.5°C vs 2°C global
35 warming (Mitchell et al., 2016). The HAPPI protocol consists of coupled land-atmosphere initial
36 condition ensemble simulations with prescribed sea surface temperatures (SSTs), sea-ice, GHG and
37 aerosol concentrations, solar and volcanic activity that coincide with three forced climate states:
38 present-day (2006–2015) (see section 1.2.1), and future (2091–2100) either with 1.5°C or 2°C global
39 warming (prescribed by modified SSTs).

41 *Detection and attribution of change in climate and impacted systems*

42
43 Formalized scientific methods are available to detect and attribute impacts of greenhouse gas forcing
44 on observed changes in climate (e.g. Hegerl et al., 2007; Seneviratne et al., 2012; Bindoff et al., 2013)
45 and impacts of climate change on natural and human systems (e.g. Stone et al., 2013; Hansen and
46 Cramer, 2015; Hansen et al., 2016). The reader is referred to these sources, as well as to the AR5 for
47 more background on these methods.

48
49 Global climate warming has already reached approximately 1°C (see Section 1.2.1) relative to pre-
50 industrial conditions, and thus ‘climate at 1.5°C global warming’ corresponds to approximately the
51 addition of only half a degree of warming compared to the present day, comparable to the warming
52 that has occurred since the 1970s (Bindoff et al., 2013). Methods used in the attribution of observed
53 changes associate with this recent warming are therefore also applicable to assessments of future

1 changes in climate at 1.5°C warming, especially in cases where no climate model simulations or
2 analyses are available.

3
4 Impacts of 1.5°C global warming can be assessed in part from regional and global climate changes
5 that have already been detected and attributed to human influence (e.g., Schleussner et al., 2017) and
6 are components of the climate system that are most responsive to current and projected future forcing.
7 For this reason, when specific projections are missing for 1.5°C global warming, some of the
8 assessments of climate change provided in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3) build upon joint assessments of a)
9 changes that were observed and attributed to human influence up to the present, i.e. for 1°C global
10 warming and b) projections for higher levels of warming (e.g., 2°C, 3°C or 4°C) to assess the changes
11 at 1.5°C. Such assessments are for transient changes only (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3).

12
13 Besides quantitative detection and attribution methods, assessments can also be based on indigenous
14 and local knowledge (see Chapter 4, Box 4.3). While climate observations may not be available to
15 assess impacts from a scientific perspective, local community knowledge can also indicate actual
16 impacts (Brinkman et al., 2016; Kabir et al., 2016). The challenge is that a community's perception of
17 loss due to the impacts of climate change is an area that requires further research (Tschakert et al.,
18 2017).

19 *Costs and benefits analysis*

20
21
22 Cost-benefit analyses are common tools used for decision-making, whereby the costs of impacts are
23 compared to the benefits from different response actions (IPCC, 2014d, e). However, for the case of
24 climate change, recognising the complex inter-linkages of the Anthropocene, cost-benefit analyses
25 tools can be difficult to use because of disparate impacts versus costs and complex interconnectivity
26 within the global social-ecological system (see Box 1.1 and Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 2). Some
27 costs are relatively easily quantifiable in monetary terms but not all. Climate change impacts humans'
28 lives and livelihoods, culture and values and whole ecosystem. It has unpredictable feedback loops
29 and impacts on other regions, (IPCC, 2014e) giving rise to indirect, secondary, tertiary and
30 opportunity costs that are typically extremely difficult to quantify. Monetary quantification is further
31 complicated by the fact that costs and benefits can occur in different regions at very different times,
32 possibly spanning centuries, while it is extremely difficult if not impossible to meaningfully estimate
33 discount rates for future costs and benefits. Thus standard cost-benefit analyses become difficult to
34 justify (IPCC, 2014e; Dietz et al., 2016) and are not used as an assessment tool in this report.

35 36 37 **1.6 Confidence, uncertainty and risk**

38
39 This report relies on the IPCC's uncertainty guidance provided in Mastrandrea et al. (2011), and
40 sources given therein. Two metrics for qualifying key findings are used:

41
42 **Confidence:** Five qualifiers are used to express levels of confidence in key findings, ranging from
43 *very low*, through *low*, *medium*, *high*, to *very high*. The assessment of confidence involves at least two
44 dimensions, one being the type, quality, amount or internal consistency of individual lines of
45 evidence, and the second being the level of agreement between different lines of evidence. Very high
46 confidence findings must either be supported by a high level of agreement across multiple lines of
47 mutually independent and individually robust lines of evidence or, if only a single line of evidence is
48 available, by a very high level of understanding underlying that evidence. Findings of low or very low
49 confidence are presented only if they address a topic of major concern.

50
51 **Likelihood:** A calibrated language scale is used to communicate assessed probabilities of outcomes,
52 ranging from *exceptionally unlikely* (<1%), *extremely unlikely* (<5%), *very unlikely* (<10%), *unlikely*
53 (<33%), *about as likely as not* (33–66%), *likely* (>66%), *very likely* (>90%), *extremely likely* (>95%)

1 to *virtually certain* (>99%). These terms are normally only applied to findings associated with high or
2 very high confidence. Frequency of occurrence within a model ensemble does not correspond to
3 actual assessed probability of outcome unless the ensemble is judged to capture and represent the full
4 range of relevant uncertainties.

5
6 Three specific challenges arise in the treatment of uncertainty and risk in this report. First, the current
7 state of the scientific literature on 1.5°C means that findings based on multiple lines of robust
8 evidence for which quantitative probabilistic results can be expressed may be few, and not the most
9 policy-relevant. Hence many key findings are expressed using confidence qualifiers alone.

10
11 Second, many of the most important findings of this report are conditional because they refer to
12 ambitious mitigation scenarios. Conditional probabilities often depend strongly on how conditions are
13 specified, such as whether temperature goals are met through early emission reductions, reliance on
14 negative emissions, or through a low climate response. Whether a certain risk is deemed likely at
15 1.5°C may therefore depend strongly on how 1.5°C is specified, whereas a statement that a certain
16 risk may be substantially higher at 2°C relative to 1.5°C may be much more robust.

17
18 Third, achieving ambitious mitigation goals will require active, goal-directed efforts aiming explicitly
19 for specific outcomes and incorporating new information as it becomes available (Otto et al., 2015).
20 This shifts the focus of uncertainty from the climate outcome itself to the level of mitigation effort
21 that may be required to achieve it. Probabilistic statements about human decisions are always
22 problematic, but in the context of robust decision-making, many near-term policies that are needed to
23 keep open the option of achieving 1.5°C may be the same, regardless of the actual probability that the
24 goal will be met (Knutti et al., 2015).

25 26 27 **1.7 Storyline of the report**

28
29 The storyline of this report (Figure 1.6) includes a set of interconnected components. The report
30 consists of five chapters, a Technical Summary and a Summary for Policymakers. It also includes a
31 set of boxes to elucidate specific or cross-cutting themes, as well as Frequently Asked Questions for
32 each chapter and a Glossary.

33
34 At a time of unequivocal and rapid global warming, this report emerges from the long-term
35 temperature goal of the Paris Agreement; strengthening the global response to the threat of climate
36 change by pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C through reducing emissions to achieve a balance
37 between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases. The
38 assessment focuses first, in Chapter 1, on how 1.5°C is defined and understood, what is the current
39 level of warming to date, and the present trajectory of change. The framing presented in Chapter 1
40 provides the basis through which to understand the enabling conditions of a 1.5°C warmer world and
41 connections to the SDGs, poverty eradication, and equity and ethics.


42
43 In Chapter 2, scenarios of a 1.5°C warmer world and the associated pathways are assessed. The
44 pathways assessment builds upon the AR5 with a greater emphasis on sustainable development in
45 mitigation pathways. All pathways begin now, and involve rapid and unprecedented societal
46 transformation. An important framing device for this report is the recognition that choices that
47 determine emissions pathways, whether ambitious mitigation or ‘no policy’ scenarios, do not occur
48 independently of these other changes and are, in fact, highly interdependent.

49
50 Projected impacts that emerge in a 1.5°C warmer world and beyond are dominant narrative threads of
51 the report and are assessed in Chapter 3. The chapter focuses on observed and attributable global and
52 regional climate changes and impacts and vulnerabilities. The projected impacts have diverse and
53 uneven spatial, temporal, and human, economic, and ecological system-level manifestations. Central

1 to the assessment is the reporting of impacts at 1.5°C and 2°C, potential impacts avoided through
 2 limiting warming to 1.5°C, and, where possible, adaptation potential and limits to adaptive capacity.

3
 4 Response options and associated enabling conditions emerge next, in Chapter 4. Attention is directed
 5 to exploring questions of adaptation and mitigation implementation and integration and
 6 transformation in a highly interdependent world, with consideration of synergies and trade-offs.
 7 Emission pathways, in particular, are broken down into policy options and instruments. The role of
 8 technological choices, institutional capacity and large-scale global scale trends like urbanization and
 9 changes in ecosystems are assessed.

10
 11 Chapter 5 covers linkages between achieving the SDGs and a 1.5°C warmer world and turns toward
 12 identifying opportunities and challenges of transformation. This is assessed within a transition to
 13 climate-resilient development pathways, and connection between the evolution towards 1.5°C,
 14 associated impacts, and emission pathways. Positive and negative effects of adaptation and mitigation
 15 response measures and pathways for a 1.5°C warmer world are examined. Progress along these
 16 pathways involves inclusive processes, institutional integration, adequate finance and technology, and
 17 attention to issues of power, values, and inequalities to maximize the benefits of pursuing climate
 18 stabilisation at 1.5°C and the goals of sustainable development at multiple scales of human and
 19 natural systems from global, regional, national to local and community levels.



20
 21
 22 **Figure 1.6: Schematic of report storyline.**

1 Frequently Asked Questions

3 FAQ 1.1: Why are we talking about 1.5°C?

5 *Summary: Climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies*
6 *and the planet. In recognition of this, the overwhelming majority of countries around the world*
7 *adopted the Paris Agreement in December 2015, the central aim of which includes pursuing efforts to*
8 *limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C. In doing so, these countries, through the United Nations*
9 *Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) also invited the IPCC to provide a Special*
10 *Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global*
11 *greenhouse gas emissions pathways.*

13 At the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) in December 2015, 195 nations adopted the Paris
14 Agreement². The first instrument of its kind, the landmark agreement includes the aim to strengthen
15 the global response to the threat of climate change by ‘holding the increase in the global average
16 temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the
17 temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’.

19 The first UNFCCC document to mention a limit to global warming of 1.5°C was the Cancun
20 Agreement, adopted at the sixteenth COP (COP16) in 2010. The Cancun Agreement established a
21 process to periodically review the ‘adequacy of the long-term global goal (LTGG) in the light of the
22 ultimate objective of the Convention and the overall progress made towards achieving the LTGG,
23 including a consideration of the implementation of the commitments under the Convention’. The
24 definition of LTGG in the Cancun Agreement was ‘to hold the increase in global average temperature
25 below 2°C above pre-industrial levels’. The agreement also recognised the need to consider
26 ‘strengthening the long term global goal on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge... to a
27 global average temperature rise of 1.5°C’.

29 Beginning in 2013 and ending at the COP21 in Paris in 2015, the first review period of the long term
30 global goal largely consisted of the Structured Expert Dialogue (SED). This was a fact-finding, face-
31 to-face exchange of views between invited experts and UNFCCC delegates. The final report of the
32 SED³ concluded that ‘in some regions and vulnerable ecosystems, high risks are projected even for
33 warming above 1.5°C’. The SED report also suggested that Parties would profit from restating the
34 temperature limit of the long-term global goal as a ‘defence line’ or ‘buffer zone’, instead of a
35 ‘guardrail’ up to which all would be safe, adding that this new understanding would ‘probably also
36 favour emission pathways that will limit warming to a range of temperatures below 2°C’. Specifically
37 on strengthening the temperature limit of 2°C, the SED’s key message was: ‘While science on the
38 1.5°C warming limit is less robust, efforts should be made to push the defence line as low as
39 possible’. The findings of the SED, in turn, fed into the draft decision adopted at COP21.

41 With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the UNFCCC invited the IPCC to provide a Special Report
42 in 2018 on ‘the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global
43 greenhouse gas emissions pathways’. The request was that the report, known as SR1.5, should not
44 only assess what a 1.5°C warmer world would look like but also the different pathways by which
45 global temperature rise could be limited to 1.5°C. In 2016, the IPCC accepted the invitation, adding
46 that the Special Report would also look at these issues in the context of strengthening the global
47 response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.


² FOOTNOTE: Paris Agreement FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 <https://unfccc.int/documents/9097>

³ FOOTNOTE: Structured Expert Dialogue (SED) final report FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1
<https://unfccc.int/documents/8707>

1 The combination of rising exposure to climate change and the fact that there is a limited capacity to
 2 adapt to its impacts amplifies the risks posed by warming of 1.5°C and 2°C. This is particularly true
 3 for developing and island countries in the tropics and other vulnerable countries and areas. The risks
 4 posed by global warming of 1.5°C are greater than for present day conditions but lower than at 2°C.
 5
 6

FAQ1.1: Timeline of 1.5°C

Milestones in the IPCC's preparation of the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C and some relevant events in the history of international climate negotiations



7
 8 **FAQ1.1, Figure 1:** A timeline of notable dates in preparing the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of
 9 1.5°C (blue) embedded within processes and milestones of the United Nations Framework Convention on
 10 Climate Change (UNFCCC; grey), including events that may be relevant for discussion of temperature limits.
 11

FAQ 1.2: How close are we to 1.5°C?

***Summary:** Human-induced warming has already reached about 1°C above pre-industrial levels at the time of writing of this Special Report. By the decade 2006–2015, human activity had warmed the world by 0.87°C (±0.12°C) compared pre-industrial times (1850–1900). If the current warming rate continues, the world would reach human-induced global warming of 1.5°C around 2040.*

Under the 2015 Paris Agreement, countries agreed to cut greenhouse gas emissions with a view to ‘holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’. While the overall intention of strengthening the global response to climate change is clear, the Paris Agreement does not specify precisely what is meant by ‘global average temperature’, or what period in history should be considered ‘pre-industrial’. To answer the question of how close are we to 1.5°C of warming, we need to first be clear about how both terms are defined in this Special Report.

The choice of pre-industrial reference period, along with the method used to calculate global average temperature, can alter scientists’ estimates of historical warming by a couple of tenths of a degree Celsius. Such differences become important in the context of a global temperature limit just half a degree above where we are now. But provided consistent definitions are used, they do not affect our understanding of how human activity is influencing the climate.

In principle, ‘pre-industrial levels’ could refer to any period of time before the start of the industrial revolution. But the number of direct temperature measurements decreases as we go back in time. Defining a ‘pre-industrial’ reference period is, therefore, a compromise between the reliability of the temperature information and how representative it is of truly pre-industrial conditions. Some pre-industrial periods are cooler than others for purely natural reasons. This could be because of spontaneous climate variability or the response of the climate to natural perturbations, such as volcanic eruptions and variations in the sun’s activity. This IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C uses the reference period 1850 to 1900 to represent pre-industrial conditions. This is the earliest period with near-global observations and is the reference period used as an approximation of pre-industrial temperatures in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report.


Once scientists have defined ‘pre-industrial’, the next step is to calculate the amount of warming at any given time relative to that reference period. In this report, warming is defined as the increase in the 30-year global average of combined temperature over land and at the ocean surface. The 30-year timespan accounts for the effect of natural variability, which can cause global temperatures to fluctuate from one year to the next. For example, 2015 and 2016 were both affected by a strong El Niño event, which amplified the underlying human-caused warming.

In the decade 2006–2015, warming reached 0.87°C (±0.12°C) relative to 1850–1900, predominantly due to human activity increasing the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Given that global temperature is currently rising by 0.2°C (±0.1°C) per decade, human-induced warming reached 1°C above pre-industrial levels around 2017 and, if this pace of warming continues, would reach 1.5°C around 2040.

While the change in global average temperature tells researchers about how the planet as a whole is changing, looking more closely at specific regions, countries and seasons reveals important details. Since the 1970s, most land regions have been warming faster than the global average, for example. This means that warming in many regions has already exceeded 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Over a fifth of the global population live in regions that have already experienced warming in at least one season that is greater than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.

FAQ1.2: How close are we to 1.5°C?

Human-induced warming reached approximately 1°C above pre-industrial levels in 2017



- 1
- 2 **FAQ1.2, Figure 1:** Human-induced warming reached approximately 1°C above pre-industrial levels in 2017.
- 3 At the present rate, global temperatures would reach 1.5°C around 2040.
- 4
- 5

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16

1.SM Framing and Context Supplementary Material

This Supplementary Material provides technical details of the calculations behind the figures in the chapter, as well as some supporting figures provided for sensitivity analysis or to provide support to the main assessment.

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1.SM.1: Supporting material for Figure 1.1

Externally-forced warming is calculated for the Cowtan & Way (Cowtan and Way, 2014) dataset at every location and for each season as in Figure 1.3. The season with the greatest externally-forced warming at every location (averaged over the 2006-2015 period) is selected to give the colour of the dots at that grid box.

Figure 1.SM.1 shows the season of maximum warming in each grid-box used in Figure 1.1, while Figure 1.SM.2 shows the warming to 2006-2015 in the season that has warmed the least.




Figure 1.SM.1: Season of greatest human-induced warming over 2006-2015 relative to 1850-1900 for the data shown in Figure 1.1.




Figure 1.SM.2: As for Figure 1.1 but with scatter points coloured by warming in the season with least warming over the 2006-2015 period.

Population data is taken from Doxsey-Whitfield et al. (2015) for 2010. The number of scatter points shown in each $1^\circ \times 1^\circ$ grid box is directly proportional to the population count in the grid-box, with a maximum number of scatter points in a single grid-box associated with the maximum population count in the dataset. For grid-boxes with (non-zero) population counts that are below the population threshold consistent with just a single scatter point (approximately 650,000), the probability that a single scatter point is plotted reduces from unity towards zero with decreasing population in the grid-box to give an accurate visual impression of population distribution.

The SDG Global Index Score is a quantitative measure of progress towards the 17 sustainable development goals (Sachs et al., 2017). The goals cross-cut the three dimensions of sustainable development – environmental sustainability, economic growth, and social inclusion. It has a range of 0-100, 100 corresponding to all SDGs being met. Versions of Figure 1.1 using the HadCRUT4, NOAA and GISTEMP temperature datasets are shown in Figure 1.SM.3, Figure 1.SM.4 and Figure 1.SM.5 respectively.




Figure 1.SM.3: As for Figure 1.1 but using the HadCRUT4 temperature dataset.




Figure 1.SM.4: As for Figure 1.1 but using the NOAA temperature dataset.




Figure 1.SM.5: As for Figure 1.1 but using the GISTEMP temperature dataset.

1.SM.2: Supporting material for Figure 1.2

Observational data used in Figure 1.2 are taken from the Met Office Hadley Centre (<http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/hadobs/hadcrut4/>), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (<https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/data-access/marineocean-data/noaa-global-surface-temperature-noaaglobaltemp>), NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies (<https://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/>) and the Cowtan & Way dataset (<http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~kdc3/papers/coverage2013/series.html>). The GISTEMP and NOAA observational products (which begin in 1880) are expressed relative to 1850-1900 by assigning these datasets the same anomaly as HadCRUT4 for the mean of the 1880-2017 period. All available data is used, through to the end of 2017, for all datasets. The grey “Observational range” shades between the minimum and maximum monthly-mean anomaly across these four temperature datasets for the month in question.

CMIP5 multi-model means, light blue dashed (full field surface air temperature) and solid (masked and blended as in Cowtan et al. (2015)) are expressed relative to a 1861-1880 base period and then expressed relative to the 1850-1900 reference period using the anomaly between the periods in the HadCRUT4 product (0.02°C). Model data are taken from Richardson et al. (2018). Only RCP8.5 r1i1p1 ensemble members are used with only one ensemble member per model for calculating the mean lines in this figure.

The pink “Holocene” shading is derived from the “Standard5x5Grid” reconstruction of Marcott et al. (2013) (expressed relative to 1850-1900 using the HadCRUT4 anomaly between this reference period and the 1961-90 base period of the data). The vertical extent of the solid shading is determined by the maximum and minimum temperature anomalies in the dataset in the period before 1850. Marcott et al. (2013) report data with a periodicity of 20 years, so the variability shown by the solid pink shading is not directly comparable to the higher frequency variability seen in the observational products which are reported every month), but this Holocene range can be compared to the emerging signal of

human-induced warming. Above and below the maximum and minimum temperature anomalies from Marcott et al. (2013) the pink shading fades out to after a magnitude of warming that is equal to the standard deviation of monthly temperature anomalies in the HadCRUT4 dataset over the pre-industrial reference period of 1850-1900, and as such this faded shading does not bound all monthly anomalies in the pre-industrial reference period.

Near term predictions from IPCC-AR5 (Kirtman et al., 2013), for the period 2016-2035 were estimated to be *likely* (>66% probability) between 0.3°C and 0.7°C above the 1986-2005 average, assuming no climatically significant future volcanic eruptions. These are expressed relative to pre-industrial using the updated 0.63°C warming to the 1986-2005 period (Section 1.2.1).

Human-induced temperature change (thick yellow line) and total (human+natural) externally-forced temperature change (thick orange line) are estimated using the method of Haustein et al. (2017) applied to the 4-dataset mean. Best-estimate historical radiative forcings, extended until the end of 2016, are taken from Myhre et al. (2013), incorporating the significant revision to the methane forcing proposed by Etminan et al. (2016). The 2-box thermal impulse-response model used in Myhre et al. (2013), with modified thermal response time-scales to match the multi-model mean from Geoffroy et al. (2013), is used to derive the shape to the global mean temperature response timeseries to total anthropogenic and natural (combined volcanic and solar) forcing. Both of these timeseries are expressed as anomalies relative to their simulated 1850-1900 averages and then used as independent regressors in a multi-variate linear regression to derive scaling factors on the two timeseries that minimise the residual between the combined forced response and the multi-dataset observational mean. The transparent shading around the thick yellow line indicates the *likely* range in attributed human-induced warming conservatively assessed at $\pm 20\%$. Note that the corresponding *likely* range of $\pm 0.1^\circ\text{C}$ uncertainty in the 0.7°C best-estimate anthropogenic warming trend over the 1951-2010 period assessed in Bindoff et al. (2013) corresponds to a smaller fractional uncertainty ($\pm 14\%$): the broader range reflects greater uncertainty in early-century warming.

The vertical extent of the 1986-2005 cross denotes the 5-95% observational uncertainty range of $\pm 0.06^\circ\text{C}$ (see Table 1.1) while that of the 2006-2015 cross denotes the assessed *likely* uncertainty range of $\pm 0.12^\circ\text{C}$ (Section 1.2.1).

To provide a methodologically independent check on the attribution of human-induced warming since the 19th century (quantitative attribution results quoted in AR5 being primarily focussed on the period 1951-2010), Figure 1.SM.6 shows a recalculation of the results of Ribes and Terray (2013), Figure 1.SM.1, applied to the CMIP5 multi-model mean response. Details of the calculation are provided in the original paper. In order to quantify the level of human-induced warming since the late 19th century, observations of GMST are regressed onto the model responses to either natural-only (NAT) or anthropogenic-only (ANT) forcings, consistent with many attribution studies assessed in AR5. Prior to this analysis, model outputs are pre-processed in order to ensure consistency with observations: spatial resolution is lowered to 5° , the spatio-temporal observational mask is applied, and all missing data are set to 0. Global and decadal averages of near-surface temperature are calculated over the 1901-2010 period (11 decades), and translated into anomalies by subtracting the mean over the entire period (1901-2010). Multi-model mean response patterns are calculated over a subset of 7 CMIP5 models providing at least 4 historical simulations and 3 historical NAT-only simulations, all covering the 1901-2010 period. The regression analysis indicates how these multi-model mean responses have to be rescaled in order to best fit observations, accounting for internal variability in both observations and model responses, but neglecting observational uncertainty. Almost no rescaling is needed for ANT (regression coefficient: 1.05 ± 0.18), while the NAT simulated response is revised downward (regression coefficient: 0.28 ± 0.49). The resulting estimate of the total externally forced response is very close to observations (Figure 1.SM.6). The ANT regression coefficient can then be used to assess the human-induced warming over a longer period. Estimated in this way, the human-induced linear warming trend 1880-2012 is found to be $0.86^\circ\text{C} \pm 0.14^\circ\text{C}$.




Figure 1.SM.6: Contributions of natural (NAT) and anthropogenic (ANT) forcings to changes in GMST over the period 1901-2010. Decadal time-series of GMST in HadCRUT4 observations (solid black), from multi-model mean response without any rescaling (dotted cyan), and as reconstructed by the linear regression (dotted black). The estimated contributions of NAT forcings only (solid blue) and anthropogenic forcing only (solid red) correspond to the CMIP5 multi-model mean response to these forcings, after rescaling. All temperatures are anomalies with respect to the 1901-2010 average, after pre-processing (missing data treated as 0). Vertices are plotted at the mid-point of the corresponding decade.

To quantify the potential impact of natural (externally-forced or internally-generated) variability on decadal-mean temperatures in 2006-2015, Figure 1.SM.7 shows an estimate of the observed warming rate, corrected for the effects of natural variability according to the method of Foster and Rahmstorf, (2011) applied to the average of the four observational datasets used in this report, updated to the end of 2017. The grey line shows the raw monthly GMST observations (with shading showing inter-dataset range), while the green shows the sum of the linear trend plus estimated known sources of variability, such as El Niño events or volcanic eruptions, estimated using an empirical regression model. The orange line shows the linear trend, after correcting for the impact of these known sources of variability, of 0.18°C per decade, while the two black lines show the recent reference periods used in this report. For comparison, the AR5 near-term predicted warming rate of $0.3\text{-}0.7^{\circ}\text{C}$ over 30 years (Kirtman et al, 2013) is shown as the pale blue plume.

The blue line in the lower panel shows residual fluctuations that cannot be attributed to known sources or modes of variability, reflecting internally-generated chaotic weather variability (the difference between grey and green lines in the top panel). The green line is not persistently below the yellow line, nor is the blue line persistently negative, over the period 2006-2015. There is a downward excursion in the residual “unexplained” variability around 2012-13, and a strong ENSO cool phase event in 2011, but even together these depress the decadal average by only a couple of hundredths of a degree.




Figure 1.SM.7: Warming and warming rate 1979-2017. The solid grey line shows the average of the four observational datasets used in this assessment report with the observational range shown by grey shading. The yellow line shows the linear trend through the observational data, corrected for the effects of known sources of natural variability (green line). The blue shading indicates that warming rates compatible with the IPCC-AR5 near-term projections. The lower panel shows the residual unexplained variability (difference between grey and green lines in upper panel) after accounting for known sources, including ENSO, solar variability and volcanic activity.

1.SM.3: Supporting material for Figure 1.3

Regional warming shown in Figure 1.3 is derived using a similar method to the calculation of externally-forced warming in Figure 1.2. At every grid box location in the native Cowtan & Way resolution, the timeseries of local temperature anomalies in the Cowtan & Way dataset are regressed onto the associated externally-forced warming timeseries, calculated as in Figure 1.1 using all available historical monthly-mean anomalies. The best-fit relationship between these two quantities is then used to estimate the forced warming relative to 1850-1900 at this location. The maps in Figure 1.3 show the average of these estimated local forced warming timeseries over the 2006-2015 period. Trends are only plotted only where over 50% of the entire observational record at this location is available.

Supplementary maps are included below for the NOAA, GISTEMP and HadCRUT4 observational data. The regression of local temperature anomalies onto the global mean externally-forced warming, allows warming to be expressed relative to 1850-1900 despite many local series in these datasets

beginning after 1900, but clearly these inferred century-time-scale warming levels are subject to a lower confidence level than the corresponding global values.

Regional warming in the decade 2006-2015 relative to preindustrial




Figure 1.SM.8: Externally-forced warming for the average of 2006-2015 relative to 1850-1900 calculated for the NOAA observational dataset as for Figure 1.3.

Regional warming in the decade 2006-2015 relative to preindustrial




Figure 1.SM.9: Externally-forced warming for the average of 2006-2015 relative to 1850-1900 calculated for the GISTEMP observational dataset as for Figure 1.3.

Regional warming in the decade 2006-2015 relative to preindustrial




Figure 1.SM.10: Externally-forced warming for the average of 2006-2015 relative to 1850-1900 calculated for the HadCRUT4 observational dataset as for Figure 1.3.

1.SM.4: Supporting material for Figure 1.4

Idealised temperature pathways computed by specifying the level of human-induced warming in 2017, $T_{2017} = 1^{\circ}\text{C}$, with temperatures from 1850 to 2017 approximated by an exponential rise, with the exponential rate constant, γ , set to give a rate of human-induced warming in 2017 of $0.2^{\circ}\text{C}/\text{decade}$. Temperatures from 2018-2100 are determined by fitting a smooth 4th-order polynomial through specified warming at particular times after 2017.

Radiative forcing F that would give the temperature profiles is computed using a 2-time-constant climate response function (Myhre et al., 2013b), with Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS) of 2.7°C and Transient Climate Response (TCR) of 1.6°C and other parameters as given in Millar et al. (2017). Equivalent CO_2 concentrations given by $C = 278 \times \exp(F/5.4)$ ppm.

Cumulative CO_2 -forcing-equivalent emissions (Jenkins et al, 2018), or the CO_2 emission pathways that would give the CO_2 concentration pathways compatible with the temperature scenario is computed using an invertible simple carbon cycle model (Myhre et al., 2013b), modified to account for changing CO_2 airborne fraction over the historical period (Millar et al., 2017). These are proportional to CO_2 emissions under the assumption of a constant fractional contribution of non- CO_2

forcers to warming. Indicative cumulative impact variable (e.g. sea level rise) is computed from temperature pathways shown in using semi-empirical model of Kopp et al. (2016).

1.SM.5: Supporting material for Figure 1.5

All scenarios in Figure 1.5 start with a 1000 member ensemble of the FAIR model (Smith et al., 2018) driven with emissions from the RCP historical dataset from 1765 to 2000 (Meinshausen et al., 2011), SSP2 from 2005 to 2020 (Fricko et al., 2017), and a linear interpolation between the two inventories for 2000 to 2005. Equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) and transient climate response (TCR) parameters are drawn from a joint lognormal distribution informed by CMIP5 models. Uncertainties in present-day non-CO₂ ERF are drawn from the distributions in Myhre et al. (2013) and uncertainties in the carbon cycle response are given a 5 to 95% range of 13% around the best estimate (Millar et al., 2017). All uncertainties except TCR and ECS are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other.

FAIR derives an effective radiative forcing (ERF) time series from emissions, from which temperature change calculated. Greenhouse gas concentrations are first calculated, from which the radiative forcing relationships from Myhre et al. (1998) are used to determine ERF. An increase of ERF of 25% for methane forcing is applied which approximates the updated relationship from Etminan et al. (2016). The Myhre et al. (1998) relationships with a scaling for methane rather than the newer Etminan et al. (2016) relationships are used because the former does not assume any band overlap between CO₂ and N₂O, and isolating CO₂ forcing from N₂O forcing is problematic for certain commitments where CO₂ emissions are set to zero and N₂O forcing is held constant.

Aerosol forcing is based on the AeroCom radiative efficiencies (Myhre et al., 2013a) for ERF_{ari} (ERF from aerosol-radiation interactions) and a logarithmic dependence on emissions of black carbon, organic carbon and sulfate for ERF_{aci} (ERF from aerosol-cloud interactions) based on the model of Ghan et al., (2013). Tropospheric ozone forcing is based on Stevenson et al., (2013). Other minor categories of anthropogenic forcing are derived from simple relationships that approximate the evolution of ERF in Annex II of Working Group I of AR5 (Prather et al., 2013) as described in Smith et al., (2018). For forcing categories other than methane (for which a significant revision to best estimate ERF has occurred since AR5), a time-varying scaling factor is implemented over the historical period, so that for a best estimate forcing, the AR5 ERF time series is replicated. This historical scaling decays linearly between 2000 and 2011 so that in 2011 onwards the FAIR ERF estimate is used for projections. For the 2000-2011 period the impact of the historical scaling is small, because FAIR emissions-forcing relationships are mostly derived from IPCC AR5 best estimates in 2005 or 2011 (Smith et al., 2018).

Two ensembles are produced: a historical (1765 to 2014) ensemble containing all (anthropogenic plus natural) forcing, and a historical+future (1765 to 2100) ensemble containing only anthropogenic forcing for each commitment scenario. In the ensemble where natural forcing is included, solar forcing for the historical period is calculated by using total solar irradiance from the SOLARIS HEPPA v3.2 dataset (Matthes et al., 2017) for 1850-2014 and from Myhre et al. (2013) for 1765-1850: the 1850-1873 mean is subtracted from the time series which is then multiplied by 0.25 (annual illumination factor) times 0.7 (planetary co-albedo) to generate the effective radiative forcing (ERF) timeseries. Volcanic forcing is taken by using stratospheric aerosol optical depths from the CMIP6 historical Easy Volcanic Aerosol dataset (Toohey et al., 2016) prepared for the HadGEM3 CMIP6 historical integrations for 1850-2014. The integrated stratospheric aerosol optical depth at 550 nm (τ) is calculated and converted to ERF by the relationship $ERF = -18 \cdot \tau$, based on time slice experiments in the HadGEM3 general circulation model, which agrees well with earlier HadGEM2 and HadCM3 versions of the UK Met Office Hadley Centre model (Gregory et al., 2016). The 1850-2014 mean volcanic ERF of -0.107 is subtracted as an offset to define the mean historical volcanic

ERF as zero. Owing to rapid adjustments to stratospheric aerosol forcing, which are included in the definition of ERF, this less negative value of $-18 \cdot \tau$ is adopted for volcanic ERF than the $RF = -25 \cdot \tau$ used in AR5.

The historical all-forcing scenario is then used to constrain parameter sets that satisfy the historical observed temperature trend of $0.90 \pm 0.19^\circ\text{C}$ (mean and 5 to 95% range) over the 1880 to 2014 period, using the mean of the HadCRUT4, GISTEMP and NOAA datasets. The trend was derived using an inflation factor for autocorrelation of residuals, and is the same method used to derive linear temperature trends in AR5 (Hartmann et al., 2013). The uncertainty bounds used here are wider than, but consistent with, the 1-sigma range of $\pm 0.12^\circ\text{C}$ assessed for the temperature change in 2006-2015 relative to 1850-1900. The parameter sets that satisfy the historical temperature constraint in the historical ensemble (323 out of 1000) are then selected for the anthropogenic-only ensembles that include commitments.

Each commitment scenario is driven with the following assumptions:

1. Zero CO₂ emissions, constant non-CO₂ forcing (blue): FAIR spun up with anthropogenic forcing to 2020. Total non-CO₂ forcing in 2020 is used as the input to the 2021-2100 period with all CO₂ fossil and land use emissions abruptly set to zero.
2. Phase out of CO₂ emissions with 1.5°C commitment (blue dotted): FAIR spun up with anthropogenic forcing to 2020. Total non-CO₂ forcing in 2020 is used as the input to the 2021-2100 period. Fossil and land-use CO₂ emissions are ramped down to zero at a linear rate over 50 years from 2021 to 2070, consistent with a 1.5°C temperature rise since pre-industrial at the point of zero CO₂ emissions in 2070.
3. Linear continuation of 2010-2020 temperature trend (blue dashed, in bottom panel only).
4. Zero GHG emissions, constant aerosol forcing (pink): FAIR spun up with anthropogenic forcing to 2020. All GHG emissions set abruptly to zero in 2021, with aerosol emissions held fixed at their 2020 levels.
5. Zero CO₂ and aerosol emissions, constant non-CO₂ GHG forcing (teal): FAIR spun up with anthropogenic forcing to 2020. Total non-CO₂ GHG forcing, which also includes the proportion of tropospheric ozone forcing attributable to methane emissions, in 2020 is used as the input to the 2021-2100 period. Fossil and land-use CO₂ and aerosol emissions abruptly set to zero in 2021.
6. Zero emissions (yellow): FAIR spun up with anthropogenic forcing to 2020. All emissions set abruptly to zero in 2021.

1.SM.6: Supporting material for FAQ 1.2 Figure 1 and Figure SPM1

This section provides supporting material for FAQ 1.2, Figure 1 and Figure SPM 1 in the Summary for Policymakers. Figure 1.SM.11, top panel, shows time-series of annual CO₂ emissions from the Global Carbon Project (Le Quéré et al, 2018) (black line and grey band, with the width of the band indicating the *likely* range, or one-standard-error, uncertainty in annual emissions), extrapolated to 2020 and then declining in a straight line to reach net zero in either 2055 (green line) or 2040 (brown line).




Figure 1.SM.11: Time-series of (top) annual CO₂ emissions, (middle) cumulative CO₂ emissions, and (bottom) non-CO₂ radiative forcing corresponding to observation-based estimates over the historical period and idealised 1.5°C-consistent pathways.

The middle panel in Figure 1.SM.11 shows cumulative (time-integrated) CO₂ emissions, or the areas highlighted as brown+green or brown, respectively, in the top panel. Brown and green lines show cumulative emissions diagnosed from a simple climate-carbon-cycle model (Millar et al, 2017), with historical airborne fraction scaled to reproduce median estimated annual emissions in 2017. Note this does not precisely reproduce median estimated cumulative emissions in 2017, but is well within the range of uncertainty.

The bottom panel in Figure 1.SM.11 shows median non-CO₂ effective radiative forcing (ERF) estimates used to drive the model over the historical period, extending forcing components using the RCP8.5 scenario (<http://www.pik-potsdam.de/~mmalte/rcps/>) between 2011 and 2020, with scaling applied to each full forcing component time-series to match the corresponding AR5 ERF component in 2011. The vertical bar in 2011 shows a simple indication of the *likely* range of non-CO₂ forcing in 2011 obtained simply by subtracting the best-estimate CO₂ forcing from the total anthropogenic forcing uncertainty, assuming the latter is normally distributed: AR5 did not give a full assessment of the distribution of non-CO₂ radiative forcing. It demonstrates there is considerable uncertainty in this quantity, which translates into uncertainty in climate system properties inferred from these data, but has a much smaller impact on estimates of human-induced warming to date, because this is also constrained by temperature observations. The green line shows non-CO₂ forcing in an indicative 1.5°C-consistent pathway consistent with those assessed by Chapter 2, while the blue line shows an idealised case in which non-CO₂ forcing remains constant after 2030.

For all percentiles of the climate response distribution, non-CO₂ forcing timeseries for these idealised scenarios are scaled to allow the corresponding percentiles of the assessed *likely* range of human-induced warming in 2017 to be achieved, assuming the latter is normally distributed. All non-CO₂ forcing components other than aerosols are scaled following their corresponding ranges of uncertainty of values in 2011 given in AR5, with low values of 2011 ERF corresponding to high values of TCR and *vice versa*. This accounts for the anti-correlation between estimated values of the TCR and estimates of current anthropogenic forcing. Then aerosol ERF (the most uncertain component) is scaled to reproduce the correct percentile of human-induced warming in 2011. Values of TCR, ECS and 2011 forcing components are given in Table 1.SM.1.

Figure 1.SM.12 shows timeseries of observed and human-induced warming to 2017 and responses to these idealised future emissions scenarios. Observed and human-induced warming estimates are reproduced exactly as in Figure 1.2, with the orange shaded band showing the assessed uncertainty range of $\pm 20\%$. The dashed line shows a simple linear extrapolation of the current rate of warming, as calculated over the past 5 years. Responses to idealized future CO₂ emissions and non-CO₂ forcing trajectories are simulated with the FAIR simple climate-carbon-cycle model (Millar et al, 2017b). The four values of the Transient Climate Response (TCR) shown (giving the borders of the green, blue and orange shaded regions) correspond to the 17th, 33rd, 67th and 83rd percentiles of a normal distribution compatible with the *likely* range of TCR as assessed by AR5, combined with the same percentiles of a log-normal distribution for the Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS) similarly anchored to the AR5 *likely* range for this quantity. Other thermal climate response parameters (short and long adjustment time-scales) are set to match those given in Myhre et al (2013) as used in Millar et al (2017a).




Figure 1.SM.12: Time-series of observed and human-induced warming to 2017 and responses to idealised 1.5°C-consistent pathways of CO₂ and non-CO₂ forcing shown in Figure 1.SM.11

All 1.5°C-consistent scenarios that are also consistent with current emissions and radiative forcing trends show increasing non-CO₂ radiative forcing over the coming decade, as emissions of cooling aerosol precursors are reduced, but there is greater variation between scenarios in non-CO₂ radiative forcing after 2030. The middle panel in Figure 1.SM.12 shows the impact of varying future non-CO₂ radiative forcing (green and blue lines in Figure 1.SM.11, bottom panel), while the green dashed lines show the original percentiles from the top panel. Failure to reduce non-CO₂ forcing after 2030 means that a scenario that would give temperatures *likely* below 1.5°C in 2100 instead give only temperatures *as likely as not* below 1.5°C by 2100. If non-CO₂ forcing were allowed to increase further (as it does in some scenarios due primarily to methane emissions), it would increase 2100 temperatures further.

The bottom panel of Figure 1.SM.12 shows the impact of reducing cumulative CO₂ emissions up to the time they reach net zero by bringing forward the date of net-zero emissions from 2055 to 2040. This reduces future warming, with the impact emerging after 2030, such that the entire *likely* range of future warming is now (on this estimate of the climate response distribution) below 1.5°C in 2100. These changes demonstrate how future warming is determined by cumulative CO₂ emissions up to the time of net-zero and non-CO₂ forcing in the decades immediately prior to that time.

Table 1.SM.1: Climate system properties in the versions of the FAIR model used in Figure 1.SM.12 and Figure 1.SM.13 as well as the FAQ 1.2, Figure 1 and Figure SPM1. TCR, ECS and total anthropogenic forcing, F_{ant} , in 2011 are set consistent with corresponding distributions in AR5, TCRE is diagnosed from the model while aerosol forcing F_{aer} is adjusted to reproduce the corresponding percentile of human-induced warming in 2017.

Percentile	TCR (°C)	ECS (°C)	TCRE (°C/TtC)	F_{aer} in 2011 (W/m ²)	F_{ant} in 2011 (W/m ²)
17%	1.0	1.5	0.9	-0.67	3.02
33%	1.4	2.0	1.3	-0.95	2.46
50%	1.75	2.6	1.5	-0.99	2.20
67%	2.1	3.3	1.75	-0.95	2.01
83%	2.5	4.5	2.2	-0.84	1.84

Carbon budget calculations in Chapter 2 are based on temperatures relative to 2006-2015, offset by a constant 0.87°C representing the best-estimate observed warming from pre-industrial to that decade. This has little effect on median estimates of future warming, because the median estimated human-induced warming to the decade 2006-2015 was close to the observed warming, but it does affect uncertainties: the uncertainty in 2030 warming relative to 2006-2015 is lower than the uncertainty in 2030 warming relative to pre-industrial because of the additional information provided by the current climate state and trajectory. This additional information is particularly important for the response to rapid mitigation scenarios in which peak warming occurs a small number of decades into the future (Millar et al, 2017a; Leach et al, 2018), highlighting the particular importance of a “seamless” approach to seasonal-to-decadal forecasting (Palmer et al, 2008; Boer et al, 2016) in the context of 1.5°C. The impact of this additional information is illustrated in Figure 1.SM.13, which is constructed identically to Figure 1.SM.12 but shows all time-series expressed as anomalies relative to 2006-2015 rather than 1850-1900. The thick grey line at 0.63°C shows 1.5°C relative to pre-industrial expressed relative to this more recent decade. The central estimate is unaffected, as is the estimate of the time at which temperatures reach 1.5°C if the current rate of warming continues, but uncertainties are reduced. For example, the idealised pathway with CO₂ emissions reaching zero in 2040 is *likely* to limit warming to less than 0.63°C above 2006-2015, even though it just overshoots 1.5°C relative to 1850-1900.




Figure 1.SM.13: As Figure 1.SM.12, but showing time-series of observed and human-induced warming to 2017 and responses to idealised 1.5°C-consistent pathways relative to 2006-2015. Level of warming corresponding to 1.5°C relative to pre-industrial given central estimate of observed warming of 0.87°C from 1850-1900 to 2006-2015 is shown by horizontal line at 0.63°C.

1.SM.7: Recent trends in emissions and radiative forcing

Figure 1.2 shows a small increase in the estimated rate of human-induced warming since 2000, reaching 0.2°C per decade in the past few years. This is attributed (Haustein et al., 2017) to recent changes in a range of climate forcers, reviewed in this section.

Most studies partition anthropogenic climate forcers into two groups by their lifetime. CO₂ and other long-lived greenhouse gases such as nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride and some halogenated gases contribute to forcing over decades and centuries. Other halogenated gases, ozone precursors and aerosols are defined as short-lived climate forcers (SLCF) due to their residence time of less than several years in the atmosphere. Although methane is either considered as a LLCF or SLCF in published studies or reports (Bowerman et al., 2013; Estrada et al., 2013; Heede, 2014; Jacobson, 2010; Kerr, 2013; Lamarque et al., 2011; Sauniois et al., 2016a; WMO, 2015), we assign methane as a SLCF for the purpose of climate assessment, because its lifetime is comparable to or shorter than the thermal adjustment time of the climate system (Smith et al., 2012).

CO₂, methane and nitrous oxide are the most prominent contributors of anthropogenic radiative forcing, contributing 63%, 20% and 6% of the anthropogenic radiative forcing in 2016 respectively, as shown in Figure 1.SM.14(a). Other long-lived greenhouse gases, including halogenated gases, and SLCFs such as tropospheric ozone are responsible of about 37% of the anthropogenic radiative

forcing (figures add up to more than 100% because of the compensating effect of aerosols). Emissions such as black carbon and sulphur dioxide form different types of aerosol particles, which interact with both shortwave and longwave radiation and alter clouds. The resulting net aerosol radiative forcing is spatially inhomogeneous and uncertain. Globally averaged, it is estimated to have reduced the globally averaged anthropogenic forcing by about 27% (figures from Myhre et al. (2013), updated: uncertainties in aerosol forcing in particular are reviewed in AR5, and will be reassessed in AR6. This report continues to work from the AR5 estimates.).

As shown in Figure 1.SM.14 (b), the growth of CO₂ emissions has slowed since 2013 because of changes in the energy mix moving from coal to natural gas and increased renewable energy generation (Boden et al., 2015). This slowdown in CO₂ emission growth has occurred despite global GDP growth increasing to 3% y⁻¹ in 2015, implying a structural shift away from carbon intensive activities (Jackson et al., 2015; Le Quéré et al., 2018). In 2016, however, anthropogenic CO₂ emissions are 36.18 GtCO₂ y⁻¹ and have begun to grow again by 0.4% with respect to 2015 (Le Quéré et al., 2018). Global average concentration in 2016 has reached 402.3 ppm, which represents an increase of about 38.4% from 1850–1900 average (290.7 ppm).

Figure 1.SM.14 (c) and (d) show that methane and nitrous oxide emissions, unlike CO₂, have followed the most emission-intensive pathways assessed in AR5 (Saunio et al., 2016b; Thompson et al., 2014). However, current trends in methane and nitrous oxide emissions are not driven in the same way by human activities. About 60% of methane emissions are attributed to human activities (e.g. ruminants, rice agriculture, fossil fuel exploitation, landfills and biomass burning, Saikawa et al., 2014; Saunio et al., 2016b), while about 40% of nitrous oxide emissions are caused by various industrial processes and agriculture (Bodirsky et al., 2012; Thompson et al., 2014). It is thus more complicated to link rates of emissions to economic trends or energy demands than is the case with CO₂ (Peters et al., 2011).

Estimates of anthropogenic emissions for methane and nitrous oxide are uncertain as shown by the difference between datasets in Figure 1.4 EDGARV4.2 (JRC, 2011) estimates and US–EPA projections give a global amount of methane emission ranging between 392.87 and 378.29 TgCH₄y⁻¹ by 2016 which corresponds to a relative increase of 0.6–1% compared to 2015 emissions. However, livestock emissions in these databases are considered to be underestimated (Wolf et al., 2017). Similar uncertainties exist for anthropogenic N₂O emissions for which only US–EPA projections are available. According to US–EPA projections, anthropogenic N₂O emissions reach 11.2 TgN₂O y⁻¹, representing a relative increase of about 1% compared to 2016. Anthropogenic CH₄ and N₂O emissions also appear to respond to major economic crises.




Figure 1.SM.14: Time series of anthropogenic radiative forcing (a), CO_2 , methane (CH_4) and nitrous oxide (N_2O) emissions (b–d) for the period 1986–2016. Anthropogenic radiative forcing data is from Myhre et al., (2013), extended from 2011 until the end of 2017 with greenhouse gas data from Dlugokencky and Tans (2016), updated radiative forcing approximations for greenhouse gases (Etminan et al., 2016) and extended aerosol forcing following (Myhre et al., 2017). Bar graph shows the sum of different forcing agents. Anthropogenic CO_2 emissions are from the Global Carbon Project (GCP2017; Le Quéré et al., 2018), and EDGAR (Joint Research Centre, 2011) datasets. Anthropogenic emissions of CH_4 and N_2O (e) are estimated from EDGAR (JRC, 2011) and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 1990). Economic crisis (Former Soviet Union, A; Asian financial crisis, B; global financial crisis, C) are reported following the methodology of (Peters et al., 2011).

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Chapter 2: Mitigation pathways compatible with 1.5°C in the context of sustainable development

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Executive Summary

This chapter assesses mitigation pathways consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. In doing so, it explores the following key questions: What role do CO₂ and non-CO₂ emissions play? {2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6} To what extent do 1.5°C pathways involve overshooting and returning below 1.5°C during the 21st century? {2.2, 2.3} What are the implications for transitions in energy, land use and sustainable development? {2.3, 2.4, 2.5} How do policy frameworks affect the ability to limit warming to 1.5°C? {2.3, 2.5} What are the associated knowledge gaps? {2.6}

The assessed pathways describe integrated, quantitative evolutions of all emissions over the 21st century associated with global energy and land use, and the world economy. The assessment is contingent upon available integrated assessment literature and model assumptions, and is complemented by other studies with different scope, for example those focusing on individual sectors. In recent years, integrated mitigation studies have improved the characterizations of mitigation pathways. However, limitations remain, as climate damages, avoided impacts, or societal co-benefits of the modelled transformations remain largely unaccounted for, while concurrent rapid technological changes, behavioural aspects, and uncertainties about input data present continuous challenges. (*high confidence*) {2.1.3, 2.3, 2.5.1, 2.6, Technical Annex 2}

The chances of limiting warming to 1.5°C and the requirements for urgent action

1.5°C-consistent pathways can be identified under a range of assumptions about economic growth, technology developments and lifestyles. However, lack of global cooperation, lack of governance of the energy and land transformation, and growing resource-intensive consumption are key impediments for achieving 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Governance challenges have been related to scenarios with high inequality and high population growth in the 1.5°C pathway literature. {2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.5}

Under emissions in line with current pledges under the Paris Agreement (known as Nationally-Determined Contributions or NDCs), global warming is expected to surpass 1.5°C, even if they are supplemented with very challenging increases in the scale and ambition of mitigation after 2030 (*high confidence*). This increased action would need to achieve net zero CO₂ emissions in less than 15 years. Even if this is achieved, temperatures remaining below 1.5°C would depend on the geophysical response being towards the low end of the currently-estimated uncertainty range. Transition challenges as well as identified trade-offs can be reduced if global emissions peak before 2030 and already achieve marked emissions reductions by 2030 compared to today.¹ {2.2, 2.3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}

Limiting warming to 1.5°C depends on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over the next decades, where lower GHG emissions in 2030 lead to a higher chance of peak warming being kept to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). Available pathways that aim for no or limited (0–0.2°C) overshoot of 1.5°C keep GHG emissions in 2030 to 25–30 GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ in 2030 (interquartile range). This contrasts with median estimates for current NDCs of 50–58 GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ in 2030. Pathways that aim for limiting warming to 1.5°C by 2100 after a temporary temperature overshoot rely on large-scale deployment of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) measures, which are uncertain and entail clear risks. {2.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.5, 2.5.3, Cross-Chapter Boxes 6 in Chapter 3 and 9 in Chapter 4, 4.3.7}

Limiting warming to 1.5°C implies reaching net zero CO₂ emissions globally around 2050 and concurrent deep reductions in emissions of non-CO₂ forcers, particularly methane (*high confidence*). Such mitigation pathways are characterized by energy-demand reductions, decarbonisation of electricity and other fuels, electrification of energy end use, deep reductions in agricultural emissions, and some form of CDR with carbon storage on land or sequestration in geological reservoirs. Low energy demand and low demand for land- and GHG-intensive consumption goods facilitate limiting warming to as close as possible to 1.5°C. {2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}.

¹ FOOTNOTE: Kyoto-GHG emissions in this statement are aggregated with GWP-100 values of the IPCC Second Assessment Report.

In comparison to a 2°C limit, required transformations to limit warming to 1.5°C are qualitatively similar but more pronounced and rapid over the next decades (*high confidence*). 1.5°C implies very ambitious, internationally cooperative policy environments that transform both supply and demand (*high confidence*). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5}

Policies reflecting a high price on emissions are necessary in models to achieve cost-effective 1.5°C-consistent pathways (*high confidence*). Other things being equal, modelling suggests the price of emissions for limiting warming to 1.5°C being about three four times higher compared to 2°C, with large variations across models and socioeconomic assumptions. A price on carbon can be imposed directly by carbon pricing or implicitly by regulatory policies. Other policy instruments, like technology policies or performance standards, can complement carbon pricing in specific areas. {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.4.5}

Limiting warming to 1.5°C requires a marked shift in investment patterns (*limited evidence, high agreement*). Investments in low-carbon energy technologies and energy efficiency would need to approximately double in the next 20 years, while investment in fossil-fuel extraction and conversion decrease by about a quarter. Uncertainties and strategic mitigation portfolio choices affect the magnitude and focus of required investments. {2.5.2}

Future emissions in 1.5°C-consistent pathways

Mitigation requirements can be quantified using carbon budget approaches that relate cumulative CO₂ emissions to global-mean temperature increase. Robust physical understanding underpins this relationship, but uncertainties become increasingly relevant as a specific temperature limit is approached. These uncertainties relate to the transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE), non-CO₂ emissions, radiative forcing and response, potential additional Earth-system feedbacks (such as permafrost thawing), and historical emissions and temperature. {2.2.2, 2.6.1}

Cumulative CO₂ emissions are kept within a budget by reducing global annual CO₂ emissions to net-zero. This assessment suggests a remaining budget for limiting warming to 1.5°C with a two-thirds chance of about 550 GtCO₂, and of about 750 GtCO₂ for an even chance (*medium confidence*). The remaining carbon budget is defined here as cumulative CO₂ emissions from the start of 2018 until the time of net-zero global emissions. Remaining budgets applicable to 2100, would approximately be 100 GtCO₂ lower than this to account for permafrost thawing and potential methane release from wetlands in the future. These estimates come with an additional geophysical uncertainty of at least ±50%, related to non-CO₂ response and TCRE distribution. In addition, they can vary by ±250 GtCO₂ depending on non-CO₂ mitigation strategies as found in available pathways. {2.2.2, 2.6.1}

Staying within a remaining carbon budget of 750 GtCO₂ implies that CO₂ emissions reach carbon neutrality in about 35 years, reduced to 25 years for a 550 GtCO₂ remaining carbon budget (*high confidence*). The ±50% geophysical uncertainty range surrounding a carbon budget translates into a variation of this timing of carbon neutrality of roughly ±15–20 years. If emissions do not start declining in the next decade, the point of carbon neutrality would need to be reached at least two decades earlier to remain within the same carbon budget. {2.2.2, 2.3.5}

Non-CO₂ emissions contribute to peak warming and thus affect the remaining carbon budget. The evolution of methane and sulphur dioxide emissions strongly influences the chances of limiting warming to 1.5°C. In the near-term, a weakening of aerosol cooling would add to future warming, but can be tempered by reductions in methane emissions (*high confidence*). Uncertainty in radiative forcing estimates (particularly aerosol) affects carbon budgets and the certainty of pathway categorizations. Some non-CO₂ forcers are emitted alongside CO₂, particularly in the energy and transport sectors, and can be largely addressed through CO₂ mitigation. Others require specific measures, for example to target agricultural N₂O and CH₄, some sources of black carbon, or hydrofluorocarbons (*high confidence*). In many cases, non-CO₂ emissions reductions are similar in 2°C pathways, indicating reductions near their assumed maximum potential by integrated assessment models. Emissions of N₂O and NH₃ increase in some pathways with strongly increased bioenergy demand. {2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.2, 2.5.3}

The role of Carbon-Dioxide Removal (CDR)

All analysed 1.5°C-consistent pathways use CDR to some extent to neutralize emissions from sources for which no mitigation measures have been identified and, in most cases, also to achieve net-negative emissions that allow temperature to return to 1.5°C following an overshoot (*high confidence*). The longer the delay in reducing CO₂ emissions towards zero, the larger the likelihood of exceeding 1.5°C, and the heavier the implied reliance on net-negative emissions after mid-century to return warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). The faster reduction of net CO₂ emissions in 1.5°C- compared to 2°C-consistent pathways is predominantly achieved by measures that result in less CO₂ being produced and emitted, and only to a smaller degree through additional CDR. Limitations on the speed, scale, and societal acceptability of CDR deployment also limit the conceivable extent of temperature overshoot. Limits to our understanding of how the carbon cycle responds to net negative emissions increase the uncertainty about the effectiveness of CDR to decline temperatures after a peak. {2.2, 2.3, 2.6, 4.3.7}

CDR deployed at scale is unproven and reliance on such technology is a major risk in the ability to limit warming to 1.5°C. CDR is needed less in pathways with particularly strong emphasis on energy efficiency and low demand. The scale and type of CDR deployment varies widely across 1.5°C-consistent pathways, with different consequences for achieving sustainable development objectives (*high confidence*). Some pathways rely more on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), while others rely more on afforestation, which are the two CDR methods most often included in integrated pathways. Trade-offs with other sustainability objectives occur predominantly through increased land, energy, water and investment demand. Bioenergy use is substantial in 1.5°C-consistent pathways with or without BECCS due to its multiple roles in decarbonizing energy use. {2.3.1, 2.5.3, 2.6, 4.3.7}

Properties of energy transitions in 1.5°C-consistent pathways

The share of primary energy from renewables increases while coal usage decreases across 1.5°C-consistent pathways (*high confidence*). By 2050, renewables (including bioenergy, hydro, wind and solar, with direct-equivalence method) supply a share of 49–67% (interquartile range) of primary energy in 1.5°C-consistent pathways; while the share from coal decreases to 1–7% (interquartile range), with a large fraction of this coal use combined with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). From 2020 to 2050 the primary energy supplied by oil declines in most pathways (–32 to –74% interquartile range). Natural gas changes by –13% to –60% (interquartile range), but some pathways show a marked increase albeit with widespread deployment of CCS. The overall deployment of CCS varies widely across 1.5°C-consistent pathways with cumulative CO₂ stored through 2050 ranging from zero up to 460 GtCO₂ (minimum-maximum range), of which zero up to 190 GtCO₂ stored from biomass. Primary energy supplied by bioenergy ranges from 40–310 EJ yr⁻¹ in 2050 (minimum-maximum range), and nuclear from 3–120 EJ/yr (minimum-maximum range). These ranges reflect both uncertainties in technological development and strategic mitigation portfolio choices. {2.4.2}

1.5°C-consistent pathways include a rapid decline in the carbon intensity of electricity and an increase in electrification of energy end use (*high confidence*). By 2050, the carbon intensity of electricity decreases to –92 to +11 gCO₂/MJ (minimum-maximum range) from about 140 gCO₂/MJ in 2020, and electricity covers 34–71% (minimum-maximum range) of final energy across 1.5°C-consistent pathways from about 20% in 2020. By 2050, the share of electricity supplied by renewables increases to 36–97% (minimum-maximum range) across 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Pathways with higher chances of holding warming to below 1.5°C generally show a faster decline in the carbon intensity of electricity by 2030 than pathways that temporarily overshoot 1.5°C. {2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3}

Demand-side mitigation and behavioural changes

Demand-side measures are key elements of 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Lifestyle choices lowering energy demand and the land- and GHG-intensity of food consumption can further support achievement of 1.5°C-consistent pathways (*high confidence*). By 2030 and 2050, all end-use sectors

(including building, transport, and industry) show marked energy demand reductions in modelled 1.5°C-consistent pathways, comparable and beyond those projected in 2°C-consistent pathways. Sectorial models support the scale of these reductions. {2.3.4, 2.4.3}

Links between 1.5°C-consistent pathways and sustainable development

Choices about mitigation portfolios for limiting warming to 1.5°C can positively or negatively impact the achievement of other societal objectives, such as sustainable development (*high confidence*). In particular, demand-side and efficiency measures, and lifestyle choices that limit energy, resource, and GHG-intensive food demand support sustainable development (*medium confidence*). Limiting warming to 1.5°C can be achieved synergistically with poverty alleviation and improved energy security and can provide large public health benefits through improved air quality, preventing millions of premature deaths. However, specific mitigation measures, such as bioenergy, may result in trade-offs that require consideration. {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3}

2.1 Introduction to Mitigation Pathways and the Sustainable Development Context

This chapter assesses the literature on mitigation pathways to limit or return global mean warming to 1.5°C (relative to the preindustrial base period 1850–1900). Key questions addressed are: What types of mitigation pathways have been developed that could be consistent with 1.5°C? What changes in emissions, energy and land use do they entail? What do they imply for climate policy and implementation, and what impacts do they have on sustainable development? In terms of feasibility (see Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1), this chapter focuses on geophysical dimensions and technological and economic enabling factors, with social and institutional dimensions as well as additional aspects of technical feasibility covered in Chapter 4.

Mitigation pathways are typically designed to reach a pre-defined climate target alone. Minimization of mitigation expenditures, but not climate-related damages or sustainable development impacts, is often the basis for these pathways to the desired climate target (see Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 2 for additional discussion). However, there are interactions between mitigation and multiple other sustainable development goals (see Sections 1.1 and 5.4) that provide both challenges and opportunities for climate action. Hence there are substantial efforts to evaluate the effects of the various mitigation pathways on sustainable development, focusing in particular on aspects for which Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) provide relevant information (e.g., land-use changes and biodiversity, food security, and air quality). More broadly, there are efforts to incorporate climate change mitigation as one of multiple objectives that in general reflect societal concerns more completely and could potentially provide benefits at lower costs than simultaneous single objective policies (e.g., Clarke et al., 2014). For example, with carefully selected policies, universal energy access can be achieved while simultaneously reducing air pollution and mitigating climate change (McCollum et al., 2011; Riahi et al., 2012; IEA, 2017d). This chapter thus presents both the pathways and an initial discussion of their context within sustainable development objectives (Section 2.5), with the latter along with equity and ethical issues discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

As described in Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1, scenarios are comprehensive, plausible, integrated descriptions of possible futures based on specified, internally consistent underlying assumptions, with pathways often used to describe the clear temporal evolution of specific scenario aspects or goal-oriented scenarios. We include both these usages of ‘pathways’ here.

2.1.1 *Mitigation pathways consistent with 1.5°C*

Emissions scenarios need to cover all sectors and regions over the 21st century to be associated with a climate change projection out to 2100. Assumptions regarding future trends in population, consumption of goods and services (including food), economic growth, behaviour, technology, policies and institutions are all required to generate scenarios (Section 2.3.1). These societal choices must then be linked to the drivers of climate change, including emissions of well-mixed greenhouse gases and aerosol and ozone precursors, and land-use and land-cover changes. Deliberate solar radiation modification is not included in these scenarios (see Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 4).

Plausible developments need to be anticipated in many facets of the key sectors of energy and land use. Within energy, these consider energy resources like biofuels, energy supply and conversion technologies, energy consumption, and supply and end-use efficiency. Within land use, agricultural productivity, food demand, terrestrial carbon management, and biofuel production are all considered. Climate policies are also considered, including carbon pricing and technology policies such as research and development funding and subsidies. The scenarios incorporate regional differentiation in sectoral and policy development. The climate changes resulting from such scenarios are derived using models that typically incorporate physical understanding of the carbon-cycle and climate response derived from complex geophysical models evaluated against observations (Sections 2.2 and 2.6).

The temperature response to a given emission pathway is uncertain and therefore quantified in terms of a probabilistic outcome. Chapter 1 assesses the climate objectives of the Paris agreement in terms of human-induced warming, thus excluding potential impacts of natural forcing such as volcanic eruptions or solar output changes or unforced internal variability. Temperature responses in this chapter are assessed using

simple geophysically-based models that evaluate the anthropogenic component of future temperature change and do not incorporate internal natural variations and are thus fit for purpose in the context of this assessment (Section 2.2.1). Hence a scenario that is consistent with 1.5°C may in fact lead to either a higher or lower temperature change, but within quantified and generally well-understood bounds (see also Section 1.2.3). Consistency with avoiding a human-induced temperature change limit must therefore also be defined probabilistically, with likelihood values selected based on risk avoidance preferences. Responses beyond global mean temperature are not typically evaluated in such models and are assessed in Chapter 3.

2.1.2 *The Use of Scenarios*

Variations in scenario assumptions and design define to a large degree which questions can be addressed with a specific scenario set, for example, the exploration of implications of delayed climate mitigation action. In this assessment, the following classes of 1.5°C – and 2°C – consistent scenarios are of particular interest to the topics addressed in this chapter: (a) scenarios with the same climate target over the 21st century but varying socio-economic assumptions (Sections 2.3 and 2.4); (b) pairs of scenarios with similar socio-economic assumptions but with forcing targets aimed at 1.5°C and 2°C (Section 2.3); (c) scenarios that follow the Nationally Determined Contributions or NDCs² until 2030 with much more stringent mitigation action thereafter (Section 2.3.5).

Characteristics of these pathways such as emissions reduction rates, time of peaking, and low-carbon energy deployment rates can be assessed as being consistent with 1.5°C. However, they cannot be assessed as ‘requirements’ for 1.5°C, unless a targeted analysis is available that specifically asked whether there could be pathways without the characteristics in question. AR5 already assessed such targeted analyses, for example asking which technologies are important to keep open the possibility to limit warming to 2°C (Clarke et al., 2014). By now, several such targeted analyses are also available for questions related to 1.5°C (Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013b; Bauer et al., 2018; Strefler et al., 2018b; van Vuuren et al., 2018). This assessment distinguishes between consistent and the much stronger concept of required characteristics of 1.5°C pathways wherever possible.

Ultimately, society will adjust as new information becomes available and technical learning progresses, and these adjustments can be in either direction. Earlier scenario studies have shown, however, that deeper emissions reductions in the near term hedge against the uncertainty of both climate response and future technology availability (Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013b; Clarke et al., 2014). Not knowing what adaptations might be put in place in the future, and due to limited studies, this chapter examines prospective rather than iteratively adaptive mitigation pathways (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1). Societal choices illustrated by scenarios may also influence what futures are envisioned as possible or desirable and hence whether those come into being (Beck and Mahony, 2017).

2.1.3 *New scenario information since AR5*

In this chapter, we extend the AR5 mitigation pathway assessment based on new scenario literature. Updates in understanding of climate sensitivity, transient climate response, radiative forcing, and the cumulative carbon budget consistent with 1.5°C are discussed in Sections 2.2.

Mitigation pathways developed with detailed process-based IAMs covering all sectors and regions over the 21st century describe an internally consistent and calibrated (to historical trends) way to get from current developments to meeting long-term climate targets like 1.5°C (Clarke et al., 2014). The overwhelming majority of available 1.5°C pathways were generated by such IAMs and these can be directly linked to climate outcomes and their consistency with the 1.5°C goal evaluated. The AR5 similarly relied upon such studies, which were mainly discussed in Chapter 6 of Working Group III (WGIII) (Clarke et al., 2014).

Since the AR5, several new integrated multi-model studies have appeared in the literature that explore

² FOOTNOTE: Current pledges include those from the US although they have stated their intention to withdraw in the future.

specific characteristics of scenarios more stringent than the lowest scenario category assessed in AR5 that was assessed to limit warming below 2°C with greater than 66% likelihood (Rogelj et al., 2015b, 2018; Akimoto et al., 2017; Su et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017; Marcucci et al., 2017; Bauer et al., 2018; Strefler et al., 2018a; van Vuuren et al., 2018; Vrontisi et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018; Bertram et al., 2018; Grubler et al., 2018; Kriegler et al., 2018b; Luderer et al., 2018). Those scenarios explore 1.5°C-consistent pathways from multiple perspectives (see Annex 2.A.3), examining sensitivity to assumptions regarding:

- socio-economic drivers and developments including energy and food demand as, for example, characterized by the shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs; Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1)
- near-term climate policies describing different levels of strengthening the NDCs
- the use of bioenergy and availability and desirability of carbon-dioxide-removal (CDR) technologies

A large number of these scenarios were collected in a scenario database established for the assessment of this Special Report (Annex 2.A.3). Mitigation pathways were classified by four factors: consistency with a temperature limit (as defined by Chapter 1), whether they temporarily overshoot that limit, the extent of this potential overshoot, and the likelihood of falling within these bounds. Specifically, they were put into classes that either kept surface temperatures below a given threshold throughout the 21st century or returned to a value below 1.5°C at some point before 2100 after temporarily exceeding that level earlier, referred to as an overshoot (OS). Both groups were further separated based on the probability of being below the threshold and the degree of overshoot, respectively (Table 2.1). Pathways are uniquely classified, with 1.5°C-related classes given higher priority than 2°C classes in cases where a pathway would be applicable to either class.

The probability assessment used in the scenario classification are based on simulations using two reduced complexity carbon-cycle, atmospheric composition and climate models: the ‘Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change’ (MAGICC) (Meinshausen et al., 2011a), and the ‘Finite Amplitude Impulse Response’ (FAIRv1.3) model (Smith et al., 2018). For the purpose of this report, and to facilitate comparison with AR5, the range of the key carbon-cycle and climate parameters for MAGICC and its setup are identical to those used in AR5 WGIII (Clarke et al., 2014). For each mitigation pathway, MAGICC and FAIR simulations provide probabilistic estimates of atmospheric concentrations, radiative forcing and global temperature outcomes until 2100. However, the classification uses MAGICC probabilities directly for traceability with AR5 and since this model is more established in the literature. Nevertheless, the overall uncertainty assessment is based on results from both models, which are considered in the context of the latest radiative forcing estimates and observed temperatures (Etminan et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2018) (Section 2.2 and Annex 2.A.1). The comparison of these lines of evidence shows *high agreement* in the relative temperature response of pathways, with *medium agreement* on the precise absolute magnitude of warming, introducing a level of imprecision in these attributes. Consideration of the combined evidence here leads to *medium confidence* in the overall geophysical characteristics of the pathways reported here.

Table 2.1: Classification of pathways this chapter draws upon along with the number of available pathways in each class. The definition of each class is based on probabilities derived from the MAGICC model in a setup identical to AR5 WGIII (Clarke et al., 2014), as detailed in Annex 2.A.4.

<i>Pathway Group</i>	<i>Pathway Class</i>	<i>Pathway selection criteria and description</i>	<i>Number of scenarios</i>	<i>Number of scenarios</i>
<i>1.5°C or 1.5°C-consistent</i>	<i>Below-1.5°C</i>	<i>Pathways limiting peak warming to below 1.5°C during the entire 21st century with 50-66% likelihood*</i>	9	90
	<i>1.5°C-low-OS</i>	<i>Pathways limiting median warming to below 1.5°C in 2100 and with a 50-67% probability of temporarily overshooting that level earlier, generally implying less than 0.1°C higher peak warming than Below-1.5°C pathways</i>	44	
	<i>1.5°C-high-OS</i>	<i>Pathways limiting median warming to below 1.5°C in 2100 and with a greater than 67% probability of temporarily overshooting that level earlier, generally implying 0.1–0.4°C higher peak warming than Below-1.5°C pathways</i>	37	
<i>2°C or 2°C-consistent</i>	<i>Lower-2°C</i>	<i>Pathways limiting peak warming to below 2°C during the entire 21st century with greater than 66% likelihood</i>	74	132
	<i>Higher-2°C</i>	<i>Pathways assessed to keep peak warming to below 2°C during the entire 21st century with 50-66% likelihood</i>	58	
<i>* No pathways were available that achieve a greater than 66% probability of limiting warming below 1.5°C during the entire 21st century based on the MAGICC model projections.</i>				

In addition to the characteristics of the above-mentioned classes, four illustrative pathway archetypes have been selected and are used throughout this chapter to highlight specific features of and variations across 1.5°C pathways. These are chosen in particular to illustrate the spectrum of CO₂ emissions reduction patterns consistent with 1.5°C, ranging from very rapid and deep near-term decreases facilitated by efficiency and demand-side measures that lead to limited CDR requirements to relatively slower but still rapid emissions reductions that lead to a temperature overshoot and necessitate large CDR deployment later in the century (Section 2.3).

2.1.4 Utility of integrated assessment models (IAMs) in the context of this report

IAMs lie at the basis of the assessment of mitigation pathways in this chapter as much of the quantitative global scenario literature is derived with such models. IAMs combine insights from various disciplines in a single framework resulting in a dynamic description of the coupled energy-economy-land-climate system that cover the largest sources of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from different sectors. Many of the IAMs that contributed mitigation scenarios to this assessment include a process-based description of the land system in addition to the energy system (e.g., Popp et al., 2017), and several have been extended to cover air pollutants (Rao et al., 2017) and water use (Hejazi et al., 2014; Fricko et al., 2016; Mouratiadou et al., 2016). Such integrated pathways hence allow the exploration of the whole-system transformation, as well as the interactions, synergies, and trade-offs between sectors, and increasing with questions beyond climate mitigation (von Stechow et al., 2015). The models do not, however, fully account for all constraints that could affect realization of pathways (see Chapter 4).

Section 2.3 assesses the overall characteristics of 1.5°C pathways based on fully integrated pathways, while Sections 2.4 and 2.5 describe underlying sectorial transformations, including insights from sector-specific assessment models and pathways that are not derived from IAMs. Such models provide detail in their domain of application and make exogenous assumptions about cross-sectoral or global factors. They often focus on a specific sector, such as the energy (Bruckner et al., 2014; IEA, 2017a; Jacobson, 2017; OECD/IEA and IRENA, 2017), buildings (Lucon et al., 2014) or transport (Sims et al., 2014) sector, or a specific country or region (Giannakidis et al., 2018). Sector-specific pathways are assessed in relation to integrated pathways because they cannot be directly linked to 1.5°C by themselves if they do not extend to 2100 or do not include all GHGs or aerosols from all sectors.

AR5 found sectorial 2°C decarbonisation strategies from IAMs to be consistent with sector-specific studies (Clarke et al., 2014). A growing body of literature on 100%-renewable energy scenarios has emerged (e.g.,

see Creutzig et al., 2017; Jacobson et al., 2017), which goes beyond the wide range of IAM projections of renewable energy shares in 1.5°C and 2°C pathways. While the representation of renewable energy resource potentials, technology costs and system integration in IAMs has been updated since AR5, leading to higher renewable energy deployments in many cases (Luderer et al., 2017; Pietzcker et al., 2017), none of the IAM projections identify 100% renewable energy solutions for the global energy system as part of cost-effective mitigation pathways (Section 2.4.2). Bottom-up studies find higher mitigation potentials in the industry, buildings, and transport sector in 2030 than realized in selected 2°C pathways from IAMs (UNEP 2017), indicating the possibility to strengthen sectorial decarbonisation strategies until 2030 beyond the integrated 1.5°C pathways assessed in this chapter (Luderer et al., 2018).

Detailed process-based IAMs are a diverse set of models ranging from partial equilibrium energy-land models to computable general equilibrium models of the global economy, from myopic to perfect foresight models, and from models with to models without endogenous technological change (Annex 2.A.2). The IAMs used in this chapter have limited to no coverage of climate impacts. They typically use GHG pricing mechanisms to induce emissions reductions and associated changes in energy and land uses consistent with the imposed climate goal. The scenarios generated by these models are defined by the choice of climate goals and assumptions about near-term climate policy developments. They are also shaped by assumptions about mitigation potentials and technologies as well as baseline developments such as, for example, those represented by different Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), especially those pertaining to energy and food demand (Riahi et al., 2017). See Section 2.3.1 for discussion of these assumptions. Since the AR5, the scenario literature has greatly expanded the exploration of these dimensions. This includes low demand scenarios (Grubler et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018), scenarios taking into account a larger set of sustainable development goals (Bertram et al., 2018), scenarios with restricted availability of CDR technologies (Bauer et al., 2018; Grubler et al., 2018; Holz et al., 2018b; Kriegler et al., 2018b; Strefler et al., 2018b; van Vuuren et al., 2018), scenarios with near-term action dominated by regulatory policies (Kriegler et al., 2018b) and scenario variations across the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (Riahi et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018). IAM results depend upon multiple underlying assumptions, for example the extent to which global markets and economies are assumed to operate frictionless and policies are cost-optimised, assumptions about technological progress and availability and costs of mitigation and CDR measures, assumptions about underlying socio-economic developments and future energy, food and materials demand, and assumptions about the geographic and temporal pattern of future regulatory and carbon pricing policies (see Annex 2.A.2 for additional discussion on IAMs and their limitations).

2.2 Geophysical relationships and constraints

Emissions pathways can be characterised by various geophysical characteristics such as radiative forcing (Masui et al., 2011; Riahi et al., 2011; Thomson et al., 2011; van Vuuren et al., 2011b), atmospheric concentrations (van Vuuren et al., 2007, 2011a; Clarke et al., 2014) or associated temperature outcomes (Meinshausen et al., 2009; Rogelj et al., 2011; Luderer et al., 2013). These attributes can be used to derive geophysical relationships for specific pathway classes, such as cumulative CO₂ emissions compatible with a specific level of warming also known as ‘carbon budgets’ (Meinshausen et al., 2009; Rogelj et al., 2011; Stocker et al., 2013; Friedlingstein et al., 2014a), the consistent contributions of non-CO₂ GHGs and aerosols to the remaining carbon budget (Bowerman et al., 2011; Rogelj et al., 2015a, 2016b) or to temperature outcomes (Lamarque et al., 2011; Bowerman et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2014b). This section assesses geophysical relationships for both CO₂ and non-CO₂ emissions.

2.2.1 Geophysical characteristics of mitigation pathways

This section employs the pathway classification introduced in Section 2.1, with geophysical characteristics derived from simulations with the MAGICC reduced-complexity carbon-cycle and climate model and supported by simulations with the FAIR reduced-complexity model (Section 2.1). Within a specific category and between models, there remains a large degree of variance. Most pathways exhibit a temperature overshoot which has been highlighted in several studies focusing on stringent mitigation pathways (Huntingford and Lowe, 2007; Wigley et al., 2007; Nohara et al., 2015; Rogelj et al., 2015d; Zickfeld and Herrington, 2015; Schleussner et al., 2016; Xu and Ramanathan, 2017). Only very few of the scenarios collected in the database for this report hold the average future warming projected by MAGICC below 1.5°C during the entire 21st century (Table 2.1, Figure 2.1). Most 1.5°C-consistent pathways available in the database overshoot 1.5°C around mid-century before peaking and then reducing temperatures so as to return below that level in 2100. However, because of numerous geophysical uncertainties and model dependencies (Section 2.2.1.1, Annex 2.A.1), absolute temperature characteristics of the various pathway categories are more difficult to distinguish than relative features (Figure 2.1, Annex 2.A.1) and actual probabilities of overshoot are imprecise. However, all lines of evidence available for temperature projections indicate a probability greater than 50% of overshooting 1.5°C by mid-century in all but the most stringent pathways currently available (Annex 2.A.1, 2.A.4).

Most 1.5°C-consistent pathways exhibit a peak in temperature by mid-century whereas 2°C-consistent pathways generally peak after 2050 (Annex 2.A.4). The peak in median temperature in the various pathway categories occurs about ten years before reaching net zero CO₂ emissions due to strongly reduced annual CO₂ emissions and deep reductions in CH₄ emissions (Section 2.3.3). The two reduced-complexity climate models used in this assessment suggest that virtually all available 1.5°C-consistent pathways peak and decline global-mean temperature rise, but with varying rates of temperature decline after the peak (Figure 2.1). The estimated decadal rates of temperature change by the end of the century are smaller than the amplitude of the climate variability as assessed in AR5 (1σ of about ±0.1°C), which hence complicates the detection of a global peak and decline of warming in observations on timescales of on to two decades (Bindoff et al., 2013). In comparison, many pathways limiting warming to 2°C or higher by 2100 still have noticeable increasing trends at the end of the century, and thus imply continued warming.

By 2100, the difference between 1.5°C- and 2°C-consistent pathways becomes clearer compared to mid-century, and not only for the temperature response (Figure 2.1) but also for atmospheric CO₂ concentrations. In 2100, the median CO₂ concentration in 1.5°C-consistent pathways is below 2016 levels (Le Quéré et al., 2018), whereas it remains higher by about 5-10% compared to 2016 in the 2°C-consistent pathways.




Figure 2.1: Pathways classification overview. (a) Average global-mean temperature increase relative to 2010 as projected by FAIR and MAGICC in 2030, 2050 and 2100; (b) response of peak warming to cumulative CO₂ emissions until net zero by MAGICC (red) and FAIR (blue); (c) decadal rate of average global-mean temperature change from 2081 to 2100 as a function of the annual CO₂ emissions averaged over the same period as given by FAIR (transparent squares) and MAGICC (filled circles). In panel (a), horizontal lines at 0.63°C and 1.13°C are indicative of the 1.5°C and 2°C warming thresholds with the respect to 1850–1900, taking into account the assessed historical warming of 0.87°C ±0.12°C between the 1850–1900 and 2006–2015 periods (Section 1.2.1). In panel (a), vertical lines illustrate both the physical and the scenario uncertainty as captured by MAGICC and FAIR and show the minimal warming of the 5th percentile of projected warming and the maximal warming of the 95th percentile of projected warming per scenario class. Boxes show the interquartile range of mean warming across scenarios, and thus represent scenario uncertainty only.

2.2.1.1 Geophysical uncertainties: non-CO₂ forcing agents

Impacts of non-CO₂ climate forcers on temperature outcomes are particularly important when evaluating stringent mitigation pathways (Weyant et al., 2006; Shindell et al., 2012; Rogelj et al., 2014b, 2015a; Samset et al., 2018). However, many uncertainties affect the role of non-CO₂ climate forcers in stringent mitigation pathways.

A first uncertainty arises from the magnitude of the radiative forcing attributed to non-CO₂ climate forcers. Figure 2.2 illustrates how, for one representative 1.5°C-consistent pathway (SSP2-1.9) (Fricko et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018), the effective radiative forcings as estimated by MAGICC and FAIR can differ (see Annex 2.A.1 for further details). This large spread in non-CO₂ effective radiative forcings leads to considerable uncertainty in the predicted temperature response. This uncertainty ultimately affects the assessed temperature outcomes for pathway classes used in this chapter (Section 2.1) and also affects the carbon budget (Section 2.2.2). Figure 2.2 highlights the important role of methane emissions reduction in this scenario in agreement with the recent literature focussing on stringent mitigation pathways (Shindell et al., 2012; Rogelj et al., 2014b, 2015a; Stohl et al., 2015; Collins et al., 2018).




Figure 2.2: Changes and uncertainties in effective radiative forcings (ERF) for one 1.5°C-consistent pathway (SSP2-19) as estimated by MAGICC and FAIR. Solid and dashed lines are indicative of the effective radiative forcing for CO₂ and non-CO₂ agents as represented by MAGICC (red) and FAIR (blue) relative to 2010, respectively. Vertical bars show the mean radiative forcing as predicted by MAGICC and FAIR of relevant non-CO₂ agents for year 2030, 2050 and 2100. The vertical lines give the uncertainty (1 σ) of the ERFs for the represented species.

For mitigation pathways that aim at halting and reversing radiative forcing increase during this century, the aerosol radiative forcing is a considerable source of uncertainty (Figure 2.2) (Samset et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2018). Indeed, reductions in SO₂ (and NO_x) emissions largely associated with fossil-fuel burning are expected to reduce the cooling effects of both aerosol radiative interactions and aerosol cloud interactions, leading to warming (Myhre et al., 2013; Samset et al., 2018). A multi-model analysis (Myhre et al., 2017)

and a study based on observational constraints (Malavelle et al., 2017) largely support the AR5 best estimate and uncertainty range of aerosol forcing. The partitioning of total aerosol radiative forcing between aerosol precursor emissions is important (Ghan et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2018) as this affects the estimate of the mitigation potential from different sectors that have aerosol precursor emission sources. The total aerosol effective radiative forcing change in stringent mitigation pathways is expected to be dominated by the effects from the phase-out of SO₂, although the magnitude of this aerosol-warming effect depends on how much of the present-day aerosol cooling is attributable to SO₂, particularly the cooling associated with aerosol-cloud interaction (Figure 2.2). Regional differences in the linearity of aerosol-cloud interaction (Carslaw et al., 2013; Kretzschmar et al., 2017) make it difficult to separate the role of individual precursors. Precursors that are not fully mitigated will continue to affect the Earth system. If, for example, the role of nitrate aerosol cooling is at the strongest end of the assessed IPCC AR5 uncertainty range, future temperature increases may be more modest if ammonia emissions continue to rise (Hauglustaine et al., 2014).

Figure 2.2 shows that there are substantial differences in the evolution of estimated effective radiative forcing of non-CO₂ forcers between MAGICC and FAIR. These forcing differences result in MAGICC simulating a larger warming trend in the near term compared to both the FAIR model and the recent observed trends of 0.2°C per decade reported in Chapter 1 (Figure 2.1, Annex 2.A.1, Section 1.2.1.3). The aerosol effective forcing is stronger in MAGICC compared to either FAIR or the AR5 best estimate, though it is still well within the AR5 uncertainty range (Annex 2.A.1.1). A recent revision (Etminan et al., 2016) increases the methane forcing by 25%. This revision is used in the FAIR but not in the AR5 setup of MAGICC that is applied here. Other structural differences exist in how the two models relate emissions to concentrations that contribute to differences in forcing (see Annex 2.A.1.1).

Non-CO₂ climate forcers exhibit a greater geographical variation in radiative forcings than CO₂, which lead to important uncertainties in the temperature response (Myhre et al., 2013). This uncertainty increases the relative uncertainty of the temperature pathways associated with low emission scenarios compared to high emission scenarios (Clarke et al., 2014). It is also important to note that geographical patterns of temperature change and other climate responses, especially those related to precipitation, depend significantly on the forcing mechanism (Myhre et al., 2013; Shindell et al., 2015; Marvel et al., 2016; Samset et al., 2016) (see also Section 3.6.2.2).

2.2.1.2 Geophysical uncertainties: climate and Earth-system feedbacks

Climate sensitivity uncertainty impacts future projections as well as carbon-budget estimates (Schneider et al., 2017). AR5 assessed the equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) to be *likely* in the 1.5–4.5°C range, *extremely unlikely* less than 1°C and *very unlikely* greater than 6°C. The lower bound of this estimate is lower than the range of CMIP5 models (Collins et al., 2013). The evidence for the 1.5°C lower bound on ECS in AR5 was based on analysis of energy-budget changes over the historical period. Work since AR5 has suggested that the climate sensitivity inferred from such changes has been lower than the 2xCO₂ climate sensitivity for known reasons (Forster, 2016; Gregory and Andrews, 2016; Rugenstein et al., 2016; Armour, 2017; Ceppi and Gregory, 2017; Knutti et al., 2017; Proistosescu and Huybers, 2017). Both a revised interpretation of historical estimates and other lines of evidence based on analysis of climate models with the best representation of today's climate (Sherwood et al., 2014; Zhai et al., 2015; Tan et al., 2016; Brown and Caldeira, 2017; Knutti et al., 2017) suggest that the lower bound of ECS could be revised upwards which would decrease the chances of limiting warming below 1.5°C in assessed pathways. However, such a reassessment has been challenged (Lewis and Curry, 2018), albeit from a single line of evidence. Nevertheless, it is premature to make a major revision to the lower bound. The evidence for a possible revision of the upper bound on ECS is less clear with cases argued from different lines of evidence for both decreasing (Lewis and Curry, 2015, 2018; Cox et al., 2018) and increasing (Brown and Caldeira, 2017) the bound presented in the literature. The tools used in this chapter employ ECS ranges consistent with the AR5 assessment. The MAGICC ECS distribution has not been selected to explicitly reflect this but is nevertheless consistent (Rogelj et al., 2014a). The FAIR model used here to estimate carbon budgets explicitly constructs log-normal distributions of ECS and transient climate response based on a multi parameter fit to the AR5 assessed ranges of climate sensitivity and individual historic effective radiative forcings (Smith et al., 2018) (Annex 2.A.1.1).

Several feedbacks of the Earth system, involving the carbon cycle, non-CO₂ GHGs and/or aerosols, may also impact the future dynamics of the coupled carbon-climate system's response to anthropogenic emissions. These feedbacks are caused by the effects of nutrient limitation (Duce et al., 2008; Mahowald et al., 2017), ozone exposure (de Vries et al., 2017), fire emissions (Narayan et al., 2007) and changes associated with natural aerosols (Cadule et al., 2009; Scott et al., 2017). Among these Earth-system feedbacks, the importance of the permafrost feedback's influence has been highlighted in recent studies. Combined evidence from both models (MacDougall et al., 2015; Burke et al., 2017; Lowe and Bernie, 2018) and field studies (like Schädel et al., 2014; Schuur et al., 2015) shows *high agreement* that permafrost thawing will release both CO₂ and CH₄ as the Earth warms, amplifying global warming. This thawing could also release N₂O (Voigt et al., 2017a, 2017b). Field, laboratory and modelling studies estimate that the vulnerable fraction in permafrost is about 5–15% of the permafrost soil carbon (~5300–5600 GtCO₂ in Schuur et al., 2015) and that carbon emissions are expected to occur beyond 2100 because of system inertia and the large proportion of slowly decomposing carbon in permafrost (Schädel et al., 2014). Published model studies suggest that a large part of the carbon release to the atmosphere is in the form of CO₂ (Schädel et al., 2016), while the amount of CH₄ released by permafrost thawing is estimated to be much smaller than that CO₂. Cumulative CH₄ release by 2100 under RCP2.6 ranges from 0.13 to 0.45 Gt of methane (Burke et al., 2012; Schneider von Deimling et al., 2012, 2015) with fluxes being the highest in the middle of the century because of maximum thermokarst lake extent by mid-century (Schneider von Deimling et al., 2015).

The reduced complexity climate models employed in this assessment do not take into account permafrost or non-CO₂ Earth-system feedbacks, although the MAGICC model has a permafrost module that can be enabled. Taking the current climate and Earth-system feedbacks understanding together, there is a possibility that these models would underestimate the longer-term future temperature response to stringent emission pathways (Section 2.2.2).

2.2.2 *The remaining 1.5°C carbon budget*

2.2.2.1 *Carbon budget estimates*

Since the AR5, several approaches have been proposed to estimate carbon budgets compatible with 1.5°C or 2°C. Most of these approaches indirectly rely on the approximate linear relationship between peak global-mean temperature and cumulative emissions of carbon (the transient climate response to cumulative emissions of carbon, TCRE (Collins et al., 2013; Friedlingstein et al., 2014a; Rogelj et al., 2016b) whereas others base their estimates on equilibrium climate sensitivity (Schneider et al., 2017). The AR5 employed two approaches to determine carbon budgets. Working Group I (WGI) computed carbon budgets from 2011 onwards for various levels of warming relative to the 1861–1880 period using RCP8.5 (Meinshausen et al., 2011b; Stocker et al., 2013) whereas WGIII estimated their budgets from a set of available pathways that were assessed to have a >50% probability to exceed 1.5°C by mid-century, and return to 1.5°C or below in 2100 with greater than 66% probability (Clarke et al., 2014). These differences made AR5 WGI and WGIII carbon budgets difficult to compare as they are calculated over different time periods, derived from a different sets of multi-gas and aerosol emission scenarios and use different concepts of carbon budgets (exceedance for WGI, avoidance for WGIII) (Rogelj et al., 2016b; Matthews et al., 2017).

Carbon budgets can be derived from CO₂-only experiments as well as from multi-gas and aerosol scenarios. Some published estimates of carbon budgets compatible with 1.5°C or 2°C refer to budgets for CO₂-induced warming only, and hence do not take into account the contribution of non-CO₂ climate forcings (Allen et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009; Zickfeld et al., 2009; IPCC, 2013a). However, because the projected changes in non-CO₂ climate forcings tend to amplify future warming, CO₂-only carbon budgets overestimate the total net cumulative carbon emissions compatible with 1.5°C or 2°C (Friedlingstein et al., 2014a; Rogelj et al., 2016b; Matthews et al., 2017; Mengis et al., 2018; Tokarska et al., 2018).

Since the AR5, many estimates of the remaining carbon budget for 1.5°C have been published (Friedlingstein et al., 2014a; MacDougall et al., 2015; Peters, 2016; Rogelj et al., 2016b; Matthews et al., 2017; Millar et al., 2017; Goodwin et al., 2018b; Krieglger et al., 2018a; Lowe and Bernie, 2018; Mengis et al., 2018; Millar and Friedlingstein, 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018; Schurer et al., 2018; Séférian et al., 2018;

Tokarska et al., 2018; Tokarska and Gillett, 2018). These estimates cover a wide range as a result of differences in the models used, and of methodological choices, as well as physical uncertainties. Some estimates are exclusively model-based while others are based on observations or on a combination of both. Remaining carbon budgets limiting warming below 1.5°C or 2°C that are derived from Earth-system models of intermediate complexity (MacDougall et al., 2015; Goodwin et al., 2018a), IAMs (Luderer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018), or based on Earth-system model results (Lowe and Bernie, 2018; Séférian et al., 2018; Tokarska and Gillett, 2018) give remaining carbon budgets of the same order of magnitude than the IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report (SYR) estimates (IPCC, 2014a). This is unsurprising as similar sets of models were used for the AR5 (IPCC, 2013b). The range of variation across models stems mainly from either the inclusion or exclusion of specific Earth-system feedbacks (MacDougall et al., 2015; Burke et al., 2017; Lowe and Bernie, 2018) or different budget definitions (Rogelj et al., 2018).

In contrast to the model-only estimates discussed above and employed in the AR5, this report additionally uses observations to inform its evaluation of the remaining carbon budget. Table 2.2 shows that the assessed range of remaining carbon budgets consistent with 1.5°C or 2°C is larger than the AR5 SYR estimate and is part way towards estimates constrained by recent observations (Millar et al., 2017; Goodwin et al., 2018a; Tokarska and Gillett, 2018). Figure 2.3 illustrates that the change since AR5 is, in very large part, due to the application of a more recent observed baseline to the historic temperature change and cumulative emissions; here adopting the baseline period of 2006-2015 (see Section 1.2.1). AR5 SYR Figures SPM.10 and 2.3 already illustrated the discrepancy between models and observations, but did not apply this as a correction to the carbon budget because they were being used to illustrate the overall linear relationship between warming and cumulative carbon emissions in the CMIP5 models since 1870, and were not specifically designed to quantify residual carbon budgets relative to the present for ambitious temperature goals. The AR5 SYR estimate was also dependent on a subset of Earth-system models illustrated in Figure 2.3 of this report. Although, as outlined below and in Table 2.2, considerably uncertainties remain, there is *high agreement* across various lines of evidence assessed in this report that the remaining carbon budget for 1.5°C or 2°C would be larger than the estimates at the time of the AR5. However, the overall remaining budget for 2100 is assessed to be smaller than that derived from the recent observational-informed estimates, as Earth-system feedbacks such as permafrost thawing reduce the budget applicable to centennial scales (see Section 2.2.2.2).




Figure 2.3: Temperature changes from 1850-1900 versus cumulative CO₂ emissions since 1st January 1876. Solid lines with dots reproduce the temperature response to cumulative CO₂ emissions plus non-CO₂ forcings as assessed in Figure SPM10 of WGI AR5, except that points marked with years relate to a

particular year, unlike in WGI AR5 Fig. SPM10 where each point relates to the mean over the previous decade. The AR5 data was derived from available Earth-system models and Earth-system models of Intermediate Complexity for the historic observations (black) and RCP 8.5 scenario (red) and the red shaded plume shows the uncertainty range across the models as presented in the AR5. The purple shaded plume and the line are indicative of the temperature response to cumulative CO₂ emissions and non-CO₂ warming adopted in this report. The non-CO₂ warming contribution is averaged from the MAGICC and FAIR models and the purple shaded range assumes the AR5 WGI TCRE distribution (Annex 2.A.1.2). The 2010 observations of temperature anomaly (0.87°C based on 2006–2015 mean compared to 1850–1900, Section 1.2.1) and cumulative carbon dioxide emissions from 1876 to the end of 2010 of 1,930 GtCO₂ (Le Quéré et al., 2018) is shown as a filled purple diamond. 2017 values based on the latest cumulative carbon emissions up to the end of 2017 of 2,220 GtCO₂ (Version 1.3 accessed 22 May 2018) and a temperature anomaly of 1.04°C based on an assumed temperature increase of 0.2°C per decade is shown as a hollow purple diamond. The thin blue line shows annual observations, with CO₂ emissions from (Le Quéré et al., 2018) and temperatures from the average of datasets in Chapter 1, Figure 1.2. The thin black line shows the CMIP5 models blended-masked estimates with CO₂ emissions also from (Le Quéré et al., 2018). Dotted black lines illustrate the remaining carbon budget estimates for 1.5°C given in Table 2.2. Note these remaining budgets exclude possible Earth-system feedbacks that could reduce the budget, such as CO₂ and CH₄ release from permafrost thawing and tropical wetlands (see Section 2.2.2.2).

2.2.2.2 CO₂ and non-CO₂ contributions to the remaining carbon budget

A remaining carbon budget can be estimated from calculating the amount of CO₂ emissions consistent, given a certain value of TCRE, with an allowable additional amount of warming. Here, the allowable warming is the 1.5°C warming threshold minus the current warming taken as the 2006–2015 average, with a further amount removed to account for the estimated non-CO₂ temperature contribution to the remaining warming (Peters, 2016; Rogelj et al., 2016b). This assessment uses the TCRE range from AR5 WGI (Collins et al., 2013) supported by estimates of non-CO₂ contributions that are based on published methods and integrated pathways (Friedlingstein et al., 2014a; Allen et al., 2016, 2018; Peters, 2016; Smith et al., 2018). Table 2.2 and Figure 2.3 show the assessed remaining carbon budgets and key uncertainties for a set of additional warming levels relative to the 2006–2015 period (see Annex 2.A.1.2 for details). With an assessed historical warming of 0.87°C ±0.12°C from 1850–1900 to 2006–2015 (Section 1.2.1), 0.63°C of additional warming would be approximately consistent with a global-mean temperature increase of 1.5°C relative to preindustrial levels. For this level of additional warming, remaining carbon budgets have been estimated (Table 2.2, Annex 2.A.1.2).

The remaining carbon budget calculation presented in the Table 2.2 and illustrated in Figure 2.3 does not consider additional Earth-system feedbacks such as permafrost thawing. These are uncertain but estimated to reduce the remaining carbon budget by an order of magnitude of about 100 GtCO₂. Accounting for such feedbacks would make the carbon budget more applicable for 2100 temperature targets, but would also increase uncertainty (Table 2.2 and see below). Excluding such feedbacks, the assessed range for the remaining carbon budget is estimated to be 1100, 750, and 550 GtCO₂ (rounded to the nearest 50 GtCO₂) for the 33rd, 50th and, 67th percentile of TCRE, respectively, with a median non-CO₂ warming contribution and starting from 1 January 2018 onward. Note that future research and ongoing observations over the next years will provide a better indication as to how the 2006–2015 base period compares with the long-term trends and might bias the budget estimates. Similarly, improved understanding in Earth-system feedbacks would result in a better quantification of their impacts on remaining carbon budgets for 1.5°C and 2°C.

After TCRE uncertainty, a major additional source of uncertainty is the magnitude of non-CO₂ forcing and its contribution to the temperature change between the present day and the time of peak warming. Integrated emissions pathways can be used to ensure consistency between CO₂ and non-CO₂ emissions (Bowerman et al., 2013; Collins et al., 2013; Clarke et al., 2014; Rogelj et al., 2014b, 2015a; Tokarska et al., 2018). Friedlingstein et al. (2014a) used pathways with limited to no climate mitigation to find a variation due to non-CO₂ contributions of about ±33% for a 2°C carbon budget. Rogelj et al. (2016b) showed no particular bias in non-CO₂ radiative forcing or warming at the time of exceedance of 2°C or at peak warming between scenarios with increasing emissions and strongly mitigated scenarios (consistent with Stocker et al., 2013). However, clear differences of the non-CO₂ warming contribution at the time of deriving a 2°C-consistent carbon budget were reported for the four RCPs. Although the spread in non-CO₂ forcing across scenarios can

be smaller in absolute terms at lower levels of cumulative emissions, it can be larger in relative terms compared to the remaining carbon budget (Stocker et al., 2013; Friedlingstein et al., 2014a; Rogelj et al., 2016b). Tokarska and Gillett (2018) find no statistically significant differences in 1.5°C-consistent cumulative emissions budgets when calculated for different RCPs from consistent sets of CMIP5 simulations.

The mitigation pathways assessed in this report indicate that emissions of non-CO₂ forcings contribute an average additional warming of around 0.15°C relative to 2006–2015 at the time of net zero CO₂ emissions, reducing the remaining carbon budget by roughly 320 GtCO₂. This arises from a weakening of aerosol cooling and continued emissions of non-CO₂ GHGs (Sections 2.2.1, 2.3.3). This non-CO₂ contribution at the time of net zero CO₂ emissions varies by about ±0.1°C across scenarios resulting in a carbon budget uncertainty of about ±250 GtCO₂ and takes into account marked reductions in methane emissions (Section 2.3.3). In case these would not be achieved, remaining carbon budgets are further reduced. Uncertainties in the non-CO₂ forcing and temperature response are asymmetric and can influence the remaining carbon budget by -400 to +200 GtCO₂ with the uncertainty in aerosol radiative forcing being the largest contributing factor (Table 2.2). The MAGICC and FAIR models in their respective parameter setups and model versions used to assess the non-CO₂ warming contribution give noticeable different non-CO₂ effective radiative forcing and warming for the same scenarios while both being within plausible ranges of future response (Fig. 2.2 and Annex 2.A.1–2). For this assessment, it is premature to assess the accuracy of their results, so it is assumed that both are equally representative of possible futures. Their non-CO₂ warming estimates are therefore averaged for the carbon budget assessment and their differences used to guide the uncertainty assessment of the role of non-CO₂ forcings. Nevertheless, the findings are robust enough to give *high confidence* that the changing emissions non-CO₂ forcings (particularly the reduction in cooling aerosol precursors) cause additional near-term warming and reduce the remaining carbon budget compared to the CO₂ only budget.

TCRE uncertainty directly impacts carbon budget estimates (Peters, 2016; Matthews et al., 2017; Millar and Friedlingstein, 2018). Based on multiple lines of evidence, AR5 WGI assessed a *likely* range for TCRE of 0.2–0.7°C per 1000 GtCO₂ (Collins et al., 2013). The TCRE of the CMIP5 Earth-system models ranges from 0.23 to 0.66°C per 1000 GtCO₂ (Gillett et al., 2013). At the same time, studies using observational constraints find best estimates of TCRE of 0.35–0.41°C per 1000 GtCO₂ (Matthews et al., 2009; Gillett et al., 2013; Tachiiri et al., 2015; Millar and Friedlingstein, 2018). This assessment continues to use the assessed AR5 TCRE range under the working assumption that TCRE is normally distributed (Stocker et al., 2013). Observation-based estimates have reported log-normal distributions of TCRE (Millar and Friedlingstein, 2018). Assuming a log-normal instead of normal distribution of the assessed AR5 TCRE range would result in about a 200 GtCO₂ increase for the median budget estimates but only about half at the 67th percentile, while historical temperature uncertainty and uncertainty in recent emissions contribute ±150 and ±50 GtCO₂ to the uncertainty, respectively (Table 2.2).

Calculating carbon budgets from the TCRE requires the assumption that the instantaneous warming in response to cumulative CO₂ emissions equals the long-term warming or, equivalently, that the residual warming after CO₂ emissions cease is negligible. The magnitude of this residual warming, referred to as the zero-emission commitment, ranges from slightly negative (i.e., a slight cooling) to slightly positive for CO₂ emissions up to present-day (Section 1.2.4) (Lowe et al., 2009; Frölicher and Joos, 2010; Gillett et al., 2011; Matthews and Zickfeld, 2012). The delayed temperature change from a pulse CO₂ emission introduces uncertainties in emission budgets, which have not been quantified in the literature for budgets consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. As a consequence, this uncertainty does not affect our carbon budget estimates directly but it is included as an additional factor in the assessed Earth-system feedback uncertainty (as detailed below) of roughly 100 GtCO₂ on decadal timescales presented in Table 2.2.

Remaining carbon budgets are further influenced by Earth-system feedbacks not accounted for in CMIP5 models, such as the permafrost carbon feedback (Friedlingstein et al., 2014b; MacDougall et al., 2015; Burke et al., 2017; Lowe and Bernie, 2018), and their influence on the TCRE. Lowe and Bernie (2018) used a simple climate sensitivity scaling approach to estimate that Earth-system feedbacks (such as CO₂ released by permafrost thawing or methane released by wetlands) could reduce carbon budgets for 1.5°C and 2°C by roughly 100 GtCO₂ on centennial time scales. Their findings are based on older previous Earth-system feedbacks understanding (Arneth et al., 2010). This estimate is broadly supported by more recent analysis of

individual feedbacks. Schädel et al. (2014) suggest an upper bound of 24.4 PgC (90 GtCO₂) emitted from carbon release from permafrost over the next forty years for a RCP4.5 scenario. Burke et al. (2017) use a single model to estimate permafrost emissions between 0.3 and 0.6 GtCO₂ y⁻¹ from the point of 1.5°C stabilization, which would reduce the budget by around 20 GtCO₂ by 2100. Comyn-Platt et al. (2018) include methane emissions from permafrost and suggest the 1.5°C remaining carbon budget is reduced by 180 GtCO₂. Additionally, Mahowald et al. (2017) find there is possibility of 0.5–1.5 GtCO₂ y⁻¹ being released from aerosol-biogeochimistry changes if aerosol emissions cease. In summary, these additional Earth system feedbacks taken together are assessed to reduce the remaining carbon budget applicable to 2100 by an order of magnitude of 100 GtCO₂, compared to the budgets based on the assumption of a constant TCRE presented in Table 2.2 (*limited evidence, medium agreement*), leading to overall *medium confidence* in their assessed impact.

The uncertainties presented in Table 2.2 cannot be formally combined, but current understanding of the assessed geophysical uncertainties suggests at least a ±50% possible variation for remaining carbon budgets for 1.5°C-consistent pathways. When put in the context of year-2017 CO₂ emissions (about 41 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹) (Le Quéré et al., 2018), a remaining carbon budget of 750 GtCO₂ (550 GtCO₂) suggests meeting net zero global CO₂ emissions in about 35 years (25 years) following a linear decline starting from 2018 (rounded to the nearest five years), with a variation of ±15–20 years due to the above mentioned geophysical uncertainties (*high confidence*).

The remaining carbon budgets assessed in this section are consistent with limiting peak warming to the indicated levels of additional warming. However, if these budgets are exceeded and the use of CDR (see Sections 2.3 and 2.4) is envisaged to return cumulative CO₂ emissions to within the carbon budget at a later point in time, additional uncertainties apply because the TCRE is different under increasing and decreasing atmospheric CO₂ concentrations due to ocean thermal and carbon-cycle inertia (Herrington and Zickfeld, 2014; Krasting et al., 2014; Zickfeld et al., 2016). This asymmetrical behaviour makes carbon budgets path-dependent in case of a budget and/or temperature overshoot (MacDougall et al., 2015). Although potentially large for scenarios with large overshoot (MacDougall et al., 2015), this path-dependence of carbon budgets has not been well quantified for 1.5°C- and 2°C-consistent scenarios and as such remains an important knowledge gap. This assessment does not explicitly account for path dependence but takes it into consideration for its overall confidence assessment.

This assessment finds a larger remaining budget from the 2006-2015 base period than the 1.5°C and 2°C remaining budgets inferred from AR5 from the start of 2011, approximately 1000 GtCO₂ for the 2°C (66% of model simulations) and approximately 400 GtCO₂ for the 1.5°C budget (66% of model simulations). In contrast, this assessment finds approximately 1600 GtCO₂ for the 2°C (66th TCRE percentile) and approximately 860 GtCO₂ for the 1.5°C budget (66th TCRE percentile) from 2011. However, these budgets are not directly equivalent as AR5 reported budgets for fractions of CMIP5 simulations and other lines of evidence, while this report uses the assessed range of TCRE and an assessment of the non-CO₂ contribution at net zero CO₂ emissions to provide remaining carbon budget estimates at various percentiles of TCRE. Furthermore, AR5 did not specify remaining budgets to carbon neutrality as we do here, but budgets until the time the temperature limit of interest was reached, assuming negligible zero emission commitment and taking into account the non-CO₂ forcing at that point in time.

In summary, although robust physical understanding underpins the carbon budget concept, relative uncertainties become larger as a specific temperature limit is approached. For the budget, applicable to the mid-century, the main uncertainties relate to the TCRE, non-CO₂ emissions, radiative forcing and response. For 2100, uncertain Earth-system feedbacks such as permafrost thawing would further reduce the available budget. The remaining budget is also conditional upon the choice of baseline, which is affected by uncertainties in both historical emissions, and in deriving the estimate of globally averaged human-induced warming. As a result, only *medium confidence* can be assigned to the assessed remaining budget values for 1.5°C and 2.0°C and their uncertainty.

Table 2.2: The assessed remaining carbon budget and its uncertainties. Shaded grey horizontal bands illustrate the uncertainty in historical temperature increase from the 1850-1900 base period until the 2006-2015 period, which impacts the additional warming until a specific temperature limit like 1.5°C or 2°C relative to the 1850-1900 period.

Additional warming since 2006-2015 [°C]*(1)	Approximate warming since 1850-1900 [°C]*(1)	Remaining carbon budget (excluding additional Earth-system feedbacks*(5)) [GtCO ₂ from 1.1.2018]*(2)			Key uncertainties and variations*(4)					
					Additional Earth-system feedbacks*(5)	Non-CO ₂ scenario variation*(6)	Non-CO ₂ forcing and response uncertainty	TCRE distribution uncertainty*(7)	Historical temperature uncertainty*(1)	Recent emissions uncertainty*(8)
		Percentiles of TCRE*(3)								
		33 rd	50 th	67 th						
0.3		290	160	80	Budgets on the left are reduced by about 100 GtCO ₂ If evaluated to 2100 and potentially more on centennial time scales	+250	-400 to +200	+100 to +200	+250	+20
0.4		530	350	230						
0.5		770	530	380						
0.6		1010	710	530						
0.63	~1.5°C	1080	770	570						
0.7		1240	900	680						
0.8		1480	1080	830						
0.9		1720	1260	980						
1		1960	1450	1130						
1.1		2200	1630	1280						
1.13	~2.°C	2270	1690	1320						
1.2		2440	1820	1430						

*(1) Chapter 1 has assessed historical warming between the 1850-1900 and 2006-2015 periods to be 0.87°C with a +/- 0.12°C *likely* (1-σ) range

*(2) Historical CO₂ emissions since the middle of the 1850-1900 historical base period (1 January 1876) are estimated at 1930 GtCO₂ (1630-2230 GtCO₂, 1-σ range) until end 2010. Since 1 January 2011, an additional 290 GtCO₂ (270-310 GtCO₂, 1-σ range) has been emitted until the end of 2017 (Le Quéré et al., 2018, Version 1.3 - accessed 22 May 2018).

*(3) TCRE: transient climate response to cumulative emissions of carbon, assessed by AR5 to fall *likely* between 0.8-2.5°C / 1000 PgC (Collins et al., 2013), considering a normal distribution consistent with AR5 (Stocker et al., 2013). Values are rounded to the nearest 10 GtCO₂ in the table and to the nearest 50 GtCO₂ in the text.

*(4) Focussing on the impact of various key uncertainties on median budgets for 0.63°C of additional warming.

*(5) Earth system feedbacks include CO₂ released by permafrost thawing or methane released by wetlands, see main text.

*(6) Variations due to different scenario assumptions related to the future evolution of non-CO₂ emissions.

*(7) The distribution of TCRE is not precisely defined. Here the influence of assuming a log-normal instead of a normal distribution shown.

*(8) Historical emissions uncertainty reflects the uncertainty in historical emissions since 1 January 2011.

2.3 Overview of 1.5°C mitigation pathways

Limiting global mean temperature increase at any level requires global CO₂ emissions to become net zero at some point in the future (Zickfeld et al., 2009; Collins et al., 2013). At the same time, limiting the residual warming of short-lived non-CO₂ emissions, can be achieved by reducing their annual emissions as far as possible (Section 2.2, Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1). This will require large-scale transformations of the global energy-agriculture-land-economy system, affecting the way in which energy is produced, agricultural systems are organised, and food, energy and materials are consumed (Clarke et al., 2014). This section assesses key properties of pathways consistent with limiting global mean temperature to 1.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels, including their underlying assumptions and variations.

Since the AR5, an extensive body of literature has appeared on integrated pathways consistent with 1.5°C (Rogelj et al., 2015b; Akimoto et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017; Löffler et al., 2017; Marcucci et al., 2017; Su et al., 2017; Bauer et al., 2018; Bertram et al., 2018; Grubler et al., 2018; Kriegler et al., 2018b; Luderer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018; Strefler et al., 2018a; van Vuuren et al., 2018; Vrontisi et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018) (Section 2.1). These pathways have global coverage and represent all GHG-emitting sectors and their interactions. Such integrated pathways allow the exploration of the whole-system transformation, and hence provide the context in which the detailed sectorial transformations assessed in Section 2.4 of this chapter are taking place.

The overwhelming majority of published integrated pathways have been developed by global IAMs that represent key societal systems and their interactions, like the energy system, agriculture and land use, and the economy (see Section 6.2 in Clarke et al., 2014). Very often these models also include interactions with a representation of the geophysical system, for example, by including spatially explicit land models or carbon-cycle and climate models. The complex features of these subsystems are approximated and simplified in these models. IAMs are briefly introduced in Section 2.1 and important knowledge gaps identified in Section 2.6. An overview to the use, scope and limitations of IAMs is provided in Annex 2.A.2.

The pathway literature is assessed in two ways in this section. First, various insights on specific questions reported by studies can be assessed to identify robust or divergent findings. Second, the combined body of scenarios can be assessed to identify salient features of pathways in line with a specific climate goal across a wide range of models. The latter can be achieved by assessing pathways available in the database to this assessment (Section 2.1, Annex 2.A.2–4). The ensemble of scenarios available to this assessment is an ensemble of opportunity: it is a collection of scenarios from a diverse set of studies that was not developed with a common set of questions and a statistical analysis of outcomes in mind. This means that ranges can be useful to identify robust and sensitive features across available scenarios and contributing modelling frameworks, but do not lend themselves to a statistical interpretation. To understand the reasons underlying the ranges, an assessment of the underlying scenarios and studies is required. To this end, this section highlights illustrative pathway archetypes that help to clarify the variation in assessed ranges for 1.5°C-consistent pathways.

2.3.1 Range of assumptions underlying 1.5°C pathways

Earlier assessments have highlighted that there is no single pathway to achieve a specific climate objective (e.g., Clarke et al., 2014). Pathways depend on the underlying development processes, and societal choices, which affect the drivers of projected future baseline emissions. Furthermore, societal choices also affect climate change solutions in pathways, like the technologies that are deployed, the scale at which they are deployed, or whether solutions are globally coordinated. A key finding is that 1.5°C-consistent pathways could be identified under a considerable range of assumptions in model studies despite the tightness of the 1.5°C emissions budget (Figures 2.4, 2.5) (Rogelj et al., 2018).

The AR5 provided an overview of how differences in model structure and assumptions can influence the outcome of transformation pathways (Section 6.2 in Clarke et al., 2014, as well as Table A.II.14 in Krey et al., 2014b) and this was further explored by the modelling community in recent years with regard to, e.g., socio-economic drivers (Kriegler et al., 2016; Marangoni et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017), technology assumptions (Bosetti et al., 2015; Creutzig et al., 2017; Pietzcker et al., 2017), and behavioural factors (van

Sluisveld et al., 2016; McCollum et al., 2017).

2.3.1.1 *Socio-economic drivers and the demand for energy and land in 1.5°C-consistent pathways*

There is deep uncertainty about the ways humankind will use energy and land in the 21st century. These ways are intricately linked to future population levels, secular trends in economic growth and income convergence, behavioural change and technological progress. These dimensions have been recently explored in the context of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) (Kriegler et al., 2012; O'Neill et al., 2014) which provide narratives (O'Neill et al., 2017) and quantifications (Crespo Cuaresma, 2017; Dellink et al., 2017; KC and Lutz, 2017; Leimbach et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017) of different future worlds in which scenario dimensions are varied to explore differential challenges to adaptation and mitigation (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1). This framework is increasingly adopted by IAMs to systematically explore the impact of socio-economic assumptions on mitigation pathways (Riahi et al., 2017), including 1.5°C-consistent pathways (Rogelj et al., 2018). The narratives describe five worlds (SSP1–5) with different socio-economic predispositions to mitigate and adapt to climate change (Table 2.3). As a result, population and economic growth projections can vary strongly across integrated scenarios, including available 1.5°C-consistent pathways (Fig. 2.4). For example, based on alternative future fertility, mortality, migration and educational assumptions, population projections vary between 8.5–10.0 billion people by 2050, and 6.9–12.6 billion people by 2100 across the SSPs. An important factor for these differences is future female educational attainment, with higher attainment leading to lower fertility rates and therewith decreased population growth up to a level of 1 billion people by 2050 (Lutz and KC, 2011; Snopkowski et al., 2016; KC and Lutz, 2017). Consistent with population development, GDP per capita also varies strongly in SSP baselines varying about 20 to more than 50 thousand USD₂₀₁₀ per capita in 2050 (in power purchasing parity values, PPP), in part driven by assumptions on human development, technological progress and development convergence between and within regions (Crespo Cuaresma, 2017; Dellink et al., 2017; Leimbach et al., 2017). Importantly, none of the GDP projections in the mitigation pathway literature assessed in this chapter included the feedback of climate damages on economic growth (Hsiang et al., 2017).

Baseline projections for energy-related GHG emissions are sensitive to economic growth assumptions, while baseline projections for land-use emissions are more directly affected by population growth (assuming unchanged land productivity and per capita demand for agricultural products) (Kriegler et al., 2016). SSP-based modelling studies of mitigation pathways have identified high challenges to mitigation for worlds with a focus on domestic issues and regional security combined with high population growth (SSP3), and for worlds with rapidly growing resource and fossil-fuel intensive consumption (SSP5) (Riahi et al., 2017). No model could identify a 2°C-consistent pathway for SSP3, and high mitigation costs were found for SSP5. This picture translates to 1.5°C-consistent pathways that have to remain within even tighter emissions constraints (Rogelj et al., 2018). No model found a 1.5°C-consistent pathway for SSP3 and some models could not identify 1.5°C-consistent pathways for SSP5 (2 of 4 models, compared to 1 of 4 models for 2°C-consistent pathways). The modelling analysis also found that the effective control of land-use emissions becomes even more critical in 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Due to high inequality levels in SSP4, land use can be less well managed. This caused 2 of 3 models to no longer find an SSP4-based 1.5°C-consistent pathway even though they identified SSP4-based 2°C-consistent pathways at relatively moderate mitigation costs (Riahi et al., 2017). Rogelj et al. (2018) further reported that all six participating models identified 1.5°C-consistent pathways in a sustainability oriented world (SSP1) and four of six models found 1.5°C-consistent pathways for middle-of-the-road developments (SSP2). These results show that 1.5°C-consistent pathways can be identified under a broad range of assumptions, but that lack of global cooperation (SSP3), high inequality (SSP4) and/or high population growth (SSP3) that limit the ability to control land use emissions, and rapidly growing resource-intensive consumption (SSP5) are key impediments.

Table 2.3: Key characteristics of the five Shared Socio-economic Pathways (O'Neill et al., 2017).

Socio-economic challenges to mitigation	Socio-economic challenges to adaptation		
	Low	Medium	High
High	SSP5: Fossil-fuelled development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • low population • very high economic growth per capita • high human development • high technological progress • ample fossil fuel resources • resource intensive lifestyles • high energy and food demand per capita • convergence and global cooperation 		SSP3: Regional rivalry <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • high population • low economic growth per capita • low human development • low technological progress • resource intensive lifestyles • resource constrained energy and food demand per capita • focus on regional food and energy security • regionalization and lack of global cooperation
Medium		SSP2: Middle of the road <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • medium population • medium and uneven economic growth • medium and uneven human development • medium and uneven technological progress • resource intensive lifestyles • medium and uneven energy and food demand per capita • limited global cooperation and convergence 	
Low	SSP1: Sustainable development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • low population • high economic growth per capita • high human development • high technological progress • environmentally oriented technological and behavioural change • resource efficient lifestyles • low energy and food demand per capita • convergence and global cooperation 		SSP4: Inequality <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Medium to high population • Unequal low to medium economic growth per capita • Unequal low to medium human development • unequal technological progress: high in globalized high tech sectors, slow in domestic sectors • unequal lifestyles and energy / food consumption: resource intensity depending on income • Globally connected elite, disconnected domestic work forces




Figure 2.4: Range of assumptions about socio-economic drivers and projections for energy and food demand in the pathways available to this assessment. 1.5°C-consistent pathways are pink, other pathways grey. Trajectories for the illustrative 1.5°C-consistent archetypes used in this Chapter (*S1*, *S2*, *S3*, *LED*) are highlighted. Population assumptions in *S2* and *LED* are identical.

Figure 2.4 compares the range of underlying socio-economic developments as well as energy and food demand in available 1.5°C-consistent pathways with the full set of published scenarios that were submitted to this assessment. While 1.5°C-consistent pathways broadly cover the full range of population and economic growth developments (except of the high population development in SSP3-based scenarios), they tend to cluster on the lower end for energy and food demand. They still encompass, however, a wide range of developments from decreasing to increasing demand levels relative to today. For the purpose of this assessment, a set of four illustrative 1.5°C-consistent pathway archetypes were selected to show the variety of underlying assumptions and characteristics (Fig. 2.4). They comprise three 1.5°C-consistent pathways based on the SSPs (Rogelj et al., 2018): a sustainability oriented scenario (*S1* based on SSP1) developed with the AIM model (Fujimori, 2017), a fossil-fuel intensive and high energy demand scenario (*S5*, based on SSP5) developed with the REMIND-MAGPIE model (Kriegler et al., 2017), and a middle-of-the-road scenario (*S2*, based on SSP2) developed with the MESSAGE-GLOBIOM model (Fricko et al., 2017). In addition, we include a scenario with low energy demand (*LED*) (Grubler et al., 2018), which reflects recent literature with a stronger focus on demand-side measures (Liu et al., 2017; Bertram et al., 2018; Grubler et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018).

2.3.1.2 Mitigation options in 1.5°C-consistent pathways

In the context of 1.5°C-consistent pathways, the portfolio of mitigation options available to the model becomes an increasingly important factor. IAMs include a wide variety of mitigation options, as well as measures that achieve CDR from the atmosphere (Krey et al., 2014a, 2014b) (see Section 4.3 for a broad assessment of available mitigation measures). For the purpose of this assessment, we elicited technology availability in models that submitted scenarios to the database as summarized in Annex 2.A.2, where a detailed picture of the technology variety underlying available 1.5°C-consistent pathways is provided. Modelling choices on whether a particular mitigation measure is included are influenced by an assessment of its global mitigation potential, the availability of data and literature describing its techno-economic characteristics and future prospects, and computational challenge to represent the measure, e.g., in terms of required spatio-temporal and process detail.

This elicitation (Annex 2.A.2) confirms that IAMs cover most supply-side mitigation options on the process level, while many demand-side options are treated as part of underlying assumptions, which can be varied (Clarke et al., 2014). In recent years, there has been increasing attention on improving the modelling of integrating variable renewable energy into the power system (Creutzig et al., 2017; Luderer et al., 2017; Pietzcker et al., 2017) and of behavioural change and other factors influencing future demand for energy and food (van Sluisveld et al., 2016; McCollum et al., 2017; Weindl et al., 2017), including in the context of 1.5°C-consistent pathways (Grubler et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018). The literature on the many diverse CDR options only recently started to develop strongly (Minx et al., 2017) (see Section 4.3.7 for a detailed assessment), and hence these options are only partially included in IAM analyses. IAMs mostly incorporate afforestation and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and only in few cases also include direct air capture with CCS (DACCS) (Chen and Tavoni, 2013; Marcucci et al., 2017; Strefler et al., 2018b).

Several studies have either directly or indirectly explored the dependence of 1.5°C-consistent pathways on specific (sets of) mitigation and CDR technologies (Liu et al., 2017; Bauer et al., 2018; Grubler et al., 2018; Holz et al., 2018b; Kriegler et al., 2018b; Rogelj et al., 2018; Strefler et al., 2018b; van Vuuren et al., 2018). However, there are a few potentially disruptive technologies that are typically not yet well covered in IAMs and that have the potential to alter the shape of mitigation pathways beyond the ranges in the IAM-based literature. Those are also included in Annex 2.A.2. The configuration of carbon-neutral energy systems projected in mitigation pathways can vary widely, but they all share a substantial reliance on bioenergy under the assumption of effective land-use emissions control. There are other configurations with less reliance on bioenergy that are not yet comprehensively covered by global mitigation pathway modelling. One approach is to dramatically reduce and electrify energy demand for transportation and manufacturing to levels that make residual non-electric fuel use negligible or replaceable by limited amounts of electrolytic hydrogen. Such an approach is presented in a first-of-its kind low energy demand scenario (Grubler et al., 2018) which is part of this assessment. Other approaches rely less on energy demand reductions, but employ cheap renewable electricity to push the boundaries of electrification in the industry and transport sectors (Breyer et al., 2017; Jacobson, 2017). In addition, these approaches deploy renewable-based Power-2-X (read: Power to “x”) technologies to substitute residual fossil-fuel use (Brynnolf et al., 2018). An important element of carbon-neutral Power-2-X applications is the combination of hydrogen generated from renewable electricity and CO₂ captured from the atmosphere (Zeman and Keith, 2008). Alternatively, algae are considered as a bioenergy source with more limited implications for land use and agricultural systems than energy crops (Williams and Laurens, 2010; Walsh et al., 2016; Greene et al., 2017).

Furthermore, a range of measures could radically reduce agricultural and land-use emissions and are not yet well-covered in IAM modelling. This includes plant-based proteins (Joshi and Kumar, 2015) and cultured meat (Post, 2012) with the potential to substitute for livestock products at much lower GHG footprints (Tuomisto and Teixeira de Mattos, 2011). Large-scale use of synthetic or algae-based proteins for animal feed could free pasture land for other uses (Madeira et al., 2017; Pikaar et al., 2018). Novel technologies such as methanogen inhibitors and vaccines (Wedlock et al., 2013; Hristov et al., 2015; Herrero et al., 2016; Subharat et al., 2016) as well as synthetic and biological nitrification inhibitors (Subbarao et al., 2013; Jie Di and Cameron, 2016) could substantially reduce future non-CO₂ emissions from agriculture if commercialised successfully. Enhancing carbon sequestration in soils (Paustian et al., 2016; Frank et al., 2017; Zomer et al., 2017) can provide the dual benefit of CDR and improved soil quality. A range of conservation, restoration and land management options can also increase terrestrial carbon uptake (Griscom et al., 2017). In addition,

the literature discusses CDR measures to permanently sequester atmospheric carbon in rocks (mineralisation and enhanced weathering, see Section 4.3.7) as well as carbon capture and usage in long-lived products like plastics and carbon fibres (Mazzotti et al., 2005; Hartmann et al., 2013). Progress in the understanding of the technical viability, economics, and sustainability of these ways to achieve and maintain carbon neutral energy and land use can affect the characteristics, costs and feasibility of 1.5°C-consistent pathways significantly.

2.3.1.3 Policy assumptions in 1.5°C-consistent pathways

Besides assumptions related to socio-economic drivers and mitigation technology, scenarios are also subject to assumptions about the mitigation policies that can be put in place. Mitigation policies can either be applied immediately in scenarios or follow staged or delayed approaches. Policies can span many sectors (e.g., economy-wide carbon pricing), or policies can be applicable to specific sectors only (like the energy sector) with other sectors (e.g., the agricultural or the land-use sector) treated differently. These variations can have an important impact on the ability of models to generate scenarios compatible with stringent climate targets like 1.5°C (Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013; Bertram et al., 2015b; Kriegler et al., 2018b; Michaelowa et al., 2018). In the scenario ensemble available to this assessment, several variations of near-term mitigation policy implementation can be found: immediate and cross-sectorial global cooperation from 2020 onward towards a global climate objective, a phase-in of globally coordinated mitigation policy from 2020 to 2040, and a more short-term oriented and regionally diverse global mitigation policy, following NDCs until 2030 (Kriegler et al., 2018b; Luderer et al., 2018; McCollum et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018; Strefler et al., 2018b). For example, above-mentioned SSP quantifications assume regionally scattered mitigation policies until 2020, and vary in global convergence thereafter (Kriegler et al., 2014a; Riahi et al., 2017). The impact of near-term policy choices on 1.5°C-consistent pathways is discussed in Section 2.3.5. The literature has also explored 1.5°C-consistent pathways building on a portfolio of policy approaches until 2030, including the combination of regulatory policies and carbon pricing (Kriegler et al., 2018b) and a variety of ancillary policies to safeguard other sustainable development goals (Bertram et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018). A further discussion of policy implications of 1.5°C-consistent pathways is provided in Section 2.5.1, while a general discussion of policies and options to strengthen action are subject of Section 4.4.

2.3.2 Key characteristics of 1.5°C-consistent pathways

1.5°C-consistent pathways are characterised by a rapid phase out of CO₂ emissions and deep emissions reductions in other GHGs and climate forcers (Section 2.2.2 and 2.3.3). This is achieved by broad transformations in the energy, industry, transport, buildings, Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use (AFOLU) sectors (Section 2.4) (Liu et al., 2017; Bauer et al., 2018; Grubler et al., 2018; Holz et al., 2018b; Kriegler et al., 2018a; Luderer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018). Here we assess 1.5°C-consistent pathways with and without overshoot during the 21st century. One study also explores pathways overshooting 1.5°C for longer than the 21st century (Akimoto et al., 2017), but these are not considered 1.5°C-consistent pathways in this report (Section 1.1.3). This subsection summarizes robust and varying properties of 1.5°C-consistent pathways regarding system transformations, emission reductions and overshoot. It aims to provide an introduction to the detailed assessment of the emissions evolution (Section 2.3.3), CDR deployment (Section 2.3.4), energy (Section 2.4.1, 2.4.2), industry (2.4.3.1), buildings (2.4.3.2), transport (2.4.3.3) and land-use transformations (Section 2.4.4) in 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Throughout Sections 2.3 and 2.4, pathway properties are highlighted with four 1.5°C-consistent pathway archetypes (*S1*, *S2*, *S5*, *LED*) covering a wide range of different socio-economic and technology assumptions (Fig. 2.5, Section 2.3.1).

2.3.2.1 Variation in system transformations underlying 1.5°C-consistent pathways

Be it for the energy, transport, buildings, industry, or AFOLU sector, the literature shows that multiple options and choices are available in each of these sectors to pursue stringent emissions reductions (Section

2.3.1.2, Annex 2.A.2, Section 4.3). Because the overall emissions total under a pathway is limited by a geophysical carbon budget (Section 2.2.2), choices in one sector affect the efforts that are required from others (Clarke et al., 2014). A robust feature of 1.5°C-consistent pathways, as highlighted by the set of pathway archetypes in Figure 2.5, is a virtually full decarbonisation of the power sector around mid-century, a feature shared with 2°C-consistent pathways. The additional emissions reductions in 1.5°C-consistent compared to 2°C-consistent pathways come predominantly from the transport and industry sectors (Luderer et al., 2018). Emissions can be apportioned differently across sectors, for example, by focussing on reducing the overall amount of CO₂ produced in the energy end use sectors, and using limited contributions of CDR by the AFOLU sector (afforestation and reforestation, *S1* and *LED* pathways in Figure 2.5) (Grubler et al., 2018; Holz et al., 2018b; van Vuuren et al., 2018), or by being more lenient about the amount of CO₂ that continues to be produced in the above-mentioned end-use sectors (both by 2030 and mid-century) and strongly relying on technological CDR options like BECCS (*S2* and *S5* pathways in Figure 2.5) (Luderer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018). Major drivers of these differences are assumptions about energy and food demand and the stringency of near term climate policy (see the difference between early action in the scenarios *S1*, *LED* and more moderate action until 2030 in the scenarios *S2*, *S5*). Furthermore, the carbon budget in each of these pathways depends also on the non-CO₂ mitigation measures implemented in each of them, particularly for agricultural emissions (Sections 2.2.2, 2.3.3) (Gernaat et al., 2015). Those pathways differ not only in terms of their deployment of mitigation and CDR measures (Sections 2.3.4 and 2.4), but also in terms of the temperature overshoot they imply (Figure 2.1). Furthermore, they have very different implications for the achievement of sustainable development objectives, as further discussed in Section 2.5.3.




Figure 2.5: Evolution and break down of global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions until 2100. The top-left panel shows global net CO₂ emissions in Below-1.5°C, 1.5°C-low-OS, and 1.5°C-high-OS pathways, with the four illustrative 1.5°C-consistent pathway archetypes of this chapter highlighted. Ranges at the bottom of the top-left panel show the 10th–90th percentile range (thin line) and interquartile range (thick line) of the time that global CO₂ emissions reach net zero per pathway class, and for all pathways classes combined. The top-right panel provides a schematic legend explaining all CO₂ emissions contributions to global CO₂ emissions. The bottom row shows how various CO₂ contributions are deployed and used in the four illustrative pathway archetypes (*S1*, *S2*, *S5*, and *LED*) used in this chapter. Note that the *S5* scenario reports the building and industry sector emissions jointly. Green-blue areas hence show emissions from the transport, and building & industry demand sectors, respectively.

2.3.2.2 Pathways keeping warming below 1.5°C or temporarily overshooting it

This subsection explores the conditions that would need to be fulfilled to stay below 1.5°C warming without overshoot. As discussed in Section 2.2.2, to keep warming below 1.5°C with a two-in-three (one-in-two) chance, the cumulative amount of CO₂ emissions from 2018 onwards need to remain below a carbon budget of 550 (750) GtCO₂, further reduced by 100 GtCO₂ when accounting for additional Earth-system feedbacks until 2100. Based on the current state of knowledge, exceeding this remaining carbon budget at some point in time would give a one-in-three (one-in-two) chance that the 1.5°C limit is overshoot (Table 2.2). For comparison, around 290 ±20 (1-sigma range) GtCO₂ have been emitted in the years 2011–2017 with annual CO₂ emissions in 2017 slightly above 40 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ (Jackson et al., 2017; Le Quéré et al., 2018). Committed fossil-fuel emissions from existing fossil-fuel infrastructure as of 2010 have been estimated at around 500 ±200 GtCO₂ (with ca. 200 GtCO₂ already emitted until 2017) (Davis and Caldeira, 2010). Coal-fired power plants contribute the largest part. Committed emissions from existing coal-fired power plants built until the end of 2016 are estimated to add up to roughly 200 GtCO₂ and a further 100–150 GtCO₂ from coal-fired power plants are under construction or planned (González-Eguino et al., 2017; Edenhofer et al., 2018). However, there has been a marked slowdown of planned coal-power projects in recent years, and some estimates indicate that the committed emissions from coal plants that are under construction or planned have halved since 2015 (Shearer et al., 2018). Despite these uncertainties, the committed fossil-fuel emissions are assessed to already amount to more than half (a third) of the remaining carbon budget.

An important question is to what extent the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement are aligned with the remaining carbon budget. It was estimated that the NDCs, if successfully implemented, imply a total of 400–560 GtCO₂ emissions over the 2018–2030 period (considering both conditional and unconditional NDCs) (Rogelj et al., 2016a). Thus, following an NDC trajectory would exhaust already 70–100% (50–75%) of the remaining two-in-three (one-in-two) 1.5°C carbon budget (unadjusted for additional Earth-system feedbacks) by 2030. This would leave only about 0–8 (9–18) years to bring down global emissions from NDC levels of around 40 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ in 2030 (Fawcett et al., 2015; Rogelj et al., 2016a) to net zero (further discussion in Section 2.3.5).

Most 1.5°C-consistent pathways show more stringent emissions reductions by 2030 than implied by the NDCs (Section 2.3.5). The lower end of those pathways reach down to below 20 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ in 2030 (Section 2.3.3, Table 2.4), less than half of what is implied by the NDCs. Whether such pathway will be able to limit warming to 1.5°C without overshoot will depend on whether cumulative net CO₂ emissions over the 21st century can be kept below the remaining carbon budget at any time. Net global CO₂ emissions are derived from the gross amount of CO₂ that humans annually emit into the atmosphere reduced by the amount of anthropogenic CDR in each year. New research has looked more closely at the amount and the drivers of gross CO₂ emissions from fossil-fuel combustion and industrial processes (FFI) in deep mitigation pathways (Luderer et al., 2018), and found that the larger part of remaining CO₂ emissions come from direct fossil-fuel use in the transport and industry sectors, while residual energy supply sector emissions (mostly from the power sector) are limited by a rapid approach to net zero CO₂ emissions until mid-century. The 1.5°C-consistent pathways from the literature that were reported in the scenario database project remaining FFI CO₂ emissions of 620–1410 GtCO₂ over the period 2018–2100 (5th–95th percentile range; median: 970 GtCO₂). Kriegler et al. (2018a) conducted a sensitivity analysis that explores the four central options for reducing fossil-fuel emissions: lowering energy demand, electrifying energy services, decarbonizing the power sector and decarbonizing non-electric fuel use in energy end-use sectors. By exploring these options to their extremes, they found a lowest value of 500 GtCO₂ (2018–2100) gross fossil-fuel CO₂ emissions for the hypothetical case of aligning the strongest assumptions for all four mitigation options. The two lines of evidence and the fact that available 1.5°C pathways cover a wide range of assumptions (Section 2.3.1) give a robust indication of a lower limit of ca. 500 GtCO₂ remaining fossil-fuel and industry CO₂ emissions in the 21st century.

To compare these numbers with the remaining carbon budget, Land-Use Change (LUC) CO₂ emissions need to be taken into account. In many of the 1.5°C-consistent pathways LUC CO₂ emissions reach zero at or before mid-century and then turn to negative values (Table 2.4). This means human changes to the land lead to atmospheric carbon being stored in plants and soils. This needs to be distinguished from the natural CO₂

uptake by land which is not accounted for in the anthropogenic LUC CO₂ emissions reported in the pathways. Given the difference in estimating the ‘anthropogenic’ sink between countries and the global integrated assessment and carbon modelling community (Grassi et al., 2017), the LUC CO₂ estimates included here are not necessarily directly comparable with countries' estimates at global level. The cumulated amount of LUC CO₂ emissions until the time they reach zero combine with the fossil-fuel and industry CO₂ emissions to a total amount of gross emissions of 670–1430 GtCO₂ for the period 2018–2100 (5th–95th percentile; median 1040 GtCO₂). The lower end of the range is similar to what emerges from a scenario of transformative change that halves CO₂ emissions every decade from 2020 to 2050 (Rockström et al., 2017). All these estimates are above the remaining carbon budget for a two-in-three chance of limiting warming below 1.5°C without overshoot, including the low end of the hypothetical sensitivity analysis of Kriegler et al. (2018a), who assumes 75 GtCO₂ LUC emissions adding to a total of 575 GtCO₂ gross CO₂ emissions. As only limited, highly idealized cases have been identified that keep gross CO₂ emissions within the 1.5°C carbon budget and based on current understanding of the geophysical response and its uncertainties, the available evidence indicates that avoiding overshoot will require some type of CDR in a broad sense, e.g., via negative LUC CO₂ emissions. (*medium confidence*) (Table 2.2).

Net CO₂ emissions can fall below gross CO₂ emissions, if CDR is brought into the mix. Studies have looked at mitigation and CDR in combination to identify strategies for limiting warming to 1.5°C (Sanderson et al., 2016; Ricke et al., 2017). CDR and/or negative LUC CO₂ emissions are deployed by all 1.5°C-consistent pathways available to this assessment, but the scale of deployment and choice of CDR measure varies widely (Section 2.3.4). Furthermore, no CDR technology has been deployed at scale yet, and all come with concerns about their potential (Fuss et al., 2018), feasibility (Nemet et al., 2018) and/or sustainability (Smith et al., 2015; Fuss et al., 2018) (see Sections 2.3.4, 4.3.2 and 4.3.7 and Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3 for further discussion). CDR can have two very different functions in 1.5°C-consistent pathways. If deployed in the first half of the century, before net zero CO₂ emissions are reached, it neutralizes some of the remaining CO₂ emissions year by year and thus slows the accumulation of CO₂ in the atmosphere. In this first function it can be used to remain within the carbon budget and avoid overshoot. If CDR is deployed in the second half of the century after carbon neutrality has been established, it can still be used to neutralize some residual emissions from other sectors, but also to create net negative emissions that actively draw down the cumulative amount of CO₂ emissions to return below a 1.5°C warming level. In the second function, CDR enables temporary overshoot. The literature points to strong limitations to upscaling CDR (limiting its first abovementioned function) and to sustainability constraints (limiting both abovementioned functions) (Fuss et al., 2018; Minx et al., 2018; Nemet et al., 2018). Large uncertainty hence exists about what amount of CDR could actually be available before mid-century. Kriegler et al. (2018a) explore a case limiting CDR to 100 GtCO₂ until 2050, and the 1.5°C-consistent pathways available in the report's database project 40–260 GtCO₂ CDR until the point of carbon neutrality (5th to 95th percentile; median 120 GtCO₂). Because gross CO₂ emissions in most cases exceed the remaining carbon budget by several hundred GtCO₂ and given the limits to CDR deployment until 2050, most of the 1.5°C-consistent pathways available to this assessment are overshoot pathways. However, the scenario database also contains nine non-overshoot pathways that remain below 1.5°C throughout the 21st century and that are assessed in the chapter.

2.3.3 Emissions evolution in 1.5°C pathways

This section assesses the salient temporal evolutions of climate forcers over the 21st century. It uses the classification of 1.5°C-consistent pathways presented in Section 2.1, which includes a Below-1.5°C class, as well as other classes with varying levels of projected overshoot (1.5°C-low-OS and 1.5°C-high-OS). First, aggregate-GHG benchmarks for 2030 are assessed. Subsequent sections assess long-lived climate forcers (LLCF) and short-lived climate forcers (SLCF) separately because they contribute in different ways to near-term, peak and long-term warming (Section 2.2, Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1).

Estimates of aggregated GHG emissions in line with specific policy choices are often compared to near-term benchmark values from mitigation pathways to explore their consistency with long-term climate goals (Clarke et al., 2014; UNEP, 2016, 2017; UNFCCC, 2016). Benchmark emissions or estimates of peak years derived from IAMs provide guidelines or milestones that are consistent with achieving a given temperature level. While they do not set mitigation requirements in a strict sense, exceeding these levels in a given year

almost invariably increases the mitigation challenges afterwards by increasing the rates of change and increasing the reliance on speculative technologies, including the possibility that its implementation becomes unachievable (Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013b; Clarke et al., 2014; Fawcett et al., 2015; Riahi et al., 2015; Kriegler et al., 2018b) (see Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1 for a discussion of feasibility concepts). These trade-offs are particularly pronounced in 1.5°C-consistent pathways and are discussed in Section 2.3.5. This section assesses Kyoto-GHG emissions in 2030 expressed in CO₂ equivalent (CO₂e) emissions using 100-year global warming potentials³.

Appropriate benchmark values of aggregated GHG emissions depend on a variety of factors. First and foremost, they are determined by the desired likelihood to keep warming below 1.5°C and the extent to which projected temporary overshoot is to be avoided (Sections 2.2, 2.3.2, and 2.3.5). For instance, median aggregated 2030 GHG emissions are about 10 GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ lower in 1.5°C-low-OS compared to 1.5°C-high-OS pathways, with respective interquartile ranges of 26–31 and 36–49 GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ (Table 2.4). These ranges correspond to 25–30 and 35–48 GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ in 2030, respectively, when aggregated with 100-year Global Warming Potentials from the IPCC Second Assessment Report. The limited evidence available for pathways aiming to limit warming below 1.5°C without overshoot or with limited amounts of CDR (Grubler et al., 2018; Holz et al., 2018b; van Vuuren et al., 2018) indicates that under these conditions consistent emissions in 2030 would fall at the lower end and below the abovementioned ranges. Ranges for the 1.5°C-low-OS and Lower-2°C classes only overlap outside their interquartile ranges highlighting the more accelerated reductions in 1.5°C-consistent compared to 2°C-consistent pathways.

Appropriate benchmark values also depend on the acceptable or desired portfolio of mitigation measures, representing clearly identified trade-offs and choices (Sections 2.3.4, 2.4, and 2.5.3) (Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013a; Clarke et al., 2014; Krey et al., 2014a; Strefler et al., 2018b). For example, lower 2030 GHG emissions correlate with a lower dependence on the future availability and desirability of CDR (Strefler et al., 2018b). Explicit choices or anticipation that CDR options are only deployed to a limited degree during the 21st century imply lower benchmarks over the coming decades that are achieved through lower CO₂ emissions. The pathway archetypes used in the chapter illustrate this further (Figure 2.6). Under middle-of-the-road assumptions of technological and socioeconomic development, pathway *S2* suggests emission benchmarks of 34, 12 and -8 GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ in the years 2030, 2050, and 2100, respectively. In contrast, a pathway that further limits overshoot and aims at eliminating the reliance on negative emissions technologies like BECCS as well as CCS (here labelled as the *LED* pathway) shows deeper emissions reductions in 2030 to limit the cumulative amount of CO₂ until net zero global CO₂ emissions (carbon neutrality). The *LED* pathway here suggest emission benchmarks of 25, 9 and 2 GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ in the years 2030, 2050, and 2100, respectively. However, a pathway that allows and plans for the successful large-scale deployment of BECCS by and beyond 2050 (*S5*) shows a shift in the opposite direction. The variation within and between the abovementioned ranges of 2030 GHG benchmarks hence depends strongly on societal choices and preferences related to the acceptability and availability of certain technologies.

Overall these variations do not strongly affect estimates of the 1.5°C-consistent timing of global peaking of GHG emissions. Both Below-1.5°C and 1.5°C-low-OS pathways show minimum-maximum ranges in 2030 that do not overlap with 2020 ranges, indicating the global GHG emissions peaked before 2030 in these pathways. Also 2020 and 2030 GHG emissions in 1.5°C-high-OS pathways only overlap outside their interquartile ranges.

Kyoto-GHG emission reductions are achieved by reductions in CO₂ and non-CO₂ GHGs. The AR5 identified two primary factors that influence the depth and timing of reductions in non-CO₂ Kyoto-GHG emissions: (1) the abatement potential and costs of reducing the emissions of these gases and (2) the strategies that allow making trade-offs between them (Clarke et al., 2014). Many studies indicate low-cost near-term mitigation options in some sectors for non-CO₂ gases compared to supply-side measures for CO₂ mitigation (Clarke et al., 2014). A large share of this potential is hence already exploited in mitigation pathways in line with 2°C. At the same time, by mid-century and beyond, estimates of further reductions of non-CO₂ Kyoto-GHGs, in

³ FOOTNOTE: In this chapter GWP-100 values from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report are used because emissions of fluorinated gases in the integrated pathways have been reported in this metric to the database. At a global scale, switching between GWP-100 values of the Second, Fourth or Fifth IPCC Assessment Reports could result in variations in aggregated Kyoto-GHG emissions of about ±5% in 2030 (UNFCCC, 2016).

particular CH₄ and N₂O, are hampered by the absence of mitigation options in the current generation of IAMs which are hence not able to reduce residual emissions of sources linked to livestock production and fertilizer use (Clarke et al., 2014; Gernaat et al., 2015) (Sections 2.3.1.2, 2.4.4, Annex 2.A.2). Therefore, while net CO₂ emissions are projected to be markedly lower in 1.5°C-consistent compared to 2°C-consistent pathways, this is much less the case for methane (CH₄) and nitrous-oxide (N₂O) (Figures 2.6–2.7). This results in reductions of CO₂ being projected to take up the largest share of emissions reductions when moving between 1.5°C-consistent and 2°C-consistent pathways (Rogelj et al., 2015b, 2018; Luderer et al., 2018). If additional non-CO₂ mitigation measures are identified and adequately included in IAMs, they are expected to further contribute to mitigation efforts by lowering the floor of residual non-CO₂ emissions. However, the magnitude of these potential contributions has not been assessed as part of this report.

The interplay between residual CO₂ and non-CO₂ emissions, as well as CDR results in different times at which global GHG emissions reach net zero levels in 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Interquartile ranges of the years in which 1.5°C-low-OS and 1.5°C-high-OS reach net zero GHG emissions range from 2060 to 2080 (Table 2.4). A seesaw characteristic can be found between near-term emissions reductions and the timing of net zero GHG emissions as a result of the reliance on net negative emissions of pathways with limited emissions reductions in the next one to two decades (see earlier). Most 1.5°C-high-OS pathways lead to net zero GHG emissions in approximately the third quarter of this century, because all of them rely on significant amounts of annual net negative emissions in the second half of the century to decline temperatures after overshoot (Table 2.4). However, emissions in pathways that aim at limiting overshoot as much as possible or more slowly decline temperatures after their peak reach this point slightly later or at times never. Early emissions reductions in this case result in a lower requirement for net negative emissions. Estimates of 2030 GHG emissions in line with the current NDCs overlap with the highest quartile of 1.5°C-high-OS pathways (Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4).

2.3.3.1 Emissions of long-lived climate forcers

Climate effects of long-lived climate forcers (LLCFs) are dominated by CO₂, with smaller contributions of N₂O and some fluorinated gases (Myhre et al., 2013; Blanco et al., 2014). Overall net CO₂ emissions in pathways are the result of a combination of various anthropogenic contributions (Figure 2.5) (Clarke et al., 2014): (a) CO₂ produced by fossil-fuel combustion and industrial processes, (b) CO₂ emissions or removals from the Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) sector, (c) CO₂ capture and sequestration (CCS) from fossil fuels or industrial activities before it is released to the atmosphere, (d) CO₂ removal by technological means, which in current pathways is mainly achieved by BECCS although other options could be conceivable (see Section 4.3.7). Pathways apply these four contributions in different configurations (Figure 2.5) depending on societal choices and preferences related to the acceptability and availability of certain technologies, the timing and stringency of near-term climate policy, and the ability to limit the demand that drives baseline emissions (Marangoni et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017; Grubler et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018), and come with very different implication for sustainable development (Section 2.5.3).

All 1.5°C-consistent pathways see global CO₂ emissions embark on a steady decline to reach (near) net zero levels around 2050, with 1.5°C-low-OS pathways reaching net zero CO₂ emissions around 2045–2055 (Table 2.4; Figure 2.5). Near-term differences between the various pathway classes are apparent, however. For instance, Below-1.5°C and 1.5°C-low-OS pathways show a clear shift towards lower CO₂ emissions in 2030 relative to other 1.5°C and 2°C pathway classes, although in all 1.5°C-consistent classes reductions are clear (Figure 2.6). These lower near-term emissions levels are a direct consequence of the former two pathway classes limiting cumulative CO₂ emissions until carbon neutrality to aim for a higher probability that peak warming is limited to 1.5°C (Section 2.2.2 and 2.3.2.2). In some cases, 1.5°C-low-OS pathways achieve net zero CO₂ emissions one or two decades later, contingent on 2030 CO₂ emissions in the lower quartile of the literature range, i.e. below about 18 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹. Median year-2030 global CO₂ emissions are of the order of 5–10 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ lower in Below-1.5°C compared to 1.5°C-low-OS pathways, which are in turn lower than 1.5°C-high-OS pathways (Table 2.4). 1.5°C-high-OS pathways show broadly similar emissions levels than the 2°C-consistent pathways in 2030.

The development of CO₂ emissions in the second half of the century in 1.5°C pathways is characterised by the need to stay or return within a carbon budget. Figure 2.6 shows net CO₂ and N₂O emissions from various sources in 2050 and 2100 in 1.5°C-consistent pathways in the literature. Virtually all 1.5°C pathways obtain net negative CO₂ emissions at some point during the 21st century but the extent to which net negative emissions are relied upon varies substantially (Figure 2.6, Table 2.4). This net withdrawal of CO₂ from the atmosphere compensates for residual long-lived non-CO₂ GHG emissions that also accumulate in the atmosphere (like N₂O) or to cancel some of the build-up of CO₂ due to earlier emissions to achieve increasingly higher likelihoods that warming stays or returns below 1.5°C (see Section 2.3.4 for a discussion of various uses of CDR). Even non-overshoot pathways that aim at achieving temperature stabilisation would hence deploy a certain amount of net negative emissions to offset any accumulating long-lived non-CO₂ GHGs. 1.5°C overshoot pathways display significantly larger amounts of annual net negative emissions in the second half of the century. The larger the overshoot the more net negative emissions are required to return temperatures to 1.5°C by the end of the century (Table 2.4, Figure 2.1).

N₂O emissions decline to a much lesser extent than CO₂ in currently available 1.5°C-consistent pathways (Figure 2.6). Current IAMs have limited emissions reduction potentials (Gernaat et al., 2015) (Sections 2.3.1.2, 2.4.4, Annex 2.A.2), reflecting the difficulty of eliminating N₂O emission from agriculture (Bodirsky et al., 2014). Moreover, the reliance of some pathways on significant amounts of bioenergy after mid-century (Section 2.4.2) coupled to a substantial use of nitrogen fertilizer (Popp et al., 2017) also makes reducing N₂O emissions harder (for example, see pathway *S5* in Figure 2.6). As a result, sizeable residual N₂O emissions are currently projected to continue throughout the century, and measures to effectively mitigate them will be of continued relevance for 1.5°C societies. Finally, the reduction of nitrogen use and N₂O emissions from agriculture is already a present-day concern due to unsustainable levels of nitrogen pollution (Bodirsky et al., 2012). Section 2.4.4 provides a further assessment of the agricultural non-CO₂ emissions reduction potential.




Figure 2.6: Annual global emissions characteristics for 2020, 2030, 2050, 2100. Data are shown for Kyoto-GHG emissions (top panel), and total CO₂ emissions, CO₂ emissions from the AFOLU sector, global N₂O emissions, and CO₂ emissions from fossil-fuel use and industrial processes. The latter is also split into emissions from the energy supply sector (electricity sector and refineries), and direct emissions from fossil-fuel use in the energy demand sectors (industry, buildings, transport) (bottom row). Horizontal black lines show the median, boxes show the interquartile range, and whiskers the minimum-maximum range. Icons indicate the four pathway archetypes used in this chapter. In case less than 7 data points are available in a class, the minimum-maximum range and single data points are shown. Kyoto-GHG emissions in the top panel are aggregated with AR4 GWP-100 and contain CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF₆. NF₃ is typically not reported by IAMs. Scenarios with year-2010 Kyoto-GHG emissions outside

the range assessed by IPCC AR5 WGIII assessed are excluded (IPCC, 2014b)..

2.3.3.2 Emissions of short-lived climate forcers and fluorinated gases

SLCFs include shorter-lived GHGs like CH₄ and some HFCs, as well as particles (aerosols), their precursors and ozone precursors. SLCFs are strongly mitigated in 1.5°C pathways as is the case for 2°C pathways (Figure 2.7). SLCF emissions ranges of 1.5°C and 2°C pathway classes strongly overlap, indicating that the main incremental mitigation contribution between 1.5°C and 2°C pathways comes from CO₂ (Luderer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018). CO₂ and SLCF emissions reductions are connected in situations where SLCF and CO₂ are co-emitted by the same process, for example, with coal-fired power plants (Shindell and Faluvegi, 2010) or within the transport sector (Fuglestvedt et al., 2010). Many CO₂-targeted mitigation measures in industry, transport and agriculture (Sections 2.4.3–4) hence also reduce non-CO₂ forcing (Rogelj et al., 2014b; Shindell et al., 2016).

Despite having a strong warming effect (Myhre et al., 2013; Etminan et al., 2016), current 1.5°C-consistent pathways still project significant emissions of CH₄ by 2050, indicating that only limited mitigation options are included and identified in IAM analyses (Gernaat et al., 2015) (Sections 2.3.1.2, 2.4.4, Table 2.A.2). The AFOLU sector contributes an important share of the residual CH₄ emissions until mid-century, with its relative share increasing from slightly below 50% in 2010 to roughly around 55–70% in 2030, and 60–80% in 2050 in 1.5°C-consistent pathways (interquartile range across 1.5°C-consistent pathways for projections). Many of the proposed measures to target CH₄ (Shindell et al., 2012; Stohl et al., 2015) are included in 1.5°C-consistent pathways (Figure 2.7), though not all (Sections 2.3.1.2, 2.4.4, Table 2.A.2). A detailed assessment of measures to further reduce AFOLU CH₄ emissions has not been conducted.

Overall reductions of SLCFs can have effects of either sign on temperature depending on the balance between cooling and warming agents. The reduction in SO₂ emissions is the dominant single effect as it weakens the negative total aerosol forcing. This means that reducing all SLCF emissions to zero would result in a short-term warming, although this warming is unlikely to be more than 0.5°C (Section 2.2 and Figure 1.5 (Samset et al., 2018)). Because of this effect, suggestions have been proposed that target the warming agents only (referred to as short-lived climate pollutants or SLCPs instead of the more general short-lived climate forcers; e.g., Shindell et al., 2012) though aerosols are often emitted in varying mixtures of warming and cooling species (Bond et al., 2013). Black Carbon (BC) emissions reach similar levels across 1.5°C-consistent and 2°C-consistent pathways available in the literature, with interquartile ranges of emissions reductions across pathways of 16–34% and 48–58% in 2030 and 2050, respectively, relative to 2010 (Figure 2.7). Recent studies have identified further reduction potentials for the near term, with global reductions of about 80% being suggested (Stohl et al., 2015; Klimont et al., 2017). Because the dominant sources of certain aerosol mixtures are emitted during the combustion of fossil fuels, the rapid phase-out of unabated fossil-fuels to avoid CO₂ emissions would also result in removal of these either warming or cooling SLCF air-pollutant species. Furthermore, they are also reduced by efforts to reduce particulate air pollution. For example, year-2050 SO₂ emissions, precursor of sulphate aerosol, in 1.5°C-consistent pathways are about 75–85% lower than their 2010 levels. Some caveats apply, for example, if residential biomass use would be encouraged in industrialised countries in stringent mitigation pathways without appropriate pollution control measures, aerosol concentrations could also increase (Sand et al., 2015; Stohl et al., 2015).

1 **Table 2.4: Emissions in 2030, 2050 and 2100 in 1.5°C and 2°C scenario classes and absolute annual rates of change between 2010–2030, 2020–2030 and 2030–2050,**
 2 **respectively.** Values show: median (25th and 75th percentile), across available scenarios. If less than seven scenarios are available (*), the minimum-maximum range is
 3 given instead. For the timing of global zero of total net CO₂ and Kyoto-GHG emissions, the interquartile range is given. Kyoto-GHG emissions are aggregated with
 4 GWP-100 values from IPCC AR4. 2010 emissions for total net CO₂, CO₂ from fossil-fuel use & industry, and AFOLU CO₂ are estimated at 38.5, 33.4, and 5 GtCO₂/yr,
 5 respectively (Le Quéré et al., 2018). A difference is reported in estimating the "anthropogenic" sink by countries or the global carbon modelling community (Grassi et
 6 al., 2017), and AFOLU CO₂ estimates reported here are thus not necessarily comparable with countries' estimates. Scenarios with year-2010 Kyoto-GHG emissions
 7 outside the range assessed by IPCC AR5 WGIII are excluded (IPCC, 2014b).

name	type category	count				Absolute annual change (GtCO ₂ /yr)			Timing of global zero
			2030	2050	2100	2010-2030	2020-2030	2030-2050	year
Total CO ₂ (net)	Below-1.5°C	5	13 (11 15)	-3 (-11 2)	-8 (-14 -3)	-1.2 (-1.3 -1.0)	-2.5 (-2.8 -1.8)	-0.8 (-1.2 -0.7)	(2037 2054)
	1.5°C-low-OS	37	21 (18 22)	0 (-2 3)	-11 (-14 -8)	-0.8 (-1 -0.7)	-1.7 (-2.3 -1.4)	-1 (-1.2 -0.8)	(2047 2055)
	1.5°C-high-OS	36	29 (26 36)	1 (-1 6)	-14 (-16 -11)	-0.4 (-0.6 0)	-1.1 (-1.5 -0.5)	-1.3 (-1.8 -1.1)	(2049 2059)
	Lower-2°C	67	27 (22 30)	9 (7 13)	-4 (-9 0)	-0.5 (-0.7 -0.3)	-1.2 (-1.9 -0.9)	-0.8 (-1 -0.6)	(2065 2096)
	Higher-2°C	54	33 (31 35)	18 (12 19)	-3 (-11 1)	-0.2 (-0.4 0)	-0.7 (-0.9 -0.5)	-0.8 (-1 -0.6)	(2070 post-2100)
CO ₂ from fossil fuels and industry (gross)	Below-1.5°C	5	18 (14 21)	10 (0 21)	8 (0 12)	-0.7 (-1.0 -0.6)	-1.5 (-2.2 -0.9)	-0.4 (-0.7 -0.0)	-
	1.5°C-low-OS	37	22 (19 24)	10 (8 14)	6 (3 8)	-0.5 (-0.6 -0.4)	-1.3 (-1.7 -0.9)	-0.6 (-0.7 -0.5)	-
	1.5°C-high-OS	36	28 (26 37)	13 (12 17)	7 (3 9)	-0.2 (-0.3 0.2)	-0.8 (-1.1 -0.2)	-0.7 (-1 -0.6)	-
	Lower-2°C	67	26 (21 31)	14 (11 18)	8 (4 10)	-0.3 (-0.6 -0.1)	-0.9 (-1.4 -0.6)	-0.6 (-0.7 -0.4)	-
	Higher-2°C	54	31 (29 33)	19 (17 23)	8 (5 11)	-0.1 (-0.2 0.1)	-0.5 (-0.7 -0.2)	-0.6 (-0.7 -0.5)	-
CO ₂ from fossil fuels and industry (net)	Below-1.5°C	5	16 (13 18)	1 (0 7)	-3 (-10 0)	-0.8 (-1.0 -0.7)	-1.8 (-2.2 -1.2)	-0.6 (-0.9 -0.5)	-
	1.5°C-low-OS	37	21 (18 22)	3 (-1 6)	-9 (-12 -4)	-0.6 (-0.7 -0.5)	-1.4 (-1.8 -1.1)	-0.8 (-1.1 -0.7)	-
	1.5°C-high-OS	36	27 (25 35)	4 (1 10)	-11 (-13 -7)	-0.3 (-0.3 0.1)	-0.9 (-1.2 -0.3)	-1.2 (-1.5 -0.9)	-
	Lower-2°C	67	26 (21 30)	11 (8 14)	-2 (-5 2)	-0.3 (-0.6 -0.1)	-1 (-1.4 -0.6)	-0.7 (-1 -0.4)	-
	Higher-2°C	54	31 (29 33)	17 (13 19)	-3 (-8 3)	-0.1 (-0.2 0.1)	-0.5 (-0.7 -0.2)	-0.7 (-1 -0.5)	-
CO ₂ from AFOLU	Below-1.5°C	5	-2 (-5 0)	-4 (-11 -1)	-4 (-5 -3)	-0.3 (-0.4 -0.2)	-0.5 (-0.8 -0.4)	-0.1 (-0.4 0)	-
	1.5°C-low-OS	37	0 (-1 1)	-2 (-4 -1)	-2 (-4 -1)	-0.2 (-0.3 -0.2)	-0.4 (-0.5 -0.3)	-0.1 (-0.2 -0.1)	-
	1.5°C-high-OS	36	1 (0 3)	-2 (-5 0)	-2 (-5 -1)	-0.1 (-0.3 -0.1)	-0.2 (-0.5 -0.1)	-0.2 (-0.3 0)	-
	Lower-2°C	67	1 (0 2)	-2 (-3 -1)	-2 (-4 -1)	-0.2 (-0.3 -0.1)	-0.3 (-0.4 -0.2)	-0.2 (-0.2 -0.1)	-
	Higher-2°C	54	2 (1 3)	0 (-2 2)	-1 (-4 0)	-0.2 (-0.2 -0.1)	-0.2 (-0.4 -0.1)	-0.1 (-0.1 0)	-
Bioenergy combined with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)	Below-1.5°C	5	0 (-1 0)	-3 (-8 0)	-6 (-13 0)	0 (-0.1 0)	0 (-0.1 0)	-0.2 (-0.4 0)	-
	1.5°C-low-OS	37	0 (-1 0)	-5 (-6 -4)	-12 (-16 -7)	0 (-0.1 0)	0 (-0.1 0)	-0.2 (-0.3 -0.2)	-
	1.5°C-high-OS	36	0 (0 0)	-7 (-9 -4)	-15 (-16 -12)	0 (0 0)	0 (0 0)	-0.3 (-0.4 -0.2)	-
	Lower-2°C	54	0 (0 0)	-4 (-5 -2)	-10 (-12 -7)	0 (0 0)	0 (0 0)	-0.2 (-0.2 -0.1)	-
	Higher-2°C	47	0 (0 0)	-3 (-5 -2)	-11 (-15 -8)	0 (0 0)	0 (0 0)	-0.1 (-0.2 -0.1)	-
Kyoto GHG (AR4) [GtCO ₂ e]	Below-1.5°C	5	22 (21 23)	3 (-3 8)	-3 (-11 3)	-1.4 (-1.5 -1.3)	-2.9 (-3.3 -2.1)	-0.9 (-1.3 -0.7)	(2044 post-2100)
	1.5°C-low-OS	31	28 (26 31)	7 (5 10)	-4 (-8 -2)	-1.1 (-1.2 -0.9)	-2.3 (-2.8 -1.8)	-1.1 (-1.2 -0.9)	(2061 2080)
	1.5°C-high-OS	32	40 (36 49)	8 (6 12)	-9 (-11 -6)	-0.5 (-0.7 0)	-1.3 (-1.8 -0.6)	-1.5 (-2.1 -1.3)	(2058 2067)
	Lower-2°C	59	38 (31 43)	17 (14 20)	3 (0 7)	-0.6 (-1 -0.3)	-1.8 (-2.4 -1.1)	-1 (-1.1 -0.6)	(2099 post-2100)
	Higher-2°C	42	45 (39 49)	26 (23 28)	5 (-5 11)	-0.2 (-0.6 0)	-1 (-1.2 -0.6)	-1 (-1.2 -0.7)	(2085 post-2100)

Emissions of fluorinated gases (IPCC/TEAP, 2005; US EPA, 2013; Velders et al., 2015; Purohit and Höglund-Isaksson, 2017) in 1.5°C-consistent pathways are reduced by roughly 75–80% relative to 2010 levels (interquartile range across 1.5°C-consistent pathways) in 2050, with no clear differences between the classes. Although unabated HFC evolutions have been projected to increase (Velders et al., 2015), the Kigali Amendment recently added HFCs to the basket of gases controlled under the Montreal Protocol (Höglund-Isaksson et al., 2017). As part of the larger group of fluorinated gases, HFCs are also assumed to decline in 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Projected reductions by 2050 of fluorinated gases under 1.5°C-consistent pathways are deeper than published estimates of what a full implementation of the Montreal Protocol’s Kigali Amendment would achieve (Höglund-Isaksson et al., 2017), which project roughly a halving of fluorinated gas emissions in 2050 compared to 2010. Assuming the application of technologies that are currently commercially available and at least to a limited extent already tested and implemented, potential fluorinated gas emissions reductions of more than 90% have been estimated (Höglund-Isaksson et al., 2017).

There is a general agreement across 1.5°C-consistent pathways that until 2030 forcing from the warming SLCFs is reduced less strongly than the net cooling forcing from aerosol effects, compared to 2010. As a result, the net forcing contributions from all SLCFs combined are projected to increase slightly by about 0.2–0.4 W/m², compared to 2010. Also, by the end of the century, about 0.1–0.3 W/m² of SLCF forcing is generally currently projected to remain in 1.5°C-consistent scenarios (Figure 2.8). This is similar to developments in 2°C-consistent pathways (Rose et al., 2014b; Riahi et al., 2017) which show median forcing contributions from these forcing agents that are generally no more than 0.1 W/m² higher. Nevertheless, there can be additional gains from targeted deeper reductions of CH₄ emissions and tropospheric ozone precursors, with some scenarios projecting less than 0.1 W/m² forcing from SLCFs by 2100.




Figure 2.7: Global characteristics of a selection of short-lived non-CO₂ emissions until mid-century for five pathway classes used in this chapter. Data are shown for methane (CH₄), fluorinated gases (F-gas), black carbon (BC), and sulphur dioxide (SO₂) emissions. Boxes with different colours refer to different scenario classes. Icons on top the ranges show four illustrative pathway archetypes that apply different mitigation strategies for limiting warming to 1.5°C. Boxes show the interquartile range, horizontal black lines the median, while whiskers the minimum-maximum range. F-gases are expressed in units of CO₂-equivalence computed with 100-year Global Warming Potentials reported in IPCC AR4.




Figure 2.8: Estimated aggregated effective radiative forcing of SLCFs for 1.5°C and 2°C pathway classes in 2010, 2030, 2050, and 2100, as estimated by the FAIR model (Smith et al., 2018). Aggregated SLCF radiative forcing is estimated as the difference between total anthropogenic radiative forcing the sum of CO₂ and N₂O radiative forcing over time and expressed relative to 1750. Symbols indicate the four pathways archetype used in this chapter. Horizontal black lines indicate the median, boxes the interquartile range, and whiskers the minimum-maximum range per pathway class. Due to very few pathways falling into the Below-1.5°C class, only the minimum-maximum is provided here.

2.3.4 CDR in 1.5°C-consistent pathways

Deep mitigation pathways assessed in AR5 showed significant deployment of CDR, in particular through BECCS (Clarke et al., 2014). This has led to increased debate about the necessity, feasibility and desirability of large-scale CDR deployment, sometimes also called ‘negative emissions technologies’ in the literature (Fuss et al., 2014; Anderson and Peters, 2016; Williamson, 2016; van Vuuren et al., 2017a; Obersteiner et al., 2018). Most CDR technologies remain largely unproven to date and raise substantial concerns about adverse side-effects on environmental and social sustainability (Smith et al., 2015; Dooley and Kartha, 2018). A set of key questions emerge: how strongly do 1.5°C-consistent pathways rely on CDR deployment and what types of CDR measures are deployed at which scale? How does this vary across available 1.5°C-consistent pathways and on which factors does it depend? How does CDR deployment compare between 1.5°C and 2°C-consistent pathways and how does it compare with the findings at the time of the AR5? How does CDR deployment in 1.5°C-consistent pathways relate to questions about availability, policy implementation, and sustainable development implications that have been raised about CDR technologies? The first three questions are assessed in this section with the goal to provide an overview and assessment of CDR deployment in the 1.5°C-consistent pathway literature. The fourth question is only touched upon here and is addressed in greater depth in Section 4.3.7, which assesses the rapidly growing literature on costs, potentials, availability, and sustainability implications of individual CDR measures (Minx et al., 2017, 2018; Fuss et al., 2018; Nemet et al., 2018). In addition, Section 2.3.5 assesses the relationship between delayed mitigation action and increased CDR reliance. CDR deployment is intricately linked to the land-use transformation in 1.5°C-consistent pathways. This transformation is assessed in Section 2.4.4. Bioenergy and BECCS impacts on sustainable land management are further assessed in Section 3.6.2 and Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3. Ultimately, a comprehensive assessment of the land implication of land-based CDR measures will be provided in the IPCC AR6 Special Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL).

2.3.4.1 CDR technologies and deployment levels in 1.5°C-consistent pathways

A number of approaches to actively remove carbon-dioxide from the atmosphere are increasingly discussed in the literature (Minx et al., 2018) (see also Section 4.3.7). Approaches under consideration include the

enhancement of terrestrial and coastal carbon storage in plants and soils such as afforestation and reforestation (Canadell and Raupach, 2008), soil carbon enhancement (Paustian et al., 2016; Frank et al., 2017; Zomer et al., 2017), and other conservation, restoration, and management options for natural and managed land (Griscom et al., 2017) and coastal ecosystems (McLeod et al., 2011). Biochar sequestration (Woolf et al., 2010; Smith, 2016; Werner et al., 2018) provides an additional route for terrestrial carbon storage. Other approaches are concerned with storing atmospheric carbon dioxide in geological formations. They include the combination of biomass use for energy production with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) (Obersteiner et al., 2001; Keith and Rhodes, 2002; Gough and Upham, 2011) and direct air capture with storage (DACCS) using chemical solvents and sorbents (Zeman and Lackner, 2004; Keith et al., 2006; Socolow et al., 2011). Further approaches investigate the mineralisation of atmospheric carbon dioxide (Mazzotti et al., 2005; Matter et al., 2016) including enhanced weathering of rocks (Schuiling and Krijgsman, 2006; Hartmann et al., 2013; Strefler et al., 2018a). A fourth group of approaches is concerned with the sequestration of carbon dioxide in the oceans, for example by means of ocean alkalisation (Kheshgi, 1995; Rau, 2011; Ilyina et al., 2013; Lenton et al., 2018). The costs, CDR potential and environmental side effects of several of these measures are increasingly investigated and compared in the literature, but large uncertainties remain, in particular concerning the feasibility and impact of large-scale deployment of CDR measures (The Royal Society, 2009; Smith et al., 2015; Psarras et al., 2017; Fuss et al., 2018) (see Chapter 4.3.7). There are also proposals to remove methane, nitrous oxide and halocarbons via photocatalysis from the atmosphere (Boucher and Folberth, 2010; de Richter et al., 2017), but a broader assessment of their effectiveness, cost, and sustainability impacts is lacking to date.

Only some of these approaches have so far been considered in IAMs (see Section 2.3.1.2). The mitigation scenario literature up to AR5 mostly included BECCS and to a more limited extent afforestation and reforestation (Clarke et al., 2014). Since then, some 2°C and 1.5°C-consistent pathways including additional CDR measures such as DACCS (Chen and Tavoni, 2013; Marcucci et al., 2017; Lehtilä and Koljonen, 2018; Strefler et al., 2018b) and soil carbon sequestration (Frank et al., 2017) have become available. Other, more speculative approaches, in particular ocean-based CDR and removal of non-CO₂ gases, have not yet been taken up by the literature on mitigation pathways. See Annex 2.A.2 for an overview on the coverage of CDR measures in models which contributed pathways to this assessment. Chapter 4.3.7 assesses the potential, costs, and sustainability implications of the full range of CDR measures.

Integrated assessment modelling has not yet explored land conservation, restoration and management options to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere in sufficient depth, despite land management having a potentially considerable impact on the terrestrial carbon stock (Erb et al., 2018). Moreover, associated CDR measures have low technological requirements, and come with potential environmental and social co-benefits (Griscom et al., 2017). Despite the evolving capabilities of IAMs in accounting for a wider range of CDR measures, 1.5°C-consistent pathways assessed here continue to predominantly rely on BECCS and afforestation / reforestation (See Annex 2.A.2). However, IAMs with spatially explicit land-use modelling include a full accounting of land-use change emissions comprising carbon stored in the terrestrial biosphere and soils. Net CDR in the AFOLU sector, including but not restricted to afforestation and reforestation, can thus in principle be inferred by comparing AFOLU CO₂ emissions between a baseline scenario and a 1.5°C-consistent pathway from the same model and study. However, baseline LUC emissions cannot only be reduced by CDR in the AFOLU sector, but also by measures to reduce deforestation and preserve land carbon stocks. The pathway literature and pathway data available to this assessment do not yet allow to separate the two contributions. As a conservative approximation, the additional net negative AFOLU CO₂ emissions below the baseline are taken as a proxy for AFOLU CDR in this assessment. Because this does not include CDR that was deployed before reaching net zero AFOLU emissions, this approximation is a lower-bound for terrestrial CDR in the AFOLU sector (including the factors that lead to net negative LUC emissions).

The scale and type of CDR deployment in 1.5°C-consistent pathways varies widely (Figure 2.9 and 2.10). Overall CDR deployment over the 21st century is substantial in most of the pathways, and deployment levels cover a wide range (770 [260-1170] GtCO₂, for median and 5th–95th percentile range). Both BECCS (560 [0 to 1000] GtCO₂) and AFOLU CDR measures including afforestation and reforestation (200 [0-550] GtCO₂)

can play a major role⁴, but for both cases pathways exist where they play no role at all. This shows the flexibility in substituting between individual CDR measures, once a portfolio of options becomes available. The high end of the CDR deployment range is populated by high overshoot pathways, as illustrated by pathway archetype S5 based on SSP5 (fossil-fuelled development, see Section 2.3.1.1) and characterized by very large BECCS deployment to return warming to 1.5°C by 2100 (Kriegler et al., 2017). In contrast, the low end is populated with pathways with no or limited overshoot that limit CDR to in the order of 100–200 GtCO₂ over the 21st century coming entirely from terrestrial CDR measures with no or small use of BECCS. These are pathways with very low energy demand facilitating the rapid phase-out of fossil fuels and process emissions that exclude BECCS and CCS use (Grubler et al., 2018) and/or pathways with rapid shifts to sustainable food consumption freeing up sufficient land areas for afforestation and reforestation (Haberl et al., 2011; van Vuuren et al., 2018). Some pathways uses neither BECCS nor afforestation but still rely on CDR through considerable net negative emissions in the AFOLU sector around mid-century (Holz et al., 2018b). We conclude that the role of BECCS as dominant CDR measure in deep mitigation pathways has been reduced since the time of the AR5. This is related to three factors: a larger variation of underlying assumptions about socio-economic drivers (Riahi et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018) and associated energy (Grubler et al., 2018) and food demand (van Vuuren et al., 2018); the incorporation of a larger portfolio of mitigation and CDR options (Liu et al., 2017; Marcucci et al., 2017; Grubler et al., 2018; Lehtilä and Koljonen, 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018); and targeted analysis of deployment limits for (specific) CDR measures (Holz et al., 2018b; Kriegler et al., 2018b; Strefler et al., 2018b) including on the availability of bioenergy (Bauer et al., 2018), CCS (Krey et al., 2014a; Grubler et al., 2018) and afforestation (Popp et al., 2014b, 2017). As additional CDR measures are being built into IAMs, the prevalence of BECCS is expected to be further reduced.




Figure 2.9: Cumulative CDR deployment in 1.5°C-consistent pathways in the literature as reported in the database collected for this assessment. Total CDR comprises all forms of CDR, including AFOLU CDR and BECCS, and in a few pathways other CDR measures like DACCS. It does not include CCS combined with fossil fuels (which is not a CDR technology as it does not result in active removal of CO₂ from the atmosphere). AFOLU CDR has not been reported directly and is hence represented by means of a proxy: the additional amount of net negative CO₂ emissions in the AFOLU sector compared to a baseline scenario (see text for a discussion). ‘Compensate CO₂’ depicts the cumulative amount of CDR that is used to neutralize concurrent residual CO₂ emissions. ‘Net negative CO₂’ describes the additional

⁴ FOOTNOTE: The median and percentiles of the sum of two quantities is in general not equal to the sum of the medians of the two quantities.

amount of CDR that is used to produce net negative emissions, once residual CO₂ emissions are neutralized. The two quantities add up to total CDR for individual pathways (not for percentiles and medians, see Footnote 4).

As discussed in Section 2.3.2, CDR can be used in two ways: (i) to move more rapidly towards the point of carbon neutrality and maintain it afterwards to stabilize global-mean temperature rise, and (ii) to produce net negative emissions drawing down anthropogenic CO₂ in the atmosphere to enable temperature overshoot by declining global-mean temperature rise after its peak (Kriegler et al., 2018a; Obersteiner et al., 2018). Both uses are important in 1.5°C-consistent pathways (Figure 2.9). Because of the tighter remaining 1.5°C carbon budget, and because many pathways in the literature do not restrict exceeding this budget prior to 2100, the relative weight of the net negative emissions component of CDR increases compared to 2°C-consistent pathways. The amount of compensatory CDR remains roughly the same over the century. This is the net effect of stronger deployment of compensatory CDR until mid-century to accelerate the approach to carbon neutrality and less compensatory CDR in the second half of the century due to deeper mitigation of end-use sectors in 1.5°C-consistent pathways (Luderer et al., 2018). Comparing median levels, end-of-century net cumulative CO₂ emissions are roughly 600 GtCO₂ smaller in 1.5°C compared to 2°C-consistent pathways, with approximately two thirds coming from further reductions of gross CO₂ emissions and the remaining third from increased CDR deployment. As a result, total CDR deployment in the combined body of 1.5°C-consistent pathways is often larger than in 2°C-consistent pathways (Figure 2.9), but with marked variations in each pathway class.




Figure 2.10: Accounting of cumulative CO₂ emissions for the four 1.5°C-consistent pathway archetypes. See top panel for explanation of the barplots. Total CDR is the difference between gross (red horizontal bar) and net (purple horizontal bar) cumulative CO₂ emissions over the period 2018–2100. Total CDR is the sum of the BECCS (grey) and AFOLU CDR (green) contributions. Cumulative net negative emissions are the difference between peak (orange horizontal bar) and net (purple) cumulative CO₂ emissions. The blue shaded area depicts the estimated range of the remaining carbon budget for a two-in-three to one-in-two chance of staying below 1.5°C. The grey shaded area depicts the range when accounting for additional Earth-system feedbacks. These remaining carbon budgets have been adjusted for the difference in starting year compared to Table 2.2

Ramp-up rates of individual CDR measures in 1.5°C-consistent pathways are provided in Table 2.4. BECCS deployment is still limited in 2030, but ramped up to median levels of 3 (Below-1.5°C), 5 (1.5°C-low-OS) and 7 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ (1.5°C-high-OS) in 2050, and to 6 (Below-1.5°C), 12 (1.5°C-low-OS) and 15 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ (1.5°C-high-OS) in 2100, respectively. Net CDR in the AFOLU sector reaches slightly lower levels in 2050, and stays more constant until 2100, but data reporting limitations prevent a more quantitative assessment here. In contrast to BECCS, AFOLU CDR is more strongly deployed in non-overshoot than overshoot pathways. This indicates differences in the timing of the two CDR approaches. Afforestation is scaled up until around mid-century, when the time of carbon neutrality is reached in 1.5°C-consistent pathways, while BECCS is projected to be used predominantly in the 2nd half of the century. This reflects that afforestation is a readily available CDR technology, while BECCS is more costly and much less mature a technology. As a result, the two options contribute differently to compensating concurrent CO₂ emissions (until 2050) and to

producing net negative CO₂ emissions (post-2050). BECCS deployment is particularly strong in pathways with high overshoots but could equally feature in pathways with a low temperature peak but a fast temperature decline thereafter (see Figure 2.1). Annual deployment levels until mid-century are not found to be significantly different between 2°C-consistent pathways and 1.5°C-consistent pathways with no or low overshoot. This suggests similar implementation challenges for ramping up CDR deployment at the rates projected in the pathways (Honegger and Reiner, 2018; Nemet et al., 2018). The feasibility and sustainability of upscaling CDR at these rates is assessed in Chapter 4.3.7.

Concerns have been raised that building expectations about large-scale CDR deployment in the future can lead to an actual reduction of near-term mitigation efforts (Geden, 2015; Anderson and Peters, 2016; Dooley and Kartha, 2018). The pathway literature confirms that CDR availability influences the shape of mitigation pathways critically (Krey et al., 2014a; Holz et al., 2018b; Kriegler et al., 2018b; Strefler et al., 2018b). Deeper near-term emissions reductions are required to reach the 1.5°C-2°C target range, if CDR availability is constrained. As a result, the least-cost benchmark pathways to derive GHG emissions gap estimates (UNEP, 2017) are dependent on assumptions about CDR availability. Using GHG benchmarks in climate policy makes implicit assumptions about CDR availability (Fuss et al., 2014; van Vuuren et al., 2017a). At the same time, the literature also shows that rapid and stringent mitigation as well as large-scale CDR deployment occur simultaneously in 1.5°C pathways due to the tight remaining carbon budget (Luderer et al., 2018). Thus, an emissions gap is identified even for high CDR availability (Strefler et al., 2018b), contradicting a wait-and-see approach. There are significant trade-offs between near-term action, overshoot and reliance on CDR deployment in the long-term which are assessed in Section 2.3.5.

Box 2.1: Bioenergy and BECCS deployment in integrated assessment modelling

Bioenergy can be used in various parts of the energy sector of IAMs, including for electricity, liquid fuel, biogas, and hydrogen production. It is this flexibility that makes bioenergy and bioenergy technologies valuable for the decarbonisation of energy use (Klein et al., 2014; Krey et al., 2014a; Rose et al., 2014a; Bauer et al., 2017, 2018). Most bioenergy technologies in IAMs are also available in combination with CCS (BECCS). Assumed capture rates differ between technologies, for example, about 90% for electricity and hydrogen production, and about 40-50% for liquid fuel production. Decisions about bioenergy deployment in IAMs are based on economic considerations to stay within a carbon budget that is consistent with a long-term climate goal. IAMs consider both the value of bioenergy in the energy system and the value of BECCS in removing CO₂ from the atmosphere. Typically, if bioenergy is strongly limited, BECCS technologies with high capture rates are favoured. If bioenergy is plentiful IAMs tend to choose biofuel technologies with lower capture rate, but high value for replacing fossil fuels in transport (Kriegler et al., 2013a; Bauer et al., 2018). Most bioenergy use in IAMs is combined with CCS if available (Rose et al., 2014a). If CCS is unavailable, bioenergy use remains largely unchanged or even increases due to the high value of bioenergy for the energy transformation (Bauer et al., 2018). As land impacts are tied to bioenergy use, the exclusion of BECCS from the mitigation portfolio, will not automatically remove the trade-offs with food, water and other sustainability objectives due to the continued and potentially increased use of bioenergy.

IAMs assume bioenergy to be supplied mostly from second generation biomass feedstocks such as dedicated cellulosic crops (for example Miscanthus or Poplar) as well as agricultural and forest residues. Detailed process IAMs include land-use models that capture competition for land for different uses (food, feed, fiber, bioenergy, carbon storage, biodiversity protection) under a range of dynamic factors including socio-economic drivers, productivity increases in crop and livestock systems, food demand, and land, environmental, biodiversity, and carbon policies. Assumptions about these factors can vary widely between different scenarios (Calvin et al., 2014; Popp et al., 2017; van Vuuren et al., 2018). IAMs capture a number of potential environmental impacts from bioenergy production, in particular indirect land-use change emissions from land conversion and nitrogen and water use for bioenergy production (Kraxner et al., 2013; Bodirsky et al., 2014; Bonsch et al., 2014; Obersteiner et al., 2016; Humpenöder et al., 2017). Especially the impact of bioenergy production on soil degradation is an area of active IAM development and was not comprehensively accounted for in the mitigation pathways assessed in this report (but is, for example, in (Frank et al., 2017)). Whether bioenergy has large adverse impacts on environmental and societal goals depends in large parts on the governance of land use (Haberl et al., 2013; Erb et al., 2016b; Obersteiner et al., 2016; Humpenöder et al., 2017). Here IAMs often make idealized assumptions about effective land management such as full protection of the land carbon stock by conservation measures and a global carbon price, respectively, but also variations on these assumptions have been explored (Calvin et al., 2014; Popp et

al., 2014a)).

2.3.4.2 Sustainability implications of CDR deployment in 1.5°C-consistent pathways

Strong concerns about the sustainability implications of large-scale CDR deployment in deep mitigation pathways have been raised in the literature (Williamson and Bodle, 2016; Boysen et al., 2017b; Dooley and Kartha, 2018; Heck et al., 2018), and a number of important knowledge gaps have been identified (Fuss et al., 2016). An assessment of the literature on implementation constraints and sustainable development implications of CDR measures is provided in Section 4.3.7 and the Cross-chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3. Potential environmental side effects as initial context for the discussion of CDR deployment in 1.5°C-consistent pathways are provided in this section. Section 4.3.7 then contrasts CDR deployment in 1.5°C-consistent pathways with other branches of literature on limitations of CDR. Integrated modelling aims to explore a range of developments compatible with specific climate goals and often does not include the full set of broader environmental and societal concerns beyond climate change. This has given rise to the concept of sustainable development pathways (van Vuuren et al., 2015) (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1), and there is an increasing body of work to extend integrated modelling to cover a broader range of sustainable development goals (Section 2.6). However, only some of the available 1.5°C-consistent pathways were developed within a larger sustainable development context (Bertram et al., 2018; Grubler et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018). As discussed in Section 2.3.4.1, those pathways are characterized by low energy and/or food demand effectively limiting fossil-fuel substitution and alleviating land competition, respectively. They also include regulatory policies for deepening early action and ensuring environmental protection (Bertram et al., 2018). Overall sustainability implications of 1.5°C-consistent pathways are assessed in Section 2.5.3 and Section 5.4.

Individual CDR measures have different characteristics and therefore would carry different risks for their sustainable deployment at scale (Smith et al., 2015). Terrestrial CDR measures, BECCS and enhanced weathering of rock powder distributed on agricultural lands require land. Those land-based measures could have substantial impacts on environmental services and ecosystems (Smith and Torn, 2013; Boysen et al., 2016; Heck et al., 2016; Krause et al., 2017) (Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3). Measures like afforestation and bioenergy with and without CCS that directly compete with other land uses could have significant impacts on agricultural and food systems (Creutzig et al., 2012, 2015; Calvin et al., 2014; Popp et al., 2014b, 2017; Kreidenweis et al., 2016; Boysen et al., 2017a; Frank et al., 2017; Humpenöder et al., 2017; Stevanović et al., 2017; Strapasson et al., 2017). BECCS using dedicated bioenergy crops could substantially increase agricultural water demand (Bonsch et al., 2014; Séférian et al., 2018) and nitrogen fertilizer use (Bodirsky et al., 2014). DACCS and BECCS rely on CCS and would require safe storage space in geological formations, including management of leakage risks (Pawar et al., 2015) and induced seismicity (Nicol et al., 2013). Some approaches like DACCS have high energy demand (Socolow et al., 2011). Most of the CDR measures currently discussed could have significant impacts on either land, energy, water, or nutrients if deployed at scale (Smith et al., 2015). However, actual trade-offs depend on a multitude factors (Haberl et al., 2011; Erb et al., 2012; Humpenöder et al., 2017), including the modalities of CDR deployment (e.g., on marginal vs. productive land) (Bauer et al., 2018), socio-economic developments (Popp et al., 2017), dietary choices (Stehfest et al., 2009; Popp et al., 2010; van Sluisveld et al., 2016; Weindl et al., 2017; van Vuuren et al., 2018), yield increases, livestock productivity and other advances in agricultural technology (Havlik et al., 2013; Valin et al., 2013; Havlik et al., 2014; Weindl et al., 2015; Erb et al., 2016b), land policies (Schmitz et al., 2012; Calvin et al., 2014; Popp et al., 2014a) and governance of land use (Unruh, 2011; Buck, 2016; Honegger and Reiner, 2018).

Figure 2.11 shows the land requirements for BECCS and afforestation in the selected 1.5°C-consistent pathway archetypes, including the LED (Grubler et al., 2018) and S1 pathways (Fujimori, 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018) following a sustainable development paradigm. As discussed, these land-use patterns are heavily influenced by assumptions about, inter alia, future population levels, crop yields, livestock production systems, and food and livestock demand, which all vary between the pathways (Popp et al., 2017) (Section 2.3.1.1). In pathways that allow for large-scale afforestation in addition to BECCS, land demand for afforestation can be larger than for BECCS (Humpenöder et al., 2014). This follows from the assumption in the modelled pathways that, unlike bioenergy crops, forests are not harvested to allow unabated carbon storage on the same patch of land. If wood harvest and subsequent processing or burial are taken into

account, this finding can change. There are also synergies between the various uses of land, which are not reflected in the depicted pathways. Trees can grow on agricultural land (Zomer et al., 2016) and harvested wood can be used with BECCS and pyrolysis systems (Werner et al., 2018). The pathways show a very substantial land demand for the two CDR measures combined, up to the magnitude of the current global cropland area. This is achieved in IAMs in particular by a conversion of pasture land freed by intensification of livestock production systems, pasture intensification and/or demand changes (Weindl et al., 2017), and to more limited extent cropland for food production, as well as expansion into natural land. However, pursuing such large scale changes in land use would pose significant food supply, environmental and governance challenges, concerning both land management and tenure (Unruh, 2011; Erb et al., 2012, 2016b; Haberl et al., 2013; Haberl, 2015; Buck, 2016), particularly if synergies between land uses, the relevance of dietary changes for reducing land demand, and co-benefits with other sustainable development objectives are not fully recognized. A general discussion of the land-use transformation in 1.5°C-consistent pathways is provided in Section 2.4.4.

An important consideration for CDR which moves carbon from the atmosphere to the geological, oceanic or terrestrial carbon pools is the permanence of carbon stored in these different pools (Matthews and Caldeira, 2008; NRC, 2015; Fuss et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2016) (see also Section 4.3.7 for a discussion). Terrestrial carbon can be returned to the atmosphere on decadal timescales by a variety of mechanisms such as soil degradation, forest pest outbreaks and forest fires, and therefore requires careful consideration of policy frameworks to manage carbon storage, e.g., in forests (Gren and Aklilu, 2016). There are similar concerns about outgassing of CO₂ from ocean storage (Herzog et al., 2003), unless it is transformed to a substance that does not easily exchange with the atmosphere, e.g., ocean alkalinity or buried marine biomass (Rau, 2011). Understanding of the assessment and management of the potential risk of CO₂ release from geological storage of CO₂ has improved since the IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (IPCC, 2005) with experience and the development of management practices in geological storage projects, including risk management to prevent sustentative leakage (Pawar et al., 2015). Estimates of leakage risk have been updated to include scenarios of unregulated drilling and limited wellbore integrity (Choi et al., 2013), finding ca. 70% of stored CO₂ still retained after 10,000 years in these circumstances (Alcalde et al., 2018). The literature on the potential environmental impacts from the leakage of CO₂ – and approaches to minimize these impacts should a leak occur – has also grown and is reviewed by Jones et al. (2015). To the extent non-permanence of terrestrial and geological carbon storage is driven by socio-economic and political factors, it has parallels to questions of fossil-fuel reservoirs remaining in the ground (Scott et al., 2015).




Figure 2.11: Land-use changes in 2050 and 2100 in the illustrative 1.5°C-consistent pathway archetypes (Fricko et al., 2017; Fujimori, 2017; Kriegler et al., 2017; Grubler et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018).

2.3.5 Implications of near-term action in 1.5°C-consistent pathways

Less CO₂ emission reductions in the near term imply steeper and deeper reductions afterwards (Riahi et al., 2015; Luderer et al., 2016a). This is a direct consequence of the quasi-linear relationship between the total cumulative amount of CO₂ emitted into the atmosphere and global mean temperature rise (Matthews et al., 2009; Zickfeld et al., 2009; Collins et al., 2013; Knutti and Rogelj, 2015). Besides this clear geophysical trade-off over time, delaying GHG emissions reductions over the coming years also leads to economic and institutional lock-in into carbon-intensive infrastructure, that is, the continued investment in and use of carbon-intensive technologies that are difficult or costly to phase-out once deployed (Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006; Jakob et al., 2014; Erickson et al., 2015; Steckel et al., 2015; Seto et al., 2016; Michaelowa et al., 2018). Studies show that to meet stringent climate targets despite near-term delays in emissions reductions, models prematurely retire carbon-intensive infrastructure, in particular coal without CCS (Bertram et al., 2015a; Johnson et al., 2015). The AR5 reports that delaying mitigation action leads to substantially higher rates of emissions reductions afterwards, a larger reliance on CDR technologies in the long term, and higher transitional and long-term economic impacts (Clarke et al., 2014). The literature mainly focuses on delayed action until 2030 in the context of meeting a 2°C goal (den Elzen et al., 2010; van Vuuren and Riahi, 2011; Kriegler et al., 2013b; Luderer et al., 2013, 2016a; Rogelj et al., 2013b; Riahi et al., 2015; OECD/IEA and IRENA, 2017). However, because of the smaller carbon budget consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C and the absence of a clearly declining long-term trend in global emissions to date, these general insights apply equally or even more so to the more stringent mitigation context of 1.5°C-consistent pathways. This is further supported by estimates of committed emissions due to fossil fuel-based infrastructure (Seto et al., 2016; Edenhofer et al., 2018).

All available 1.5°C pathways that explore consistent mitigation action from 2020 onwards peak global Kyoto-GHG emissions in the next decade and already decline Kyoto-GHG emissions to below 2010 levels by 2030. The near-term emissions development in these pathways can be compared with estimated emissions in 2030 implied by the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted by Parties to the Paris Agreement (Figure 2.12). Altogether, these NDCs are assessed to result in global Kyoto-GHG emissions on the order of 50–58 GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ in 2030 (for example, den Elzen et al., 2016; Fujimori et al., 2016; UNFCCC, 2016; Rogelj et al., 2017; Rose et al., 2017b; Benveniste et al., 2018; Vrontisi et al., 2018), see Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4 for detailed assessment). In contrast, 1.5°C-consistent pathways available to this assessment show an interquartile range of about 26–38 (median 31) GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ in 2030, reducing to 26–31 (median 28) GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ if only pathways with low overshoot are taken into account⁵, and still lower if pathways without overshoot are considered (Table 2.4, Section 2.3.3). Published estimates of the emissions gap between conditional NDCs and 1.5°C-consistent pathways in 2030 range from 16 (14–22) GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ (UNEP, 2017) for a greater than one-in-two chance of limiting warming below 1.5°C in 2100 to 25 (19–29) GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ (Vrontisi et al., 2018) for a greater than two-in-three chance of meeting the 1.5°C limit.

The later emissions peak and decline, the more CO₂ will have accumulated in the atmosphere. Peak cumulated CO₂ emissions and consequently also peak temperatures increase with 2030 emissions levels (Figure 2.12). Current NDCs (Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4) are estimated to lead to CO₂ emissions of about 400–560 GtCO₂ from 2018 to 2030 (Rogelj et al., 2016a). Available 1.5°C- and 2°C-consistent pathways with 2030 emissions in the range estimated for the NDCs rely on an assumed swift and widespread deployment of CDR after 2030, and show peak cumulative CO₂ emissions from 2018 of about 800–1000 GtCO₂, above the remaining carbon budget for a one-in-two chance of remaining below 1.5°C. These emissions reflect that no pathway is able to project a phase out of CO₂ emissions starting from year-2030 NDC levels of about 40 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ (Fawcett et al., 2015; Rogelj et al., 2016a) to net zero in less than ca. 15 years. Based on the implied emissions until 2030, the high challenges of the assumed post-2030 transition, and the assessment of carbon budgets in Section 2.2.2, global warming is assessed to exceed 1.5°C if emissions stay at the levels implied by the NDCs until 2030 (Figure 2.12). The chances of remaining below 1.5°C in these circumstances remain conditional upon geophysical properties that are uncertain, but these

⁵ FOOTNOTE: Note that aggregated Kyoto-GHG emissions implied by the NDCs from Cross-Chapter Box 4.3 and Kyoto-GHG ranges from the pathway classes in Chapter 2 are only approximately comparable, because this chapter applies GWP-100 values from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report while the NDC Cross-Chapter Box 4.3 applies GWP-100 values from the IPCC Second Assessment Report. At a global scale, switching between GWP-100 values of the Second to the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report would result in an increase in estimated aggregated Kyoto-GHG emissions of about no more than 3% in 2030 (UNFCCC, 2016).

Earth system response uncertainties would have to serendipitously align beyond current median estimates in order for current NDCs to become consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C.




Figure 2.12: Median global warming estimated by MAGICC (left panel) and peak cumulative CO₂ emissions (right panel) in 1.5°C-consistent pathways in the SR1.5 scenario database as a function of CO₂-equivalent emissions (based on AR4 GWP-100) of Kyoto-GHG in 2030. Pathways that were forced to go through the NDCs or a similarly high emissions point in 2030 by design are highlighted by yellow marker edges (see caption of Figure 2.13 and text for further details on the design of these pathways). The NDC range of global Kyoto-GHG emissions in 2030 assessed in Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4 is shown by black dotted lines (adjusted to AR4 GWPs for comparison). As a second line of evidence, peak cumulative CO₂ emissions derived from a 1.5°C pathway sensitivity analysis (Kriegler et al., 2018a) are shown by grey circles in the right-hand panel. Numbers show gross fossil-fuel and industry emissions of the sensitivity cases increased by assumptions about the contributions from AFOLU (5 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ until 2020, followed by a linear phase out until 2040) and non-CO₂ Kyoto-GHGs (median non-CO₂ contribution from 1.5°C-consistent pathways available in the database: 10 GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ in 2030), and reduced by assumptions about CDR deployment until the time of net zero CO₂ emissions (limiting case for CDR deployment assumed in (Kriegler et al., 2018a) (logistic growth to 1, 4, 10 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ in 2030, 2040, and 2050, respectively, leading to approx. 100 GtCO₂ CDR by mid-century).

It is unclear whether following NDCs until 2030 would still allow global mean temperature to return to 1.5°C by 2100 after a temporary overshoot, due to the uncertainty associated with the Earth system response to net negative emissions after a peak (Section 2.2). Available IAM studies are working with reduced-form carbon cycle-climate models like MAGICC which assume a largely symmetric Earth-system response to positive and net negative CO₂ emissions. The IAM findings on returning warming to 1.5°C from NDCs after a temporary temperature overshoot are hence all conditional on this assumption. Two types of pathways with 1.5°C-consistent action starting in 2030 have been considered in the literature (Luderer et al., 2018) (Figure 2.13): pathways aiming to obtain the same end-of-century carbon budget despite higher emissions until 2030, and pathways assuming the same mitigation stringency after 2030 (approximated by using the same global price of emissions as found in least-cost pathways starting from 2020). An IAM comparison study found increasing challenges to implement pathways with the same end-of-century 1.5°C-consistent carbon budgets after following NDCs until 2030 (ADVANCE) (Luderer et al., 2018). The majority of model experiments (four out of seven) failed to produce NDC pathways that would return cumulative CO₂ emissions over the 2016–2100 period to 200 GtCO₂, indicating limitations to the availability and timing of CDR. The few such pathways that were identified show highly disruptive features in 2030 (including abrupt transitions from moderate to very large emissions reduction and low carbon energy deployment rates) indicating a high risk that the required post-2030 transformations are too steep and abrupt to be achieved by the mitigation measures in the models (*high confidence*). NDC pathways aiming for a cumulative 2016–2100 CO₂ emissions budget of 800 GtCO₂ were more readily obtained (Luderer et al., 2018), and some were classified

as 1.5°C-high-OS pathways in this assessment (Section 2.1).

NDC pathways that apply a post-2030 price of emissions after 2030 as found in least-cost pathways starting from 2020 show infrastructural carbon lock-in as a result of following NDCs instead of least-cost action until 2030. A key finding is that carbon lock-ins persist long after 2030, with the majority of additional CO₂ emissions occurring during the 2030–2050 period. Luderer et al. (2018) find 90 (80–120) GtCO₂ additional emissions until 2030, growing to 240 (190–260) GtCO₂ by 2050 and 290 (200–200) GtCO₂ by 2100. As a result, peak warming is about 0.2°C higher and not all of the modelled pathways return warming to 1.5°C by the end of the century. There is a four sided trade-off between (i) near-term ambition, (ii) degree of overshoot, (iii) transitional challenges during the 2030–2050 period, and (iv) the amount of CDR deployment required during the century (Figure 2.13) (Holz et al., 2018b; Strefler et al., 2018b). Transition challenges, overshoot, and CDR requirements can be significantly reduced if global emissions peak before 2030 and fall below levels in line with current NDCs by 2030. For example, Strefler et al. (2018b) find that CDR deployment levels in the second half of the century can be halved in 1.5°C-consistent pathways with similar CO₂ emissions reductions rates during the 2030–2050 period if CO₂ emissions by 2030 are reduced by an additional 30% compared to NDC levels. Kriegler et al. (2018b) investigate a global roll out of selected regulatory policies and moderate carbon pricing policies. They show that additional reductions of ca. 10 GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ can be achieved in 2030 compared to the current NDCs. Such 20% reduction of year-2030 emissions compared to current NDCs would effectively lower the disruptiveness of post-2030 action. Strengthening of short-term policies in deep mitigation pathways has hence been identified as bridging options to keep the Paris climate goals within reach (Bertram et al., 2015b; IEA, 2015a; Spencer et al., 2015; Kriegler et al., 2018b).




Figure 2.13: Comparison of pathways starting action for limiting warming to 1.5°C as of 2020 (A; light-blue diamonds) with pathways following the NDCs until 2030 and aiming to limit warming to 1.5°C thereafter. 1.5°C pathways following the NDCs either aim for the same cumulative CO₂ emissions by 2100 (B; red diamonds) or assume the same mitigation stringency as reflected by the price of emissions in associated least-cost 1.5°C-consistent pathways starting from 2020 (P; black diamonds). Panels show the underlying emissions pathways (a), additional warming in the delay scenarios compared to 2020 action case (b), cumulated CDR (c), CDR ramp-up rates (d), cumulated gross CO₂ emissions from fossil-fuel combustion and industrial (FFI) processes over the 2018–2100 period (e), and gross FFI CO₂ emissions reductions rates (f). Scenario pairs / triplets (circles and diamonds) with 2020 and 2030 action variants were calculated by six (out of seven) models in the ADVANCE study symbols (Luderer et al., 2018) and five of them (passing near-term plausibility checks) are shown by symbols. Only two of five models could identify pathways with post-2030 action leading to a 2016–2100 carbon budget of ca. 200 GtCO₂ (red). The range of all 1.5°C-consistent pathways with no and low overshoot is shown by the boxplots.

2.4 Disentangling the whole-system transformation

Mitigation pathways map out prospective transformations of the energy, land and economic systems over this century (Clarke et al., 2014). There is a diversity of potential pathways consistent with 1.5°C, yet they share some key characteristics summarized in Table 2.5. To explore characteristics of 1.5°C pathways in greater detail, this section focuses on changes in energy supply and demand, and changes in the AFOLU sector.

Table 2.5: Overview of key characteristics of 1.5°C pathways.

1.5°C pathway characteristic	Supporting information	Reference
Rapid and profound near-term decarbonisation of energy supply	Strong upscaling of renewables and sustainable biomass and reduction of unabated (no CCS) fossil fuels, along with the rapid deployment of CCS lead to a zero-emission energy supply system by mid-century.	Section 2.4.1 Section 2.4.2
Greater mitigation efforts on the demand side	All end-use sectors show marked demand reductions beyond the reductions projected for 2°C pathways. Demand reductions from IAMs for 2030 and 2050 lie within the potential assessed by detailed sectorial bottom-up assessments.	Section 2.4.3
Switching from fossil fuels to electricity in end-use sectors	Both in the transport and the residential sector, electricity covers marked larger shares of total demand by mid-century.	Section 2.4.3.2 Section 2.4.3.3
Comprehensive emission reductions are implemented in the coming decade	Virtually all 1.5°C-consistent pathways decline net annual CO ₂ emissions between 2020 and 2030, reaching carbon neutrality around mid-century. Below-1.5°C and 1.5°C-low-OS show maximum net CO ₂ emissions in 2030 of 18 and 28 GtCO ₂ yr ⁻¹ , respectively. GHG emissions in these scenarios are not higher than 34 GtCO ₂ e yr ⁻¹ in 2030.	Section 2.3.4
Additional reductions, on top of reductions from both CO ₂ and non-CO ₂ required for 2°C, are mainly from CO ₂	Both CO ₂ and the non-CO ₂ GHGs and aerosols are strongly reduced by 2030 and until 2050 in 1.5°C pathways. The greatest difference to 2°C pathways, however, lies in additional reductions of CO ₂ , as the non-CO ₂ mitigation potential that is currently included in integrated pathways is mostly already fully deployed for reaching a 2°C pathway.	Section 2.3.1.2
Considerable shifts in investment patterns	Low-carbon investments in the energy supply side (energy production and refineries) are projected to average 1.6-3.8 trillion 2010USD yr ⁻¹ globally to 2050. Investments in fossil fuels decline, with investments in unabated coal halted by 2030 in most available 1.5°C-consistent projections, while the literature is less conclusive for investments in unabated gas and oil. Energy demand investments are a critical factor for which total estimates are uncertain.	Section 2.5.2
Options are available to align 1.5°C pathways with sustainable development	Synergies can be maximized, and risks of trade-offs limited or avoided through an informed choice of mitigation strategies. Particularly pathways that focus on a lowering of demand show many synergies and few trade-offs.	Section 2.5.3
CDR at scale before mid-century	By 2050, 1.5°C pathways project deployment of BECCS at a scale of 3–7 GtCO ₂ yr ⁻¹ (range of medians across 1.5°C pathway classes), depending on the level of energy demand reductions and mitigation in other sectors. Some 1.5°C pathways are available that do not use BECCS, but only focus terrestrial CDR in the AFOLU sector.	Section 2.3.3, 2.3.4.1

2.4.1 Energy System Transformation

The energy system links energy supply (Section 2.4.2) with energy demand (Section 2.4.3) through final energy carriers including electricity and liquid, solid or gaseous fuels that are tailored to their end-uses. To chart energy-system transformations in mitigation pathways, four macro-level decarbonisation indicators associated with final energy are useful: limits to the increase of final energy demand, reductions in the carbon intensity of electricity, increases in the share of final energy provided by electricity, and reductions in the carbon intensity of final energy other than electricity (referred to in this section as the carbon intensity of the residual fuel mix). Figure 2.14 shows changes of these four indicators for the pathways in the scenario database (Section 2.1.3 and Annex 2.A.3) for 1.5°C and 2°C pathways (Table 2.1).

Pathways in both the 1.5°C and 2°C classes (Figure 2.14) generally show rapid transitions until mid-century

with a sustained but slower evolution thereafter. Both show an increasing share of electricity accompanied by a rapid decline in the carbon intensity of electricity. Both also show a generally slower decline in the carbon intensity of the residual fuel mix, which arises from the decarbonisation of liquids, gases and solids provided to industry, residential and commercial activities, and the transport sector.

The largest differences between 1.5°C and 2°C pathways are seen in the first half of the century (Figure 2.14), where 1.5°C pathways generally show lower energy demand, a faster electrification of energy end-use, and a faster decarbonisation of the carbon intensity of electricity and the residual fuel mix. There are very few pathways in the Below-1.5°C class (Figure 2.14). Those scenarios that are available, however, show a faster decline in the carbon intensity of electricity generation and residual fuel mix by 2030 than most pathways that are projected to temporarily overshoot 1.5°C and return by 2100 (or 2°C pathways), and also appear to distinguish themselves already by 2030 by reductions in final energy demand and an increased electricity share (Figure 2.14).




Figure 2.14: Decomposition of transformation pathways into energy demand (top left), carbon intensity of electricity (top right), the electricity share in final energy (bottom left), and the carbon intensity of the residual (non-electricity) fuel mix (bottom right). Boxplots show median, interquartile range and full range of pathways. Pathway temperature classes (Table 2.1) and illustrative pathway archetypes are indicated in the legend. Values following the class labels give the number of available pathways in each class.

2.4.2 Energy supply

Several energy supply characteristics are evident in 1.5°C pathways assessed in this section: i) growth in the share of energy derived from low carbon-emitting sources (including renewables, nuclear, and fossil fuel with CCS) and a decline in the overall share of fossil fuels without CCS (Section 2.4.2.1), ii) rapid decline in the carbon intensity of electricity generation simultaneous with further electrification of energy end-use (Section 2.4.2.2), and iii) the growth in the use of CCS applied to fossil and biomass carbon in most 1.5°C pathways (Section 2.4.2.3).

2.4.2.1 Evolution of primary energy contributions over time

By mid-century, the majority of primary energy comes from non-fossil-fuels (i.e., renewables and nuclear

energy) in most 1.5°C pathways (Table 2.6). Figure 2.15 shows the evolution of primary energy supply over this century across 1.5°C pathways, and in detail for the four illustrative pathway archetypes highlighted in this chapter. Note that this section reports primary energy using the direct equivalent method on a lower heating values basis (Bruckner et al., 2014).

Renewable energy (including biomass, hydro, solar, wind, and geothermal) increases across all 1.5°C pathways with the renewable energy share of primary energy reaching 28–88% in 2050 (Table 2.6) with an interquartile range of 49–67%. The magnitude and split between bioenergy, wind, solar, and hydro differ between pathways, as can be seen in the illustrative pathway archetypes in Figure 2.15. Bioenergy is a major supplier of primary energy, contributing to both electricity and other forms of final energy such as liquid fuels for transportation (Bauer et al., 2018). In 1.5°C pathways, there is a significant growth in bioenergy used in combination with CCS for pathways where it is included (Figure 2.15).

Nuclear power increases its share in most 1.5°C pathways by 2050, but in some pathways both the absolute capacity and share of power from nuclear generators declines (Table 2.15). There are large differences in nuclear power between models and across pathways (Kim et al., 2014; Rogelj et al., 2018). One of the reasons for this variation is that the future deployment of nuclear can be constrained by societal preferences assumed in narratives underlying the pathways (O'Neill et al., 2017; van Vuuren et al., 2017b). Some 1.5°C pathways no longer see a role for nuclear fission by the end of the century, while others project over 200 EJ yr⁻¹ of nuclear power in 2100 (Figure 2.15).

The share of primary energy provided by total fossil fuels decreases from 2020 to 2050 in all 1.5°C pathways, however, trends for oil, gas and coal differ (Table 2.6). By 2050, the share of primary energy from coal decreases to 0–13% across 1.5°C pathways with an interquartile range of 1–7%. From 2020 to 2050 the primary energy supplied by oil changes by –93 to +6% (interquartile range –75 to –32%); natural gas changes by –88 to +99% (interquartile range –60 to –13%), with varying levels of CCS. Pathways with higher use of coal and gas tend to deploy CCS to control their carbon emissions (see Section 2.4.2.3). As the energy transition is accelerated by several decades in 1.5°C pathways compared to 2°C pathways, residual fossil-fuel use (i.e., fossil fuels not used for electricity generation) without CCS is generally lower in 2050 than in 2°C pathways, while combined hydro, solar, and wind power deployment is generally higher than in 2°C pathways (Figure 2.15).

In addition to the 1.5°C pathways included in the scenario database (Annex 2.A.3), there are other analyses in the literature including, for example, sector-based analyses of energy demand and supply options. Even though not necessarily developed in the context of the 1.5°C target, they explore in greater detail some options for deep reductions in GHG emissions. For example, there are analyses of transition to up to 100% renewable energy by 2050 (Creutzig et al., 2017; Jacobson et al., 2017), which describe what is entailed for a renewable energy share largely from solar and wind (and electrification) that is above the range of 1.5°C pathways available in the database, although there have been challenges to the assumptions used in high renewable analyses (e.g., Clack et al., 2017). There are also analyses that result in a large role for nuclear energy in mitigation of GHGs (Hong et al., 2015; Berger et al., 2017a, 2017b; Xiao and Jiang, 2017). BECCS could also contribute a larger share, but faces challenges related to its land use and impact on food supply (Burns and Nicholson, 2017) (assessed in greater detail in Sections 2.3.4.2, 4.3.7 and 5.4). These analyses could, provided their assumptions prove plausible, expand the range of 1.5°C pathways.

In summary, the share of primary energy from renewables increases while that from coal decreases across 1.5°C pathways (*high confidence*). This statement is true for all 1.5°C pathways in the scenario database and associated literature (Annex 2.A.3), and is consistent with the additional studies mentioned above, an increase in energy supply from lower-carbon-intensity energy supply, and a decrease in energy supply from higher-carbon-intensity energy supply.




Figure 2.15: Primary energy supply for the four illustrative pathway archetypes plus the IEA’s Faster Transition Scenario (OECD/IEA and IRENA, 2017) (top panel), and their relative location in the ranges for 1.5°C and 2°C pathway classes (lower panel). The category ‘Other renewables’ includes primary energy sources not covered by the other categories, for example, hydro and geothermal energy. The number of pathways that have higher primary energy than the scale in the bottom panel are indicated by the numbers above the whiskers. Black horizontal dashed lines indicates the level of primary energy supply in 2015 (IEA, 2017e). Boxplots in the lower panel show the minimum-maximum range (whiskers), interquartile range (box), and median (vertical thin black line). Symbols in the lower panel show the four pathway archetypes S1 (white square), S2 (yellow square), S5 (black square), LED (white disc), as well as the IEA’s Faster Transition Scenario (red disc).

Table 2.6: Global primary energy supply of 1.5°C pathways from the scenario database (Annex 2.A.3). Values given for the median (maximum, minimum) across the full range of 85 available 1.5°C pathways. Growth Factor = [(primary energy supply in 2050)/(primary energy supply in 2020) – 1].

	Primary energy supply [EJ]			Share of primary energy [%]		Growth Factor 2020-2050
	2020	2030	2050	2020	2050	
total primary	582.12 (636.98, 483.22)	502.81 (749.05, 237.37)	580.78 (1012.50, 289.02)			0.03 (0.59, -0.51)
renewables	87.70 (101.60, 60.16)	139.48 (203.90, 87.75)	293.80 (584.78, 176.77)	15.03 (20.39, 10.60)	60.80 (87.89, 28.47)	2.62 (6.71, 0.91)
biomass	61.35 (73.03, 40.54)	75.28 (113.02, 44.42)	154.13 (311.72, 40.36)	10.27 (14.23, 7.14)	26.38 (54.10, 10.29)	1.71 (5.56, -0.42)
non-biomass	26.35 (36.58, 17.60)	61.60 (114.41, 25.79)	157.37 (409.94, 53.79)	4.40 (7.19, 2.84)	28.60 (61.61, 9.87)	4.63 (13.46, 1.38)
nuclear	10.93 (18.55, 8.52)	16.22 (41.73, 6.80)	24.48 (115.80, 3.09)	1.97 (3.37, 1.45)	4.22 (13.60, 0.43)	1.34 (7.22, -0.64)
fossil	493.44 (638.04, 376.30)	347.62 (605.68, 70.14)	199.63 (608.39, 43.87)	83.56 (114.75, 77.73)	33.58 (74.63, 7.70)	-0.58 (0.12, -0.91)
coal	147.09 (193.55, 83.23)	49.46 (176.99, 5.97)	23.84 (134.69, 0.36)	25.72 (30.82, 17.19)	4.99 (13.30, 0.05)	-0.85 (-0.30, -1.00)
gas	135.58 (169.50, 105.01)	127.99 (208.55, 17.30)	88.97 (265.66, 14.92)	23.28 (28.39, 18.09)	13.46 (34.83, 2.80)	-0.37 (0.99, -0.88)
oil	195.02 (245.15, 151.02)	175.69 (319.80, 38.94)	93.48 (208.04, 15.07)	33.79 (42.24, 28.07)	16.22 (27.30, 2.89)	-0.54 (0.06, -0.93)

Table 2.7: Global electricity generation of 1.5°C pathways from the scenarios database (Annex 2.A.3). Values given for the median (maximum, minimum) values across the full range across 89 available 1.5°C pathways. Growth Factor = [(primary energy supply in 2050)/(primary energy supply in 2020) – 1].

	Electricity generation [EJ]			Share of electricity generation [%]		Growth Factor 2020-2050
	2020	2030	2050	2020	2050	
total electricity	100.09 (113.98, 83.53)	120.01 (177.51, 81.28)	224.78 (363.10, 126.96)			1.31 (2.55, 0.28)
renewables	26.38 (41.80, 18.26)	59.50 (111.70, 30.06)	153.72 (324.26, 84.69)	27.95 (41.84, 17.38)	77.52 (96.65, 35.58)	5.08 (10.88, 2.37)
biomass	1.52 (7.00, 0.66)	3.55 (11.96, 0.79)	16.32 (40.32, 0.21)	1.55 (7.30, 0.63)	8.02 (30.28, 0.08)	6.53 (38.14, -0.93)
non-biomass	24.48 (35.72, 17.60)	55.68 (101.90, 25.79)	136.40 (323.91, 53.79)	25.00 (40.43, 16.75)	66.75 (96.46, 27.51)	4.75 (10.64, 1.38)
nuclear	10.84 (18.55, 8.52)	15.49 (41.73, 6.80)	22.64 (115.80, 3.09)	10.91 (18.34, 8.62)	8.87 (39.61, 1.02)	1.21 (7.22, -0.64)
fossil	61.35 (76.76, 39.48)	38.41 (87.54, 2.25)	14.10 (118.12, 0.00)	61.55 (71.03, 47.26)	8.05 (33.19, 0.00)	-0.76 (0.54, -1.00)
coal	32.37 (46.20, 14.40)	10.41 (43.12, 0.00)	1.29 (46.72, 0.00)	32.39 (40.88, 17.23)	0.59 (12.87, 0.00)	-0.96 (0.01, -1.00)
gas	24.70 (41.20, 13.44)	25.00 (51.99, 2.01)	11.92 (67.94, 0.00)	24.71 (39.20, 11.80)	6.78 (32.59, 0.00)	-0.52 (1.63, -1.00)
oil	1.82 (13.36, 1.12)	0.92 (7.56, 0.24)	0.08 (8.78, 0.00)	2.04 (11.73, 1.01)	0.04 (3.80, 0.00)	-0.97 (0.98, -1.00)

2.4.2.2 Evolution of electricity supply over time

Electricity supplies an increasing share of final energy, reaching 34 to 71% in 2050, across 1.5°C pathways (Figure 2.14), extending the historical increases in electricity share seen over the past decades (Bruckner et al., 2014). From 2020 to 2050, the quantity of electricity supplied in most 1.5°C pathways more than doubles (Table 2.7). By 2050, the carbon intensity of electricity has fallen rapidly to -92 to +11 gCO₂/MJ electricity across 1.5°C pathways from a value of around 140 gCO₂/MJ (range: 88–181 gCO₂/MJ) in 2020 (Figure 2.14). A negative contribution to carbon intensity is provided by BECCS in most pathways (Figure 2.16).

By 2050, the share of electricity supplied by renewables increases from 23% in 2015 (IEA, 2017b) to 36–97% across 1.5°C pathways. Wind, solar, and biomass together make a major contribution in 2050, although the share for each spans a wide range across 1.5°C pathways (Figure 2.16). Fossil fuels on the other hand have a decreasing role in electricity supply with their share falling to 0–33% by 2050 (Table 2.7).

In summary, 1.5°C pathways include a rapid decline in the carbon intensity of electricity and an increase in electrification of energy end use (*high confidence*). This is the case across all 1.5°C pathways and their associated literature (Annex 2.A.3), with pathway trends that extend those seen in past decades, and results that are consistent with additional analyses (see Section 2.4.2.2).




Figure 2.16: Electricity generation for the four illustrative pathway archetypes plus the IEA’s Faster Transition Scenario (OECD/IEA and IRENA, 2017) (top panel), and their relative location in the ranges for 1.5°C and 2°C scenario classes (lower panel). The category ‘Other renewables’ includes electricity generation not covered by the other categories, for example, hydro and geothermal. The number of pathways that have higher primary energy than the scale in the bottom panel are indicated by the numbers above the whiskers. Black horizontal dashed lines indicate the level of primary energy supply in 2015 (IEA, 2017e). Boxplots in the lower panel show the minimum-maximum range (whiskers), interquartile range (box), and median (vertical thin black line). Symbols in the lower panel show the four pathway archetypes S1 (white square), S2 (yellow square), S5 (black square), LED (white disc), as well as the IEA’s Faster Transition Scenario (red disc).

2.4.2.3 Deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage

Studies have shown the importance of CCS for deep mitigation pathways (Krey et al., 2014a; Kriegler et al., 2014b), based on its multiple roles to limit fossil-fuel emissions in electricity generation, liquids production, and industry applications along with the projected ability to remove CO₂ from the atmosphere when combined with bioenergy. This remains a valid finding for those 1.5°C and 2°C pathways that do not radically reduce energy demand nor offer carbon-neutral alternatives to liquids and gases that do not rely on bioenergy.

There is a wide range of CCS that is deployed across 1.5°C pathways (Figure 2.17). A few 1.5°C pathways with very low energy demand do not include CCS at all (Grubler et al., 2018). For example, the LED pathway has no CCS, whereas other pathways like the S5 pathway rely on a large amount of BECCS to get to net-zero carbon emissions. The cumulative fossil and biomass CO₂ stored through 2050 ranges from zero to 460 GtCO₂ across 1.5°C pathways, with zero up to 190 GtCO₂ from biomass captured and stored. Some pathways have very low fossil-fuel use overall, and consequently little CCS applied to fossil fuels. In 1.5°C pathways where the 2050 coal use remains above 20 EJ yr⁻¹ in 2050, 33–100% is combined with CCS. While deployment of CCS for natural gas and coal vary widely across pathways, there is greater natural gas primary energy connected to CCS than coal primary energy connected to CCS in many pathways (Figure 2.17).

CCS combined with fossil-fuel use remains limited in some 1.5°C pathways (Rogelj et al., 2018) as the limited 1.5°C carbon budget penalizes CCS if it is assumed to have incomplete capture rates or if fossil fuels are assumed to continue to have significant lifecycle GHG emissions (Pehl et al., 2017). However, high capture rates are technically achievable now at higher cost, although effort to date have focussed on cost reduction of capture (IEAGHG, 2006; DOE/NETL, 2013).

The quantity of CO₂ stored via CCS over this century in 1.5°C pathways ranges from zero to 1,900 GtCO₂, (Figure 2.17). The IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (IPCC, 2005) found that that, worldwide, it is *likely* that there is a technical potential of at least about 2,000 GtCO₂ of storage capacity in geological formations. Furthermore the IPCC (2005) recognised that there could be a much larger potential for geological storage in saline formations, but the upper limit estimates are uncertain due to lack of information and an agreed methodology. Since IPCC (2005), understanding has improved and there have been detailed regional surveys of storage capacity (Vangkilde-Pedersen et al., 2009; Ogawa et al., 2011; Wei et al., 2013; Bentham et al., 2014; Riis and Halland, 2014; Warwick et al., 2014; NETL, 2015) and improvement and standardisation of methodologies (e.g., Bachu et al. 2007a, b). Dooley (2013) synthesised published literature on both the global geological storage resource as well as the potential demand for geologic storage in mitigation pathways, and found that the cumulative demand for CO₂ storage was small compared to a practical storage capacity estimate (as defined by Bachu et al., 2007a) of 3,900 GtCO₂ worldwide. Differences, however, remain in estimates of storage capacity due to, e.g. the potential storage limitations of subsurface pressure build-up (Szulczewski et al., 2014) and assumptions on practices that could manage such issues (Bachu, 2015). Kearns et al. (2017) constructed estimates of global storage capacity of 8,000 to 55,000 GtCO₂ (accounting for differences in detailed regional and local estimates), which is sufficient at a global level for this century, but found that at a regional level, robust demand for CO₂ storage exceeds their lower estimate of regional storage available for some regions. However, storage capacity is not solely determined by the geological setting, and Bachu (2015) describes storage engineering practices that could further extend storage capacity estimates. In summary, the storage capacity of all of these global estimates is larger than the cumulative CO₂ stored via CCS of 1.5°C pathways over this century.

There is uncertainty in the future deployment of CCS given the limited pace of current deployment, the evolution of CCS technology that would be associated with deployment, and the current lack of incentives for large-scale implementation of CCS (Bruckner et al., 2014; Clarke et al., 2014; Riahi et al., 2017). Given the importance of CCS in most mitigation pathways and its current slow pace of improvement, the large-scale deployment of CCS as an option depends on the further development of the technology in the near term. Chapter 4 discusses how progress on CCS might be accelerated.




Figure 2.17: CCS deployment in 1.5°C and 2°C pathways for biomass, coal and natural gas (EJ of primary energy) and the cumulative quantity of fossil (including from, e.g., cement production) and biomass CO₂ stored via CCS (lower right in GtCO₂ stored). Boxplots show median, interquartile range and full range of pathways in each temperature class. Pathway temperature classes (Table 2.1), illustrative pathway archetypes, and the IEA’s Faster Transition Scenario (IEA WEM) (OECD/IEA and IRENA, 2017) are indicated in the legend.

2.4.3 Energy end-use sectors

Since the power sector is almost decarbonized by mid-century in both 1.5°C and 2°C pathways, major differences come from CO₂ emission reductions in end-use sectors. Energy-demand reductions are key and common features in 1.5°C-consistent pathways, which can be achieved by efficiency improvements and various specific demand-reduction measures. Another important feature is end-use decarbonisation including by electrification, although the potential and challenges in each end-use sector vary significantly.

In the following sections, the potential and challenges of CO₂ emission reductions towards 1.5°C and 2°C-consistent pathways are discussed for each end-use energy sector (industry, buildings, and transport sectors). For this purpose, two types of pathways are analysed and compared: IAM (integrated assessment modelling) studies and sectoral (detailed) studies. IAM data are extracted from the database that was compiled for this assessment (see Annex 2.A.3), and the sectoral data are taken from a recent series of publications; ‘Energy Technology Perspectives’ (ETP) (IEA, 2014, 2015b, 2016a, 2017a), the IEA/IRENA report (OECD/IEA and IRENA, 2017), and the Shell Sky report (Shell International B.V., 2018). The IAM pathways are categorized according to their temperature rise in 2100 and the overshoot of temperature during the century (see Table 2.1 in Section 2.1). Since the number of Below-1.5°C pathways is small, the following analyses focus only on the featured of the 1.5°C-low-OS and 1.5°C-high-OS pathways (hereafter denoted together as 1.5°C overshoot pathways or IAM-1.5DS-OS) and 2°C-consistent pathways (IAM-2DS). In order to show the diversity of IAM pathways, we again show specific data from the four illustrative pathways archetypes used throughout this chapter (see Sections 2.1 and 2.3).

IEA ETP-B2DS (‘Beyond 2 Degrees’) and ETP-2DS are pathways with a 50% chance of limiting temperature rise below 1.75°C and 2°C by 2100, respectively (IEA, 2017a). The IEA-66%2DS pathway

keeps global-mean temperature rise below 2°C not just in 2100 but also over the course of the 21st century with a 66% chance of being below 2°C by 2100 (OECD/IEA and IRENA, 2017). The comparison of CO₂ emission trajectories between ETP-B2DS and IAM-1.5DS-OS show that these are consistent up to 2060 (Figure 2.18). IEA scenarios assume that only a very low level of BECCS is deployed to help offset emissions in difficult-to-decarbonize sectors, and that global energy-related CO₂ emissions cannot turn net-negative at any time and stay zero from 2060 to 2100 (IEA, 2017a). Therefore, although its temperature rise in 2100 is below 1.75°C rather than below 1.5°C, this scenario can give information related to 1.5°C-consistent overshoot pathway up to 2050. The trajectory of IEA-66%2DS (also referred to in other publications as IEA’s ‘Faster Transition Scenario’) lies between IAM-1.5DS-OS and IAM-2DS pathway ranges, and IEA-2DS stays in the range of 2°C-consistent IAM pathways. The Shell-Sky scenario aims to hold the temperature rise to well-below 2°C, but it is a delayed action pathway relative to others, as can be seen in Figure 2.18.

Energy-demand reduction measures are key to reduce CO₂ emissions from end-use sectors for low-carbon pathways. The up-stream energy reductions can be several times to an order of magnitude larger than the initial end-use demand reduction. There are interdependencies among the end-use sectors and also between energy-supply and end-use sectors, which raise the importance of a wide, systematic approach. As shown in Figure 2.19, global final-energy consumption grows by 30% and 10% from 2010 to 2050 for 2°C-consistent and 1.5°C overshoot pathways from IAMs, respectively, while much higher growth of 75% is projected for reference scenarios. The ranges within a specific pathway class are due to a variety of factors as introduced in Section 2.3.1, as well as differences between modelling frameworks. The important energy efficiency improvements and energy conservation that facilitate many of the 1.5°C pathways raise the issue of potential rebound effects (Saunders, 2015), which, while promoting development, can make the achievement of low-energy demand futures more difficult than modelling studies anticipate (see Sections 2.5 and 2.6).




Figure 2.18: Comparison of CO₂ emission trajectories of sectoral pathways (IEA ETP-B2DS, ETP-2DS, IEA-66%2DS, Shell-Sky) with the ranges of IAM pathway (2DS are 2°C-consistent pathways and 1.5DS-OS are 1.5°C-consistent overshoot pathways). The CO₂ emissions shown here are the energy-related emissions including industrial process emissions.




Figure 2.19: (a) Global final energy, (b) direct CO₂ emissions from the all energy demand sectors, (c) carbon intensity, and (d) structure of final energy (electricity, liquid fuel, coal, and biomass). The squares and circles indicate the IAM archetype pathways and diamonds the data of sectoral scenarios. The red dotted line indicates the 2010 level. H2DS: Higher-2°C, L2DS: Lower-2°C, 1.5DS-H: 1.5°C-high-OS, 1.5DS-L: 1.5°C-low-OS, 1.5DS = 1.5DS-OS: 1.5°C-consistent pathways with overshoot. Section 2.1 for descriptions.

Final-energy demand is driven by demand in energy services for mobility, residential and commercial activities (buildings), and manufacturing. This heavily depends on assumptions about socio-economic futures as represented by the SSPs (Bauer et al., 2017) (see Sections 2.1, 2.3 and 2.5). The structure of this demand drives the composition of final energy use in terms of energy carriers (electricity, liquids, gases, solids, hydrogen etc.).

Figure 2.19 shows the structure of global final energy demand in 2030 and 2050, indicating the trend toward electrification and fossil fuel usage reduction. This trend is more significant in 1.5°C pathways than 2°C pathways. Electrification continues throughout the second half of the century leading to a 3.5 to 6-fold increase in electricity demand (interquartile range; median 4.5) by the end of the century relative to today (Grubler et al., 2018; Luderer et al., 2018). Since the electricity sector is completely decarbonised by mid-century in 1.5°C pathways (see Figure 2.20), electrification is the primary means to decarbonize energy end-use sectors.

The CO₂ emissions⁶ of end-use sectors and carbon intensity are shown in Figure 2.20. The projections of IAMs and IEA studies show rather different trends, especially in the carbon intensity. These differences come from various factors, including the deployment of CCS, the level of fuel switching and efficiency

⁶ FOOTNOTE: This section reports “direct” CO₂ emissions as reported for pathways in the database for the report. As shown below, the emissions from electricity are nearly zero around 2050, so the impact of indirect emissions on the whole emission contributions of each sector is very small in 2050.

improvements, and the effect of structural and behavioural changes. IAM projections are generally optimistic for the industry sectors, but not for buildings and transport sectors. Although GDP increases by a factor of 3.4 from 2010 to 2050, the total energy consumption of end-use sectors grows by only about 30% and 20% in 1.5°C overshoot and 2°C-consistent pathways, respectively. However, CO₂ emissions would need to be reduced further to achieve the stringent temperature limits. Fig. 2.20 shows that the reduction in CO₂ emissions of end-use sectors is larger and more rapid in 1.5°C overshoot than 2°C-consistent pathways, while emissions from the power sector are already almost zero in 2050 in both sets of pathways indicating that supply-side emissions reductions are almost fully exploited already in 2°C-consistent pathways (see Figure 2.20) (Rogelj et al., 2015b, 2018; Luderer et al., 2016b). The emission reductions in end-use sectors is largely made possible due to efficiency improvements, demand reduction measures and electrification, but its level differs among end-use sectors. While the carbon intensity of industry and the buildings sector decreases to a very low level of around 10 gCO₂ MJ⁻¹, the carbon intensity of transport becomes the highest of any sector by 2040 due to its higher reliance on oil-based fuels. In the following subsections, the potential and challenges of CO₂ emission reduction in each end-use sector are discussed in detail.




Figure 2.20: Comparison of (a) direct CO₂ emissions and (b) carbon intensity of the power and energy end-use sectors (industry, buildings, and transport sectors) between IAMs and sectoral studies (IEA-ETP and IEA/IRENA). Diamond markers in panel (b) show data for IEA-ETP scenarios (2DS and B2DS), and IEA/IRENA scenario (66%2DS). Note: for the data of IAM studies, there is rather large variation of projections for each indicator. Please see the details in the following figures in each end-use sector section.

2.4.3.1 Industry

The industry sector is the largest end-use sector both in terms of final-energy demand and GHG emissions. Its direct CO₂ emissions currently account for about 25% of total energy-related and process CO₂ emissions, and have increased with an average annual rate of 3.4% between 2000 and 2014, significantly faster than total CO₂ emissions (Hoesly et al., 2018). In addition to emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels, non-energy uses of fossil fuels in the petro-chemical industry and metal smelting, as well as non-fossil fuel process emissions (e.g., from cement production) contribute a small amount (~5%) to the sector's CO₂ emissions inventory. Material industries are particularly energy and emissions intensive: steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, non-metallic minerals, and pulp and paper alone accounted for close to 66% of final-

energy demand, and 72% of direct industry sector emissions in 2014 (IEA, 2017a). In terms of end-uses, the bulk of energy in manufacturing industries is required for process heating and steam generation, while most electricity (but smaller shares of total final energy) is used for mechanical work (Banerjee et al., 2012; IEA, 2017a).

As shown in Figure 2.21, a major share of the additional emission reductions required for 1.5°C-overshoot pathways beyond those in 2°C-consistent pathways comes from industry. Final energy, CO₂ emissions, and carbon intensity are consistent in IAM and sectoral studies, but in IAM-1.5°C-overshoot pathways the share of electricity is higher than IEA-B2DS (40% vs. 25%) and hydrogen is also considered to have a share of about 5% vs. 0%. In 2050, final energy is increased by 30% and 5% compared with the 2010 level (red dotted line) for 1.5°C-overshoot and 2°C-consistent pathways, respectively, but CO₂ emissions are decreased by 80% and 50% and carbon intensity by 80% and 60%, respectively. This additional decarbonisation is brought by switching to low carbon fuels and CCS deployment.




Figure 2.21: Comparison of (a) final energy, (b) direct CO₂ emissions, (c) carbon intensity, (d) electricity and biomass consumption in the industry sector between IAM and sectoral studies. The squares and circles indicate the IAM archetype pathways and diamonds the data of sectoral scenarios. The red dotted line indicates the 2010 level. H2DS: Higher-2°C, L2DS: Lower-2°C, 1.5DS-H: 1.5°C-high-OS, 1.5DS-L: 1.5°C-low-OS, 1.5DS = 1.5DS-OS: 1.5°C-consistent pathways with overshoot. Section 2.1 for descriptions.

Broadly speaking, the industry sector’s mitigation measures can be categorized in terms of the following five strategies: (i) reductions in the demand, (ii) energy efficiency, (iii) increased electrification of energy demand, (iv) reducing the carbon content of non-electric fuels, and (v) deploying innovative processes and application of CCS. IEA ETP estimates the relative contribution of different measures for CO₂ emission reduction in their B2DS scenario compared with their reference scenario in 2050 as follows: energy

efficiency 42%, innovative process and CCS 37%, switching to low carbon fuels and feed-stocks 13% and material efficiency (include efficient production and use to contribute to demand reduction) 8%. The remainder of this section delves more deeply into the potential mitigation contributions of these strategies as well as their limitations.

Reduction in the use of industrial materials, while delivering similar services, or improving the quality of products could help to reduce energy demand and overall system-level CO₂ emissions. Strategies include using materials more intensively, extension of product lifetimes, increasing recycling, and increasing inter-industry material synergies, such as clinker substitution in cement production (Allwood et al., 2013; IEA, 2017a). Related to material efficiency, use of fossil-fuel feed-stocks could shift to lower-carbon feed-stocks such as oil to natural gas and biomass and end-uses could shift to more sustainable materials such as biomass-based materials, reducing the demand for energy-intensive materials (IEA, 2017a).

Reaping energy efficiency potentials hinges critically on advanced management practices in industrial facilities such as energy management systems, as well as targeted policies to accelerate adoption of best available technology (see Section 2.5). Although excess energy, usually as waste heat, is inevitable, recovering and reusing this waste heat under economically and technically viable conditions benefits the overall energy system. Furthermore, demand-side management strategies could modulate the level of industrial activity in line with the availability of resources in the power system. This could imply a shift away from peak demand and as power supply decarbonizes, this demand-shaping potential could shift some load to times with high portions of low-carbon electricity generation (IEA, 2017a).

In the industry sector, energy demand increases more than 40% between 2010 and 2050 in baseline scenarios. However, in the 1.5°C-overshoot and 2°C-consistent pathways from IAMs, the increase is only 30% and 5%, respectively (Figure 2.21). These energy demand reductions encompass both efficiency improvements in production as well as reductions in material demand, as most IAMs do not discern these two factors.

CO₂ emissions from industry increase by 30% in 2050 compared to 2010 in baseline scenarios. By contrast, these emissions are reduced by 80% and 50% relative to 2010 levels in 1.5°C-overshoot and 2°C-consistent pathways from IAMs, respectively (Figure 2.21). By mid-century, CO₂ emissions per unit electricity are projected to decrease to near zero in both sets of pathways (see Figure 2.20). An accelerated electrification of the industry sector thus becomes an increasingly powerful mitigation option. In the IAM pathways, the share of electricity increases up to 30% by 2050 in 1.5°C-overshoot pathways (Figure 2.21) from 20% in 2010. Some industrial fuel uses are substantially more difficult to electrify than others, and electrification would have other effects on the process, including impacts on plant design, cost and available process integration options (IEA, 2017a)⁷.

In 1.5°C-overshoot pathways, the carbon intensity of non-electric fuels consumed by industry decreases to 16 gCO₂ MJ⁻¹ by 2050, compared to 25 gCO₂ MJ⁻¹ in 2°C-consistent pathways. Considerable carbon intensity reductions are already achieved by 2030, largely via a rapid phase-out of coal. Biomass becomes an increasingly important energy carrier in the industry sector in deep-decarbonisation pathways, but primarily in the longer term (in 2050, biomass accounts for only 10% of final energy consumption even in 1.5°C-overshoot pathways). In addition, hydrogen plays a considerable role as a substitute for fossil-based non-electric energy demands in some pathways.

Without major deployment of new sustainability-oriented low-carbon industrial processes, the 1.5°C-overshoot target is difficult to achieve. Bringing such technologies and processes to commercial deployment requires significant investment in research and development. Some examples of innovative low-carbon process routes include: new steelmaking processes such as upgraded smelt reduction and upgraded direct reduced iron, inert anodes for aluminium smelting, and full oxy-fuelling kilns for clinker production in cement manufacturing (IEA, 2017a).

⁷ FOOTNOTE: Electrification can be linked with the heating and drying process by electric boilers and electro-thermal processes, and also low-temperature heat demand by heat pumps. In iron and steel industry, hydrogen produced by electrolysis can be used as a reduction agent of iron instead of coke. Excess resources, such as black liquor will provide the opportunity to increase the systematic efficiency to use for electricity generation.

CCS plays a major role in decarbonizing the industry sector in the context of 1.5°C and 2°C pathways, especially in industries with higher process emissions, such as cement, iron and steel industries. In 1.5°C-overshoot pathways, CCS in industry reaches 3 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ by 2050, albeit with strong variations across pathways. Given project long-lead times and the need for technological innovation, early scale-up of industry CCS is essential to achieve the stringent temperature target. Development and demonstration of such projects has been slow, however. Currently, only two large-scale industrial CCS projects outside of oil and gas processing are in operation (Global CCS Institute, 2016). The estimated current cost⁸ of CO₂ avoided (in 2015-US\$) ranges from \$20-27 tCO₂⁻¹ for gas processing and bio-ethanol production, and \$60-138 tCO₂⁻¹ for fossil fuel-fired power generation up to \$104-188 tCO₂⁻¹ for cement production (Irlam, 2017).

2.4.3.2 Buildings

In 2014, the buildings sector accounted for 31% of total global final-energy use, 54% of final-electricity demand, and 8% of energy-related CO₂ emissions (excluding indirect emission due to electricity). When upstream electricity generation is taken into account, buildings were responsible for 23% of global energy-related CO₂ emissions, with one-third of those from direct fossil fuel consumption (IEA, 2017a).

Past growth of energy consumption has been mainly driven by population and economic growth, with improved access to electricity, and higher use of electrical appliances and space cooling resulting from increasing living standards, especially in developing countries (Lucon et al., 2014). These trends will continue in the future and in 2050, energy consumption is projected to increase by 20% (50%) compared to 2010 in IAM-1.5°C-overshoot (2°C-consistent) pathways (Figure 2.22). However, sectoral studies (IEA-ETP scenarios) show different trends. Energy consumption in 2050 decreases compared to 2010 in ETP-B2DS, and the reduction rate of CO₂ emissions is higher than in IAM pathways (Figure 2.22). Mitigation options are often more widely covered in sectoral studies (Lucon et al., 2014), leading to greater reductions in energy consumption and CO₂ emissions.

Emissions reductions are driven by a clear tempering of energy demand and a strong electrification of the buildings sector. The share of electricity in 2050 is 60% in 1.5°C-overshoot pathways, compared with 50% in 2°C-consistent pathways (Figure 2.22). Electrification contributes to the reduction of direct CO₂ emissions by replacing carbon-intensive fuels, like oil and coal. Furthermore, when combined with a rapid decarbonisation of the power system (see Section 2.4.1) it also enables further reduction of indirect CO₂ emissions from electricity. Sectoral bottom-up models in general estimate lower electrification potentials for the buildings sector in comparison to global IAMs (see Figure 2.22). Besides CO₂ emissions, increasing global demand for air conditioning in buildings may also lead to increased emissions of HFCs in this sector over the next few decades. Although these gases are currently a relatively small proportion of annual GHG emissions, their use in the air conditioning sector is expected to grow rapidly over the next few decades if alternatives are not adopted. However, their projected future impact can be significantly mitigated through better servicing and maintenance of equipment and switching of cooling gases (Shah et al., 2015; Purohit and Höglund-Isaksson, 2017).

IEA-ETP (IEA, 2017a) analysed the relative importance of various technology measures toward the reduction of energy and CO₂ emissions in the buildings sector. The largest energy savings potential is in heating and cooling demand largely due to building envelope improvements and high efficiency and renewable equipment. In the ETP-B2DS, energy demand for space heating and cooling is 33% lower in 2050 than the reference scenario and these reductions account for 54% of total reductions from the reference scenario. Energy savings from shifts to high-performance lighting, appliances, and water heating equipment account for a further 24% of the total reduction. The long-term, strategic shift away from fossil-fuel use in buildings, alongside the rapid uptake of energy efficient, integrated and renewable energy technologies (with clean power generation), leads to a drastic reduction of CO₂ emissions. In ETP-B2DS, the direct CO₂ emissions are 79% lower than the reference scenario in 2050 and the remaining emissions come mainly from the continued use of natural gas.

⁸ FOOTNOTE: These are first-of-a-kind (FOAK) cost data.

The buildings sector is characterized by very long-living infrastructure and immediate steps are hence important to avoid lock-in of inefficient carbon and energy-intensive buildings. This applies both to new buildings in developing countries where substantial new construction is expected in the near future and to retrofits of existing building stock in developed regions. This represents both a significant risk and opportunity for mitigation⁹. A recent study highlights the benefits of deploying the most advanced renovation technologies, which would avoid lock-in into less efficient measures (Güneralp et al., 2017). Aside from the effect of building envelope measures, adoption of energy-efficient technologies such as heat pumps and more recently light-emitting diodes is also important for the reduction of energy and CO₂ emissions (IEA, 2017a). Consumer choices, behaviour and building operation can also significantly affect energy consumption (see Section 4.3).




Figure 2.22: Comparison of (a) final energy, (b) direct CO₂ emissions, (c) carbon intensity, (d) electricity and biomass consumption in the buildings sector between IAM and sectoral studies. The squares and circles indicate the IAM archetype pathways and diamonds the data of sectoral scenarios. The red dotted line indicates the 2010 level. H2DS: Higher-2°C, L2DS: Lower-2°C, 1.5DS-H: 1.5°C-high-OS, 1.5DS-L: 1.5°C-low-OS, 1.5DS = 1.5DS-OS: 1.5°C-consistent pathways with overshoot. Section 2.1 for descriptions.

⁹ FOOTNOTE: In this section, we only discuss the direct emissions from the sector, but the selection of building materials have a significant impact on the reduction of energy and emissions during the production, such as shift from the steel and concrete to wood-based materials.

2.4.3.3 Transport

Transport accounted for 28% of global final-energy demand and 23% of global energy-related CO₂ emissions in 2014. Emissions increased by 2.5% annually between 2010 and 2015, and over the past half century the sector has witnessed faster emissions growth than any other. The transport sector is the least diversified energy end-use sector; the sector consumed 65% of global oil final-energy demand, with 92% of transport final-energy demand consisting of oil products (IEA, 2017a), suggesting major challenges for deep decarbonisation.

Final energy, CO₂ emissions, and carbon intensity for the transport sector are shown in Figure 2.23. The projections of IAMs are more pessimistic than IEA-ETP scenarios, though both clearly project deep cuts in energy consumption and CO₂ emissions by 2050. For example, 1.5°C-overshoot pathways from IAMs project a reduction of 15% in energy consumption between 2015 and 2050, while ETP-B2DS projects a reduction of 30% (Figure 2.23). Furthermore, IAM pathways are generally more pessimistic in the projections of CO₂ emissions and carbon intensity reductions. In AR5 (Clarke et al., 2014; Sims et al., 2014), similar comparisons between IAMs and sectoral studies were performed and these were in good agreement with each other. Since the AR5, two important changes can be identified; rapid growth of electric vehicle sales in passenger cars, and more attention towards structural changes in this sector. The former contributes to reduction of CO₂ emissions and the latter reduction of energy consumption.

Deep emissions reductions in the transport sector would be achieved by several means. Technology focused measures such as energy efficiency and fuel-switching are two of these. Structural changes that avoid or shift transport activity are also important. While the former solutions (technologies) always tend to figure into deep decarbonisation pathways in a major way, this is not always the case with the latter, especially in IAM pathways. Comparing different types of global transport models, Yeh et al. (2016) find that sectoral (intensive) studies generally envision greater mitigation potential from structural changes in transport activity and modal choice. Though, even there, it is primarily the switching of passengers and freight from less- to more-efficient travel modes (e.g., cars, trucks and airplanes to buses and trains) that is the main strategy; other actions, such as increasing vehicle load factors (occupancy rates) and outright reductions in travel demand (e.g., as a result of integrated transport, land-use and urban planning), figure much less prominently. Whether these dynamics accurately reflect the actual mitigation potential of structural changes in transport activity and modal choice is a point of investigation. According to the recent IEA-ETP scenarios, the share of avoid (reduction of mobility demand) and shift (shifting to more efficient modes) measures in the reduction of CO₂ emissions from the reference to B2DS scenarios in 2050 amounts to 20% (IEA, 2017a).

The potential and strategies to reduce energy consumption and CO₂ emissions differ significantly among transport modes. In ETP-B2DS, the shares of energy consumption and CO₂ emissions in 2050 for each mode are rather different (see Table 2.8), indicating the challenge of decarbonizing heavy-duty vehicles (HDV, trucks), aviation, and shipping. The reduction of CO₂ emissions in the whole sector from the reference scenario to ETP-B2DS is 60% in 2050, with varying contributions per mode (Table 2.8). Since there is no silver bullet for this deep decarbonisation, every possible measure would be required to achieve this stringent emissions outcome. The contribution of various measures for the CO₂ emission reduction from the reference scenario to the IEA-B2DS in 2050 can be decomposed to efficiency improvement (29%), biofuels (36%), electrification (15%), and avoid/shift (20%) (IEA, 2017a). It is noted that the share of electrification becomes larger compared with older studies, reflected by the recent growth of electric vehicle sales worldwide. Another new trend is the allocation of biofuels to each mode of transport. In IEA-B2DS, the total amount of biofuels consumed in the transport sector is 24EJ¹⁰ in 2060, and allocated to LDV (light-duty vehicles, 17%), HDV (35%), aviation (28%), and shipping (21%), that is, more biofuels is allocated to the difficult-to-decarbonize modes (see Table 2.8).

¹⁰ FOOTNOTE: This is estimated for the biofuels produced in a "sustainable manner" from non-food crop feed-stocks, which are capable of delivering significant lifecycle GHG emissions savings compared with fossil fuel alternatives, and which do not directly compete with food and feed crops for agricultural land or cause adverse sustainability impacts.

Table 2.8: Transport sector indicators by mode in 2050 (IEA, 2017a). Share of Energy consumption, biofuel consumption, CO₂ emissions, and reduction of energy consumption and CO₂ emissions from 2014. (CO₂ emissions are Well-to-Wheel emissions, including the emission during the fuel production.), LDV: Light Duty Vehicle, HDV: Heavy Duty Vehicle

	Share of each mode (%)			Reduction from 2014 (%)	
	Energy	Biofuel	CO ₂	Energy	CO ₂
LDV	36	17	30	51	81
HDV	33	35	36	8	56
Rail	6		-1	-136	107
Aviation	12	28	14	14	56
Shipping	17	21	21	26	29

In road transport, incremental vehicle improvements (including engines) are relevant, especially in the short to medium term. Hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) are also instrumental to enabling the transition from ICEs (internal combustion engine vehicles) to electric vehicles, especially plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs). Electrification is a powerful measure to decarbonize short-distance vehicles (passenger cars and two and three wheelers) and the rail sector. In road freight transport (trucks), systemic improvements (e.g., in supply chains, logistics, and routing) would be effective measures with efficiency improvement of vehicles. Shipping and aviation are more challenging to decarbonize, while their demand growth is projected to be higher than other transport modes. Both modes would need to pursue highly ambitious efficiency improvements and use of low-carbon fuels. In the near and medium term, this would be advanced biofuels while in the long term it could be hydrogen as direct use for shipping or an intermediate product for synthetic fuels for both modes (IEA, 2017a).

The share of low-carbon fuels in the total transport fuel mix increases to 10% (16%) by 2030 and to 40% (58%) by 2050 in 1.5°C-overshoot pathways from IAMs. The IEA-B2DS scenario is on the more ambitious side, especially in the share of electricity. Hence, there is wide variation among scenarios, including the IAM pathways, regarding changes in the transport fuel mix over the first half of the century. As seen in Figure 2.23, the projections of energy consumption, CO₂ emissions, and carbon intensity are quite different between IAM and ETP scenarios. These differences can be explained by more weight on efficiency improvements and avoid/shift decreasing energy consumption, and the higher share of biofuels and electricity accelerating the speed of decarbonisation in ETP scenarios. Although biofuel consumption and electric vehicle sales have increased significantly in recent years, the growth rates projected in these pathways would be unprecedented and far higher than has been experienced to date.




Figure 2.23: Comparison of (a) final energy, (b) direct CO₂ emissions, (c) carbon intensity, (d) electricity and biofuel consumption in the transport sector between IAM and sectoral studies. The squares and circles indicate the IAM archetype pathways and diamonds the data of sectoral scenarios. The red dotted line indicates the 2010 level. H2DS: Higher-2°C, L2DS: Lower-2°C, 1.5DS-H: 1.5°C-high-OS, 1.5DS-L: 1.5°C-low-OS, 1.5DS = 1.5DS-OS: 1.5°C-consistent pathways with overshoot. Section 2.1 for descriptions.

1.5°C pathways require an acceleration of the mitigation solutions already featured in 2°C-consistent pathways (e.g., more efficient vehicle technologies operating on lower-carbon fuels), as well as those having received lesser attention in most global transport decarbonisation pathways up to now (e.g., mode-shifting and travel demand management). Current-generation, global pathways generally do not include these newer transport sector developments, whereby technological solutions are related to shifts in traveller's behaviour.

2.4.4 Land-use transitions and changes in the agricultural sector

The agricultural and land system described together under the umbrella of the AFOLU (Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use) sector plays an important role in 1.5°C pathways (Clarke et al., 2014; Smith and Bustamante, 2014; Popp et al., 2017). On the one hand, its emissions need to be limited over the course of this century to be in line with pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C (see Sections 2.2-3). On the other hand, the AFOLU system is responsible for food and feed production, for wood production for pulp and construction, for the production of biomass that is used for energy, CDR or other uses, and for the supply of non-provisioning (ecosystem) services (Smith and Bustamante, 2014). Meeting all demands together requires changes in land use, as well as in agricultural and forestry practices, for which a multitude of

potential options have been identified (Smith and Bustamante, 2014; Popp et al., 2017) (see also Annex 2.A.2 and Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.7).

This section assesses the transformation of the AFOLU system, mainly making use of pathways from IAMs (see Section 2.1) that are based on quantifications of the SSPs and that report distinct land-use evolutions in line with limiting warming to 1.5°C (Calvin et al., 2017; Fricko et al., 2017; Fujimori, 2017; Kriegler et al., 2017; Popp et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017; van Vuuren et al., 2017b; Doelman et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018). The SSPs were designed to vary mitigation challenges (O'Neill et al., 2014) (Cross-Chapter Box 1.1), including for the AFOLU sector (Popp et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017). The SSP pathway ensemble hence allows for a structured exploration of AFOLU transitions in the context of climate change mitigation in line with 1.5°C, taking into account technological and socio-economic aspects. Other considerations, like food security, livelihoods and biodiversity, are also of importance when identifying AFOLU strategies. These are at present only tangentially explored by the SSPs. Further assessments of AFOLU mitigation options are provided in other parts of this report and in the IPCC AR6 Special Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL). Chapter 4 provides an assessment of bioenergy (including feedstocks, see Section 4.3.1), livestock management (Section 4.3.1), reducing rates of deforestation and other land-based mitigation options (as mitigation and adaptation option, see Section 4.3.2), and BECCS, Afforestation and Reforestation options (including the bottom-up literature of their sustainable potential, mitigation cost and side effects, Section 4.3.7). Chapter 3 discusses impacts land-based CDR (Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3). Chapter 5 assesses the sustainable development implications of AFOLU mitigation, including impacts on biodiversity (Section 5.4). Finally, the SRCCL will undertake a more comprehensive assessment of land and climate change aspects. For the sake of complementarity, this section focusses on the magnitude and pace of land transitions in 1.5°C pathways, as well as on the implications of different AFOLU mitigation strategies for different land types. The interactions with other societal objectives and potential limitations of identified AFOLU measures link to these large-scale evolutions, but these are assessed elsewhere (see above).

Land-use changes until mid-century occur in the large majority of SSP pathways, both under stringent and in absence of mitigation (Figure 2.24). In the latter case, changes are mainly due to socio-economic drivers like growing demands for food, feed and wood products. General transition trends can be identified for many land types in 1.5°C pathways, which differ from those in baseline scenarios and depend on the interplay with mitigation in other sectors (Figure 2.24) (Popp et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018). Mitigation that demands land mainly occurs at the expense of agricultural land for food and feed production. Additionally, some biomass is projected to be grown on marginal land or supplied from residues and waste, but at lower shares. Land for second generation energy crops (such as miscanthus or poplar) expands by 2030 and 2050 in all available pathways that assume a cost-effective achievement of a 1.5°C temperature goal in 2100 (Figure 2.24), but the scale depends strongly on underlying socioeconomic assumptions (see later discussion of land pathway archetypes). Reducing rates of deforestation restricts agricultural expansion and forest cover can expand strongly in 1.5°C and 2°C pathways alike compared to its extent in no-climate policy baselines due to reduced deforestation, afforestation and reforestation measures. However, the extent to which forest cover expands varies highly across models in the literature, with some models projecting forest cover to stay virtually constant or decline slightly. This is due to whether afforestation and reforestation is included as a mitigation technology in these pathways and interactions with other sectors.

As a consequence of other land use changes, pasture land is generally projected to be reduced compared to both baselines in which no climate change mitigation action is undertaken and 2°C-consistent pathways. Furthermore, cropland for food and feed production decreases in most 1.5°C pathways, both compared to a no-climate baseline and relative to 2010. These reductions in agricultural land for food and feed production are facilitated by intensification on agricultural land and in livestock production systems (Popp et al., 2017), as well as changes in consumption patterns (Frank et al., 2017; Fujimori, 2017) (see also 4.3.2 for an assessment of these mitigation options). For example, in a scenario based on rapid technological progress (Kriegler et al., 2017), global average cereal crop yields in 2100 are assumed to be above 5 tDM/ha.yr in mitigation scenarios aiming at limiting end-of-century radiative forcing to 4.5 or 2.6 W/m², compared to 4 tDM/ha.yr in the SSP5 baseline to ensure the same food production. Similar improvements are present in 1.5°C variants of such scenarios. Historically, cereal crop yields are estimated at 1 tDM/ha.yr and ca. 3 tDM/ha.yr in 1965 and 2010, respectively (calculations based on FAOSTAT, 2017). For aggregate energy crops, models assume 4.2-8.9 tDM/ha.yr in 2010, increasing to about 6.9-17.4 tDM/ha.yr in 2050, which fall within the range found in the bottom-up literature yet depend on crop, climatic zone, land quality, and plot

size (Searle and Malins, 2014).




Figure 2.24: Overview of land-use change transitions in 2030 and 2050, relative to 2010 based on pathways based on the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) (Popp et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018). Grey: no-climate-policy baseline; green: 2.6 W/m² pathways; blue: 1.9 W/m² pathways. Pink: 1.9 W/m² pathways grouped per underlying socioeconomic assumption (from left to right: SSP1 sustainability, SSP2 middle-of-the-road, SSP5 fossil-fuelled development). Ranges show the minimum-maximum range across the SSPs. Single pathways are shown with plus signs. Illustrative archetype pathways are highlighted with distinct icons. Each panel shows the changes for a different land type. 1.9 and 2.6 W/m² are taken as proxies for 1.5°C and 2°C pathways, respectively. 2.6 W/m² pathways are mostly consistent with the Lower-2°C and Higher-2°C pathway classes. 1.9 W/m² pathways are consistent with the 1.5°C-low-OS (mostly SSP1 and SSP2) and 1.5°C-high-OS (SSP5) pathway classes. In 2010, pasture was estimated to cover about 3-3.5 10³ Mha, food and feed crops about 1.5-1.6 10³ Mha, energy crops about 0-14 Mha and forest about 3.7-4.2 10³ Mha, across the models that reported SSP pathways (Popp et al., 2017).

The pace of projected land transitions over the coming decades can differ strongly between 1.5°C and baseline scenarios without climate change mitigation and from historical trends (Table 2.9). However, there is uncertainty in the sign and magnitude of these future land-use changes (Prestele et al., 2016; Popp et al., 2017; Doelman et al., 2018). The pace of projected cropland changes overlaps with historical trends over the past four decades, but in several cases also goes well beyond this range. By the 2030-2050 period, the projected reductions in pasture and potentially strong increases in forest cover imply a reversed dynamic compared to historical and baseline trends. For forest increases, this suggests that distinct policy and government measures would be needed to achieve this, particularly in a context of projected increased bioenergy use.

Table 2.9: Annual pace of land-use change in baseline, 2°C and 1.5°C pathways. All values in Mha/yr. 2.6 W/m² pathways are mostly consistent with the Lower-2°C and Higher-2°C pathway classes. 1.9 W/m² pathways are broadly consistent with the 1.5°C-low-OS (mostly SSP1 and SSP2) and 1.5°C-high-OS (SSP5) pathway classes. Baseline projections reflect land-use developments projected by integrated assessment models under the assumptions of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) in absence of climate policies (Popp et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018). Values give the full range across SSP scenarios. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT, 2017), 4.9 billion hectares (approximately 40% of the land surface) was under agricultural use in 2005, either as cropland (1.5 billion hectares) or pasture (3.4 billion hectares). FAO data in the table are equally from FAOSTAT (2017).

Annual pace of land-use change [Mha yr ⁻¹]					
Land type	Pathway	Time window		Historical	
		2010-2030	2030-2050	1970-1990	1990-2010
Pasture	1.9 W m ⁻²	[-14.6/3.0]	[-28.7/-5.2]	8.7	0.9
	2.6 W m ⁻²	[-9.3/4.1]	[-21.6/0.4]	Permanent meadows and pastures (FAO)	Permanent meadows and pastures (FAO)
	Baseline	[-5.1/14.1]	[-9.6/9.0]		
Cropland for food, feed and material	1.9 W m ⁻²	[-12.7/9.0]	[-18.5/0.1]		
	2.6 W m ⁻²	[-12.9/8.3]	[-16.8/2.3]		
	Baseline	[-5.3/9.9]	[-2.7/6.7]		
Cropland for energy	1.9 W m ⁻²	[0.7/10.5]	[3.9/34.8]		
	2.6 W m ⁻²	[0.2/8.8]	[2.0/22.9]		
	Baseline	[0.2/4.2]	[-0.2/6.1]		
Total cropland (Sum of cropland for food and feed & energy)	1.9 W m ⁻²	[-6.8/12.8]	[-5.8/26.7]	4.6	0.9
	2.6 W m ⁻²	[-8.4/9.3]	[-7.1/17.8]	Arable land and Permanent crops	Arable land and Permanent crops
	Baseline	[-3.0/11.3]	[0.6/11.0]		
Forest	1.9 W m ⁻²	[-4.8/23.7]	[0.0/34.3]	N.A.	-5.6
	2.6 W m ⁻²	[-4.7/22.2]	[-2.4/31.7]	Forest (FAO)	Forest (FAO)
	Baseline	[-13.6/3.3]	[-6.5/4.3]		

Changes of the AFOLU sector are driven by three main factors: demand changes, efficiency of production, and policy assumptions (Smith et al., 2013; Popp et al., 2017). Demand for agricultural products and other land-based commodities is influenced by consumption patterns (including dietary preferences and food waste affecting demand for food and feed) (Smith et al., 2013; van Vuuren et al., 2018), demand for forest products for pulp and construction (including less wood waste), and demand for biomass for energy production (Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011; Smith and Bustamante, 2014). Efficiency of agricultural and forestry production relates to improvements in agricultural and forestry practices (including product cascades, by-products as well as more waste- and residue-based biomass for energy production), agricultural and forestry yield increases as well as intensification of livestock production systems leading to higher feed efficiency and changes in feed composition (Havlík et al., 2014; Weindl et al., 2015). Policy assumptions relate to the level of land protection, the treatment of food waste, policy choices about the timing of mitigation action (early vs late), the choice and preference of land-based mitigation options (for example, the inclusion of afforestation and reforestation as mitigation options), interactions with other sectors (Popp et al., 2017) and trade (Schmitz et al., 2012; Wiebe et al., 2015).

A global study (Stevanović et al., 2017) reported similar GHG reduction potentials for production (agricultural production measures in combination with reduced deforestation) and consumption side (diet change in combination with lower shares of food waste) measures of in the order of 40% in 2100¹¹ (compared to a baseline scenario without land-based mitigation). Lower consumption of livestock products by 2050 could also substantially reduce deforestation and cumulative carbon losses (Weindl et al., 2017). On

¹¹ FOOTNOTE: Land-based mitigation options on the supply and the demand side are assessed in 4.3.2 and CDR options with a land component in 4.3.7. Chapter 5 (Section 5.4) assesses the implications of land-based mitigation for related SDGs, e.g., food security.

the supply side, minor productivity growth in extensive livestock production systems is projected to lead to substantial CO₂ emission abatement, but the emission saving potential of productivity gains in intensive systems is limited, mainly due to trade-offs with soil carbon stocks (Weindl et al., 2017). In addition, even within existing livestock production systems, a transition from extensive to more productive systems bears substantial GHG abatement potential, while improving food availability (Gerber et al., 2013; Havlík et al., 2014). Many studies highlight the capability of agricultural intensification for reducing GHG emissions in the AFOLU sector or even enhancing terrestrial carbon stocks (Valin et al., 2013; Popp et al., 2014a; Wise et al., 2014). Also the importance of immediate and global land-use regulations for a comprehensive reduction of land-related GHG emissions (especially related to deforestation) has been shown by several studies (Calvin et al., 2017; Fricko et al., 2017; Fujimori, 2017). Ultimately, there are also interactions between these three factors and the wider society and economy, for example, if CDR technologies that are not land based are deployed (like direct air capture – DACCS, see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.7) or if other sectors over- or underachieve their projected mitigation contributions (Clarke et al., 2014). Variations in these drivers can lead to drastically different land-use implications (Popp et al., 2014b) (Figure 2.24).

Stringent mitigation pathways inform general GHG dynamics in the AFOLU sector. First, CO₂ emissions from deforestation can be abated at relatively low carbon prices if displacement effects in other regions (Calvin et al., 2017) or other land-use types with high carbon density (Calvin et al., 2014; Popp et al., 2014a; Kriegler et al., 2017) can be avoided. However, efficiency and costs of reducing rates of deforestation strongly depend on governance performance, institutions and macroeconomic factors (Wang et al., 2016). Secondly, besides CO₂ reductions, the land system can play an important role for overall CDR efforts (Rogelj et al., 2018) via BECCS, afforestation and reforestation, or a combination of options. The AFOLU sector also provides further potential for active terrestrial carbon sequestration, e.g., via land restoration, improved management of forest and agricultural land (Griscom et al., 2017), or biochar applications (Smith, 2016) (see also Section 4.3.7). These options have so far not been extensively integrated in the mitigation pathway literature (see Annex 2.A.2), but in theory their availability would impact the deployment of other CDR technologies, like BECCS (Section 2.3.4) (Strefler et al., 2018a). These interactions will be discussed further in the SRCCL.

Residual agricultural non-CO₂ emissions of CH₄ and N₂O play an important role for temperature stabilisation pathways and their relative importance increases in stringent mitigation pathways in which CO₂ is reduced to net zero emissions globally (Gernaat et al., 2015; Popp et al., 2017; Stevanović et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018), for example, through their impact on the remaining carbon budget (Section 2.2). Although agricultural non-CO₂ emissions show marked reduction potentials in 2°C-consistent pathways, complete elimination of these emission sources does not occur in IAMs based on the evolution of agricultural practice assumed in integrated models (Figure 2.25) (Gernaat et al., 2015). CH₄ emissions in 1.5°C pathways are reduced through improved agricultural management (e.g., improved management of water in rice production, manure and herds, and better livestock quality through breeding and improved feeding practices) as well as dietary shifts away from emissions-intensive livestock products. Similarly, N₂O emissions decrease due to improved N-efficiency and manure management (Frank et al., 2018). However, high levels of bioenergy production can also result in increased N₂O emissions (Kriegler et al., 2017) highlighting the importance of appropriate management approaches (Davis et al., 2013). Residual agricultural emissions can be further reduced by limiting demand for GHG-intensive foods through shifts to healthier and more sustainable diets (Tilman and Clark, 2014; Erb et al., 2016b; Springmann et al., 2016) and reductions in food waste (Bajželj et al., 2014; Muller et al., 2017; Popp et al., 2017) (see also Chapter 4, and SRCCL). Finally, several mitigation measures that could affect these agricultural non-CO₂ emissions are not, or only to a limited degree, considered in the current integrated pathway literature (see Annex 2.A.2). Such measures (like plant-based and synthetic proteins, methane inhibitors and vaccines in livestock, alternate wetting and drying in paddy rice, or nitrification inhibitors) are very diverse and differ in their development or deployment stages. Their potentials have not been explicitly assessed here.




Figure 2.25: Agricultural emissions in transformation pathways. Global agricultural CH₄ (left) and N₂O (right) emissions. Boxplots show median, interquartile range and full range. Classes are defined in Section 2.1.

Pathways consistent with 1.5°C rely on one or more of the three strategies highlighted above (demand changes, efficiency gains, and policy assumptions), and can apply these in different configurations. For example, among the four illustrative archetypes used in this chapter (Section 2.1) the LED and S1 pathways focus on generally low resource and energy consumption (including healthy diets with low animal-calorie shares and low food waste) as well as significant agricultural intensification in combination with high levels of nature protection. Under such assumptions, comparably small amounts of land are needed for land demanding mitigation activities such as BECCS and afforestation and reforestation, leaving the land footprint for energy crops in 2050 virtually the same compared to 2010 levels for the LED pathway. In contrast, future land-use developments can look very differently under the resource- and energy-intensive S5 pathway that includes unhealthy diets with high animal shares and high shares of food waste (Tilman and Clark, 2014; Springmann et al., 2016) combined with a strong orientation towards technology solutions to compensate for high reliance on fossil-fuel resources and associated high levels of GHG emissions in the baseline. In such pathways, climate change mitigation strategies strongly depend on the availability of CDR through BECCS (Humpeöder et al., 2014). As a consequence, the S5 pathway sources significant amounts of biomass through bioenergy crop expansion in combination with agricultural intensification. Also, further policy assumptions can strongly affect land-use developments, highlighting the importance for land use of making appropriate policy choices. For example, within the SSP set, some pathways rely strongly on a policy to incentivise afforestation and reforestation for CDR together with BECCS, which results in an expansion of forest area and a corresponding increase in terrestrial carbon stock. Finally, the variety of pathways illustrates how policy choices in the AFOLU and other sectors strongly affect land-use developments and associated sustainable development interactions (Section 5.4) in 1.5°C pathways.

The choice of strategy or mitigation portfolio impacts the GHG dynamics of the land system and other sectors (see Section 2.3), as well as the synergies and trade-offs with other environmental and societal objectives (see Section 2.5.3 and Section 5.4). For example, AFOLU developments in 1.5°C pathways range from strategies that differ almost an order of magnitude in their projected land requirements for bioenergy (Figure 2.24), and some strategies would allow an increase in forest cover over the 21st century compared to strategies under which forest cover remains approximately constant. High agricultural yields and application of intensified animal husbandry, implementation of best-available technologies for reducing non-CO₂ emissions, or lifestyle changes including a less-meat-intensive diet and less CO₂-intensive transport modes, have been identified to allow for such a forest expansion and reduced footprints from bioenergy without compromising food security (Frank et al., 2017; Doelman et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018).

The IAMs used in the pathways underlying this assessment (Popp et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018) do not include all potential land-based mitigation options and side-effects, and their results are hence subject to uncertainty. For example, recent research has highlighted the potential impact of forest management practices on land carbon content (Erb et al., 2016a; Naudts et al., 2016) and the uncertainty surrounding future crop yields (Haberl et al., 2013; Searle and Malins, 2014), and water availability (Liu et al., 2014). These aspects are included in IAMs in varying degrees, but were not assessed in this report. Furthermore, land-use modules of some IAMs can depict spatially resolved climate damages to agriculture (Nelson et al., 2014), but this option was not used in the SSP quantifications (Riahi et al., 2017). Damages (e.g., due to ozone exposure or varying indirect fertilization due to atmospheric N and Fe deposition (e.g.,

Shindell et al., 2012; Mahowald et al., 2017) are also not included. Finally, this assessment did not look into the literature of agricultural sector models which could provide important additional detail and granularity to the here presented discussion¹². This limits their ability to capture the full mitigation potentials and benefits between scenarios. An in-depth assessment of these aspects lies outside the scope of this Special Report. However, their existence affects the confidence assessment of the AFOLU transition in 1.5°C pathways.

Despite the limitations of current modelling approaches, there is *high agreement* and *robust evidence* across models and studies that the AFOLU sector plays an important role in stringent mitigation pathways. The findings from these multiple lines of evidence also result in *high confidence* that AFOLU mitigation strategies can vary significantly based on preferences and policy choices, facilitating the exploration of strategies that can achieve multiple societal objectives simultaneously (see also Section 2.5.3). At the same time, given the many uncertainties and limitations, only *low to medium confidence* can be attributed by this assessment to the more extreme AFOLU developments found in the pathway literature, and *low to medium confidence* to the level of residual non-CO₂ emissions.

¹² FOOTNOTE: For example, the GLEAM (<http://www.fao.org/gleam/en/>) model from the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO).

2.5 Challenges, opportunities and co-impacts of transformative mitigation pathways

This section examines aspects other than climate outcomes of 1.5°C mitigation pathways. Focus is given to challenges and opportunities related to policy regimes, price of carbon and co-impacts, including sustainable development issues, which can be derived from the existing integrated pathway literature. Attention is also given to uncertainties and critical assumptions underpinning mitigation pathways. The challenges and opportunities identified in this section are further elaborated Chapter 4 (e.g., policy choice and implementation) and Chapter 5 (e.g., sustainable development). The assessment indicates unprecedented policy and geopolitical challenges.

2.5.1 Policy frameworks and enabling conditions

Moving from a 2°C to a 1.5°C pathway implies bold integrated policies that enable higher socio-technical transition speeds, larger deployment scales, and the phase-out of existing systems that may lock in emissions for decades (Geels et al., 2017; Kuramochi et al., 2017; Rockström et al., 2017; Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2017; Kriegler et al., 2018b; Michaelowa et al., 2018) (*high confidence*). This requires higher levels of transformative policy regimes in the near term, which allow deep decarbonisation pathways to emerge and a net zero carbon energy-economy system to emerge in the 2040–2060 period (Rogelj et al., 2015b; Bataille et al., 2016b). This enables accelerated levels of technological deployment and innovation (Geels et al., 2017; IEA, 2017a; Grubler et al., 2018) and assumes more profound behavioural, economic and political transformation (Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 4.4). Despite inherent levels of uncertainty attached to modelling studies (e.g., related to climate and carbon-cycle response), studies stress the urgency for transformative policy efforts to reduce emissions in the short term (Riahi et al., 2015; Kuramochi et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018).

The available literature indicates that mitigation pathways in line with 1.5°C-consistent pathways would require stringent and integrated policy interventions (*very high confidence*). Higher policy ambition often takes the form of stringent economy-wide emission targets (and resulting peak-and-decline of emissions), larger coverage of NDCs to more gases and sectors (e.g., land-use, international aviation), much lower energy and carbon intensity rates than historically seen, carbon prices much higher than the ones observed in real markets, increased climate finance, global coordinated policy action, and implementation of additional initiatives (e.g., by non-state actors) (Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5.2). The diversity (beyond carbon pricing) and effectiveness of policy portfolios are of prime importance, particularly in the short-term (Mundaca and Markandya, 2016; Kuramochi et al., 2017; OECD, 2017; Kriegler et al., 2018b; Michaelowa et al., 2018). For instance, deep decarbonisation pathways in line with a 2°C target (covering 74% of global energy-system emissions) include a mix of stringent regulation (e.g., building codes, minimum performance standards), carbon pricing mechanisms and R&D (research and development) innovation policies (Bataille et al., 2016a). Carbon pricing, direct regulation and public investment to enable innovation are critical for deep decarbonisation pathways (Grubb et al., 2014). Effective planning (including compact city measures) and integrated regulatory frameworks are also key drivers in the IEA-ETP B2DS study for the transport sector (IEA, 2017a). Effective urban planning can reduce GHG emissions from urban transport between 20% and 50% (Creutzig, 2016). Comprehensive policy frameworks would be needed if the decarbonisation of the power system is pursued while increasing end-use electrification (including transport) (IEA, 2017a). Technology policies (e.g., feed-in-tariffs), financing instruments, carbon pricing and system integration management driving the rapid adoption of renewable energy technologies are critical for the decarbonisation of electricity generation (Bruckner et al., 2014; Luderer et al., 2014; Creutzig et al., 2017; Pietzcker et al., 2017). Likewise, low-carbon and resilient investments are facilitated by a mix of coherent policies including fiscal and structural reforms (e.g., labour markets), public procurement, carbon pricing, stringent standards, information schemes, technology policies, fossil-fuel subsidy removal, climate risk disclosure, and land-use and transport planning (OECD, 2017). Pathways in which CDR options are restricted emphasise the strengthening of near-term policy mixes (Luderer et al., 2013; Kriegler et al., 2018b). Together with the decarbonisation of the supply side, ambitious policies targeting fuel switching and energy efficiency improvements on the demand side play a major role across mitigation pathways (Clarke et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014b; Riahi et al., 2015; Kuramochi et al., 2017; Brown and Li, 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018; Wachsmuth and Duscha, 2018).

The combined evidence suggests that aggressive policies addressing energy efficiency are central in keeping 1.5°C within reach and lowering energy system and mitigation costs (Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013b, 2015b; Grubler et al., 2018) (*high confidence*). Demand-side policies that increase energy efficiency or limit energy demand at a higher rate than historically observed are critical enabling factors reducing mitigation costs for stringent mitigation pathways across the board (Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013b, 2015b; Clarke et al., 2014; Bertram et al., 2015a; Bataille et al., 2016b). Ambitious sector-specific mitigation policies in industry, transportation and residential sectors are needed in the short run for emissions to peak in 2030 (Méjean et al., 2018). Stringent demand-side policies (e.g., tightened efficiency standards for buildings and appliances) driving the expansion, efficiency and provision of high-quality energy services are essential to meet a 1.5°C mitigation target while avoiding the need of CDR (Grubler et al., 2018). A 1.5°C pathway for the transport sector is possible using a mix of additional and stringent policy actions preventing (or reducing) the need for transport, encouraging shifts towards efficient modes of transport, and improving vehicle-fuel efficiency (Ghota et al., 2018). Stringent demand-side policies also reduce the need for CCS (Wachsmuth and Duscha, 2018). Even in the presence of weak-near term policy frameworks, increased energy efficiency lowers mitigation costs noticeably compared to pathways with reference energy intensity (Bertram et al., 2015a). Horizontal issues in the literature relate to the rebound effect, the potential overestimation of the effectiveness of energy efficiency policy, and policies to counteract the rebound (Saunders, 2015; van den Bergh, 2017; Grubler et al., 2018) (Sections 2.4 and 4.4).

SSP-based modelling studies underline that socio-economic and climate policy assumptions strongly influence mitigation pathway characteristics and the economics of achieving a specific climate target (Bauer et al., 2017; Guivarch and Rogelj, 2017; Riahi et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018) (*very high confidence*). SSP assumptions related to economic growth and energy intensity are critical determinants of projected CO₂ emissions (Marangoni et al., 2017). A multi-model inter-comparison study found that mitigation challenges in line with a 1.5°C target vary substantially across SSPs and policy assumptions (Rogelj et al., 2018). Under SSP1-SPA1 (sustainability) and SSP2-SPA2 (middle-of-the-road), the majority of IAMs were capable of producing 1.5°C pathways. On the contrary, none of the IAMs contained in the SR1.5 database could produce a 1.5°C pathway under SSP3-SPA3 assumptions. Preventing elements include, for instance, climate policy fragmentation, limited control of land-use emissions, heavy reliance on fossil fuels, unsustainable consumption and marked inequalities (Rogelj et al., 2018). Dietary aspects of the SSPs are also critical: climate-friendly diets were contained in ‘sustainability’ (SSP1) and meat-intensive diets in SSP3 and SSP5 (Popp et al., 2017). CDR requirements are reduced under ‘sustainability’ related assumptions (Strefler et al., 2018b). These are major policy-related factors for why SSP1-SPA1 translates into relatively low mitigation challenges whereas SSP3-SPA3 and SSP5-SPA5 entail futures that pose the highest socio-technical and economic challenges. SSPs/SPAs assumptions indicate that policy-driven pathways that encompass accelerated change away from fossil fuels, large-scale deployment of low-carbon energy supplies, improved energy efficiency and sustainable consumption lifestyles reduce the risks of climate targets becoming unreachable (Clarke et al., 2014; Riahi et al., 2015, 2017; Marangoni et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2017, 2018; Strefler et al., 2018b).

Policy assumptions that lead to weak or delayed mitigation action from what would be possible in a fully cooperative world, strongly influence the achievability of mitigation targets (Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013; OECD, 2017; Holz et al., 2018a; Strefler et al., 2018b) (*high confidence*). Such regimes also include current NDCs (Fawcett et al., 2015; Aldy et al., 2016; Rogelj et al., 2016a, 2017; Hof et al., 2017; van Soest et al., 2017), which have been reported to make achieving a 2°C pathway unattainable without CDR (Strefler et al., 2018b). Not strengthening NDCs make it very challenging to keep 1.5°C within reach (see Section 2.3 and Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4). One multi-model inter-comparison study (Luderer et al., 2016b, 2018) explored the effects on 1.5°C pathways assuming the implementation of current NDCs until 2030 and stringent reductions thereafter. It finds that delays in globally coordinated actions leads to various models reaching no 1.5°C-consistent pathways during the 21st century. Transnational emission reduction initiatives (TERIs) outside the UNFCCC have also been assessed and found to overlap (70–80%) with NDCs and be inadequate to bridge the gap between NDCs and a 2°C pathway (Roelfsema et al., 2018). Weak and fragmented short-term policy efforts use up a large share of the long-term carbon budget before 2030–2050 (Bertram et al., 2015a; van Vuuren et al., 2016) and increase the need for the full portfolio of mitigation measures, including CDR (Clarke et al., 2014; Riahi et al., 2015; Xu and Ramanathan, 2017). Furthermore, fragmented policy scenarios also exhibit ‘carbon leakage’ via energy and capital markets (Arroyo-Currás et al., 2015; Kriegler et al., 2015b). A lack of integrated policy portfolios can increase the

risks of trade-offs between mitigation approaches and sustainable development objectives (see Sections 2.5.3 and 5.4). However, more detailed analysis is needed about realistic (less disruptive) policy trajectories until 2030 that can strengthen near-term mitigation action and meaningfully decrease post-2030 challenges (see Section 4.4).

Whereas the policy frameworks and enabling conditions identified above pertain to the ‘idealised’ dimension of mitigation pathways, aspects related to 1.5°C mitigation pathways in practice are of prime importance. For example, issues related to second-best stringency levels, international cooperation, public acceptance, distributional consequences, multi-level governance, non-state actions, compliance levels, capacity building, rebound effects, linkages across highly heterogeneous policies, sustained behavioural change, finance and intra- and inter-generational issues need to be considered (Somanthan et al., 2014; Bataille et al., 2016a; Mundaca and Markandya, 2016; Baranzini et al., 2017; van den Bergh, 2017; Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2017; Chan et al., 2018; Holz et al., 2018a; Klinsky and Winkler, 2018; Michaelowa et al., 2018; Patterson et al., 2018) (see Section 4.4). Furthermore, policies interact with a wide portfolio of pre-existing policy instruments that address multiple areas (e.g., technology markets, economic growth, poverty alleviation, climate adaptation) and deal with various market failures (e.g., information asymmetries) and behavioural aspects (e.g., heuristics) that prevent or hinder mitigation actions (Kolstad et al., 2014; Mehling and Tvinnereim, 2018). The socio-technical transition literature points to multiple complexities in real-world settings that prevent reaching ‘idealised’ policy conditions but at the same time can still accelerate transformative change through other co-evolutionary processes of technology and society (Geels et al., 2017; Rockström et al., 2017). Such co-processes are complex and go beyond the role of policy (including carbon pricing) and comprise the role of citizens, businesses, stakeholder groups or governments, as well as the interplay of institutional and socio-political dimensions (Michaelowa et al., 2018; Veland et al., 2018). It is argued that large system transformations, similar to those in 1.5°C pathways, require prioritizing an evolutionary and behavioural framework in economic theory rather than an optimization or equilibrium framework as is common in current IAMs (Grubb et al., 2014; Patt, 2017). Accumulated know-how, accelerated innovation and public investment play a key role in (rapid) transitions (Geels et al., 2017; Michaelowa et al., 2018) (see Sections 4.2 and 4.4).

In summary, the emerging literature supports the AR5 on the need for integrated, robust and stringent policy frameworks targeting both the supply and demand-side of energy-economy systems (*high confidence*). Continuous ex-ante policy assessments provide learning opportunities for both policy makers and stakeholders.

[START CROSS CHAPTER BOX 5 HERE]

Cross-Chapter Box 5: Economics of 1.5°C Pathways and the Social Cost of Carbon

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Two approaches have been commonly used to assess alternative emissions pathways: **cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA)** and **cost-benefit analysis (CBA)**. **CEA** aims at identifying emissions pathways minimising the total mitigation costs of achieving a given warming or GHG limit (Clarke et al., 2014). **CBA** has the goal to identify the optimal emissions trajectory minimising the discounted flows of abatement expenditures and monetised climate change damages (Boardman, 2006; Stern, 2007). A third concept, the **Social Cost of Carbon (SCC)** measures the total net damages of an extra metric ton of CO₂ emissions due to the associated climate change (Nordhaus, 2014; Pizer et al., 2014; Rose et al., 2017a). Negative and positive impacts are monetised, discounted and the net value is expressed as an equivalent loss of consumption today. The SCC can be evaluated for any emissions pathway under policy consideration (Rose, 2012; NASEM, 2016, 2017).

Along the optimal trajectory determined by CBA, the SCC equals the discounted value of the marginal abatement cost of a metric ton of CO₂ emissions. Equating the present value of future damages and marginal abatement costs includes a number of critical value judgments in the formulation of the social welfare function (SWF), particularly in how non-market damages and the distribution of damages across countries and individuals and between current and future generations are valued (Kolstad et al., 2014). For example, since climate damages accrue to a larger extent in the farther future and can persist for many years,

assumptions and approaches to determine the social discount rate (normative ‘prescriptive’ vs. positive ‘descriptive’) and social welfare function (e.g., discounted utilitarian SWF vs. undiscounted prioritarian SWF) can heavily influence CBA outcomes and associated estimates of SCC (Kolstad et al., 2014; Pizer et al., 2014; Adler and Treich, 2015; Adler et al., 2017; NASEM, 2017; Nordhaus, 2017; Rose et al., 2017a).

In CEA, the marginal abatement cost of carbon is determined by the climate goal under consideration. It equals the shadow price of carbon associated with the goal which in turn can be interpreted as the willingness to pay for imposing the goal as a political constraint. Emissions prices are usually expressed in carbon (equivalent) prices using the GWP-100 metric as the exchange rate for pricing emissions of non-CO₂ GHGs controlled under internationally climate agreements (like CH₄, N₂O and fluorinated gases, see Cross-Chapter Box 1.2)¹³. Since policy goals like the goals of limiting warming to 1.5°C or well below 2°C do not directly result from a money metric trade-off between mitigation and damages, associated shadow prices can differ from the SCC in a CBA. In CEA, value judgments are to a large extent concentrated in the choice of climate goal and related implications, while more explicit assumptions about social values are required to perform CBA. For example, assumptions about the social discount rate no longer affect the overall abatement levels now set by the climate goal, but the choice and timing of investments in individual measures to reach these levels.

Although CBA-based and CEA-based assessment are both subject to large uncertainty about socio-techno-economic trends, policy developments and climate response, the range of estimates for the SCC along an optimal trajectory determined by CBA is far higher than for estimates of the shadow price of carbon in CEA-based approaches. In CBA, the value judgments about inter- and intra-generational equity combined with uncertainties in the climate damage functions assumed, including their empirical basis, are important (Pindyck, 2013; Stern, 2013; Revesz et al., 2014). In a CEA-based approach, the value judgments about the aggregate welfare function matter less and uncertainty about climate response and impacts can be tied into various climate targets and related emissions budgets (Clarke et al., 2014).

The CEA- and CBA-based carbon cost estimates are derived with a different set of tools. They are all summarised as integrated assessment models (IAMs) but in fact are of very different nature (Weyant, 2017). Detailed process IAMs such as AIM (Fujimori, 2017), GCAM (Thomson et al., 2011; Calvin et al., 2017), IMAGE (van Vuuren et al., 2011b, 2017b), MESSAGE-GLOBIOM (Riahi et al., 2011; Havlík et al., 2014; Fricko et al., 2017), REMIND-MAgPIE (Popp et al., 2010; Luderer et al., 2013; Kriegler et al., 2017) and WITCH (Bosetti et al., 2006, 2008, 2009) include a process-based representation of energy and land systems, but in most cases lack a comprehensive representation of climate damages, and are typically used for CEA. Diagnostic analyses across CBA-IAMs indicate important dissimilarities in modelling assembly, implementation issues and behaviour (e.g., parametric uncertainty, damage responses, income sensitivity) that need to be recognised to better understand SCC estimates (Rose et al., 2017a).

CBA-IAMs such as DICE (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Nordhaus, 2013, 2017), PAGE (Hope, 2006) and FUND (Tol, 1999; Anthoff and Tol, 2009) attempt to capture the full feedback from climate response to socio-economic damages in an aggregated manner, but are usually much more stylised than detailed process IAMs. In a nutshell, the methodological framework for estimating SCC involves projections of population growth, economic activity and resulting emissions; computations of atmospheric composition and global-mean temperatures as a result of emissions; estimations of physical impacts of climate changes; monetisation of impacts (positive and negative) on human welfare; and the discounting of the future monetary value of impacts to year of emission (Kolstad et al., 2014; Revesz et al., 2014; NASEM, 2017; Rose et al., 2017a). There has been a discussion in the literature to what extent CBA-IAMs underestimate the SCC due to, for example, a limited treatment or difficulties in addressing damages to human well-being, labour productivity, value of capital stock, ecosystem services and the risks of catastrophic climate change for future generations (Ackerman and Stanton, 2012; Revesz et al., 2014; Moore and Diaz, 2015; Stern, 2016). However, there has been progress in ‘bottom-up’ empirical analyses of climate damages (Hsiang et al., 2017), the insights of which could be integrated into these models (Dell et al., 2014). Most of the models used in Chapter 2 on 1.5°C mitigation pathways are detailed process IAMs and thus deal with CEA.

¹³ FOOTNOTE: Also other metrics to compare emissions have been suggested and adopted by governments nationally (Kandlikar, 1995; Marten et al., 2015; Shindell, 2015; Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, 2016).

An important question is how results from CEA- and CBA-type approaches can be compared and synthesised. Such synthesis needs to be done with care, since estimates of the shadow price of carbon under the climate goal and SCC estimates from CBA might not be directly comparable due to different tools, approaches and assumptions used to derive them. Acknowledging this caveat, the SCC literature has identified a range of factors, assumptions and value judgements that support SCC values above \$100 tCO₂⁻¹ that are also found as net present values of the shadow price of carbon in 1.5°C pathways. These factors include accounting for tipping points in the climate system (Lemoine and Traeger, 2014; Cai et al., 2015; Lontzek et al., 2015), a low social discount rate (Nordhaus, 2005; Stern, 2007) and inequality aversion (Schmidt et al., 2013; Dennig et al., 2015; Adler et al., 2017).

The SCC and the shadow price of carbon are not merely theoretical concepts but used in regulation (Pizer et al., 2014; Revesz et al., 2014; Stiglitz et al., 2017). As stated by the report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Pricing (Stiglitz et al., 2017), in the real world there is a distinction to be made between the implementable and efficient explicit carbon prices and the implicit (notional) carbon prices to be retained for policy appraisal and the evaluation of public investments, as is already done in some jurisdictions such as the USA, UK and France. Since 2008, the U.S. government has used SCC estimates to assess the benefits and costs related to CO₂ emissions resulting from federal policymaking (NASEM, 2017; Rose et al., 2017a).

The use of the SCC for policy appraisals is however not straightforward in an SDG context. There are suggestions that a broader range of polluting activities than only CO₂ emissions, for example emissions of air pollutants, and a broader range of impacts than only climate change, such as impacts on air quality, health and sustainable development in general (see Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion), would need to be included in social costs (Sarofim et al., 2017; Shindell et al., 2017a). Most importantly, a consistent valuation of the SCC in a sustainable development framework would require accounting for the SDGs in the social welfare formulation (see Chapter 5).

[END CROSS CHAPTER BOX 5 HERE]

2.5.2 Economic and financial implications of 1.5°C Pathways

2.5.2.1 Price of carbon emissions

The price of carbon assessed here is fundamentally different from the concepts of optimal carbon price in a cost-benefit analysis, or the social cost of carbon (see Cross-Chapter Box 5 in this Chapter and Section 3.5.2). Under a cost-effective analysis (CEA) modelling framework, prices for carbon (mitigation costs) reflect the stringency of mitigation requirements at the margin (i.e., cost of mitigating one extra unit of emission).

Based on data available for this special report, the price of carbon varies substantially across models and scenarios, and their value increase with mitigation efforts (see Figure 2.26) (*high confidence*). For instance, undiscounted values under a Higher-2°C pathway range from 10–200 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO_{2-eq}⁻¹ in 2030, 45–960 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO_{2-eq}⁻¹ in 2050, 120–1000 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO_{2-eq}⁻¹ in 2070 and 160–2125 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO_{2-eq}⁻¹ in 2100. On the contrary, estimates for a Below-1.5°C pathway range from 135–5500 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO_{2-eq}⁻¹ in 2030, 245–13000 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO_{2-eq}⁻¹ in 2050, 420–17500 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO_{2-eq}⁻¹ in 2070 and 690–27000 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO_{2-eq}⁻¹ in 2100. One can also observe that values for 1.5°C-low-OS pathway are relatively higher than 1.5°C-high-OS pathway in 2030, but the difference decreases over time. This is because in 1.5°C-high-OS pathways there is relatively less mitigation activity in the first half of the century, but more in the second half. *LED* exhibits the lowest values across the illustrative pathway archetypes. As a whole, the average discounted price of emissions across 1.5°C- and 2°C pathways differs by a factor of four across models (assuming a 5% annual discount rate). If values from 1.5°C-high-OS pathways (with peak warming 0.1–0.4°C higher than 1.5°C) or pathways with very large land-use sinks are kept in the 1.5°C pathway superclass, the differential value is reduced to a limited degree, from a factor 4 to a factor 3. The increase in carbon prices between 1.5°C- and 2°C-consistent pathways is based on a direct comparison of pathway pairs from the same model and the same study in which the 1.5°C-consistent pathway assumes a significantly smaller carbon budget compared to the 2°C-consistent pathway (e.g., 600 GtCO₂ smaller in the CD-LINKS and ADVANCE studies). This assumption is the main driver behind the increase in the price of carbon (Luderer et al., 2018; McCollum et

al., 2018).¹⁴ Considering incomplete and uncertain information, an optimal price of carbon of the magnitude estimated in modelling studies needs to be compared with what is politically and institutionally feasible (see Section 4.4.5.2).

The wide range of values depends on numerous aspects, including methodologies, projected energy service demands, mitigation targets, fuel prices and technology availability (Clarke et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2015b; Rogelj et al., 2015c; Riahi et al., 2017; Stiglitz et al., 2017) (*high confidence*). The characteristics of the technology portfolio, particularly in terms of investment costs and deployment rates play a key role (Luderer et al., 2013, 2016a; Clarke et al., 2014; Bertram et al., 2015a; Riahi et al., 2015; Rogelj et al., 2015c). Models that encompass a higher degree of technology granularity and that entail more flexibility regarding mitigation response, often produce relatively lower mitigation costs than those that show less flexibility from a technology perspective (Bertram et al., 2015a; Kriegler et al., 2015a). Pathways providing high estimates often have limited flexibility of substituting fossil fuels with low-carbon technologies and the associated need to compensate fossil-fuel emissions with CDR. Emission prices are also sensitive to the non-availability of BECCS (Bauer et al., 2018). Furthermore, and due to the treatment of future price anticipation, recursive-dynamic modelling approaches (with ‘myopic anticipation’) exhibit higher prices in the short term but modest increases in the long term compared to optimisation modelling frameworks with ‘perfect foresight’ that show exponential pricing trajectories (Guivarch and Rogelj, 2017). The chosen social discount rate in CEA studies (range of 2–8% per year in the reported data, varying over time and sectors) can also affect the choice and timing of investments in mitigation measures (Clarke et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2015b; Weyant, 2017). However, the impacts of varying discount rates on 1.5°C (and 2°C) mitigation strategies can only be assessed to a limited degree. The above highlights the importance of sampling bias in pathway analysis ensembles towards outcomes derived from models which are more flexible, have more mitigation options and cheaper cost assumptions and thus can provide feasible pathways in contrast to other who are unable to do so (Tavoni and Tol, 2010; Clarke et al., 2014; Bertram et al., 2015a; Kriegler et al., 2015a; Guivarch and Rogelj, 2017). All CEA-based IAM studies reveal no unique carbon pricing path (Bertram et al., 2015a; Kriegler et al., 2015b; Akimoto et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017).


Socio-economic conditions and policy assumptions also influence the price of carbon (Bauer et al., 2017; Guivarch and Rogelj, 2017; Hof et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018) (*very high confidence*). A multi-model study (Riahi et al., 2017) estimated the average discounted price of carbon (2010-2100, 5% discount rate) for a 2°C target to be nearly three times higher in the SSP5 marker than in the SSP1 marker. Another multi-model study (Rogelj et al., 2018) estimated average discounted carbon prices (2020-2100, 5%) to be 35–65% lower in SSP1 compared to SSP2 in 1.5°C pathways. Delayed near-term mitigation policies and measures, including the limited extent of international global cooperation, increases total economic mitigation costs, and corresponding prices of carbon (Luderer et al., 2013; Clarke et al., 2014). This is because stronger efforts are required in the period after the delay to counterbalance the higher emissions in the near term. Staged accession scenarios also produce higher carbon prices than immediate action mitigation scenarios under the same stringency level of emissions (Kriegler et al., 2015b). In addition, the revenue recycling effect of carbon pricing can reduce mitigation costs by displacing distortionary taxes (Baranzini et al., 2017; OECD, 2017; McFarland et al., 2018; Sands, 2018; Siegmeier et al., 2018) and the reduction of capital tax (compared to a labour tax) can yield greater savings in welfare costs (Sands, 2018). The effect on public budgets is particularly important in the near term, however it can decline in the long term as carbon neutrality is achieved (Sands, 2018).

It has been long argued that carbon pricing (whether via a tax or cap-and-trade scheme) can theoretically achieve cost-effective emission reductions (Nordhaus, 2007; Stern, 2007; Aldy and Stavins, 2012; Goulder and Schein, 2013; Somanthan et al., 2014; Weitzman, 2014; Tol, 2017). Whereas the integrated assessment literature is mostly focused on the role of carbon pricing to reduce emissions (Clarke et al., 2014; Riahi et al., 2017; Weyant, 2017) there is an emerging body of studies (including bottom-up approaches) that focuses on the interaction and performance of various policy mixes (e.g., regulation, subsidies, standards). Assuming global implementation of a mix of regionally existing best practice policies (mostly regulatory policies in the electricity, industry, buildings, transport and agricultural sectors) and moderate carbon pricing (between 5–

¹⁴ FOOTNOTE: Unlike AR5, which only included cost-effective scenarios for estimating discounted average carbon prices for 2015-2100 (also using a 5% discount rate) (see Clarke et al., 2014, p.450), please note that values shown in Figure 2.26 (panel b) include delays or technology constraint cases (see Sections 2.1 and 2.3).

20 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO₂⁻¹ in 2025 in most world regions and average prices around 25 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO₂⁻¹ in 2030), early action mitigation pathways are generated that reduce global CO₂ emissions by an additional 10 GtCO_{2e} in 2030 compared to the NDCs (Kriegler et al., 2018b) (see Section 2.3.5). Furthermore, a mix of stringent energy efficiency policies (e.g., minimum performance standards, building codes) combined with a carbon tax (rising from 10 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO₂⁻¹ in 2020 to 27 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO₂⁻¹ in 2040) is more cost-effective than a carbon tax alone (from 20 to 53 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO₂⁻¹) to generate a 1.5°C pathway for the U.S. electric sector (Brown and Li, 2018). Likewise, a policy mix encompassing a moderate carbon price (7 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO₂⁻¹ in 2015) combined with a ban on new coal-based power plants and dedicated policies addressing renewable electricity generation capacity and electric vehicles reduces efficiency losses compared with an optimal carbon pricing in 2030 (Bertram et al., 2015b). One study estimates the price of carbon in high energy-intensive pathways to be 25–50% higher than in low energy-intensive pathways that assume ambitious regulatory instruments, economic incentives (in addition to a carbon price) and voluntary initiatives (Méjean et al., 2018). A bottom-up approach shows that stringent minimum performance standards (MEPS) for appliances (e.g., refrigerators) can effectively complement carbon pricing, as tightened MEPS can achieve ambitious efficiency improvements that cannot be assured by carbon prices of 100 USD₂₀₁₀ tCO₂⁻¹ or higher (Sonnenschein et al., 2018). The literature indicates that the pricing of emissions is relevant but needs to be complemented with other policies to drive the required changes in line with 1.5°C-consistent cost-effective pathways (Stiglitz et al., 2017; Mehling and Tvinnereim, 2018; Méjean et al., 2018; Michaelowa et al., 2018) (*low to medium evidence, high agreement*) (see Section 4.4.5).

In summary, new analyses are consistent with the AR5 and show that the price of carbon would need to increase significantly when a higher level of stringency is pursued (*high confidence*). Values vary substantially across models, scenarios and socio-economic, technology and policy assumptions. While the price of carbon is central to prompt mitigation pathways compatible with 1.5°C-consistent pathways, a complementary mix of stringent policies is required.






Figure 2.26: Global price of carbon emissions consistent with mitigation pathways. Panels show undiscounted price of carbon (2030-2100) (top panel) and average price of carbon (2030-2100) discounted at a 5% discount rate (lower panel). AC: Annually compounded. NPV: Net present value. Median values in floating black line. The number of pathways included in boxplots is indicated in the legend. Number of pathways outside the figure range is noted at the top.

2.5.2.2 Investments

Realising the transformations towards a 1.5°C world requires a major shift in investment patterns (McCollum et al., 2018). Literature on global climate-change mitigation investments is relatively sparse, with most detailed literature having focused on 2°C pathways (McCollum et al., 2013; Bowen et al., 2014; Gupta and Harnisch, 2014; Marangoni and Tavoni, 2014; OECD/IEA and IRENA, 2017).

Global energy-system investments in the year 2016 are estimated at approximately 1.7 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ (approximately 2.2% of global GDP and 10% of gross capital formation), of which 0.23 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ was for incremental end-use energy efficiency and the remainder for supply-side capacity installations (IEA, 2017c). There is some uncertainty surrounding this number because not all entities making investments report them publicly, and model-based estimates show an uncertainty range of about $\pm 15\%$ (McCollum et al., 2018). Notwithstanding, the trend for global energy investments has been generally upward over the last two decades: increasing about threefold between 2000 and 2012, then levelling off for three years before declining in both 2015 and 2016 as a result of the oil price collapse and simultaneous capital cost reductions for renewables (IEA, 2017c).

Estimates of demand-side investments, either in total or for incremental efficiency efforts, are more uncertain, mainly due to a lack of reliable statistics and definitional issues about what exactly is counted towards a demand-side investment and what the reference should be for estimating incremental efficiency (McCollum et al., 2013). Grubler and Wilson (2014) use two working definitions (a broader and a narrower one) to provide a first-order estimate of historical end-use technology investments in total. The broad definition defines end-use technologies as the technological systems purchasable by final consumers in order to provide a useful service, for example, heating and air conditioning systems, cars, freezers, or aircraft. The narrow definition sets the boundary at the specific energy-using components or subsystems of the larger end-use technologies (e.g., compressor, car engine, heating element). Based on these two definitions, demand-side energy investments for the year 2005 were estimated about 1–3.5 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ (central estimate 1.7 trillion USD₂₀₁₀) using the broad definition and 0.1–0.6 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ (central estimate 0.3 trillion USD₂₀₁₀) using the narrower definition. Due to these definitional issues, demand-side investment projections are uncertain, often underreported, and difficult to compare. Global IAMs often do not fully and explicitly represent all the various measures that could improve end-use efficiency.

Research carried out by six global IAM teams found that 1.5°C-consistent climate policies would require a marked upscaling of energy system supply-side investments (resource extraction, power generation, fuel conversion, pipelines/transmission, and energy storage) between now and mid-century, reaching levels of between 1.6–3.8 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ yr⁻¹ globally on average over the 2016-2050 timeframe (McCollum et al., 2018) (Figure 2.27). How these investment needs compare to those in a policy baseline scenario is uncertain: they could be higher, much higher, or lower. Investments in the policy baselines from these same models are 1.6–2.7 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ yr⁻¹. Much hinges on the reductions in energy demand growth embodied in the 1.5°C pathways, which require investing in energy efficiency. Studies suggest that annual supply-side investments by mid-century could be lowered by around 10% (McCollum et al., 2018) and in some cases up to 50% (Grubler et al., 2018) if strong policies to limit energy demand growth are successfully implemented. However, the degree to which these supply-side reductions would be partially offset by an increase in demand-side investments is unclear.

Some trends are robust across scenarios (Figure 2.27). First, pursuing 1.5°C mitigation efforts requires a major reallocation of the investment portfolio, implying a financial system aligned to mitigation challenges. The path laid out by countries' current NDCs until 2030 will not drive these structural changes; and despite increasing low-carbon investments in recent years (IEA, 2016b; Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF, 2017), these are not yet aligned with 1.5°C. Specifically, annual investments in low-carbon energy are projected to average 0.8–2.9 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ yr⁻¹ globally to 2050 in 1.5 °C pathways, overtaking fossil investments globally already by around 2025 (McCollum et al., 2018). The bulk of these investments are projected to be for clean electricity generation, particularly solar and wind power (0.09–1.0 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ yr⁻¹ and 0.1–0.35 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ yr⁻¹, respectively) as well as nuclear power (0.1–0.25 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ yr⁻¹). The precise apportioning of these investments depends on model assumptions and societal preferences related to mitigation strategies and policy choices (see Sections 2.1 and 2.3). Investments for electricity transmission and distribution and storage are also scaled up in 1.5°C pathways (0.3–1.3 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ yr⁻¹), given their widespread electrification of the end-use sectors (see Section 2.4). Meanwhile, 1.5°C pathways see a reduction in annual investments for fossil-fuel extraction and unabated fossil electricity generation (to 0.3–0.85 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ yr⁻¹ on average over the 2016–2050 period). Investments in unabated coal are halted by 2030 in most 1.5°C projections, while the literature is less conclusive for investments in unabated gas (McCollum et al., 2018). This illustrates how mitigation strategies vary between models, but in the real world should be considered in terms of their societal desirability (see Section 2.5.3). Furthermore, some fossil investments made over the next few years – or those made in the last few – will likely need to be retired prior to fully recovering their capital investment or before the end of their operational lifetime (Bertram et al., 2015a; Johnson et al., 2015; OECD/IEA and IRENA, 2017). How the pace of the energy transition will be affected by such dynamics, namely with respect to politics and society, is not well captured by global IAMs at present. Modelling studies have, however, shown how the reliability of institutions influences investment risks and hence climate mitigation investment decisions (Iyer et al., 2015), finding that a lack of regulatory credibility or policy commitment fails to stimulate low-carbon investments (Bosetti and Victor, 2011; Faehn and Isaksen, 2016).

Low-carbon supply-side investment needs are projected to be largest in OECD countries and those of developing Asia. The regional distribution of investments in 1.5°C pathways estimated by the multiple models in (McCollum et al., 2018) are the following (average over 2016-2050 timeframe): 0.30-1.3 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ yr⁻¹ (ASIA), 0.35–0.85 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ yr⁻¹ (OECD), 0.08–0.55 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ yr⁻¹ (MAF), 0.07–0.25 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ yr⁻¹ (LAM), and 0.05–0.15 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ yr⁻¹ (REF) (regions are defined consistent with their use in AR5 WGIII, see Table A.II.8 in Krey et al., 2014b).

Until now, IAM investment analyses of 1.5 °C pathways have focused on middle-of-the-road socioeconomic and technological development futures (SSP2) (Fricko et al., 2017). Consideration of a broader range of development futures would yield different outcomes in terms of the magnitudes of the projected investment levels. Sensitivity analyses indicate that the magnitude of supply-side investments as well as the investment portfolio do not change strongly across the SSPs for a given level of climate policy stringency (McCollum et al., 2018). With only one dedicated multi-model comparison study published, there is *limited to medium evidence* available. For some features, there is *high agreement* across modelling frameworks leading, for example, to *medium to high confidence* that limiting global temperature increase to 1.5°C will require a major reallocation of the investment portfolio. Given the limited amount of sensitivity cases available

compared to the default SSP2 assumptions, *medium confidence* can be assigned to the specific energy and climate mitigation investment estimates reported here.

Assumptions in modelling studies indicate a number of challenges. For instance, access to finance and mobilisation of funds are critical (Fankhauser et al., 2016; OECD, 2017). In turn, policy efforts need to be effective in re-directing financial resources (UNEP, 2015; OECD, 2017) and reduce transaction costs for bankable mitigation projects (i.e. projects that have adequate future cash-flow, collateral, etc. so lenders are willing to finance it), particularly on the demand side (Mundaca et al., 2013; Brunner and Enting, 2014; Grubler et al., 2018). Assumptions also imply that policy certainty, regulatory oversight mechanisms and fiduciary duty need to be robust and effective to safeguard credible and stable financial markets and de-risk mitigation investments in the long term (Clarke et al., 2014; Mundaca et al., 2016; EC, 2017; OECD, 2017). Importantly, the different time horizons that actors have in the competitive finance industry are typically not explicitly captured by modelling assumptions (Harmes, 2011). See Section 4.4.5 for details of climate finance in practice.

In summary and despite inherent uncertainties, the emerging literature indicates a gap between current investment patterns and those compatible with 1.5°C (or 2°C) pathways (*limited to medium evidence, high agreement*). Estimates and assumptions from modelling frameworks suggest a major shift in investment patterns and entail a financial system effectively aligned with mitigation challenges (*high confidence*).




Figure 2.27: Historical and projected global energy investments. (a) Historical investment estimates across six global models from (McCollum et al., 2018) (bars = model means, whiskers full model range) compared to historical estimates from IEA (International Energy Agency) 2016) (triangles). (b) Average annual investments over the 2016–2050 period in no-climate policy ‘baselines’, scenarios which implement the NDCs (‘NDC’), scenarios consistent with the Lower-2°C pathway class (‘2°C’), and scenarios in line with the 1.5°C-low-OS pathway class (‘1.5°C’). Whiskers show the range of models; wide bars show the multi-model means; narrow bars represent analogous values from individual IEA

scenarios (OECD/IEA and IRENA, 2017). (c) Average annual mitigation investments and disinvestments for the 2016–2030 periods relative to the baseline. The solid bars show the values for ‘2°C’ pathways, while the hatched areas show the additional investments for the pathways labelled with ‘1.5°C’. Whiskers show the full range around the multi-model means. T&D stands for transmission and distribution, and CCS stands for carbon capture and storage. Global cumulative carbon dioxide emissions, from fossil fuels and industrial processes (FF&I) but excluding land use, over the 2016–2100 timeframe range from 880 to 1074 GtCO₂ (multi-model mean: 952 GtCO₂) in the ‘2°C’ pathway and from 206 to 525 GtCO₂ (mean: 390 GtCO₂) in the ‘1.5°C’ pathway.

2.5.3 Sustainable development features of 1.5°C pathways

Potential synergies and trade-offs between 1.5°C mitigation pathways and different sustainable development (SD) dimensions (see Cross-Chapter Box 4) are an emerging field of research. Section 5.4 assesses interactions between individual mitigation measures with other societal objectives, as well as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Table 5.1). This section synthesized the Chapter 5 insights to assess how these interactions play out in integrated 1.5°C pathways, and the four illustrative pathway archetypes of this chapter in particular (see Section 2.1). Information from integrated pathways is combined with the interactions assessed in Chapter 5 and aggregated for each SDG, with a level of confidence attributed to each interaction based on the amount and agreement of the scientific evidence (see Chapter 5).

Figure 2.28 shows how the scale and combination of individual mitigation measures (i.e., their mitigation portfolios) influence the extent of synergies and trade-offs with other societal objectives. All pathways generate multiple synergies with SD dimensions and can advance several other SDGs simultaneously. Some, however, show higher risks for trade-offs. An example is increased biomass production and its potential to increase pressure on land and water resources, food production, biodiversity, and reduced air-quality when combusted inefficiently. At the same time, mitigation actions in energy-demand sectors and behavioural response options with appropriate management of rebound effects can advance multiple SDGs simultaneously, more so than energy supply-side mitigation actions (see Section 5.4, Table 5.1 and Figure 5.3 for more examples). Of the four pathway archetypes used in this chapter (*S1*, *S2*, *S5*, and *LED*), the *S1* and *LED* pathways show the largest number of synergies and least number of potential trade-offs, while for the *S5* pathway most potential trade-offs are identified. In general, pathways with emphasis on demand reductions, with policies that incentivise behavioural change, sustainable consumption patterns, healthy diets and relatively low use of CDR (or only afforestation) show relatively more synergies with individual SDGs than others.

There is *robust evidence* and *high agreement* in the pathway literature that multiple strategies can be considered to limit warming to 1.5°C (see Sections 2.1.3, 2.3 and 2.4). Together with the extensive evidence on the existence of interactions of mitigation measures with other societal objectives (Section 5.4), this results in *high confidence* that the choice of mitigation portfolio or strategy can markedly affect the achievement of other societal objectives. For instance, action on SLCFs has been suggested to facilitate the achievement of SDGs (Shindell et al., 2017b) and to reduce regional impacts, e.g., from black carbon sources on snow and ice loss in the Arctic and alpine regions (Painter et al., 2013), with particular focus on the warming sub-set of SLCFs. Reductions in both surface aerosols and ozone through methane reductions provide health and ecosystem co-benefits (Jacobson, 2002, 2010; Anenberg et al., 2012; Shindell et al., 2012; Stohl et al., 2015; Collins et al., 2018). Public health benefits of stringent mitigation pathways in line with 1.5°C-consistent pathways can be sizeable. For instance, a study examining a more rapid reduction of fossil-fuel usage to achieve 1.5°C relative to 2°C, similar to that of other recent studies (Grubler et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018), found that improved air quality would lead to more than 100 million avoided premature deaths over the 21st century (Shindell et al., 2018). These benefits are assumed to be in addition to those occurring under 2°C pathways (e.g., Silva et al., 2016), and could in monetary terms offset a large portion to all of the initial mitigation costs (West et al., 2013; Shindell et al., 2018). However, some sources of SLCFs with important impacts for public health (e.g., traditional biomass burning) are only mildly affected by climate policy in the available integrated pathways and are more strongly impacted by baseline assumptions about future societal development and preferences, and technologies instead (Rao et al., 2016, 2017).

At the same time, the literature on climate-SDG interactions is still an emergent field of research and hence

there is *low to medium confidence* in the precise magnitude of the majority of these interactions. Very limited literature suggests that achieving co-benefits are not automatically assured but result from conscious and carefully coordinated policies and implementation strategies (Shukla and Chaturvedi, 2012; Clarke et al., 2014; McCollum et al., 2018). Understanding these mitigation-SDG interactions is key for selecting mitigation options that maximise synergies and minimize trade-offs towards the 1.5°C and sustainable development objectives (van Vuuren et al., 2015; Hildingsson and Johansson, 2016; Jakob and Steckel, 2016; von Stechow et al., 2016; Delponte et al., 2017).

In summary, the combined evidence indicates that the chosen mitigation portfolio can distinctly have an impact on the achievement of other societal policy objectives (*high confidence*); however, there is uncertainty regarding the specific extent of climate-SDG interactions.

Sustainable development implications of alternative mitigation choices for 1.5°C pathways

deployment of specific mitigation measures can interact in various ways with SDGs




a level of confidence is assigned based on scientific evidence (table 2.28.1 indicates where additional evidence supports a particular conclusion - see Chapter 2)




SDG Interaction per mitigation measure and scale of deployment in pathway archetypes

pathways vary in their portfolio of mitigation measures, here illustrated by the four archetype pathways (LED, S1, S2, S5) which vary in their societal developments and mitigation strategies to achieve a 1.5°C-consistent emission pathway (see Section 2.1)

climate change mitigation measure and its interaction with SDGs



this leads to different relative scenario SDG risk and synergy profiles for each respective pathway archetype



combining the relative deployment of all more mitigation measures and their SDG interventions results in SDG synergy and risk profiles, which allow to assess the relative desirability of a mitigation pathway strategy in the context of sustainable development

Figure 2.28: Interactions of individual mitigation measures and alternative mitigations portfolios for 1.5°C with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The assessment of interactions between mitigation measures and individual SDGs is based on the assessment of Section 5.4. Proxy indicators and synthesis method are described in Annex 2.A.5.

2.6 Knowledge gaps

This section summarises the knowledge gaps articulated in earlier sections of the chapter.

2.6.1 *Geophysical understanding*

Knowledge gaps are associated with the carbon-cycle response, the role of non-CO₂ emissions and on the evaluation of an appropriate historic baseline.

Quantifying how the carbon cycle responds to negative emissions is an important knowledge gap for strong mitigation pathways (Section 2.2). Earth-system feedback uncertainties are important to consider for the longer-term response, particularly in how permafrost melting might affect the carbon budget (Section 2.2). Future research and ongoing observations over the next years will provide a better indication as to how the 2006-2015 base period compares with the long-term trends and might at present bias the carbon budget estimates.

The future emissions of short-lived climate forcers and their temperature response are a large source of uncertainty in 1.5°C pathways, having a greater relative uncertainty than in higher CO₂ emission pathways. Their global emissions, their sectorial and regional disaggregation and their climate response are generally less well quantified than for CO₂ (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). Emissions from the agricultural sector including land-use based mitigation options in 1.5°C pathways constitute the main source of uncertainty here and are an important gap in understanding the potential achievement of stringent mitigation scenarios (Sections 2.3 and 2.4). This also includes uncertainties surrounding the mitigation potential of the long-lived GHG nitrous oxide. (Sections 2.3 and 2.4)

There is considerable uncertainty in how future emissions of aerosol precursors will affect the effective radiative forcing from aerosol-cloud interaction. The potential future warming from mitigation of these emissions reduces remaining carbon budgets and increases peak temperatures (Section 2.2). The potential co-benefits of mitigating air pollutants and how the reduction in air pollution may affect the carbon sink are also important sources of uncertainty (Sections 2.2 and 2.5).

The pathway classification employed in this Chapter employs results from the MAGICC model with its AR5 parameter sets. The alternative representation of the relationship between emissions and effective radiative forcing and response in the FAIR model would lead to a different classification that would make 1.5°C targets more achievable (Section 2.2 and Annex 2.A.1). Such a revision would significantly alter the temperature outcomes for the pathways and, if the result is found to be robust, future research and assessments would need to adjust their classifications accordingly. Any possible high bias in the MAGICC response may be partly or entirely offset by missing Earth system feedbacks that are not represented in either climate emulator that would act to increase the temperature response (Section 2.2). For this assessment report, any possible bias in MAGICC setup applied in this and earlier reports is not established enough in the literature to change the classification approach. However, we only place *medium confidence* in the classification adopted by the chapter.

2.6.2 *Integrated assessment approaches*

IAMs attempt to be as broad as possible in order to explore interactions between various societal subsystems, like the economy, land, and energy system. They hence include stylised and simplified representations of these subsystems. Climate damages, avoided impacts and societal co-benefits of the modelled transformations remain largely unaccounted for and are important knowledge gaps. Furthermore, rapid technological changes and uncertainties about input data present continuous challenges.

The IAMs used in this report do not account for climate impacts (Section 2.1), and similarly, none of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) projections in the mitigation pathway literature assessed in this chapter included the feedback of climate damages on economic growth (Section 2.3). Although some IAMs do allow for climate impact feedbacks in their modelling frameworks, particularly in their land components, such

feedbacks were by design excluded in pathways developed in the context of the SSP framework. The SSP framework aims at providing an integrative framework for the assessment of climate change adaptation and mitigation. IAMs are typically developed to inform the mitigation component of this question, while the assessment of impacts is carried out by specialized impact models. However, the use of a consistent set of socio-economic drivers embodied by the SSPs allows for an integrated assessment of climate change impacts and mitigation challenges at a later stage. Further integration of these two strands of research will allow a better understanding of climate impacts on mitigation studies.

Many of the IAMs that contributed mitigation pathways to this assessment include a process-based description of the land system in addition to the energy system and several have been extended to cover air pollutants and water use. These features make them increasingly fit to explore questions beyond those that touch upon climate mitigation only. The models do not, however, fully account for all constraints that could affect realization of pathways (Section 2.1).

While the representation of renewable energy resource potentials, technology costs and system integration in IAMs has been updated since AR5, bottom-up studies find higher mitigation potentials in the industry, buildings, and transport sector in that realized by selected pathways from IAMs, indicating the possibility to strengthen sectorial decarbonisation strategies compared to the IAM 1.5°C pathways assessed in this chapter (Section 2.1).

Studies indicate that a major shift in investment patterns is required to limit global warming to 1.5°C. This assessment would benefit from a more explicit representation and understanding of the financial sector within the modelling approaches. Assumptions in modelling studies imply low-to-zero transaction costs for market agents and that regulatory oversight mechanisms and fiduciary duty need to be highly robust to guarantee stable and credible financial markets in the long term. This area can be subject to high uncertainty, however. The heterogeneity of actors (e.g., banks, insurance companies, asset managers, or credit rating agencies) and financial products also needs to be taken into account, as does the mobilisation of capital and financial flows between countries and regions (Section 2.5).

The literature on interactions between 1.5°C mitigation pathways and SDGs is an emergent field of research (Section 2.3.5, 2.5 and Chapter 5). Whereas the choice of mitigation strategies can noticeably affect the attainment of various societal objectives, there is uncertainty regarding the extent of the majority of identified interactions. Understanding climate-SDG interactions helps the choice of mitigation options that minimize trade-offs and risks and maximise synergies towards sustainable development objectives and the 1.5°C goal (Section 2.5).

2.6.3 Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR)

Most 1.5°C and 2°C pathways are heavily reliant on CDR at a speculatively large scale before mid-century. There are a number of knowledge gaps associated with such technologies. Chapter 4 performs a detailed assessment of CDR technologies.

There is uncertainty in the future deployment of CCS given the limited pace of current deployment, the evolution of CCS technology that would be associated with deployment, and the current lack of incentives for large-scale implementation of CCS (Section 4.2.7). Technologies other than BECCS and afforestation have yet to be comprehensively assessed in integrated assessment approaches. No proposed technology is close to deployment at scale and regulatory frameworks are not established. This limits how they can be realistically implemented within IAMs. (Section 2.3)

Evaluating the potential from BECCS is problematic due to large uncertainties in future land projections due to differences in modelling approaches in current land-use models which are at least as great as the differences attributed to climate scenario variations. (Section 2.3)

There is substantial uncertainty about the adverse effects of large-scale CDR deployment on the environment and societal sustainable development goals. It is not fully understood how land use and land management choices for large-scale BECCS will affect various ecosystem services and sustainable development, and

further translate into indirect impacts on climate including GHG emissions other than CO₂. (Section 2.3, Section 2.5.3)

Frequently Asked Questions

FAQ 2.1: What kind of pathways limit warming to 1.5°C and are we on track?

Summary: There is no definitive way to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. This Special Report identifies two main conceptual pathways to illustrate different interpretations. One stabilises global temperature at, or just below, 1.5°C. Another sees global temperature temporarily exceed 1.5°C before coming back down. Countries' pledges to reduce their emissions are currently not in line with limiting global warming to 1.5°C.

Scientists use computer models to simulate the emissions of greenhouse gases that would be consistent with different levels of warming. The different possibilities are often referred to as 'greenhouse gas emission pathways'. There is no single, definitive pathway to limiting warming to 1.5°C.

This IPCC special report identifies two main pathways that explore global warming of 1.5°C. The first involves global temperature stabilising at or below before 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. The second pathway sees warming exceed 1.5°C around mid-century, remain above 1.5°C for a maximum duration of a few decades, and return to below 1.5°C before 2100. The latter is often referred to as an 'overshoot' pathway. Any alternative situation in which global temperature continues to rise, exceeding 1.5°C permanently until the end of the 21st century, is not considered to be a 1.5°C pathway.


The two types of pathway have different implications for greenhouse gas emissions, as well as for climate change impacts and for achieving sustainable development. For example, the larger and longer an 'overshoot', the greater the reliance on practices or technologies that remove CO₂ from the atmosphere, on top of reducing the sources of emissions (mitigation). Such ideas for CO₂ removal have not been proven to work at scale and, therefore, run the risk of being less practical, effective or economical than assumed. There is also the risk that the use of CO₂ removal techniques ends up competing for land and water and if these trade-offs are not appropriately managed, they can adversely affect sustainable development. Additionally, a larger and longer overshoot increases the risk for irreversible climate impacts, such as the onset of the collapse of polar ice shelves and accelerated sea level rise.

Countries that formally accept or 'ratify' the Paris Agreement submit pledges for how they intend to address climate change. Unique to each country, these pledges are known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Different groups of researchers around the world have analysed the combined effect of adding up all the NDCs. Such analyses show that current pledges are not on track to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. If current pledges for 2030 are achieved but no more, researchers find very few (if any) ways to reduce emissions after 2030 sufficiently quickly to limit warming to 1.5°C. This, in turn, suggests that with the national pledges as they stand, warming would exceed 1.5°C, at least for a period of time, and practices and technologies that remove CO₂ from the atmosphere at a global scale would be required to return warming to 1.5°C at a later date.

A world that is consistent with holding warming to 1.5°C would see greenhouse gas emissions rapidly decline in the coming decade, with strong international cooperation and a scaling up of countries' combined ambition beyond current NDCs. In contrast, delayed action, limited international cooperation, and weak or fragmented policies that lead to stagnating or increasing greenhouse gas emissions would put the possibility of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels out of reach.

FAQ2.1: Conceptual pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C

Two main pathways illustrate different interpretations for limiting global warming to 1.5°C. The consequences will be different depending on the pathway



FAQ2.1, Figure 1: Two main pathways for limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels are discussed in this Special Report. These are: stabilising global temperature at, or just below, 1.5°C (left) and global temperature temporarily exceeding 1.5°C before coming back down later in the century (right). Temperatures shown are relative to pre-industrial but pathways are illustrative only, demonstrating conceptual not quantitative characteristics.

FAQ 2.2: What do energy supply and demand have to do with limiting warming to 1.5°C?

Summary: Limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels would require major reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in all sectors. But different sectors are not independent of each other and making changes in one can have implications for another. For example, if we as a society use a lot of energy, then this could mean we have less flexibility in the choice of mitigation options available to limit warming to 1.5°C. If we use less energy, the choice of possible actions is greater. For example we could be less reliant on technologies that remove carbon dioxide (CO₂) from the atmosphere.

To stabilise global temperature at any level, ‘net’ CO₂ emissions would need to be reduced to zero. This means the amount of CO₂ entering the atmosphere must equal the amount that is removed. Achieving a balance between CO₂ ‘sources’ and ‘sinks’ is often referred to as ‘net zero’ emissions or ‘carbon neutrality’. The implication of net zero emissions is that the concentration of CO₂ in the atmosphere would slowly decline over time until a new equilibrium is reached, as CO₂ emissions from human activity are redistributed and taken up by the oceans and the land biosphere. This would lead to a near-constant global temperature over many centuries.

Warming will not be limited to 1.5°C or 2°C unless transformations in a number of areas achieve the required greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Emissions would need to decline rapidly across all of society’s main sectors, including buildings, industry, transport, energy, and agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU). Actions that can reduce emissions include, for example, phasing out coal in the energy sector, increasing the amount of energy produced from renewable sources, electrifying transport, and reducing the ‘carbon footprint’ of the food we consume.

The above are examples of ‘supply-side’ actions. Broadly speaking, these are actions that can reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the use of low-carbon solutions. A different type of action can reduce how much energy human society uses, while still ensuring increasing levels of development and well-being. Known as ‘demand-side’ actions, this category includes improving energy efficiency in buildings and reducing consumption of energy- and greenhouse-gas intensive products through behavioural and lifestyle changes, for example. Demand and supply-side measures are not an either-or question, they work in parallel with each other. But emphasis can be given to one or the other.


Making changes in one sector can have consequences for another, as they are not independent of each other. In other words, the choices that we make now as a society in one sector can either restrict or expand our options later on. For example, a high demand for energy could mean we would need to deploy almost all known options to reduce emissions in order to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, with the potential for adverse side-effects. For example, a high-demand pathway increases our reliance on practices and technologies that remove CO₂ from the atmosphere. As of yet, such techniques have not been proven to work on a large scale and, depending on how they are implemented, could compete for land and water. By leading to lower overall energy demand, effective demand-side measures could allow for greater flexibility in how we structure our energy system. However, demand-side measures are not easy to implement and barriers have prevented the most efficient practices being used in the past.

FAQ2.2: Energy demand and supply in 1.5°C world

Lower energy demand could allow for greater flexibility in how we structure our energy system.

Low energy demand allows more choice about which low-carbon energy supply options to use to limit warming to 1.5°C.

With high energy demand, there is less flexibility as virtually all available options would need to be considered.



* Options include renewable energy (such as bioenergy, hydro, wind and solar), nuclear and the use of carbon dioxide removal techniques

FAQ2.2, Figure 1: Having a lower energy demand increases the flexibility in choosing options for supplying energy. A larger energy demand means many more low carbon energy supply options would need to be used.

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5

6

1 **Executive Summary**

2
3 This chapter builds on findings of the AR5 and assesses new scientific evidence of changes in the climate
4 system and the associated impacts on natural and human systems, with a specific focus on the magnitude and
5 pattern of risks for global warming of 1.5°C above the pre-industrial period. Chapter 3 explores observed
6 impacts and projected risks for a range of natural and human systems with a focus on how risk levels change
7 at 1.5°C and 2°C. The chapter also revisits major categories of risk (Reasons for Concern) based on the
8 assessment of the new knowledge available since the AR5.

9 10 **1.5°C and 2°C warmer worlds**

11 **The global climate has changed relative to the preindustrial period with multiple lines of evidence that**
12 **these changes have had impacts on organisms and ecosystems, as well as human systems and well-**
13 **being (*high confidence*).** The increase in global mean surface temperature (GMST), which reached 0.87°C
14 in 2006-2015 relative to 1850-1900, has increased the frequency and magnitude of impacts (*high*
15 *confidence*), strengthening evidence of how increasing GMST to 1.5°C or higher could impact natural and
16 human systems (1.5°C versus 2°C) {3.3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, Cross-Chapter Boxes 6, 7 and 8 in this
17 Chapter}.

18
19 **Human-induced global warming has already caused multiple observed changes in the climate system**
20 (*high confidence*). In particular this includes increases in both land and ocean temperatures, as well as more
21 frequent heatwaves in most land regions (*high confidence*). There is also *high confidence* that it has caused
22 an increase in the frequency and duration of marine heatwaves. Further, there is evidence that global
23 warming has led to an increase in the frequency, intensity and/or amount of heavy precipitation events at
24 global scale (*medium confidence*), as well as having increased the risk of drought in the Mediterranean
25 region (*medium confidence*) {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4}.

26
27 **Changes in temperature extremes and heavy precipitation indices are detectable in observations for**
28 **the 1991-2010 period compared with 1960-1979, when a global warming of approximately 0.5°C**
29 **occurred (*high confidence*).** The observed tendencies over that time frame are consistent with attributed
30 changes since the mid-20th century (*high confidence*) {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3}.

31
32 **There is no single ‘1.5°C warmer world’ (*high confidence*).** Important aspects to consider (beside that of
33 global temperature) are the possible occurrence of an overshoot and its associated peak warming and
34 duration, how stabilization of global surface temperature at 1.5°C is achieved, how policies might be able to
35 influence the resilience of human and natural systems, and the nature of the regional and sub-regional risks
36 (*high confidence*). Overshooting poses large risks for natural and human systems, especially if the
37 temperature at peak warming is high, because some risks may be long-lasting and irreversible, such as the
38 loss of many ecosystems (*high confidence*). The rate of change for several types of risks may also have
39 relevance with potentially large risks in case of a rapid rise to overshooting temperatures, even if a decrease
40 to 1.5°C may be achieved at the end of the 21st century or later (*medium confidence*). If overshoot is to be
41 minimized, the remaining equivalent CO₂ budget available for emissions is very small, which implies that
42 large, immediate, and unprecedented global efforts to mitigate greenhouse gases are required (*high*
43 *confidence*) {Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this Chapter; Sections 3.2 and 3.6.2}.

44
45 **Substantial global differences in temperature and extreme events are expected if GMST reaches 1.5°C**
46 **versus 2°C above the preindustrial period (*high confidence*).** Regional surface temperature means and

1 extremes are higher at 2°C as compared to 1.5°C for oceans (*high confidence*). Temperature means and
2 extremes are higher at 2°C as compared to 1.5°C global warming in most land regions, and display in some
3 regions 2-3 times greater increases when compared to GMST (*high confidence*). There are also substantial
4 increases in temperature means and extremes at 1.5°C versus present (*high confidence*) {3.3.1, 3.3.2}.

5 **Substantial changes in regional climate occur between 1.5°C and 2°C (*high confidence*), depending on**
6 **the variable and region in question (*high confidence*). Particularly large differences are found for**
7 **temperature extremes (*high confidence*).** Hot extremes display the strongest warming in mid-latitudes in
8 the warm season (with increases of up to 3°C at 1.5°C of warming, i.e. a factor of two) and at high-latitudes
9 in the cold season (with increases of up to 4.5°C at 1.5°C of warming, i.e. a factor of three) (*high*
10 *confidence*). The strongest warming of hot extremes is found in Central and Eastern North America, Central
11 and Southern Europe, the Mediterranean region (including Southern Europe, Northern Africa and the near-
12 East), Western and Central Asia, and Southern Africa (*medium confidence*). The number of highly unusual
13 hot days increase the most in the tropics, where inter-annual temperature variability is lowest; the emergence
14 of extreme heatwaves is thus earliest in these regions, where they become already widespread at 1.5°C global
15 warming (*high confidence*). Limiting global warming to 1.5°C instead of 2°C could result in around 420
16 million fewer people being frequently exposed to extreme heatwaves, and about 65 million fewer people
17 being exposed to exceptional heatwaves, assuming constant vulnerability (*medium confidence*) {3.3.1, 3.3.2,
18 Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this Chapter}.

19 **Limiting global warming to 1.5°C limits risks of increases in heavy precipitation events in several**
20 **regions (*high confidence*).** The regions with the largest increases in heavy precipitation events for 1.5°C to
21 2°C global warming include several high-latitude regions such as Alaska/Western Canada, Eastern
22 Canada/Greenland/Iceland, Northern Europe, northern Asia; mountainous regions (e.g. Tibetan Plateau); as
23 well as Eastern Asia (including China and Japan) and in Eastern North America (*medium confidence*).
24 {3.3.3}. Tropical cyclones are projected to increase in intensity (with associated increases in heavy
25 precipitation) although not in frequency (*low confidence, limited evidence*) {3.3.3, 3.3.6}.

26 **Limiting global warming to 1.5°C is expected to substantially reduce the probability of drought and**
27 **risks associated with water availability (i.e. water stress) in some regions (*medium confidence*).** In
28 particular, risks associated with increases in drought frequency and magnitude are substantially larger at 2°C
29 than at 1.5°C in the Mediterranean region (including Southern Europe, Northern Africa, and the Near-East)
30 and Southern Africa (*medium confidence*) {3.3.3, 3.3.4, Box 3.1, Box 3.2}.

31 **Risks to natural and human systems are lower at 1.5°C than 2°C (*high confidence*).** This is owing to the
32 smaller rates and magnitudes of climate change, including reduced frequencies and intensities of
33 temperature-related extremes. Reduced rates of change enhance the ability of natural and human systems to
34 adapt, with substantial benefits for a range of terrestrial, wetland, coastal and ocean ecosystems (including
35 coral reefs and wetlands), freshwater systems, as well as food production systems, human health, tourism,
36 energy systems, and transportation {3.3.1, 3.4}.

37 **Some regions are projected to experience multiple compound climate-related risks at 1.5°C that will**
38 **increase with warming of 2°C and higher (*high confidence*).** Some regions are projected to be affected by
39 collocated and/or concomitant changes in several types of hazards. Multi-sector risks are projected to overlap
40 spatially and temporally, creating new (and exacerbating current) hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities that
41 will affect increasing numbers of people and regions with additional warming. Small island states and
42 economically disadvantaged populations are particularly at risk. {Box 3.5, 3.3.1, 3.4.5.3, 3.4.5.6, 3.4.11,
43 3.5.4.9}.

1 **There is *medium confidence* that a global warming of 2°C would lead to an expansion of areas with**
2 **significant increases in runoff as well as those affected by flood hazard, as compared to conditions at**
3 **1.5°C global warming.** A global warming of 1.5°C would also lead to an expansion of the global land area
4 with significant increases in runoff (*medium confidence*) as well as an increase in flood hazard in some
5 regions (*medium confidence*) when compared to present-day conditions {3.3.5}.

6 **There is *high confidence* that the probability of a sea-ice-free Arctic Ocean during summer is**
7 **substantially higher at 2°C when compared to 1.5°C.** It is *very likely* that there will be at least one sea-ice-
8 free Arctic summer out of 10 years for warming at 2°C, with the frequency decreasing to one sea-ice-free
9 Arctic summer every 100 years at 1.5°C. There is also *high confidence* that an intermediate temperature
10 overshoot will have no long-term consequences for Arctic sea-ice coverage and that hysteresis behaviour is
11 not expected {3.3.8, 3.4.4.7}.

12
13 **Global mean sea level rise will be around 0.1 m less by the end of the century in a 1.5°C world as**
14 **compared to a 2°C warmer world (*medium confidence*).** Reduced sea level rise could mean that up to 10.4
15 million fewer people (based on the 2010 global population and assuming no adaptation) are exposed to the
16 impacts of sea level globally in 2100 at 1.5°C as compared to 2°C {3.4.5.1}. A slower rate of sea level rise
17 enables greater opportunities for adaptation (*medium confidence*) {3.4.5.7}. There is *high confidence* that sea
18 level rise will continue beyond 2100. Instabilities exist for both the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets that
19 could result in multi-meter rises in sea level on centennial to millennial timescales. There is *medium*
20 *confidence* that these instabilities could be triggered under 1.5° to 2°C of global warming {3.3.9, 3.6.3}.

21
22 **The ocean has absorbed about 30% of the anthropogenic carbon dioxide, resulting in ocean**
23 **acidification and changes to carbonate chemistry that are unprecedented in 65 million years at least**
24 **(*high confidence*).** Risks have been identified for the survival, calcification, growth, development, and
25 abundance of a broad range of taxonomic groups (i.e. from algae to fish) with substantial evidence of
26 predictable trait-based sensitivities. Multiple lines of evidence reveal that ocean warming and acidification
27 (corresponding to global warming of 1.5°C of global warming) is expected to impact a wide range of marine
28 organisms, ecosystems, as well as sectors such as aquaculture and fisheries (*high confidence*) {3.3.10, 3.4.4}.

29
30 **There are larger risks at 1.5°C than today for many regions and systems,** with adaptation being required
31 now and up to 1.5°C. There are, however, greater risks and effort needed for adaptation to 2°C (*high*
32 *confidence*) {3.4, Box 3.4, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this Chapter}.

33 **Future risks at 1.5°C will depend on the mitigation pathway and on the possible occurrence of a**
34 **transient overshoot (*high confidence*).** The impacts on natural and human systems would be greater where
35 mitigation pathways temporarily overshoot 1.5°C and return to 1.5°C later in the century, as compared to
36 pathways that stabilizes at 1.5°C without an overshoot. The size and duration of an overshoot will also affect
37 future impacts (e.g. loss of ecosystems, *medium confidence*). Changes in land use resulting from mitigation
38 choices could have impacts on food production and ecosystem diversity {Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, Cross-
39 Chapter boxes 7 and 8 in this Chapter}.

40 **Climate change risks for natural and human systems**

41 *Terrestrial and Wetland Ecosystems*

42
43
44 **Risks of local species losses and, consequently, risks of extinction are much less in a 1.5°C versus a 2°C**
45 **warmer world (*medium confidence*).** The number of species projected to lose over half of their climatically

1 determined geographic range (about 18% of insects, 16% of plants, 8% of vertebrates) is reduced by 50%
2 (plants, vertebrates) or 66% (insects) at 1.5°C versus 2°C of warming (*high confidence*). Risks associated
3 with other biodiversity-related factors such as forest fires, extreme weather events, and the spread of invasive
4 species, pests, and diseases, are also reduced at 1.5°C versus 2°C of warming (*high confidence*), supporting
5 greater persistence of ecosystem services {3.4.3.2, 3.5.2}.

6
7 **Constraining global warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C and higher has strong benefits for terrestrial
8 and wetland ecosystems and for the preservation of their services to humans (*high confidence*).** Risks
9 for natural and managed ecosystems are higher on drylands compared to humid lands. The terrestrial area
10 affected by ecosystem transformation (13%) at 2°C, which is approximately halved at 1.5°C global warming
11 (*high confidence*). Above 1.5°C, an expansion of desert and arid vegetation would occur in the
12 Mediterranean biome (*medium confidence*), causing changes unparalleled in the last 10,000 years (*medium
13 confidence*) {3.3.2.2, 3.4.3.5, 3.4.6.1., 3.5.5.10, Box 4.2}.

14
15 **Many impacts are projected to be larger at higher latitudes due to mean and cold-season warming
16 rates above the global average (*medium confidence*).** High-latitude tundra and boreal forest are
17 particularly at risk, and woody shrubs are already encroaching into tundra (*high confidence*). Further
18 warming is projected to cause greater effects in a 2°C world than a 1.5°C world, for example, constraining
19 warming to 1.5°C would prevent the melting of an estimated permafrost area of 2 million km² over centuries
20 compared to 2°C (*high confidence*) {3.3.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.4}.

21 *Ocean ecosystems*

22
23
24 **Ocean ecosystems are experiencing large-scale changes, with critical thresholds expected to be reached
25 at 1.5°C and above (*high confidence*).** In the transition to 1.5°C, changes to water temperatures will drive
26 some species (e.g. plankton, fish) to relocate to higher latitudes and for novel ecosystems to appear (*high
27 confidence*). Other ecosystems (e.g. kelp forests, coral reefs) are relatively less able to move, however, and
28 will experience high rates of mortality and loss (*very high confidence*). For example, multiple lines of
29 evidence indicate that the majority of warmer water coral reefs that exist today (70-90%) will largely
30 disappear when global warming exceeds 1.5°C (*very high confidence*) {3.4.4, Box 3.4}.

31 **Current ecosystem services from the ocean will be reduced at 1.5°C, with losses being greater at 2°C
32 (*high confidence*).** The risks of declining ocean productivity, shifts of species to higher latitudes, damage to
33 ecosystems (e.g. coral reefs, and mangroves, seagrass and other wetland ecosystems), loss of fisheries
34 productivity (at low latitudes), and changing ocean chemistry (e.g., acidification, hypoxia, dead zones),
35 however, are projected to be substantially lower when global warming is limited to 1.5°C (*high confidence*)
36 {3.4.4, Box 3.4}.

37 *Water Resources*

38
39
40 **The projected frequency and magnitude of floods and droughts in some regions are smaller under a
41 1.5°C versus 2°C of warming (*medium confidence*).** Human exposure to increased flooding is projected to
42 be substantially lower at 1.5°C as compared to 2°C of global warming, although projected changes create
43 regionally differentiated risks (*medium confidence*). The differences in the risks among regions are strongly
44 influenced by local socio-economic conditions (*medium confidence*) {3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.4.2}.

45 **Risks to water scarcity are greater at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming in some regions (*medium
46 confidence*).** Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would approximately halve the fraction of world population

1 expected to suffer water scarcity as compared to 2°C, although there is considerable variability between
2 regions (*medium confidence*). Socioeconomic drivers, however, are expected to have a greater influence on
3 these risks than the changes in climate (*medium confidence*) {3.3.5, 3.4.2, Box 3.5}.

4 *Land Use, Food Security and Food Production Systems*

5
6
7 **Global warming of 1.5°C (as opposed to 2°C) is projected to reduce climate induced impacts on crop**
8 **yield and nutritional content in some regions (*high confidence*)**. Affected areas include Sub-Saharan
9 Africa (West Africa, Southern Africa), South-East Asia, and Central and South America. A loss of 7-10% of
10 rangeland livestock globally is projected for approximately 2°C of warming with considerable economic
11 consequences for many communities and regions {3.6, 3.4.6, Box 3.1, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this Chapter}.

12 **Risks of food shortages are lower in the Sahel, southern Africa, the Mediterranean, central Europe,**
13 **and the Amazon at 1.5°C of global warming when compared to 2°C (*medium confidence*)**. This
14 suggests a transition from medium to high risk of regionally differentiated impacts between 1.5 and 2°C for
15 food security (*medium confidence*). International food trade is *likely* to be a potential adaptation response for
16 alleviating hunger in low- and middle-income countries {Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this Chapter}.

17 **Fisheries and aquaculture are important to global food security but are already facing increasing risks**
18 **from ocean warming and acidification (*medium confidence*), which will increase at 1.5°C global**
19 **warming**. Risks are increasing for marine aquaculture and many fisheries at warming and acidification at
20 1.5°C (e.g., many bivalves such as oysters, and fin fish; *medium confidence*), especially at low latitudes
21 (*medium confidence*). Small-scale fisheries in tropical regions, which are very dependent on habitat
22 provided by coastal ecosystems such as coral reefs, mangroves, seagrass and kelp forests, are at a high risk at
23 1.5°C due to loss of habitat (*medium confidence*). Risks of impacts and decreasing food security become
24 greater as warming and acidification increase, with substantial losses likely for coastal livelihoods and
25 industries (e.g. fisheries, aquaculture) as temperatures increase beyond 1.5°C (*medium to high confidence*).
26 {3.4.4, 3.4.5, 3.4.6, Box 3.1, Box 3.4, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this Chapter}

27 **Land use and land-use change emerge as a critical feature of virtually all mitigation pathways that**
28 **seek to limit global warming to 1.5°C (*robust evidence, high agreement*)**. Most least-cost mitigation
29 pathways to limit peak or end-of-century warming to 1.5°C make use of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR),
30 predominantly employing significant levels of Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and/or
31 Afforestation and Reforestation (AR) in their portfolio of mitigation measures (*robust evidence, high*
32 *agreement*) {Cross-Chapter Box 7 in this Chapter}.

33 **Large-scale, deployment of BECCS and/or AR would have a far-reaching land and water footprint**
34 **(*medium evidence, high agreement*)**. Whether this footprint results in adverse impacts, for example on
35 biodiversity or food production, depends on the existence and effectiveness of measures to conserve land
36 carbon stocks, measures to limit agricultural expansion so as to protect natural ecosystems, and the potential
37 to increase agricultural productivity (*high agreement, medium evidence*). In addition, BECCS and/or AR
38 would also have substantial direct effects on regional climate through biophysical feedbacks, which are
39 generally not included in Integrated Assessments Models (*high confidence*). {Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8
40 in this Chapter, Section 3.6.2}

41 **The impacts of large-scale CDR deployment can be greatly reduced if a wider portfolio of CDR**
42 **options is deployed, a holistic policy for sustainable land management is adopted and if increased**
43 **mitigation effort strongly limits demand for land, energy and material resources, including through**
44 **lifestyle and dietary change (*medium agreement, medium evidence*)**. In particular, reforestation may be

1 associated with significant co-benefits if implemented so as to restore natural ecosystems (*high confidence*)
2 {Cross-Chapter Box 7 in this Chapter}

3 4 *Human Systems: Human Health, Well-Being, Cities, and Poverty*

5
6 **Any increase in global warming (e.g., +0.5°C) will affect human health (*high confidence*). Risks will be**
7 **lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C for heat-related morbidity and mortality (*very high confidence*),**
8 **particularly in urban areas because of urban heat islands (*high confidence*).** Risks also will be greater
9 for ozone-related mortality if the emissions needed for the formation of ozone remain the same (*high*
10 *confidence*), and for undernutrition (*medium confidence*). Risks are projected to change for some vector-
11 borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever (*high confidence*), with positive or negative trends
12 depending on the disease, region, and extent of change (*high confidence*). Incorporating estimates of
13 adaptation into projections reduces the magnitude of risks (*high confidence*) {3.4.7, 3.4.7.1}.

14 **Global warming of 2°C is expected to pose greater risks to urban areas than global warming of 1.5°C**
15 **(*medium confidence*).** The extent of risk depends on human vulnerability and the effectiveness of adaptation
16 for regions (coastal and non-coastal), informal settlements, and infrastructure sectors (energy, water, and
17 transport) (*high confidence*) {3.4.5, 3.4.8}.

18
19 **Poverty and disadvantage have increased with recent warming (about 1°C) and are expected to**
20 **increase in many populations as average global temperatures increase from 1°C to 1.5°C and beyond**
21 **(*medium confidence*).** Outmigration in agricultural-dependent communities is positively and statistically
22 significantly associated with global temperature (*medium confidence*). Our understanding of the linkages of
23 1.5°C and 2°C on human migration are limited and represent an important knowledge gap {3.4.10, 3.4.11,
24 5.2.2, Table 3.5}.

25 26 *Key Economic Sectors and Services*

27
28 **Globally, the projected impacts on economic growth in a 1.5°C warmer world are larger than those of**
29 **the present-day (about 1°C), with the largest impacts expected in the tropics and the Southern**
30 **Hemisphere subtropics (*limited evidence, low confidence*).** At 2°C substantially lower economic growth is
31 projected for many developed and developing countries (*limited evidence, medium confidence*), with the
32 potential to also limit economic damages at 1.5°C of global warming. {3.5.2, 3.5.3}.

33
34 **The largest reductions in growth at 2°C compared to 1.5 °C of warming are projected for low- and**
35 **middle-income countries and regions** (the African continent, southeast Asia, India, Brazil and Mexico)
36 (*limited evidence, medium confidence*){3.5}.

37
38 **Global warming has affected tourism and increased risks are projected for specific geographic regions**
39 **and the seasonality of sun, beach, and snow sports tourism under warming of 1.5°C (*very high***
40 ***confidence*).** Risks will be lower for tourism markets that are less climate sensitive, such as non-
41 environmental (e.g., gaming) or large hotel-based activities (*high confidence*) {3.4.9.1}. Risks for coastal
42 tourism, particularly in sub-tropical and tropical regions, will increase with temperature-related degradation
43 (e.g. heat extremes, storms) or loss of beach and coral reef assets (*high confidence*) {3.4.9.1, 3.4.4.12; 3.3.6,
44 Box 3.4}.

1

2 *Small islands, and coastal and low-lying areas*

3

4 **Small islands are projected to experience multiple inter-related risks at 1.5°C that will increase with**
5 **warming of 2°C and higher (*high confidence*).** Climate hazards at 1.5°C are lower compared to 2°C (*high*
6 *confidence*). Long term risks of coastal flooding and impacts on population, infrastructure and assets (*high*
7 *confidence*), freshwater stress (*medium confidence*), and risks across marine ecosystems (*high confidence*),
8 and critical sectors (*medium confidence*) increase at 1.5°C as compared to present and further increase at
9 2°C, limiting adaptation opportunities and increasing loss and damage (*medium confidence*). Migration in
10 small islands (internally and internationally) occurs due to multiple causes and for multiple purposes, mostly
11 for better livelihood opportunities (*high confidence*) and increasingly due to sea level rise (*medium*
12 *confidence*). {3.3.2.2, 3.3.6-9, 3.4.3.2, 3.4.4.2, 3.4.4.5, 3.4.4.12, 3.4.5.3, 3.4.7.1, 3.4.9.1, 3.5.4.9, Box 3.4,
13 Box 3.5}.

14

15 **Impacts associated with sea level rise and changes to the salinity of coastal groundwater, increased**
16 **flooding and damage to infrastructure, are critically important in sensitive environments such as small**
17 **islands, low lying coasts and deltas at global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C (*high confidence*).** Localised
18 subsidence and changes to river discharge can potentially exacerbate these effects {3.4.5.4}. Adaptation is
19 happening today (*high confidence*) and remains important over multi-centennial timescales {3.4.5.3, 3.4.5.7,
20 Box 3.5, 5.4.5.4}.

21

22 **Existing and restored natural coastal ecosystems may be effective in reducing the adverse impacts of**
23 **rising sea levels and intensifying storms by protecting coastal and deltaic regions.** Natural
24 sedimentation rates are expected to be able to offset the effect of rising sea levels given the slower rates of
25 sea-level rise associated with 1.5°C of warming (*medium confidence*). Other feedbacks, such as landward
26 migration of wetlands and the adaptation of infrastructure, remain important (*medium confidence*) {3.4.4.12,
27 3.4.5.4, 3.4.5.7}

28

29 **Increased reasons for concern**

30 **There are multiple lines of evidence that there has been a substantial increase since AR5 in the levels**
31 **of risk associated with four of the five Reasons for Concern (RFCs) for global warming levels of up to**
32 **2°C (*high confidence*).** Constraining warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C avoids risk reaching a ‘very high’
33 level in RFC1 (Unique and Threatened Systems) (*high confidence*), and avoids risk reaching a ‘high’ level in
34 RFC3 (Distribution of Impacts) (*high confidence*) and RFC4 (Global Aggregate Impacts) (*medium*
35 *confidence*). It also reduces risks associated with RFC2 (Extreme Weather Events) and RFC5 (Large scale
36 singular events) (*high confidence*) {3.5.2}.

37 **In “Unique and Threatened Systems” (RFC1) the transition from high to very high risk is located**
38 **between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming as opposed to at 2.6°C global warming in AR5,** owing to new
39 and multiple lines of evidence for changing risks for coral reefs, the Arctic, and biodiversity in general (*high*
40 *confidence*) {3.5}.

41 1. **In “Extreme Weather Events” (RFC2) the transition from moderate to high risk is located**
42 **between 1.0°C and 1.5°C global warming,** which is very similar to the AR5 assessment but there is
43 greater confidence in the assessment (*medium confidence*). The impact literature contains little

- 1 information about the potential for human society to adapt to extreme weather events and hence it has
2 not been possible to locate the transition from 'high' (red) to 'very high' risk within the context of
3 assessing impacts at 1.5°C versus 2°C global warming. There is thus *low confidence* in the level at which
4 global warming could lead to very high risks associated with extreme weather events in the context of
5 this report {3.5}.
- 6 2. **In “Distribution of impacts” (RFC3) a transition from moderate to high risk is now located**
7 **between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming as compared with between 1.6°C and 2.6°C global warming**
8 **in AR5**, due to new evidence about regionally differentiated risks to food security, water resources,
9 drought, heat exposure, and coastal submergence (*high confidence*) {3.5}.
- 10
11 3. **In “Global aggregate impacts” (RFC4) a transition from moderate to high levels of risk now**
12 **occurs between 1.5°C and 2.5°C global warming** as opposed to at 3°C warming in AR5, owing to new
13 evidence about global aggregate economic impacts and risks to the earth’s biodiversity (*medium*
14 *confidence*) {3.5}.
- 15 4. **In “Large scale singular events” (RFC5), moderate risk is located at 1°C global warming**
16 **and high risks are located at 2.5°C global warming**, as opposed to 1.9°C (moderate) and 4°C global
17 warming (high) risk in AR5 because of new observations and models of the West Antarctic ice sheet
18 (*medium confidence*) {3.3.9, 3.5.2, 3.6.3}
- 19
20
21

1 **3.1 About the chapter**


2

3 Chapter 3 uses relevant definitions of a potential 1.5°C warmer world from Chapters 1 and 2 and builds
4 directly on their assessment of gradual versus overshoot scenarios. It interacts with information presented in
5 Chapter 2 via the provision of specific details relating to the mitigation pathways (e.g., land use changes) and
6 their implications for impacts. Information for the assessment and implementation of adaptation options in
7 Chapter 4, and the context for considering the interactions of climate change with sustainable development in
8 Chapter 5 for the assessment of impacts on sustainability, poverty and inequalities at the level of sub-regions
9 to households, are provided by Chapter 3.

10 This chapter is necessarily transdisciplinary in its coverage of the climate system, natural and managed
11 ecosystems, and human systems and responses, due to the integrated nature of the natural and human
12 experience. While climate change is acknowledged as a centrally important driver, it is not the only driver of
13 risks to human and natural systems, and in many cases, it is the interaction between these two broad
14 categories of risk that is important (Chapter 1).

15 The flow of the chapter, linkages between sections, a list of chapter and cross chapter boxes, and a content
16 guide for reading according to focus or interest are given in Figure 3.1. Key definitions used in the chapter
17 are collected in the Glossary. Confidence language is used throughout this chapter and likelihood statements
18 (e.g. *likely*, *very likely*) are provided when there is *high* confidence in the assessment.

19



1

2 **Figure 3.1:** Chapter 3 structure and quick guide

3

4 The underlying literature assessed in Chapter 3 is broad, including a large number of recent publications
 5 specific to assessments for 1.5°C warming. The chapter also utilizes information covered in prior IPCC
 6 special reports, for example Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to
 7 Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX, IPCC, 2012), and many chapters which assess impacts on
 8 natural and managed ecosystems and humans and adaptation options from the IPCC WGII Fifth Assessment
 9 Report (AR5) (IPCC, 2014b). For this reason, the chapter provides information based on a broad range of
 10 assessment methods. Details about the approaches used are presented in Section 3.2.

11

12 Section 3.3 gives a general overview of recent literature on observed climate change impacts as the context
 13 for projected future risks. With a few exceptions, the focus is on analyses of *transient responses* at 1.5°C and
 14 2°C, with simulations of *short-term stabilization scenarios* (Section 3.2) also assessed in some cases. In
 15 general, *long-term equilibrium stabilization responses* could not be assessed due to lack of data availability.
 16 A detailed analysis of detection and attribution is not provided. Furthermore, possible interventions in the
 17 climate system through radiation modification measures which are not tied to reductions of greenhouse gas
 18 emissions or concentrations are not assessed in this chapter.

19

20 Understanding the observed impacts and projected risks of climate change forms a crucial element in
 21 understanding how the world is likely to change under global warming of 1.5°C above the preindustrial

1 period (with reference to 2°C). Section 3.4 explores the new literature and updates the assessment of impacts
2 and projected risks into the future for a large number of natural and human systems. By also exploring
3 adaptation opportunities (where the literature allows), the section prepares the ground for later discussions in
4 subsequent chapters about opportunities to tackle both mitigation and adaptation. The section is mostly
5 globally focussed because of limited research on regional risks and adaptation options at 1.5°C and 2°C. For
6 example, on the risks of warming of 1.5°C and 2°C in urban areas, and climate-sensitive health outcomes,
7 such as climate related disease, medical impacts of poor air quality, or mental health, were not considered
8 because of the lack of projections of how risks might change in 1.5°C and 2°C worlds. In addition, the
9 complex interactions of climate change with drivers of poverty and livelihoods meant it was not possible to
10 detect and attribute recent changes to climate change, even with increasing documentation of climate-related
11 impacts on places where indigenous peoples live and where subsistence-oriented communities are to be
12 found, because of limited projections of the risks associated with warming of 1.5°C and 2°C.

13
14 To explore avoided impacts and reduced risks at 1.5°C compared with 2°C, the chapter adopts the AR5
15 ‘Reasons for Concern’ aggregated projected risk framework (Section 3.5). Updates in terms of the
16 aggregation of risk are informed by the most recent literature and the assessments offered in Sections 3.3 and
17 3.4 with focus on the avoided impacts at 1.5°C as compared to 2°C. Economic benefits to be obtained
18 (Section 3.5.3), climate change ‘hot spots’ that can be avoided or reduced (Section 3.5.4 as guided by the
19 assessments of Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5), and tipping points that can be avoided (Section 3.5.5) at 1.5°C
20 compared to higher degrees of global warming, are all examined. These latter assessments are, however,
21 constrained to regional analysis, and the section does not include an assessment of loss and damages.

22
23 Section 3.6 provides an overview on specific aspects of the mitigation pathways considered compatible with
24 1.5°C global warming including some overshoot above 1.5°C global warming during the 21st century. Non-
25 CO₂ implications and projected risks of mitigation pathways, such as changes to land use and atmospheric
26 compounds are presented and explored. Finally, implications for sea ice, sea level and permafrost beyond the
27 end of the century are assessed.

28
29 The exhaustive assessment of 1.5°C specific literature presented across all the sections in Chapter 3
30 highlighted knowledge gaps resulting from the heterogeneous information across systems, regions and
31 sectors. Some of these gaps are listed in Section 3.7.

32
33

34 **3.2 How are risks at 1.5°C and higher levels of global warming assessed in this chapter?**

35

36 The methods that are applied for assessing observed and projected changes in climate and weather are
37 presented in Section 3.2.1 while those used for assessing the observed impacts and projected risks to natural
38 and managed systems, and human settlements, are described in Section 3.2.2. Given that changes in climate
39 associated with 1.5°C of global warming were not the focus of past IPCC reports, dedicated approaches
40 based on recent literature and which are specific to the present report, are also described. Background on
41 specific methodological aspects (climate model simulations available for assessments at 1.5°C global
42 warming, attribution of observed changes in climate and their relevance for assessing projected changes at
43 1.5°C and 2°C global warming, and the propagation of uncertainties from climate forcing to impacts on the
44 ecosystems) are provided in the Supplementary Material 3.SM.

45

46 **3.2.1 How are changes in climate and weather at 1.5°C versus higher levels of warming assessed?**

47

1 Evidence for the assessment of changes to climate at 1.5°C versus 2°C can draw both from observations and
2 model projections. Global Mean Surface Temperature (GMST) anomalies were about +0.87°C (±0.10°C
3 *likely* range) above pre-industrial industrial (1850-1900) values in the 2006-2015 decade, with a recent
4 warming of about 0.2°C (±0.10°C) per decade (Chapter 1). Human-induced global warming reached
5 approximately 1°C (±0.2°C *likely* range) in 2017 (Chapter 1). While some of the observed trends may be due
6 to internal climate variability, methods of detection and attribution can be applied to assess which part of the
7 observed changes may be attributed to anthropogenic forcing (Bindoff et al., 2013b). Hence, evidence from
8 attribution studies can be used to assess changes in the climate system that are already detectable at lower
9 levels of global warming and would thus continue to change for a further increase of 0.5°C or 1°C in global
10 warming (see Supplementary Material 3.SM.1 and Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4 and 3.3.11). A recent
11 study also investigated significant changes in extremes for a 0.5°C difference in global warming based on the
12 historical record (Schleussner et al., 2017).

13
14 Climate model simulations are necessary for the investigation of the response of the climate system to
15 various forcings, in particular for forcings associated with higher levels of greenhouse gas concentrations.
16 Model simulations include experiments with global and regional climate models, as well as impact models
17 (driven with output from climate models) to evaluate the risk related to climate change for natural and
18 human systems (Supplementary Material 3.SM.1). Climate model simulations were generally used in the
19 context of particular ‘climate scenarios’ from previous IPCC reports (e.g., IPCC, 2007, 2013). This means
20 that emission scenarios (IPCC, 2000) were used to drive climate models, providing different projections for
21 given emissions pathways. The results were consequently used in a ‘storyline’ framework, which presents
22 the development of climate in the course of the 21st century and beyond, if a given emission pathway was to
23 be followed. Results were assessed for different time slices within the model projections, for example for
24 2016-2035 (‘near term’, which is slightly below a 1.5°C global warming in most scenarios, Kirtman et al.,
25 2013), 2046-65 (mid 21st century, Collins et al., 2013), and 2081-2100 (end of 21st century, Collins et al.,
26 2013). Given that this report focuses on climate change for a given mean global temperature response (1.5°C
27 or 2°C), methods of analysis had to be developed and/or adapted from previous studies in order to provide
28 assessments for the specific purposes here.

29
30 A major challenge in assessing climate change under 1.5°C (or 2°C and higher-level) global warming
31 pertains to the **definition of a ‘1.5°C or 2°C climate projection’** (see also Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this
32 Chapter). Resolving this challenge includes the following considerations:

- 33
34 A. The need for distinguishing between (a) **transient climate responses** (i.e. those that ‘pass through’
35 1.5°C or 2°C global warming), (b) **short-term stabilization responses** (i.e. late 21st-century
36 scenarios that result in stabilization at a mean global warming of 1.5°C or 2°C by 2100), and (c)
37 **long-term equilibrium stabilization responses** (i.e. once climate equilibrium at 1.5°C or 2°C is
38 reached, after several millennia). These responses can be very different in terms of climate variables
39 and the inertia associated with a given climate forcing. A striking example is Sea Level Rise (SLR).
40 In this case, projected increases within the 21st century are minimally dependent on the considered
41 scenario yet stabilize at very different levels for a long-term warming of 1.5°C versus 2°C (Section
42 3.3.9).
- 43
44 B. That ‘1.5°C or 2°C emissions scenarios’ presented in Chapter 2 are targeted to hold warming below
45 1.5°C or 2°C with a certain probability (generally 2/3) over the course, or end, of the 21st century.
46 These scenarios should be seen as operationalisations of 1.5°C or 2°C worlds. However, when these
47 emission scenarios are used to drive climate models, some of the resulting simulations lead to

1 warming above these respective thresholds (typically with a probability of 1/3, see Chapter 2 and
2 Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this Chapter). This is due both to discrepancies between models and internal
3 climate variability. For this reason, the climate outcome for any of these scenarios, even those
4 excluding an overshoot (see next point, C.), include some probability of reaching a global climate
5 warming higher than 1.5°C or 2°C. Hence, a comprehensive assessment of climate risks associated
6 with ‘1.5°C or 2°C climate scenarios’ needs to include consideration of higher levels of warming
7 (e.g. up to 2.5°C -3°C, see Chapter 2 and Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this Chapter).

- 8
- 9 C. Most of the ‘1.5°C scenarios’, and some of the ‘2°C emissions scenarios’ of Chapter 2, include a
10 temperature overshoot during the course of the 21st century. This means that median temperature
11 projections under these scenarios exceed the target warming levels over the course of the century
12 (typically up to 0.5°C-1°C higher than the respective target levels at most), before warming returns
13 to below 1.5°C or 2°C achieved by 2100. During the overshoot phase, impacts would therefore
14 correspond to higher transient temperature levels than 1.5°C or 2°C. For this reason, impacts for
15 transient responses at these higher levels are also partly addressed in Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this
16 Chapter on 1.5°C warmer worlds, and some analyses for changes in extremes are also displayed for
17 higher levels of warming in Section 3.3 (Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.9, 3.10, 3.12, 3.13). Most importantly,
18 different overshoot scenarios may have very distinct impacts depending on (a) the peak temperature
19 of the overshoot, (b) the length of the overshoot period, and (c) the associated rate of change in
20 global temperature over the time period of the overshoot. While some of these issues are briefly
21 addressed in Sections 3.3 and 3.6, and the Cross-Chapter Box 8 (in this Chapter), the definition and
22 questions surrounding overshoot will need to be addressed more comprehensively in the IPCC AR6
23 report.
- 24
- 25 D. The meaning of ‘1.5°C or 2°C’ global warming climate was not defined prior to this report, although
26 it is defined as relative to the climate associated with the Pre-Industrial Period. This requires an
27 agreement on the exact reference time period (for 0°C warming) and the time frame over which the
28 global warming is assessed (e.g. typically a climatic time period, such as one that is 20 or 30 years in
29 length). As discussed in Chapter 1, a 1.5°C climate is one in which temperature differences averaged
30 over a multi-decade timescale are 1.5°C above the pre-industrial reference period. Greater detail is
31 provided in the Cross-Chapter Box 8. Inherent to this is the observation that the mean temperature of
32 a ‘1.5°C warmer world’ can be regionally and temporally much higher (e.g. regional annual
33 temperature extremes can display a warming of more than 6°C, see Section 3.3 and Cross-Chapter
34 Box 8 in this Chapter).
- 35
- 36 E. Non-greenhouse gas related interference with mitigation pathways can strongly affect regional
37 climate. For example, biophysical feedbacks from changes in land use and irrigation (e.g. Hirsch et
38 al., 2017; Thiery et al., 2017), or projected changes in short-lived pollutants (e.g. Z. Wang et al.,
39 2017), can have large influences on local temperatures and climate conditions. While these effects
40 are not explicitly integrated into the scenarios developed in Chapter 2, they may affect projected
41 changes in climate for 1.5°C of global warming. These issues are addressed in more detail in Section
42 3.6.2.2.

43

44 The assessment done in the current chapter largely focusses on the analysis of **transient responses in**
45 **climate at 1.5°C versus 2°C** and higher levels of warming (see point A. above, Section 3.3). It generally
46 uses the Empirical Scaling Relationship approach (ESR, Seneviratne et al., 2018c), also termed ‘time
47 sampling’ approach (James et al., 2017), which consists of sampling the response at 1.5°C and other levels of

1 global warming from all available global climate model scenarios for the 21st century (e.g., Schleussner et
2 al., 2016b; Seneviratne et al., 2016; Wartenburger et al., 2017). The ESR approach focuses more on the
3 derivation of a continuous relationship, while the term time sampling is more commonly used when
4 comparing a limited number of warming levels (e.g. 1.5°C versus 2°C). A similar approach in the case of
5 Regional Climate Model (RCM) simulations consists of sampling the RCM model output corresponding to
6 the time frame at which the driving General Circulation Model (GCM) reaches the considered temperature
7 level (e.g., as done within the IMPACT2C project (Jacob and Solman, 2017), see description in Vautard et
8 al. (2014)). As an alternative to the ESR or time sampling approach, pattern scaling may be used. Pattern
9 scaling is a statistical approach that describes relationships of specific climate responses as a function of
10 global temperature change. Some assessments of this chapter are also based on this method. The
11 disadvantage of pattern scaling, however, is that the relationship may not perfectly emulate the models'
12 responses at each location and for each global temperature level (James et al., 2017). Expert judgement is a
13 third methodology that can be used to assess probable changes at 1.5°C or 2°C by combining changes that
14 have been attributed for the observed time period (corresponding already to a warming of 1°C or smaller if
15 assessed over a shorter time period) and known projected changes at 3°C or 4°C above the pre-industrial
16 (Supplementary Material 3.SM.1). In order to compare effects induced by a 0.5°C difference in global
17 warming, it is also possible to use, in a first approximation, the historical record as a proxy in which two
18 periods are compared in cases where they approximate this difference in warming (e.g. such as 1991-2010
19 and 1960-1979, e.g. Schleussner et al., 2017). Using observations, however, does not allow an accounting for
20 possible non-linear changes that would occur above 1°C or as 1.5°C of global warming is achieved.

21
22 In some cases, assessments for **short-term stabilization responses** could also be provided, derived from
23 using a subset of model simulations that reach a given temperature limit by 2100, or were driven with Sea
24 Surface Temperature (SST) consistent with such scenarios. This includes new results from the 'Half a degree
25 additional warming, prognosis and projected impacts' (HAPPI) project (Chapter 1, Section 1.5.2, Mitchell et
26 al., 2017). It should be noted that there is evidence that for some variables (e.g. temperature and precipitation
27 extremes), responses after short-term stabilization (i.e. approximately equivalent to the RCP2.6 scenario) are
28 very similar to the transient response of higher-emission scenarios (Seneviratne et al., 2016, 2018a;
29 Wartenburger et al., 2017; Tebaldi and Knutti, 2018). This is, however, less the case for mean precipitation
30 (e.g., Pendergrass et al., 2015)) for which other aspects of the emissions scenarios appear relevant.

31
32 For the assessment of **long-term equilibrium stabilization responses**, this chapter uses results from
33 existing simulations where available (e.g. for sea level rise), although the available data for this type of
34 projections is limited for many variables and scenarios and will need to be addressed in more depth in the
35 IPCC AR6 report.

36
37 Supplementary Material 3.SM.1 of this chapter includes greater detail of the climate models and associated
38 simulations that were used to support the present assessment, as well as a background on detection and
39 attribution approaches of relevance to assessing changes in climate at 1.5°C global warming.

40
41

42 **3.2.2 How are potential impacts on ecosystems assessed at 1.5°C versus higher levels of warming?**

43

44 Considering that the observed impacts so far are for a lower global warming than 1.5°C (generally up to the
45 2006-2015 decade, i.e. for a global warming of 0.87°C or less; see above), direct information on the impacts
46 of a global warming of 1.5°C is not yet available. The global distribution of observed impacts shown in the
47 AR5 (Cramer et al., 2014), however, demonstrates that methodologies now exist which are capable of

1 detecting impacts in systems strongly influenced by confounding factors (e.g. urbanization or more generally
2 human pressure) or where climate may play only a secondary role in driving impacts. Attribution of
3 observed impacts to greenhouse gas forcing is more rarely performed, but a recent study (Hansen and Stone,
4 2016) shows that most of the detected temperature-related impacts that were reported in the AR5 (Cramer et
5 al., 2014) can be attributed to anthropogenic climate change, while the signals for precipitation-induced
6 responses are more ambiguous.

7
8 One simple approach for assessing possible impacts on natural and managed systems at 1.5°C versus 2°C
9 consists of identifying impacts of a global 0.5°C warming in the observational record (e.g., Schleussner et
10 al., 2016b), assuming that the impacts would scale linearly for higher levels of warming (although this may
11 not be appropriate). Another approach is to use conclusions from past climates combined with the modeling
12 of the relationships between climate drivers and natural systems (Box 3.3). A more complex approach relies
13 on laboratory or field experiments (Dove et al., 2013; Bonal et al., 2016) which provide useful information
14 on the causal effect of a few factors (which can be as diverse as climate, greenhouse gases (GHG),
15 management practices, biological and ecological factors) on specific natural systems that may have unusual
16 physical and chemical characteristics (e.g., Fabricius et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2017). The latter can be
17 important in helping to develop and calibrate impact mechanisms and models through empirical
18 experimentation and observation.

19
20 Risks for natural and human systems are often assessed with impact models where climate inputs are
21 provided by Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP)-based climate projections. Studies projecting
22 impacts at 1.5°C or 2°C global warming have increased in recent times (see Section 3.4) even if the four
23 RCP scenarios used in the AR5 are not strictly associated to these levels of global warming levels. Several
24 approaches have been used to extract the required climate scenarios, as described in Section 3.2.1. As an
25 example, Schleussner et al. (2016b) applied time sampling (or ESR) approach (described in Section 3.2.1) to
26 estimate the differential effect of 1.5°C and 2°C global warming on water availability and impacts on
27 agriculture using an ensemble of simulations under the RCP8.5 scenario. As a further example using a
28 different approach, Iizumi et al. (2017) derived a 1.5°C scenario from simulations with a crop model using
29 interpolation between the no-change (approximately 2010) conditions and the RCP2.6 scenario (with a
30 global warming of +1.8°C in 2100), and derived the corresponding 2°C scenario from RCP2.6 and RCP4.5
31 simulations in 2100. The Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Integration and Intercomparison Project Phase 2
32 (ISIMIP2) (Frieler et al., 2017) extended this approach to a number of sectoral impacts on the terrestrial and
33 marine ecosystems. In most cases, the risks are assessed by impact models coupled offline to climate models
34 after bias correction, which may modify long-term trends (Grillakis et al., 2017).

35
36 Assessment of local impacts of climate change necessarily involves a change in scale (i.e from the global
37 scale to that of natural or human systems) (Frieler et al., 2017; Reyer et al., 2017d; Jacob et al., 2018). An
38 appropriate method of downscaling (Supplementary Material 3.SM.1) is crucially important in translating
39 perspectives on 1.5°C and 2°C to scales and impacts relevant to humans and ecosystems. A major challenge
40 that is associated with this requirement is to reproduce correctly the variance of local to regional changes, as
41 well as the frequency and amplitude of the extreme events (Vautard et al., 2014). In addition, maintaining
42 physical consistency between downscaled variables is also important, but challenging (Frost et al., 2011).


43
44 Another major challenge relates to the propagation of the uncertainties at each step of the methodology, from
45 the global forcings to the global climate, and regional climate to the impacts at the ecosystem level, taking
46 into account local disturbances and local policy effects. The risks for natural and human systems are the
47 result of intricate global and local drivers, which makes quantitative uncertainty analysis difficult. Such

1 analyses are partly done using multi-model approaches, such as multi-climate and multi-impact models
2 (Warszawski et al., 2013, 2014; Frieler et al., 2017). In some cases, the greater proportion of the uncertainty
3 (e.g., crop projections) is due to variation among crop models rather than that of the downscaled climate
4 models being used (Asseng et al., 2013). The study of the error propagation is an important issue for coupled
5 models. Dealing correctly with the uncertainties in a robust probabilistic model is particularly important
6 when considering the potential for relatively small changes to affect the already small signal associated with
7 0.5°C (Supplementary Material 3.SM.1). The computation of the impact per unit of climatic change either
8 based on models or data is a simple way to present the probabilistic ecosystem response taking into account
9 the various sources of uncertainties (Fronzek et al., 2011).

10
11 In summary, in order to assess risks at 1.5°C and higher levels of global warming, several considerations
12 need to be taken into account. Projected climates under 1.5°C of global warming can be different depending
13 on the temporal aspects and pathways of emissions. Considerations include whether global temperature is a)
14 temporarily at this level (i.e. is a transient phase on its way to higher levels of warming), b) arrives at 1.5°C
15 after stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations with or without overshoot, or c) is at this level as part of
16 long-term climate equilibrium (after several millennia). Assessments of impacts of 1.5°C warming are
17 generally based on climate simulations for these different possible pathways. More data and analyses are
18 available for transient impacts (a). There are fewer data for dedicated climate model simulations that are able
19 to assess pathways consistent with (b). There are very limited data available for the assessment of changes at
20 climate equilibrium (c). In some cases, inferences regarding the impacts of further warming of 0.5°C above
21 today (i.e. 1.5°C global warming) can also be drawn from observations of similar sized changes (0.5°C) that
22 have occurred in the past (e.g. last 50 years). However, impacts can only be partly inferred from these types
23 of observations given the strong possibility of non-linear changes, as well as lag effects for some climate
24 variables (e.g. sea level rise, snow and ice melt). For the impact models, three problems are noted about the
25 coupling procedure: (i) the bias correction of the climate model which may modify the simulated response of
26 the ecosystem, (ii) the necessity to downscale the climate model outputs to reach a pertinent scale for the
27 ecosystem without losing the physical consistency of the downscaled climate fields, and (iii) the necessity to
28 develop an integrated study of the uncertainties.

3.3 Global and regional climate changes and associated hazards

33 This section provides the assessment of changes in climate at 1.5°C global warming relative to higher global
34 mean temperatures. Section 3.3.1 provides a brief overview of changes to global climate. Sections 3.3.2-
35 3.3.11 provide assessments for specific aspects of the climate system, including regional assessments for
36 temperature (Section 3.3.2) and precipitation (Section 3.3.3) means and extremes. Analyses of regional
37 changes are based on the set of regions displayed in Figure 3.2. A synthesis of the main conclusions of this
38 section is provided in Section 3.3.11. The section builds upon assessments from the IPCC AR5 WG1 report
39 (Bindoff et al., 2013a; Christensen et al., 2013; Collins et al., 2013; Hartmann et al., 2013; IPCC, 2013) and
40 Chapter 3 of the IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and disasters to Advance
41 Climate Change Adaptation (SREX)(Seneviratne et al., 2012), as well as a substantial body of new literature
42 related to projections of climate at 1.5°C and 2°C of warming above the pre-industrial period (e.g., Vautard
43 et al., 2014; Fischer and Knutti, 2015; Schleussner et al., 2016b; Seneviratne et al., 2016, 2018c; Déqué et
44 al., 2017; Maule et al., 2017; Mitchell et al., 2017; Wartenburger et al., 2017; Zaman et al., 2017; Betts et al.,
45 2018; Jacob et al., 2018; Kharin et al., 2018; Mitchell et al., 2018; Wehner et al., 2018). The main
46 assessment methods are as already detailed in Section 3.2.




1 **Figure 3.2:** Regions used for regional analyses provided in Section 3.3. The choice of regions is based on the IPCC
 2 Fifth Assessment Report (AR5, Chapter 14, Christensen et al., 2013) and Annex 1: Atlas and the Special
 3 Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation
 4 (SREX, Chapter 3, Seneviratne et al., 2012), including seven additional regions (Arctic, Antarctic and
 5 islands) compared to the IPCC SREX report (indicated with asterisks). Analyses for regions with asterisks
 6 are provided in the Supplementary Material 3.SM.2

9 3.3.1 Global changes in climate

11 There is *high confidence* that the Global Mean Surface Temperature (GMST) warming has reached 0.87°C
 12 ($\pm 0.10^\circ\text{C}$ *likely* range) above pre-industrial in the 2006-2015 decade (Chapter 1). The AR5 assessed that the
 13 globally averaged temperature (combined over land and ocean) displayed a warming of about 0.85°C
 14 [0.65°C to 1.06°C] for the period 1880-2012, with a large fraction of the detected global warming being
 15 attributed to anthropogenic forcing (Bindoff et al., 2013a; Hartmann et al., 2013; Stocker et al., 2013). While
 16 new evidence has highlighted that sampling biases and the choice of approaches to estimate GMST (e.g.,
 17 using water versus air temperature over oceans; model simulations versus observations-based estimates) can
 18 affect estimates of GMST warming (Richardson et al., 2016) (see also Supplementary Material 3.SM.2), the
 19 present assessment is consistent with that of the AR5 regarding a detectable and dominant effect of
 20 anthropogenic forcing on observed trends in global temperature (e.g., also confirmed in Ribes et al., 2017).
 21 As highlighted in Chapter 1, human-induced warming reached approximately 1°C ($\pm 0.2^\circ\text{C}$ *likely* range) in
 22 2017. More background on recent observed trends in global climate is provided in the Supplementary
 23 Material 3.SM.2.

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A global warming of 1.5°C implies warmer mean temperatures compared to pre-industrial times in almost all locations on both land and oceans (*high confidence*) (Figure 3.3). In addition, differences resulting from 1.5°C and 2°C global warming are detectable in mean temperatures in almost all locations on both land and ocean (*high confidence*). The land-sea contrast in temperature warming is important and implies particularly large changes in temperature over land, with larger mean warming than 1.5°C in most land regions (*high confidence*; see Section 3.3.2 for more details). The highest warming of the mean temperature is found in the northern high latitudes (*high confidence*; Figure 3.3, see Section 3.3.2 for more details). Projections for precipitation are more uncertain, but highlight significant increases in mean precipitation in the Northern Hemisphere high latitudes at 2°C versus 1.5°C global warming (*medium confidence*) (Figure 3.3). For droughts, changes in evapotranspiration and precipitation timing are also relevant (see Section 3.3.4). Figure 3.4 displays changes in temperature extremes (the hottest day of the year, TXx, and the coldest day of the year TNn) and heavy precipitation (the annual maximum 5-day precipitation, Rx5day). These analyses reveal distinct patterns of changes, with highest changes in TXx in mid-latitude land, and highest changes in TNn in high latitudes (both land and oceans). Differences at 1.5°C versus 2°C are significant across the globe. Changes in heavy precipitation are less robust, but display particularly strong differences in the high latitudes.



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Figure 3.3: Projected mean temperature (top) and mean precipitation changes (bottom) at 1.5°C global warming (left) and 2°C global warming (middle) compared to pre-industrial time period (1861-1880), and difference (right; hatching highlights areas in which 2/3 of the models agree on the sign of change). Assessed from transient response over 20-year time period at given warming, based on Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP)8.5 Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) model simulations (adapted from Seneviratne et al., 2016, and Wartenburger et al., 2017, see Supplementary Material 3.SM.2 for more details). Note that the responses at 1.5°C Global Mean Surface Temperature (GMST) warming are similar for RCP2.6 simulations (see Supplementary Material 3.SM.2).

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
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Figure 3.4: Projected change in extreme at 1.5°C global warming (left) and 2°C global warming (middle) compared to pre-industrial time period (1861-1880), and difference (right; hatching highlights areas in which 2/3 of the models agree on the sign of change): temperature of annual hottest day, TXx (top), and annual coldest day, TNn, (middle), and annual maximum 5-day precipitation, Rx5day (bottom). Same underlying methodology and data basis as Figure 3.3 (see Supplementary Material 3.SM.2 for more details). Note that the responses at 1.5°C Global Mean Surface Temperature (GMST) warming are similar for Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 2.6 simulations (see Supplementary Material 3.SM.2).

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These projected changes at 1.5°C and 2°C global warming are consistent with the attribution of global observed historical trends in temperature and precipitation means and extremes (Bindoff et al., 2013a) as well as with some observed changes for a recent global warming of 0.5°C (Schleussner et al., 2017), as also addressed in more detail in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3). Attribution studies have shown that there is *high confidence* that anthropogenic forcing has had a detectable influence on trends in global warming (*virtually certain* since the mid 20th century), in land warming on all continents except Antarctica (*likely* since the mid of the 20th century), ocean warming since 1970 (*very likely*) and in increases in hot extremes and decreases in cold extremes since the mid 20th century (*very likely*) (Bindoff et al., 2013a). In addition, there is *medium*

1 *confidence* that anthropogenic forcing has contributed to increases in mean precipitation in the North-
2 Hemisphere high-latitudes since the mid 20th century and to global-scale increases in heavy precipitation in
3 land regions with sufficient observations over the same time period (Bindoff et al., 2013a). Schleussner et al.
4 (2017) have shown from analyses of recent observed tendencies that changes in temperature extremes and
5 heavy precipitation indices are detectable in observations for the 1991-2010 period compared with 1960-
6 1979, when a global warming of approximately 0.5°C occurred (*high confidence*). The observed tendencies
7 over that time frame are thus consistent with attributed changes since the mid-20th century (*high confidence*).
8

9 The next sections assess changes in several different types of climate-related hazards. It should be noted that
10 the different types of hazards are considered in isolation, but that some regions are projected to be affected
11 by collocated and/or concomitant changes in several types of hazards (for instance sea level rise and heavy
12 precipitation in some regions, possibly leading together to more flooding, or droughts and heatwaves, which
13 can together increase the risk of fire occurrence). Such events, also called compound events, may
14 substantially increase risks in some regions (e.g. (Amir et al., 2014; Van Den Hurk et al., 2015; Martius et
15 al., 2016; Zscheischler et al., 2018). A detailed assessment of physically-defined compound events was not
16 possible as part of this report, but aspects related to overlapping multi-sector risks are highlighted in Sections
17 3.4 and 3.5.
18

20 **3.3.2 Regional temperatures on land, including extremes**

22 *3.3.2.1 Observed and attributed changes in regional temperature means and extremes*

23 While the quality of temperature measurements obtained through ground observational networks tend to be
24 high compared to that of measurements for other climate variables (Seneviratne et al., 2012), it should be
25 noted that some regions are undersampled. Cowtan and Way (2014) highlighted issues regarding
26 undersampling being concentrated at the poles and over Africa, which may lead to biases in estimated
27 changes in GMST (see also Supplementary Material 3.SM.2 and Chapter 1). This undersampling also affects
28 the confidence of assessments regarding regional observed and projected changes in both mean and extreme
29 temperature. Despite this partly limited coverage, the attribution chapter of the AR5 (Bindoff et al., 2013a)
30 and recent papers (e.g., Sun et al., 2016; Wan et al., 2018) assessed that over every continental regions and in
31 many sub-continental regions, anthropogenic influence has made a substantial contribution to surface
32 temperature increases since the mid-20th century.
33

34 There is (*very likely*) that there has been an overall decrease in the number of cold days and nights and an
35 overall increase in the number of warm days and nights at the global scale on land. There is also (*likely*) that
36 consistent changes are detectable on continental scale in North America, Europe and Australia. This is
37 consistent with the SREX and AR5 assessments (Seneviratne et al., 2012; Hartmann et al., 2013). There is
38 *high confidence* that these observed changes in temperature extremes can be attributed to anthropogenic
39 forcing (AR5, Bindoff et al., 2013a). As highlighted in Section 3.2, the observational record can be used to
40 assess past changes associated with a global warming of 0.5°C. Schleussner et al. (2017) used this approach
41 to assess observed changes in extreme indices for the 1991-2010 versus the 1960-1979 period, which
42 corresponds to just about 0.5°C GMST difference in the observed record (based on the Goddard Institute for
43 Space Studies Surface Temperature Analysis (GISTEMP) dataset, Hansen et al., 2010). They found that
44 substantial changes due to 0.5°C warming are apparent for indices related to hot and cold extremes, as well
45 as for the Warm Spell Duration Indicator (WSDI). In particular, they identified that one quarter of the land
46 has experienced an intensification of hot extremes (maximum temperature in the hottest day of the year,
47 TXx) by more than 1°C and a reduction of the intensity of cold extremes by at least 2.5°C (minimum

1 temperature in the coldest night of the years, TNn). In addition, that study shows that half of the global land
2 mass has experienced changes in WSDI of more than six days as well as an emergence of extremes outside
3 the range of natural variability (Schleussner et al., 2017). Analyses from Schleussner et al. (2017) for
4 temperature extremes are provided in the Supplementary Material 3.SM Annex 3-3 (Figure S3.63.SM.6).

7 3.3.2.2 Projected changes at 1.5°C versus 2°C in regional temperature means and extremes

8 There are several lines of evidence available for providing a regional assessment of projected change in
9 temperature means and extremes at 1.5°C versus 2°C global warming (see Section 3.2). These include,
10 analyses of changes in extremes as a function of global warming based on existing climate simulations using
11 the Empirical Scaling Relationship (ESR) and variations therefrom (see Section 3.2 for details about the
12 methodology) (e.g., Schleussner et al., 2017; Dosio and Fischer, 2018; Seneviratne et al., 2018c) dedicated
13 simulations for 1.5°C versus 2°C global warming, for instance based on the Half a degree additional
14 warming, prognosis and projected impacts (HAPPI) experiment (Mitchell et al., 2017) or other model
15 simulations (e.g., Dosio et al., 2018); and analyses based on statistical pattern scaling approaches (e.g.
16 Kharin et al., 2018). Results with these different lines of evidence display qualitatively consistent results
17 regarding changes in temperature means and extremes at 1.5°C global warming compared to pre-industrial
18 climate and 2°C global warming.

19
20 There are statistically significant differences in temperature means and extremes at 1.5°C versus 2°C global
21 warming, both in the global average (Schleussner et al., 2016b; Dosio et al., 2018; Kharin et al., 2018), as
22 well as in most land regions (Wartenburger et al., 2017; Seneviratne et al., 2018c; Wehner et al., 2018) (*high*
23 *confidence*). Temperatures over oceans display significant increases between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming
24 (Figures 3.3 and 3.4). A general background on the available evidence on regional changes in temperature
25 means and extremes at 1.5°C versus 2°C global warming is provided in the Supplementary Material 3.SM.2.
26 As an example, Figure 3.5 shows for the IPCC SREX regions (Figure 3.2) regionally-based analyses of
27 changes in the temperature of hot extremes as a function of warming (corresponding analyses for changes in
28 the temperature of cold extremes are provided in the Supplementary Material 3.SM.2). As can be seen in
29 these analyses, the mean response of the intensity of temperature extremes in climate models to changes in
30 the global mean temperature is approximately linear and independent of the considered emission scenario
31 (Seneviratne et al., 2016; Wartenburger et al., 2017). Nonetheless, in the case of changes in the number of
32 days exceeding a given threshold, changes are found to be approximately exponential, with higher increases
33 for rare events (Fischer and Knutti, 2015; Kharin et al., 2018); see for example, Figure 3.6. This behavior is
34 consistent with a linear increase in absolute temperature for extreme threshold exceedances (Whan et al.,
35 2015).

36
37 As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, there is an important land-sea warming contrast, with stronger warming on
38 land (see also Christensen et al., 2013; Collins et al., 2013; Seneviratne et al., 2016), which implies that
39 regional warming on land is generally higher than 1.5°C even when mean global warming is at 1.5°C. As
40 highlighted in Seneviratne et al. (2016), this feature is generally stronger for temperature extremes (Figures
41 3.4 and 3.5; Supplementary Material 3.SM.2). For differences in regional temperature extremes at mean
42 global warming of 1.5°C versus 2°C, this implies differences of as much as 1°C -1.5°C in some locations,
43 which are thus 2-3 times larger than the differences in global mean temperature. For hot extremes, the
44 strongest warming is found in Central and Eastern North America, Central and Southern Europe, the
45 Mediterranean, Western and Central Asia, and Southern Africa (Figures 3.4 and 3.5). These regions are all
46 characterized by a strong soil-moisture-temperature coupling (Vogel et al., 2017) leading to increased
47 dryness and, consequently, a reduction in evaporative cooling and thus added warming in the projections.

1 Some of these regions also show a wide range of responses to temperature extremes, in particular Central
2 Europe and Central North America, due to discrepancies in the representation of the underlying processes in
3 present climate models (Vogel et al., 2017). For mean temperature and cold extremes, the strongest warming
4 is found in the northern high-latitude regions (*high confidence*). This is due to substantial ice-snow-albedo-
5 temperature feedbacks (Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4, middle), related to the known ‘polar amplification’
6 mechanism (e.g., IPCC, 2013; Masson-Delmotte et al., 2013).


7
8 Figure 3.7 displays maps of changes in the Number of Hot Days (NHD) at 1.5°C and 2°C GMST warming.
9 Maps of changes in the number of Frost Days (FD) can be found in the Supplementary Material 3.SM.2 .
10 These analyses reveal clear patterns of changes between the two warming levels, also consistent with
11 analysed changes in heatwave occurrence (e.g., Dosio et al., 2018). For the NHD, the largest differences are
12 found in the tropics due to the lower interannual temperature variability (Mahlstein et al., 2011), and despite
13 the tendency for higher absolute changes in hot temperature extremes in mid-latitudes (Figures 3.4 and 3.5).
14 The emergence of extreme heatwaves is thus earliest in these regions, where they become already
15 widespread at 1.5°C global warming (*high confidence*). These analyses are consistent with other recent
16 assessments. Coumou and Robinson (2013) find that under a 1.5°C warming, already 20% of the global land
17 area, centered in low latitude regions, is projected to experience highly unusual monthly temperatures during
18 boreal summers (a number which nearly doubles for 2°C of global warming).

19
20 Figure 3.8 includes an objective identification of “hot spots” / key risks in temperature indices subdivided by
21 regions, based on the ESR approach applied to Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5)
22 simulations (Wartenburger et al., 2017). It is noted that results based on the HAPPI multi-model experiment
23 (Mitchell et al., 2017) display similar results (Seneviratne et al., 2018c). The considered regions follow the
24 classification of Figure 3.2 and also include the global land. The figure displays red shading for all instances
25 in which a significant difference is found between regional responses at 1.5°C versus 2°C. Based on these
26 analyses, the following can be stated: Significant changes in responses are found in all regions, for most
27 temperature indices, with the exception of i) the Diurnal Temperature Range (DTR) in most regions, of ii)
28 Ice Days (ID), Frost Days (FD), and Growing Season Length (GSL) in mostly warm regions, and of iii) the
29 minimum yearly value of the Maximum Daily Temperature (TXn) in very few regions. In terms of the sign
30 of the changes, it can be seen that warm extremes display an increase in intensity, frequency and spell length
31 (e.g. increase of the temperature of the hottest day of the year (TXx) in all regions, increase of proportion of
32 days above 90th percentile of Tmax (TX90p) in all regions, increase of the length of the WSDI in all
33 regions), while cold extremes display a decrease in intensity, frequency and spell length (e.g. increase of the
34 temperature of the coldest night of the year (TNn) in all regions, decrease in the proportion of days below the
35 10th percentile of Tmin (TN10p), decrease in the length of the Cold Spell Duration Index (CSDI) in all
36 regions). Hence, while warm extremes are intensified, it should also be noted that cold extremes become less
37 intense in affected regions.

38
39 Overall, large increases in hot extremes happen in many densely inhabited regions (Figure 3.5), both
40 compared to present-day climate and at 2°C versus 1.5°C global warming. For instance, Dosio et al. (2018)
41 concluded based on a modeling study that 13.8% of the world population would be exposed to severe heat
42 waves at least once every 5 years under 1.5°C global warming, with a threefold increase (36.9%) under 2°C
43 warming, i.e. a difference of about 1.7 billion people. They also conclude that limiting global warming to
44 1.5°C would result in about 420 million fewer people being frequently exposed to extreme heat waves, and
45 about 65 million fewer people being exposed to exceptional heat waves. However, changes in vulnerability
46 were not considered in that study.


1 In summary, there are statistically significant differences in temperature means and extremes at 1.5°C versus
2 2°C global warming, both in the global average as well as in near all land regions¹ and the ocean (*likely*).
3 Also, the observational record reveals that substantial changes due to a 0.5°C GMST warming are apparent
4 for indices related to hot and cold extremes, as well as for the WSDI (*likely*). A warming of 2°C versus 1.5°C
5 leads to more frequent and more intense hot extremes in all land regions¹, as well as to longer warm spells,
6 affecting many densely inhabited regions (*very likely*). Strongest increases in the frequency of hot extremes
7 happens for the rarest events (*very likely*). On the other hand, cold extremes would become less intense and
8 less frequent, and cold spells would be less extended (*very likely*). Temperature extremes on land generally
9 increase more than the global average temperature (*very likely*). Extreme hot days in mid-latitudes display an
10 up to two-fold higher warming than the GMST (*likely*). The highest levels of warming for extreme hot days
11 are found in Central and Eastern North America, Central and Southern Europe, the Mediterranean, Western
12 and Central Asia, and Southern Africa (*likely*). These regions have a strong soil-moisture-temperature
13 coupling in common, leading to increased dryness and, consequently, a reduction in evaporative cooling,
14 although there is substantial model range in the representation of these processes, in particular in Central
15 Europe and Central North America (*likely*). The coldest nights in high-latitudes warm by as much as 1.5°C
16 for a 0.5°C increase in GMST, i.e. a three-fold higher warming (*likely*). The NHD shows the largest
17 differences between 1.5°C and 2.0°C in the tropics because of their low interannual temperature variability
18 (*likely*); the emergence of extreme heatwaves is thus earliest in these regions, where they become already
19 widespread at 1.5°C global warming (*high confidence*). Limiting global warming to 1.5°C instead of 2°C
20 could result in around 420 million fewer people being frequently exposed to extreme heatwaves, and about
21 65 million fewer people being exposed to exceptional heatwaves, assuming constant vulnerability (*medium*
22 *confidence*).
23
24

¹FOOTNOTE: Using the SREX definition of regions (Figure 3.2)




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Figure 3.5: Projected changes in annual maximum daytime temperature (TXx) as function of global temperature warming for IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risk of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX) regions (Figure 3.2), based on empirical scaling relationship applied to Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) data (adapted from Seneviratne et al., 2016, and Wartenburger et al., 2017) together with projected changes from the Half a degree additional warming, prognosis and projected impacts (HAPPI) multi-model experiment (Mitchell et al., 2017, based on analyses in Seneviratne et al., 2018c) (bar plots on regional analyses and central plot, respectively). For analyses for other regions from Figure 3.2 (with asterisks), see Supplementary Material 3.SM.2. (The stippling indicates significance of the differences of changes in between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming based on all model simulations, using a two-sided paired Wilcoxon test ($p = 0.01$, after controlling the false discovery rate according to Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). See Supplementary Material 3.SM.2 for details.



1
 2 **Figure 3.6:** Probability ratio (PR) of exceeding extreme temperature thresholds. Left (a): PR of exceeding (blue) 99th
 3 and (red) 99.9th percentile of pre-industrial daily temperature at a given warming level relative to pre-
 4 industrial conditions averaged across land (from Fischer and Knutti, 2015). Middle (b) and right (c) : PR
 5 for hottest day of the year (TXx) and coldest night of the year (TNn) for different event probabilities (with
 6 RV indicating return values) in the current climate (1°C warming) ; the shading shows the interquartile
 7 (25%-75%) range (from Kharin et al., 2018).
 8



9
 10 **Figure 3.7:** Projected change number of hot days (10% warmest days) at 1.5°C global warming (left) and 2°C global
 11 warming (middle) compared to pre-industrial time period (1861-1880), and difference (right; hatching
 12 highlights areas in which 2/3 of the models agree on the sign of change). Same underlying methodology
 13 and data basis as Figure 3.2 (Supplementary Material 3.SM.2 Annex 3.1 S3-3 for more details).
 14

	Global Land	ALA	AMZ	CAM	CAS	CEU	CGI	CNA	EAF	EAS	ENA	MED	NAS	NAU	NEB	NEU	SAF	SAH	SAS	SAU	SEA	SSA	TIB	WAF	WAS	WNA	WSA
T	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
CSDI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DTR	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
FD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GSL	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
ID	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SU	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
TN10p	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TN90p	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
TNn	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
TNx	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
TR	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
TX10p	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TX90p	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
TXn	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
TXx	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
WSDI	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

Figure 3.8: Significance of differences of regional mean temperature and range of temperature indices between the 1.5°C and 2°C global mean temperature targets (rows). Definition of indices: T: mean temperature; CSDI: Cold Spell Duration Index; DTR: Diurnal Temperature Range; FD: Frost Days; GSL: Growing Season Length; ID: Ice Days; SU: Summer Days; TN10P: Proportion of days with minimum temperature (TN) below 10th percentile of TN; TN90p: Proportion of days with TN higher than 90th percentile TN; TNn: minimum yearly value of TN; TNx: maximum yearly value of TN; TR: Tropical Nights; TX10p: Proportion of days with maximum Temperature (TX) lower than 10th percentile of TX; TX90p: Proportion of days with TX higher than 90th percentile of TX; TXn: minimum yearly value of TX; TXx: maximum yearly value of TX; WSDI: Warm Spell Duration Index. Columns indicate analysed regions and global land (see Figure 3.2 for definition). Significant differences are shown in red shading (increases indicated with + sign, decreases indicated with - sign), insignificant differences are shown in grey shading. Note that decreases in CSDI, FD, ID, TN10p and TX10p are linked to increased temperatures in cold days or nights. Significance is tested using a two-sided paired Wilcoxon test (p=0.01, after controlling the false discovery rate according to Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) (adapted from Wartenburger et al., 2017).

3.3.3 Regional precipitation, including heavy precipitation and monsoons

This section addresses regional changes in precipitation on land, with a focus on heavy precipitation and consideration of changes to the key features of monsoons.

3.3.3.1 Observed and attributed changes in regional precipitation

Observed global changes in the water cycle, including precipitation, are more uncertain than observed changes in temperature (Hartmann et al., 2013; Stocker et al., 2013). There is *high confidence* that mean

1 precipitation over the mid-latitude land areas of the Northern Hemisphere has increased since 1951
2 (Hartmann et al., 2013). For other latitudinal zones area-averaged long-term positive or negative trends have
3 *low confidence* due to data quality, data completeness or disagreement amongst available estimates
4 (Hartmann et al., 2013). There is in particular *low confidence* regarding observed trends in precipitation in
5 monsoon regions, based on the SREX report (Seneviratne et al., 2012), the AR5 (Hartmann et al., 2013), as
6 well as on more recent publications (Singh et al., 2014; Taylor et al., 2017; Bichet and Diedhiou, 2018)
7 Supplementary Material 3.SM.2).

8
9 For heavy precipitation, the AR5 (Hartmann et al., 2013), assessed that observed trends displayed more areas
10 with increases than decreases in the frequency, intensity and/or amount of heavy precipitation (*likely*). In
11 addition, it assessed that in land regions where observational coverage is sufficient for assessment, there is
12 *medium confidence* that anthropogenic forcing has contributed to a global-scale intensification of heavy
13 precipitation over the second half of the 20th century (Bindoff et al., 2013a).

14
15 Regarding changes in precipitation associated with a global warming of 0.5°C, the observed record suggests
16 that robust increases in observed precipitation extremes can be identified for annual maximum 1-day
17 precipitation (RX1day) and consecutive 5-day precipitation (RX5day) for GMST changes of this magnitude
18 (Schleussner et al., 2017) (Supplementary Material 3.SM.2, Figure 3.SM.7).

20 21 3.3.3.2 Projected changes at 1.5°C versus 2°C in regional precipitation

22 Figure 3.3 (Section 3.3.1) summarizes the projected changes in mean precipitation at 1.5°C versus 2°C.
23 Some regions display substantial changes in mean precipitation between 1.5°C versus 2°C global warming,
24 in particular decreases in the Mediterranean area, including Southern Europe, the Arabian Peninsula and
25 Egypt. Some studies are also available for other regions across the world. For instance, Déqué et al. (2017)
26 investigates the impact of a 2°C global warming on precipitation over tropical Africa and found that average
27 precipitation does not show a significant response due to two compensating phenomena: (a) the number of
28 rain days decreases whereas the precipitation intensity increases, and (b) the rainy season occurs later during
29 the year with less precipitation in early summer and more precipitation in late summer. The assessment
30 found insignificant differences between 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios for tropical Africa, which is consistent with
31 the results of Figure 3.3. For Europe, for 2°C global warming, a robust increase of precipitation over Central
32 and Northern Europe in winter and only over Northern Europe in summer, and decreases of precipitation in
33 Central/Southern Europe in summer, with changes reaching 20% have been reported by Vautard et al. (2014)
34 and is more pronounced than with +1.5°C global warming (Jacob et al., 2018).

35
36 For changes in heavy precipitation, Figure 3.9 displays projected changes in the 5-day maximum
37 precipitation (Rx5day) as a function of global temperature increase, using a similar approach as in Figure
38 3.5. Further analyses are available in the Supplementary Material (Supplementary Material 3.SM.2). These
39 analyses show that projected changes in heavy precipitation are more uncertain than for temperature
40 extremes. However, the mean response of model simulations is generally robust and linear (see also Fischer
41 et al., 2014; Seneviratne et al., 2016). As for temperature this response is also found to be mostly
42 independent of the considered emissions scenario (e.g. Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP)2.6
43 versus RCP8.5; also Section 3.2). This appears to be a specific feature of heavy precipitation, possibly due to
44 a stronger coupling with temperature, as the scaling of projections of mean precipitation changes with global
45 warming shows some scenario dependency (Pendergrass et al., 2015).


46
47 The differences in heavy precipitation are generally small between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming (Figure

1 3.9 and Supplementary Material 3.SM.2 Figure 3.SM.10). Some regions display substantial increases, for
2 instance in Southern Asia, but generally in less than 2/3 of the CMIP5 models (Supplementary Material
3 3.SM.2, Figure 3.SM.10). Wartenburger et al. (2017) suggests that for Eastern Asia, there are substantial
4 differences in heavy precipitation at 1.5°C versus 2°C. Based on regional climate simulations, Vautard et al.
5 (2014) found a robust increase in heavy precipitation everywhere in Europe and in all seasons, except
6 Southern Europe in summer, consistent with the analysis of Jacob et al. (2014) which used more recent
7 downscaled climate scenarios (EURO-CORDEX) and a higher resolution (12km) for +2°C global warming.
8 There is a consistent agreement in the direction of change for +1.5°C global warming over much of Europe
9 (Jacob et al., 2018). While there are variations between regions, the global tendency for heavy precipitation
10 suggests an increase at 2°C versus 1.5°C (see also Fischer and Knutti, 2015), and Kharin et al., 2018), Figure
11 3.10, as well as Betts et al., 2018).

12
13 The AR5 assessed that the global monsoon, aggregated over all monsoon systems, is *likely* to strengthen,
14 with increases in its area and intensity, while the monsoon circulation weakens (Christensen et al., 2013).
15 There are a few publications that provide more recent evaluations on projections of changes in monsoons for
16 high-emissions scenarios (e.g., Jiang and Tian, 2013; Jones and Carvalho, 2013; Sylla et al., 2015, 2016);
17 Supplementary Material 3.SM.2). However, given that a) scenarios at 1.5°C or 2°C would include a
18 substantially smaller radiative forcing than those assessed in the AR5 and these more recent studies, and b)
19 the fact that there appears to be no specific assessment of changes in monsoon precipitation at 1.5°C versus
20 2°C global warming in the present literature, the present assessment is that there is *low confidence* regarding
21 changes in monsoons at these low global warming levels, as well as regarding differences in monsoon
22 responses at 1.5°C versus 2°C.

23
24 Similarly, as for Figure 3.8, Figure 3.11 includes an objective identification of “hot spots” / key risks in
25 heavy precipitation indices subdivided by regions, based on (Wartenburger et al., 2017). The considered
26 regions follow the classification of the IPCC SREX report (Figure 3.2) and also include global land areas.
27 The figure displays red shading for all instances in which a significant difference is found between regional
28 responses at 1.5°C versus 2°C. Hot spots displaying statistically significant changes in heavy precipitation
29 between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming are found in high-latitude (Alaska/Western Canada, Eastern
30 Canada/Greenland/Iceland, Northern Europe, Northern Asia) and high-altitude (Tibetan Plateau) regions, as
31 well as in Eastern Asia (including China and Japan) and in Eastern North America. Results are less
32 consistent for other regions. Note that analyses for meteorological drought (lack of precipitation) are
33 provided in Section 3.3.4.


34
35 In summary, observations and projections for mean and heavy precipitation are less robust than for
36 temperature means and extremes (*high confidence*). Observations show that there are more areas with
37 increases than decreases in the frequency, intensity and/or amount of heavy precipitation (*likely*). Several
38 regions display statistically significant differences in heavy precipitation at 1.5°C vs. 2°C warming (with
39 stronger increase at 2°C), and there is a global tendency towards increases in heavy precipitation on land
40 between these two temperature levels (*likely*). Overall, regions that display statistically significant changes in
41 heavy precipitation between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming are found in high-latitude (Alaska/Western
42 Canada, Eastern Canada/Greenland/Iceland, Northern Europe, Northern Asia) and high-altitude (Tibetan
43 Plateau) regions, as well as in Eastern Asia (including China and Japan) and in Eastern North America
44 (*medium confidence*). There is *low confidence* in projected changes in heavy precipitation in other regions.
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Figure 3.9: Projected changes in annual 5-day maximum precipitation (Rx5day) as function of global temperature warming for IPCC Special Report on the Risk of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX) regions (Figure 3.2), based on empirical scaling relationship applied to Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) together with projected changes from the HAPPI multi-model experiment (bar plots on regional analyses and central plot). Same data basis and analysis approach as in Figure 3.5 (Supplementary Material 3.SM.2 for more details).

Probability ratio of heavy precipitation as function of global warming and event probability



1
2 **Figure 3.10:** Probability ratio (PR) of exceeding extreme precipitation (heavy precipitation) thresholds. (Left, a): PR of
3 exceeding the (blue) 99th and (red) 99.9th percentile of pre-industrial daily precipitation at a given
4 warming level relative to pre-industrial conditions averaged across land (from Fischer and Knutti, 2015).
5 (Right, b): PR for precipitation extremes (Rx1d) for different event probabilities (with RV indicating
6 return values) in the current climate (1°C warming); the shading shows the interquartile (25%-75%) range
7 (from Kharin et al., 2018).
8

	Global Land	ALA	AME	CAM	CAS	CEU	CGI	CNA	EMF	EAS	ENA	MED	NAS	NAU	NEM	NEU	SAF	SAH	SAS	SAU	SEA	SSA	TIB	WAF	WAS	WNA	WSA
PRCPTOT			-					-			-		-	-		-		-	-		-			-		-	
CWD	-		-	-	-	-		-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	
R10mm	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	
R1mm	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	
R20mm	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	
R95ptot																		-		-							
R99ptot																		-									
Rx1day	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Rx5day	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	
SDII	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	

9
10 **Figure 3.11: Significance of differences of regional mean precipitation** and range of precipitation indices between
11 the 1.5°C and 2°C global mean temperature targets (rows). Definition of indices: PRCPTOT: mean
12 precipitation; CWD: Consecutive Wet Days; R10mm: Number of days with precipitation > 10mm;
13 R1mm: Number of days with precipitation > 1mm; R20mm: Number of days with precipitation > 20mm;
14 R95ptot: Proportion of rain falling as 95th percentile or higher; R99ptot: Proportion of rain falling as 99th
15 percentile or higher; RX1day: Intensity of maximum yearly 1-day precipitation; RX5day: Intensity of
16 maximum yearly 5-day precipitation; SDII: Simple Daily Intensity Index. Columns indicate analysed
17

1 regions and global land (see Figure 3.3 for definition). Significant differences are shown in red shading
2 (increases indicated with + sign, decreases indicated with – sign), insignificant differences are shown in
3 grey shading. Same data basis and analysis approach as in Figure 3.8 (see Supplementary Material
4 3.SM.2 for more details).
5
6

7 **3.3.4 Drought and dryness**

8 **3.3.4.1 Observed and attributed changes**

9 The IPCC AR5 assessed that there was *low confidence* in the sign of drought trends since 1950 at global
10 scale, but that there was (*likely*) trends in some regions of the world, including drought increases in the
11 Mediterranean and West Africa and drought decreases in central North America and north-west Australia
12 (Hartmann et al., 2013; Stocker et al., 2013). The AR5 assessed that there was *low confidence* in the
13 attribution of global changes in droughts (Bindoff et al., 2013a) and did not provide assessments for the
14 attribution of regional changes in droughts (Bindoff et al., 2013a).
15

16 The recent literature does not suggest a necessary revision of this assessment, except in the Mediterranean
17 region. Recent publications based on observational and modeling evidence suggest that human emissions
18 have substantially increased the probability of drought years in the Mediterranean region (Gudmundsson and
19 Seneviratne, 2016; Gudmundsson et al., 2017). Based on this evidence, there is *medium confidence* that
20 enhanced greenhouse forcing contributed to increased drying in the Mediterranean region (including
21 Southern Europe, Northern Africa and the Near-East) and that this tendency will thus continue to be
22 increased under higher levels of global warming.
23
24

25 **Box 3.1: Sub-Saharan Africa: Changes in Temperature and Precipitation Extremes**

26 Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced the dramatic consequences of climate extremes becoming more frequent
27 and more intense over the past decades (Paeth et al., 2010; Taylor et al., 2017). To reduce the adverse effects
28 of climate change, all African countries signed the Paris Agreement and through their Nationally Determined
29 Contributions (NDCs), they committed to contribute to the global effort of mitigation of Greenhouse Gas
30 (GHG) emissions in the aim to hold global temperature increases to ‘well below 2 degrees’ and to pursue
31 efforts to limit warming to ‘1.5 °C above preindustrial levels’. The target of limiting to 1.5°C above pre-
32 industrial levels is a useful message to share the urgency, but it focused the climate change debate on a
33 temperature threshold (Section 3.3.2), while the potential impacts of these global warming levels at local to
34 regional scales on key sectors such as agriculture, energy, health, etc. remain uncertain in most regions and
35 countries of Africa (Sections 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.5 and 3.3.6).
36

37 Weber et al. (2018) found that at regional scales, temperature increases in Sub-Saharan Africa are projected
38 to be higher than the global mean temperature increase (at global warming of 1.5°C and at 2°C; Section 3.3.2
39 for further background and analyses of climate model projections). Even if the mean global temperature
40 anomaly is kept below 1.5°C, regions between 15°S and 15°N are projected to experience an increase in hot
41 nights as well as longer and more frequent heat waves (e.g., Kharin et al., 2018). Increases would be even
42 larger if the global mean temperature reaches 2°C of global warming, with significant changes in the
43 occurrence and intensity of temperature extremes in all Sub-Saharan regions (Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2;
44 Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.8).
45

46 West and Central Africa display particularly large increases in the number of hot days, both at 1.5°C and 2°C
47

1 global warming (Section 3.3.2). This is due to the relatively small interannual present-day variability, which
2 implies that climate-change signals can be detected earlier (Mahlstein et al., 2011, Section 3.3.2). Changes in
3 total precipitation exhibit several uncertainties, mainly in the Sahel (Diedhiou et al., 2018) Section 3.3.3 and
4 Figure 3.8). In the Guinea Coast and Central Africa, a weak change in the total precipitation is noted though
5 it is projected in most models (70%) a decrease of the length of wet spells and a slight increase of heavy
6 rainfall. Western Sahel is projected by most models (80%) to experience the strongest drying with a
7 significant increase in the maximum length of dry spells (Diedhiou et al., 2018). Above 2°C, this region
8 could become more vulnerable to drought and could meet serious food security issues (Salem et al., 2017;
9 Parkes et al., 2018) Cross-Chapter Box 6 and Section 3.4.6). West Africa has thus been identified as a
10 climate-change hot spot with a likelihood of negative impact of climate change in crop yields and production
11 (Cross-Chapter Box 6, Section 3.4.6; Sultan and Gaetani, 2016; Palazzo et al., 2017). Despite uncertainty in
12 future projections of the precipitation in West Africa, which is essential for rain-fed agriculture, a robust
13 evidence of yield loss might emerge. This yield loss is mainly driven by increased mean temperature while
14 potential wetter or drier conditions as well as elevated CO₂ concentrations can modulate this effect (Roudier
15 et al., 2011); see also Cross-Chapter Box 6 and Section 3.4.6). Using Representative Concentration Pathway
16 (RCP)8.5 Coordinated Regional Climate Downscaling Experiment (CORDEX) scenarios from 25 Regional
17 Climate Models (RCMs) forced with different General Circulation Models (GCMs), Klutse et al. (2018)
18 noted over West Africa a decrease of mean rainfall in models with larger warming at 1.5°C (Section 3.3.4)
19 and Mba et al. (2018) found over Central Africa a lack of consensus in the changes in precipitation (Figure
20 3.8 and Section 3.3.4), though there is a tendency to a decrease of the maximum length of Consecutive Wet
21 Days (CWD) and a significant increase of the maximum length of Consecutive Dry Days (CDD).

22
23 Over southern Africa, models agree in a positive sign of change for temperature, with temperature rising
24 faster at 2°C (1.5°C-2.5°C) compared to 1.5°C (0.5°C - 1.5°C). Areas of the south-western region, especially
25 in South Africa and parts of Namibia and Botswana are expected to experience the highest increases in
26 temperature (Engelbrecht et al., 2015; Maure et al., 2018; Section 3.3.2). The western part of southern Africa
27 is projected to become drier with increasing drought frequency and number of heat waves towards the end of
28 the 21st century (Engelbrecht et al., 2015; Dosio, 2017; Maure et al., 2018) Section 3.3.4). At 1.5°C, a robust
29 signal of precipitation reduction is found over the Limpopo basin and smaller areas of the Zambezi basin, in
30 Zambia, as well as in parts of Western Cape, in South Africa, while an increase is projected over central and
31 western South Africa as well as in southern Namibia (Section 3.3.4). At 2°C, the region is projected to face
32 robust precipitation decreases of about 10-20% and increases in the length of CDD with longer dry spells
33 projected over Namibia, Botswana, northern Zimbabwe and southern Zambia. Conversely, the length of
34 CWD is projected to decrease with robust signals over Western Cape (Maure et al., 2018). Projected
35 reductions in stream flow between 5% and 10% in the Zambezi River Basin have been associated with
36 increased evaporation and transpiration rates resulting from rise in temperature (Kling et al., 2014; Section
37 3.3.5) with issues on hydroelectric power across the southern African region.

38
39 Over Eastern Africa, Osima et al. (2018) found that annual rainfall projections show a robust wetting signal
40 over Somalia and a less robust decrease over central and northern Ethiopia (Section 3.3.3). The length of
41 CDD and CWD are projected to increase and decrease respectively (Section 3.3.4). These projected changes
42 could impact the agricultural and water sectors in the region (Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this Chapter and
43 Section 3.4.6).

44 [END BOX 3.1 HERE]

45
46

1 3.3.4.2 Projected changes in drought and dryness at 1.5°C versus 2°C

2
3 There is *medium confidence* in projections of changes in drought and dryness. This is partly consistent with
4 the AR5, which assessed these projections as being ‘*likely (medium confidence)*’ (Collins et al., 2013;
5 Stocker et al., 2013). However, given the *medium confidence*, we assess that it does not seem suitable to
6 provide a likelihood statement, consistent with the IPCC uncertainty guidance document (Mastrandrea et al.,
7 2010) and the assessment of the IPCC SREX report (Seneviratne et al., 2012). The technical summary of the
8 AR5 (Stocker et al., 2013) assessed that soil moisture drying in the Mediterranean, Southwest USA and
9 southern African regions was consistent with projected changes in the Hadley circulation and increased
10 surface temperatures and concluded that there was *high confidence* in *likely* surface drying in these regions
11 by the end of this century under the RCP8.5 scenario. However, more recent assessments have highlighted
12 uncertainties in dryness projections due to a range of factors, including variations between considered
13 drought and dryness indices and the effects of enhanced CO₂ concentrations on plant water-use efficiency
14 (Orlowsky and Seneviratne, 2013; Roderick et al., 2015). Overall, projections of changes in drought and
15 dryness for high-emissions scenarios (e.g. RCP8.5 corresponding to about 4 °C global warming) are
16 uncertain in many regions, despite the existence of a few regions displaying consistent drying in most
17 assessments (e.g., Seneviratne et al., 2012; Orlowsky and Seneviratne, 2013). Uncertainty is expected to be
18 even larger for conditions of smaller signal-to-noise ratio such as for global warming levels of 1.5°C and
19 2°C.
20

21 Some published literature is now available on the evaluation of differences in drought and dryness
22 occurrence at 1.5°C and 2°C global warming for a) Precipitation-Evapotranspiration (P-E, i.e. as a general
23 measure of water availability; Wartenburger et al., 2017; Greve et al., 2018), b) soil moisture anomalies
24 (Lehner et al., 2017; Wartenburger et al., 2017), c) consecutive dry days (Schleussner et al., 2016b;
25 Wartenburger et al., 2017), d) the 12-month Standardized Precipitation Index (Wartenburger et al. (2017), e)
26 the Palmer-Drought Severity Index (Lehner et al., 2017), f) annual mean runoff (Schleussner et al., 2016b,
27 see also next section). These analyses are overall consistent, despite the known sensitivity of drought
28 assessment to chosen drought indices (see above paragraph).
29

30 Figure 3.12 in Greve et al. (2018) derives the sensitivity of regional changes in precipitation minus
31 evapotranspiration to global temperature changes. The analysed simulations span the full range of available
32 emissions scenarios and the sensitivities are derived using a modified pattern scaling approach. The applied
33 approach assumes linear dependencies on global temperature changes while thoroughly addressing
34 associated uncertainties via resampling methods. Northern high-latitude regions display robust responses
35 towards increased wetness, while subtropical regions display a tendency towards drying but with a large
36 range of responses. While the internal variability and the scenario choice play an important role in the overall
37 spread of the simulations, the uncertainty stemming from the climate model choice usually dominates,
38 accounting for about half of the total uncertainty in most regions (Wartenburger et al., 2017; Greve et al.,
39 2018). The sign of projections, i.e. whether there might be increases or decreases in water availability under
40 higher global warming, is particularly uncertain in tropical and mid-latitude regions. An assessment of the
41 implications of limiting global mean temperature warming to values below (i) 1.5°C or (ii) 2°C shows that
42 opting for the 1.5°C-target might slightly influence the mean response, but could substantially reduce the risk
43 of experiencing extreme changes in regional water availability (Greve et al., 2018).
44





Figure 3.12: Summary of the likelihood of increases/decreases in Precipitation-Evapotranspiration (P-E) in Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) simulations considering all scenarios and a representative subset of 14 climate models (one from each modeling center). Panel plots show the uncertainty distribution of the sensitivity of P-E to global temperature change as a function of global mean temperature change averaged for most IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risk of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX) regions (see Figure 3.2) outlined in the map (from Greve et al., 2018).

The analysis for the mean response is also qualitatively consistent with results from Wartenburger et al. (2017), which use an ESR (Section 3.2) rather than pattern scaling for a range of drought and dryness indices, as well as with a recent assessment of Lehner et al. (2017) which consider changes in droughts assessed from the soil moisture changes and from the Palmer-Drought Severity Index. We note that these two further publications do not provide a specific assessment for changes in tails of the drought and dryness distribution. The conclusions of (Lehner et al., 2017) are that a) ‘risks of consecutive drought years shows little change in the US Southwest and Central Plains, but robust increases in Europe and the Mediterranean’, and that b) ‘limiting warming to 1.5°C may have benefits for future drought risk, but such benefits are regional, and in some cases highly uncertain’.

Figure 3.11 displays projected changes in CDD as a function of global temperature increase, using a similar approach as in Figures 3.5 (based on Wartenburger et al., 2017). The analyses also include results from the HAPPI experiment (Mitchell et al., 2017). Again, the CMIP5-based ESR estimates and the results of the HAPPI experiment are found to agree well. We note the large disparity of responses depending on the considered regions.

1 Similarly as for Figures 3.8 and 3.11, Figure 3.14 includes an objective identification of “hot spots” / key
 2 risks in dryness indices subdivided by regions, based on (Wartenburger et al., 2017). This analysis reveals
 3 the following hot spots of drying, i.e. with increases in CDD, and decreases in P-E, Soil Moisture Anomalies
 4 (SMA), and SPI12, with at least one of the indices displaying statistically significant drying: the
 5 Mediterranean region (MED ; including Southern Europe, northern Africa, and the Near-East), Northeastern
 6 Brazil (NEB), and Southern Africa.



8
 9
 10 **Figure 3.13:** Projected changes in consecutive dry days (CDD) as function of global temperature warming for IPCC
 11 Special Report on Managing the Risk of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change
 12 Adaptation (SREX) regions, based on empirical scaling relationship applied to Coupled Model
 13 Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) data together with projected changes from the HAPPI multi-
 14 model experiment (bar plots on regional analyses and central plot, respectively). Same data basis and
 15 analysis approach as in Figure 3.5 (Supplementary Material 3.SM.2 for more details).

Global Land	ALA	AMZ	CAM	CAS	CEU	CGI	CNA	EAF	EAS	ENA	MED	NAS	NAU	NEH	NEU	SAF	SAH	SAS	SAU	SEA	SEA	SSA	TIB	WAF	WAS	WNA	WSA
CDD	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	+
P-E	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	-
SMA	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+
SPI12	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+

1 **Figure 3.14:** Similar as Figures 3.8 and 3.11 but for changes in dryness indices. Significance of differences of regional
 2 drought and dryness indices between the 1.5°C and 2°C global mean temperature targets (rows).
 3 Definition of indices: CDD: Consecutive Dry Days; P-E: Precipitation minus Evaporation; SMA: Soil
 4 Moisture Anomalies; SPI12: 12-month SPI. Columns indicate regions and global land (see Figure 3.2 for
 5 definitions). Significant differences are shown in light blue/brownshading (increases in indices indicated
 6 with + sign, decreases indicated with – sign; the light blue shading indicates decreases in dryness
 7 (decreases in CDD, or increases in P-E, SMA or SPI12) and the light brown shading indicates increases in
 8 dryness (increases in CDD, or decreases in P-E, SMA or SPI12). Insignificant differences are shown in
 9 grey shading. Same data basis and analysis approach as in Figure 3.7 (see Supplementary Material
 10 3.SM.2 for more details).
 11

12 Overall the available literature, consistent with this analysis, reports particularly strong increases in dryness
 13 and decreases in water availability in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean when shifting from a 1.5°C to
 14 a 2°C global warming (Schleussner et al., 2016b; Lehner et al., 2017; Wartenburger et al., 2017; Greve et al.,
 15 2018; Samaniego et al., 2018; Figure 3.13). The fact that this is a region that is also already displaying
 16 substantial drying in the observational record (Seneviratne et al., 2012; Sheffield et al., 2012; Greve et al.,
 17 2014; Gudmundsson and Seneviratne, 2016; Gudmundsson et al., 2017) provides additional evidence
 18 supporting this tendency, suggesting that it is a hot spot of dryness change above 1.5°C (see also Box 3.2).
 19 The other identified hot spots, Southern Africa and Northeastern Brazil, are also consistently shown to
 20 display drying trends in other publications for higher levels of forcing (e.g., Orłowsky and Seneviratne,
 21 2013), although there are so far to our knowledge no studies reporting observed drying trends in these
 22 regions. There are substantial increases in risk of dryness (*medium confidence*) in both the Mediterranean
 23 region and South Africa at 2°C versus 1.5°C global warming, because these regions display significant
 24 changes in two dryness indicators (CDD and SMA) at these two global warming levels (Figure 3.14). There
 25 is *low confidence* elsewhere due to lack of consistency in analyses with different models or different dryness
 26 indicators. However, in many regions, there is *medium confidence* that most extreme risks of changes in
 27 dryness are avoided at 2°C versus 1.5°C (Figure 3.12).
 28

29 In summary, in terms of drought and dryness, limiting global warming to 1.5°C may substantially reduce the
 30 probability of extreme changes in water availability in some regions compared to changes for 2°C global
 31 warming (*medium confidence*). When shifting from 1.5 to 2°C, available studies and analyses suggest strong
 32 increases in dryness and reduced water availability in the Mediterranean region (including Southern Europe,
 33 northern Africa, and the Near-East) and in Southern Africa (*medium confidence*). Based on observations and
 34 model experiments, a drying trend is already detectable in the Mediterranean region, i.e. for a global warming
 35 of less than 1°C (*medium confidence*).
 36

37 [START BOX 3.2 HERE]

38 **Box 3.2:** Mediterranean Basin and the Middle East Droughts

39
 40 Human society has developed in tandem with the natural environment of the Mediterranean Basin over
 41 several millennia, laying the ground for diverse and culturally rich communities. Even if advances in
 42 technology may offer some protection from climatic hazards, the consequences of climatic change for
 43 inhabitants of the Mediterranean continue to depend on the long term interplay between an array of societal
 44 and environmental factors (Holmgren et al., 2016). This makes this region an example of strong vulnerability
 45 and various adaptation responses. Previous IPCC assessments and recent publications project regional
 46 changes in climate under increased warming, including consistent climate model projections of increased
 47 precipitation deficit amplified by strong regional warming (Seneviratne et al., 2012; Christensen et al., 2013;
 48 Collins et al., 2013; Greve and Seneviratne, 2015; Section 3.3.3).

1
2 A good example of such long history of resilience is the Eastern Mediterranean region, which has exhibited a
3 strong negative trend in precipitation since 1960 (Mathbout et al., 2017) and experienced an intense and
4 prolonged drought episode between 2007 and 2010 (Kelley et al., 2015). This drought was the longest and
5 the most intense in the last 900 years (Cook et al., 2016). Some authors (e.g., Trigo et al., 2010; Kelley et al.,
6 2015) assert that very low precipitation levels have driven a steep decline in agricultural productivity in the
7 Euphrates and Tigris catchment basins, and displaced hundreds of thousands of people, mainly in Syria.
8 Impacts have also been noticed on the water resource (Yazdanpanah et al., 2016) and the crop performance
9 in Iran (Saeidi et al., 2017). Many historical periods of turmoil have coincided with severe droughts, for
10 example the drought which occurred at the end of the Bronze Age, approximately 3200 years ago
11 (Kaniewski et al., 2015). In this instance, a number of flourishing Eastern Mediterranean civilizations
12 collapsed, and rural settlements re-emerged with agro-pastoral activities and limited long-distance trade. This
13 illustrates how some vulnerable regions are forced to pursue drastic adaptive responses, including migration
14 and societal structure changes.

15
16 The potential evolution of drought conditions under 1.5°C/2°C warming (Section 3.3.4) can be analyzed by
17 comparing the 2008 drought (high temperature, low precipitation) with the 1960 drought (low temperature,
18 low precipitation) (Kelley et al., 2015). Though the precipitation deficits were comparable, the 2008 drought
19 was amplified by increased evapotranspiration induced by much higher temperatures (a mean increase of
20 1°C on the 1931-2008 period on Syria) and a large population increase (from 5 million in 1960 to 22 million
21 in 2008). Koutroulis et al. (2013) projects that of the 18% decrease of water availability for Crete under a
22 2°C global warming at the end of the 21st century, only 6% is due to decreased precipitation (the rest is due
23 to an increase in evapotranspiration). This study and others like it confirm an important risk of extreme
24 drought conditions for the Middle East (even higher in continental locations than in islands) with a 1.5°C
25 global warming (Jacob et al., 2018), consistent with current observed changes (Greve et al., 2014); Section
26 3.3.4). Risks of drying in the Mediterranean region can be substantially reduced if global warming is limited
27 to 1.5°C compared to 2°C or higher levels of warming (Guiot and Cramer, 2016); see also Section 3.4.3).
28 Higher warming levels may induce strong levels of vulnerability exacerbated by large changes in
29 demography.

30 [END BOX 3.2 HERE]

31 32 **3.3.5 Runoff and fluvial flooding**

33 34 *3.3.5.1 Observed and attributed changes in runoff and river flooding*

35 There has been progress since the AR5 in identifying historical changes in streamflow and continental
36 runoff. Dai (2016) using available streamflow data shows that long-term (1948–2012) flow trends are
37 statistically significant only for 27.5% of the 200 world’s major rivers with negative trends outnumbering the
38 positive ones. Although streamflow trends are mostly non-statistically significant, they are consistent with
39 observed regional precipitation changes. From 1950 to 2012, precipitation and runoff have increased over
40 southeastern South America, central and northern Australia, the central and northeast United States, central
41 and northern Europe, and most of Russia and decreased over most of Africa, East and South Asia, eastern
42 coastal Australia, southeastern and northwestern United States, western and eastern Canada, the
43 Mediterranean region and in some regions of Brazil (Dai, 2016).

44
45 A large part of the observed regional trends in streamflow and runoff could have resulted from internal
46 multidecadal and multiyear climate variations, especially the Pacific Decadal Variability (PDV), the Atlantic
47 Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO) and the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) although the effect of

1 anthropogenic greenhouse gasses and aerosols could also be important (Hidalgo et al., 2009; Gu and Adler,
2 2013, 2015; Chiew et al., 2014; Luo et al., 2016; Gudmundsson et al., 2017). Additionally, other human
3 activities can influence the hydrological cycle such as land-use/land-cover change, modifications in river
4 morphology and water table depth, construction and operation of hydropower plants, dikes and weirs,
5 wetland drainage and agricultural practices such as water withdrawal for irrigation. All of these can also
6 have a large impact on runoff at river basin scales although there is less agreement over their influence on
7 global mean runoff (Gerten et al., 2008; Sterling et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2014; Betts et al., 2015; Arheimer et
8 al., 2017). Some studies suggest that increases in global runoff resulting from changes in land-cover or land-
9 use (predominantly deforestation) are counterbalanced by decreases from irrigation (Gerten et al., 2008;
10 Sterling et al., 2012). Likewise, forest and grassland fires can also modify the hydrological response at a
11 watershed scale when the burned area is significant (Versini et al., 2013; Springer et al., 2015; Wine and
12 Cadol, 2016).

13
14 Few studies explore observed changes in extreme streamflow and river flooding since the IPCC AR5.
15 Mallakpour and Villarini (2015) analyzed changes of flood magnitude and frequency in Central United
16 States considering stream gauge daily records with at least 50 years of data ending no earlier than 2011.
17 They showed that flood frequency has increased while there was limited evidence of a decrease in flood
18 magnitude in this region. Stevens et al. (2016) found a rise in the number of reported floods in the United
19 Kingdom during the period 1884–2013 with flood events appearing more frequently towards the end of the
20 20th century. A peak was identified in 2012 when annual rainfall was the second highest in over 100 years.
21 Do et al. (2017) computed the trends in annual maximum daily streamflow data across the globe over the
22 1966–2005 period. They found decreasing trends for a large number of stations in western North America
23 and Australia, and increasing trends in parts of Europe, eastern North America, parts of South America and
24 southern Africa.

25
26 In summary, streamflow trends since 1950 are non-statistically significant in most of the world's largest
27 rivers (*high confidence*), while flood frequency and extreme streamflow increased in some regions (*high*
28 *confidence*).

30 3.3.5.2 Projected changes at 1.5°C versus 2°C in runoff and river flooding


31 Global-scale assessments of projected changes on freshwater systems generally suggest that areas with either
32 positive or negative changes in mean annual streamflow are smaller for 1.5°C than for 2°C global warming
33 (Betts et al., 2018; Döll et al., 2018). Döll et al. (2018) found that only 11% of the global land area
34 (excluding Greenland and Antarctica) shows statistically significant larger hazard at 2°C than at 1.5°C.
35 Significant decreases are found for 13% of the global land area for both global warming levels, while
36 significant increases are projected to occur for 21% of the global land area for 1.5°C, and rise to between
37 26% (Döll et al., 2018) and approximately 50% (Betts et al., 2018) for 2°C.

38
39 At the regional scale, projected runoff changes in general follow the spatial extent of projected changes in
40 precipitation (see Section 3.3.3). Emerging literature shows runoff projections for different warming levels.
41 For 2°C global warming, an increase in runoff is projected for much of the high northern latitudes, Southeast
42 Asia, East Africa, north-eastern Europe, India, and parts of, Austria, China, Hungary, Norway, Sweden, the
43 northwest Balkans, and Sahel (Schleussner et al., 2016b; Donnelly et al., 2017; Zhai et al., 2017; Döll et al.,
44 2018). Additionally, decreases are projected in the Mediterranean region, South Australia, Central America
45 and Central and Southern South America (Schleussner et al., 2016b; Donnelly et al., 2017; Döll et al., 2018).
46 Differences between 1.5°C and 2°C would be most prominent in the Mediterranean where the median

1 reduction in annual runoff is expected to be about 9% (likely range 4.5–15.5%) at 1.5°C, while at 2°C
2 warming, runoff could decrease by 17% (likely range 8–25%) (Schleussner et al., 2016b). Consistently, Döll
3 et al. (2018) found that for an increase in global warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, statistically insignificant
4 changes of the mean annual streamflow around the Mediterranean region become significant with decreases
5 of 10–30%. Donnelly et al. (2017) found an intense decrease in runoff along both the Iberian and Balkan
6 coasts as warming level increases.

7
8 Basin-scale projections of river runoff at different warming levels are available for many regions. Betts et al.
9 (2018) assessed runoff changes in 21 of the world major river basins at 1.5°C and 2°C global warming
10 (Figure 3.15). They found a general tendency towards increased runoff in the majority of the basins except in
11 the Amazon, Orange, Danube and Guadiana basins where the range of projections indicate decreased mean
12 flows (Figure 3.13). In the case of the Amazon, mean flows are projected to decline by up to 25% for 2°C
13 global warming. Gosling et al. (2017) analyzed the impact of global warming of 1°C, 2°C and 3°C above
14 pre-industrial levels on river runoff at catchment scale, focusing on eight major rivers in different continents:
15 Upper Amazon, Darling, Ganges, Lena, Upper Mississippi, Upper Niger, Rhine and Tagus. Their results
16 show that the sign and magnitude of change with global warming for the Upper Amazon, Darling, Ganges,
17 Upper Niger and Upper Mississippi is unclear, while the Rhine and Tagus may experience decreases in
18 projected runoff and the Lena may increase. Donnelly et al. (2017) analyzed the mean flow response to
19 different warming levels for six major European rivers: Glomma, Wisla, Lule, Ebro, Rhine and Danube.
20 Consistent with the increases in mean runoff in large parts of northern Europe, the Glomma, Wisla and Lule
21 rivers could increase their discharges with global warming while the Ebro could decrease in part due to a
22 decrease in runoff in southern Europe. In the case of the Rhine and Danube rivers, Donnelly et al. (2017) did
23 not find clear results. Projected mean annual runoff of the Yiluo River catchment in northern China will
24 decrease by 22% for 1.5°C and by 21% for 2°C, while the the mean annual runoff for the Beijiing River in
25 southern China, is projected to increase by less than 1% and 3% in comparicon to the studied baseline period
26 for 1.5°C and 2°C respectively (L. Liu et al., 2017). Chen et al. (2017) assessed the future changes of water
27 resources in the Upper Yangtze River basin for the same warming levels and found a slight decrease in the
28 annual discharge for 1.5°C which reverses sign for 2°C. Montroull et al. (2018) studied the hydrological
29 impacts of the main rivers (Paraguay, Paraná, Iguazú and Uruguay) in La Plata basin in South America under
30 1.5°C and 2°C global warming and for two emission scenarios. The Uruguay basin shows increases in
31 streamflow in all scenarios/warming targets except for the combination of RCP8.5/1.5°C warming. The
32 increase is approximately 15% above the 1981–2000 reference period for 2°C global warming and the
33 RCP4.5 scenario. For the other three rivers the sign of the change in mean streamflow highly depends on the
34 RCP and GCM used.

35
36 Marx et al. (2018) analyzed how hydrological low flows in Europe are affected under different global
37 warming levels (1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C). The Alpine region shows the strongest low flow increase from 22%
38 for 1.5°C to 30% for 2°C because of the snow melt contribution, while in the Mediterranean low flows are
39 expected to decrease due to the projected decreases in annual precipitation. Döll et al. (2018) found that
40 extreme low flows in the tropical Amazon, Congo and Indonesian basins could decrease by 10% while in the
41 southwestern part of Russia they could increase by 30% at 1.5°C. For 2°C, projected increases of extreme
42 low flows are exacerbated in the higher northern latitudes and in eastern Africa, India and Southeast Asia
43 while projected decreases intensify in the Amazon basin, Western United States, central Canada, and in
44 Southern and Western Europe, although not in the Congo basin or Indonesia, where models show less
45 agreement.



1
2 **Figure 3.15:** Runoff changes in twenty-one of the world major river basins at 1.5°C (blue) and 2°C (orange) global
3 warming simulated by the Joint UK Land Environment Simulator (JULES) ecosystem–hydrology model
4 under the ensemble of six climate projections. Boxes show the 25th and 75th percentile changes, whiskers
5 show the range, circles show the four projections that do not define the ends of the range, and crosses
6 show the ensemble means. Numbers in square brackets show the ensemble-mean flow in the baseline
7 (millimetres of rain equivalent) (from Betts et al., 2018).
8

9 Recent analysis of projections in river flooding and extreme runoff and flows are available for different
10 global warming levels. At the global scale, Alfieri et al. (2017) assessed the frequency and magnitude of
11 river floods and their impacts under 1.5°C, 2°C, and 4°C global warming scenarios. They found that flood
12 events with occurrence interval larger than the return period of present flood protections are projected to
13 increase in all continents under all considered warming levels, leading to widespread increment in the flood
14 hazard. Döll et al. (2018) found that high flows are projected to increase significantly on 11% and 21% of
15 the global land area at 1.5°C and 2°C respectively. Significantly increased high flows are expected to occur
16 in South and Southeast Asia and Central Africa at 1.5°C which intensify under 2°C and include parts of
17 South America.
18

19 At continental scale, Donnelly et al. (2017) and Thober et al. (2018) explored climate change impacts on
20 European high flows and/or floods under 1.5°C, 2°C, and 3°C global warming. Thober et al. (2018)

1 identified the Mediterranean region as a hotspot of change with significant decreases of –11% (-13%) in high
2 flows at 1.5°C (2°C) mainly resulting from reduced precipitation (Box 3.2). In Northern regions, high flows
3 are projected to rise between 1%-5% for 1.5°C and 2°C respectively due to increasing precipitation, although
4 floods could decrease by 6% in both scenarios due to less snowmelt. Donnelly et al. (2017) found that high
5 runoff levels could rise in intensity, robustness and spatial extent over large parts of continental Europe, with
6 increasing warming level. For 2°C, flood magnitudes are expected to increase significantly in Europe south
7 of 60°N, except for some regions (Bulgaria, Poland, southern Spain) while they are projected to decrease in
8 most of Finland, northwestern Russia and northern Sweden, with the exception of southern Sweden and
9 some coastal areas in Norway where floods may increase (Roudier et al., 2016). At basin scale, Mohammed
10 et al. (2017) found that floods are projected to be more frequent and flood magnitudes greater at 2°C than at
11 1.5°C in the Brahmaputra River in Bangladesh.

12
13 In coastal regions, increases in heavy precipitation associated with tropical cyclones (Section 3.3.6) combined
14 with increased sea levels (Section 3.3.9) may lead to increased flooding (Section 3.4.5).

15
16 In summary, there is *medium confidence* that a global warming of 2°C would lead to an expansion of the area
17 with significant increases in runoff as well as of the area affected by flood hazard compared to conditions at
18 1.5°C global warming. A global warming of 1.5°C would also lead to an expansion of the global land area
19 with significant increases in runoff (*medium confidence*) as well as to an increase in flood hazard in some
20 regions (*medium confidence*) compared to present day conditions.

21 22 23 **3.3.6 Tropical cyclones and extratropical storms**

24
25 Most recent studies on observed trends in the attributes of tropical cyclones are focusing on the satellite era
26 starting in 1979 (Rienecker et al., 2011), but the study of observed trends is complicated by the heterogeneity
27 of constantly advancing remote sensing techniques and instrumentation during this period (e.g., Landsea et
28 al., 2006; Walsh et al., 2016). Numerous studies towards and beyond AR5 have reported a decreasing trend
29 in the global number of tropical cyclones and/or the globally accumulated cyclonic energy (Emanuel, 2005;
30 Elsner et al., 2008; Knutson et al., 2010; Holland and Bruyère, 2014; Klotzbach and Landsea, 2015; Walsh et
31 al., 2016). A theoretical physical basis for such a decrease to occur under global warming has recently been
32 provided by Kang and Elsner (2015). However Klotzbach (2006), using a relatively short (twenty year)
33 relatively homogeneous remotely sensed record reported no significant trends in global cyclonic activity,
34 consistent with more recent findings of Holland and Bruyère (2014). Such contradictions, in combination
35 with the fact that the almost four-decade long period of remotely sensed observations remains relatively
36 short to distinguish anthropogenically induced trends from decadal and multi-decadal variability, implies that
37 there is only *low confidence* regarding changes in global tropical cyclone numbers under global warming
38 over the last four decades.

39
40 Studies on the detection of trends in the occurrence of very intense tropical cyclones (category 4 and 5
41 hurricanes on the Saffir-Simpson scale) over recent decades have yielded contradicting results. Most studies
42 have reported increases in these systems (Emanuel, 2005; Webster et al., 2005; Klotzbach, 2006; Elsner et
43 al., 2008; Knutson et al., 2010; Holland and Bruyère, 2014; Walsh et al., 2016), and in particular for the
44 North Atlantic, North Indian and South Indian Ocean basins (e.g., Singh et al., 2000; Singh, 2010; Kossin et
45 al., 2013; Holland and Bruyère, 2014; Walsh et al., 2016). In the North Indian Ocean over the Arabian Sea,
46 an increase in the frequency of extremely severe cyclonic storms has been reported and attributed to
47 anthropogenic warming (Murakami et al., 2017). However, to the east over the Bay of Bengal, tropical

1 cyclones and severe tropical cyclones have exhibited decreasing trends over the period 1961–2010, although
2 the ratio between severe tropical cyclones and cyclones is increasing (Mohapatra et al., 2017). Moreover,
3 studies that have used more homogeneous records but that were consequently limited to rather short periods
4 of 20 to 25 years in length, have reported no statistically significant trends or decreases in the global number
5 of these systems (Kamahori et al., 2006; Klotzbach and Landsea, 2015). CMIP5 model simulations of the
6 historical period have also not produced anthropogenically induced trends in very intense tropical cyclones
7 (Bender et al., 2010; Knutson et al., 2010, 2013; Camargo, 2013; Christensen et al., 2013), consistent with
8 the findings of Klotzbach and Landsea (2015). There is consequently *low confidence* in the larger number of
9 studies reporting increasing trends in the global number of very intense cyclones.

10
11 GCM projections of the changing attributes of tropical cyclones under high levels of greenhouse gas forcing
12 (3°C to 4°C) are consistently indicating decreases in the global number of tropical cyclones (Knutson et al.,
13 2010, 2015; Sugi and Yoshimura, 2012; Christensen et al., 2013; Yoshida et al., 2017). A smaller number of
14 studies based on statistical downscaling methodologies are contradicting these findings, however, and are
15 indicative of increases in the global number of tropical cyclones under climate change (Emanuel, 2017).
16 Most studies also indicate increases in the global number of very intense tropical cyclones under high levels
17 of global warming (Knutson et al., 2015; Sugi et al., 2017) consistent with dynamic theory (Kang and Elsner,
18 2015), although a few studies contradict this finding (e.g., Yoshida et al., 2017). Hence, we assess that under
19 3 to 4 °C of warming *it is more likely than not (medium confidence)* that the global number of tropical
20 cyclones would decrease whilst the number of very intense cyclones would increase.

21
22 Only two studies have to date directly explored the changing tropical cyclone attributes under 1.5°C versus
23 2°C of global warming. Using a high resolution global atmospheric model, Wehner et al. (2017) concluded
24 that the differences in tropical cyclone statistics under 1.5°C versus 2°C stabilization scenarios as defined by
25 the HAPPI protocols (Mitchell et al., 2017) are small. Consistent with the majority of studies performed for
26 higher degrees of global warming, the total number of tropical cyclones is projected to decrease under global
27 warming, whilst the most intense (category 4 and 5) cyclones are projected to occur more frequently. These
28 very intense storms are projected to be associated with higher peak wind speeds and lower central pressures
29 under 2°C versus 1.5°C of global warming. The accumulated cyclonic energy is projected to decrease
30 globally from 1.5 to 2 °C, in association with a decrease in the global number of tropical cyclones under
31 progressively higher levels of global warming. It is also noted that heavy rainfall associated with tropical
32 cyclones has been assessed in the IPCC SREX to *likely* increase under increasing global warming
33 (Seneviratne et al., 2012). Two recent articles suggest that there is *high confidence* that global warming for
34 present conditions (i.e. about 1°C of global warming, see Section 3.3.1) has increased the heavy precipitation
35 associated with the 2017 Hurricane Harvey by about 15% or more (Risser and Wehner, 2017; van
36 Oldenborgh et al., 2017). Hence, it can be inferred, under the assumption of linear dynamics, that further
37 increases in heavy precipitation would occur under 1.5°C, 2°C and higher levels of global warming (*medium*
38 *confidence*). Using a high resolution regional climate model, (Muthige et al., 2018) also explored the effects
39 of different degrees of global warming on tropical cyclones over the southwest Indian Ocean, in transient
40 simulations that downscaled a number of RCP8.5 GCM projections. Decreases in tropical cyclone
41 frequencies are projected under both 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming. The decreases in cyclone frequencies
42 under 2°C global warming are somewhat larger than under 1.5°C of global warming, but with no further
43 decreases projected under 3°C of global warming. This suggests that 2°C of warming, at least in these
44 downscaling simulations, represent a type of stabilization level in terms of tropical cyclone formation over
45 the southwest Indian Ocean and landfall over southern Africa (Muthige et al., 2018). There is thus *limited*
46 *evidence* that the global number of tropical cyclones will be less under 2°C of global warming compared to
47 1.5 °C of warming, but with an increase in the number of very intense cyclones (*low confidence*).

1
2 The global response of the mid-latitude atmospheric circulation to 1.5 and 2°C of warming was investigated
3 using the HAPPI ensemble with a focus on the winter season (Li et al., 2018). Under 1.5 °C of global
4 warming a weakening of storm activity over North America, an equatorward shift of the North Pacific jet
5 exit and an equatorward intensification of the South Pacific jet are projected. Under an additional 0.5°C of
6 warming a poleward shift of the North Atlantic jet exit and an intensification on the flanks of the Southern
7 Hemisphere storm track become more pronounced. The weakening of the Mediterranean storm track that is
8 projected under low mitigation emerges in the 2 °C warmer world (Li et al., 2018). The AR5 (Stocker et al.,
9 2013) assessed that under high greenhouse forcing (3°C or 4°C) there is *low confidence* in projections of
10 poleward shifts of the North-Hemisphere storm tracks, while there is *high confidence* that there would be a
11 small poleward shift of the South-Hemisphere storm tracks. In the context of this report, we assess that there
12 is *limited evidence* and *low confidence* in whether any projected signal for higher levels of warming is to be
13 well-manifested under 2°C of global warming.
14

15 16 3.3.7 *Ocean circulation and temperature* 17

18 It is *virtually certain* that the temperature of the upper layers of the ocean (0–700 m) has been increasing at a
19 rate just behind that of the warming trend for the planet. The surface of three ocean basins have warmed over
20 the period 1950–2016 (by 0.11°C, 0.07°C, and 0.05°C per decade for the Indian, Atlantic and Pacific oceans
21 respectively; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2014, AR5 Chapter 30), with the greatest changes occurring at the
22 highest latitudes. Isotherms (i.e. lines of equal temperature) of sea surface temperature (SST) are traveling to
23 higher latitudes at rates of up to 40 km per year (Burrows et al., 2014; García Molinos et al., 2015). Long-
24 term patterns of variability make detecting signals due to climate change complex, although the recent
25 acceleration of changes to the temperature of the surface layers of the ocean has made the climate signal
26 more distinct (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2014). There is also evidence of significant increases in the frequency
27 of marine heatwaves in the observational record (Oliver et al., 2018), consistent with changes in mean ocean
28 temperatures (*high confidence*). Increasing climate extremes in the ocean are associated with the general rise
29 in global average surface temperature as well as more intense patterns of climate variability (e.g., climate
30 change intensification of ENSO). Increased heat in the upper layers of the ocean is also driving more intense
31 storms and greater rates of inundation, which, together with sea level rise, are already driving significant
32 impacts to sensitive coastal and low-lying areas.
33

34 Increasing land-sea temperature gradients, as induced by higher rates of continental warming compared to
35 the surrounding oceans under climate change, have the potential to strengthen upwelling systems associated
36 with the eastern boundary currents (Benguela, Canary, Humboldt and Californian Currents) (Bakun, 1990).
37 Observed trends support the conclusion that a general strengthening of longshore winds has occurred
38 (Sydeman et al., 2014), but are unclear in terms of trends detected in the upwelling currents themselves
39 (Lluch-Cota et al., 2014). Projecting the scale of the changes between 1°C and 1.5°C, and 1.5°C and 2°C is
40 only informed by the changes over the past change in GMST of 0.5°C (*low confidence*). However, the weight
41 of evidence from GCM projections of future climate change indicates the general strengthening of the
42 Benguela, Canary and Humboldt upwelling systems under enhanced anthropogenic forcing (D. Wang et al.,
43 2015) is *likely* to occur. This strengthening is projected to be stronger at higher latitudes. In fact, evidence
44 from regional climate modelling is supportive of an increase in long-shore winds at higher latitudes, but at
45 lower latitudes long-shore winds may decrease as a consequence of the poleward displacement of the
46 subtropical highs under climate change (Christensen et al., 2007; Engelbrecht et al., 2009).
47

1 *It is more likely than not* that the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) has been weakening
2 in recent decades, given the detection of the cooling of surface waters in the north Atlantic and evidence that
3 the Gulf Stream has slowed by 30% since the late 1950s (Srokosz and Bryden, 2015; Caesar et al., 2018).
4 There is only *limited evidence* linking the current anomalously weak state of AMOC to anthropogenic
5 warming (Caesar et al., 2018). It is *very likely* that the AMOC will weaken over the 21st century. Best
6 estimates and range for the reduction from CMIP5 are 11% (1 to 24%) in RCP2.6 and 34% (12 to 54%) in
7 RCP8.5 (AR5). There is no evidence indicating significantly different amplitudes of AMOC weakening for
8 1.5°C versus 2°C of global warming.
9

10 3.3.8 *Sea ice*

11 Summer sea ice in the Arctic has been retreating rapidly in recent decades. During the period 1997 to 2014
12 for example, the monthly mean sea-ice extent during September decreased on average by 130,000 km² per
13 year (Serreze and Stroeve, 2015). This is about four times as fast as the September sea-ice loss during the
14 period 1979 to 1996. Also sea-ice thickness has decreased substantially, with an estimated decrease in ice
15 thickness of more than 50% in the central Arctic (Lindsay and Schweiger, 2015). Sea-ice coverage and
16 thickness also decrease in CMIP5-model simulations of the recent past, and are projected to decrease in the
17 future (Collins et al., 2013). However, the modeled sea-ice loss in most CMIP5 models is much weaker
18 than observed. Compared to observations, the simulations are weak in terms of their sensitivity to both
19 global mean temperature rise (Rosenblum and Eisenman, 2017) and to anthropogenic CO₂ emissions (Notz
20 and Stroeve, 2016). This mismatch between the observed and modeled sensitivity of Arctic sea ice implies
21 that the multi-model-mean response of future sea-ice evolution probably underestimates the sea-ice loss for
22 a given amount of global warming. To address this issue, studies estimating the future evolution of Arctic
23 sea ice tend to bias correct the model simulations based on the observed evolution of Arctic sea ice in
24 response to global warming. Often based on such bias correction, pre-AR5 and post-AR5 studies agree that
25 for 1.5 °C global warming relative to pre-industrial levels, the Arctic Ocean will maintain a sea-ice cover
26 throughout summer for most years (Collins et al., 2013; Notz and Stroeve, 2016; Screen and Williamson,
27 2017; Jahn, 2018; Niederdrenk and Notz, 2018; Sigmond et al., 2018). For 2°C global warming relative to
28 pre-industrial levels, chances of an ice-free Arctic during summer are substantially higher (Screen and
29 Williamson, 2017; Jahn, 2018; Niederdrenk and Notz, 2018; Screen et al., 2018; Sigmond et al., 2018). The
30 Arctic is *very likely* to have experienced at least one ice-free Arctic summer after about 10 years of
31 stabilized warming at 2°C compared to after about 100 years of stabilized warming at 1.5°C (Jahn, 2018;
32 Screen et al., 2018; Sigmond et al., 2018). For a specific given year under stabilized warming of 2°C,
33 studies based on large ensembles of simulations with a single model estimate the likelihood for ice-free
34 conditions as 35% without a bias correction of the underlying model (Sanderson et al., 2017; Jahn, 2018);
35 as between 10% and >99% depending on the observational record used to correct the sensitivity of sea ice
36 decline to global warming in the underlying model (Niederdrenk and Notz, 2018); and as 19% based on a
37 procedure to correct for biases in the climatological sea ice coverage in the underlying model (Sigmond et
38 al., 2018). The uncertainty of the first year of the occurrence of an ice-free Arctic Ocean arising from
39 internal variability is estimated to be about 20 years (Notz, 2015; Jahn et al., 2016).
40
41
42

43 The more recent estimates of the warming necessary to achieve an ice-free Arctic Ocean during summer are
44 lower than the ones given in AR5 (about 2.6°C-3.1°C relative to preindustrial or 1.6°C-2.1°C global
45 warming relative to the present day), which was similar to the estimate of 3°C relative to preindustrial
46 levels (or 2°C global warming relative to the present day) by Mahlstein and Knutti (2012) based on bias-
47 corrected CMIP3 models. Rosenblum and Eisenman (2016) explain why the sensitivity estimated by

1 Mahlstein and Knutti (2012) might be too low, estimating instead that September sea ice in the Arctic
2 disappears for 2°C relative to preindustrial (or about 1°C global warming relative to the present day), in line
3 with the other recent estimates. Notz and Stroeve (2016) use the observed correlation between September
4 sea-ice extent and cumulative CO₂ emissions to estimate that the Arctic Ocean would become nearly sea-
5 ice-free during September with a further 1000 Gt of emissions, which also implies a sea-ice loss at about
6 2°C global warming. Some of the uncertainty in these numbers derives from the possible impact of aerosols
7 (Gagne et al., 2017) and of volcanic forcing (Rosenblum and Eisenman, 2016). During winter, little Arctic
8 sea ice is projected to be lost for either 1.5°C or 2°C global warming (Niederrenk and Notz, 2018).
9

10 Regarding the behavior of Arctic sea ice under decreasing temperatures following a possible overshoot of a
11 long-term temperature target, a substantial number of pre-AR5 studies have found that there is no indication
12 of hysteresis behavior of Arctic sea ice (Holland et al., 2006; Schroeder and Connolley, 2007; Armour et
13 al., 2011; Sedláček et al., 2011; Tietsche et al., 2011; Boucher et al., 2012; Ridley et al., 2012). In
14 particular, the relationship between Arctic sea-ice coverage and GMST is found to be indistinguishable
15 between a warming scenario and a cooling scenario. These results have been confirmed by post-AR5
16 studies (Li et al., 2013; Jahn, 2018), which implies *high confidence* that an intermediate temperature
17 overshoot has no long-term consequences for Arctic sea-ice coverage.
18

19 In the Antarctic, sea ice shows regionally contrasting trends, with for example strongly decreased sea-ice
20 coverage near the Antarctic peninsula and increased sea-ice coverage in the Amundsen Sea (Hobbs et al.,
21 2016). Averaged over these contrasting regional trends, there has been a slow long-term increase in overall
22 sea-ice coverage in the Southern Ocean, with, however, comparably low ice coverage from September 2016
23 onwards. Collins et al. (2013) have *low confidence* in Antarctic sea ice projections because of the wide
24 range of model projections and an inability of almost all models to reproduce observations such as the
25 seasonal cycle, interannual variability and the long-term slow increase. No studies are hence available to
26 robustly assess the possible future evolution of Antarctic sea ice under low-warming scenarios.
27

28 In summary, the probability of a sea-ice-free Arctic Ocean during summer is substantially higher at 2°C
29 compared to 1.5°C global warming relative to pre-industrial levels and it is *very likely* that there will be the
30 least one sea-ice-free Arctic summer after about 10 years of stabilized warming at 2°C, while about 100
31 years are required at 1.5°C. There is *high confidence* that an intermediate temperature overshoot has no
32 long-term consequences for Arctic sea-ice coverage.
33

35 3.3.9 *Sea level*

36
37 Sea level varies over a wide range of temporal and spatial scales, which can be divided into three broad
38 categories. These are Global Mean Sea Level (GMSL), regional variation about this mean, and the
39 occurrence of sea-level extremes associated with storm surges and tides. GMSL has been rising since the
40 late 19th century from the low rates of change that characterized the previous two millennia (Church et al.,
41 2013). Slowing in the reported rate over the last two decades (Cazenave et al., 2014) may be attributable to
42 instrumental drift in the observing satellite system (Watson et al., 2015) and volcanoes (Fasullo et al.,
43 2016). Accounting for the former results in rates (1993 to mid-2014) of between 2.6 and 2.9 mm yr⁻¹
44 (Watson et al., 2015). The relative contributions from thermal expansion, glacier and ice-sheet mass loss, as
45 well as freshwater storage on land, are relatively well understood (Church et al., 2013; Watson et al., 2015)
46 and their attribution is dominated by anthropogenic forcing since 1970 (15±55% before 1950, 69±31%
47 after 1970) (Slangen et al., 2016).

1
2 There has been a significant advance in the literature since AR5, which has seen the development of Semi-
3 Empirical Models (SEMs) into a broader emulation-based approach (Kopp et al., 2014; Mengel et al., 2016;
4 Nauels et al., 2017) that is partially based on the results from more detailed, process-based modelling,
5 where available. Church et al. (2013) assigned *low confidence* to SEMs because of their assumption that the
6 relation between climate forcing and GMSL is the same in the past (calibration) and future (projection).
7 Probable future changes in the relative contributions of thermal expansion, glaciers and (in particular) ice
8 sheets invalidate this assumption, however recent emulation-based studies overcome this by considering
9 individual GMSL contributors separately and are therefore employed in this assessment. In this subsection,
10 the process-based literature of individual contributors to GMSL is considered for scenarios close to 1.5°C
11 and 2°C before assessing emulation-based approaches.

12
13 A limited number of processes-based studies are relevant to GMSL in 1.5°C and 2°C worlds. Marzeion et al.
14 (2018) force a global glacier model with temperature-scaled scenarios based on RCP2.6 to investigate the
15 difference between 1.5°C and 2°C and find little difference between scenarios in the glacier contribution to
16 GMSL at 2100 (54-97 mm relative to present day for 1.5°C, and 63-112 mm for 2°C using a 90% confidence
17 interval). This arises because melt during the remainder of the century is dominated by the response to
18 warming from preindustrial to present-day levels (in turn a reflection of the slow response times of glaciers).
19 Fuerst et al. (2015) make projections of Greenland ice sheet's contribution to GMSL using an ice-flow
20 model forced by the regional climate model Modèle Atmosphérique Régional (MAR, considered by Church
21 et al., 2013) to be the 'most realistic' such model). They obtain an RCP2.6 range of 24-60 mm (1 standard
22 deviation) by the end of the century (relative to 2000 and consistent with the assessment of Church et al.
23 (2013)), however their projections do not allow the difference between 1.5°C and 2°C worlds to be evaluated.

24
25 The Antarctic ice sheet can contribute both positively and negatively to future GMSL rise by, respectively,
26 increases in outflow (solid ice lost directly to the ocean) and increases in snowfall (due to the increased
27 moisture-bearing capacity of a warmer atmosphere). Frieler et al. (2015) suggest a range of 3.5-8.7 % K⁻¹
28 for this effect, which is consistent with the AR5. Observations from the Amundsen Sea sector of Antarctic
29 suggest an increase in outflow (Mouginot et al., 2014) over recent decades associated with grounding line
30 retreat (Rignot et al., 2014) and the influx of relatively warm Circumpolar Deepwater (Jacobs et al., 2011).
31 Literature on the attribution of these change to anthropogenic forcing is still in its infancy (Goddard et al.,
32 2017; Turner et al., 2017a). RCP2.6-based projections of Antarctic outflow (Levermann et al., 2014;
33 Golledge et al., 2015; DeConto and Pollard, 2016, who include snowfall changes) are consistent with the
34 AR5 assessment of Church et al. (2013) for end-of-century GMSL for RCP2.6, and do not support
35 substantial additional GMSL rise by Marine Ice Sheet Instability or associated instabilities (see Section
36 3.6). While agreement is relatively good, concerns about the numerical fidelity of these models still exist
37 and this may affect the quality of their projections (Drouet et al., 2013; Durand and Pattyn, 2015). An
38 assessment of Antarctic contributions beyond the end of the century, in particular related to the Marine Ice
39 Sheet Instability, can be found in Section 3.6.

40
41 While some literature on process-based projections of GMSL at 2100 is available, it is insufficient to
42 distinguish between emission scenarios associated with 1.5°C and 2°C worlds. This literature is, however,
43 consistent with Church et al. (2013) assessment of a *likely* range of 0.28-0.61 m at 2100 (relative to 1986-
44 2005) suggesting that AR5 assessment is still appropriate. Recent emulation-based studies show
45 convergence towards this AR5 assessment (Table 3.1) and offer the advantage of allowing a comparison
46 between 1.5°C and 2°C worlds. Table 3.1 presents a compilation of both recent emulation-based and SEM
47 studies.

Table 3.1: Compilation of recent projections for sea level at 2100 (in cm) for Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP)2.6, and 1.5 and 2.0 °C scenarios. Upper and lower limits are shown for the 17-84% and 5-95% confidence intervals quoted in the original papers.

Study	Baseline	RCP2.6		1.5°C		2°C	
		67%	90%	67%	90%	67%	90%
AR5	1986-2005	28-61					
Kopp et al. (2014)	2000	37-65	29-82				
Jevrejeva et al. (2016)	1986-2005		29-58				
Kopp et al. (2016)	2000	28-51	24-61				
Mengel et al. (2016)	1986-2005	28-56					
Nauels et al. (2017)	1986-2005	35-56					
Goodwin et al. (2017)	1986-2005		31-59 45-70 45-72				
Schaeffer et al. (2012)	2000		52-96		54-99		56-105
Schleussner et al. (2016b)	2000			26-53		36-65	
Bittermann et al. (2017)	2000				29-46		39-61
Jackson et al. (2018)	1986-2005			30-58 40-77	20-67 28-93	35-64 47-93	24-74 32-117
Sanderson et al. (2017)					50-80		60-90
Nicholls et al. (2018)	1986-2005				24-54		31-65
Rasmussen et al. (2018)	2000			35-64	28-82	39-76	28-96
Goodwin et al. (2018)	1986-2005				26-62		30-69

There is little consensus between the reported ranges of GMSL rise (Table 3.1), in particular at their upper limit, however there is *medium agreement* that GMSL at 2100 would be 0-0.2 m higher in a 2°C world compared to 1.5 °C with a most likely value of 0.1 m. There is *medium confidence* in this assessment because of issues associated with both projections of the Antarctic contribution to GMSL that are employed in emulation-based studies (see above) and the issues previously identified with SEMs (Church et al., 2013).

Translating projections of GMSL to the scale of coastlines and islands requires two further steps. The first accounts for regional changes associated with changing water and ice loads (such as Earth's gravitational field and rotation, and vertical land movement), as well as accounting for spatial differences in ocean heat uptake and circulation. The second maps regional sea level on to changes in the return periods of particular flood events to account for effects not included in global climate models such as tides, storm surges and wave setup and runup. Kopp et al. (2014) present a framework to do this and give an example application for nine sites (in the US, Japan, northern Europe and Chile). Of these sites, seven (all except those in northern Europe) experience at least a quadrupling in the number of years in the 21st century with 1-in-100 year floods under RCP2.6 compared to no future sea-level rise. Rasmussen et al. (2018)(2018) use this approach to investigate the difference between 1.5°C and 2°C worlds up to 2200. They find that the reduction in the frequency of 1-in-100 year floods in 1.5°C compared to 2°C worlds is greatest in the eastern US and Europe, with ESL event frequency amplification being reduced by about a half and with smaller reductions for Small Island Developing States (SIDS). This latter contrasts with the finding of Vitousek et al. (2017) that regions with low variability in extreme water levels (such as SIDS in the tropics) are particularly sensitive to GMSL rise such that a doubling of frequency may be expected for even small (0.1-0.2 m) rises. Schleussner et al. (2011) emulate the AMOC based on a subset of CMIP-class climate models. When forced using global

1 temperatures appropriate to the CP3-PD scenario (1°C warming at 2100 relative to 2000 or ~2 °C relative to
2 preindustrial), the emulation suggests an 11% median reduction in AMOC strength at 2100 (relative to 2000)
3 with associated 0.04 m dynamic sea-level rise along the New York City coastline.
4

5 In summary, there is *medium confidence* that GMSL rise will be about 0.1 m less by the end of the century
6 in a 1.5°C compared to a 2°C warmer world. SLR beyond 2100 is discussed in 3.6, however recent
7 literature strongly supports Church et al. (2013)'s assessment that sea level rise will continue well beyond
8 2100.
9

10 [START BOX 3.3 HERE]

11 **Box 3.3:** Lessons from Past Warm Climate Episodes

12
13 Climate projections and associated risk assessments for a future warmer world are based on climate model
14 simulations. However, Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) climate models do not
15 include all existing earth system feedbacks and may therefore underestimate both rates and extents of
16 changes (Knutti and Sedláček, 2012). Evidence from natural archives of three moderately warmer (1.5°C-
17 2°C) climate episodes in Earth's past help to assess such long-term feedbacks (Fischer et al., 2018).
18

19 While evidence over the last 2000 yr and during the Last Glacial Maximum (LGM) has been discussed in
20 detail in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (Masson-Delmotte et al., 2013), the climate system response
21 during past warm intervals was the focus of a recent review paper (Fischer et al., 2018) summarized in this
22 Box. Examples of past warmer conditions (with essentially modern physical geography) include the
23 Holocene Thermal Maximum (HTM) (broadly defined as about 10-5 kyr before present (BP), where present
24 is defined as 1950), the Last Interglacial (LIG about 129-116 kyr BP) and the Mid Pliocene Warm Period
25 (MPWP, 3.3-3.0 millions years BP).
26

27 The global temperature response to changes in the insolation forcing during the HTM (Marcott et al., 2013)
28 and the LIG (Hoffman et al., 2017) was up to +1°C warmer than preindustrial (1850-1900); high-latitude
29 warming was 2-4°C (Capron et al., 2017), while temperature in the tropics changed little. Both HTM and
30 LIG experienced atmospheric CO₂ levels similar to preindustrial conditions (Masson-Delmotte et al. 2013).
31 During the MPWP, the most recent time period when CO₂ concentrations were similar to present, the global
32 temperature was >1°C and Arctic temperatures about 8°C warmer than preindustrial (Brigham-Grette et al.,
33 2013).
34

35 Although imperfect as analogs for the future, these regional changes can inform risk assessments such as the
36 potential for crossing irreversible thresholds or amplifying anthropogenic changes (Box 3.3 Figure 1). For
37 example, HTM and LIG Greenhouse Gas (GHG) concentrations show no evidence of runaway greenhouse
38 gas releases under limited global warming. Transient releases of CO₂ and CH₄ may follow permafrost
39 melting, but may be compensated by peat growth over longer timescales (Yu et al., 2010). Warming may
40 release CO₂ by enhancing soil respiration, counteracting CO₂ fertilization of plant growth (Frank et al.,
41 2010). Evidence of a collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) during these past
42 events of limited global warming could not be found (Galaasen et al., 2014).
43

44 Ecosystems and biome (major ecosystem types) distributions changed significantly with warming both in the
45 ocean and on land. For example, during past warming events some tropical and temperate forests retreated
46 due to increased aridity, while savannas expanded (Dowsett et al., 2016). Poleward shifts of marine and
47 terrestrial ecosystems, upward shifts in Alpine regions, and reorganisations of marine productivity are also

1 recorded in natural archives (Williams et al., 2009; Haywood et al., 2016).

2


3 Past warm events are associated with partial sea ice loss in the Arctic. Limited data on Antarctic sea ice so
4 far preclude firm conclusions about southern-hemisphere sea ice losses (de Vernal et al., 2013).

5

6 Reconstructed global sea level rise of 6-9 m during the LIG and possibly > 6m during the MPWP requires a
7 retreat of either the Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets (or both) (Dutton et al., 2015). While ice sheet and
8 climate models allow for a substantial retreat of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) and parts of East
9 Antarctic Ice Sheet (DeConto and Pollard, 2016), direct observational evidence is still lacking. Evidence for
10 ice retreat in Greenland is stronger, although a complete collapse of the Greenland ice sheet during the LIG
11 can be excluded (Dutton et al., 2015). Under modest warming past sea levels rise rates were similar or up to
12 two times larger than observed over the past two decades (Kopp et al., 2013). Given the long timescales
13 involved to reach equilibrium in a warmer world, sea level rise will likely continue for millennia even if
14 warming is limited to 2°C.

15

16 Finally, temperature reconstructions from these past warm intervals suggest that current climate models
17 underestimate regional warming at high latitudes (polar amplification) and long-term (multi-millennial)
18 global warming. None of these past warm climate episodes experienced the high speed of change in
19 atmospheric CO₂ and temperatures that we are experiencing today (Fischer et al., 2018).



20

21

22 **Box 3.3, Figure 1:** Impacts and responses of components of the Earth System. Summary of typical changes found for

1 warmer periods in the paleorecord as discussed in Fischer et al. (2018) (all statements relative to pre-industrial.
2 Statements in *italic* indicate that no conclusions can be drawn for the future). Note that significant spatial variability and
3 uncertainty exists in the assessment of each component and, therefore, this figure should not be referred to without
4 reading the publication in detail. HTM: Holocene Thermal Maximum, LIG: Last Interglacial, MPWP: Mid Pliocene
5 Warm Period

6 [END BOX 3.3 HERE]

9 3.3.10 Ocean chemistry

10
11 Ocean chemistry includes pH, salinity, oxygen, CO₂, and a range of other ions and gases, which affected by
12 precipitation, evaporation, storms, river run-off, coastal erosion, up-welling, ice formation, and the
13 activities of organisms and ecosystems (Stocker et al., 2013). Ocean chemistry is also changing with global
14 temperature, with impacts projected at 1.5°C and, more so, at 2°C (*high agreement, medium evidence*).
15 Projected changes in the upper layers of the ocean include of pH, oxygen content, as well as sea level.
16 Despite its many component processes, ocean chemistry has been relatively stable for long periods of time
17 prior to the Industrial Period (Hönisch et al., 2012). Ocean chemistry is changing under the influence of
18 human activities and rising greenhouse gases (*virtually certain*, Rhein et al., 2013; Stocker et al., 2013).
19 About 30% of CO₂ emitted by human activities, for example, has been absorbed by the ocean where it has
20 combined with water to produce a dilute acid that dissociates and drives ocean acidification (Cao et al.,
21 2007; Stocker et al., 2013). Ocean pH has decreased by 0.1 pH units since the Pre-Industrial Period, which is
22 unprecedented in the last 65 Ma (*high confidence*, Ridgwell and Schmidt, 2010) or even 300 Ma of Earth
23 history (*medium confidence*, Hönisch et al., 2012).

24
25 Ocean acidification is most pronounced where temperatures are lowest (e.g. Polar regions) or where CO₂-
26 rich water is brought to the ocean surface by upwelling (Feely et al., 2008). Acidification can also be
27 influenced by effluents from natural or disturbed coastal land use (Salisbury et al., 2008), plankton blooms
28 (Cai et al., 2011), and the atmospheric deposition of acidic materials (Omstedt et al., 2015). These sources
29 may not be directly attributable to climate change, yet may amplify the impacts of ocean acidification (Bates
30 and Peters, 2007; Duarte et al., 2013). Ocean acidification also influences the ionic composition of seawater
31 by changing the organic and inorganic speciation of trace metals (e.g. 20-fold increases in free ion
32 concentrations such as Al) which may have impacts although these are poorly understood (Stockdale et al.,
33 2016).

34
35 Oxygen varies regionally and with depth, and is highest in Polar regions and lowest in the eastern basins of
36 the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the northern Indian Ocean (Doney et al., 2014; Karstensen et al., 2015;
37 Schmidt et al., 2017). Increasing surface water temperatures have reduced oxygen in the ocean by 2%
38 since 1960 with other variables such as ocean acidification, sea level rise, precipitation, wind, and storm
39 patterns playing roles (Schmidt et al., 2017). Changes to ocean mixing and metabolic rates (due to
40 increased temperature and supply of organic carbon to deep areas) has increased the frequency of ‘dead
41 zones’, areas where oxygen levels no longer support oxygenic life (Diaz and Rosenberg, 2008). Drivers are
42 complex and include both climate change and other factors (Altieri and Gedan, 2015) with increases in
43 tropical as well as temperate regions (Altieri et al., 2017).

44
45 Ocean salinity is changing in directions that are consistent with surface temperatures and the global water
46 cycle (i.e. evaporation and inundation). Some regions (e.g. northern oceans and Arctic regions) have
47 decreased salinity (i.e. due to melting glaciers and ice sheets) while others are increasing in salinity due to

1 higher sea surface temperatures and evaporation (Durack et al., 2012). These changes in salinity (density) are
 2 also potentially driving changes to large scale patterns of water movement (Section 3.3.8)
 3
 4

5 **3.3.11 Global synthesis**

6
 7 Tables 3.2 present a summary of the assessments of global and regional climate changes and associated
 8 hazards for this chapter, based on the existing literature. For more detailed observation and attribution in
 9 ocean and cryosphere systems please refer to the upcoming IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and
 10 Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (SROCC) due to be released in 2019.
 11

12 **Table 3.2:** Summary of assessments of global and regional climate changes and associated hazards. Confidence and
 13 likelihood statements are quoted from the relevant chapter text and are omitted where no assessment was
 14 made, in which case the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) is given where available. Observed impacts
 15 and projected risks in natural and human systems. GMST: Global Mean Surface Temperature, AMOC:
 16 Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, GMSL: Global Mean Sea Level.
 17

	Observed change (recent past versus pre-industrial)	Attribution of observed change to human- induced forcing (present versus pre-industrial)	Projected change at 1.5°C global warming compared to pre- industrial (1.5°C versus 0°C)	Projected change at 2°C global warming compared to pre-industrial (2°C versus 0°C)	Differences between 2°C and 1.5°C global warming
GMST anomaly	GMST anomalies were 0.87°C ($\pm 0.10^\circ\text{C}$ <i>likely</i> range) above pre-industrial (1850-1900) values in the 2006-2015 decade, with a recent warming of about 0.2°C ($\pm 0.10^\circ\text{C}$) per decade (<i>high confidence</i>) [Chapter 1]	The observed 0.87°C GMST increase in the 2006-2015 decade compared to pre-industrial (1850-1900) conditions was mostly human-induced (<i>high confidence</i>) Human-induced warming reached about 1°C ($\pm 0.2^\circ\text{C}$ <i>likely</i> range) above pre-industrial levels in 2017 [Chapter 1]	1.5°C	2°C	0.5°C

	Observed change (recent past versus pre-industrial)	Attribution of observed change to human-induced forcing (present versus pre-industrial)	Projected change at 1.5°C global warming compared to pre-industrial (1.5°C versus 0°C)	Projected change at 2°C global warming compared to pre-industrial (2°C versus 0°C)	Differences between 2°C and 1.5°C global warming
Temperature extremes	<p>Overall decrease in the number of cold days and nights and an overall increase in the number of warm days and nights at the global scale on land (<i>very likely</i>)</p> <p>Continental-scale increase in intensity and frequency of hot days and nights, and decrease in intensity and frequency of cold day and nights, in North America, Europe and Australia. (<i>very likely</i>)</p> <p>Increases in frequency or duration of warm spell lengths in large parts of Europe, Asia and Australia (<i>high confidence (likely)</i>), as well as on global scale (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.2]</p>	<p>Anthropogenic forcing has contributed to the observed changes in the frequency and intensity of daily temperature extremes on the global scale since the mid-20th century (<i>very likely</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.2]</p>	<p>Global-scale increased intensity and frequency of hot days and nights, and decreased intensity and frequency of cold days and nights (<i>very likely</i>)</p> <p>Warming of temperature extremes highest over land, including many inhabited regions (<i>high confidence</i>), with increases of up to 3°C in mid-latitude warm season, and up to 4.5 in high-latitude cold season (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>Highest increase of frequency of unusually hot extremes in tropical regions (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.2]</p>	<p>Global-scale increased intensity and frequency of hot days and nights, and decreased intensity and frequency of cold days and nights (<i>very likely</i>)</p> <p>Warming of temperature extremes highest over land, including many inhabited regions (<i>high confidence</i>), with increases of up to 4°C in mid-latitude warm season, and up to 6°C in high-latitude cold season (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>Highest increase of frequency of unusually hot extremes in tropical regions (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.2]</p>	<p>Global-scale increased intensity and frequency of hot days and nights, and decreased intensity and frequency of cold days and nights (<i>high confidence</i>)</p> <p>Global-scale increase in length of warm spells and decrease in length of cold spells (<i>high confidence</i>)</p> <p>Strongest increase in frequency for rarest and most extreme events (<i>high confidence</i>)</p> <p>Particularly large increases in hot extremes in inhabited regions (<i>high confidence</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.2]</p>

	Observed change (recent past versus pre-industrial)	Attribution of observed change to human-induced forcing (present versus pre-industrial)	Projected change at 1.5°C global warming compared to pre-industrial (1.5°C versus 0°C)	Projected change at 2°C global warming compared to pre-industrial (2°C versus 0°C)	Differences between 2°C and 1.5°C global warming
Heavy precipitation	<p>More areas with increases than decreases in the frequency, intensity and/or amount of heavy precipitation (<i>likely</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.3]</p>	<p>Human influence contributed to global-scale tendency towards increases in the frequency, intensity and/or amount of heavy precipitation events (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.3]</p>	<p>Increases in frequency, intensity and/or amount heavy precipitation when averaged on global land, with positive trends in several regions (<i>high confidence</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.3]</p>	<p>Increases in frequency, intensity and/or amount heavy precipitation when averaged on global land, with positive trends in several regions (<i>high confidence</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.3]</p>	<p>Higher frequency, intensity and/or amount of heavy precipitation when averaged on global on land at 2°C versus 1.5°C (<i>high confidence</i>)</p> <p>Several regions are projected to experience increases in heavy precipitation at 2°C warming versus 1.5°C (<i>high confidence</i>), in particular in high-latitude and mountainous regions, as well as in Eastern Asia and Eastern North America (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.3]</p>

	Observed change (recent past versus pre-industrial)	Attribution of observed change to human-induced forcing (present versus pre-industrial)	Projected change at 1.5°C global warming compared to pre-industrial (1.5°C versus 0°C)	Projected change at 2°C global warming compared to pre-industrial (2°C versus 0°C)	Differences between 2°C and 1.5°C global warming
Drought and dryness	<p><i>High confidence</i> in dryness trends in some regions, especially drying in Mediterranean region (including Southern Europe, Northern Africa and the Near-East)</p> <p><i>Low confidence</i> in drought and dryness trends at global scale.</p> <p>[Section 3.3.4]</p>	<p><i>Medium confidence</i> in attribution of drying trend in Southern Europe Mediterranean region</p> <p><i>Low confidence</i> elsewhere, in part due to large interannual variability and longer duration (and thus lower frequency) of drought events, as well as to dependency on dryness index definition</p> <p>[Section 3.3.4]</p>	<p><i>Medium confidence</i> of drying trends in Mediterranean region.</p> <p><i>Low confidence</i> elsewhere, in part due to large interannual variability and longer duration (and thus lower frequency) of drought events, as well as to dependency on dryness index definition</p> <p>[Section 3.3.4]</p>	<p><i>Medium confidence</i> of drying trends in Mediterranean region and South Africa.</p> <p><i>Low confidence</i> elsewhere, in part due to large interannual variability and longer duration (and thus lower frequency) of drought events, as well as to dependency on dryness index definition</p> <p>[Section 3.3.4]</p>	<p><i>Medium confidence</i> of stronger drying trends in Mediterranean region and South Africa at 2°C versus 1.5°C global warming.</p> <p><i>Low confidence</i> elsewhere, in part due to large interannual variability and longer duration (and thus lower frequency) of drought events, as well as to dependency on dryness index definition</p> <p>[Section 3.3.4]</p>
Runoff & river flooding	<p>Streamflow trends mostly non-statistically significant (<i>high confidence</i>)</p> <p>Increase in flood frequency and extreme streamflow in some regions (<i>high confidence</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.5]</p>	<p>Not assessed in this report.</p>	<p>Expansion of the global land area with significant increase in runoff (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>Increase in flood hazard in some regions (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.5]</p>	<p>Expansion of the global land area with significant increase in runoff (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>Increase in flood hazard in some regions (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.5]</p>	<p>Expansion of the global land area with significant increase in runoff (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>Expansion in the area affected by flood hazard (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.5]</p>

	Observed change (recent past versus pre-industrial)	Attribution of observed change to human-induced forcing (present versus pre-industrial)	Projected change at 1.5°C global warming compared to pre-industrial (1.5°C versus 0°C)	Projected change at 2°C global warming compared to pre-industrial (2°C versus 0°C)	Differences between 2°C and 1.5°C global warming
Tropical & extra-tropical cyclones	<p><i>Low confidence</i> in robustness of observed changes</p> <p>[Section 3.3.6]</p>	<p>Not meaningful to assess given <i>low confidence</i> in changes, which are due to large inter-annual variability, heterogeneity of the observational record and contradictory findings regarding trends in the observational record.</p>	<p><i>Low confidence</i> in manifestation of changes in storm tracks under 2°C global warming</p> <p><i>Limited evidence</i> that the global number of tropical cyclones will be less under 2°C of global warming compared to 1.5 °C of warming, but with an increase in the number of very intense cyclones (low confidence).</p> <p>[Section 3.3.6]</p>		
Ocean temperature and circulation	<p><i>High confidence</i> in observed warming of upper ocean, with slightly lower rates than global warming</p> <p>Increased occurrence of marine heatwaves (<i>high confidence</i>)</p> <p>AMOC has been weakening over recent decades (<i>more likely than not</i>)</p> <p>[Sections 3.3.7]</p>	<p><i>Limited evidence</i> attributing the weakening of AMOC in recent decades to anthropogenic forcing</p>	<p>Further increases in ocean temperatures, including more frequent marine heatwaves (<i>high confidence</i>)</p> <p>AMOC will weaken over 21st century and substantially so under high levels (higher than 2°C) of global warming (<i>very likely</i>)</p>		
Sea ice	<p>Continuing the trends reported in AR4, the annual Arctic sea ice extent decreased over the period 1979–2012. The rate of this decrease was <i>very likely</i> between 3.5 and 4.1% per decade (0.45 to 0.51 million</p>	<p>Anthropogenic forcings are <i>very likely</i> to have contributed to Arctic sea ice loss since 1979</p> <p>AR5 Chapter 10 (Bindoff et al., 2013a)</p>	<p>At least one sea-ice-free Arctic summer after about 100 years of stabilized warming (<i>very likely</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.8]</p>	<p>At least one sea-ice-free Arctic summer after about 10 years of stabilized warming (<i>very likely</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.8]</p>	<p>Probability of sea-ice-free Arctic summer greatly reduced at 1.5°C versus 2°C global warming (<i>high confidence</i>)</p> <p>[Section 3.3.8]</p>

	Observed change (recent past versus pre-industrial)	Attribution of observed change to human-induced forcing (present versus pre-industrial)	Projected change at 1.5°C global warming compared to pre-industrial (1.5°C versus 0°C)	Projected change at 2°C global warming compared to pre-industrial (2°C versus 0°C)	Differences between 2°C and 1.5°C global warming
	km ² per decade) AR5 Chapter 4 (Vaughan et al., 2013)		Intermediate temperature overshoot has no long-term consequences for Arctic sea-ice cover (<i>high confidence</i>) 3.3.8		
Sea level	It is <i>likely</i> that the rate of GMSL has continued to increase since the early 20th century, with estimates that range from 0.000 [–0.002 to 0.002] mm yr ^{–2} to 0.013 [0.007 to 0.019] mm yr ^{–2} AR5 Chapter 13 (Church et al., 2013)	It is <i>very likely</i> that there is a substantial contribution from anthropogenic forcings to the global mean sea level rise since the 1970s AR5 Chapter 10 (Bindoff et al., 2013a)	Not assessed in this report	Not assessed in this report	GMSL rise will be about 0.1 m less at 1.5°C versus 2°C global warming (<i>medium confidence</i>) [Section 3.3.9]
Ocean chemistry	Ocean acidification due to increased CO ₂ has resulted in 0.1 pH unit decrease since the pre-industrial period which is unprecedented in the last 35 Ma (<i>high confidence</i>) [Section 3.3.10]	It is <i>very likely</i> that oceanic uptake of anthropogenic CO ₂ has resulted in acidification of surface waters. [Section 3.3.10]	Ocean chemistry is changing with global temperature with impacts projected at 1.5°C and, more so, at 2°C (<i>high agreement, medium evidence</i>) [Section 3.3.10]		

1

3.4 Observed impacts and projected risks in natural and human systems

3.4.1 Introduction

In Section 3.4, we explore the new literature and update the assessment of impacts and projected risks into the future for a large number of natural and human systems. We also explore adaptation opportunities laying the steps for reducing climate change, preparing the ground for later discussions on the opportunities to tackle both mitigation and adaptation while at the same time recognising the importance of sustainable development and reducing the inequities among people and societies facing climate change.

Working Group II (WGII) of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) provided an assessment of the literature for climate risk for natural and human systems across a wide range of environments, sectors and greenhouse gas scenarios, as well as for particular geographic regions (IPCC, 2014a, 2014b). The comprehensive assessment undertaken by AR5 evaluated the evidence of changes to natural systems, and the impact on human communities and industry. While impacts varied substantially between systems, sectors and regions, many changes over the past 50 years can be attributed to human driven climate change and its impacts. In particular, risks were observed by AR5 to be increasing for natural ecosystems as climate extremes increase in frequency and intensity, as well as those associated with fauna and flora shifting their biogeographical ranges to higher latitudes and altitudes, with consequences for ecosystem services and human dependence. AR5 also reported increasing evidence of changing patterns of disease, invasive species, as well as growing risks for coastal communities and industry, especially important when it comes to sea level rise and human vulnerability.

One of the strong themes that has emerged from AR5 was that previous assessments may have underestimated how sensitive natural and human systems are to climate change. A more recent analysis of attribution to greenhouse gas forcing at the global scale (Hansen and Stone, 2016) has confirmed that many impacts related to changes in regional atmospheric and ocean temperature can be confidently attributed to anthropogenic forcing, while attribution to anthropogenic forcing of those related to precipitation are by comparison less clear. Moreover there is no strong direct relationship between the robustness of climate attribution and that of impact attribution (Hansen and Stone, 2016). The observed changes in human systems are increased by the loss of ecosystem services (e.g. reduced access to safe water) that are supported by biodiversity (Cramer et al., 2014). Limited research on the risks of warming of +1.5 and +2°C was conducted following AR5 for most key economic sectors and services, for livelihoods and poverty, and for rural areas. For these systems, climate is one of many drivers that result in adverse outcomes. Other factors include patterns of demographic change, socioeconomic development, trade, and tourism. Further, consequences of climate change for infrastructure, tourism, migration, crop yields, and other impacts interact with underlying vulnerabilities, such as for individuals and communities engaged in pastoralism, mountain farming, and artisanal fisheries, to affect livelihoods and poverty (Dasgupta et al., 2014).

Incomplete data and understanding of these lower end climate scenarios has increased the request for greater data and understanding of the projected risks of warming of 1.5°C, and 2°C for reference. This section explores the available literature on the projected risks, impacts and adaptation options, and is supported by additional information and background in Supplementary Material (3.SM3, 3.SM;3.1, 3.SM.3.2, 3.SM.3.4, 3.SM.3.5, S3-4-12). A description of the main assessment methods of this chapter is given in Section 3.2.2.

1 3.4.2 Freshwater resources (quantity and quality)

2

3 3.4.2.1 Water availability

4 WGII AR5 concluded that about 80% of the world's population already suffers from serious threats to its
5 water security as measured by indicators including water availability, water demand, and pollution
6 (Vörösmarty et al., 2010). UNESCO (2011) concluded that climate change can alter the availability of water
7 and threaten water security.

8

9 Although physical changes on streamflow and continental runoff that are consistent with climate change
10 have been identified (Section 3.3.5), water scarcity in the past is still less well understood because the
11 scarcity assessment needs to take into account various factors such as the operations of water supply
12 infrastructure and human water use behaviour (Mehran et al., 2017), as well as incorporating green water,
13 water quality, and environmental flow requirements (J. Liu et al., 2017). Over the past century, substantial
14 growth in population, industrial and agricultural activities, and living standards have exacerbated water stress
15 in many parts of the world, especially in semi-arid and arid regions such as California in the US
16 (AghaKouchak et al., 2015; Mehran et al., 2015). Due to changes in climate and water consumption
17 behavior, and particularly the effects of spatial distribution of population growth relative to water resources,
18 the population under water scarcity increased from 0.24 billion (14% of global population) in the 1900s to
19 3.8 billion (58%) in the 2000s. In that last period (2000s), 1.1 billion people (17% of global population)
20 mostly living in South and East Asia, North Africa and Middle East were facing high water shortage and
21 high water stress (Kummu et al., 2016).

22

23 Over the next few decades, and for increases in global mean temperature of less than about 2°C, the AR5
24 concluded that changes in population will generally have a greater effect on water resource availability than
25 changes in climate. Climate change, however, will regionally exacerbate or offset the effects of population
26 pressure (Jiménez Cisneros et al., 2014).

27

28 The differences in projected changes in runoff under 1.5°C and 2°C, particularly those that are regional, are
29 described in Section 3.3.5. Constraining to 1.5°C instead of 2°C warming can mitigate the risks on water
30 availability although socio-economic drivers could affect the availability more than the risks posed by the
31 variation in warming levels, while the risks found in regions are not homogeneous (*medium evidence,*
32 *medium agreement*) (Gerten et al., 2013; Hanasaki et al., 2013; Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes, 2014; Schewe et
33 al., 2014; Karnauskas et al., 2018). Assuming a constant population in these models, Gerten et al. (2013)
34 reveal that an additional 8% of the world population in 2000 will be exposed to new or aggravated water
35 scarcity at 2°C warming. This value is almost halved - with 50 % larger reliability - when warming is
36 constrained to 1.5°C. People inhabiting river basins particularly in the Middle East and Near East become
37 newly exposed to chronic water scarcity even if the warming is constrained under 2°C warming. Many
38 regions especially in Europe, Australia and southern Africa appear to be affected at 1.5°C if the reduction in
39 water availability is computed for non-water scarce basins in addition to the reductions in water-scarce
40 regions. From a contemporary population of approximately 1.3 billion exposed to water scarcity, about 3%
41 (North America) to 9% (Europe) are prone to aggravated scarcity at 2°C warming (Gerten et al., 2013).
42 Under the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP)2 population scenario, about 8% of the global population
43 are projected to experience a severe reduction in water resources under warming of 1.7°C in 2021-2040,
44 increasing to 14 % of the population under 2.7°C in 2043-2071, based on either the criteria of discharge
45 reduction >20% or >1 standard deviation (Schewe et al., 2014). Depending on the scenarios of SSP1 to 5,
46 exposure to the increase of water scarcity in 2050 will be globally reduced by 184–270 million people at
47 about 1.5°C compared to the impacts at about 2°C. However the variation between socio-economic

1 differences is larger than the variation between warming levels (Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes, 2014).

2
3 On many small developing islands, there will be freshwater stress derived from projected aridity change,
4 however, constraining to 1.5°C warming can avoid a substantial fraction of water stress compared to 2°C,
5 especially across the Caribbean region, particularly on the island of Hispaniola (Dominican Republic and
6 Haiti) (Karnauskas et al. (2018). Hanasaki et al. (2013) conclude that the projected range of changes in
7 global irrigation water withdrawal (relative to the baseline of 1971-2000) with human configuration fixing
8 non-meteorological variables at the period of about 2000 are 1.1–2.3% and 0.6–2.0% lower at 1.5°C than at
9 2°C, respectively. The same study, Hanasaki et al. (2013) reports on the importance of water use scenarios in
10 water scarcity assessments, but neither quantitative nor qualitative information regarding water use are
11 available. Hanasaki et al. (2013) conclude that the projected ranges of changes in global irrigation water
12 withdrawal with human configuration fixing non-meteorological variables at about 2000 are 1.1–2.3% at
13 about 1.5°C, which is projected by Geophysical Fluid Dynamic Laboratory (GFDL) model (Representative
14 Concentration Pathway (RCP)2.6 in 2071-2100 and RCP4.5 in 2011-2040), and 0.6-2.0% at about 2°C
15 according to the projection using the Hadley Centre New Global Environmental Model (HadGEM) and
16 Model for Interdisciplinary Research on Climate (MIROC) models (RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 in 2011-2040,
17 respectively).

18
19 Comparing the impacts on hydropower production at 1.5°C and 2°C, it is found that mean gross potential
20 increases in northern, eastern and western Europe, and decreases in southern Europe (Tobin et al., 2018;
21 Jacob et al., 2018). The Baltic and Scandinavian countries will have the most positive impacts on production.
22 The most negatively impacted are Greece, Spain, and Portugal, although the impacts can be reduced by
23 limiting warming at 1.5°C (Tobin et al., 2018). It is found that, in Greece, Spain and Portugal, a warming of
24 2°C will decrease hydropower potential below 10%, while limiting to 1.5°C warming will keep the reduction
25 to 5% or less. There is however, substantial uncertainty associated with these results due to a large spread
26 between the climate models (Tobin et al., 2018).

27
28 Due to a combination of higher water temperatures and reduced summer river flows, the usable capacity of
29 thermoelectric power plants using river water for cooling is expected to reduce in all European countries
30 (Tobin et al., 2018; Jacob et al., 2018), with the magnitude of decreases being about 5% for 1.5°C and 10%
31 for 2°C for most European countries (Tobin et al., 2018). Greece, Spain, and Bulgaria will have the largest
32 reduction at 2°C (Tobin et al., 2018).

33
34 Fricko et al. (2016) assess the direct global energy sector water use across a broad range of energy system
35 transformation pathways in order to identify the water impacts of a 2°C climate policy. This study revealed
36 that there will be substantial divergence in water withdrawal for thermal power plant cooling under a
37 condition in which the distribution of future cooling technology for energy generation is fixed, whereas
38 adopting alternative cooling technologies and water resources will make the divergence considerably
39 smaller.

40 41 3.4.2.2 *Extreme hydrological events (floods and droughts)*

42 WG II AR5 concluded that socio-economic losses from flooding since the mid-20th century have increased
43 mainly due to greater exposure and vulnerability (*high confidence*; Jiménez Cisneros et al., 2014). There is
44 *low confidence* due to *limited evidence*, however, that anthropogenic climate change has affected the
45 frequency and the magnitude of floods. WGII AR5 also concluded that there is no evidence that surface
46 water and groundwater drought frequency has changed over the last few decades, although impacts of
47 drought have increased mostly due to increased water demand (Jiménez Cisneros et al., 2014).

1
2 Since the AR5, the number of studies related to river flooding and meteorological drought based on long-
3 term observed data have been gradually increasing. There has been progress since the AR5 in identifying
4 historical changes in streamflow and continental runoff (Section 3.3.5). As a result of population and
5 economic growth, increased exposure of people and assets has caused more damage due to flooding.
6 However, differences in flood risks among regions reflect the balance among the magnitude of the flood,
7 population, their vulnerabilities, the value of assets affected by flooding, and the capacity to cope with flood
8 risks that depend on socio-economic development conditions as well as topography and hydro-climatic
9 conditions (Tanoue et al., 2016). The AR5 assessment concluded that there was *low confidence* in the
10 attribution of global changes in droughts (Bindoff et al., 2013b). However, recent publications based on
11 observational and modeling evidence assessed that human emissions have substantially increased the
12 probability of drought years in the Mediterranean region (Sections 3.3.4).
13
14 WGII AR5 assessed that global flood risk will increase in the future partly due to climate change (*limited*
15 *evidence, medium agreement*), with projected changes in the frequency of droughts longer than 12 months
16 being more uncertain, because of their dependence on accumulated precipitation over long periods (Jiménez
17 Cisneros et al., 2014).
18
19 Increases in the risks associated with runoff at global scale (*high confidence*), and in flood hazard in some
20 regions (*high confidence*), can be expected at warming of 1.5°C level with an overall increase in the area
21 affected by flood hazard at 2°C (*high confidence*) (see Section 3.3.5). There are studies, however, revealing
22 that socio-economic conditions will exacerbate flood impacts more than global climate change, and the
23 magnitude of the impacts can be larger in some region (Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes, 2014; Winsemius et al.,
24 2016; Alfieri et al., 2017; Arnell et al., 2018; Kinoshita et al., 2018) (*limited evidence, medium agreement*).
25 Assuming constant population sizes, countries representing 73% of the world population will experience
26 increasing flood risk with an average of 580% increase at 4°C compared to the impact simulated over the
27 baseline period 1976-2005. Such impact is projected to be reduced to 100% increase at 1.5°C and 170% at
28 2°C (Alfieri et al., 2017). Alfieri et al. (2017) reveal that the largest increases in flood risks are found in U.S.,
29 Asia, and Europe in general, while decreases are found in only few countries in Eastern Europe and Africa.
30 Alfieri et al (2017) report that the projected changes are not homogeneously distributed on the world land
31 surface. Alfieri et al. (2018) studied the population affected by flood events in European states, specifically
32 Central and Western Europe, and found that the population affected can be limited to 86% for 1.5°C
33 warming compared to 93% at 2°C. Under the SSP2 population scenario, Arnell et al. (2018) find that 39%
34 (range 36-46%) of impacts on populations exposed to river flood can be globally avoided at 1.5°C compared
35 to 2 °C warming.
36
37 Under SSP1-5 scenario, Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes (2014) find that the number of people exposed to
38 increased flooding in 2050 under warming of about 1.5°C can be reduced by 26–34 million compared to
39 those people exposed to increased flooding associated with 2°C. Variation between socio-economic
40 differences, however, are larger than the variation between the extent of global warming. Kinoshita et al.
41 (2018) find that a serious increase in potential flood fatality (5.7%) is projected without any adaptation if
42 global warming increases from 1.5°C to 2°C, whereas an increase in potential economic loss (0.9%) is
43 relatively small. Nevertheless, the study indicates that socio-economic changes have a stronger contribution
44 to the potentially increased consequences of future floods, and about a half of the increase of potential
45 economic losses is mitigated by autonomous adaptation.
46
47 There is limited information about the global and regional projected risks posed by droughts at 1.5°C and

1 2°C. However, hazards by droughts under 1.5°C can be reduced compared to the hazards at 2°C (Section
2 3.3.4). Under constant socio-economic conditions, the population exposed to drought at 2°C warming is
3 projected to be larger than at 1.5°C (Smirnov et al., 2016; Sun et al., 2017; Arnell et al., 2018; Liu et al.,
4 2018) (*limited evidence, medium agreement*). Under the same scenario, the global mean monthly number of
5 people expected to be exposed to extreme drought at 1.5°C in 2021-2040 is projected to be 114.3 million
6 people while 190.4 million people at 2°C in 2041-2060 (Smirnov et al., 2016) . Under the SSP2 population
7 scenario, Arnell et al. (2018) project that 39% (range 36-51%) of impacts on populations exposed to drought
8 can be globally avoided at 1.5°C compared to 2°C.

9
10 Liu et al. (2018) study the changes in population exposure to severe droughts in 27 regions and around the
11 globe for 1.5°C and 2°C warming using the SSP1 population scenario, compared to the baseline period of
12 1986-2005, and conclude that urban population exposure in most regions can be decreased at 1.5°C
13 (350.2±158.8 million) compared to 2°C (410.7±213.5 million), respectively. Liu et al. (2018) also suggest
14 that more urban populations will be exposed to severe droughts in Central Europe, Southern Europe, the
15 Mediterranean, West Africa, East and West Asia and Southeast Asia, and the number of the affected people
16 will escalate further in these regions at 2°C. In the Haihe River Basin in China, the proportion of the
17 population exposed to droughts at 1.5°C is projected to be reduced by 30.4%, but increased by 74.8% at 2°C
18 relative to 339.65 million people in the 1986–2005 period (Sun et al., 2017) .

19
20 Alfieri et al. (2018) estimate expected damage from flood at the European level for the baseline period (1976-
21 2005), in which the reported annual figure is 5 billion euro of losses and reveal that relative changes of flood
22 impacts rise with warming levels from 116% at 1.5°C to 137% at 2°C, respectively.

23
24 Kinoshita et al. (2018) study the increase of potential economic loss in SSP3 and project that the smaller loss at
25 1.5°C compared to at 2°C (0.9%) is marginal regardless of whether the vulnerability is fixed at the current level
26 or not. Winsemius et al. (2016) show adaptation measures have the potential to greatly reduce present and future
27 flood damage, by analyzing the differences in results with and without flood protection standard. They conclude
28 that increases in flood induced economic impacts (% Gross Domestic Product, GDP) in African countries are
29 mainly driven by climate change and Africa's growing assets become increasingly exposed to floods. And hence
30 there is greater need for long-term and sustainable investments in adaptation in Africa.

31 32 3.4.2.3 Groundwater

33 WGII AR5 concluded that the detection of changes in groundwater systems, and attribution of those changes
34 to climatic changes, are rare owing to a lack of appropriate observation wells and an overall small number of
35 studies (Jiménez Cisneros et al., 2014).

36
37 Since AR5, the number of studies based on long-term observed data continues to be limited. The
38 groundwater-fed lakes in north-eastern central Europe have been affected by climate and land use changes,
39 and show a predominantly negative lake-level trend in 1999–2008 (Kaiser et al., 2014).

40
41 WGII AR5 concluded that climate change is projected to reduce groundwater resources significantly in most
42 dry subtropical regions (*robust evidence, high agreement*; Jiménez Cisneros et al., 2014).

43
44 In some regions, groundwater is often intensively used to supplement the excess demand, often leading to
45 groundwater depletion. Climate change adds further pressure on water resources and exaggerates human
46 water demands due to increasing temperatures over agricultural lands (Wada et al., 2017). Very few studies

1 project the risks of groundwater depletion under 1.5°C and 2°C warming. Under 2°C warming, impacts posed
2 on groundwater are projected to be greater than at 1.5°C (*limited evidence, low agreement*; Portmann et al.,
3 2013; Salem et al., 2017).

4
5 Portmann et al. (2013) indicate that 2.0% (range 1.1-2.6%) of global land area is projected to suffer from an
6 extreme decrease of renewable groundwater resources of more than 70% at 2°C, which is clearly mitigated at
7 1.5°C. The study also projects that 20% of global land surface is affected by more than 10% groundwater
8 reduction at 1.5°C with the percentage of the land impacted increasing at 2°C. In a groundwater-dependent
9 irrigated region in Northwest Bangladesh, the average groundwater level during the major irrigation period
10 (January-April) is projected to decrease in accordance with temperature rise (Salem et al., 2017).

11 3.4.2.4 Water quality

12 WGII AR5 concluded that most observed changes to water quality from climate change are from isolated
13 studies, mostly of rivers or lakes in high-income countries, using a small number of variables (Jiménez
14 Cisneros et al., 2014). The AR5 report assessed that climate change is projected to reduce raw water quality,
15 posing risks to drinking water quality with conventional treatment (*medium evidence, high agreement*;
16 Jiménez Cisneros et al. (2014)).

17
18 Since AR5, studies have detected climate change impacts on several indices of water quality in lakes,
19 watershed and regional (e.g., Patiño et al., 2014; Aguilera et al., 2015; Watts et al., 2015; Marszelewski and
20 Pius, 2016; Capo et al., 2017). Since WGII AR5, the number of studies utilizing RCP scenarios at regional or
21 watershed scale have been gradually increased (e.g., Boehlert et al., 2015; Teshager et al., 2016;
22 Marcinkowski et al., 2017). There are, however, few studies that explore projected impacts on water quality
23 under 1.5°C versus 2°C warming. Differences in impacts on water quality between 1.5°C and 2°C warming is
24 unclear (Bonte and Zwolsman, 2010; Hosseini et al., 2017) (*limited evidence, low agreement*). The daily
25 probability of exceeding the chloride standard for drinking water taken from Lake IJsselmeer (Andijk, the
26 Netherlands) is projected to increase about five times at 2°C relative to 1°C since 1990 (Bonte and
27 Zwolsman, 2010). Mean monthly dissolved oxygen concentrations and nutrient concentrations in the upper
28 Qu'Appelle River (Canada) in 2050-2055 are projected to decrease less at about 1.5°C warming (RCP2.6 in
29 2050-2055) compared to about 2°C (RCP4.5 in 2050-2055) (Hosseini et al., 2017). In the three river basins
30 (Sekong, Sesan, and Srepok in southeast Asia) about 2°C warming (1.05 °C increase in the 2030s relative to
31 the baseline period 1981-2008, RCP8.5), impacts posed by land-use change on water quality is projected to
32 be greater than at 1.5°C (0.89 °C increase in the 2030s relative to the baseline period 1981-2008,
33 RCP4.5)(Trang et al., 2017). Under the same warming scenario, Trang et al. (2017) project annual nitrogen
34 (N) and phosphorus (P) yields change in 2030s at about 1.5°C and about 2°C as well as with combinations of
35 two land-use change scenarios: 1) conversion of forest to grassland, and 2) of forest to agricultural land. The
36 projected changes in N (P) yield under 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios are 7.3 (5.1)% and -6.6 (-3.6)%, whereas
37 under the combination of land-use scenarios are 1) 5.2 (12.6)% and 8.8 (11.7)%, and 2) 7.5 (14.9)% and
38 3.7(8.8)%, respectively (Trang et al., 2017).

39 40 41 3.4.2.5 Soil erosion and sediment load

42 WGII AR5 concluded that there is little or no observational evidence that soil erosion and sediment load
43 have been altered significantly due to climate change (*limited evidence, medium agreement*), (Jiménez
44 Cisneros et al., 2014). As studies of climate change impacts on soil erosion have increased where rainfall is
45 an important driver (Lu et al., 2013), studies have increasingly considered other factors such as rainfall
46 intensity (e.g., Shi and Wang, 2015; Li and Fang, 2016), snow melt, and change of vegetation cover due to
47 temperature rise (Potemkina and Potemkin, 2015), and crop management practices (Mullan et al., 2012).

1 WGII AR5 concluded that increases in heavy rainfall and temperature are projected to change soil erosion
2 and sediment yield, although the extent of these changes is highly uncertain and depends on rainfall
3 seasonality, land cover, and soil management practices (Jiménez Cisneros et al., 2014).
4


5 While published studies of climate change impacts on soil erosion have increased since 2000 globally (Li
6 and Fang, 2016), few articles have addressed impacts at 1.5°C and 2°C warming. The existing studies have
7 found few differences in projected risks posed on sediment load under 1.5°C and 2°C (*limited evidence, low*
8 *agreement*; Cousino et al., 2015; Shrestha et al., 2016). The differences between average annual sediment
9 load under 1.5°C and 2°C warmings are not clear because of complex interactions among climate change,
10 land cover/surface and soil management (Cousino et al., 2015; Shrestha et al., 2016). Averages of annual
11 sediment load are projected to be similar under 1.5°C and 2°C, in particular in the Great Lakes region in the
12 US as well as in the Lower Mekong region in Southeast Asia (Cousino et al., 2015; Shrestha et al., 2016).
13
14

15 **3.4.3 Terrestrial and wetland ecosystems**


16 **3.4.3.1 Biome shifts**

17 Latitudinal and elevational shifts of biomes (major ecosystem types) boreal, temperate, and tropical regions
18 have been detected (Settele et al., 2014, AR5) and new studies confirm this (e.g. for shrub encroachment on
19 tundra; Larsen et al., 2014). Attribution studies indicate that anthropogenic climate change has made a
20 greater contribution to these changes than any other factor (Settele et al., 2014, *medium confidence*).
21
22

23 An ensemble of seven Dynamic Vegetation Models driven by projected climates from 19 alternative General
24 Circulation Models (GCMs) (Warszawski et al., 2013) shows 13% (range 8-20%) of biomes transforming at
25 2°C warming, but only 4% (range 2-7%) doing so at 1°C; suggesting that about 7% may be transformed at
26 1.5°C, indicating a doubling of the areal extent of biome shifts between 1.5°C and 2°C warming (Figure
27 3.15a). A single ecosystem model LPJmL (Gerten et al., 2013) illustrates that biome shifts in the Arctic,
28 Tibet, Himalayas, South Africa and Australia would be avoided by constraining warming to 1.5°C as
29 compared with 2°C (Figure 3.15b). Seddon et al. (2016) quantitatively identified ecologically sensitive
30 regions to climate change in most of the continents from tundra to tropical rainforest. Biome transformation
31 may in some cases be associated with novel climates and ecological communities (Prober et al., 2012).



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Figure 3.16: (a) Fraction of global natural vegetation (including managed forests) at risk of severe ecosystem change as a function of global mean temperature change for all ecosystems, models, global climate change models

1 and Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). The colours represent the different ecosystem
2 models, which are also horizontally separated for clarity. Results are collated in unit-degree bins, where
3 the temperature for a given year is the average over a 30-year window centred on that year. The boxes
4 span the 25th and 75th percentiles across the entire ensemble. The short, horizontal stripes represent
5 individual (annual) data points, the curves connect the mean value per ecosystem model in each bin. The
6 solid (dashed) curves are for models with (without) dynamic vegetation composition changes. Source:
7 (Warszawski et al., 2013) (b) Threshold level of global temperature anomaly above pre-industrial levels
8 that leads to significant local changes in terrestrial ecosystems. Regions with severe (coloured) or
9 moderate (greyish) ecosystem transformation; delineation refers to the 90 biogeographic regions. All
10 values denote changes found in >50% of the simulations. Source: (Gerten et al., 2013). Regions coloured
11 in dark red are projected to undergo severe transformation under a global warming of 1.5°C while those
12 coloured in light red do so at 2°C; other colors are used when there is no severe transformation unless
13 global warming exceeds 2°C.
14
15

16 3.4.3.2 Changes in phenology

17 Advancement in spring phenology of 2.8 ± 0.35 days per decade has been observed in plants and animals in
18 most Northern Hemisphere ecosystems in recent decades (between 30°N and 72°N), and this has been
19 attributed to changes in climate (*high confidence*) (Settele et al., 2014). The rates of change are particularly
20 rapid in the Arctic zone in relation with higher local warming (Oberbauer et al., 2013), but in tropical forests,
21 the phenology changes rather respond to moisture stress (Zhou et al., 2014). While a full review cannot be
22 included here, trends consistent with this earlier finding continue to be detected, including in the flowering
23 times of plants (Parmesan and Hanley, 2015), in the dates of egg laying and migration in birds (newly in
24 China, Wu and Shi, 2016), in the emergence dates of butterflies (Roy et al., 2015), and in the seasonal
25 greening-up of vegetation as detected by satellites (i.e. in the Normalised Difference Vegetation Index,
26 NDVI, Piao et al., 2015).
27

28 The potential for de-coupling of species-species interactions due to differing phenological responses to
29 climate change is well established (Settele et al., 2014) for example for plants and their insect pollinators
30 (Willmer, 2012; Scaven and Rafferty, 2013). Now, mid-century projections of plant and animal phenophases
31 in UK (Thackeray et al., 2016) clearly indicate that the timing of phenological events could change more for
32 primary consumers (6.2 days earlier on average) than for higher trophic levels (2.5-2.9 days earlier on
33 average), indicating the potential for phenological mismatch and associated risks for ecosystem functionality
34 in the future, associated with global warming of 2.1-2.7°C above pre-industrial; while differing responses
35 could alter community structure in temperate forests (Roberts et al., 2015). Here, the temperate forest
36 phenology is projected to gain 14.3 days in the near term (2010-2039) and 24.6 days in the medium term
37 (2040-2069), so in first approximation the difference between 2°C and 1.5°C global warming is about 10
38 days (Roberts et al., 2015). This phenological plasticity is not always adaptive and must be taken cautiously
39 (Duputié et al., 2015), due to accompanying changes in climate variability (risk of frost damage for plants or
40 earlier emergence of insects resulting in mortality during cold spells). Another adaptive response for the
41 plants is expanding their range with increased vigor and altered herbivore resistance in their new range,
42 analogous to invasive plants (Macel et al., 2017).
43

44 In summary, limiting warming to 1.5°C as compared with 2°C may avoid a few days of advance in spring
45 phenology and hence decrease the risks of loss of ecosystem functionality due to phenological mismatch
46 between trophic levels, and also of maladaptation coming from the sensitivity of many species to increased
47 climate variability. Nevertheless, this difference between 1.5°C and 2°C warming might be limited for plants
48 able to expand their range.

3.4.3.3 *Changes in species range, abundance and extinction*

AR5 (Settele et al., 2014) concluded that the geographical ranges of many terrestrial and freshwater plant and animal species have moved over the last several decades in response to warming: approximately 17 km per decade poleward and 11 m up in altitude per decade. Recent trends confirm this finding, for example the spatial and interspecific variance in bird populations in Europe and the North America since 1980 were found to be well-predicted by trends in climate suitability (Stephens et al., 2016). Further, a recent meta-analysis of 27 studies concerning a total of 976 species (Wiens, 2016) found that 47% of local extinctions (extirpations) reported across the globe during the 20th century could be attributed to climate change, is significantly higher in tropical regions, for animals and in freshwater habitats. IUCN (2017) lists 305 terrestrial animal and plant species from Pacific island developing nations as being threatened by climate change and severe weather. Due to lags in the responses of some species to climate change, shifts in insect pollinator ranges may result in novel assemblages with unknown implications for biodiversity and ecosystem function (Rafferty, 2017).

Warren et al. (2013) simulated climatically determined geographic range loss under 2°C and 4°C global warming for 50,000 plant and animal species accounting for uncertainty in climate projections and for the potential ability of species to disperse naturally in an attempt to track their geographically shifting climate envelope. This earlier study has now been updated and expanded to incorporate 105,501 species, including 19,848 insects, and finds that a warming of 2°C by 2100 would lead to projected bioclimatic range losses of >50% in 18 (6-35)% of 19,848 insects species, 8 (4-16)% of 12,429 vertebrate species, and 16 (9-28)% of 73,224 plant species studied (Warren et al., 2018b). At 1.5°C this falls to 6 (1-18) % insects, 4 (2-9)% vertebrates and 8 (4-15)% plants. Hence the number of insect species projected to lose over half their geographic range is reduced by two-thirds when warming is limited to 1.5°C as compared with 2°C, while the number of vertebrate and plant species projected to lose over half their geographic range is halved (Warren et al., 2018b). This is consistent with estimates made from an earlier study suggesting that range losses at 1.5°C were significantly lower for plants than those at 2°C warming (Smith et al., 2018). It should be noted that at 1.5°C warming, and if species' ability to disperse naturally to track their preferred climate geographically is inhibited by natural or anthropogenic obstacles, there still remain 10% amphibians, 8% reptiles, 6% mammals, 5% birds, 10% insects and 8% plants which are projected to lose over half their range, while species on average lose 20-27% of their range (Warren et al., 2018b). Since bird and mammal species can disperse more easily, a small proportion can gain range as climate changes, but even at 1.5°C warming the total range loss integrated over all birds and mammals greatly exceeds the integrated range gain (Warren et al., 2018b).

A number of caveats are noted in studies projecting climatic range change, since the approach does not incorporate the effects of extreme weather events and the role of interactions between species; and trophic interactions may locally counteract range expansion of species towards higher altitudes (Bråthen et al., 2018). Also, there is the potential for highly invasive species to become established in new areas as climate changes (Murphy and Romanuk, 2014), but there is no literature that quantifies this potential for 1.5°C warming.

Pecl et al. (2017) summarize at the global level the consequences (for economic development, livelihoods, food security, human health and culture) of climate-change induced species redistribution and conclude that, even if anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions stopped today, the effort for human systems to adapt to the most crucial effects of climate-driven species redistribution will be far reaching and extensive. For example, key insect crop pollinator families (Apidae, Syrphidae and Calliphoridae; i.e., bees, hoverflies and

1 blowflies) are shown to retain significantly greater geographic ranges under 1.5°C global warming as
2 compared with 2°C (Warren et al., 2018b). In some cases when species (such as pest and disease species)
3 move into areas which become newly climatically suitable they may become invasive or harmful to human
4 or natural systems (Settele et al., 2014). Some studies are beginning to locate ‘refugial’ areas where the
5 climate remains suitable in the future for most of the species currently present: for example, (Smith et al.,
6 2018) estimate that 5.5-14% more of the globe’s terrestrial land area can act as climatic refugia for plants
7 under 1.5°C warming as compared to 2°C.

8
9 There is no literature that directly estimates the proportion of species at increased risk of global (as opposed
10 to local) commitment to extinction as a result of climate change as this is difficult to quantify. However, it is
11 possible to compare the proportions of species at risk of very high range loss in Figure 2 in Warren et al.
12 (2018b) where discernibly lower number of terrestrial species projected to lose over 90% of their range at
13 1.5°C global warming as compared with 2°C; a link between very high levels of range loss and greatly
14 increased extinction risk may be inferred (Urban, 2015). Hence limiting global warming to 1.5°C as
15 compared with 2°C would be expected to reduce both range losses and associated extinction risks in
16 terrestrial species (*medium confidence*).

17 18 3.4.3.4 Changes in ecosystem function, biomass and carbon stocks

19 WGII AR5 (Settele et al., 2014) concluded that there is *high confidence* that net terrestrial ecosystem
20 productivity at the global scale has increased relative to the preindustrial era and that rising CO₂
21 concentrations are contributing to this trend through stimulation of photosynthesis, yet there is no clear,
22 consistent signal of a climate change contribution. In the northern latitudes, the productivity change has a
23 lower velocity than the warming possibly because of lack of resource and vegetation acclimation
24 mechanisms (M. Huang et al., 2017). Biomass and soil carbon stocks in terrestrial ecosystems are currently
25 increasing (*high confidence*), but are vulnerable to loss to the atmosphere as a result of projected increases in
26 the intensity of storms, wildfires, land degradation and pest outbreaks (Settele et al., 2014; Seidl et al., 2017).
27 This would contribute to a decrease in the terrestrial carbon sink. Anderegg et al. (2015) show that the total
28 ecosystem respiration, at the global scale, has increased in response to increase of nighttime temperature (1
29 PgC year⁻¹ °C⁻¹, p=0.02).

30
31 The increase of total ecosystem respiration in spring and autumn, in relation with higher temperature, may
32 turn boreal forest from carbon sink to carbon source (Hadden and Grelle, 2016). This is confirmed for the
33 boreal peatlands where increased temperature may diminish the carbon storage and compromise the stability
34 of the peatland (Dieleman et al., 2016). In addition, J. Yang et al. (2015) showed that fires reduce carbon
35 sink of global terrestrial ecosystems by 0.57 PgC yr⁻¹ in ecosystems with high carbon storage, such as
36 peatlands and tropical forests. Consequently for adaptation purposes, it is necessary to enhance carbon sinks,
37 especially in forests which are prime regulators within the water, energy and carbon cycles (Ellison et al.,
38 2017). Soil is also a key compartment for carbon sequestration (Lal, 2014; Minasny et al., 2017) depending
39 on the net biome productivity and the soil quality (Bispo et al., 2017).

40
41 The AR5 assessed that there remains large uncertainty in the land carbon cycle behavior in the future (Ciais
42 et al., 2013), with most, but not all, CMIP5 models simulating continued terrestrial carbon uptake under all
43 four RCP scenarios (Jones et al., 2013). Disagreement between models outweighs differences between
44 scenarios even up to 2100 (Hewitt et al., 2016; Lovenduski and Bonan, 2017). Increased CO₂ will drive
45 further increases in land carbon sink (Ciais et al., 2013; Schimel et al., 2015) which could persist for
46 centuries (Pugh et al., 2016). Nitrogen, phosphorus and other nutrients, will limit terrestrial carbon cycle
47 response to both CO₂ and climate (Goll et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2014; Wieder et al., 2015; Zaehle et al.,

1 2015; Ellsworth et al., 2017). Climate change may accelerate plant uptake of carbon (Gang et al., 2015), but
2 also decomposition processes (Todd-Brown et al., 2014; Koven et al., 2015; Crowther et al., 2016). Ahlström
3 et al. (2012) found a net loss of carbon in extra-tropics and largest spread across model results in the tropics.
4 The net effect of climate change is to reduce the carbon sink expected under CO₂ increase alone (Settele et
5 al., 2014). Friend et al. (2014) found substantial uptake of carbon by vegetation under future scenarios when
6 considering the effects of both climate change and elevated CO₂.

7
8 There is little published literature examining modelled land carbon changes specifically under 1.5°C
9 warming, but here existing CMIP5 models and published data are used to draw some conclusions. For
10 systems with significant inertia, such as vegetation or soil carbon stores, changes in carbon storage will
11 depend on the rate of change of forcing and so are dependent on the choice of scenario (Jones et al., 2009;
12 Ciais et al., 2013; Sihi et al., 2017). To avoid legacy effects of the choice of scenario we focus on the
13 response of Gross Primary Productivity (GPP) – the rate of photosynthetic carbon uptake – by the models,
14 rather than by changes in their carbon store.

15
16 Figure 3.16 shows different responses of the terrestrial carbon cycle to climate change in different regions.
17 The models show a consistent response of increased GPP in temperate latitudes of approximately 2.0 GtC yr⁻¹
18 K⁻¹. Similarly Gang et al. (2015) also projected a robust increase in Net Primary Productivity (NPP) of
19 temperate forests, however Ahlström et al. (2012) show this could be offset or reversed by increases in
20 decomposition. Globally, GPP increases or remains approximately unchanged in most models (Hashimoto et
21 al., 2013). This is confirmed by Sakalli et al. (2017) for Europe using Euro-Cordex regional models under a
22 2°C global warming for the 2034-2063 period (storage will increase by +5% in soil and by +20% in
23 vegetation). But using the same models, Jacob et al. (2018) showed that limiting warming to +1.5°C instead
24 of +2°C avoids an increase in ecosystem vulnerability of 40-50%.

25
26 At the global scale, linear scaling is acceptable for net primary production, biomass burning, and surface
27 runoff and impacts on terrestrial carbon storage will be greater at 2°C than at 1.5°C (Tanaka et al., 2017). If
28 global CO₂ concentrations and temperatures stabilise, or peak and decline, then both land and ocean carbon
29 sinks – which are primarily driven by the continued increase in atmospheric CO₂ – will also decline, and
30 may even reverse (Jones et al., 2016) and so if a given amount of anthropogenic CO₂ is removed from the
31 atmosphere, an equivalent amount of land and ocean anthropogenic CO₂ will be released to the atmosphere
32 (Cao and Caldeira, 2010).

33
34 In conclusion, ecosystem respiration will increase with temperature, reducing soil carbon storage. Soil
35 carbon storage will be larger if global warming is restricted to 1.5°C, although some of the associated
36 changes will be countered by enhanced gross primary production due to elevated CO₂ concentration (i.e. the
37 ‘fertilization effect’) and higher temperatures, especially at medium and high latitudes (*medium confidence*).

38




Figure 3.17: The response of terrestrial productivity (Gross Primary Productivity, GPP) to climate change, globally (top left) and for three latitudinal regions: 30°S-30°N; 30-60°N and 60-90°N. Data was used from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) archive (<http://cmip-pcmdi.llnl.gov/cmip5/>). Seven Earth System Models used: Norwegian Earth System Model (NorESM-ME, yellow); Community Earth System Model (CESM, red); Institute Pierre Simon Laplace (IPSL)-CM5-LR (dark blue); Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL, pale blue); Max Plank Institute-Earth System Model (pink); Hadley Centre New Global Environmental Model 2-Earth System (HadGEM2-ES, orange); Canadian Earth System Model 2 (CanESM2, green). Results are differences in GPP from model simulations with ($^{\circ}1\text{pctCO}_2$) and without ($^{\circ}\text{esmfixclim1}$) the effects of climate change. Data are plotted against global mean temperature increase above pre-industrial from simulations with 1% per year increase in CO_2 ($^{\circ}1\text{pctCO}_2$).

3.4.3.5 Regional and ecosystem-specific risks

A large number of threatened systems including mountain ecosystems, highly biodiverse tropical wet and dry forests, deserts, freshwater systems and dune systems are assessed in the AR5. These include Mediterranean areas in Europe, Siberian, tropical and desert ecosystems in Asia, Australian rainforests, the Fynbos and succulent Karoo areas of South Africa, and wetlands in Ethiopia, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In all these systems, it has been shown that impacts accrue with greater warming and thus impacts at 2°C would be expected to be greater than those at 1.5°C (*medium confidence*).

The **High Arctic region**, with tundra-dominated landscapes, has warmed more than the global average over the last century (Settele et al., 2014) (Section 3.3). The Arctic tundra biome is experiencing increasing fire disturbance and permafrost degradation (Bring et al., 2016; DeBeer et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2016; Yang et

1 al., 2016). Both of these processes facilitate conditions for the establishment of woody species in tundra
2 areas. Arctic terrestrial ecosystems are being disrupted by delays in winter onset and mild winters associated
3 with global warming (Cooper, 2014) (*high confidence*). Observational constraints suggest stabilisation at
4 1.5°C would avoid approximately 2 million km² of permafrost compared with stabilisation at 2°C (Chadburn
5 et al., 2017), but the timescale for release of thawed carbon as CO₂ or CH₄ is likely to be many centuries
6 (Burke et al., 2017). In Northern Eurasia, the growing season length is projected to lengthen by about 3-12
7 days for 1.5°C and 6-16 days for 2°C (*medium confidence*) (Zhou et al., 2018). Aalto et al. (2017) predict a
8 72% reduction of cryogenic land surface processes in Northern Europe for RCP2.6 in 2040-2069
9 (corresponding to a global warming of approximately 1.6°C), with only slightly larger losses for RCP4.5
10 (2°C global warming). Long-term absence of snow reduces vascular plant cover in the understorey by 92%,
11 reduces fine root biomass by 39% (Blume-Werry et al., 2016)

12
13 Projected impacts on **forests** as climate changes include increases in the intensity of storms, wildfires and
14 pest outbreaks (Settele et al., 2014), potentially leading to forest dieback (*medium confidence*). Warmer and
15 drier conditions particularly facilitate fire, drought and insect disturbances, while warmer and wetter
16 conditions increase disturbances from wind and pathogens (Seidl et al., 2017). Including disturbances in the
17 simulations may influence productivity changes of European forests in response to climate change (Reyer et
18 al., 2017b). There is additional evidence for attribution of increased forest fire in North America to
19 anthropogenic climate change during 1984-2015, via the mechanism of increasing fuel aridity almost
20 doubling the western US forest fire area compared to what would have been expected in the absence of
21 climate change (Abatzoglou and Williams, 2016). This projection is in line with projected fire risks, which
22 indicate that fire frequency would increase over 37.8% of global land areas during 2010-2039 (Moritz et al.,
23 2012), corresponding to a global warming level of approximately 1.2 °C; as compared with over 61.9% of
24 the global land area in 2070-2099, corresponding to a warming of approximately 3.5°C² (Table 26-1 in
25 Romero-Lankao et al., 2014) also indicated significantly lower wildfire risks in North America for near term
26 warming (2030-2040, which may be considered a proxy for 1.5°C) than at 2°C (*high confidence*).

27
28 **Amazon tropical forest** has been shown to be close to its climatic threshold (Hutyra et al., 2005), but this
29 threshold may move under elevated CO₂ (Good et al., 2011). Future changes in rainfall, especially dry
30 season length, will determine response of Amazon forest (Good et al., 2013). The forest may be especially
31 vulnerable to combined pressure from multiple stressors: namely changes in climate and continued
32 anthropogenic disturbance (Borma et al., 2013; Nobre et al., 2016). Modelling (Huntingford et al., 2013) and
33 observational constraints (Cox et al., 2013) suggest large scale forest dieback less likely than suggested
34 under early coupled modelling studies (Cox et al., 2000; Jones et al., 2009). Nobre et al. (2016) estimate
35 climate threshold of 4°C and a deforestation threshold of 40%.

36
37 In many places around the world the **savanna** boundary is moving into former grasslands with woody
38 encroachment and tree cover and biomass has increased over the past century due to changes in land
39 management, rising CO₂, climate variability and change (often in combination) (Settele et al., 2014). For the
40 plant species in the Mediterranean region, shift in phenology, range contraction, health decline have been
41 observed because of precipitation decrease and temperature increase (*medium confidence*) (Settele et al.,
42 2014). Recent studies using independent complementary approaches now show that there is a regional-scale

² FOOTNOTE: The approximate temperatures are derived from (Figure 10.5 panel A, Meehl et al. 2007), which indicates an ensemble average projection of 0.7 °C or 3°C above 1980-1999, which is itself 0.5°C above pre-industrial) (Figure 10.5 panel A, Meehl et al. 2007).

1 threshold in the Mediterranean region between 1.5 °C and 2°C warming (Guiot and Cramer, 2016;
2 Schleussner et al., 2016b). Guiot and Cramer (2016) finds that only if global warming is constrained to 1.5°C
3 can biome shifts unprecedented in the last 10,000 years be avoided (*medium confidence*) – whilst 2°C
4 warming results in a decrease of 12-15% of the Mediterranean biome area. The Fynbos biome in
5 southwestern South Africa is vulnerable to the increasing impact of fires under increasing temperatures and
6 drier winters. It is projected to lose about 20%, 45% and 80% of its current suitable climate area under 1°C,
7 2°C and 3°C of global warming compared to 1961-1990, respectively (*high confidence*) (Engelbrecht and
8 Engelbrecht, 2016). In Australia, an increase in the density of trees and shrubs at the expense of grassland
9 species - is occurring across all major Australian ecosystems and is projected to be amplified (NCCARF,
10 2013). In Central America, Lyra et al. (2017) showed that with a global warming of 3°C in 2100, the tropical
11 rainforest biomass will be reduced by more than 50% with large replacement by savanna and grassland. With
12 a global warming close to 1.5°C in 2050, a biomass decrease 20% is projected (Lyra et al., 2017). If a linear
13 response is assumed, with a global warming of 2°C, we deduced that the decrease may reach 30% (*medium*
14 *confidence*).

15
16 Freshwater ecosystems are considered to be among the most threatened on the planet (Settele et al., 2014).
17 Although peatlands cover only about 3% of the land surface, they hold one-third of the world's soil carbon
18 stock (400 to 600 Pg) (Settele et al., 2014). In the Congo Basin (Dargie et al., 2017) and in the Amazonian
19 Basin (Draper et al., 2014), the peatlands store the equivalent of the tropical forest. But this stored carbon is
20 vulnerable to land use change and future risk of drought, for example in northeast Brazil (*high confidence*)
21 (Figure 3.12, Section 3.3.4.2). At the global scale, they are undergoing rapid major transformations through
22 drainage and burning in preparation for oil palm and other crops or through unintentional burning (Magrin et
23 al., 2014). Wetland salinization, a widespread threat to the structure and ecological functioning of inland and
24 coastal wetlands, is occurring at a high rate and large geographic scale (Herbert et al., 2015). Settele et al.
25 (2014) find that rising water temperatures are projected to lead to shifts in freshwater species distributions
26 and worsen water quality. Some of these ecosystems respond non-linearly to changes in temperature, for
27 example it has been found that the wetland function of the Prairie Pothole region in North America is
28 projected to decline beyond a local warming of 2°C-3°C above present (a 1°C local warming, corresponding
29 to a 0.6°C global warming) (Johnson and Poiani, 2016). If the ratio of local to global warming remains
30 similar for these small levels of warming, this would indicate a global temperature threshold of 1.2°C-1.8°C
31 warming. Hence constraining global warming to approximately 1.5°C warming would maintain the
32 functioning of the prairie pothole ecosystem in terms of their productivity and biodiversity, but an 20%
33 increase of precipitation can offset a 2°C global warming (*high confidence*) (Johnson and Poiani, 2016).

34 35 3.4.3.6 Summary of implications for ecosystem services

36 In summary, constraining global warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C has strong benefits for terrestrial wetland
37 ecosystems and their services (*high confidence*). These benefits include avoidance of biome transformations,
38 species range losses, increased extinction risks (all *medium confidence*), changes in phenology (*high*
39 *confidence*), together with projected increases in extreme weather events which are not yet factored into
40 these analyses (Section 3.3) all contribute to disruption of ecosystem functioning and loss of cultural,
41 provisioning and regulating services provided by these ecosystems to humans. Examples of such services
42 include soil conservation (avoidance of desertification), flood control, water and air purification, pollination,
43 nutrient cycling, some sources of food, and recreation.

44
45
46

1 3.4.4 Oceans systems

2
3 The Ocean plays a central role in regulating atmospheric gas concentrations, global temperature and climate.
4 It is also provides habitat to a large number of organisms and ecosystems that provide goods and services
5 that are worth trillions of USD per year (e.g., Costanza et al., 2014; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2015). Together
6 with local stresses (Halpern et al., 2015), climate change poses a major threat to an increasing number of
7 ocean ecosystems (e.g. coral reefs: *virtually certain*, WGII AR5) and consequently for many coastal
8 communities who depend on marine resources for food, livelihoods and a safe place to live. Previous
9 sections have described changes in the ocean that include rapid increases in ocean temperature down to at
10 least 700 m (Section 3.3.7). Anthropogenic carbon dioxide has also decreased pH, as well as affected the
11 concentration of ions such as carbonate (Section 3.3.10 and 3.4.4.5), over a similar depth range. Increased
12 ocean temperature has intensified storms (Section 3.3.6), as well as expanded ocean volume and increased
13 sea levels globally (Section 3.3.9) and decreased the extent of polar summer sea ice (Section 3.3.8), as well
14 as the overall solubility of the ocean for oxygen (Section 3.3.10). Importantly, changes in the response to
15 climate change rarely operate in isolation. Consequently, the effect of global warming at 1.5°C versus 2°C,
16 must be considered in the light of multiple, interactive factors that may accumulate and interact over time to
17 produce complex risks, hazards and impacts on human and natural systems.
18

19 3.4.4.1 Observed impacts

20
21 Physical and chemical changes to the ocean from increasing atmospheric CO₂ and other GHGs are already
22 driving significant changes to ocean systems (*very high confidence*) and will continue to do so at 1.5°C and,
23 more so, at 2°C above the pre-industrial period (Section 3.3.11). These changes have been accompanied by
24 other changes such as ocean acidification, intensifying storms, and deoxygenation (Levin and Le Bris, 2015).
25 Risks are already significant at current greenhouse gas concentrations and temperatures, and vary
26 significantly between depths, location and ecosystems, with impacts being singular, interactive and/or
27 cumulative (Boyd et al., 2015).
28

29 3.4.4.2 Warming and stratification of the surface ocean

30
31 As atmospheric greenhouse gasses have increased, the global mean surface temperature (GMST) has reached
32 about 1°C above the pre-industrial period, and oceans have rapidly warmed from the ocean surface to the
33 deep sea (Hughes and Narayanaswamy, 2013; Levin and Le Bris, 2015; Yasuhara and Danovaro, 2016;
34 Sweetman et al., 2017) (*high agreement, robust evidence*; Sections 3.3.1.2 and 3.3.7). Marine organisms are
35 already responding to these changes by shifting their biogeographical ranges to higher, cooler latitudes, at
36 rates that range from 0 to 40 km yr⁻¹ (Burrows et al., 2014; Chust et al., 2014b; Bruge et al., 2016;
37 Poloczanska et al., 2016) which has consequently affected the structure and function of the ocean, along with
38 its biodiversity and food webs (*high agreement, robust evidence*). Movements of organisms does not
39 necessarily equate to the movement of entire ecosystems. For example, species of reef-building corals have
40 been observed to shift their geographic ranges yet this has not resulted in the shift of entire coral ecosystems
41 (Woodroffe et al., 2010; Yamano et al., 2011) (*medium agreement, medium evidence*). In the case of ‘less
42 mobile’ ecosystems (e.g. coral reefs, kelp forests, intertidal communities), shifts in biogeographical ranges
43 may be limited with mass mortalities and disease outbreaks increasing in frequency as the exposure to
44 extreme temperatures have increased (Hoegh-Guldberg, 1999; Garrabou et al., 2009; Rivetti et al., 2014;
45 Maynard et al., 2015; Krumhansl et al., 2016; Hughes et al., 2017b) (*high agreement, robust evidence*; see
46 also Box 3.4). These trends will become more pronounced at 1.5°C, and more so at 2°C, above the
47 preindustrial period (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007; Donner, 2009; Frieler et al., 2013; Horta E Costa et al.,

1 2014; Verges et al., 2014; Vergés et al., 2016; Zarco-Perello et al., 2017) and are *likely* to result in decreases
2 in marine biodiversity at the equator and correspondingly increases in biodiversity at higher latitudes
3 (Cheung et al., 2009; Burrows et al., 2014).

4
5 While the impacts of relocating species are mostly negative for human communities and industry, there are
6 instances of short-term gains. Fisheries, for example, may expand temporarily at high latitudes in the
7 northern hemisphere as the extent of summer sea ice recedes and NPP increases (*medium agreement,*
8 *medium evidence*; Cheung et al., 2010; Lam et al., 2016; Weatherdon et al., 2016). High latitude fisheries are
9 not only influenced by the effect of temperature on NPP but are also strongly influenced by the direct effects
10 of changing temperatures on fish and fisheries themselves (Barange et al., 2014; Pörtner et al., 2014; Cheung
11 et al., 2016b; Weatherdon et al., 2016; Section 3.4.4.9). Temporary gains in the productivity of high latitude
12 fisheries are offset against a growing number of examples from low and mid latitudes where increases in sea
13 temperature are driving decreases in NPP, due to the direct effects of elevated temperatures and/or reduced
14 ocean mixing from reduced ocean upwelling (increased stratification; *low to medium confidence*; (Cheung et
15 al., 2010; Ainsworth et al., 2011; Lam et al., 2012, 2014, 2016; Bopp et al., 2013; Boyd et al., 2014; Chust et
16 al., 2014; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2014; Poloczanska et al., 2014; Pörtner et al., 2014; Signorini et al., 2015).
17 Reduced ocean upwelling has implications for millions of people and industries that depend on fisheries for
18 food and livelihoods (Bakun et al., 2015; FAO, 2016; Kämpf and Chapman, 2016) although there is *low*
19 *confidence* in the projection of the size of the consequences at 1.5°C (*low agreement, limited evidence*). It is
20 also important to appreciate these changes in the context of large-scale ocean processes such as the ocean
21 carbon pump. The export of organic carbon to deeper layers of the ocean increases as NPP changes in the
22 surface ocean, for example, with implications for food webs and oxygen levels (Boyd et al., 2014; Sydeman
23 et al., 2014; Altieri and Gedan, 2015; Bakun et al., 2015; Boyd, 2015).

24 25 26 3.4.4.3 Storms and coastal run-off

27 Storms, wind, waves and inundation can have highly destructive impacts on ocean and coastal ecosystems as
28 well as the human communities that depend on them (IPCC, 2012; Seneviratne et al., 2012). The intensity of
29 tropical cyclones across the world's ocean has increased although the overall number of tropical cyclones
30 has decreased (Elsner et al., 2008; Holland and Bruyère, 2014) (*medium agreement, limited evidence*;
31 Section 3.3.6). The direct force of wind and waves associated with larger storms, along with changes in
32 storm direction, increase the risks of physical damage to coastal communities as well as ecosystems such as
33 mangroves (*medium agreement, limited evidence*; Long et al., 2016; Primavera et al., 2016; Villamayor et
34 al., 2016; Cheal et al., 2017) and tropical coral reefs (De'ath et al., 2012; Bozec et al., 2015; Cheal et al.,
35 2017). These changes are associated with increases in maximum wind speed, wave height, and the
36 inundation, although trends in these variables vary from region to region (Section 3.3.5). In some cases, this
37 can lead to increased exposure to related impacts (reduced water quality and sediment run-off; *high*
38 *agreement, medium evidence*) (Brodie et al., 2012; Wong et al., 2014; Anthony, 2016; AR5-Table 5.1).

39
40 Sea level rise also amplifies impacts from observed sea level rise (Section 3.3.9) with robust evidence that
41 storm surge and damage are already penetrating farther inland than a few decades ago, changing conditions
42 for coastal ecosystems and human communities, especially Small Island Developing States (SIDS, Box 3.5)
43 and low-lying coastal communities with issues such as storm surges transforming coastal areas (Section
44 3.4.5; Brown et al., 2018a). Changes in the frequency of extreme events, such as more intense storms, have
45 the potential (along with other factors such as disease, feed web changes, invasive organisms, and heat stress
46 mortality; (Burge et al., 2014; Maynard et al., 2015; Weatherdon et al., 2016; Clements et al., 2017) to
47 overwhelm the capacity for natural and human systems to recover following disturbances, as has recently

1 been seen for centrally important ecosystems such as tropical coral reefs (Box 3.4), which have changed
2 from coral-dominated ecosystems to assemblages dominated by other organisms such as seaweeds, with
3 changes in associated organisms and ecosystem services (De'ath et al., 2012; Bozec et al., 2015; Cheal et al.,
4 2017; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2017; Hughes et al., 2017a, 2017b) (*high agreement, medium evidence*). The
5 impacts of storms are amplified by sea level rise (Section 3.4.5) with substantial challenges today and in the
6 future for cities, delta, and small islands in particular (Section 3.4.5.2 - 3.4.5.4) as well as coastlines and
7 ecosystems (Section 3.4.5.5 – 3.4.5.7).

10 3.4.4.4 Ocean circulation

11 The movement of water within the ocean is essential to its biology and ecology as well the circulation of
12 heat, water and nutrients around the planet (Section 3.3.7). The movement of these factors drives local and
13 regional climates as well as primary productivity and food production. Firmly attributing recent changes in
14 the strength and direction of ocean currents to climate change, however, is complicated by long-term patterns
15 and variability (e.g., Pacific Decadal Oscillation, PDO, Signorini et al., 2015) and the lack of records that
16 match the long-term nature of these changes in many cases (Lluch-Cota et al., 2014). An assessment of
17 literature since the AR5 (Sydeman et al., 2014), however, has concluded that (overall) upwelling-favourable
18 winds have intensified in the California, Benguela, and Humboldt upwelling systems, but have weakened in
19 the Iberian system, over 60 years of records (1946-2012) (*medium agreement, medium evidence*) and are
20 neutral for the Canary upwelling system. These conclusions are consistent with the developing consensus
21 that wind driving upwelling systems are likely to intensify under climate change for most systems (Sydeman
22 et al., 2014; Bakun et al., 2015; Di Lorenzo, 2015) with potentially positive and negative consequences
23 (Bakun et al., 2015).

24
25 Changes in ocean circulation can have profound impacts on marine ecosystems by connecting regions and
26 facilitating the entry and establishment of species in areas where they were unknown before (e.g.,
27 'tropicalization' of temperate ecosystems, (Wernberg et al., 2012; Verges et al., 2014; Vergés et al., 2016;
28 Zarco-Perello et al., 2017) as well as the arrival of novel disease agents (Burge et al., 2014; Maynard et al.,
29 2015; Weatherdon et al., 2016) (*medium agreement, limited evidence*). For example, the sea urchin,
30 *Centrostephanus rodgersii*, a herbivore, has been able to reach Tasmania, where it was previously unknown,
31 from the Australian mainland due to a strengthening of the East Australian Current (EAC; *high agreement,*
32 *robust evidence*) (Ling et al., 2009). As a consequence, the distribution and abundance of kelp forests has
33 rapidly decreased with implications for fisheries and other ecosystem services (Ling et al., 2009). These risks
34 to marine ecosystems are likely to become greater at 1.5°C and further so at 2°C (*medium agreement,*
35 *medium evidence*, Cheung et al., 2009; Pereira et al., 2010; Pinsky et al., 2013; Burrows et al., 2014).

36
37 Changes to ocean circulation can have even larger impacts in terms of scale and impacts. Weakening of the
38 Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), for example, is projected to be highly disruptive to
39 natural and human systems as the delivery of heat to higher latitudes via this current system is reduced.
40 Evidence of a slowdown of AMOC has increased since AR5 (Smeed et al., 2014; Rahmstorf et al., 2015a,
41 2015b; Kelly et al., 2016) yet a strong causal connecton to climate change is missing (*low agreement, limited*
42 *evidence*; Section 3.3.7).

45 3.4.4.5 Ocean acidification

46 Ocean chemistry encompasses a wide range of phenomena and chemical species of which many are integral
47 to the biology and ecology of the ocean (Section 3.3.10) (Gatusso et al., 2014; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2014;

1 Pörtner et al., 2014; Gattuso et al., 2015). While changes to ocean chemistry are likely to be centrally
2 important, the literature on how climate change might influence ocean chemistry over the short and long
3 term is limited (*high agreement, limited evidence*). By contrast, numerous risks from the specific changes
4 associated with ocean acidification have been identified (Dove et al., 2013; Kroeker et al., 2013; Pörtner et
5 al., 2014; Gattuso et al., 2015; Albright et al., 2016) with the consensus that resulting changes to the
6 carbonate chemistry of seawater are having, and are likely to have, fundamental and substantial impacts on a
7 wide variety of organisms (*high agreement, robust evidence*). Organisms with shells and skeletons made out
8 of calcium carbonate are particularly at risk, as are the early life history stages of a broad number of
9 organisms and processes such as de-calcification, although some taxa that did not show the same sensitivity
10 to changes in CO₂, pH and carbonate concentrations (Dove et al., 2013; Fang et al., 2013; Kroeker et al.,
11 2013; Pörtner et al., 2014; Gattuso et al., 2015). These risks vary with latitude (i.e. greatest changes at high
12 latitudes) and depths, with the latter involving the rapid shoaling of the aragonite saturation horizon (i.e.
13 where concentrations of calcium and carbonate fall below the saturation point for aragonite, a key crystalline
14 form of calcium carbonate) as CO₂ penetrates deeper as concentrations in the atmosphere increase over time.
15 Under many models and scenarios, the aragonite saturation reaches the surface from 2030 onwards and with
16 poorly understood impacts and consequences for ocean organisms, ecosystems and people (Orr et al., 2005;
17 Roberts et al., 2008; Hauri et al., 2016).

18
19 It is also difficult to reliably separate the impacts of ocean warming and acidification, especially under field
20 settings. Ocean waters have increased in sea surface temperature (SST) by approximately 0.9°C and
21 decreased in pH by 0.11 units since 1870-1899 ('preindustrial', Table 1 in Gattuso et al., 2015; Bopp et al.,
22 2013). As CO₂ concentrations continue to increase along with other GHGs, pH will decrease linearly with
23 SST, reaching 1.72°C and a decrease of 0.22 pH units (under RCP4.5) relative to the preindustrial period.
24 These changes are likely to continue given the linear correlation of SST and pH. Experimental manipulation
25 of CO₂, temperature and consequently acidification indicate that these impacts will continue to increase in
26 size and scale as CO₂ and SST continue to increase in tandem (Dove et al., 2013; Fang et al., 2013; Kroeker
27 et al., 2013).

28
29 While many risks have been defined through laboratory and mesocosm experiments, there is a growing list
30 of impacts from the field (*medium agreement, medium evidence*) that include community scale impacts on
31 bacterial assemblages and processes (Endres et al., 2014), coccolithophores (K.L.S. Meier et al., 2014),
32 pteropods and polar food webs (Bednaršek et al., 2012, 2014), phytoplankton (Moy et al., 2009; Riebesell et
33 al., 2013; Richier et al., 2014), benthic ecosystems (Hall-Spencer et al., 2008; Linares et al., 2015), seagrass
34 (Garrard et al., 2014), macroalgae (Webster et al., 2013; Ordonez et al., 2014), as well as excavating
35 sponges, endolithic microalgae, and reef-building corals (Dove et al., 2013; Reyes-Nivia et al., 2013; Fang et
36 al., 2014), and coral reefs (Fabricius et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2017; Box 3.4). Some ecosystems such as
37 bathyal areas (200–3000 m) are likely to undergo significant reductions in pH by the year 2100 (0.29 to 0.37
38 pH units) yet evidence is currently limited despite the potential importance of these areas (Hughes and
39 Narayanaswamy, 2013; Sweetman et al., 2017) (*medium agreement, limited evidence*).

40 41 42 3.4.4.6 Deoxygenation

43 Oxygen in the ocean is maintained by a series of processes including ocean mixing, photosynthesis,
44 respiration and solubility (Boyd et al., 2014, 2015; Pörtner et al., 2014; Breitburg et al., 2018).
45 Concentrations of oxygen in the ocean are declining (*high agreement, robust evidence*) due to three main
46 factors that relate to climate change: (1) heat related stratification of the water column (less ventilation and
47 mixing), (2) reduced oxygen solubility as ocean temperature increases, and (3) impacts of warming on

1 biological processes that produce or consume oxygen such as photosynthesis and respiration (*high*
2 *agreement, robust evidence*) (Bopp et al., 2013; Pörtner et al., 2014; Altieri and Gedan, 2015; Deutsch et al.,
3 2015; Schmidtko et al., 2017; Shepherd et al., 2017; Breitburg et al., 2018). Similarly, a range of processes
4 (Section 3.4.11) are also acting synergistically, including non-climate change factors such as run-off and
5 coastal eutrophication (e.g. from coastal farming, intensive aquaculture) leading to increased phytoplankton
6 productivity, which increase the metabolic rate of coastal microbial communities by supplying greater
7 amounts of organic carbon (Altieri and Gedan, 2015; Bakun et al., 2015; Boyd, 2015). Deep sea areas are
8 likely to experience some of the greatest challenges as abyssal seafloor habitats in areas of deep-water
9 formation experiencing decreased water column oxygen concentrations by as much as 0.03 mL L⁻¹ by 2100
10 (Levin and Le Bris, 2015; Sweetman et al., 2017).

11
12 The number of ‘dead zones’ (areas where oxygenic waters have been replaced by hypoxic conditions) has
13 been growing strongly since the 1990s (Diaz and Rosenberg, 2008; Altieri and Gedan, 2015; Schmidtko et
14 al., 2017). While attribution can be difficult due to the complexity of the climate and non-climate change-
15 related processes involved, some impacts related to deoxygenation (*medium agreement, limited evidence*)
16 include the expansion of the Oxygen Minimum Zones (OMZ) (Turner et al., 2008; Carstensen et al., 2014;
17 Acharya and Panigrahi, 2016; Lachkar et al., 2018), physiological impacts (Pörtner et al., 2014), and
18 mortality and/or displacement oxygenic organisms such as fish (Hamukuaya et al., 1998; Thronson and
19 Quigg, 2008; Jacinto, 2011) and invertebrates (Hobbs and McDonald, 2010; Bednaršek et al., 2016; Seibel,
20 2016; Altieri et al., 2017). Deoxygenation interacts with ocean acidification to present substantial and
21 combined challenges for fisheries and aquaculture (*medium agreement, medium evidence*) (Hamukuaya et
22 al., 1998; Bakun et al., 2015; Rodrigues et al., 2015; Feely et al., 2016; S. Li et al., 2016; Asiedu et al.,
23 2017a; Clements et al., 2017; Clements and Chopin, 2017; Breitburg et al., 2018). Deoxygenation is likely to
24 have greater impacts as ocean warming and acidification increases (*high agreement, medium evidence*), with
25 most impacts being larger and more numerous than today (e.g. greater challenges for aquaculture and
26 fisheries from hypoxia), and the number of hypoxic areas continue to increase. Risks from deoxygenation are
27 *virtually certain* to increase as warming continues although our understanding of risks at 1.5°C versus 2°C is
28 incomplete (*high agreement, limited evidence*). Reducing coastal pollution and consequently the export of
29 organic carbon into deep benthic habitats is highly likely to reduce the decline in the oxygen concentrations
30 in coastal waters and in hypoxic areas in general (Breitburg et al., 2018).

33 3.4.4.7 Loss of sea ice

34 Sea ice has been a persistent feature of the planet’s polar regions (Polyak et al., 2010) and is central to
35 marine ecosystems, people (e.g. food, culture and livelihoods) and industries (e.g. fishing, tourism, oil and
36 gas, and shipping). Summer sea ice in these regions (e.g. Arctic, Antarctic and Southern Ocean), however,
37 has been retreating rapidly in recent decades (Section 3.3.8) with an assessment of the literature revealing
38 that a fundamental transformation is occurring in polar organisms and ecosystems driven by climate change
39 (*high agreement, robust evidence*) (Larsen et al., 2014). These changes are strongly affecting people in the
40 Arctic who have close relationships with sea ice and associated ecosystems, and are facing major adaptation
41 challenges as a result of sea level rise, coastal erosion, the accelerated thawing of permafrost, changing
42 ecosystems and resources, and many other issues (Ford, 2012; Ford et al., 2015).

43
44 There is considerable and compelling evidence that a further increase of 0.5°C from today in average global
45 surface temperature will lead to multiple levels of impact on a variety of organisms - from phytoplankton to
46 marine mammals some of the most dramatic changes occurring in the Arctic Ocean and Western Antarctic
47 Peninsula (Turner et al., 2014, 2017b; Steinberg et al., 2015; Piñones and Fedorov, 2016).

1
2 The impacts of climate change on sea ice is part of the focus of the IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and
3 Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (SROCC), due to be released in 2019. Therefore, without intending to be
4 comprehensive, there are a range of responses to the loss of sea ice that are occurring and are likely to
5 increase at 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming. Photosynthetic communities such as macroalgae, phytoplankton,
6 and microalgae dwelling on the underside of floating sea ice are changing due to increased temperatures,
7 light, and nutrient levels. As sea ice retreats, mixing of the water column increases, and phototrophs have
8 increased access to seasonally high levels of solar radiation (Dalpadado et al., 2014; W.N. Meier et al., 2014)
9 (*medium agreement, medium evidence*). These changes are *very likely* to stimulate fisheries productivity in
10 high latitude regions by mid-century (Cheung et al., 2009, 2010, 2016b; Lam et al., 2014), with evidence of
11 this is already happening for several fisheries species in high latitude regions in the northern hemisphere
12 such as the Bering Sea, although these ‘positive’ impacts may be relatively short-lived (Hollowed and
13 Sundby, 2014; Sundby et al., 2016). In addition to the impact of climate change on fisheries via impacts on
14 NPP, there are also direct effects of temperature on fish, which may have a range of impacts (Pörtner et al.,
15 2014). Sea ice in Antarctica is undergoing changes that exceed those seen in the Arctic (Maksym et al.,
16 2011; Reid et al., 2015) with increases in sea ice coverage in the western Ross Sea being accompanied by
17 strong decreases in the Bellingshausen and Amundsen seas (Hobbs et al., 2016). While Antarctica is not
18 permanently populated, the ramifications of changes to the productivity of vast regions such as the Southern
19 Ocean has substantial implications as far as ocean foodwebs and fisheries are concerned.
20
21

22 3.4.4.8 Sea level rise

23 Mean sea level is increasing (Section 3.3.9) with substantial impacts already being felt by coastal ecosystems
24 and communities (*high agreement, robust evidence*). These changes are interacting with other factors such as
25 strengthening storms, which together are driving greater storm surge, infrastructure damage, erosion and
26 habitat loss (Church et al., 2013; Stocker et al., 2013; Blankespoor et al., 2014). Coastal wetland ecosystems
27 such as mangroves, sea grasses and salt marshes are under pressure from rising sea level (*medium*
28 *agreement, medium evidence*, Section 3.4.5) (Di Nitto et al., 2014; Ellison, 2014; Lovelock et al., 2015;
29 Mills et al., 2016; Nicholls et al., 2018) as well as a wide range of other non-climate change related risks and
30 impacts, with on-going loss of wetlands recently estimated at approximately 1% per annum across a large
31 number of countries (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Alongi, 2015). While some ecosystems (e.g. mangroves) may
32 be able to shift shoreward as sea levels increase, coastal development (e.g. coastal building, seawalls, and
33 agriculture) can often interrupt shoreward shifts as does reduced sediment supplies down some rivers due to
34 coastal development (Di Nitto et al., 2014; Lovelock et al., 2015; Mills et al., 2016).
35

36 The response to sea level rise challenges for ocean and coastal systems include reducing the impact of other
37 stresses such as those arising from tourism, fishing, coastal development, reduced sediment supply, and
38 unsustainable aquaculture/agriculture in order to build ecological resilience (Hossain et al., 2015; Sutton-
39 Grier and Moore, 2016; Asiedu et al., 2017a). Available literature largely concludes that these challenges
40 will intensify under a 1.5°C world but will be higher at 2°C, especially when considered in the context of
41 changes occurring beyond the end of the current century. In some cases, restoration of coastal habitats and
42 ecosystems may be a cost-effective way of responding to changes arising from increasing levels of exposure
43 from rising sea levels, intensifying storms, coastal inundation, and salinization (Section 3.4.5, Box 3.5)
44 (Arkema et al., 2013) although limits of these strategies have been identified (e.g., Lovelock et al., 2015;
45 Weatherdon et al., 2016). These and other issues and options are explored in Section 3.4.5.
46

1 *3.4.4.9 Projected risks and adaptation options for a global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C above pre-industrial*
2 *levels*

3 Given the space available, it is impossible to be comprehensive and hence the intention is to illustrate key
4 risks and adaptation options in the ocean, and hence the intention is to illustrate key risks and adaptation
5 options for ecosystem and sectors. This assessment builds on the recent expert consensus of Gattuso and
6 colleagues (Gattuso et al., 2015) by assessing new literature (from 2015-2017) and adjusting the levels of
7 risk in the light of this recent literature. To do this, we use input from the original expert group's assessment
8 (Supplementary Material 3.SM.3.2) and focus particularly on the implications of global warming of 1.5°C as
9 compared to 2°C. A discussion of potential adaptation options is also provided, the details of which will be
10 further explored in later chapters of this special report. This section refers heavily to the review, analysis and
11 literature presented in the Supplementary Material that accompanies this report.
12
13

14 *3.4.4.10 Framework organisms (tropical corals, mangroves and seagrass)*

15 Marine organisms ('ecosystem engineers'), such as seagrass, kelp, oysters, salt marsh species, mangrove and
16 corals, build physical structures or frameworks (i.e. sea grass meadows, kelp forests, oyster reefs, salt
17 marshes, mangrove forests and coral reefs) which form the habitat for large numbers of species (Gutiérrez et
18 al., 2012). These organisms in turn provide food, livelihoods, cultural significance, and services such as
19 coastal protection (Bell et al., 2011, 2017; Cinner et al., 2012; Arkema et al., 2013; Nurse et al., 2014; Wong
20 et al., 2014; Barbier, 2015; Bell and Taylor, 2015; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2015; Mycoo, 2017; Pecl et al.,
21 2017).
22

23 Risks of climate change impacts for seagrass and mangrove ecosystems have recently been assessed by an
24 expert group led by Short et al. (2016). Impacts of climate change were similar across a range of submerged
25 and emerged plants. Submerged plants such as seagrass were affected mostly by temperature extremes
26 (Arias-Ortiz et al., 2018) and indirectly by turbidity, while emergent communities such as mangroves and
27 salt marshes were most susceptible to sea level variability and temperature extremes, which is consistent
28 with other evidence (Di Nitto et al., 2014; Sierra-Correa and Cantera Kintz, 2015; Osorio et al., 2016;
29 Sasmito et al., 2016), especially in the context of human activities that reduce sediment supply (Lovelock et
30 al., 2015) or interrupt the shoreward movement of mangroves by coastal infrastructure leading to 'coastal
31 squeeze' where coastal ecosystems are trapped between changing ocean conditions and coastal infrastructure
32 (Mills et al., 2016). Projection of the future distribution of seagrasses suggest a poleward shift, with concern
33 that low latitude seagrass communities may contract due to increasing stress levels (Valle et al., 2014).
34

35 Present-day risks from climate change (i.e. sea level rise, heat stress, intensifying storms) are medium for
36 seagrass and high to very high for reef building corals (Figure 3.20, Supplementary Material 3.SM.3.2) with
37 evidence of strengthening of concern since the AR5 and the conclusion that tropical corals may be even
38 more vulnerable to climate change than indicated in assessments done in 2014 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2014;
39 Gattuso et al., 2015). The current assessment also took into account the heat wave-related loss of 50% of
40 shallow water corals across hundreds of kilometres of the world's largest continuous coral reef system, the
41 Great Barrier Reef. These large-scale impacts plus the observation of back-to-back bleaching events on the
42 Great Barrier Reef predicted two decades ago (Hoegh-Guldberg, 1999) and arriving sooner than predicted
43 (Hughes et al., 2017b, 2018), suggest that the research community has under-estimated climate risks for
44 coral reefs. General assessment of climate risks for mangroves prior to this special report concluded that they
45 face greater risks from deforestation and unsustainable coastal development than climate change (Alongi,
46 2008; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2014; Gattuso et al., 2015) Recent climate related die-offs (Duke et al., 2017;
47 Lovelock et al., 2017), however, suggest that climate change risks may have been underestimated for

1 mangroves as well. With the events of the last past 3 years in mind, risks are now considered to be
2 undetectable to moderate (i.e now moderate risks start at 1.3°C as opposed to 1.8°C). Consequently, when
3 average global warming reaches 1.3°C above pre-industrial period, mangroves risk from climate change will
4 be moderate, while tropical coral reefs are *virtually certain* to experience high risks of impacts such as very
5 frequent mass mortalities (at least while populations of corals persist). At global warming of 1.8°C above the
6 preindustrial period, seagrasses are projected to reach moderate to high levels of risk (e.g. sea level rise,
7 erosion, damage from extreme temperatures, storm damage), while risks to mangroves from climate change
8 will remain medium (e.g. risks of not keeping up with SLR; more frequent heat stress mortality) (Figure
9 3.17).

10
11 At the current GMST, tropical coral reefs will reach a very high risk of impact at 2°C (Figure 3.17) with
12 most available evidence suggesting that coral dominated ecosystems will be non-existent at this temperature
13 or higher (e.g., coral abundance near zero in most locations, intensifying storms ‘flattening’ reefs’ 3-
14 dimensional structure; Alvarez-Filip et al., 2009) (*high agreement, robust evidence*). Impacts at this point
15 (coupled with ocean acidification) are likely to undermine the ability of tropical coral reefs to provide habitat
16 for the current high levels of biodiversity as well as a range of ecosystem services important for millions of
17 people (e.g., food, livelihoods, coastal protection, cultural services) (Burke et al., 2011).

18
19 Strategies for reducing the impact of climate change on framework organisms include reducing non-climate
20 change stresses (e.g. coastal pollution, overfishing, destructive coastal development) in order to increase
21 ecological resilience in the face of accelerating climate change impacts (World Bank, 2013; Ellison, 2014;
22 Anthony et al., 2015; Sierra-Correa and Cantera Kintz, 2015; Kroon et al., 2016; O’Leary et al., 2017) as
23 well protecting locations where organisms may be more robust (Palumbi et al., 2014), or less exposed to
24 climate change (Bongaerts et al., 2010; van Hooijdonk et al., 2013; Beyer et al., 2018). This might involve
25 cooler areas due to upwelling or deep-water communities that experience less extreme conditions and
26 impacts, or variable conditions that lead to more resilient organisms. Given the potential value for promoting
27 the survival of coral communities under climate change, efforts for preventing their loss to non-climate
28 stresses is important (Bongaerts et al., 2010; Chollett et al., 2013, 2014; Fine et al., 2013; van Hooijdonk et
29 al., 2013; Cacciapaglia and van Woesik, 2015) but see (Chollett et al., 2010; Bongaerts et al., 2017; Beyer et
30 al., 2018; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). A full understanding of the utility and feasibility of the role of
31 refugia in reducing the loss of ecosystems has yet to be developed (*medium agreement, limited evidence*).
32 There is also interest in *ex situ* conservation approaches involving the restoration of corals via aquaculture
33 (Shafir et al., 2006; Rinkevich, 2014) and ‘assisted evolution’ to help corals adapt to changing sea
34 temperatures (van Oppen et al., 2015, 2017), although there are numerous challenges that must be surpassed
35 if these remedies are to be cost effective responses to preserving coral reefs under rapid climate change
36 (Hoegh-Guldberg, 2012, 2014a; Bayraktarov et al., 2016) (*low agreement, limited evidence*).

37
38 Integrating coastal infrastructure with ecosystems dependent on mangroves, seagrasses and salt marsh such
39 that they are able to shift shoreward as sea levels rise. Maintaining sediment supply to coastal areas will
40 enable mangroves can keep pace with sea level rise (Shearman et al., 2013; Lovelock et al., 2015; Sasmito et
41 al., 2016). For this reason, not damming rivers will also maintain the sediment supply needed for mangrove
42 habitat, and hence the ability of mangroves to persist without drowning as sea level increases (Lovelock et
43 al., 2015). In addition, integrated coastal zone management should recognize the importance and economic
44 expediency of using natural ecosystems such as mangroves and tropical coral reefs to protect coastal human
45 communities (Arkema et al., 2013; Temmerman et al., 2013; Ferrario et al., 2014; Hinkel et al., 2014; Elliff
46 and Silva, 2017). High levels of adaptation will be required to prevent impacts on food security and
47 livelihoods in general (*medium agreement, medium evidence*). Adaptation options include developing

1 alternative livelihoods and food sources, ecosystem-based management/adaptation such as ecosystem
2 restoration, and constructing coastal infrastructure that reduces the impacts of rising seas and intensifying
3 storms (Rinkevich, 2015; Weatherdon et al., 2016; Asiedu et al., 2017a; Feller et al., 2017). Clearly, these
4 options need to be carefully assessed in terms of feasibility, cost and scalability, as well as in the light of the
5 coastal ecosystems involved (Bayraktarov et al., 2016).

6 7 8 *3.4.4.11 Ocean food webs (pteropods, bivalves, krill, and fin fish)*

9 Ocean food webs are vast interconnected systems that transfer of solar energy and nutrients from
10 phytoplankton to higher trophic levels (including apex predators) as well as through other food web
11 interactions. Here, we take four representative types of marine organisms which are important within food
12 webs across the ocean, and which illustrate the impacts and ramifications of 1.5°C or greater levels of
13 warming.

14
15 Pteropods are small pelagic molluscs that produce a calcium carbonate shell and which are highly abundant
16 in temperate and polar waters, where they form an important link in the food web between phytoplankton
17 and a range of other organisms including fish, whales and birds. The second group, bivalve molluscs (e.g.
18 clams, oysters and mussels) are also filter-feeding invertebrates that underpin important fisheries and
19 aquaculture industries (from the polar to tropical regions) and are important as food sources for a range of
20 organisms including humans. The third group of organisms considered here are a globally significant group
21 of invertebrates known as euphausiid crustaceans (krill), which are a key food source for many marine
22 organisms and hence a major link between primary producers and higher trophic levels (e.g. fish, mammals,
23 sea birds). Antarctic krill, *Euphausia superba*, are among the most abundant species in mass and are
24 consequently an essential component of polar food webs (Atkinson et al., 2009). The last group, the fin
25 fishes, are vitally important components of ocean food webs, and contribute to the income of coastal
26 communities, industries and nations, and are important to food security and livelihoods of hundreds of
27 millions of people globally (FAO, 2016). Further background to this section is provided in Supplementary
28 Material (Supplementary Material 3.SM.3.2).

29
30 There is a moderate risk to ocean food webs under present day conditions (Figure 3.17, *medium to high*
31 *confidence*). Changing water chemistry and temperature is affecting the ability of pteropods to produce their
32 shells, as well as swim and survive (Roberts et al., 2008; Bednaršek et al., 2016). Shell dissolution is 19-26%
33 higher, for example, in both nearshore and offshore populations since the pre-industrial period (Feely et al.,
34 2016). There is considerable concern as to whether these organisms are declining further, especially given
35 their central importance in ocean food webs (David et al., 2017). Reviewing the literature reveals that
36 pteropods face high risks of impact at 1.5°C and increasing risks of impacts at average global temperatures
37 of 2°C or more above the preindustrial period (*medium agreement, medium evidence*).

38
39 As temperatures increase to 1.5°C and beyond, the risk of impacts from ocean warming and acidification
40 remain moderate to high except in the case of bivalves (mid latitude) where the risks of impacts become high
41 to very high. Ocean warming and acidification are already affecting the life history stages of bivalve
42 molluscs (e.g., Asplund et al., 2014; Mackenzie et al., 2014; Waldbusser et al., 2014; Zittier et al., 2015; Shi
43 et al., 2016; Velez et al., 2016; Q. Wang et al., 2016; Castillo et al., 2017; Lemasson et al., 2017; Ong et al.,
44 2017; X. Zhao et al., 2017). Impacts on adult bivalves include decreased growth, increased respiration, and
45 reduced calcification with larval stages tending to show greater developmental abnormalities and mortality
46 after exposure (Q. Wang et al., 2016; Lemasson et al., 2017; Ong et al., 2017; X. Zhao et al., 2017) (*medium*
47 *agreement, robust evidence*). Risks accumulate at higher temperatures for bivalve molluscs, with very high

1 risks at 1.8°C or more. This general pattern continues with low latitude fin fish acquiring medium to high
2 risks of impact (*medium agreement, medium evidence*) when average global surface temperatures reach
3 1.3°C above the pre-industrial period, and very high risks at 1.8°C (Figure 3.17; *medium agreement, medium*
4 *evidence*).

5
6 Large scale changes to food web structure is occurring in all oceans. For example, record levels of sea ice
7 loss in the Antarctic (Notz and Stroeve, 2016; Turner et al., 2017b) translate as a loss of habitat and hence
8 abundance of krill (Piñones and Fedorov, 2016), with negative ramifications for seabirds and whales which
9 feed on krill (Croxall, 1992; Trathan and Hill, 2016). Other influences such as high rates of ocean
10 acidification, coupled with the shoaling of the aragonite saturation horizon, are likely to also play key roles
11 (Kawaguchi et al., 2013; Piñones and Fedorov, 2016). As with many risks associated with impacts at the
12 ecosystem scale, most adaptation options focus on the management of non-climate change stresses from
13 human activities. Reducing non-climate change stresses such as pollution and habitat destruction will be
14 important in efforts to maintain these important food web components. Fisheries management at local to
15 regional scales will be important in reducing stress on food web organisms such as those discussed here, as
16 well as helping communities and industries adapt to changing food web structure and resources (see further
17 discussion of fisheries *per se* below; Section 3.4.6.3). One strategy is to maintain higher population levels of
18 fished species in order to provide more resilient stocks in the face of challenges driven by climate change
19 (Green et al., 2014; Bell and Taylor, 2015).

20 21 22 3.4.4.12 Key ecosystem services (e.g. carbon uptake, coastal protection, and tropical coral reef recreation)

23 The ocean provides important services that include the regulation of atmospheric composition via gas
24 exchange across the boundary between ocean and atmosphere, and storage of carbon in vegetation and soils
25 associated with ecosystems such as mangroves, salt marsh, and coastal peatlands, among other components.
26 These include a series of physicochemical processes which are influenced by ocean chemistry, circulation,
27 oceanography, temperature and biogeochemical components, as well as by non-climate activities (Boyd,
28 2015). The ocean is also a net sink for CO₂ (another important service), absorbing approximately 30% of
29 human emissions from the burning of fossil fuels and modification of land use (IPCC, 2013). Carbon uptake
30 by the ocean is decreasing (Iida et al., 2015), with concern growing from observations and models regarding
31 changes in ocean circulation (Rahmstorf et al., 2015b); Sections 3.3.7 and 3.4.4.4). Biological components of
32 carbon uptake by the ocean are also changing with observations of changing NPP in equatorial (*medium*
33 *agreement, medium evidence*) and coastal upwelling systems (*medium agreement, medium evidence*, (Lluch-
34 Cota et al., 2014; Sydeman et al., 2014; Bakun et al., 2015) as well as subtropical gyre systems (Signorini et
35 al., 2015, *low agreement, limited evidence*). There is general agreement that NPP will decline as ocean
36 warming and acidification increase (Bopp et al., 2013; Boyd et al., 2014; Pörtner et al., 2014; Boyd, 2015)
37 (*medium agreement, medium evidence*).

38
39 Risks of impacts from reduced carbon uptake, coastal protection, and services contributing to coral reef
40 recreation are moderate at 1.5°C of warming (*medium agreement, limited evidence*). At 2°C, risks of impacts
41 associated with changes to carbon uptake remain moderate, while the climate risks associated with reduced
42 coastal protection and recreation on tropical coral reefs are high, especially given the vulnerability of this
43 ecosystem and others (e.g. seagrass, mangroves) to climate change (Figure 3.17). Coastal protection is
44 another service provided by natural barriers such as mangroves, seagrass meadows, coral reefs, and other
45 coastal ecosystems, and which is important for protecting human communities and infrastructure against the
46 impacts associated with rising sea levels, waves and intensifying storms (Gutiérrez et al., 2012; Kennedy et
47 al., 2013; Ferrario et al., 2014; Barbier, 2015; Cooper et al., 2016; Hauer et al., 2016; Narayan et al., 2016).

1 Both natural and human coastal protection have the potential to reduce impacts (Fu and Song, 2017).
2 Tropical coral reefs, for example, provide effective protection by dissipating about 97% of wave energy,
3 with 86% of the energy being dissipated by reef crests alone (Ferrario et al., 2014; Narayan et al., 2016).
4 Mangroves play an important role in coastal protection as well as resources for coastal communities but are
5 already under moderate risk of not keeping up with the sea level rise due to climate change and to
6 contributing factors such as reduced sediment supply or obstacles for the shift shoreward (Saunders et al.,
7 2014; Lovelock et al., 2015). This implies that coastal areas currently protected by mangroves may
8 experience growing risks over time.

9
10 Tourism is one of the largest industries globally (Rosselló-Nadal, 2014; Markham et al., 2016; Spalding et
11 al., 2017). A substantial part of the global tourist industry is associated with tropical coastal regions and
12 islands where tropical coral reefs and related ecosystems play important roles (Section 3.4.9.1). Coastal
13 tourism can be a dominant money earner in terms of foreign exchange for many countries, particularly SIDS
14 (Section 3.4.9.1., Box 3.5; Weatherdon et al., 2016; Spalding et al., 2017). The direct relationship between
15 increasing global temperatures, intensifying storms, elevated thermal stress, and the loss of tropical coral
16 reefs has raised concern about the risks of climate change for local economies and industries based on
17 tropical coral reefs. Risks to coral reef recreational services from climate change are considered here as well
18 as in Box 3.5, Section 3.4.9, and Supplementary Material 3.SM.3.2.


19
20 Adapting to the broad global changes in carbon uptake by the ocean are limited and are discussed with
21 respect to the changes in NPP and their implications for fishing industries later in this report. These are broad
22 scale and indirect, with the only other solution at scale being reducing the entry of CO₂ into the ocean.
23 Strategies for adapting to reduced coastal protection involve avoidance of vulnerable areas, managed retreat
24 from threatened locations, and/or accommodation of impacts and loss of services (Bell, 2012; André et al.,
25 2016; Cooper et al., 2016; Mills et al., 2016; Raabe and Stumpf, 2016; Fu and Song, 2017) Within these
26 broad options, there are strategies that involve direct human intervention (e.g. coastal hardening, seawalls
27 and artificial reefs) (Rinkevich, 2014, 2015; André et al., 2016; Cooper et al., 2016; Narayan et al., 2016),
28 while there are others that exploit the opportunities for increasing coastal protection by involving a naturally
29 occurring oyster banks, coral reefs, mangroves, seagrass, and other ecosystems (UNEP-WCMC, 2006;
30 Scyphers et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2012; Ferrario et al., 2014; Cooper et al., 2016). Natural ecosystems,
31 when healthy, also have the ability to repair themselves after being damaged, which sets them apart from
32 coastal hardening and other human responses that require constant maintenance (Barbier, 2015; Elliff and
33 Silva, 2017). Recognizing and restoring coastal ecosystems in general may be more cost-effective than
34 human structures such as the installation of seawalls and coastal hardening, where natural adaptation
35 (ecosystem-based adaptation) is limited and the costs of creating and maintaining structures is generally
36 expensive (Temmerman et al., 2013; Mycoo, 2017).

37
38 Recent studies have increasingly stressed the need for coastal protection to be considered within the context
39 of new ways of managing coastal land, including protecting and ensuring that coastal ecosystems are able to
40 undergo shifts in their distribution and abundance (Clausen and Clausen, 2014; Martínez et al., 2014; Cui et
41 al., 2015; André et al., 2016; Mills et al., 2016)(André et al., 2016). Facilitating these changes will require
42 new tools in terms of legal and financial instruments, as well as integrated planning that involves not only
43 human communities and infrastructure, but also associated ecosystem responses and values (Bell, 2012;
44 Mills et al., 2016). In this regard, the interactions between climate change, sea level rise and coastal disasters
45 are being increasingly informed by models (Bosello and De Cian, 2014) with a widening appreciation of the
46 role of natural ecosystems as an alternative to hardened coastal structures (Cooper et al., 2016). Adaptation
47 options for tropical coral reef recreation include: (1) Protecting and improving biodiversity and ecological

- 1 function by minimizing the impact of non-climate change stresses (e.g. pollution, overfishing), (2) Ensuring
- 2 adequate levels of coastal protection by supporting and repairing ecosystems that protect coastal regions, (3)
- 3 ensuring fair and equitable access to the economic opportunities associated with recreational activities, and
- 4 (4) seeking and protecting supplies of water for tourism, industry, and agriculture alongside community
- 5 needs.
- 6

Risks for specific marine and coastal organisms, ecosystems and sectors

The key elements are presented here as a function of the risk level assessed between 1.5 and 2°C (Average global sea surface temperature).



7
8
9 **Figure 3.18:** : Summary of additional risks of impacts from ocean warming (and associated climate change factors such as ocean acidification) for a range of ocean organisms, ecosystem and sectors at 1.0°C, 1.5°C and 2.0°C
10 warming of average sea surface temperature (SST) relative to the preindustrial period. The dotted line
11 (0.87°C) is a measure of the extent of present day warming. Assessment of changing risk levels and
12 associated confidence were derived from the expert judgement of Gattuso et al., (2015) and the Lead
13 Authors of this Chapter plus the additional input was received from the many reviewers of the ocean
14 systems section of SR1.5. Note: (1) The analysis done here is not intended to be comprehensive. The
15 examples of organisms, ecosystems and sectors discussed here are intended to outline the evidence and
16 projection of impacts and the risks for ocean systems. (2) The evaluation of risks by experts did not
17 consider genetic adaptation, acclimatization, or human risk reduction strategies (mitigation and societal
18 adaptation). (3) As discussed elsewhere (3.3.10, 3.4.4.5, Box 3.4; Gattuso et al 2015), ocean acidification
19

1 is also having impacts on organisms and ecosystems as carbon dioxide increases in the atmosphere. These
 2 changes are part of the response reported here although partitioning the effects of the two drivers is
 3 difficult at this point in time and hence is not attempted. (4) Confidence levels (L=Low, M=Moderate,
 4 H=High, and VH=Very high) were assessed for the position of the transitions from one level of additional
 5 climate risk to the next successive level (Gattuso et al. (2015). Three transitions were possible: W-Y
 6 (white to yellow), Y-R (yellow to red), and R-P (red to purple), with the colours corresponding to the level
 7 of additional risk posed by climate change (see Figure 3.17). For each of the 13 Ocean ‘embers’, the
 8 levels of confidence for these transitions were assessed (based on level of agreement, extent of evidence)
 9 to be: Seagrasses (mid-latitude): W-Y (VH); Y-R (H); R-P(H); Mangroves: W-Y (M); Warm water
 10 corals: W-Y (H); Y-R (VH); R-P (VH); Pteropods (high latitude): W-Y (L); Y-R (M); R-P (H); Bivalves
 11 (mid-latitude): W-Y (H); Y-R (M); R-P (M), Krill (high latitude): W-Y (M); Y-R (L); R-P (L); Finfish:
 12 W-Y (H); Y-R (H); R-P (M); Open ocean carbon uptake: W-Y (H); Y-R (H); Coastal protection: W-Y
 13 (M); Y-R (L); R-P (L); Recreational services from coral reefs: W-Y (H); Y-R (M); R-P (M); Bivalve
 14 fisheries and aquaculture (mid-latitude): W-Y (H); Y-R (M); Fin fisheries (low latitude): W-Y (H); Y-R
 15 (M); R-P (H); and Fin fisheries (high latitude): W-Y (H); Y-R (H); R-P (L)

18 [START BOX 3.4 HERE]

19 **Box 3.4:** Tropical Coral Reefs in a 1.5°C Warmer World

20
 21 Tropical coral reefs face very high risks (Figure 3.19) of becoming unsustainable as coral dominated
 22 ecosystems if warming exceeds 1.5°C. A 1.5°C world is better for coral reefs than a 2°C world, in which
 23 coral reefs mostly disappear (Donner et al., 2005; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2014; Schleussner et al., 2016b;
 24 van Hoodonk et al., 2016; Frieler et al., 2017; Hughes et al., 2017a). Even with warming up until today
 25 (0.87°C; Chapter 1), a substantial proportion of coral reefs have experienced large scale mortalities that are
 26 causing them to rapidly contract (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2014). In the last 3 years alone, large coral reef
 27 systems such as the Great Barrier Reef (Australia) have lost as much as 50% of their shallow water corals
 28 (Hughes et al., 2017b).

29
 30 Coral dominated reefs are found between latitude 30°S and 30°N along coastlines where they provide habitat
 31 for over a million species (Reaka-Kudla, 1997). The food, income, coastal protection, cultural context, and
 32 many other services for millions of people along tropical coastal areas (Burke et al., 2011; Cinner et al.,
 33 2012; Kennedy et al., 2013; Pendleton et al., 2016) are underpinned by a mutualistic symbiosis between reef-
 34 building corals and dinoflagellates from the genus *Symbiodinium* (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2017). Tropical
 35 coral reefs are found down to depth of 150 m and are dependent on light, as distinct from the cold deep-
 36 water reef systems that extend down to depths of 2000 m or more. The difficulty in accessing deep-water
 37 reef systems also means that the literature on impacts of climate change is limited by comparison to tropical
 38 coral reefs (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2017). Consequently, this Box focuses on the impacts of climate change
 39 on tropical coral reefs, particularly with respect to their prospects under average global surface temperatures
 40 of 1.5°C and 2°C above the pre-industrial period.

41
 42 The distribution and abundance of coral reefs has decreased by approximately 50% over the past 30 years
 43 (Gardner et al., 2005; Bruno and Selig, 2007; De’ath et al., 2012) as a result of pollution, storms, overfishing
 44 and unsustainable coastal development (Burke et al., 2011; Halpern et al., 2015; Cheal et al., 2017). More
 45 recently, climate change (heat stress; Hoegh-Guldberg, 1999; Baker et al., 2008; Spalding and Brown, 2015;
 46 Hughes et al., 2017b) has emerged as the greatest threat to coral reefs with temperatures of just 1°C above
 47 the long-term summer maximum for an area (referenced to 1985-1993) over 4-6 weeks being enough to
 48 cause mass coral bleaching (loss of the symbiosis) and mortality (*very high confidence*, WGII AR5 Box 18-

2, Cramer et al., 2014). Ocean warming and acidification can also slow growth and calcification, making corals less competitive to other benthic organisms such as macroalgae (Dove et al., 2013; Reyes-Nivia et al., 2013, 2014). As corals disappear, so do fish stocks, and many other reef-dependent species, directly impacting industries such as tourism and fisheries, as well as coastal livelihoods for many, often disadvantaged, people (Wilson et al., 2006; Graham, 2014; Graham et al., 2015; Cinner et al., 2016)(Pendleton et al., 2016). These impacts are exacerbated by increasingly intense storms (Section 3.3.6), which physically destroy coral communities and hence reefs (Cheal et al., 2017), and by ocean acidification (Sections 3.3.10 and 3.4.4.5) which can weaken coral skeletons, contribute to disease, and slow the recovery of coral communities after mortality events (Gardner et al., 2005; Dove et al., 2013; Kennedy et al., 2013; Webster et al., 2013; Hoegh-Guldberg, 2014b; Anthony, 2016) (*medium agreement, limited evidence*). Ocean acidification also leads to greater activity by decalcifying organisms such as excavating sponges (Kline et al., 2012; Dove et al., 2013; Fang et al., 2013, 2014, Reyes-Nivia et al., 2013, 2014).

Predictions of back-to-back bleaching events (Hoegh-Guldberg, 1999) have become reality over 2015-2017 (e.g., Hughes et al., 2017b) as have projections of declining coral abundance (*high confidence*). Models have also become increasingly capable, and predict the large-scale loss of coral reefs by mid-century under even low emission scenarios (Hoegh-Guldberg, 1999; Donner et al., 2005; Donner, 2009; van Hooidonk and Huber, 2012; Frieler et al., 2013; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2014; van Hooidonk et al., 2016). Even achieving emission reduction goals consistent with the ambitious goal of 1.5°C under the Paris Agreement will result in the further loss of 90% of reef-building corals compared to today, with 99% of corals being lost under warming of 2°C or more above the pre-industrial period (Frieler et al., 2013; Hoegh-Guldberg, 2014b; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2014; Schleussner et al., 2016b; Hughes et al., 2017a).

The assumptions underpinning these assessments are considered to be highly conservative. In some hypothetical cases, ‘optimistic’ assumptions in models include the rapid thermal adaptation by corals (0.2-1.0°C per decade and 0.4°C per decade; (Donner et al., 2005; Schleussner et al., 2016b), respectively) as well as very rapid recovery rates from impacts (i.e., 5 years; Schleussner et al., 2016b). Adaptation to climate change at these high rates (if at all) has not been documented and rates of recovery from mass mortality tend to be much longer (> 15 years; Baker et al., 2008). Probability analysis also reveals that the underlying increases in sea temperatures that drive coral bleaching and mortality are 25% less likely under 1.5°C versus 2°C (King et al., 2017). Differences between rates of heating suggest the possibility of temporary climate refugia (Caldeira, 2013; van Hooidonk et al., 2013; Cacciapaglia and van Woesik, 2015; Keppel and Kavousi, 2015) which may play an important role in terms of the regeneration coral reefs, especially if these refuges are protected from non-climate change risks. Higher latitude sites are reporting the arrival of reef-building corals, which may deserve focus in terms of limited refugia and coral reef structures, which are likely to be low in biodiversity when compared to tropical reefs today (Kersting et al., 2017). Similar proposals have been made for the potential role of deep water (30 to 150 m) or mesophotic coral reefs (Bongaerts et al., 2010; Holstein et al., 2016) avoiding shallow water extremes (i.e. heat, storms) although the ability of these ecosystems to repopulate damaged shallow water areas may be limited (Bongaerts et al., 2017).

Given the sensitivity of corals to heat stress, even short periods of overshoot (i.e. decades) will be very challenging to coral reefs. Losing 90% of today's coral reefs, however, will remove resources and increase poverty levels across the world's tropical coastlines, highlighting the key issue of equity for the millions of people that depend on these valuable ecosystems (Spalding et al., 2014; Halpern et al., 2015). Anticipating these challenges to food and livelihoods for coastal communities will become increasingly important, and as will adaptation options such as the diversification of livelihoods and the development of new sustainable

1 industries to reduce the dependency of coastal communities on threatened coastal ecosystems such as coral
2 reefs (Cinner et al., 2012, 2016; Pendleton et al., 2016). At the same time, coastal communities will need to
3 pre-empt changes to other services provided by coral reefs such as coastal protection (Kennedy et al., 2013;
4 Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2014; Pörtner et al., 2014; Gattuso et al., 2015). Other threats and challenges to
5 coastal living such as sea level rise will amplify challenges from declining coral reefs. Given the scale and
6 cost of these interventions, implementing them earlier rather than later would be expedient.

7 **[END BOX 3.4 HERE]**
8
9

10 **3.4.5 Coastal and low-lying areas, and sea level rise**

11 Sea level rise (SLR) is accelerating in response to climate change (Section 3.3.9; Church et al., 2013) and is
12 producing significant impacts (*high agreement, robust evidence*). In this section, impacts and projections of
13 sea level rise are reported at global and city scales (Sections 3.4.5.1-3.4.5.2) and for coastal systems
14 (Sections 3.4.5.3 – 3.4.5.6). For some sectors, there is a lack of precise evidence of change at 1.5°C and 2°C.
15 Adaptation to sea level rise is discussed in Section 3.4.5.7.
16
17
18

19 **3.4.5.1 Global / sub-global scale**

20 Sea level rise (SLR) and other oceanic climate change will result in salinization, flooding and erosion and
21 affect human and ecological systems, including health, heritage, freshwater, biodiversity, agriculture,
22 fisheries and other services (*very high agreement, robust evidence*). Due to the commitment to SLR, there is
23 an overlapping uncertainty in projections (Schleussner et al., 2016b; Sanderson et al., 2017; Goodwin et al.,
24 2018; Mengel et al., 2018; Nicholls et al., 2018; Rasmussen et al., 2018) of about 0.1 m difference in Global
25 Mean Sea Level (GMSL) rise between 1.5°C and 2°C worlds in 2100 (Section 3.3.9, Table 3.3). Exposure
26 and impacts at 1.5°C and 2°C differ at different time horizons (Schleussner et al., 2016b; Brown et al.,
27 2018a, b; Nicholls et al., 2018; Rasmussen et al., 2018). However, these are distinct from higher rises in
28 temperature (e.g., 4°C or more as discussed in Brown et al., 2018a) over centennial scales. The benefits of
29 climate change mitigation reinforce findings of earlier IPCC reports (e.g., Wong et al., 2014).
30

31 Table 3.3 notes the land and people exposed to sea level rise (assuming there is no adaptation or protection at
32 all) using the Dynamic Interactive Vulnerability Assessment (DIVA) model (extracted from Brown et al.,
33 2018a) and Goodwin et al., 2018); Also see Supplementary Material 3.SM, Table 3.SM.4). Thus, even with
34 temperature stabilization, exposure increases. In contrast, land area exposed is projected to at least double by
35 2300 using a RCP8.5 scenario (Brown et al., 2018a). In the 21st century, land area exposed to sea level rise
36 (assuming there is no adaptation or protection at all) is at least an order of magnitude larger than the
37 cumulative land loss due to submergence (which takes into account defences) (Brown et al., 2016, 2018a)
38 regardless of sea level rise scenario. Slower rates of rise due to climate change mitigation may provide
39 greater opportunity for adaptation (*medium confidence*), which can substantially reduce impacts.
40

41 Agreeing with WGII AR5 Section 5.4.3.1 (Wong et al., 2014), climate change mitigation may reduce or
42 delay coastal impacts and exposure (*very high confidence, robust evidence*). Adaptation has the potential to
43 substantially reduce risk (Nicholls et al., 2007; Wong et al., 2014; Sections 5.5 and 5.4.3.1; Sections 6.4.2.3
44 and 6.6.). At 1.5°C in 2100, 31–69 million people world-wide could be exposed to flooding assuming no
45 adaptation or protection at all (and 2010 population values), compared with 32–79 million people at 2°C in
46 2100 (Rasmussen et al., 2018) (Supplementary Material 3.SM, Table 3.SM.4). As a result, up to 10.4 million
47 more people would be exposed to sea-level rise at 2°C compared with 1.5°C in 2100. With a 1.5°C

1 stabilization scenario in 2100, 55-94 million people / year are at risk from flooding increasing to 115-188
2 million people per year in 2300 (50th percentile, SSP1-5, no socio-economic change after 2100). This
3 assumes there is no upgrade to present protection levels (Nicholls et al., 2018). The number of people at risk
4 increases by approximately 18% using a 2°C scenario and 266% using a RCP8.5 scenario in 2300 (Nicholls
5 et al., 2018). Through prescribed IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) SLR scenarios, Arnell
6 et al. (2016) also found people flooded increased substantially after 2°C without further adaptation from
7 present protection levels, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century.

8
9 Coastal flooding by the sea is likely to cost thousands on billions of USD annually, with damage costs under
10 constant protection 0.3–5.0% of global GDP in 2100 for a RCP2.6 scenario (Hinkel et al., 2014). Risks are
11 projected to be highest in south and south-east Asia, assuming there is no upgrade to present protection
12 levels, for all temperatures of climate warming (Arnell et al., 2016; Brown et al., 2016) Countries where at
13 least 50 million people exposed to SLR (assuming no adaptation or protection at all) based on a 1,280 Pg C
14 emission scenario (approximately 1.5°C temperature rise above today’s level) include China, Bangladesh,
15 Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, United States and Vietnam (Clark et al., 2016). Rasmussen et al.
16 (2018) and Brown et al. (2018a) project similar countries at high exposure from SLR. Thus there is *high*
17 *confidence* that SLR will have significant impacts world-wide in this century and beyond.

18 19 20 3.4.5.2 Cities

21 Observations of the impacts of SLR are difficult to record due to multiple drivers of change in cities. Rather,
22 there are observations of ongoing or planned adaptation to SLR and extreme water levels, and this will
23 continue (Araos et al., 2016; Nicholls et al., 2018), whilst other cities are yet to prepare (see Section Cross-
24 chapter Box 4.1) (*high confidence, medium to robust evidence*). There are limited observations and analysis
25 of how cities will cope with higher and/or multi-centennial SLR, with the exception of Amsterdam, New
26 York and London (Nicholls et al., 2018).

27
28 Coastal urban areas are projected to see more extreme water levels due to rising sea levels which may lead to
29 increased flooding and damage of infrastructure from extreme events (unless adaptation is undertaken), plus
30 salinization of groundwater. These impacts may be enhanced through localized subsidence (Wong et al.,
31 2014) causing greater relative SLR. At least 136 mega cities (port cities with a population greater than 1
32 million in 2005) are at risk from flooding due to SLR (with magnitudes of rise possible under 1.5°C or 2°C
33 in the 21st century, as indicated in Section 3.3.9) unless further adaptation is undertaken (Hanson et al., 2011;
34 Hallegatte et al., 2013). Many of these cities are located in south and south-east Asia (Hallegatte et al., 2013;
35 Cazenave and Cozannet, 2014; Clark et al., 2016; Jevrejeva et al., 2016). Jevrejeva et al. (2016) report with
36 2°C of warming by 2040 (for RCP8.5), more than 90% of global coastlines will experience SLR greater than
37 0.2 m. However, for scenarios where 2°C is stabilized or occurs later in time, this figure is likely to differ
38 due to the commitment to SLR. Raising existing dikes helps to protect against SLR substantially reducing
39 risk (whilst acknowledging other forms of adaptation exist). By 2300, dike heights under an unmitigation
40 scenario (RCP8.5) could be more than 2 m higher (on average for 136 mega cities) than under climate
41 change mitigation scenarios at 1.5°C or 2°C (Nicholls et al., 2018). Thus, rising sea levels commits to long-
42 term adaptation in coastal cities. Thus, rising sea levels commits to long-term adaptation in coastal cities
43 (*high confidence*).

44 45 46 3.4.5.3 Small islands

47 Qualitative physical observations of SLR (and other stresses) include inundation of parts of low-lying

1 islands, land degradation due to saltwater intrusion in Kiribati and Tuvalu (Wairiu, 2017) and shoreline
2 change in French Polynesia (Yates et al., 2013), Tuvalu (Kench et al., 2015, 2018) and Hawaii (Romine et
3 al., 2013). Observations, models and other evidence indicate that unconstrained Pacific atolls have kept pace
4 with SLR with little reduction in size or experienced a net gain in land (Kench et al., 2015, 2018; McLean
5 and Kench, 2015; Beetham et al., 2017). Whilst islands are highly vulnerable to SLR (*high confidence*,
6 *robust evidence*), they are also reactive to change. Small islands are impacted by multiple climatic stressors,
7 with SLR being more important a stressor to some islands rather than others (Box 3.5, Section 3.4.10,
8 Section 4.3.5.6, Box 4.3, 5.2.1, 5.5.3.3, Box 5.3).

9
10 Observations of adaptation to multiple drivers of coastal change, including SLR, include retreat (migration),
11 accommodate and defend. Migration (internal and international) has always been important on small islands
12 (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012; Weir et al., 2017), with changing environmental and weather conditions (as a
13 planned adaptation strategy) just one factor in the choice to migrate (Campbell and Warrick, 2014) (Sections
14 3.4.10, 4.3.5.6 and 5.3.2). Whilst flooding may result in migration or relocation for example, Vunidogoloa,
15 Fiji, (McNamara and Des Combes, 2015; Gharbaoui and Blocher, 2016) or Soloman Islands (Albert et al.,
16 2017), in-situ adaptation may have been tried or preferred, for example stilted housing or raised floors in
17 Tubigon, Bohol, Philippines (Jamero et al., 2017), raised roads and floors in Batasan and Ubay, Phillipines
18 (Jamero et al., 2018) raised platforms for faluw in Leang, Federated States of Micronesia (Nunn et al., 2017).
19 Protective features, such as seawalls or beach nourishment are observed to locally reduce erosion and flood
20 risk, but can have other adverse implcations (Sovacool, 2012; Mycoo, 2014, 2017; Nurse et al., 2014;
21 Section 29.6.22).

22
23 There is a lack of precise, quantitative studies of projected impacts of SLR at 1.5°C and 2°C. Small islands
24 are projected to be at risk and very sensitive to coastal climate change and other stressors (*high agreement*,
25 *robust evidence*) (Nurse et al., 2014; Benjamin and Thomas, 2016; Ourbak and Magnan, 2017; Brown et al.,
26 2018a; Nicholls et al., 2018; Rasmussen et al., 2018; Section 29.3 and 29.4), such as oceanic warming, SLR
27 (resulting in salinization, flooding and erosion), cyclones and mass coral bleaching and mortality (Section
28 3.4.4, Box 3.4, Box 3.5). These can have significant socio-economic and ecological implications, such as on
29 health, agriculture and water resources, which have impacts for livelihoods (Sovacool, 2012; Mycoo, 2014,
30 2017; Nurse et al., 2014). Combinations of drivers causing adverse impacts are important: Storlazzi et al.
31 (2018) found that the impacts of SLR and wave-induced flooding (within a temperature horizon equivalent
32 of 1.5°C) could affect freshwater availability on Roi-Namur, Marshall Islands, but is also dependent on other
33 extreme weather events, such as temperature. Freshwater may also be affected by a 0.40 m rise in sea-level
34 (which may be experienced with a 1.5°C warming) in other Pacific atolls (Terry and Chui, 2012). Whilst
35 SLR is a major hazard for atolls, islands of higher elevation are also threatened given there is often a lot of
36 infrastructure located near to the coast (Kumar and Taylor, 2015; Nicholls et al., 2018). Tens of thousands of
37 people on small islands are exposed to SLR (Rasmussen et al., 2018). Giardino et al. (2018) found that hard
38 defence structures on the island of Ebeye in the Marshall Islands, were effective for longer time periods at
39 the sea level rise associated with 1.5°C and 2°C. In Jamacia and St Lucia, SLR and extreme sea levels
40 threaten transport system infrastructure at 1.5°C unless further adaptation is undertaken (Monioudi et al.,
41 2018). Slower rates of SLR will provide greater opportunity for adaptation to be successful (*medium*
42 *agreement*), but will not reduce it substantially enough on islands of the lowest elevation. Migration and/or
43 relocation may be an adaptation option (Section 3.4.10). Thomas and Benjamin (2017) highlight three areas
44 of concern in the context of loss and damage at 1.5°C: a lack of data, gaps in financial assessments, and a
45 lack of targeted policies or mechanisms to address this (Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5). Small islands
46 remain vulnerable to SLR (*high confidence*).

3.4.5.4 Deltas and estuaries

Observations of SLR and human influence are felt through salinization leading to mixing in deltas and estuaries, aquifers, flooding (also enhanced by precipitation and river discharge), erosion land degradation, threatening freshwater sources and posing risks to ecosystems and human systems (Wong et al., 2014; Section 5.4). For instance, in the Delaware River Estuary on the USA east coast, upward trends of streamflow adjusted salinity (measured since the 1900s) accounting for the effects of streamflow and seasonal variations have been detected with SLR a potential cause (Ross et al., 2015).

Z. Yang et al. (2015) found that USA future climate scenarios (A1B 1.6°C and B1 2°C in the 2040s) had a greater effect on salinity intrusion than future land use/land cover change in the Snohomish River estuary, Washington state (USA). This resulted in a shift in the salinity both upstream and downstream in low flow conditions. Projecting impacts in deltas needs an understanding of both fluvial discharge and SLR, making projections complex as the drivers operate on different time and spatial scales (Zaman et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2018b) The mean annual flood depth when 1.5°C is first projected to be reached in the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta may be less than the most extreme annual flood depth seen today, taking account of SLR, plus surges, tides, bathymetry and local river flows (Brown et al., 2018b). Furthermore increased river salinity and saline intrusion in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna is likely with 2°C of warming (Zaman et al., 2017). Salinisation could impact agriculture and food security (Cross-Chapter Box 6). For 1.5°C or 2°C stabilization conditions in 2200, or 2300 plus surges, a minimum of 44% of the the Bangladesh Ganges-Brahmaputra, Indian Bengal, Indian Mahanadi and Ghanese Volta deltas land area (without defences) would be exposed unless sedimentation occurs (Brown et al., 2018b). Other deltas are similarly vulnerable. SLR is one factor affecting deltas, and assessment of numerous geophysical and anthropogenic drivers of geomorphic change is important (Tessler et al., 2018). For example, dike building to reduce flooding and dam building (Gupta et al., 2012) restricts sediment movement and deposition leading to enhanced subsidence, which can occur at a greater rate than SLR (Auerbach et al., 2015; Takagi et al., 2016). Although dikes remain essential to reduce flood risk today, promoting sedimentation is an advisable strategy (Brown et al., 2018b) which may involve nature-based solutions. Transformative decisions regarding the extent of sediment restrictive infrastructure may need to be considered over centennial scales (Brown et al., 2018b). Thus in a 1.5°C or 2°C world, deltas, which are home to millions of people, are highly threatened from SLR and localised subsidence today, and over long time scales (*high confidence, medium evidence*).

3.4.5.5 Wetlands

Observations indicate that wetlands, such as saltmarshes and mangrove forests are disrupted by changing conditions (Wong et al., 2014; Lovelock et al., 2015; Section 5.4.2.4; Section 3.4.4.8), such as total water levels and sediment availability. For example, observations indicated that saltmarshes in Connecticut and New York measured from 1900 to 2012, have accreted with SLR, but have lost marsh surface relative to tidal datums, leading to increased marsh flooding and further accretion (Hill and Anisfeld, 2015). This stimulated marsh carbon storage, and aided climate change mitigation.

Salinisation may lead to shifts in wetland communities and their ecosystems functions, affecting freshwater wetlands (Herbert et al., 2015). Some projections of wetland change, with magnitudes (but not necessarily rates or timing) of SLR analogous at 1.5°C and 2°C, indicate a net loss (e.g., Cui et al., 2015 with a 2.6 mm yr⁻¹ rise (aligning with AR5) in the Yangtze Estuary; Blankespoor et al., 2014) 1 m rise in multiple countries; Arnell et al. (2016) using an A1 SRES scenario of up to 0.48 m by 2050 on a global scale; drowning of 60% of marshes studied world-wide (with a rate of sea-level rise of 4.4 mm yr⁻¹) by 2100 (Crosby et al., 2016), whilst others report a net gain with wetland transgression ((Raabe and Stumpf, 2016) in the Gulf of Mexico).

1 However, the feedback between wetlands and sea level is complex, with parameters such as lack of
2 accommodation space restricting inland migration, or sediment supply and feedback between plant growth
3 and geomorphology (Kirwan and Megonigal, 2013; Ellison, 2014; Martínez et al., 2014; Spencer et al.,
4 2016) still being explored. Reducing global warming from 2°C to 1.5°C will deliver long-term benefits from
5 lower SLR, allowing natural sedimentation rates to more likely keep up with SLR. It remains unclear how
6 wetlands will respond and under what conditions (including other climate parameters) with a rise in 1.5°C
7 and 2°C, simultaneously recognising they have great potential for adaptation and climate change mitigation
8 (*medium confidence, medium evidence*) (Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.3).
9

10 3.4.5.6 Other coastal settings

11 Numerous impacts have not been quantified at 1.5°C or 2°C but remain important. This includes systems
12 identified in WGII AR5 (Wong et al., 2014; Section 5.4), such as beaches, barriers, sand dunes, rocky coasts,
13 aquifers, lagoons and ecosystems (for the latter, see Section 3.4.4.12). For example, SLR effects erosion and
14 accretion, and therefore sediment movement, instigating shoreline change (Wong et al., 2014; Section
15 5.4.2.1) which could affect land-based ecosystems. Global observations indicate no overall clear effect of
16 SLR on shoreline change (Le Cozannet et al. (2014) as it is highly site specific (e.g., Romine et al. 2013)
17 Infrastructure or geological constraints reduces shoreline movement causing coastal squeeze (e.g. in Japan,
18 beach losses due to SLR are projected with a RCP2.6 scenario, and are projected to increase under RCP8.5
19 (Udo and Takeda, 2017)). Compound flooding (the combined risk of flooding from multiple drivers) has
20 increased significantly over the past century in major coastal cities (Wahl et al., 2015) and is likely to
21 increase with further development and SLR at 1.5°C and 2°C unless adaptation is undertaken. Thus SLR rise
22 will have a wide range of adverse effects on coastal zones (*medium confidence*).
23
24
25

26 3.4.5.7 Adapting to coastal change

27 Adaptation to coastal change from SLR and other drivers is occurring today (*high agreement, robust*
28 *evidence*, see Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4) including migration, ecosystem-based adaptation, raising
29 infrastructure and defences, salt-tolerant food production, early warning systems, insurance and education
30 (Wong et al., 2014; Section 5.4.2.1). Climate change mitigation will reduce the rate of SLR this century,
31 decreasing the need for extensive, and in places, immediate adaptation. Adaptation will reduce impacts in
32 human settings (Hinkel et al., 2014; Wong et al., 2014) (*high agreement, robust evidence*), although there is
33 less certainty for ecosystems (Sections 4.3.2, 4.3.3.3). While some ecosystems (e.g., mangroves) may be able
34 to move shoreward as sea levels increase, coastal development (e.g., coastal building, seawalls, and
35 agriculture) often interrupt these transitions (Saunders et al., 2014). Options for responding to these
36 challenges include reducing the impact of other stresses such as those arising from tourism, fishing, coastal
37 development, and unsustainable aquaculture/agriculture. In some cases, restoration of coastal habitats and
38 ecosystems can be a cost-effective way of responding to changes arising from increasing levels of exposure
39 from rising sea levels, intensifying storms, coastal inundation and salinization communities (Arkema et al.,
40 2013; Temmerman et al., 2013; Ferrario et al., 2014; Hinkel et al., 2014; Spalding et al., 2014; Elliff and
41 Silva, 2017).
42

43 Since the AR5, planned and autonomous adaptation and forward planning has become more wide-spread
44 (Araos et al., 2016; Nicholls et al., 2018), but continued efforts are required as many localities are in the
45 early stages of adapting or not adapting at all (Araos et al., 2016) (See Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4).
46 This is regional and sub-sectoral specific, and also linked to non-climatic factors (Ford et al., 2015);
47

1 Lesnikowski et al., 2015; Araos et al., 2016). Adaptation pathways (e.g., Ranger et al., 2013; Barnett et al.,
 2 2014; Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2014; Buurman and Babovic, 2016) assist long-term thinking, but are not
 3 widespread practice despite knowledge of long-term risk (Section 4.2.2). Furthermore, retreat and human
 4 migration have increasingly being considered as a management response (Hauer et al., 2016; Geisler and
 5 Currens, 2017), with a growing emphasis on green adaptation. There are few studies on the adaptation limits
 6 to SLR where transformation change may be required (Wong et al., 2014, Section 5.5.8; Nicholls et al. 2015;
 7 Section 4.2.2.3). SLR poses a long-term threat (Section 3.3.9), even with 1.5°C and 2°C of warming
 8 centennial scale adaptation remains essential (*high confidence, robust evidence*).

11 **Table 3.3:** Land and people exposed to sea level rise (SLR, assuming no protection at all). Extracted from (Brown et
 12 al., 2018a; Goodwin et al., 2018). SSP: Shared Socioeconomic Pathway, wrt: with respect to
 13

Climate scenario	Impact factor, assuming there is no adaptation or protection at all (50 th , [5 th -95 th percentiles])	Year			
		2050	2100	2200	2300
1.5°C	Temperature rise wrt 1850–1900 (°C)	1.71 (1.44-2.16)	1.60 (1.26-2.33)	1.41 (1.15-2.10)	1.32 (1.12-1.81)
	SLR (m) wrt 1986-2005	0.20 (0.14-0.29)	0.40 (0.26-0.62)	0.73 (0.47-1.25)	1.00 (0.59-1.55)
	Land exposed (x10 ³ km ²)	574 [558-597]	620 [575-669]	666 [595-772]	702 [666-853]
	People exposed, SSP1-5 (millions)	127.9-139.0 [123.4-134.0, 134.5-146.4]	102.7-153.5 [94.8-140.7, 102.7-153.5]	--	133.8-207.1 [112.3-169.6, 165.2 - 263.4]*
2°C	Temperature rise wrt 1850–1900 (°C)	1.76 (1.51-2.16)	2.03 (1.72-2.64)	1.90 (1.66-2.57)	1.80 (1.60-2.20)
	SLR (m) wrt 1986-2005	0.20 (0.14-0.29)	0.46 (0.30-0.69)	0.90 (0.58-1.50)	1.26 (0.74-1.90)
	Land exposed (10 ³ km ²)	575 [558-598]	637 [585-686]	705 [618-827]	767 [642-937]
	People exposed, SSP1-5 (millions)	128.1-139.2 [123.6-134.2, 134.7-146.6]	105.5-158.1 [97.0-144.1, 118.1-179.0]	--	148.3 - 233.0 [120.3-183.4, 186.4-301.8]*

*Population is held static after 2300.

14 [START BOX 3.5 HERE]

15 **Box 3.5:** Small Island Developing States (SIDS)

16 1.5°C warming is expected to prove a challenging state for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) that are
 17 already experiencing impacts associated with climate change. At 1.5°C, compounding impacts from
 18 interactions between climate drivers may contribute to loss of, or change in, critical natural and human
 19 systems (*high agreement, medium evidence*). There are a number of reduced risks at 1.5°C versus 2°C,
 20 particularly when coupled with adaptation efforts (*high agreement, medium evidence*).

21 **Changing climate hazards for SIDS at 1.5°C**

1
2 Mean surface temperature is projected to increase in SIDS at 1.5°C (*high agreement, robust evidence*). The
3 Caribbean region will experience 0.5°C–1.5°C warming compared to 1971–2000 baseline, with greatest
4 warming over larger land masses (Taylor et al., 2018). Under the Representative Concentration Pathway
5 (RCP)2.6 scenario, the western tropical Pacific is projected to experience warming of 0.5°C–1.7°C relative
6 to 1961–1990. Extreme temperatures will also increase, with potential for elevated impacts as a result of
7 comparably small natural variability (Reyer et al., 2017a). Compared to the 1971–2000 baseline, up to 50%
8 of the year are projected to be under warm spell conditions in the Caribbean at 1.5°C with a further increase
9 by up to 70 days at 2°C (Taylor et al., 2018).

10
11 Changes in precipitation patterns, freshwater availability and drought sensitivity differ between small island
12 regions (*high agreement, medium evidence*). Some western Pacific and the northern Indian Ocean islands
13 may see increased freshwater availability, while islands in most other regions are projected to see a
14 substantial decline (Holding et al., 2016; Karnauskas et al., 2016). For several SIDS, approximately 25% of
15 the overall freshwater stress projected under 2°C at 2030 can be avoided by limiting global warming to
16 1.5°C (Karnauskas et al., 2018). In accordance with an overall drying trend, an increasing drought risk is
17 projected for Caribbean SIDS (Lehner et al., 2017) and moderate to extreme drought conditions are projected
18 to be about 9% longer on average for 2°C versus 1.5°C for islands in this region (Taylor et al., 2018).

19
20 Projected changes in the ocean system at higher warming targets (Section 3.4.4), including potential changes
21 in circulation (Section 3.3.7) and increases in both surface temperatures (Section 3.3.7) and ocean
22 acidification (Section 3.3.10) suggest steadily increasing risks for SIDS associated with warming levels close
23 to and exceeding 1.5°C.

24
25 Differences in global sea level between 1.5°C and 2°C depend on the time scale considered and will fully
26 materialize only after 2100 (Section 3.3.9). Projected changes in regional sea level are similarly time
27 dependent, but generally found to be above global average for tropical regions including small islands (Kopp
28 et al., 2014; Jevrejeva et al., 2016). Sea level related threats for SIDS, for example, from salinisation,
29 flooding, permanent inundation, erosion and pressure on ecosystems, will therefore persist well beyond the
30 21st century even under 1.5°C warming (Section 3.4.5.3; Nicholls et al., 2018). Prolonged interannual sea
31 level inundations may increase throughout the tropical Pacific with ongoing warming and in the advent of
32 increased frequency of extreme La Niña events, exacerbate coastal impacts of projected global mean Sea
33 Level Rise (SLR; Widlansky et al., 2015). Changes to frequency of extreme El Niño and La Niña events may
34 also increase the frequency of droughts and floods in South Pacific islands (Cai et al., 2012; Box 4.2; Section
35 3.5.2)

36
37 Extreme precipitation in small island regions is often linked to tropical storms and contributes to the climate
38 hazard (Khouakhi et al., 2017). Similarly, extreme sea levels for small islands, particularly in the Caribbean,
39 are linked to tropical cyclone occurrence (Khouakhi and Villarini, 2017). Under a 1.5°C stabilization
40 scenario, there is a projected decrease in the frequency of weaker tropical storms and an increase in the
41 number of intense cyclones (Section 3.3.6, Wehner et al., 2017). There are insufficient studies to assess
42 differences in tropical cyclone statistics for 1.5°C versus 2°C (Section 3.3.6). There are considerable
43 differences in the adaptation responses to tropical cyclones across SIDS (Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter
44 4).

45 46 **Impacts on key natural and human systems**

47

1 Projected increases in aridity and decreases in freshwater availability at 1.5°C, along with additional risks
2 from SLR and increased wave-induced run-up, might leave several atoll islands uninhabitable (Storlazzi et
3 al., 2015; Gosling and Arnell, 2016). Changes in availability and quality of freshwater linked to a
4 combination of changes to climate drivers may adversely impact SIDS' economies (White and Falkland,
5 2010; Terry and Chui, 2012; Holding and Allen, 2015; Donk et al., 2018). Growth-rate projections based on
6 temperature impacts alone indicate robust negative impacts on GDP per capita growth for SIDS (Petris et al.,
7 2018, Section 3.4.7.1, Section 3.4.9.1, Section 3.5.4.9). These impacts are reduced considerably under 1.5°C
8 but may be increased by escalating risks from climate related extreme weather events and SLR (Section
9 3.4.5.3, Section 3.4.9.4, Section 3.5.3)

10
11 Marine systems and associated livelihoods in SIDS face higher risks at 2°C as compared to 1.5°C (*high*
12 *agreement, medium evidence*). Mass coral bleaching and mortality are projected to increase due to
13 interactions between rising ocean temperatures, ocean acidification, and destructive waves from intensifying
14 storms (Section 3.4.4, Box 3.4, Section 5.2.3). At 1.5°C, approximately 70–90% of global coral reefs are
15 projected to be at risk of long-term degradation due to coral bleaching, increasing to 99% at 2°C
16 (Schleussner et al., 2016b). Warmer temperatures are also related to an increase in coral disease
17 development, leading to coral degradation (Maynard et al., 2015). For marine fisheries, limiting warming to
18 1.5°C decreases the risk of species extinction and declines in maximum catch potential, particularly for small
19 islands in tropical oceans (Cheung et al., 2016a).

20
21 Long term risks of coastal flooding and impacts on population, infrastructure and assets are projected to
22 increase with higher levels of warming (*high agreement, robust evidence*). Tropical regions including small
23 islands are expected to experience the largest increases in coastal flooding frequency with the frequency of
24 extreme water-level events in small islands projected to double by 2050 (Vitousek et al., 2017). Wave driven
25 coastal flooding risks for reef-lined islands may increase as a result of coral reef degradation and SLR
26 (Quataert et al., 2015). Exposure to coastal hazards is particularly high for SIDS, with a significant share of
27 population, infrastructure and assets at risk (Scott et al., 2012; Kumar and Taylor, 2015; Rhiney, 2015; Byers
28 et al., 2018; Section 3.4.9, Section 3.4.5.3). Limiting warming to 1.5°C instead of 2°C spares the inundation
29 of lands currently home to 60,000 individuals in SIDS by 2150 (Rasmussen et al., 2018). However, such
30 estimates do not take into account shoreline response (Section 3.4.5) or adaptation.

31
32 Risks of impacts across sectors are higher at 1.5°C as compared to the present, and will further increase at
33 2°C (*high agreement, medium evidence*). Projections indicate that at 1.5°C there will be increased incidents
34 of internal migration and displacement (Albert et al., 2017, Sections 3.5.5, 4.3.6, 5.2.2), limited capacity to
35 assess loss and damage (Thomas and Benjamin, 2017) and substantial increases in risk to critical
36 transportation infrastructure from marine inundation (Monioudi et al., 2018). The difference between 1.5°C
37 and 2°C might exceed limits for normal thermoregulation of livestock animals and result in persistent heat
38 stress for livestock animals in SIDS (Lallo et al., 2018).

39
40 At 1.5C limits to adaptation will be reached for several key impacts in SIDS resulting in residual impacts and
41 loss and damage (Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, Section 1.1.1). There are a number of reduced risks
42 when limiting temperature increase to 1.5°C versus 2°C, particularly when coupled with adaptation efforts
43 that take into account sustainable development (Mycos, 2017; Thomas and Benjamin, 2017; Section 3.4.2,
44 Box 4.3, Section 5.6.3.1, Box 5.3). Region-specific pathways for SIDS exist to address climate change
45 (Section 5.6.3.1, Box 5.3, Box 4.6, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4).

46 **[END BOX 3.5 HERE]**

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3.4.6 Food, nutrition security and food production systems (including fisheries and aquaculture)

3.4.6.1 Crop production

Quantifying the observed impacts of climate change for food security and food production systems requires assumptions about the many non-climate variables that interact with climate change variables. Implementing specific strategies can partly or greatly alleviate the climate change impacts on these systems (Wei et al., 2017), whilst the degree of compensation is mainly dependent on geographical area and crop type (Rose et al., 2016). Despite these issues, recent studies confirm that observed climate changes have already affected crop suitability in many areas, resulting in changes in the production levels of the main agricultural crops. These impacts are evident in many areas of the world ranging from Asia (C. Chen et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2015; He and Zhou, 2016) to America (Cho and McCarl, 2017) and Europe (Ramirez-Cabral et al., 2016), particularly affecting typical local crops cultivated in specific climate conditions (e.g., Mediterranean crops like olive and grapevine, (Moriondo et al., 2013a, b).

Temperature and precipitation trends have reduced crop production and yields, with the most negative impacts on wheat and maize (Lobell et al., 2011), whilst the effects on rice and soybean yields are less clear and may be positive or negative (Kim et al., 2013; van Oort and Zwart, 2018). Warming has resulted in positive effects on crop yield in some high-latitude areas (Jaggard et al., 2007; Supit et al., 2010; Gregory and Marshall, 2012; C. Chen et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2015; He and Zhou, 2016; Daliakopoulos et al., 2017), also suggesting the possibility of more than one harvest per year (B. Chen et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2015). Climate variability was found to explain more than 60% of the of maize, rice, wheat and soybean yield variations in the main global breadbaskets areas (Ray et al., 2015), with variation in the percentage according to crop type and scale (Moore and Lobell, 2015; Kent et al., 2017). Climate trends explain also change in the lengthening of the growing season, where greater modifications were found in the northern latitude areas (Qian et al., 2010; Mueller et al., 2015).

The rise in tropospheric ozone has already reduced yields of wheat, rice, maize, and soybean ranging from 3% to 16% globally (Van Dingenen et al., 2009). Some studies found that increases in atmospheric CO₂ concentrations would be expected to increase yields by enhancing radiation and water use efficiencies (Elliott et al., 2014; Durand et al., 2017). In open-top chamber experiments at elevated CO₂ and 1.5°C warming, maize and potato yields were observed to increase by 45.7% and 11%, respectively (Singh et al. 2013; Abebe et al., 2016). However, observations of actual crop yield trends indicate that reductions as a result of climate change remain more common than crop yield increases, despite increased atmospheric CO₂ concentration (Porter et al., 2014). For instance, McGrath and Lobell (2013) indicated that production stimulation at increased atmospheric CO₂ concentration was mostly driven by differences in climate and crop species, whilst yield variability due to elevated CO₂ was only about 50–70% of the variability due to climate. However, importantly, the faster growth rates induced by elevated CO₂ often coincided with lower protein values in several important C3 cereal grains (Myers et al., 2014) although perhaps not always for C4 grains such as sorghum under drought conditions (De Souza et al., 2015). Elevated CO₂ concentrations of 568–590 ppm alone (a range that corresponds approximately to RCP6 in the 2080s and hence a warming of 2.3–3.3°C (van Vuuren et al., 2011a, WGI Table 12.2) alone reduced the protein, micronutrient, and B vitamin content of the 18 rice cultivars grown most widely grown in southeast Asia, where it is a staple food source, by an amount sufficient to create nutritional-related health risks for 600 million people (Zhu *et al.* 2018). Overall, the effects of increased CO₂ concentration alone during the 21st century are therefore expected to have a negative impact on global food security (*medium confidence*).

1
2 Crop yields in the future will also be affected by projected changes in temperature and precipitation. Studies
3 of major cereals showed that maize and wheat yields begin to decline with 1°C–2°C of local warming and
4 under nitrogen stress conditions at low latitudes (Porter et al., 2014; Rosenzweig et al., 2014) (*high*
5 *confidence*). A few studies since the AR5 have focused on the impacts on cropping systems for scenarios
6 where global mean temperatures increase within 1.5°C. (Schleussner et al., 2016b) projected that
7 constraining warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C would avoid significant risks of tropical crop yield declines in
8 West Africa, South East Asia, and Central and South America. Ricke et al. (2015) highlighted that cropland
9 stability declines rapidly between 1°C and 3°C warming, whilst Bassu et al. (2014) suggested that an increase
10 of air temperature negatively influence the modeled maize yield response of -0.5 t ha^{-1} per degree Celsius,
11 as also reported by Challinor et al. (2014) for tropical regions. Niang et al. (2014) projected significantly
12 lower risks to crop productivity in Africa at 1.5°C compared to 2°C warming. Lana et al. (2017) indicated
13 that the impact of temperature increases on crop failure of maize hybrids was much greater as temperatures
14 increase to +2°C compared to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). J. Huang et al. (2017) found that limiting warming at
15 +1.5 °C compared to +2°C, maize yield losses would be reduced over drylands. Although Rosenzweig et al.
16 (2017, 2018) did not find a clear distinction between yield declines or increases in some breadbasket regions
17 between the two temperature levels, these studies generally did find declines in breadbasket regions when the
18 effects of CO₂ fertilization were excluded. Iizumi et al. (2017) found lower maize and soybean yields
19 reduction at +1.5°C than at +2°C, higher rice production at +2°C than at +1.5°C warming and no clear
20 differences for wheat at global mean basis. These results were largely consistent with other studies (Faye et
21 al., 2018; Ruane et al., 2018). In the western Sahel and southern Africa, moving from 1.5°C to 2°C warming
22 was projected to result in further reduction of maize, sorghum and cocoa cropping areas suitability as well as
23 yield losses especially for C3, only partially compensated by rainfall change (Läderach et al., 2013; World
24 Bank, 2013; Sultan and Gaetani, 2016).

25
26 Some studies found a significant reduction in global production of wheat rice, maize, and soybean of $6.0 \pm$
27 2.9% , $3.2 \pm 3.7\%$, $7.4 \pm 4.5\%$ and 3.1% , respectively, for each degree Celsius increase in global mean
28 temperature (Asseng et al. 2015; C. Zhao et al., 2017). Similarly, Li et al. (2017) indicated a significant
29 reduction in rice yields by about 10.3% in the greater Mekong sub-region (*medium confidence*). Large rice and
30 maize yield losses are to be expected in China due to climate extremes (Wei et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2017)
31 (*medium confidence*).

32
33 Crop production is also negatively affected also by a factor generally excluded from the aforementioned
34 studies, that is the increase in both direct and indirect climate extremes. Direct extremes include changes in
35 rainfall extremes (Rosenzweig et al., 2014), increases in hot nights (Welch et al., 2010; Okada et al., 2011));
36 extremely high daytime temperature (Schlenker and Roberts, 2009; Jiao et al., 2016, Lesk et al., 2016);
37 drought (Jiao et al., 2016; Lesk et al., 2016), heat stress (Deryng et al., 2014, Betts et al., 2018), flood (Betts
38 et al., 2018; Byers et al., 2018), chilling damage, (Jiao et al., 2016), while indirect effects include the spread
39 of pest and diseases (van Bruggen et al., 2015, Jiao et al., 2014), which can also have detrimental effects on
40 cropping systems.

41
42 Taken together, the findings of studies on the effects of changes in temperature, precipitation, changes in
43 CO₂ concentration and extreme weather events indicate that a global warming of 2°C is projected to result in
44 a greater reduction in global crop yields and global nutrition than a global warming of 1.5°C (*high*
45 *confidence*, Section 3.6).

46

1 3.4.6.2 Livestock production

2 Studies of climate change impacts on livestock production are few in number. Climate change is expected to
3 directly affect yield quantity and quality (Notenbaert et al., 2017), beside indirectly impacting the livestock
4 sector through feed quality changes and spread of pests and diseases (Kipling et al., 2016) (*high confidence*).
5 Increased warming and its extremes are expected to cause changes in physiological processes in livestock
6 (i.e., thermal distress, sweating and high respiratory rates) (Mortola and Frappell, 2000) and to have
7 detrimental effects on animal feeding, growth rates (André et al., 2011; Renaudeau et al., 2011; Collier and
8 Gebremedhin, 2015) and reproduction (De Rensis et al., 2015). Wall et al. (2010) observed reduced milk
9 yields and increased cow mortality as the impact of heat stress on dairy cow production over some UK
10 regions, whilst reduction in water supply might increase cattle water demand (Masike and Urich, 2008).
11 Generally, heat stress can be responsible for domestic animal mortality increase and economic losses (Vitali
12 et al., 2009), affecting a wide range of reproductive parameters (e.g., embryonic development and
13 reproductive efficiency in pigs, Barati et al., 2008; ovarian follicle development and ovulation in horses,
14 Mortensen et al., 2009).

15
16 Much attention has also been dedicated to ruminant diseases (e.g., liver fluke, Fox et al., 2011; blue-tongue
17 virus, Guis et al., 2012; Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD), Brito et al. (2017); or zoonotic diseases, Njeru et
18 al., 2016; Simulundu et al., 2017).

19
20 Future climate change impacts on livestock are expected to increase. In temperate climates, warming is
21 expected to lengthen forage growing season but decrease forage quality, with important variations due to
22 rainfall changes (Craine et al., 2010; Hatfield et al., 2011; Izaurralde et al., 2011). Similar studies confirmed
23 decrease in forage quality both for natural grassland in France (Graux et al., 2013) and sown pastures in
24 Australia (Perring et al., 2010). Water resources availability for livestock are expected to decrease due to
25 increased runoff and reduced groundwater resource. Increased temperature will likely induce changes in
26 river discharge and basins water amount, leading human and livestock populations to experience water stress
27 especially over the driest areas (Palmer et al., 2008) (i.e., sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia) (*medium*
28 *confidence*). Elevated temperatures are also expected to increase methane production (M.A. Lee et al., 2017;
29 Knapp et al., 2014). Globally, a decline in livestock of more 7.5-9.6% is expected at about 2°C warming,
30 with associated economic losses of between \$9.7 and \$12.6 billion (Boone et al., 2017).

31 32 33 3.4.6.3 Fisheries and aquaculture production

34 Global fisheries and aquaculture contribute a total of 88.6 and 59.8 million tons from capture and
35 aquaculture (FAO, 2016), playing an important role in food security of a large number of countries
36 (McClanahan et al., 2015; Pauly and Charles, 2015) and resulting essential to meet the protein demand of a
37 growing global population (Cinner et al., 2012, 2016; FAO, 2016; Pendleton et al., 2016). A steady increase
38 in the risks associated with bivalve fisheries and aquaculture at mid-latitude is coincident with increases in
39 temperature, ocean acidification, introduced species, disease and other drivers (Lacoue-Labarthe et al., 2016;
40 Clements et al., 2017; Clements and Chopin, 2017; Parker et al., 2017). Sea level rise and storm
41 intensification pose a risk to hatcheries and other infrastructure (Callaway et al., 2012; Weatherdon et al.,
42 2016), whilst others risks are associated with the invasion of parasites and pathogens (Asplund et al., 2014;
43 Castillo et al., 2017). Human actions have reduced the risks from these factors which are expected to be
44 more likely moderated under RCP2.6 and very high under RCP8.5 (Gattuso et al., 2015). The climate related
45 risks for fin fish (Section 3.4.4) are producing a number of challenges for small scale fisheries (e.g.,
46 (Kittinger, 2013; Pauly and Charles, 2015; Bell et al., 2017). Recent literature (2015–2017) described
47 growing threats from the rapid shifts in the biogeography of key species (Poloczanska et al., 2013, 2016;

1 Burrows et al., 2014; García Molinos et al., 2015) and the ongoing rapid degradation of key ecosystems such
2 as coral reefs, seagrass and mangroves (Section 3.4.4; Box 3.4). The acceleration of these changes, coupled
3 with non-climate stresses (e.g., pollution, overfishing, unsustainable coastal development), drive many
4 small-scale fisheries well below the sustainable harvesting levels required to maintain these resources as a
5 source of food (McClanahan et al., 2009, 2015; Cheung et al., 2010; Pendleton et al., 2016). As a result,
6 projections of climate change and the growth in human population increasingly project scenarios that include
7 shortages of fish protein for many regions (e.g., Pacific Ocean, Bell et al., 2013; 2017); Indian Ocean, for
8 example, (McClanahan et al., 2015). Mitigation of these risks involves marine spatial planning, fisheries
9 repair, sustainable aquaculture, and the development of alternative livelihoods (Kittinger, 2013; McClanahan
10 et al., 2015; Song and Chuenpagdee, 2015; Weatherdon et al., 2016). Other threats concern the increasing
11 incidence of alien species and diseases (Kittinger et al., 2013; Weatherdon et al., 2016).

12
13 Risks of climate change related impacts on low latitude fin fisheries are low today, but are expected to reach
14 very high levels under all RCPs especially at low latitudes (*high confidence*) by 1.1°C. Projections for mid to
15 high latitude fisheries include increases in fishery productivity in some cases (Cheung et al., 2013; Hollowed
16 et al., 2013; Lam et al., 2014; FAO, 2016). These are associated with the biogeographical shift of species
17 towards higher latitudes (Fossheim et al., 2015) which brings benefits as well as challenges (e.g., increased
18 risk of disease and invasive species). Factors underpinning the expansion of fisheries production to high
19 latitude locations include warming, increased light levels and mixing due to retreating sea ice (Cheung et al.,
20 2009), resulting in substantial increases in primary productivity and fish harvesting in the North Pacific and
21 North Atlantic (Hollowed and Sundby, 2014).

22
23 Present day risks for mid latitude bivalve fisheries and aquaculture are low up to 1.3°C, moderate at 1.3°C,
24 and moderate to high up to 1.9°C (Figure 3.17). For instance, Cheung et al. (2016a), simulating the loss in
25 fishery productivity at 1.5°C, 2°C and 3.5°C above the preindustrial period, found that the potential global
26 catch for marine fisheries will *likely* decrease by more than 3 million metric tons for each degree of
27 warming. Low latitude finfish fisheries have higher risks of impacts, with present day risks being moderate
28 and becoming high risks at 1.5°C and 2°C. High latitude fisheries are undergoing major transformations, and
29 while production is increasing, present day risk is moderate, and remains at moderate at 1.5°C and 2°C
30 (Figure 3.3).

31
32 Adaptation measures can be applied to shellfish, large pelagic fish resources and biodiversity and include
33 options such as protecting reproductive stages and brood stock from periods of high Ocean Acidification (OA),
34 stock selection for high tolerance to OA (Ekstrom et al., 2015; Rodrigues et al., 2015; Handisyde et al., 2016;
35 Lee, 2016; Weatherdon et al., 2016; Clements and Chopin, 2017) (*high confidence*), redistribution of highly
36 migratory resources (Pacific tuna) (*high confidence*), governance instruments such as international fisheries
37 agreements (Lehodey et al., 2015; Matear et al., 2015), protection and regeneration of reef habitats, reduction
38 of coral reefs stresses and development of alternative livelihoods (e.g., aquaculture, Bell et al., 2013, 2017).

41 **Cross-Chapter Box 6: Food Security**

42
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2
3 Climate change influences food and nutritional security through its effects on food availability and quality,
4 access, and distribution (Paterson and Lima, 2010; Thornton et al., 2014; FAO, 2016). More than 815 million
5 people were undernourished in 2016; 11% of the world's population, with higher proportions of populations
6 in Africa (20%), southern Asia (14.4%) and the Caribbean (17.7%), with recent decreases in food security
7 (FAO et al., 2017). Overall, food security is expected to be reduced at 2°C warming compared to 1.5°C
8 warming, due to projected impacts of climate change and extreme weather on crop nutrient content and
9 yields, livestock, fisheries and aquaculture (Sections 3.4.4.12 and 3.4.3.6), and land use (cover type and
10 management) (*high confidence*; Section 3.4.6). The impacts of climate change on yield, area, pests, price,
11 and food supplies are projected to have major implications for sustainable development, poverty eradication,
12 inequality, and the ability for the international community to meet the United Nations Sustainable
13 Development Goals (SDGs; Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1)

14
15 Goal 2 of the SDGs aims to end hunger, achieve food security, improve nutrition, and promote sustainable
16 agriculture by 2030. This builds on the Millennium Development Goal (MDG); efforts to achieve Goal 1
17 reduced the proportion of undernourished people in low- and middle-income countries from 23.3% in 1990
18 to 12.9% in 2015. Climate change threatens the possibility of achieving SDG 2 and could reverse the
19 progress made. Food security and agriculture are also critical to other aspects of sustainable development,
20 including eradicating poverty (SDG 1), health and wellbeing (SDG 3), clean water (SDG 6), decent work
21 (SDG 8) and the protection of ecosystems on land and water (SDG 14 and SDG 15) (UN, 2015, 2017; Pérez-
22 Escamilla, 2017).

23
24 Increasing global temperatures pose large risks to food security globally and regionally, especially at low
25 latitude areas (Cheung et al., 2010; Rosenzweig et al., 2013; Porter et al., 2014; Rosenzweig and Hillel,
26 2015; Lam et al., 2016) with warming of 2°C projected to result in a greater reduction in global crop yields
27 and global nutrition than a global warming of 1.5°C (*high confidence*, Section 3.4.6) owing to the combined
28 effects of changes in temperature, precipitation, and changes in extreme weather events and in CO₂
29 concentrations. Climate change can exacerbate malnutrition, reducing nutrient availability and quality of
30 food products (Cramer et al., 2014; Springmann et al., 2016); (*medium confidence*). Generally, vulnerability
31 to decreases in water and food availability is reduced at 1.5°C versus 2°C (Cheung et al., 2016a; Betts et al.,
32 2018), whilst at 2°C these are expected to be exacerbated especially in regions such as the African Sahel, the
33 Mediterranean, central Europe, the Amazon, and western and southern Africa (Sultan and Gaetani, 2016;
34 Lehner et al., 2017; Betts et al., 2018; Byers et al., 2018; Rosenzweig et al., 2018) (*high confidence*).

35
36 Rosenzweig et al. (2018) and Ruane et al. (2018) report that the higher CO₂ concentrations at 2°C caused
37 positive effects in some regions compared to 1.5°C. Production can also benefit from warming in higher
38 latitudes with fertile soils, crop, and grassland, in contrast to the situation at low latitudes (Section 3.4.6) and
39 similar benefits could arise for high latitude fisheries production (*high confidence*; Section 3.4.6.3). Studies
40 exploring regional climate change risks on crop production are strongly influenced by the use of alternative
41 regional climate change projections and the assumed strength of CO₂ fertilisation effects (Section 3.6) which
42 are uncertain. For C3 crops, theoretically advantageous CO₂ fertilisation effects may not be realized in the
43 field; further, they are often accompanied by losses in protein and nutrient content of crops (Section 3.6) and
44 hence these projected benefits may not be realized. In addition, some micronutrients such as iron and zinc
45 will be less accumulated and less available in food (Myers *et al.*, 2014). Together, the impacts on protein
46 availability may take as many as 150 million people into protein deficiency by 2050 (Medek *et al.*, 2017).
47 However, short-term benefits could arise for high latitude fisheries production as waters warm, sea ice

1 contracts and primary productivity increases due to climate change (Cheung et al., 2010; Hollowed and
2 Sundby, 2014; Lam et al., 2016; Sundby et al., 2016; Weatherdon et al., 2016) (*high confidence*; Section
3 3.4.6.3).

4
5 Factors affecting projections of food security include variability in regional climate projections, climate
6 change mitigation (where this affects land use; see Section 3.6 and Cross-Chapter Box 7) and biological
7 responses (McGrath and Lobell, 2013; Elliott et al., 2014; Pörtner et al., 2014; Durand et al., 2017; AR5
8 6.5.1) (*medium confidence*; Section 3.4.6.1), extreme events (droughts, floods) (Rosenzweig et al., 2014;
9 Wei et al., 2017) (*high confidence*; Sections 3.4.6.1, 3.4.6.2), financial volatility (Kannan et al., 2000; Ghosh,
10 2010; Naylor and Falcon, 2010; HLPE, 2011) and the distributions of pests and disease (van Bruggen et al.,
11 2015; Jiao et al., 2014). Changes in temperature and precipitation are projected to increase global food prices
12 by 3–84% by 2050 (IPCC, 2013). Differences in price impacts of climate change are accompanied by
13 differences in land use change (Nelson et al., 2014b), energy policies and food trade (Mueller et al., 2011;
14 Wright, 2011; Roberts and Schlenker, 2013). Fisheries and aquatic production systems (aquaculture) face
15 similar challenges to those of crop and livestock sectors (Asiedu et al., 2017a, b; Utete et al., 2018; Section
16 3.4.6.3). Human influences on food security include demography, food wastage, diet shift, incomes and
17 prices, storage, health status, trade patterns, conflict, and access to land and government or other assistance
18 (Chapters 4 and 5). Across all these systems, the efficiency of adaptation strategies is uncertain, because it is
19 strongly linked with future economic and trade environments and their response to changing food availability
20 (Lobell et al., 2011; von Lampe et al., 2014; d'Amour et al., 2016; Wei et al., 2017) (*medium confidence*).

21
22 Climate change impacts on food security can be reduced through adaptation (Hasegawa et al., 2014). While
23 climate change is very likely to decrease agricultural yield, the consequences could be reduced substantially
24 at 1.5°C with appropriate investment (Neumann et al., 2010; Muller, 2011; Roudier et al., 2011), awareness-
25 raising to help inform farmers of new technologies for maintaining yield, and strong adaptation strategies
26 and policies that develop sustainable agricultural choices (Sections 4.3.2 and 4.5.3). In this regard, initiatives
27 such as 'climate smart' food production and distribution systems may assist adaptation via technologies and
28 adaptation strategies for food systems (Lipper et al., 2014; Martinez-Baron et al., 2018; Whitfield et al.,
29 2018) as well as meet mitigation goals (Harvey et al., 2014).

30
31 K.R. Smith et al. (2014) concluded that climate change will negatively affect childhood undernutrition and
32 stunting through reduced food availability, and will negatively affect undernutrition-related childhood
33 mortality and increase disability-adjusted life years lost, with the largest risks in Asia and Africa (Ishida et
34 al., 2014; Hasegawa et al., 2016; Springmann et al., 2016; Supplementary Material 3.SM, Table 3.SM.12).
35 Studies comparing the health risks associated with food insecurity at 1.5°C and 2°C concluded that risks are
36 higher and the globally undernourished population larger at 2°C (Hales et al., 2014; Ishida et al., 2014;
37 Hasegawa et al., 2016). Climate change impacts on dietary and weight-related risk factors were projected to
38 increase mortality due to global reductions in food availability and consumption of fruit, vegetables, and red
39 meat (Springmann et al., 2016). Further, temperature increases are reducing the protein and micronutrient
40 content of major cereal crops, which is expected to further affect food security (Myers et al., 2017) (Zhu et
41 al. 2018).

42
43 Strategies for improving food security often do so in complex settings such as the Mekong River Basin in
44 South-East Asia. The Mekong is a major food bowl (Smajgl et al., 2015) yet is also a climate change hotspot
45 (de Sherbinin, 2014; Lebel et al., 2014). It is also a useful illustration of the complexity of adaptation choices
46 and actions in a 1.5°C world. Climate projections indicate increased annual average temperatures and
47 precipitation (Zhang et al., 2016) and increased flooding and related disaster risks (T.F. Smith et al., 2013;

1 Ling et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2016). Sea level rise and saline intrusion are ongoing risks to agricultural
2 systems (Renaud et al., 2015). The main climate impacts in the Mekong will be on ecosystem health through
3 salinity intrusion, biomass reduction, and biodiversity losses (Le Dang et al., 2014; Smajgl et al., 2015);
4 agricultural productivity and food security (Smajgl et al., 2015); livelihoods such as fishing and farming (D.
5 Wu et al., 2013); and disaster risk (D. Wu et al., 2013; Hoang et al., 2016) with implications for human
6 mortality and economic and infrastructure losses.

7
8 Adaptation imperatives and costs in the Mekong will be higher under increased temperatures via impacts on
9 agriculture and aquaculture, hazard exposure, and infrastructure. Adaptation measures to meet food security
10 include greater investment in crop diversification and integrated agriculture-aquaculture practices (Renaud et
11 al., 2015), improving water use technologies (e.g., irrigation, pond capacity improvement, rainwater
12 harvesting), soil management, crop diversification, and strengthening allied sectors such as livestock rearing
13 and aquaculture (ICEM, 2013). Ecosystem-based approaches, such as integrated water resources
14 management, demonstrate successes in mainstreaming adaptation into existing strategies (Sebesvari et al.,
15 2017). However, some of these adaptive strategies can have negative impacts that deepen the divide between
16 land-rich and land-poor farmers (Chapman et al., 2016). Construction of high dikes for example has enabled
17 triple-cropping with benefits for land-wealthy farmers but increasing debt for land-poor farmers (Chapman
18 and Darby, 2016).

19
20 Institutional innovation has happened through the establishment of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in
21 1995, an intergovernmental body between Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam. The MRC has
22 facilitated impact assessment studies, regional capacity building, and local project implementation (Schipper
23 et al., 2010), although mainstreaming of adaptation into development policies has lagged behind needs (Gass
24 et al., 2011). Existing adaptation interventions can be strengthened through improving flexibility of
25 institutions dealing with land use planning and agricultural production, improved monitoring of saline
26 intrusion, and setting up early warning systems that can be accessed by the local authorities or farmers
27 (Renaud et al., 2015; Hoang et al., 2016; Tran et al., 2018). It is critical to identify and invest in synergistic
28 strategies from an ensemble of infrastructural options (e.g., building dikes); soft adaptation measures (e.g.,
29 land-use change) (Smajgl et al., 2015; Hoang et al., 2018); combinations of top-down government-led (e.g.,
30 relocation) and bottom-up household strategies (e.g., increasing house height) (Ling et al., 2015); and
31 community-based adaptation initiatives that merge scientific knowledge with local solutions (Gustafson et
32 al., 2016, 2017; Tran et al., 2018). Critical attention needs to be given to strengthening social safety nets and
33 livelihood assets whilst ensuring that adaptation plans are mainstreamed into broader development goals
34 (Sok and Yu, 2015; Kim et al., 2017). The complexity of environmental, social and economic pressure on
35 people in the Mekong River Basin highlights the complexity of climate impacts and adaptation in this region,
36 and the fact that costs are likely to be much lower at 1.5°C than 2°C.

37 [END BOX X-B 3.1 HERE]

38 39 40 **3.4.7 Human health**

41
42 Climate change adversely affects human health by increasing exposure and vulnerability to climate-related
43 stresses, and decreasing the capacity of health systems to manage changes in the magnitude and pattern of
44 climate-sensitive health outcomes (Cramer et al., 2014; Hales et al., 2014). Changing weather patterns are
45 associated with shifts in the geographic range, seasonality, and intensity of transmission of selected climate-
46 sensitive infectious diseases (e.g., Semenza and Menne, 2009), and increasing morbidity and mortality are
47 associated with extreme weather and climate events (e.g., K.R. Smith et al., 2014). Health detection and

1 attribution studies conducted since the AR5 provided evidence using multi-step attribution that climate
2 change is negatively affecting adverse health outcomes associated with heatwaves; Lyme disease in Canada;
3 and *Vibrio* emergence in northern Europe (Mitchell, 2016; Mitchell et al., 2016; Ebi et al., 2017). The IPCC
4 AR5 concluded there is *high to very high confidence* that climate change will lead to greater risks of injuries,
5 disease and death due to more intense heatwaves and fires; increased risks of undernutrition; and
6 consequences of reduced labor productivity in vulnerable populations (K.R. Smith et al., 2014).
7
8

9 3.4.7.1 Projected risk at 1.5°C and 2°C

10 Supplementary Material 3.SM, Tables 3.SM.8, 3.SM.9 and 3.SM.10 (based on Ebi et al., 2018) summarize
11 the projected risks to human health of warming of 1.5°C and 2°C from studies of temperature-related
12 morbidity and mortality, air quality and vector borne diseases assessed in and since the AR5. Other climate-
13 sensitive health outcomes, such as diarrheal diseases, mental health and the full range of sources of poor air
14 quality, were not considered because of the lack of projections of how risks could change at 1.5°C and 2°C.
15 Few projections were for specific temperatures above pre-industrial temperature; Supplementary Material
16 3.SM, Table 3.SM.7 provides the conversions used to translate risks projected at particular time slices to
17 temperature change (Ebi et al., 2018).
18

19 **Temperature-related morbidity and mortality:** The magnitude of projected heat-related morbidity and
20 mortality is greater at 2°C than at 1.5°C (*very high confidence*) (Doyon et al., 2008; Jackson et al., 2010;
21 Hanna et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2012; Petkova et al., 2013; Hajat et al., 2014; Hales et al., 2014; Honda et
22 al., 2014; Vardoulakis et al., 2014; Garland et al., 2015; Huynen and Martens, 2015; Li et al., 2015;
23 Schwartz et al., 2015; L. Wang et al., 2015; Guo et al., 2016; T.T. Li et al., 2016; Chung et al., 2017;
24 Kendrovski et al., 2017; Arnell et al., 2018; Mitchell, 2018). The number of people exposed to heat events is
25 projected to be greater at 2°C than at 1.5°C (Russo et al., 2016; Mora et al., 2017; Byers et al., 2018;
26 Harrington and Otto, 2018; King et al., 2018). The extent to which morbidity and mortality increase varies
27 by region, presumably because of acclimatization, population vulnerability, the built environment, access to
28 air conditioning and other factors (Russo et al., 2016; Mora et al., 2017; Byers et al., 2018; Harrington and
29 Otto, 2018; King et al., 2018). Populations at highest risk include older adults, children, women, those with
30 chronic diseases, and people taking certain medications (*very high confidence*). Assuming adaptation takes
31 place reduces the projected magnitude of risks (Hales et al., 2014; Huynen and Martens, 2015; Li et al.,
32 2016b).
33

34 In some regions, cold-related mortality is projected to decrease with warmer temperatures, although
35 increases in heat-related mortality generally are projected to outweigh any reductions in cold-related
36 mortality with warmer winters, with the heat-related risks increasing with greater degrees of warming
37 (Huang et al., 2012; Hajat et al., 2014; Vardoulakis et al., 2014; Gasparrini et al., 2015; Huynen and
38 Martens, 2015; Schwartz et al., 2015).
39

40 **Occupational health:** Higher ambient temperatures and humidity levels place additional stress placed on
41 individuals engaging in physical activity. Safe work activity and worker productivity during the hottest
42 months of the year would be increasingly compromised with additional climate change (*medium agreement,*
43 *low evidence*) (Dunne et al., 2013; Kjellstrom et al., 2013, 2017; Sheffield et al., 2013; Habibi Mohraz et al.,
44 2016). Patterns of change may be complex; for example, at 1.5°C, there could be about a 20% reduction in
45 areas experiencing severe heat stress in East Asia, compared to significant increases in low latitudes at 2°C
46 (Lee and Min, 2018). The costs of preventing workplace heat-related illnesses through worker breaks suggest
47 the difference in economic loss between 1.5°C and 2°C could be approximately 0.3% global GDP in 2100

1 (Takakura et al., 2017). In China, taking into account population growth and employment structure, high
2 temperature subsidies for employees working on extremely hot days are projected to increase from 38.6
3 billion yuan yr⁻¹ in 1979–2005 to 250 billion yuan yr⁻¹ in the 2030s (about 1.5°C) (Zhao et al., 2016).
4

5 **Air quality:** Because ozone formation is temperature dependent, projections focusing only on temperature
6 increase generally conclude that ozone-related mortality will increase with additional warming, with the risks
7 higher at 2°C than at 1.5°C (*high confidence*) (Heal et al., 2013; Tainio et al., 2013; Likhvar et al., 2015;
8 Silva et al., 2016; Dionisio et al., 2017; J.Y. Lee et al., 2017); Supplementary Material 3.SM Table 3.SM.9)
9 reductions in precursor emissions would reduce future ozone concentrations (and associated mortality).
10 Changes in projected PM-related mortality could increase or decrease, depending on climate projections and
11 emissions assumptions (Tainio et al., 2013; Likhvar et al., 2015; Silva et al., 2016; Table S8).
12

13 **Malaria:** Recent projections of the potential impacts of climate change on malaria globally and for Asia,
14 Africa, and South America (Supplementary Material 3.SM Table 3.SM.10) confirm that weather and climate
15 are among the drivers of the geographic range, intensity of transmission, and seasonality of malaria, and that
16 the relationships are not necessarily linear, resulting in complex patterns of changes in risk with additional
17 warming (*very high confidence*) (Ren et al., 2016; Song et al., 2016; Semakula et al., 2017). Projections
18 suggest the burden of malaria could increase with climate change because of a greater geographic range of
19 the *Anopheles* vector, longer season, and/or increase in the number of people at risk, with larger burdens with
20 greater amounts of warming, with regionally variable patterns (*high agreement, medium evidence*). Vector
21 populations are projected to shift with climate change, with expansions and reductions depending on the
22 degree of local warming, the ecology of the mosquito vector, and other factors (Ren et al., 2016).
23

24 **Aedes (mosquito vector for dengue fever, chikungunya, yellow fever, and Zika virus):** Projections of the
25 geographic distribution of *Aedes aegypti* and *Ae. albopictus* (principal vectors) or of the prevalence of
26 dengue fever generally conclude there will be an increase in the number of mosquitos and a larger
27 geographic range at 2° than at 1.5°C and beyond than at present, and suggest more individuals at risk of
28 dengue fever, with regional differences (*high confidence*) (Fischer et al., 2011; Colón-González et al., 2013;
29 Fischer et al., 2013; Bouzid et al., 2014; Ogden et al., 2014a; Mweya et al., 2016). The risks increase with
30 greater warming. Projections suggest that climate change will expand the geographic range of chikungunya,
31 with greater expansions with higher degrees of warming (Tjaden et al., 2017).
32

33 **Other vector-borne diseases:** Increased warming in North America and Europe could result in latitudinal
34 and altitudinal expansions of regions climatically suitable for West Nile Virus transmission, particularly
35 along the current edges of its transmission areas, and extension of the transmission season, with the
36 magnitude and pattern of changes varying by location and degree of warming (Semenza et al., 2016). Most
37 projections conclude that climate change will expand the geographic range and seasonality of Lyme and
38 other tick-borne diseases in parts of North America and Europe (Ogden et al., 2014b; Levi et al., 2015). The
39 changes are larger with greater warming and under higher greenhouse gas emission pathways. Projections of
40 the impacts of climate change on leishmaniosis and Chagas disease indicate climate change could increase or
41 decrease future health burdens, with greater impacts at higher degrees of warming (González et al., 2014;
42 Ceccarelli and Rabinovich, 2015).
43

44 In summary, warming of 2°C poses greater risks to human health than warming of 1.5°C, often with the risks
45 varying regionally, and with a few exceptions (*high confidence*). There is *very high confidence* that each
46 additional unit of warming will increase heat-related morbidity and mortality, and that adaptation would
47 reduce the magnitude of impacts. There is *high confidence* that ozone-related mortality will increase if

1 precursor emissions remain the same, and that warmer temperatures will affect the transmission of some
2 infectious diseases, with increases and decreases projected depending on disease (e.g., malaria, dengue, West
3 Nile virus, and Lyme disease), region, and degree of temperature change.

6 **3.4.8 Urban areas**

8 There is new literature on urban climate change and its differential impacts on and risks for infrastructure
9 sectors —energy, water, transport, buildings— and vulnerable populations, including those living in informal
10 settlements (UCCRN, 2018). However, there is limited literature on the risks of warming of 1.5°C and 2°C
11 in urban areas. Heat-related extreme events (Matthews et al., 2017), variability in precipitation (Yu et al.,
12 2018) and sea-level rise can directly affect urban areas (Bader et al., 2018; Dawson, et al., 2018; Section
13 3.4.5). Indirect risks may arise from interactions between urbanization and natural systems.

15 Future warming and urban expansion could lead to more extreme heat stress (Argüeso et al., 2015; Suzuki-
16 Parker et al., 2015). At 1.5°C, twice as many megacities (such as Lagos, Nigeria and Shanghai, China) could
17 become heat-stressed, exposing more than 350 million more people to deadly heat by 2050 under midrange
18 population growth. Without considering adaptation options, such as cooling from more reflective roofs, and
19 overall characteristics of urban agglomerations in terms of landuse, zoning and building codes (UCCRN,
20 2018), at 2°C warming, Karachi (Pakistan) and Kolkata (India) could expect annual conditions equivalent to
21 the deadly 2015 heatwaves (Akbari et al., 2009; Oleson et al., 2010; Matthews et al., 2017). Warming of 2°C
22 is expected to increase the risks of heatwaves in China’s urban agglomerations (Yu and Zhai, 2018).
23 Stabilising at 1.5 °C warming could decrease extreme temperature-related mortality compared with
24 stabilisation at 2°C for key European cities, assuming no adaptation and constant vulnerability (Jacob et al.,
25 2018; Mitchell et al., 2018). Holding temperature change to below 2°C, taking Urban Heat Islands (UHI)
26 into consideration, could result in a substantial increase in the occurrence of deadly heatwaves in cities, with
27 the impacts similar at 1.5°C and 2°C, with both substantially larger than under the present climate (Matthews
28 et al., 2017; Yu et al., 2018).

30 For extreme heat events, an additional 0.5°C of warming implies a shift from the upper-bounds of observed
31 natural variability to a new global climate regime (Schleussner et al., 2016b), with differential implications
32 for the urban poor (Revi et al., 2014; Jean-Baptiste et al., 2018; UCCRN, 2018). Adverse impacts of extreme
33 events could arise in tropical coastal areas of Africa, South America, and South East Asia (Schleussner et al.,
34 2016b), with large informal settlements and other vulnerable urban populations, and with vulnerable assets,
35 including urban infrastructure—energy, water, transport, and buildings (McGranahan et al., 2007; Hallegatte
36 et al., 2013; Revi et al., 2014; UCCRN, 2018). Mediterranean water stress is projected to increase from 9%
37 at 1.5°C to 17% at 2°C compared to 1986-2005. Regional dry spells are projected to expand from 7% at
38 1.5°C to 11% at 2°C. Sea-level rise is expected to be lower for 1.5°C than 2°C, lowering risks for coastal
39 metropolitan agglomerations (Schleussner et al., 2016b).

41 Increases in the intensity of UHI could exacerbate warming of urban areas, with projections ranging from a
42 6% decrease to a 30% increase for a doubling of CO₂ (McCarthy et al., 2010). Increases in population and
43 city size, in the context of a warmer climate, are projected to increase UHI (Georgescu et al., 2012; Argüeso
44 et al., 2014; Conlon et al., 2016; Kusaka et al., 2016; Grossman-Clarke et al., 2017).

46 Climate models are better at projecting implications of greenhouse gas forcing on physical systems than
47 assessing differential risks associated with achieving a specific temperature target (James et al., 2017). These

1 challenges in managing risks are amplified when combined with the scale of urban areas and assumptions
2 about socio-economic pathways (Krey et al., 2012; Kamei et al., 2016; Yu et al., 2016; Jiang and Neill,
3 2017).

4
5 In summary, in the absence of adaptation, in most cases, warming of 2°C poses greater risks to urban areas
6 than warming of 1.5°C, depending on the vulnerability of the location (coastal or non-coastal), infrastructure
7 sectors (energy, water, transport), levels of poverty and the mix of formal and informal settlements.

10 **3.4.9 Key economic sectors and services**

11
12 Climate change will affect tourism, energy systems, and transportation through direct impacts on operations
13 (e.g., sea level rise) and through impacts on supply and demand, with the risks varying significantly across
14 geographic region, season, and time. Projected risks also depend on assumptions with respect to population
15 growth, the rate and pattern of urbanization, and investments in infrastructure. Table 3.SM.11 in
16 Supplementary Material 3.SM summarizes the cited publications.

19 **3.4.9.1 Tourism**

20 The implications of climate change for the global tourism sector are far-reaching and are impacting sector
21 investments, destination assets (environment and cultural), operational and transportation costs, and tourist
22 demand patterns (Scott et al., 2016a; Scott and Gössling, 2018). Since the AR5, observed impacts on tourism
23 markets and destination communities continue to be not well analyzed, despite many analogue conditions
24 (e.g., heatwaves, major hurricanes, wild fires, reduced snow pack, coastal erosion, coral reef bleaching) that
25 are anticipated to occur more frequently with climate change. There is some evidence that observed impacts
26 on tourism assets (environmental and cultural heritage) is leading to the development of ‘last chance’
27 tourism markets, where travellers visit destinations before they are substantially degraded by climate change
28 impacts or to view the impacts of climate change on landscapes (Lemelin et al., 2012; Stewart et al., 2016;
29 Piggott-McKellar and McNamara, 2017).

30
31 There is limited research on the differential risks of 1.5° versus 2°C temperature increase and resultant
32 environmental and socio-economic impacts in the tourism sector. The translation of these changes in climate
33 resources for tourism into projections of tourism demand remains geographically limited to Europe. Based
34 on analyses of tourist comfort, summer and spring-autumn tourism in much of Western Europe may be
35 favored by 1.5°C warming, with negative effects projected for Spain, Cyprus (decrease of 8% and 2%
36 overnight stays, respectively) and most coastal regions of the Mediterranean (Jacob et al., 2018). Similar
37 geography of potential tourism gains (central and northern Europe) and reduced summer favorability
38 (Mediterranean countries) are projected under 2°C (Grillakis et al., 2016). Considering potential changes in
39 natural snow only, winter overnight stays at 1.5°C are projected to decline by 1–2% in Austria, Italy, and
40 Slovakia, with an additional 1.9 million overnight stays lost under 2°C warming (Jacob et al., 2018). Using
41 an econometric analysis of the relationship between regional tourism demand and climate conditions, Ciscar
42 et al. (2014) projected a 2°C world would reduce European tourism by -5% (€15 billion yr⁻¹), with losses up
43 to -11% (€6 billion yr⁻¹) for southern Europe and a potential gain of €0.5 billion yr⁻¹ in the UK.

44
45 Growing evidence indicates that the magnitude of projected impacts is temperature-dependent and sector
46 risks will be much greater with higher temperature increases and resultant environmental and socio-

1 economic impacts (Markham et al., 2016; Scott et al., 2016a; Jones, 2017; Steiger et al., 2017). Studies from
2 27 countries consistently project substantially decreased reliability of ski areas that are dependent on natural
3 snow, increased snowmaking requirements and investment in snowmaking systems, shortened and more
4 variable ski seasons, a contraction in the number of operating ski areas, altered competitiveness among and
5 within regional ski markets, and subsequent impacts on employment and the value of vacation properties
6 (Steiger et al., 2017). Studies that continue to omit snowmaking do not reflect the operating realities of most
7 ski areas and overestimate impacts at 1.5–2°C. In all regional markets, the extent and timing of these impacts
8 depend on the magnitude of climate change and the types of adaptive responses by the ski industry, skiers
9 and destination communities. The decline in number of former Olympic Winter Games host locations that
10 could remain climatically reliable for future Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games was also projected to be
11 much greater under scenarios warmer than 2°C (Scott et al., 2015; Jacob et al., 2018).

12
13 The tourism sector is also affected by climate-induced changes in environmental systems that are critical
14 assets for tourism, including biodiversity, beaches, glaciers, and other environmental and cultural heritage.
15 Limited analyses of projected risks associated with 1.5° versus 2°C are available (Section 3.4.4.12). A global
16 analysis of SLR risk to 720 UNESCO Cultural World Heritage sites projected that about 47 sites could be
17 affected under 1°C warming, increasing to 110 and 136 sites under 2°C and 3°C, respectively (Marzeion and
18 Levermann, 2014). Similar risks to vast worldwide coastal tourism infrastructure and beach assets remain
19 unquantified in most major tourism destinations and SIDS that economically depend on coastal tourism. One
20 exception is the projection that an eventual 1 m SLR could partially or fully inundate 29% of 900 coastal
21 resorts in 19 Caribbean countries, with a substantially higher proportion (49–60%) vulnerable to associated
22 coastal erosion (Scott and Verkoeyen, 2017).

23
24 A major barrier to understanding the risks of climate change for tourism (from the destination community to
25 global scales) has been the lack of integrated sectoral assessments that analyze the full range of potential
26 compounding impacts and their interactions with other major drivers of tourism (Rosselló-Nadal, 2014; Scott
27 et al., 2016b). A global vulnerability index (27 indicators) in 181 countries found that countries with the
28 lowest risk are found in western and northern Europe, central Asia, Canada, and New Zealand, while the
29 highest sector risks are projected in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and SIDS in the Caribbean, Indian
30 and Pacific Oceans (Scott and Gössling, 2018). Countries with the highest risks and where tourism
31 represents a significant proportion of the national economy (more than 15% GDP) include many SIDS and
32 least developed countries. Sectoral climate change risk also aligned strongly with regions where tourism
33 growth is projected to be the strongest over the coming decades, including sub-Saharan Africa and South
34 Asia; representing an important potential barrier to tourism development. The transnational implications of
35 these impacts on the highly interconnected global tourism sector and the contribution of tourism to achieving
36 the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) remain important uncertainties.

37
38 In summary, climate is an important factor influencing the geography and seasonality of tourism demand and
39 spending globally (*very high confidence*). Increasing temperatures will directly impact climate dependent
40 tourism markets, including sun and beach, and snow sports tourism, with lesser risks for other tourism
41 markets that are less climate sensitive (*high confidence*). The degradation or loss of beach and coral reef
42 assets will increase risks for coastal tourism, particularly in sub-tropical and tropical regions (*high*
43 *confidence*).

44 45 3.4.9.2 Energy systems

46 Climate change will likely increase the demand for air conditioning in most tropical and sub-tropical regions

1 (Arent et al., 2014; Hong and Kim, 2015). Increasing temperatures will decrease the thermal efficiency of
2 fossil, nuclear, biomass and solar power generation technologies, as well as buildings and other
3 infrastructure (Arent et al., 2014). For example, in Ethiopia, capital expenditures through 2050 might either
4 decrease by approximately 3% under extreme wet scenarios or increase by up to 4% under a severe dry
5 scenario (Block and Strzepek, 2012). In the Zambezi River basin, hydropower may fall by 10% by 2030
6 (about 1.5°C) and by 35% by 2050 under the driest scenario (Strzepek et al., 2012).

7
8 Impacts on energy systems can affect Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The economic damage in the United
9 States from climate change is estimated to be roughly 1.2% cost of GDP per 1°C increase on average under
10 RCP8.5 (Hsiang et al., 2017). Projections of the GDP indicate that negative impacts of energy demand
11 associated with space heating and cooling in 2100 are highest (median: -0.94%) under 4°C (RCP8.5)
12 compared with a GDP change (median: -0.05%) under 1.5°C, depending on the socio-economic conditions
13 (Park et al., 2018). Additionally, total energy demands for heating and cooling at the global scale do not
14 change much with increases in Global Mean Temperature (GMT) up to 2°C. There is, however, a high
15 degree of variability between regions (Arnell et al., 2018).

16
17 Evidence for the impact of climate change on energy systems since AR5 is limited. Globally, gross
18 hydropower potential is projected to increase (+2.4% under RCP2.6; +6.3% under RCP8.5 for the 2080s)
19 with the most growth in central Africa, Asia, India, and northern high latitudes (van Vliet et al., 2016). Byers
20 et al. (2018) found energy impacts at 2°C increase including increased cooling degree days, especially in
21 tropical regions, as well as increased hydro-climatic risk to thermal and hydropower plants predominantly in
22 Europe, North America, south and southeast Asia, and southeast Brazil. Donk et al. (2018) assessed future
23 climate impacts on hydropower in Suriname, finding a decrease of approximately 40% power capacity is
24 projected for global temperature increase in the range of 1.5°C. At minimum and maximum increases in
25 global mean temperatures of 1.35° and 2°C, the overall stream flow in Florida, USA is projected to increase
26 by an average of 21% with pronounced seasonal variations, resulting in increases in power generation in
27 winter (72%) and autumn (15%) and decreases in summer (-14%; Chilkoti et al., 2017). Changes are greater
28 at the higher projected temperature. In a reference scenario with global mean temperatures rising by 1.7°C
29 from 2005 to 2050, U.S. electricity demand in 2050 was 1.6–6.5% higher than a control scenario with
30 constant temperatures (McFarland et al., 2015). Decreased electricity generation of -15% is projected for
31 Brazil starting in 2040, declining to -28% later in the century (de Queiroz et al., 2016). In large parts of
32 Europe, electricity demand is projected to decrease mainly due to reduced heating demand (Jacob et al.,
33 2018).

34
35 In Europe, no major differences in large-scale wind energy resources, inter-annual or intra-annual variability
36 are projected for 2016–2035 under RCP8.5 and RCP4.5 (Carvalho et al., 2017). However, in 2046–2100,
37 wind energy density is projected to decrease in Eastern Europe and increase in Baltic regions (-30% vs.
38 +30%). Intra-annual variability is expected to increase in Northern Europe and decrease in Southern Europe.
39 Under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, the annual energy yield of European wind farms as a whole as projected to be
40 installed by 2050 will remain stable (± 5 for all climate models). However, wind farm yields will undergo
41 changes up to 15% in magnitude at country and local scales and a 5% change in magnitude at regional scale
42 (Tobin et al., 2015, 2016). Hosking et al. (2018) assessed wind power generation over Europe for 1.5°C
43 warming, finding the potential for wind energy to be greater than previously assumed in Northern Europe.
44 Additionally, Tobin et al. (2018) assessed impacts under 1.5°C and 2°C increases on wind, solar photovoltaic
45 and thermoelectric power generation across Europe. Results found that photovoltaic and wind power might
46 be reduced by up to 10%, and hydropower and thermoelectric generation might decrease by up to 20%, with

1 limited impacts for 1.5°C warming, but increasing as temperature increases (Tobin et al., 2018).

3 3.4.9.3 *Transportation*

4 Road, air, rail, shipping and pipeline transportation can be impacted directly or indirectly by weather and
5 climate, including increases in precipitation and temperature; extreme weather events (flooding and storms);
6 SLR; and incidence of freeze-thaw cycles (Arent et al., 2014). Much of the published research on the risks of
7 climate change for the transportation sector has been qualitative.

8
9 Limited new research since the AR5 supports that increases in global temperatures will impact the
10 transportation sector. Warming is projected to result in increased numbers of days of ice-free navigation and
11 a longer shipping season in cold regions, thus impacting shipping and reducing transportation cost (Arent et
12 al., 2014). In the North Sea Route, large-scale commercial shipping might not be possible until 2030 for bulk
13 shipping and until 2050 for container shipping under RCP8.5, but more shipping resulting in short-lived
14 pollutants, as well as CO₂ and non-CO₂ emissions associated with additional economic growth enabled by the
15 North Sea Route, is expected to contribute to a mean temperature rise of 0.05% (Yumashev et al., 2017). For
16 a scenario with global mean temperature stabilization of open water vessel transits has the potential to double
17 by mid-century with a season ranging from two to four months (Melia et al., 2016).

20 3.4.10 *Livelihoods and poverty, and the changing structure of communities*

21
22 Multiple drivers and embedded social processes influence the magnitude and pattern of livelihoods and
23 poverty, and the changing structure of communities related to migration, displacement, and conflict (Adger
24 et al., 2014). In AR5, evidence of a climate change signal was limited, with more evidence of impacts of
25 climate change on the places where indigenous people live and on traditional ecological knowledge (Olsson
26 et al., 2014).

29 3.4.10.1 *Livelihoods and poverty*

30 At approximately 1.5°C (2030), climate change will be a poverty-multiplier that makes poor people poorer,
31 and increases the poverty head count (Hallegatte et al., 2016; Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017). Poor people
32 might be heavily affected by climate change even when impacts on the rest of population are limited.
33 Climate change could force more than 100 million people into extreme poverty, with the numbers attributed
34 to climate change alone between 3 million and 16 million, mostly through impacts on agriculture and food
35 prices (Hallegatte et al., 2016; Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017). Unmitigated warming could reshape the
36 global economy later in the century by reducing average global incomes and widening global income
37 inequality (Burke et al., 2015b). Most severe impacts are projected for urban areas and some rural regions in
38 sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia.

40 3.4.10.2 *The changing structure of communities: Migration, displacement, and conflict*

41 **Migration:** In AR5, the potential impacts of climate change on migration and displacement were identified
42 as an emerging risk (Oppenheimer et al., 2014). The social, economic and environmental factors underlying
43 migration are complex and varied; therefore, detecting the effect of observed climate change or assessing its
44 possible magnitude is challenging with any degree of confidence (Cramer et al., 2014).

45
46 No studies specifically explored the difference in risks between 1.5°C and 2°C on human migration. The

1 literature consistently highlights the complexity of migration decisions and the difficulties in attributing
2 causation (e.g. (Nicholson, 2014; Baldwin and Fornalé, 2017; Bettini, 2017; Constable, 2017; Islam and
3 Shamsuddoha, 2017; Suckall et al., 2017). The studies on migration that most closely explore the probable
4 impacts of 1.5°C and 2°C typically focus on the effects of temperature and precipitation anomalies directly
5 on migration or indirectly through examining migration due to changing agriculture yield and livelihood
6 sources (Mueller et al., 2014; Piguet and Laczko, 2014; Mastorillo et al., 2016; Sudmeier-Rieux et al.,
7 2017).

8
9 Temperature had a positive and statistically significant effect on outmigration over recent decades in 163
10 countries, but only for agricultural-dependent countries (R. Cai et al., 2016). A 1°C increase in temperature
11 in the International Migration Database of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
12 (OECD) was associated with a 1.9% increase in bilateral migration flows from 142 sending countries and 19
13 receiving countries, and an additional millimeter of precipitation was associated with an increase in
14 migration by 0.5% (Backhaus et al., 2015). An increase in precipitation anomalies, but over a different time
15 period, was strongly associated with an increase in outmigration but no significant effects of temperature
16 anomalies were reported (Coniglio and Pesce, 2015).

17
18 Internal and international migration have always been important for small islands (Farbotko and Lazrus,
19 2012; Weir et al., 2017). There is rarely a single cause for migration (Constable, 2017). Numerous factors are
20 important, including work, education, quality of life, family ties, access to resources or development
21 (Bedarff and Jakobeit, 2017; Speelman et al., 2017; Nicholls et al., 2018). Depending on the situation,
22 changing weather, climatic, or environmental conditions might each be one factor in the choice to migrate
23 (Campbell and Warrick, 2014).

24
25 **Displacement:** At 2°C warming, there is a potential for significant population displacement concentrated in
26 the tropics (Hsiang and Sobel, 2016). Tropical populations may have to move at distances greater than
27 1000 km if global mean temperature rises by 2 °C from the period of 2011–2030 to the end of the century. A
28 disproportionately rapid evacuation from the tropics could lead concentration of population in tropical
29 margins and the subtropics, where population densities could increase by 300% or more (Hsiang and Sobel,
30 2016).

31
32 **Conflict:** A recent study has called for cautiousness in relating conflict to climate change due to sampling
33 bias (Adams et al., 2018). Often taking limited consideration of the multiple drivers of conflict, inconsistent
34 associations are reported between climate change and conflict (e.g., Hsiang et al., 2013; Hsiang and Burke,
35 2014; Buhaug, 2015, 2016; Carleton and Hsiang, 2016; Carleton et al., 2016). There also are inconsistent
36 relationships between climate change, migration, and conflict (e.g., Theisen et al., 2013; Buhaug et al., 2014;
37 Selby, 2014; Brzoska and Fröhlich, 2016; Burrows and Kinney, 2016; Christiansen, 2016; Reyer et al.,
38 2017c; Waha et al., 2017). Across world regions and the international to micro level, the strength of the
39 relationship between drought and conflict under most circumstances is limited (Buhaug, 2016; von Uexkull
40 et al., 2016). However, drought significantly increases the likelihood of sustained conflict for particularly
41 vulnerable nations or groups due to their livelihood dependence on agriculture. This is particularly relevant
42 among groups in the least developed countries (von Uexkull et al., 2016), sub-Saharan Africa (Serdeczny et
43 al., 2016; Almer et al., 2017) and in the Middle East (Waha et al., 2017). Hsiang et al. (2013) report causal
44 evidence and convergence across studies that climate change is linked to human conflicts across all major
45 regions of the world, and across a range of spatial and temporal scales. A 1°C increase in temperature or
46 more extreme rainfall increases the frequency of intergroup conflicts by 14% (Hsiang et al., 2013). If the
47 world warms by 2°C–4°C by 2050, then rates of human conflict could increase. Some causal associations

1 between violent conflict and socio-political stability were reported from local to global scales and from hours
2 to millennium (Hsiang and Burke, 2014). A temperature increase by one standard deviation in increased the
3 risk of interpersonal conflict by 2.4% and intergroup conflict by 11.3% (Burke et al., 2015a). Armed-conflict
4 risks and climate-related disasters are associated in ethnically fractionalized countries, indicating there is no
5 clear signal that environmental disasters directly trigger armed conflicts (Schleussner et al., 2016a).
6

7 In summary, average global temperatures that extend beyond 1.5°C are likely to increase poverty and
8 disadvantage in many populations globally. By the mid to late 21st century, climate change is projected to be
9 a poverty multiplier that makes poor people poorer and increases poverty head count, and the association of
10 temperature and economic productivity is not linear (*high confidence*). Temperature has a positive and
11 statistically significant effect on outmigration for agricultural-dependent communities (*medium confidence*).
12
13

14 **3.4.11 Interacting and cascading risks**

15

16 The literature on compound as well as interacting and cascading risks at warming of 1.5°C and 2°C is
17 limited. Spatially compound risks, often referred to as hotspots, involve multiple hazards from different
18 sectors overlapping in location (Piontek et al., 2014). Global exposures were assessed for 14 impact
19 indicators covering water, energy and land sectors from changes including drought intensity and water stress
20 index, cooling demand change and heatwave exposure, habitat degradation, and crop yields using an
21 ensemble of climate and impact models (Byers et al., 2018). Exposures approximately double between 1.5°C
22 and 2°C, and the land area affected by climate risks increases as warming progresses. For populations
23 vulnerable to poverty, the exposure to climate risks in multiple sectors is an order of magnitude greater (8–32
24 fold) in the high poverty and inequality scenarios (SSP3; 765–1,220 million) compared to sustainable
25 socioeconomic development (SSP1; 23–85 million). Asian and African regions are projected to
26 experience 85–95% of global exposure with 91–98% of the exposed and vulnerable population (depending
27 on SSP/GMT combination), approximately half of which are in South Asia. Figure 3.18 shows that moderate
28 and high multi-sector impacts are prevalent where vulnerable people live, predominantly in South Asia
29 (mostly Pakistan, India, and China), at 1.5°C, but spreading to sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and East
30 Asia at higher levels of warming. Beyond 2°C and at higher risk thresholds, the world’s poorest are expected
31 to be disproportionately impacted, particularly in cases (SSP3) of high inequality in Africa and southern
32 Asia. Table 3.4 shows the number of exposed and vulnerable people at 1.5°C and 2°C, with 3°C for context,
33 for selected multi-sector risks.
34




Figure 3.19: Multi-sector risk maps for 1.5, 2°C, and locations where 2°C brings impacts not experienced at 1.5°C (2–1.5°C). The left column shows the full range of the multi-sector risk score (range 0–9) with transparency and the scores >5.0 in full color. Score must be >4.0 to be considered “multi-sector”. The right column greyscale overlays the 2050 vulnerable populations (low income) under Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP)2 with the multi-sector risk score > 5.0 in full color, indicating the concentrations of exposed and vulnerable populations to risks in multiple sectors. Source: (Byers et al., 2018)

Table 3.4: Number of exposed and vulnerable people at 1.5°C, 2°C, and 3°C for selected multi-sector risks under Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). Source: (Byers et al., 2018)

SSP2 (SSP1 to SSP3 range), millions	1.5°C		2°C		3°C	
	Exposed	Exposed & Vulnerable	Exposed	Exposed & Vulnerable	Exposed	Exposed & Vulnerable
Water stress index	3340 (3032-3584)	496 (103-1159)	3658 (3080-3969)	586 (115-1347)	3920 (3202-4271)	662 (146-1480)
Heatwave event exposure	3960 (3546-4508)	1187 (410-2372)	5986 (5417-6710)	1581 (506-3218)	7909 (7286-8640)	1707 (537-3575)
Hydroclimate risk to power production	334 (326-337)	30 (6-76)	385 (374-389)	38 (9-94)	742 (725-739)	72 (16-177)
Crop yield change	35 (32-36)	8 (2-20)	362 (330-396)	81 (24-178)	1817 (1666-1992)	406 (118-854)

SSP2 (SSP1 to SSP3 range), millions	1.5°C		2°C		3°C	
	Habitat degradation	91 (92-112)	10 (4-31)	680 (314-706)	102 (23-234)	1357 (809-1501)
Multi-sector exposure	Summaris e					
2 indicators	1129 (1019 – 1250)	203 (42 – 487)	2726 (2132 – 2945)	562 (117 – 1220)	3500 (3212 – 3864)	707 (212 – 1545)
3 indicators	66 (66 – 68)	7 (0.9 – 19)	422 (297 – 447)	54 (8 – 138)	1472 (1177 – 1574)	237 (48 – 538)
4 indicators	5 (0.3 – 5.7)	0.3 (0 – 1.2)	11 (5 – 14)	0.5 (0 – 2)	258 (104 – 280)	33 (4 – 86)

1
2
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6
7

3.4.12 Summary of projected risks at 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming

The following table summarises the information presented as part of Section 3.4, illustrating the growing of evidence of increasing risks across a broad range of natural and human systems at 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming.

1
2 **Table 3.5:** Summary of projected risks at 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming
3

Sector	Physical climate change drivers	Nature of risk	Global risks at 2°C global warming above pre-industrial	Global risks at 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial	Change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C	Confidence in risk statements	Regions where risks are particularly high with 2°C global warming	Regions where change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C are particularly high	Regions with little or no information	RF C*	Adaptation potential at 1.5°C	Adaptation potential at 2°C	Confidence in assigning adaptation
Freshwater	Precipitation, temperature, snowmelt	Water Stress	Additional 8% of the world population in 2000 to new or aggravated water scarcity	Around half compared to the risks at 2.0°C	~100% increase	M		Europe, Australia and southern Africa		3	L	L	M
		Fluvial flood	170% increase in population affected as compared to the impact simulated over the baseline	100% increase in population affected as compared to the impact simulated over the	70% increase	M	U.S., Asia, and Europe		Africa and Oceania	2	L/M	L/M	M

Sector	Physical climate change drivers	Nature of risk	Global risks at 2°C global warming above pre-industrial	Global risks at 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial	Change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C	Confidence in risk statements	Regions where risks are particularly high with 2°C global warming	Regions where change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C are particularly high	Regions with little or no information	RF C *	Adaptation potential at 1.5°C	Adaptation potential at 2°C	Confidence in assigning adaptation
			period 1976–2005	baseline period 1976–2005									
		Drought	410.7±213.5 million, changes in urban population exposure to severe drought at the globe	350.2±158.8 million, changes in urban population exposure to severe drought at the globe	60.5±84.1 million (±84.1 based on the SSP1 scenario)	M	Central Europe, Southern Europe, the Mediterranean, West Africa, East and West Asia and Southeast Asia			2	L/M	L/M	L
Terrestrial ecosystems	Temperature, precipitation	Species range loss	H (18% insects, 8% vertebrates, 16% plants lose >50% range)	M (6% insects, 4% vertebrates, 8% plants, lose >50% range)	Double or triple	H		Amazon, Europe, South Africa		1, 4	M	L	H

Sector	Physical climate change drivers	Nature of risk	Global risks at 2°C global warming above pre-industrial	Global risks at 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial	Change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C	Confidence in risk statements	Regions where risks are particularly high with 2°C global warming	Regions where change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C are particularly high	Regions with little or no information	RF C *	Adaptation potential at 1.5°C	Adaptation potential at 2°C	Confidence in assigning adaptation
		Loss of ecosystem functioning and services	H	M		M							
		Shifts of biomes (major ecosystem types)	13% (range 8–20%) transformed	Around 7% transformed	Around double	H		Arctic, Tibet, Himalayas, South Africa and Australia		4	-	-	-
	Heat and cold stress, warming, precipitation.	Wildfire	H	H	L	M	Canada, USA, Mediterranean	Mediterranean	Central and South America, Australia, Russia, China, Africa	1, 2, 4, 5	L	L	M

Sector	Physical climate change drivers	Nature of risk	Global risks at 2°C global warming above pre-industrial	Global risks at 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial	Change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C	Confidence in risk statements	Regions where risks are particularly high with 2°C global warming	Regions where change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C are particularly high	Regions with little or no information	RF C *	Adaptation potential at 1.5°C	Adaptation potential at 2°C	Confidence in assigning adaptation
Ocean	Warming and stratification of the surface ocean	Loss of framework species (coral reefs)	very H (<i>virtually certain</i>)	H	3	H/very H	Tropical/subtropical countries	Tropical/subtropical countries	Southern Red Sea, Somalia, Yemen; deep water coral reefs	1, 2	H	L	H
		Loss of framework species (seagrass)	H	M	5	H/very H	Tropical/subtropical countries	Tropical/subtropical countries	Southern Red Sea, Somalia, Yemen; Myanmar	1, 2	M	L	M/H
		Loss of framework species (mangroves)	M/H	M	3	M/H	Tropical/subtropical countries	Tropical/subtropical countries	Southern Red Sea, Somalia, Yemen; Myanmar	1, 3	M	L	M/H
		Disruption of marine food webs	M	L	5	M	Global	Global	Deep Sea	4	M	L	M/H

Sector	Physical climate change drivers	Nature of risk	Global risks at 2°C global warming above pre-industrial	Global risks at 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial	Change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C	Confidence in risk statements	Regions where risks are particularly high with 2°C global warming	Regions where change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C are particularly high	Regions with little or no information	RF C *	Adaptation potential at 1.5°C	Adaptation potential at 2°C	Confidence in assigning adaptation
		Range migration of marine species and ecosystems	H	M	5	H	Global	Global	Deep Sea	1	M	L	H
		Loss of finfish and fisheries	M/H	M/H	5	H	Global	Global	Deep Sea	4	M	M/L	M/H
	Ocean acidification and elevated sea temperatures	Loss of coastal ecosystems and protection	M	L/M	5	M	Low latitude tropical/subtropical countries	Low latitude tropical/subtropical countries	Most regions - risks not well defined	1	M	M/L	M
		Loss of bivalves and bivalve fisheries	M	M	3	H	Temperate countries with up-welling	Temperate countries with up-welling	Most regions - risks not well defined	4	M/H	L/M	M/H

Sector	Physical climate change drivers	Nature of risk	Global risks at 2°C global warming above pre-industrial	Global risks at 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial	Change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C	Confidence in risk statements	Regions where risks are particularly high with 2°C global warming	Regions where change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C are particularly high	Regions with little or no information	RF C *	Adaptation potential at 1.5°C	Adaptation potential at 2°C	Confidence in assigning adaptation
		Changes to physiology and ecology of marine species	M	L/M	3	H	Global	Global	Most regions - risks not well defined	4	L	L	M/H
	Reduced bulk ocean circulation and de-oxygenation	Increased hypoxic dead zones	L/M	L	5	L/M	Temperate countries with up-welling	Temperate countries with up-welling	Deep Sea	4	L	L	M
		Changes to up-welling productivity	M	L	5	L/M	Most upwelling regions	Most upwelling regions	Some up-welling systems	4	L	L	M
	Intensified storm	Loss of coastal ecosystems	H/very H	H	5	H	Tropical/subtropical countries	Tropical/subtropical countries		1, 4	M	L	M

Sector	Physical climate change drivers	Nature of risk	Global risks at 2°C global warming above pre-industrial	Global risks at 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial	Change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C	Confidence in risk statements	Regions where risks are particularly high with 2°C global warming	Regions where change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C are particularly high	Regions with little or no information	RF C *	Adaptation potential at 1.5°C	Adaptation potential at 2°C	Confidence in assigning adaptation
		Inundation and destruction of human/coastal infrastructure and livelihoods.	H/very H	H	5	H	Global	Global		1, 5	M/H	M	M/L
	Loss of sea ice	Loss of habitat	very H	H	5	H	Polar regions	Polar regions		1	L	very L	H
		Increased productivity but changing fisheries	M/H	L/M	5	very H	Polar regions	Polar regions		1, 4	L	M/L	H

Sector	Physical climate change drivers	Nature of risk	Global risks at 2°C global warming above pre-industrial	Global risks at 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial	Change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C	Confidence in risk statements	Regions where risks are particularly high with 2°C global warming	Regions where change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C are particularly high	Regions with little or no information	RF C *	Adaptation potential at 1.5°C	Adaptation potential at 2°C	Confidence in assigning adaptation
Coastal	Sea level rise, increased storminess	Area exposed (assuming no defences)	590-613 th km ² when 2.0degC first reached	562-575 th km ² when 1.5degC first reached	Increasing . 25 -38 th km ² when temperatures are first reached, 10-17 th km ² in 2100 increasing to 16-230 th km ² in 2300	M/H (dependent on population datasets)	Asia. Small islands	Asia. Small islands	Small islands	2,3	M	M	M
		Population exposed (assuming no defences)	141-151 million when 2.0degC first reached	128-143 million when 1.5degC first reached	Increasing . 13 - 8 million when temperatures are first reached, 0-6 million people in	M/H (dependent on population datasets)	Asia. Small islands	Asia. Small islands	Small islands	2,3	M	M	M

Sector	Physical climate change drivers	Nature of risk	Global risks at 2°C global warming above pre-industrial	Global risks at 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial	Change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C	Confidence in risk statements	Regions where risks are particularly high with 2°C global warming	Regions where change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C are particularly high	Regions with little or no information	RF C *	Adaptation potential at 1.5°C	Adaptation potential at 2°C	Confidence in assigning adaptation
					2100, increasing to 35-95 million people in 2300								
		People at risk taking account of defences (modelled in 1995)	Between 14.9-52.3 million people / yr if defences are not upgraded from the modelled 1995 baseline	Between 2.3-27.8 million people / yr as defences are not upgraded from the 1995 baseline	Increasing with time, but highly dependent on adaptation .	M/H (dependent on adaptation)	Asia. Small islands. Potentially African nations.	Asia. Small islands	Small islands	2,3, 4	M	M	M

Sector	Physical climate change drivers	Nature of risk	Global risks at 2°C global warming above pre-industrial	Global risks at 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial	Change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C	Confidence in risk statements	Regions where risks are particularly high with 2°C global warming	Regions where change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C are particularly high	Regions with little or no information	RF C *	Adaptation potential at 1.5°C	Adaptation potential at 2°C	Confidence in assigning adaptation
Food security and food production systems	Heat and cold stress, warming, precipitation.	Changes in ecosystem production	H	M/H	M/H	M/H	Global	Noth America, Central and South America, Mediterranean basin, South Africa, Australia, Asia	---	2, 4,5	H	M/H	M/H
	Heat and cold stress, warming, precipitation.	Shift and composition change of biomes (major ecosystem types)	H	M/H	M	L/M	Global	Global, Tropical areas, Mediterranean	Africa, Asia	1, 2, 3, 4	L/M	L	L/M
Human health	Temperature	Heat-related morbidity and mortality	M/H	M	Risk increased	VH	All regions at risk	All regions	Africa	2,3, 4	H	H	H
		Occupational heat stress	M/H	M	Risk increased	M	Tropical regions	Tropical regions	Africa	2,3, 4	H	M	M

Sector	Physical climate change drivers	Nature of risk	Global risks at 2°C global warming above pre-industrial	Global risks at 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial	Change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C	Confidence in risk statements	Regions where risks are particularly high with 2°C global warming	Regions where change in risk when moving from 2°C to 1.5°C are particularly high	Regions with little or no information	RFC*	Adaptation potential at 1.5°C	Adaptation potential at 2°C	Confidence in assigning adaptation
	Air quality	Ozone-related mortality	M/H (if precursor emissions remain the same)	M (if precursor emissions remain the same)	Risk increased	H	High income and emerging economies	High income and emerging economies	Africa, parts of Asia	2,3,4	L	L	M
	Temperature, precipitation	Undernutrition	M/H	M	Risk increased	H	Low-income countries in Africa and Asia	Low-income countries in Africa and Asia	Small islands	2,3,4	M	L	M
Key economic	Temperature	Tourism (sun and beach, and snow sports)	H	M/H	Risk increased	VH	Coastal tourism, particularly in sub-tropical and tropical regions	Coastal tourism, particularly in sub-tropical and tropical regions	Africa	1,2,3	M	L	H

*RFC: 1 = unique and threatened systems, 2 = extreme events, 3 = unequal distribution of impacts, 4 = global aggregate impacts (economic + biodiversity), 5 = large scale singular events

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3.4.13 Synthesis of key elements of risk

Some elements of the assessment in Section 3.4 are synthesised in a single diagram (Figure 3.19) that indicates the overall risk in five broad categories for natural and human systems as a result of anthropogenic climate change and increases in Global Mean Surface Temperature (GMST). The elements included are supported by a substantive enough body of literature providing at least *medium confidence* in the assessment. The format for figure 3.19 matches that of Figure 19.4 of WGII AR5 Chapter 19 (Oppenheimer et al., 2014) and Figure 3.19) by indicating the levels of the transition of risk from undetectable to moderate (detected and attributed), from moderate to high (severe and widespread) and from high to very high, the latter indicating significant irreversibility or persistence of climate-related hazards combined with a much reduced capacity to adapt. Regarding the transition from undetectable to moderate, the impact literature assessed in the AR5 focused on describing and quantifying linkages between weather and climate patterns and impact outcomes, with limited detection and attribution to anthropogenic climate change (Cramer et al., 2014). A more recent analysis of attribution to greenhouse gas forcing at the global scale (Hansen and Stone, 2016) confirmed that the impacts related to changes in regional atmospheric and ocean temperature can be confidently attributed to anthropogenic forcing, while attribution to anthropogenic forcing of those related to precipitation is only weakly evident or absent. Moreover, there is no strong direct relationship between the robustness of climate attribution and that of impact attribution (Hansen and Stone, 2016).

The current synthesis is complementary to the synthesis in Section 3.5.2 that categorizes risks into ‘Reasons for Concern’ (RFCs), as described in Oppenheimer et al. (2014). Each element presented here maps to one or more RFCs, and the figure indicates this relationship. It should be emphasized that risks to the issues assessed here are only a subset of the full range of risks that contribute to the RFCs. This figure is not intended to replace the RFCs but rather to indicate how risks to particular elements of the earth system accrue with global warming, with a focus on levels of warming of 1.5°C and 2°C. Key evidence assessed in earlier parts of this chapter are summarized to indicate the transition points between the levels of risk. A fuller account is in the Supplementary Material 3.SM S3-4-12.

In terrestrial ecosystems (related to RFC1 and RFC4), detection and attribution studies show that impacts of climate change on terrestrial ecosystems began to take place over the few decades, indicating a transition from no risk (white) to moderate risk (yellow) below recent temperatures (*high confidence*, Section 3.4.3). Risks to unique and threatened terrestrial ecosystems are generally higher under warming of 2°C as compared to 1.5°C (Section 3.5.2.1), while at the global scale, severe and widespread risks (red) are projected to occur by 2°C of warming. These risks are associated with biome shifts and species range loss (Sections 3.4.3 and 3.5.2.4); however, because many systems and species are unable to adapt to levels of warming below 2°C, the transition to high risk (red) is located below 2°C (*high confidence*). At 3°C of warming, however, biome shifts and species range losses escalate to very high levels and the systems have very little capacity to adapt (purple; Section 3.4.3; *high confidence*).

In the Arctic (related to RFC1), the increased rate of summer sea ice melt was detected and attributed to climate change by the year 2000 (corresponding to warming of 0.7°C), indicating moderate risk (yellow). At 1.5°C warming, an ice-free Arctic ocean is considered *unlikely* whilst by 2°C warming it is considered *likely* and this unique ecosystem is considered unable to adapt, hence a transition from high (red) to very high (purple) risk is expected between 1.5°C and 2°C warming.

For coral reefs, there is *high confidence* in the transitions between colour assignments, especially in the growing impacts in the transition of warming from 0.4°C to 0.6°C, and in projections of change from 0.6°C to

1 1.3°C (Section 3.4.4; Box 3.4). This assessment took into account the heat wave related loss of 50% of
2 shallow water corals across hundreds of kilometres of the world's largest continuous coral reef system, the
3 Great Barrier Reef, as well as other sites globally. Together with sequential mass coral bleaching and
4 mortality events on the Great Barrier Reef (Hoegh-Guldberg, 1999; Hughes et al., 2017b, 2018), suggest that
5 climate risks are very high for coral reefs. General assessment of climate risks for mangroves prior to this
6 special report concluded that they face greater risks from deforestation and unsustainable coastal
7 development than climate change (Alongi, 2008; Gattuso et al., 2015)(Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2014). Recent
8 climate related die-offs (Duke et al., 2017; Lovelock et al., 2017), however, suggest that climate change risks
9 may have been underestimated for mangroves as well, leading to risks considered to be undetectable to
10 moderate, with the transition now starting at 1.3°C as opposed to 1.8°C as assessed in 2015 (Gattuso et al.,
11 2015). Risks of climate change related impacts on small-scale fisheries at low latitudes (many of which are
12 dependent on ecosystems such as coral reefs and mangroves) *are moderate today but are expected to reach*
13 *high levels of risk by 1.1°C (high confidence)* (Section 3.4.4.10).

14
15 The transition from white to yellow (related to RFC3, 4) is based on AR5 WGII Chapter 7 which indicated
16 with *high confidence* that climate change impacts on crop yields have been detected and attributed to climate
17 change, with the current assessment providing further evidence to confirm this (Section 3.4.6). Impacts were
18 detected in the tropics (AR5 WGII Chapter 7, AR5 WGII Chapter 18) and with increasing warming regional
19 risks become high in some regions by 1.5°C warming, and in many regions by 2.5°C warming, indicating a
20 transition from moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2.5°C warming (*medium confidence*). Impacts from
21 fluvial flooding (related to RFCs 2, 3 and 4) depend on the frequency and intensity of the events as well as
22 the extent of exposure and vulnerability of society (i.e., socioeconomic conditions; the effect of non-climate
23 stressors). Risks posed by 1.5°C warming continue to increase with warming (Sections 3.4.2, 3.3.5), with
24 projected increases threefold relative to current risk in economic damages due to flooding in 19 countries for
25 a warming of 2°C, indicating a transition to high risk at this level (*medium confidence*). Because few studies
26 assess the potential to adapt to these risks, there was insufficient evidence to locate a transition to very high
27 risk (purple).

28
29 Climate-change induced SLR and associated coastal flooding (related to RFCs 2, 3 and 4) were detectable
30 and attributable since approximately 1970 (Slangen et al., 2016), where temperatures have risen by 0.3°C
31 (Section 3.3.9) (*medium confidence*). Analysis suggests that impacts could be more widespread in sensitive
32 systems such as small islands (Section 3.4.5.3) (*high confidence*) and increasingly widespread by the 2070s
33 (Brown et al., 2018a), even when considering adaptation measures, suggesting a transition to high risk (red)
34 (Section 3.4.5). With 2.5°C warming, adaptation limits would be exceeded in sensitive areas, and hence a
35 transition to purple (very high risk) can be located here (*medium confidence*). Sea level rise could have
36 adverse effects for centuries, posing significant risk to low lying areas (Sections 3.4.5.7 and 3.5.2.5) (*high*
37 *confidence*).

38
39 For heat-related morbidity and mortality (related to RFCs 2, 3 and 4), detection and attribution studies show
40 heat-related mortality in some locations increased due to climate change (*high confidence*, Section 3.4.7, Ebi
41 et al., 2017). The projected risks of heat-related morbidity and mortality are generally higher under warming
42 of 2°C than 1.5°C (*high confidence*), with projections of greater exposure to high ambient temperatures and
43 increased morbidity and mortality (Section 3.4.7). Risk levels will depend on the rate of warming and the
44 (related) level of adaptation, so a transition in risk from moderate (yellow) to high (red) is located between
45 1°C and 3°C with *medium confidence*.

46
47 For tourism (related to RFCs 3 and 4), changing weather patterns, extreme weather and climate events, and


1 sea level rise are affecting many (but not all) global tourism investments and environmental and cultural
2 destination assets (Section 3.4.4.12), with ‘last chance’ tourism markets developing based on observed
3 impacts on environmental and cultural heritage (Section 3.4.9.1), indicating a transition from undetected to
4 moderate risk between 0°C and 1.5°C (*high confidence*). Based on limited analyses, risks to the tourism
5 sector are higher at 2°C than at 1.5°C, with greater impacts on climate-sensitive sun, beach, and snow sports
6 tourism markets. The degradation or loss of coral reef systems will increase the risks to coastal tourism,
7 particularly in sub-tropical and tropical regions. A transition in risk from moderate (yellow) to high (red) is
8 located between 1.5 and 3°C (*medium confidence*).
9

10 Owing to the existing effects that climate change is already having upon ecosystems, human health and
11 agriculture, climate change is already beginning to make it more difficult to reach goals to eradicate poverty
12 and hunger and protect health and life on land (Sections 5.1 and 5.2.1), suggesting a transition from
13 undetected to moderate risk below recent temperatures at 0.5°C warming (*medium confidence*). Based
14 on limited analyses there is evidence and agreement that the risks to sustainable development are
15 considerably less at 1.5°C than 2°C (Section 5.2.2) including avoided impacts on poverty and food security.
16 It is easier to achieve many of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at 1.5°C, suggesting that a
17 transition to higher risk has not yet begin at this level. At 2°C and higher (e.g., RCP8.5) however, there are
18 high risks of failure to meet SDGs such as eradicating poverty and hunger, providing safe water,
19 reducing inequality, and protecting ecosystems and which are likely to become severe and widespread if
20 warming were increase further to about 3°C (*medium confidence*) (Section 5.2.3).
21

22 **Disclosure statement:** The selection of elements is not intended to be fully comprehensive and does not
23 necessarily include all elements for which there is a substantive body of literature, nor does it necessarily
24 include all elements which are of particular interest to decision makers.
25
26
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Risks for specific natural, managed and human systems

The key elements are presented here as a function of the risk level assessed between 1.5 and 2°C.



1
2 **Figure 3.20:** The dependence of risk associated with selected elements of human and natural systems on the level of
3 climate change, adapted from Figure 3.18 and from AR5 WGII Chapter 19, and highlighting the nature of
4 this dependence between 0 and 2°C warming above pre-industrial levels. The color scheme indicates the
5 additional risks due to climate change. The shading of each ember provides a qualitative indication of the
6 increase in risk with temperature for each individual ‘element’. At one end, undetectable risk (white)
7 indicates no detection and attribution of climate change with at least medium confidence. At the other end
8 of the risk spectrum, the transition from red to purple, introduced for the first time in AR4, is defined by
9 very high risk and the presence of significant irreversibility or persistence of climate-related hazards
10 combined with limited ability to adapt due to the nature of the hazard or impact. Comparison of the
11 increase of risk across elements indicates the relative sensitivity of elements to increases in Global Mean
12 Surface Temperature (GMST). As was done previously, this assessment takes autonomous adaptation into
13 account, as well as limits to adaptation independently of development pathway. The levels of risk
14 illustrated reflect the judgements of the authors of Chapter 3 and Gattuso et al. (2015; for three marine
15 elements).

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18
19 **3.5 Avoided impacts and reduced risks at 1.5°C compared with 2°C**

20
21 **3.5.1 Introduction**


22
23 Oppenheimer et al. (2014, AR5 Chapter 19) provide a framework that aggregates projected risks from global

1 mean temperature change into five categories known as ‘Reasons for Concern’. Risks are classified as
 2 moderate, high, or very high and coloured yellow, red and purple respectively in Figure 19.4 (see AR5
 3 Chapter 19 for details and findings). The framework’s conceptual basis and the risk judgments made in
 4 Oppenheimer et al. (2014) were recently reviewed, confirming most judgements made in the light of more
 5 recent literature (O’Neill et al., 2017). We adopt the approach of Oppenheimer et al. (2014), with updates in
 6 terms of the aggregation of risk as informed by the most recent literature, for the analysis of avoided impacts
 7 at 1.5°C compared to 2°C of global warming presented in this section.

8
 9 The economic benefits to be obtained by achieving the global temperature goal of 1.5°C, as compared to 2°C
 10 (or higher) are discussed in Section 3.5.3 in the light of the five reasons for concern explored in Section
 11 3.5.2. Climate change hot spots that can be avoided or reduced by achieving the 1.5°C target are summarised
 12 in Section 3.5.4. The section concludes with a discussion of regional tipping points that can be avoided at
 13 1.5°C compared to higher degrees of global warming (Section 3.5.5).

14
 15
 16 **3.5.2 Aggregated avoided impacts and reduced risks at 1.5°C versus 2°C of global warming**

17
 18 A brief summary of the accrual of RFC with global warming as assessed in WGII AR5 is provided in the
 19 following sections, which leads into an update of relevant literature published since AR5. The new literature
 20 is used to confirm the levels of global warming at which risks are considered to increase to moderate, and
 21 from moderate to high, and from high to very high. Figure 3.20 modifies Figure 19.4 from AR5 WGII with
 22 the ensuing text in this subsection providing the justification for the modifications. O’Neill et al. (2017)
 23 presents a very similar assessment to WGII AR5, but with further discussion of the future potential to create
 24 socioeconomic-scenario specific embers. At present, there is insufficient literature to do this so the original
 25 simple approach has been used here. Since the focus in the present assessment is on the consequences of
 26 warming of 1.5°C to 2°C, with no assessment for global warming of 3°C or more are not included, the
 27 embers developed here are discontinued at 3°C.
 28



29

1 **Figure 3.21:** The dependence of risk associated with the Reasons for Concern (RFCs) on the level of climate change,
2 updated and adapted from WGII AR5 Ch 19, Figure 19.4 and highlighting the nature of this dependence
3 between 0°C and 2°C warming above pre-industrial levels. The color scheme indicates the additional risks
4 due to climate change. The shading of each ember provides a qualitative indication of the increase in risk
5 with temperature for each individual ‘reason’. The transition from red to purple, introduced for the first
6 time in AR4, is defined by very high risk and the presence of significant irreversibility or persistence of
7 climate-related hazards combined with limited ability to adapt due to the nature of the hazard or impact.
8 Comparison of the increase of risk across RFCs indicates the relative sensitivity of RFCs to increases in
9 GMST. As was done previously, this assessment takes autonomous adaptation into account, as well as
10 limits to adaptation (RFC 1, 3, 5) independently of development pathway. The rate and timing of impacts
11 were taken into account in assessing RFC 1 and 5. The levels of risk illustrated reflect the judgements of
12 the Ch 3 authors. [Note to reviewers: In WGII AR5 Ch 19 and more recently in O’Neill et al. 2017 the
13 need to detail how these kinds of figures vary with socioeconomic pathway is noted and suggestions are
14 made therein as to how this might be done. That is seen as a task for IPCC AR6, and beyond the scope of
15 what is feasible to do for SR1.5]

16 17 18 19 3.5.2.1 RFC 1- Unique and threatened systems

20 WGII AR5 Chapter 19 found that some unique and threatened systems are at risk from climate change at
21 current temperatures, with increasing numbers of systems at risk of severe consequences at global warming
22 of 1.6°C above pre-industrial levels. It was also observed that many species and ecosystems have limited
23 ability to adapt to the very large risks associated with warming of 2.6°C or more, particularly Arctic sea ice
24 and coral reef systems (*high confidence*). A transition from white to yellow indicating the onset of moderate
25 risk was therefore located below present day global temperatures (*medium confidence*); a transition from
26 yellow to red indicating the onset of high risk was located at 1.6°C, and a transition to purple indicating the
27 onset of very high risk at about 2.6°C. This WGII AR5 analysis already implies a significant reduction in
28 risks to unique and threatened systems if warming is limited to 1.5°C as compared with 2°C. Since AR5,
29 evidence of present day impacts in these systems has continued to grow (Sections 3.4.2.2, 3.4.2.3, and
30 3.4.2.5), whilst new evidence has also accumulated about increased risks at 1.5°C vs 2°C warming in Arctic
31 ecosystems (Section 3.3.9), coral reefs (Section 3.4.3), some other unique ecosystems (Section 3.4.2) and
32 biodiversity.

33
34 New literature since AR5 provides a closer focus on the comparative levels of risk to coral reefs at 1.5°C
35 versus 2°C global warming. As assessed in Section 3.4.4 and Box 3.4, reaching 2°C will increase the
36 frequency of mass coral bleaching and mortality to a point at which it will result in the total loss of coral
37 reefs from the world’s tropical and subtropical regions. Restricting overall warming to 1.5°C will still see a
38 downward trend in average coral cover (70–90% decline by mid-century) but will prevent the total loss of
39 coral reefs projected with warming of 2°C. The remaining reefs at 1.5°C will also benefit from increasingly
40 stable ocean conditions by the mid-to-late 21st century. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C during the course
41 of the century may, therefore, open the window for many ecosystems to adapt or reassert geographically past
42 climate change. This indicates a transition in risk in this system from high to very high (red to purple) (*high*
43 *confidence*) at 1.5°C warming and contributes to a lowering of the transition from high to very high (red to
44 purple) in this RFC1 compared to AR5. Further details of risk transitions for ocean systems are described in
45 Figure 3.20.

46
47 Substantial losses of Arctic Ocean summer ice were projected in AR5 WGI for global warming of 1.6°C,
48 with a nearly ice-free Arctic Ocean being projected for global warming of greater than 2.6°C. Since AR5, the

1 importance of a threshold between 1°C and 2°C has been further emphasized in the literature, with sea ice
2 projected to persist throughout the year for a global warming less than 1.5°C, yet chances of an ice-free
3 Arctic during summer being high at 2°C warming (Section 3.3.8). Less of the permafrost in the Arctic is
4 projected to thaw (21–37% under 1.5°C warming as compared with 35–47% for 2°C warming) (Section
5 3.3.5.2), which would be expected to reduce risks to both social and ecological systems in the Arctic. This
6 indicates a transition in risk in this system from high to very high (red to purple) between 1.5°C and 2°C
7 warming and contributes to a lowering of the transition from high to very high (red to purple) in this RFC1
8 compared to AR5.

9
10 AR5 identifies a large number of threatened systems including mountain ecosystems, highly biodiverse
11 tropical wet and dry forests, deserts, freshwater systems and dune systems. These include the Mediterranean
12 areas in Europe, Siberian, tropical and desert ecosystems in Asia, Australian rainforests, the Fynbos and
13 succulent Karoo areas of S. Africa, and wetlands in Ethiopia, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In all these
14 systems, impacts accrue with greater warming and impacts at 2°C being expected to be greater than those at
15 1.5°C (*medium confidence*). One study since the AR5 has shown that constraining global warming to 1.5°C
16 would maintain the functioning of the prairie pothole ecosystem (north America) in terms of its productivity
17 and biodiversity, whilst a warming of 2°C would not do so (Carter Johnson et al., 2016). The large
18 proportion of insects projected to lose over half their range at 2°C warming (25%) as compared to 1.5°C
19 warming (9%) also suggests a significant loss of functionality in these systems at 2°C warming owing to the
20 key role of insects in nutrient cycling, pollination, detritivory, and other key ecosystem processes (Section
21 3.4.2).

22
23 Unique and threatened systems in small island states and in systems fed by glacier meltwater were also
24 considered in AR5 in making a contribution to this RFC, but there is little new information about these systems
25 that pertains to 1.5°C or 2°C global warming.

26
27 Taken together, the evidence suggests that the transition from high to very high risk (red to purple) in unique
28 and threatened systems occurs at a lower level of warming, between 1.5°C and 2°C (*high confidence*), than in
29 AR5 where this transition was located at 2.6°C. The transition from moderate to high risk (yellow to red)
30 would relocate very slightly from 1.6°C to 1.5°C.

31 3.5.2.2 RFC 2- Extreme weather events

32
33 In this sub-subsection reduced risks in terms of the likelihood of occurrence of extreme weather events are
34 discussed for 1.5°C as compared to 2°C of global warming – for those extreme events where current evidence
35 is available. AR5 assigned a moderate (yellow) level of risk due to extreme weather events at recent
36 temperatures (1986-2005) due to the attribution of heat and precipitation extremes to climate change, and a
37 transition to high (red) beginning below 1.6°C global warming based on the magnitude, likelihood and
38 timing of projected changes in risk associated with extreme events, indicating more severe and widespread
39 impacts. The AR5 analysis already suggests a significant benefit of limiting warming to 1.5°C, since this
40 might keep risks closer to the moderate level. New literature since AR5 provides greater confidence in a
41 reduced level of risks due to extreme weather events at 1.5°C versus 2°C for some types of extremes (see
42 Section 3.3 and below).

1 **Temperature:** It is very likely that further increases in number of warm days/nights and decrease in number
2 of cold days/nights and in overall temperature of hot and cold extremes will occur under 1.5°C of global
3 warming compared to present-day climate (1°C warming), with further increases towards 2°C of warming
4 (section 3.3). As assessed in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, impacts of a 0.5°C global warming can be identified
5 for temperature extremes at global scales, based on observations and the analysis of climate models. At 2°C
6 of global warming, it is likely that temperature increases of more than 2°C will occur over most land regions
7 in terms of extreme temperatures (on average between 3 and 8°C depending on region and considered
8 extreme index) (Section 3.3.2). Regional increases in temperature extremes under 1.5°C of global warming,
9 can be reduced to 2–6°C (Section 3.3.2). Benefits to be obtained from this general reduction in extremes
10 depends to a large extent on whether the lower range of increases in extremes at 1.5°C is sufficient for
11 critical thresholds to be exceeded, within the context of wide-ranging aspects such as crop yields, human
12 health and the sustainability of ecosystems.

13
14 **Heavy precipitation:** AR5 assessed trends in heavy precipitation for land regions where observational
15 coverage was sufficient for assessment. It concluded with medium confidence that anthropogenic forcing has
16 contributed to a global-scale intensification of heavy precipitation over the second half of the 20th century. A
17 recent observations-based study also shows that a 0.5°C increase in global mean temperature has a detectable
18 effect on changes in precipitation extremes at global scale (Schleussner et al., 2017), thus suggesting that
19 there would be detectable differences in heavy precipitation at 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming. These
20 results are consistent with analyses of climate projections, although they also highlight a large amount of
21 regional variation in the sensitivity of changes in heavy precipitation (Section 3.3.3).

22
23 **Droughts:** When considering the difference between precipitation minus evaporation as a function of global
24 temperature changes, the subtropics generally display an overall trend towards drying, whilst the northern
25 high latitudes display a robust response towards increased wetting (Section 3.3.4, Figure 3.12). Limiting
26 global mean temperature increase to 1.5°C as opposed to 2°C could substantially reduce the risk of reduced
27 regional water availability (Section 3.3.4). Regions that are to benefit include much of South America,
28 southern Africa, Australia and the Mediterranean.

29
30 **Fire:** The increased amount of evidence that anthropogenic climate change has already caused significant
31 increases in fire area globally (Section 3.4.3) is in line with projected fire risks. These risks are projected to
32 increase further under 1.5°C of global warming relative to the present day (Section 3.4.3). Under 1.2°C of
33 global warming, fire frequency was estimated to increase by over 37.8% of global land areas, compared to
34 61.9% of global land areas under 3.5°C of warming. For in-depth discussion and uncertainty estimates, see
35 (Meehl et al., 2007; Moritz et al., 2012; Romero-Lankao et al., 2014).

36
37 In “Extreme Weather Events” (RFC2) the transition from moderate to high risk is located between 1°C and
38 1.5°C global warming, which is very similar to the AR5 assessment but there is greater confidence in the
39 assessment (*medium confidence*). The impact literature contains little information about the potential for
40 human society to adapt to extreme weather events and hence it has not been possible to locate the transition
41 from 'high' (red) to 'very high' risk within the context of assessing impacts at 1.5°C vs 2°C global warming.
42 There is thus *low confidence* in the level at which global warming could lead to very high risks associated
43 with extreme weather events in the context of this report.
44

3.5.2.3 RFC 3 - Distribution of impacts

Risks due to climatic change are unevenly distributed and are generally greater at lower latitudes and for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development. AR5 located the transition to moderate risk below recent temperatures owing to the detection and attribution of regionally differentiated changes in crop yields (*medium to high confidence*) and new literature continues to confirm this finding. Based on assessment of risks to regional crop production and water resources, AR5 located the transition from moderate to high risk between 1.6°C and 2.6°C above pre-industrial levels. Cross-Chapter Box 6 highlights that at 2°C warming, new literature shows that risks of food shortage are projected to emerge in the African Sahel, the Mediterranean, central Europe, the Amazon, western and southern Africa, and that these are much larger than the corresponding risks at 1.5°C. This suggests a transition from moderate to high risk of regionally differentiated impacts between 1.5°C and 2°C above pre-industrial levels for food security (*medium confidence*). Reduction in the availability of water resources for less than 2°C is projected to be greater than 1.5°C of global warming, although changes in socioeconomics could have a greater influence (Section 3.4.2), with larger risks in the Mediterranean (Box 3.2) but estimates of the magnitude of the risks remain similar to those cited in AR5. Globally, millions of people may be at risk from sea level rise during the 21st century (Hinkel et al., 2014; Hauer et al., 2016), particularly if adaptation is limited. At 2°C of warming, more than 70% of global coastlines will experience sea-level rise greater than 0.2 m, suggesting regional differences in the risks of coastal flooding. Regionally differentiated multi-sector risks are already apparent at 1.5°C warming, being more prevalent vulnerable people live, predominantly in South Asia (mostly Pakistan, India, and China), but these spread to sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and East Asia as temperature rises, with the world's poorest disproportionately impacted by 2°C (Byers et al., 2018). The hydrological impacts of climate change in Europe in a 1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C warmer world are intense and spatially more extensive (Donnelly et al., 2017). Taken together, a transition from moderate to high risk is now located between 1.5°C and 2°C above pre-industrial levels based on an assessment of risks to food security, water resources, drought, heat exposure and coastal submergence (*high confidence*).

3.5.2.4 RFC 4 - Global aggregate impacts

Oppenheimer et al. (2014) explain the inclusion of non-economic metrics related to impacts on ecosystems and species at the global level, in addition to economic metrics in global aggregate impacts. The degradation of ecosystem services by climate change and ocean acidification were in general excluded from previous global aggregate economic analyses.

Global economic impacts: WGII AR5 found that overall global aggregate impacts become moderate between 1–2°C of warming and the transition to moderate risk levels was therefore located at 1.6°C above pre-industrial levels. This was based on the assessment of literature using model simulations which indicate that the global aggregate economic impact will become significantly negative between 1°C and 2°C of warming (*medium confidence*), whilst there will be a further increase in the magnitude and likelihood of aggregate economic risks at 3°C warming (*low confidence*).

Since AR5, three studies have emerged using two entirely different approaches which indicate that economic damages are projected to be higher by 2100 if warming reaches 2°C than if it is constrained to 1.5°C. The study of Warren et al. (2018c) uses the integrated assessment model PAGE09 to estimate that avoided global economic damages of 22% (10–26%) accrue from constraining warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C, 90% (77–93%) from 1.5°C rather than 3.66°C, and 87% (74–91%) from 2°C rather than 3.66°C; while Petris et al. (2018) identify several regions in which economic damages are greater at 2°C warming compared to 1.5°C, further estimating that projected damages at 1.5°C remain similar to today's levels of economic damage.

1 Another study (Burke et al., 2018) uses an empirical, statistical approach and finds that limiting warming to
2 1.5°C instead of 2°C would save 1.5–2.0% of Gross World Product (GWP) by mid-century and 3.5% of
3 GWP by end-of-century (see figure 2A in Burke et al 2018), which under a 3% discount rate corresponds to
4 \$8.1-11.6 trillion and \$38.5 trillion in avoided damages by mid- and end-of-century, respectively, agreeing
5 closely with the Warren et al. (2018c) estimate of \$15 trillion. In the no policy baseline temperature rises by
6 3.66°C by 2100, resulting in global GDP loss of 2.6% (5-95% percentile range 0.5–8.2%), as compared with
7 0.3% (0.1–0.5%) by 2100 in the 1.5°C scenario and 0.5% (0.1–1.0%) in the 2°C scenario. Limiting warming
8 to 1.5°C rather than 2°C by 2060 has also been estimated to result in co-benefits of 0.5–0.6% of world GDP
9 due to reductions in air pollution (Shindell et al., 2018) which is similar to the avoided damages identified
10 for the USA (see below).

11
12 Two studies focusing only on the USA (Hsiang et al., 2017; Yohe, 2017) also found that economic damages
13 are projected to be higher by 2100 if warming reaches 2°C than if it is constrained to 1.5°C (one study finds a
14 mean difference 0.35% GDP, range 0.2–0.65%, the other identifies a GDP loss of 1.2% per degree of
15 warming, hence approximately 0.6% for half a degree). Further, the avoided risks compared to a ‘no policy’
16 baseline are greater in the 1.5°C case (4%, range 2–7%) compared to the 2°C case (3.5%, range 1.8–6.5%).
17

18 These analyses suggest that the point at which global aggregates of economic impacts become negative is
19 below 2°C (*medium confidence*), and that there is a possibility that this is below 1.5°C warming.
20

21 Oppenheimer et al. (2014) note that the global aggregated damages associated with large scale singular
22 events has not been explored, and reviews of integrated modelling exercises have indicated a potential
23 underestimation of global aggregate damages due to the lack of consideration of the potential for these
24 events in many studies. Since AR5, a further analysis of the potential economic consequences of triggering
25 these large scale singular events (Y. Cai et al., 2016; Lemoine and Traeger, 2016), also indicates a two to
26 eightfold larger economic impact associated with a warming of 3°C than most previous analyses, depending
27 on the number of events incorporated: Lemoine includes only three known singular events whereas (Y. Cai
28 et al., 2016) include five.
29

30 **Biome shifts, risks of species extinction and ecosystem functioning and services:** 13% (range 8–20%) of
31 the earth’s land area is projected to undergo biome shifts under 2°C warming compared to approximately 7%
32 at 1.5°C warming (Section 3.4.3, Warszawski et al., 2013), hence implying a halving of biome
33 transformations. Overall levels of species loss at 2°C warming are similar to previous studies for plants and
34 vertebrates (Warren et al., 2011; Warren et al., 2018b) but insects have been found to be more sensitive to
35 climate change, with 18% (6–35%) projected to lose over half their range at 2°C warming compared to 6%
36 (1–18%) under 1.5°C warming, which is 66% (Section 3.4.3). The critical role of insects in ecosystem
37 functioning therefore suggests impacts already on global ecosystem functioning at 2°C warming. Since AR5
38 new literature indicates that impacts on marine fish stocks and fisheries are lower in 1.5–2°C global warming
39 relative to pre-industrial level when compared to higher warming scenarios (Section 3.4.6) especially in
40 tropical and polar systems.
41

42 In AR5, the transition from no impacts detected (white) to moderate impacts (yellow) was considered to
43 occur between 1°C and 2°C global warming, reflecting the impacts on the economy and on biodiversity
44 globally; whereas high risks (red) were associated with 3°C warming to reflect the high risks to biodiversity
45 and accelerated effects on the global economy. The new evidence suggests moderate impacts on the global
46 aggregate economy and global biodiversity by 1.5°C, suggesting a lowering of the transition to moderate risk

1 (yellow) already by 1.5°C; and higher risks than previously thought on the global aggregate economy and
2 global biodiversity by 2°C global warming; suggesting that risks transition to high between 2°C
3 and 3°C warming, as opposed to at 3°C as previously thought (*medium confidence*).
4
5

6 3.5.2.5 RFC 5 - Large scale singular events

7 Large scale singular events are components of the global earth system that are thought to hold the risk of
8 reaching critical tipping points under climate change, and that can result in or be associated with major shifts
9 in the climate system. These components include:
10

- 11 • The cryosphere: West-Antarctic ice sheet, Greenland ice sheet
- 12 • The thermohaline circulation (slowdown of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Current, AMOC).
- 13 • The El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) as a global mode of climate variability
- 14 • Role of the Southern Ocean in global carbon cycle
15

16 AR5 assessed that the risks associated with these events become moderate between 0.6°C and 1.6°C above
17 pre-industrial levels due to early warning signs and that risk becomes high between 1.6°C and 4.6°C due to
18 the potential for commitment to large irreversible sea level rise from the melting of land based ice sheets
19 (*low to medium confidence*). The increase in risk between 1.6°C and 2.6°C above pre-industrial levels was
20 assessed to be disproportionately large. New findings since AR5 are detailed below.
21

22 **Greenland and West-Antarctic ice sheets and Marine Ice Sheet Instability:** Various feedbacks between
23 the Greenland ice sheet and the wider climate system (most notably those related to the dependence of ice
24 melt on albedo and surface elevation) make irreversible loss of the ice sheet a possibility. Church et al.
25 (2013) assess this threshold to be 2°C or higher (relative to pre-industrial temperature).
26

27 Robinson et al. (2012) find a range for this threshold of 0.8–3.2°C (95% confidence). The threshold of global
28 temperature increase that may initiate irreversible loss of the West-Antarctic ice sheet and Marine Ice Sheet
29 Instability (MISI) is estimated to range between 1.5°C and 2°C. The timescale for eventual loss of the ice
30 sheets varies between millennia and tens of millennia and assumes constant surface temperature forcing
31 during this period. Were temperature to cool subsequently, the ice sheets might regrow although the amount
32 of cooling required is likely to be highly dependent on the duration and rate of the previous retreat. The
33 magnitude of global sea level rise plausible to occur over the next two centuries under 1.5–2°C of global
34 warming is estimated to be in the order of several tenths of a meter by most studies (*low confidence*)
35 (Schewe et al., 2011; Church et al., 2013; Levermann et al., 2014; Marzeion and Levermann, 2014; Fuerst et
36 al., 2015; Golledge et al., 2015), although a smaller number of investigations (Joughin et al., 2014; Golledge
37 et al., 2015; DeConto and Pollard, 2016) project increases of 1–2 m. This body of evidence suggest that the
38 temperature range of 1.5–2°C may be regarded as representing moderate risk (it may trigger MISI in
39 Antarctica or irreversible loss of the Greenland ice sheet and it may be associated with sea-level rise as high
40 as 1–2 m over a period of two centuries).
41

1 **Thermohaline circulation (slowdown of AMOC):** It is more likely than not that the AMOC has been
2 weakening in recent decades, given the detection of the cooling of surface waters in the North Atlantic and
3 evidence that the Gulf Stream has slowed by 30% since the late 1950s (Srokosz and Bryden, 2015; Caesar et
4 al., 2018). There is limited evidence linking the recent weakening of the AMOC to anthropogenic warming
5 (Caesar et al., 2018). It is very likely that the AMOC will weaken over the 21st century. Best estimates and
6 range for the reduction from CMIP5 are 11% (1–24%) in RCP2.6 and 34% (12–54%) in RCP8.5 (AR5).
7 There is no evidence indicating significantly different amplitudes of AMOC weakening for 1.5°C vs 2°C of
8 global warming, or of a shutdown of the AMOC at these global temperature thresholds. Associated risks are
9 classified as low to medium.

10
11 **El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO):** Extreme El Niño events are associated with significant warming of
12 the usually cold eastern Pacific Ocean, and occur about once every 20 years (Cai et al., 2015). Such events
13 reorganize the distribution of regions of organized convection, and affect weather patterns across the globe.
14 Recent research (G. Wang et al., 2017) indicate that the frequency of extreme El Niño events increases
15 linearly with the global mean temperature, and that the number of such events might double (one event every
16 ten years) under 1.5°C of global warming. This pattern is projected to persist for a century after stabilization
17 at 1.5°C, thereby challenging the limits to adaptation, and thus indicating high risk even at the 1.5°C
18 threshold. La Niña event frequencies are projected to remain similar to that of the present-day under 1.5–2°C
19 of global warming.

20
21 **Role of the Southern Ocean in the global carbon cycle:** The critical role of the Southern Ocean as a net
22 sink of carbon might decline under global warming, and assessing this effect under 1.5°C compared to 2°C of
23 global warming is a priority. Changes in ocean chemistry (e.g., oxygen content, ocean acidification),
24 especially those associated with the deep sea, are associated concerns (Section 3.3.10).

25
26 Large scale singular events (RFC5) moderate risk is now located at 1°C and high risks are located 2°C, as
27 opposed to 1.9°C (moderate) and 4°C (high) risk in AR5 because of new observations and models of the
28 West Antarctic ice sheet (medium confidence), which suggests the ice sheet may be in the early stages of
29 Marine Ice Sheet Instability (MISI). Very-high risk is assessed as lying above 5°C because the growing
30 literature on process-based projections of the West Antarctic ice sheet predominantly supports the AR5
31 assessment of a MISI contribution of an additional several tenths of a metre by 2100.

34 3.5.3 *Regional economic benefit analysis for the 1.5°C vs 2°C global temperature goals*

35
36 This section reviews recent literature that estimates the economic benefits for constraining global warming to
37 1.5°C as compared to 2°C. The focus here is on evidence pertaining to specific regions, rather than on global
38 aggregated benefits (Section 3.5.2.4). At 2°C of global warming, lower economic growth is projected for
39 many countries, with low-income countries projected to experience the greatest losses (*limited evidence,*
40 *medium confidence*) (Burke et al., 2018; Petris et al., 2018). A critical issue for developing countries in
41 particular is that advantages in some sectors are projected to be offset by the increasing mitigation costs
42 (Rogelj et al., 2013; Burke et al., 2018)– with food production being a key factor. That is, although
43 restraining the global temperature increase to 2°C is projected to reduce crop losses under climate change,
44 relative to higher levels of warming, the associated mitigation costs may increase the risk of hunger in low-
45 income countries (*low confidence*) (Hasegawa et al., 2016). It is *likely* that the even more stringent mitigation
46 measures required to restrict global warming to 1.5°C (Rogelj et al., 2013) will further increase these

1 mitigation costs and impacts. International trade in food might be a key response measure for alleviating
2 hunger in developing countries under 1.5°C and 2°C stabilization scenarios (Hasegawa et al., 2016).

3
4 Although warming is projected to be the highest in the Northern Hemisphere under 1.5°C or 2°C of global
5 warming, regions in the tropics and Southern Hemisphere subtropics that are projected to experience the
6 largest impacts on economic growth (*limited evidence, medium confidence*) (Gallup et al., 1999; Burke et al.,
7 2018; Petris et al., 2018). Despite the uncertainties associated with climate change projections and
8 econometrics (e.g., Burke et al., 2016), it is *more likely than not* that there will be large differences in
9 economic growth under 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming for developing versus developed countries (Burke
10 et al., 2018; Petris et al., 2018). Statistically significant reductions in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per
11 capita growth are projected across much of the African continent, southeast Asia, India, Brazil and Mexico
12 (*limited evidence, medium confidence*). Countries in the western parts of tropical Africa are projected to
13 benefit most from restricting global warming to 1.5°C as opposed to 2°C, in terms of future economic
14 growth (Petris et al., 2018). An important reason why developed countries in the tropics and subtropics are
15 to benefit substantially from restricting global warming to 1.5°C, relates to present-day temperatures in these
16 regions being above the threshold thought to be optimal for economic production (Burke et al., 2015b,
17 2018).

18
19 The world's largest economies are also projected to benefit from restricting warming to 1.5°C, as opposed to
20 2°C (*medium confidence*), with the likelihood of such benefits to be realized estimated to be 76%, 85% and
21 81% for the USA, China and Japan, respectively (Burke et al., 2018). Two studies focusing only on the USA
22 (Hsiang et al., 2017; Yohe, 2017) also found that economic damages are projected to be higher by 2100 if
23 warming reaches 2°C than if it is constrained to 1.5°C (one study finds a mean difference 0.35% GDP, range
24 0.2–0.65%, the other identifies a GDP loss of 1.2% per degree of warming, hence approximately 0.6% for
25 half a degree). Indeed, no statistically significant changes in GDP are projected to occur over most of the
26 developed world (*limited evidence, low confidence*) (Petris et al., 2018).

27
28 A caveat of the analysis of Petris et al. (2018) and Burke et al. (2018) is that the effects of sea-level rise are
29 not included in the estimations of damages or future economic growth, implying a potential underestimate
30 of the benefits of limiting warming to 1.5°C, for the case where significant sea level rise is avoided at 1.5°C
31 but exceeded at 2°C.

32 33 34 **3.5.4 Reducing hot spots of change for 1.5°C and 2°C global warming**

35
36 This sub-section integrates Sections 3.3 and 3.4 in terms of climate change induced hot-spots that occur
37 through interactions across the physical climate system, ecosystems and socio-economic human systems,
38 with a focus on the extent to which risks can be avoided or reduced by achieving the 1.5°C global
39 temperature goal (as opposed to the 2°C goal). Findings are summarised in Table 3.6.

40 41 42 **3.5.4.1 Arctic sea ice**

43 Ice-free Arctic Ocean summers are *very likely* at levels of global warming higher than 2°C (Notz and
44 Stroeve, 2016; Rosenblum and Eisenman, 2016; Screen and Williamson, 2017; Niederdrenk and Notz,
45 2018). Some studies are even indicative of the entire Arctic Ocean summer period becoming ice-free under
46 2°C of global warming whilst other more conservatively estimate this probability to be in the order of 50%
47 (Sanderson et al., 2017; Section 3.3.8). The probability for an ice-free Arctic in September at 1.5°C of global

1 warming is low and substantially lower than for the case of 2°C of global warming (*high confidence*) (Screen
2 and Williamson, 2017; Jahn, 2018; Niederdrenk and Notz, 2018; Section 3.3.8). There is, however, a single
3 study that questions the validity of the 1.5°C threshold in terms of maintaining summer Arctic Ocean sea-ice
4 (Niederdrenk and Notz, 2018). Finally, during winter, only little ice is projected to be lost for either 1.5°C or
5 2°C global warming (*medium confidence*) (Niederdrenk and Notz, 2018). The losses in sea ice at 1.5°C and
6 2°C of warming will result in habitat losses for organisms such as seals, polar bears, whales and sea-birds
7 (e.g., Larsen et al., 2014). There is *high agreement* and *robust evidence* that photosynthetic species will
8 change due to sea-ice retreat and related changes in temperature and radiation (Section 3.4.4.7), and this is
9 *very likely* to benefit fisheries productivity in the Northern Hemisphere spring bloom system (Section
10 3.4.4.7).

11
12

13 3.5.4.2 Arctic land regions

14 In some Arctic land regions, the warming of cold extremes and annual minimum temperature at 1.5°C is
15 stronger than the global mean temperature increase by a factor of 2–3, i.e. 3°C–4.5°C regional warming at
16 1.5°C global warming (e.g., northern Europe, Supplementary Material 3.SM, Figure 3.SM.6 – also see
17 Section 3.3.2.2 and Seneviratne et al., 2016). Moreover, over much of the Arctic, a further increase of 0.5°C
18 in the global surface temperature, from 1.5 to 2°C may lead to further temperature increases of 2–2.5°C
19 (Figure 3.3). As a consequence, biome (major ecosystem types) shifts are *likely* in the Arctic, with increases
20 in fire frequencies, degradation in permafrost and increases in tree cover *likely* to occur under at 1.5°C
21 warming, with further amplification of these changes under 2°C of global warming (e.g., Gerten et al., 2013;
22 Bring et al., 2016). Rising temperatures, thawing permafrost and changing weather patterns will increasingly
23 impact on people, infrastructure and industries in the Arctic (W.N. Meier et al., 2014), with these impacts
24 larger at 2°C vs 1.5°C of warming (*medium confidence*).

25
26

27 3.5.4.3 Alpine regions

28 Alpine regions are generally regarded as climate change hotspots given their generally cold and harsh
29 climates in which a rich biodiversity has evolved, but which are vulnerable to increases in temperature.
30 Under regional warming, alpine species have been found to migrate upwards on mountain slopes (Reasoner
31 and Tinner, 2009), an adaptation response with obvious limited by mountain height and habitability.
32 Moreover, many of the world's Alpine regions are important from a water security perspective through
33 associated glacier melt, snow melt and river flow (Section 3.3.5.2 for a discussion of these aspects).
34 Projected biome shifts are already *likely* to be severe in alpine regions at 1.5°C warming and increase further
35 for 2°C warming (Chen et al., 2014a; Gerten et al., 2013; Figure 1b).

36
37

38 3.5.4.4 Southeast Asia

39 Southeast Asia is a region highly vulnerable to increased flooding in the context of sea-level rise (Arnell et
40 al., 2016; Brown et al., 2016, 2018a). Risks from increased flooding rise from 1.5°C to 2°C of warming
41 (*medium confidence*), with substantial increases beyond 2°C (Arnell et al., 2016). Southeast Asia displays
42 statistically significant differences in projected changes in heavy precipitation, run-off and high flows at
43 1.5°C versus 2°C warming (with stronger increase at 2°C; Wartenburger et al., 2017; Döll et al., 2018;
44 Seneviratne et al., 2018a); Section 3.3.3), and thus is thought to be a hotspot in terms of increases in heavy
45 precipitation between these two global temperature levels (Schleussner et al., 2016b; Seneviratne et al.,
46 2016) (*medium confidence*). For Southeast Asia, a 2°C warming by 2040 indicated a one-third decline in per
47 capita crop production (Nelson et al., 2010) associated with general decreases in crop yields. However, under

1 1.5°C of warming, significant risks for crop yield reduction in the region are avoided (Schleussner et al.,
2 2016b). These changes pose significant risks for poor people in both rural regions and urban areas of
3 Southeast Asia (Section 3.4.10.1), with these risks being larger at 2°C of global warming compared to 1.5°C
4 of warming (*medium confidence*).

5 6 7 3.5.4.5 Southern Europe and the Mediterranean

8 The Mediterranean is regarded as a climate change hot spot both in terms of projected stronger warming of
9 the regional land-based hot extremes compared to the mean global temperature warming (e.g., Seneviratne et
10 al., 2016) and projected substantial decreases in mean precipitation with associated substantial increases in
11 dry spells. The latter is projected to increase from 7% to 11% when comparing regional impacts at 1.5°C
12 versus 2°C of global warming, respectively (Schleussner et al., 2016b). Low river flows are projected to
13 decrease in the Mediterranean under 1.5°C of global warming (Marx et al., 2018) with associated significant
14 decreases in high flows and floods (Thober et al., 2018), largely in response to reduced precipitation. The
15 median reduction in annual runoff almost double from about 9% (likely range: 4.5–15.5%) at 1.5°C to 17%
16 (likely range: 8–25%) at 2°C (Schleussner et al., 2016b). Similar results are found by (Döll et al., 2018).
17 Overall, there is *high confidence* of strong increases in dryness and decreases in water availability in the
18 Mediterranean and southern Europe from 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming. Sea-level rise is expected to be
19 lower for 1.5°C versus 2°C, lowering risks for coastal metropolitan agglomerations. The risks (with current
20 adaptation) related to water deficit in the Mediterranean are high for a global warming of 2°C, but can be
21 substantially reduced if global warming is limited to 1.5°C (Guiot and Cramer, 2016; Schleussner et al.,
22 2016b; Donnelly et al., 2017; Section 3.3.4).

23 24 25 3.5.4.6 West Africa and the Sahel

26 West Africa and the Sahel are *likely* to experience increases in the number of hot nights and longer and more
27 frequent heat waves even if the global temperature increase is constrained to 1.5°C, with further increase at
28 2°C of global warming and beyond (e.g., Weber et al., 2018). Moreover, the daily rainfall intensity and run-
29 off is expected to increase (*low confidence*) towards 2°C and higher global warming scenarios (Weber et al.,
30 2018; Schleussner et al., 2016b), with these changes also being relatively large compared to the projected
31 changes at 1.5°C of warming. Moreover, increased risks are projected in terms of drought, particularly for
32 the pre-monsoon season (Sylla et al., 2015), with both rural and urban populations affected, and increasingly
33 so at 2°C of global warming as opposed to 1.5°C (Liu et al., 2018). Based on a World Bank (2013) study for
34 sub-Saharan Africa, a 1.5°C warming by 2030 might reduce the present maize cropping areas by 40%,
35 rendering these no longer suitable for current cultivars. Substantial negative impacts are also projected for
36 sorghum suitability in the western Sahel (Läderach et al., 2013; Sultan and Gaetani, 2016). Increase in
37 warming (2°C) by 2040 would result in further yield losses and damages to crops (i.e., maize, sorghum,
38 wheat, millet, groundnut, cassava). Schleussner et al. (2016b) consistently indicate reduced impacts on crop
39 yield for West Africa under 2°C vs 1.5°C of global warming. There is *medium confidence* that vulnerabilities
40 to water and food security in the African Sahel will be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global warming
41 (Cheung et al., 2016b; Betts et al., 2018), and at 2°C these vulnerabilities are expected to be worse (Sultan
42 and Gaetani, 2016; Lehner et al., 2017; Betts et al., 2018; Byers et al., 2018; Rosenzweig et al., 2018) (*high*
43 *evidence*). For global warming greater than 2°C, the western Sahel might experience the strongest drying and
44 experience serious food security issues (Ahmed et al., 2015; Parkes et al., 2018).

1 3.5.4.7 Southern Africa

2 The southern African region is projected to be a climate change hot spot in terms of both hot extremes
3 (Figures 3.5 and 3.6) and drying (Figure 3.12). Indeed, temperatures have been rising in the subtropical
4 regions of southern Africa at approximately twice the global rate over the last five decades (Engelbrecht et
5 al., 2015). Associated elevated warming of the regional land-based hot extremes has occurred (Section 3.3;
6 Seneviratne et al., 2016). Increases in the number of hot nights as well as longer and more frequent heat waves
7 are projected even if the global temperature increase is constrained to 1.5°C (*high confidence*), with further
8 increase at 2°C of global warming and beyond (*high confidence*) (Weber et al., 2018).

9
10 Moreover, the region is *likely* to become generally drier with reduced water availability under low mitigation
11 (Niang et al., 2014; Engelbrecht et al., 2015; Karl et al., 2015; James et al., 2017), with this particular risk
12 also prominent under 2°C of global warming and even 1.5°C of warming (Gerten et al., 2013). Risks are
13 significantly reduced, however, under 1.5°C of global warming (Schleussner et al., 2016b). There are
14 consistent and statistically significant projected increases in risks of increased meteorological drought in
15 southern Africa at 2°C vs 1.5°C of warming (*medium confidence*). Despite the general rainfall reductions
16 projected for southern Africa, daily rainfall intensities are expected to increase over much of the region
17 (*medium confidence*), and increasingly so with further amounts of global warming. There is medium
18 confidence that livestock in southern Africa will experience increased water stress under both 1.5°C and 2°C
19 of global warming, with negative economic consequences (e.g., Boone et al., 2017). The region is also
20 projected to experience reduced maize, sorghum and cocoa cropping area suitability as well as yield losses
21 under 1.5°C of warming, with further decreases towards 2°C of warming (World Bank, 2013). Generally,
22 there is *high confidence* that vulnerability to decreases in water and food availability is reduced at 1.5°C
23 versus 2°C for southern Africa (Betts et al., 2018), whilst at 2°C these are expected to be higher (Lehner et
24 al., 2017; Betts et al., 2018; Byers et al., 2018; Rosenzweig et al., 2018) (*high confidence*).

25 26 27 3.5.4.8 Tropics

28 Worldwide, the largest increases in the number of hot days are projected to occur in the tropics (Figure 3.7).
29 Moreover, the largest differences in the number of hot days for 1.5°C of global warming versus 2°C of
30 global warming are found in the tropics (Mahlstein et al., 2011). In tropical Africa, increases in the number
31 of hot nights, as well as longer and more frequent heat waves, are projected under 1.5°C of global warming,
32 with further increases under 2°C of global warming (Weber et al., 2018). Impact studies for major tropical
33 cereals reveal that yields of maize and wheat begin to decline with 1°C to 2°C of local warming in the
34 tropics. Schleussner et al. (2016b) project that constraining warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C would avoid
35 significant risks of tropical crop yield declines in West Africa, South East Asia, and Central and South
36 America. There is *limited evidence* and thus *low confidence* that these changes may result in significant
37 population displacement from the tropics to the subtropics (e.g., Hsiang and Sobel, 2016).

38 39 40 3.5.4.9 Small islands

41 Small islands are well recognized to be very sensitive to climate change impact such as sea-level rise,
42 oceanic warming, precipitation, cyclones and coral bleaching (*high agreement, robust evidence*) (Nurse et
43 al., 2014; Ourbak and Magnan, 2017). Even at 1.5°C of global warming, the compounding impacts of
44 changes in rainfall, temperature, tropical cyclones and sea levels are likely to be significant across multiple
45 natural and human systems. There are potential benefits to Small Island Developing States (SIDS) from
46 avoided risks at 1.5°C versus 2°C, especially when coupled with adaptation efforts. In terms of sea-level rise,
47 by 2150, roughly 40,000 less people living in SIDS will be inundated in a 1.5°C world than in a 2°C world

(Rasmussen et al., 2018). Constraining global warming to 1.5°C would significantly reduce water stress (about 25%) as compared to the projected water stress at 2°C (e.g., Caribbean region, Karnauskas et al., 2018), and may enhance the ability of SIDS to adapt (Benjamin and Thomas, 2016). Up to 50% of the year is projected to be very warm in the Caribbean for 1.5°C, with a further increase by up to 70 days for 2°C versus 1.5°C (Taylor et al., 2018). By limiting warming to 1.5°C instead of 2°C in 2050, risks of coastal flooding (measured as the flood amplification factors for 100-year flood events) are reduced between 20 and 80% for SIDS (Rasmussen et al., 2018). A case study of Jamaica with lessons for other Caribbean SIDS demonstrates that the difference between 1.5°C and 2°C is likely to challenge livestock thermoregulation, resulting in persistent heat stress for livestock (Lallo et al., 2018).

3.5.4.10 Fynbos and shrub biomes

The Fynbos and succulent Karoo biomes of South Africa are threatened systems that have been assessed in AR5. Similar shrublands exist in the semi-arid regions of other continents, the Sonora-Mojave Creosotebush-White Bursage Desert Scrub ecosystem in the USA being a prime example. Impacts accrue across these systems with greater warming, with impacts at 2°C likely to be greater than those at 1.5°C (*medium confidence*). Under 2°C of global warming, regional warming in drylands will be 3.2–4°C and under 1.5°C of global warming, mean warming in drylands will still be about 3°C. The Fynbos biome in southwestern South Africa is vulnerable to the increasing impact of fires under increasing temperatures and drier winters (*high confidence*). The Fynbos biome is projected to lose about 20%, 45% and 80% of its current suitable climate area under 1°C, 2°C and 3°C of warming with respect to present-day climate (Engelbrecht and Engelbrecht, 2016), demonstrating the value of climate change mitigation in protecting this rich centre of biodiversity.

Table 3.6: Emergence and intensity of climate change hot-spots under different degrees of global warming

Region and/or Phenomena	Warming of 1.5°C or less	Warming of 1.5°C-2°C	Warming of 2°C - 3°C
Arctic sea-ice	Arctic summer sea-ice is <i>likely</i> to be maintained. Habitat losses for organisms such as polar bears, whales, seals and sea-birds Benefits for arctic fisheries	The risk of an ice free Arctic in summer is ~ 50% or higher. Habitat losses for organisms such as polar bears, whales, seals and sea-birds may be critical if summers are ice-free Benefits for arctic fisheries	Arctic is <i>very likely</i> to be ice-free in summer. Critical habitat losses for organisms such as polar bears, whales, seals and sea-birds Benefits for arctic fisheries
Arctic land regions	Cold extremes warm by a factor of 2.5-3, reaching up to 5.5 °C (<i>high confidence</i>) Biome shifts in the tundra and	Cold extremes warm by as much as 8 °C (<i>high confidence</i>) Larger intrusions of trees and shrubs in the tundra than under 1.5 °C of warming	Drastic regional warming is <i>very likely</i> A collapse in permafrost may

Region and/or Phenomena	Warming of 1.5°C or less	Warming of 1.5°C-2°C	Warming of 2°C - 3°C
	permafrost deterioration is <i>likely</i>	is <i>likely</i> ; larger but constrained losses in permafrost are <i>likely</i>	plausibly occur (<i>low confidence</i>); a drastic biome shift from tundra to boreal forest is possible (<i>low confidence</i>).
Alpine regions	Severe shifts in biomes are <i>likely</i> Reduced grassland net primary productivity	Even more severe shifts are <i>likely</i> Increased risks for reduced grassland net primary productivity	Critical losses in alpine habitats are <i>likely</i> Increased risks for significantly reduced grassland net primary productivity
Southeast Asia	Risks for increased flooding related to sea-level rise Increases in heavy precipitation events Significant risks of crop yield reductions are avoided	Higher risks for increased flooding related to sea-level rise (<i>medium confidence</i>) Stronger increases in heavy precipitation events (<i>medium confidence</i>) One third decline in per capita crop production (<i>medium confidence</i>)	Substantial increases in risks related to flooding from sea-level rise Substantial increased in heavy precipitation and high flow events Substantial reductions in crop yield
Small Islands	Land of 40,000 less people inundated by 2150 on SIDS Risks for coastal flooding reduced by 20-80% for SIDS Fresh water stress reduced by 25% Increase in the	Tens of thousands displaced due to inundation of SIDS High risks for coastal flooding Fresh water stress from projected aridity Further increase of about 70 warm days per year	Substantial and widespread impacts through inundation of SIDS, coastal flooding, fresh water stress, persistent heat stress and loss of most coral reefs very likely

Region and/or Phenomena	Warming of 1.5°C or less	Warming of 1.5°C-2°C	Warming of 2°C - 3°C
	<p>number of warm days for SIDS in the tropics</p> <p>Persistent heat stress in cattle avoided</p> <p>Loss of 70-90% of coral reefs</p>	<p>Persistent heat stress in cattle in SIDS</p> <p>Loss of most coral reefs – remaining structures weaker due to ocean acidification</p>	
Mediterranean	<p>Increase (about 7%) in dry-spells</p> <p>Reduction in runoff of about 9% (likely range: 4.5–15.5%)</p> <p>Risk of water deficit</p>	<p><i>High confidence</i> of further increases (11%) in dry spells</p> <p><i>High confidence</i> of further reductions (about 17%) in runoff (likely range 8–28%)</p> <p>Higher risks for water deficit</p>	<p>Substantial reductions in precipitation and reductions in runoff <i>very likely</i></p> <p>Very high risks for water deficit</p>
West African and the Sahel	<p>Reduced maize and sorghum production is <i>likely</i>, with suitable for maize production reduced by as much as 40%</p> <p>Increased risks for under-nutrition</p>	<p>Negative impacts on maize and sorghum production <i>likely</i> larger than at 1.5 °C</p> <p>Higher risks for undernutrition;</p>	<p>Negative impacts on crop yield may result in major regional food insecurities (<i>medium confidence</i>)</p> <p>High risks for undernutrition</p>
Southern African savannahs and drought	<p><i>Likely</i> reductions in water availability</p> <p>High risks for increased mortality from heat-waves;</p> <p>High risk for undernutrition in communities dependent on dryland agriculture and livestock</p>	<p>Even larger reductions in rainfall and water availability <i>likely</i>;</p> <p>Higher risks for increased mortality from heat-waves (<i>high confidence</i>);</p> <p>Higher risks for undernutrition in communities dependent on dryland agriculture and livestock</p>	<p>Large reductions in rainfall and water availability are <i>likely</i></p> <p>Very high risks for undernutrition in communities dependent on dryland agriculture and livestock</p>

Region and/or Phenomena	Warming of 1.5°C or less	Warming of 1.5°C-2°C	Warming of 2°C - 3°C
Tropics	Accumulated heat-wave duration up to two months (<i>high confidence</i>); 3% reduction in maize crop yield.	Accumulated heat-wave duration up to three months (<i>high confidence</i>); 7% reduction in maize crop yield.	Oppressive temperatures and accumulated heat-wave duration <i>very likely</i> to directly impact on human health, mortality and productivity Substantial reductions in crop yield <i>very likely</i>
Fynbos biome	About 30% of suitable climate area lost (<i>medium confidence</i>)	Increased losses (about 45%) of suitable climate area (<i>medium confidence</i>)	Up to 80% of suitable climate area lost (<i>medium confidence</i>)

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3.5.5 Avoiding regional tipping points by achieving more ambitious global temperature goals

Tipping points refer to critical thresholds in a system that, when exceeded, can lead to a significant change in the state of the system, often with an understanding that the change is irreversible. An understanding of the sensitivities of tipping points in the physical climate system, as well as ecosystems and human systems, is essential for understanding the risks and opportunities from mitigation. This subsection reviews tipping points across these three areas within the context of the different sensitivities to 1.5°C versus 2°C of global warming. Sensitivities to less ambitious global temperature goals are also briefly reviewed. Moreover, how integrated risks across physical, natural and human systems may accumulate to lead to the exceedance of thresholds for particular systems is also analysed. The emphasis in this section is on the identification of regional tipping points and their sensitivity to 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming – note that tipping points in the global climate system, referred to as large scale singular events, have already been discussed in Section 3.5.2. A summary of regional tipping points is provided in Table 3.7.

3.5.5.1 Arctic sea-ice

Collins et al. (2013) discuss the loss of Arctic sea ice in the context of potential tipping points. Climate models have been used to assess whether a bifurcation exists that would lead to the irreversible loss of Arctic sea ice (Armour et al., 2011; Boucher et al., 2012; Ridley et al., 2012) and to test whether summer sea ice extent can recover after it has been lost (Schroeder and Connolley, 2007; Sedláček et al., 2011; Tietsche et al., 2011). These studies do not find evidence of bifurcation and find that sea ice returns within a few years of its loss, leading Collins et al. (2013) to conclude that there is little evidence for a tipping point in the transition from perennial to seasonal ice cover. Studies do not find evidence of irreversibility or tipping points, and suggest that year-round sea ice could return with years given a suitable climate (*medium confidence*) (Schroeder and Connolley, 2007; Sedláček et al., 2011; Tietsche et al., 2011).

3.5.5.2 Tundra

Tree-growth in tundra-dominated landscapes is strongly constrained by the number of days above 0°C. A potential tipping point exists, where the number of days below 0°C decrease to the extent that tree fraction increases significantly. Tundra-dominated landscapes have warmed more than the global average over the last century (Settele et al., 2014), with associated increases in fires and permafrost degradation (Bring et al., 2016; DeBeer et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2016). Both of these processes facilitate conditions for woody species establishment in tundra areas, and the eventual transition of the tundra to boreal forest. The number of investigations into how the tree-fraction may respond in the Arctic to different degrees of global warming is limited, and generally indicative that substantial increases will likely occur gradually (e.g., Lenton et al., 2008). Abrupt changes only plausible at levels of warming significantly larger than 2°C (*low confidence*) and are to occur in conjunction with a collapse in permafrost (Drijfhout et al., 2015).

3.5.5.3 Permafrost

Widespread thawing of permafrost potentially makes a large carbon store (estimated to be twice the size of the atmospheric store, Dolman et al., 2010) vulnerable to decomposition, which would lead to further increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide and methane and hence further global warming. This feedback loop between warming and the release of greenhouse gas from thawing tundra represents a potential tipping point. However, the carbon released from thawing permafrost is projected to be restricted to 0.12-0.25 Gt C a⁻¹ to the atmosphere in a 2°C world, and to 0.08-0.16 Gt C a⁻¹ for 1.5°C (Burke et al., 2006), and thus do not represent a tipping point (*medium confidence*). At higher degrees of global warming, in the order of 3°C, a different type of tipping point in permafrost may be reached. A single model projection (Drijfhout et al., 2015) suggests that higher temperatures may induce a smaller ice fraction in soils in the tundra, leading to more rapidly warming soils and a positive feedback mechanism that results in permafrost collapse (*low confidence*). The disparity between the multi-millennial timescales of soil carbon accumulation and potentially rapid decomposition in a warming climate implies that the loss of this carbon to the atmosphere is essentially irreversible (Collins et al., 2013).

3.5.5.4 Asian monsoon

It is the pressure gradient between the Indian Ocean and Asian continent that at a fundamental level determines the strength of the Asian monsoon. As land masses warm faster than the oceans, a general strengthening of this gradient, and hence monsoons, may be expected under global warming (e.g., Lenton et al., 2008). Additional factors such as changes in albedo induced by aerosols and snow-cover change may also affect temperature gradients and consequently pressure gradients and the strength of the monsoon. In fact, it has been estimated that an increase of the landmass albedo to 0.5 would represent a tipping point resulting in the collapse of the monsoon system (Lenton et al., 2008). The overall impacts of the various types of radiative forcing under different emission scenarios are more subtle, with a weakening of the monsoon north of about 25°N in East Asia and a strengthening south of this latitude projected by (Jiang and Tian, 2013) under high and modest emission scenarios. Increases in the intensity of monsoon precipitation is likely under low mitigation (AR5). Given that scenarios at 1.5°C or 2°C would include a substantially smaller radiative forcing than those assessed in the studies of Jiang and Tian (2013) there is *low confidence* regarding changes in monsoons at these low global warming levels, as well as regarding the differences between responses at 1.5°C versus 2°C levels of global warming.

1 3.5.5.5 *West African monsoon and the Sahel*

2 Earlier work has identified 3°C of global warming as a tipping point leading to a significant strengthening of
3 the West African monsoon and subsequent wettening (and greening) of the Sahel and Saharah (Lenton et al.,
4 2008). AR5 (Niang et al., 2014) as well as more recent research through the Coordinated Regional
5 Downscaling Experiment for Africa (CORDEX-AFRICA) provide a more uncertain view, however, in terms
6 of the rainfall futures of the Sahel under low mitigation futures. Even if a wetter Sahel should materialize
7 under 3°C of global warming (*low confidence*), it should be noted that there will be significant offsets in the
8 form of strong regional warming and related adverse impacts on crop yield, livestock mortality and human
9 health under such low mitigation futures (Engelbrecht et al., 2015; Sylla et al., 2016; Weber et al., 2018b)

12 3.5.5.6 *Rain forests*

13 A large portion of rainfall over the world's largest rainforests are recirculated (e.g., Lenton et al., 2008),
14 which raises the concern that deforestation may trigger a threshold in reduced forest cover leading to
15 pronounced forest dieback. For the Amazon, this deforestation threshold has been estimated to be 40%
16 (Nobre et al., 2016). Global warming of 3°C–4°C may also, independent of deforestation, represent a tipping
17 point that results in a significant dieback of the Amazon forest, with a key forcing mechanism being stronger
18 El Niño events bringing more frequent droughts to the region (Nobre et al., 2016). Increased fire
19 frequencies under global warming may interact with and accelerate deforestation, particularly during periods
20 of El Niño induced droughts (Lenton et al., 2008; Nobre et al., 2016). Global warming of 3°C is projected to
21 reduce the extent of tropical rainforest in Central America, with biomass productivity being reduced by more
22 than 50%, and a large replacement of rainforest by savanna and grassland (Lyra et al., 2017). Overall,
23 modelling studies (Huntingford et al., 2013; Nobre et al., 2016) and observational constraints (Cox et al.,
24 2013) suggest that pronounced rainforest dieback may only be triggered at 3°C–4 °C (*medium confidence*),
25 although pronounced biomass losses may occur at 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming.

28 3.5.5.7 *Boreal forests*

29 Boreal forests are likely to experience higher local warming than the global average (WGII AR5: Collins et
30 al., 2013). Increased disturbance from fire, pests and heat related mortality may affect in particular the
31 southern boundary of boreal forests (Gauthier et al., 2015) (*medium confidence*), with these impacts accruing
32 with greater warming and thus impacts at 2°C would be expected to be greater than those at 1.5°C (*medium*
33 *confidence*). A tipping point for significant dieback of the boreal forests is thought to exist, where increased
34 tree mortality will result in the creation of large regions of open woodlands and grasslands, which would
35 favour further regional warming and increased fire frequencies, thus inducing a powerful positive feedback
36 mechanism (Lenton et al., 2008; Lenton, 2012). This tipping point has been estimated to exist between 3 and
37 4°C of global warming (Lucht et al., 2006; Krieger et al., 2009) (*low confidence*), but given the complexities
38 of the various forcing mechanisms and feedback processes this is thought to be an uncertain estimate.

41 3.5.5.8 *Heat-waves, unprecedented heat and human health*

42 Increases in ambient temperature are linearly related with hospitalizations and deaths (so there isn't a tipping
43 point per se) once specific thresholds are exceeded. It is plausible that coping strategies will not be in place
44 for many regions, with potentially significant impacts on communities with low adaptive capacity,
45 effectively representing the occurrence of a local/regional tipping point. In fact, even if global warming is
46 restricted to below 2°C, taking into consideration urban heat island effects, there could be a substantial
47 increase in the occurrence of deadly heatwaves in cities, with the impacts similar at 1.5°C and 2°C, but

1 substantially larger than under the present climate (Matthews et al., 2017). At +1.5°C, twice as many
 2 megacities as present (such as Lagos, Nigeria, and Shanghai, China) are *likely* to become heat stressed,
 3 potentially exposing more than 350 million more people to deadly heat stress by 2050. At +2°C warming,
 4 Karachi (Pakistan) and Kolkata (India) could expect annual conditions equivalent to their deadly 2015
 5 heatwaves (*medium confidence*). These statistics imply a tipping point in the extent and scale of heat-wave
 6 impacts. However, these projections do not integrate adaptation to projected warming, for instance, cooling
 7 that could be achieved with more reflective roofs and urban surfaces overall (Akbari et al., 2009; Oleson et
 8 al., 2010).

11 3.5.5.9 Agricultural systems: key staple crops

12 A large number of studies consistently indicate that maize crop yield will be negatively affected under
 13 increased global warming, with negative impacts being higher under 2°C of warming than at 1.5°C of warming
 14 (e.g., Niang et al., 2014; Schleussner et al., 2016b; J. Huang et al., 2017; Iizumi et al., 2017). Under 2°C of
 15 global warming, losses of 8-14% are projected in global maize production (Bassu et al., 2014). Under more
 16 than 2°C of global warming, regional losses are projected to be about 20% if they co-occur with reductions in
 17 rainfall (Lana et al., 2017). These changes may be classified as incremental rather than representing a tipping
 18 point. Large-scale reductions in maize crop yield including the potential for the collapse of this crop in some
 19 regions may exist under 3°C or more of global warming (*low confidence*) (e.g., Thornton et al., 2011).

22 3.5.5.10 Agricultural systems: livestock in the tropics and subtropics

23 The potential impacts of climate change on livestock (Section 3.4.6) and in particular direct impacts through
 24 increased heat-stress has been less well studied than impacts on crop yield, in particular from the perspective
 25 of critical thresholds being exceeded. A case study of Jamaica reveals that the difference in heat stress for
 26 livestock between 1.5°C and 2°C is likely to exceed the limits for normal thermoregulation and result in
 27 persistent heat stress for livestock animals (Lallo et al., 2018). It is plausible that this finding holds for
 28 livestock production in both tropical and subtropical regions more generally (*medium confidence*) (see
 29 Section 3.4.6). It is plausible that under 3°C of global warming, significant reductions in the areas suitable
 30 for livestock production occur (*low confidence*) due to strong increases in regional temperatures in the
 31 tropics and subtropics (*high confidence*). Thus, regional tipping points in the viability of livestock production
 32 may well exist, but little evidence quantifying such changes exist.

34 **Table 3.7:** Summary of enhanced risks in the exceedance of regional tipping points under different global
 35 temperature goals.

36 Tipping point	Warming of 1.5°C or less	Warming of 1.5°C-2°C	Warming of up to 3°C
Arctic sea-ice	Arctic summer sea-ice is <i>likely</i> to be maintained. Sea-ice changes reversible under suitable climate restoration	The risk of an ice free Arctic in summer is ~ 50% or higher. Sea-ice changes reversible under suitable climate restoration	Arctic is <i>very likely</i> to be ice-free in summer. Sea-ice changes reversible under suitable climate restoration
Tundra	Decrease in number of growing degree days	Further decreases in number of growing	Potential for an abrupt increase in tree-

Tipping point	Warming of 1.5°C or less	Warming of 1.5°C-2°C	Warming of up to 3°C
	below 0°C Abrupt increases in tree-cover are <i>unlikely</i>	degree days below 0°C Abrupt increased in tree cover are unlikely	fraction (<i>low confidence</i>)
Permafrost	21-37% reduction in permafrost 2 million km ² more permafrost maintained than under 2°C of global warming (<i>medium confidence</i>) 0.08-0.16 Gt C a ⁻¹ released Irreversible loss of stored carbon	35-47% reduction in permafrost 0.12-0.25 Gt C a ⁻¹ released Irreversible loss of stored carbon	Potential for permafrost collapse (<i>low confidence</i>)
Asian Monsoon	<i>Low confidence</i> in projected changes	<i>Low confidence</i> in projected changes	Increases in the intensity of monsoon precipitation <i>likely</i> .
West African monsoon and the Sahel	Uncertain changes, <i>unlikely</i> that a tipping point is reached	Uncertain changes, <i>unlikely</i> that tipping point is reached	Strengthening of monsoon and wettening and greening of Sahel and Sahara (<i>low confidence</i>) Negative associated impacts through increase in extreme temperature events
Rainforests	Reduced biomass, deforestation and fire increases pose uncertain risks to forest dieback	Larger biomass reductions than under 1.5 °C warming, deforestation and fire increases pose uncertain risk to forest dieback	Potential tipping point leading to pronounced forest dieback (<i>medium confidence</i>)
Boreal forests	Increased tree mortality at southern boundary of boreal forest (<i>medium confidence</i>)	Further increases in tree mortality at southern boundary of boreal forest (<i>medium confidence</i>)	Potential tipping point for significant dieback of boreal forest (<i>low confidence</i>)
Heat-waves, unprecedented heat	Substantial increase in occurrence of potentially	Substantial increase in potentially deadly	Substantial increase in potentially deadly

Tipping point	Warming of 1.5°C or less	Warming of 1.5°C-2°C	Warming of up to 3°C
and human health	deadly heat-waves <i>likely</i> More than 350 million more people exposed to deadly heat by 2050 under a midrange population growth scenario	heat-waves <i>likely</i> Annual occurrence of heat-waves similar to deadly 2015 heat-waves in India and Pakistan	heat-waves <i>very likely</i>
Key staple crops	Global maize crop reductions of about 10%	Larger reductions in maize crop production that under 1.5°C of about 15%	Drastic reductions in maize crop globally and in Africa (<i>high confidence</i>), of 20% or more; potential tipping point for collapse of maize crop in some regions (<i>low confidence</i>)
Livestock in the tropics and subtropics	Increased heat-stress	Onset of persistent heat-stress (<i>medium confidence</i>)	Persistent heat-stress <i>likely</i> .

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1 **[START BOX 3.6 HERE]**

2 **Box 3.6:** Economic Damages from Climate Change

3
4 Balancing of the costs and benefits of mitigation is challenging because estimating the value of climate
5 change damages depends on multiple parameters whose appropriate values have been debated for decades
6 (for example, the appropriate value of the discount rate) or that are very difficult to quantify (for example,
7 the value of non-market impacts; the economic effects of losses in ecosystem services; and the potential for
8 adaptation, which is dependent on the rate and timing of climate change and on the socioeconomic content)
9 (see Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 2 for the definition of the social cost of carbon, and discussion of the
10 economics of 1.5°C-consistent pathways and the social cost of carbon, including the impacts of inequality on
11 the social cost of carbon).

12
13 Global economic damages of climate change are smaller under warming of 1.5°C than 2°C in 2100 (Warren
14 et al., 2018c). The mean net present value of the costs of damages from warming in 2100 for 1.5°C and 2°C
15 (including costs associated with climate change-induced market and non-market impacts, impacts due to sea
16 level rise, and impacts associated with large scale discontinuities) are \$54 and \$69 trillion, respectively,
17 relative to 1961-1990.

18
19 Values of the social cost of carbon vary when tipping points are included. The social cost of carbon in the
20 default setting of the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE) model increases from \$15/tCO₂ to \$116
21 (range 50-166)/tCO₂ when large-scale singularities or ‘tipping elements’ are incorporated (Y. Cai et al., 2016;
22 Lemoine and Traeger, 2016). Lemoine and Traeger (2016) included optimization calculations that minimize
23 welfare impacts resulting from the combination of climate change risks and climate change mitigation costs,
24 showing that welfare is minimized if warming is limited to 1.5°C. These calculations excluded the large
25 health co-benefits that accrue when greenhouse gas emissions are reduced (Shindell 2018; Section 3.4.7.1)

26
27 The economic damages of climate change in the USA are projected to be large (Hsiang et al., 2017; Yohe,
28 2017). Although not specifically related to 1.5°C warming, Hsiang et al. (2017) concluded that the USA
29 could lose 2.3% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per degree of global warming. Yohe (2017) calculated
30 transient temperature trajectories from a linear relationship with contemporaneous cumulative emissions
31 under a median no-policy baseline trajectory that brings global emissions to roughly 93 GtCO₂ per year by
32 the end of the century (Fawcett et al., 2015), with 1.75°C per 1000 GtCO₂ as the median estimate (Yohe,
33 2017). Associated aggregate economic damages in decadal increments through the year 2100 are estimated
34 in terms of the percentage loss of GDP at the median, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile transient temperature
35 (Hsiang et al., 2017). The results for the baseline no-policy case indicate that economic damages along
36 median temperature change and median damages (median-median) reach 4.5% of GDP by 2100, with an
37 uncertainty range of 2.5% and 8.5% resulting from different combinations of temperature change and
38 damages. Avoided damages from achieving a 1.5°C temperature limit along the median-median case is
39 nearly 4% (range 2.0 – 7.0%) by 2100. Avoided damages from achieving a 2°C temperature limit is lower:
40 3.5% (range 1.8% - 6.5%). Avoided damages from achieving 1.5°C vs. 2°C is modest; it is about 0.35%
41 (range 0.20 – 0.65%) by 2100. The values of achieving either temperature limit do not diverge significantly
42 until 2040, when their difference tracks between 0.05% and 0.13%; the differences between the two
43 temperature targets begin to diverge substantially in the second half of the century.

44 **[END BOX 3.6 HERE]**

45

3.6 Implications of different 1.5°C and 2°C pathways

This section provides an overview on specific aspects of the mitigation pathways considered compatible with 1.5°C global warming. Some of these aspects are also addressed in more detail in the Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in this Chapter.

3.6.1 Gradual vs overshoot in 1.5°C scenarios

All 1.5°C scenarios from Chapter 2 include some overshoot above 1.5°C global warming during the 21st century (Chapter 2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this Chapter). The level of overshoot may also depend on natural climate variability. An overview of possible outcomes of a 1.5°C-consistent mitigation scenarios for changes in physical climate at the time of overshoot and by 2100 is provided in the Cross-Chapter Box 8 on “1.5°C warmer worlds”. Cross-Chapter Box 8 also highlights the implications of overshoots.

3.6.2 Non-CO₂ implications and projected risks of mitigation pathways

3.6.2.1 Land use changes

Risks arising from Land use changes in Mitigation Pathways

In mitigation pathways, land use change is affected by many different mitigation options. First of all, mitigation of non-CO₂ emissions from agricultural production can shift agricultural production between regions via trade of agricultural commodities. Secondly, protection of carbon rich ecosystems such as tropical forests constrains area for agricultural expansion. Thirdly, also demand side mitigation measures such as less consumption of resource intensive commodities (animal products) or food waste reductions reduce pressure on land (Popp et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018). Finally, Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) is a key component of most, but not all mitigation pathways presented in the literature to date which constrain warming to 1.5°C or 2°C. Typically, CDR measures that require land can include Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), afforestation and reforestation (AR), soil carbon sequestration, direct air capture, biochar, and enhanced weathering (see Cross-Chapter Box 7 in this Chapter). These potential methods are assessed in Section 4.3.7.

In cost-effective Integrated Assessment Modelling (IAM) pathways recently developed to be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C, use of CDR in the form of BECCS and AR are also fundamental elements (Chapter 2; Popp et al., 2017; Hirsch et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018; Seneviratne et al., 2018c). The land-use footprint of CDR deployment in 1.5°C-consistent pathways can be substantial (Section 2.3.4, Figure 2.11), even though IAMs predominantly rely on second generation biomass and assume future productivity increases in agriculture.

A body of literature has explored potential consequences of large scale use of CDR. In this case, the corresponding land footprint by the end of the century could be extremely large, with estimates including: up to 18% of the land surface being used (Wiltshire and Davies-Barnard, 2015); vast acceleration of the loss of primary forest and natural grassland (Williamson, 2016) leading to increased greenhouse gas emissions (P. Smith et al., 2013, Smith et al., 2015); potential loss of up to 10% of the current forested lands to biofuels (Yamagata et al., 2018). Other estimates reach 380-700 Mha/21-64% of current arable cropland (Section

1 4.3.7); while Boysen et al. (2017) find that in a scenario in which emission reductions were sufficient only to
2 limit warming to 2.5°C, use of CDR to limit warming further to 1.7°C would result in conversion of 1.1-1.5
3 Gha of land – implying enormous losses of both cropland and natural ecosystems (Boysen et al., 2017).
4 Newbold et al. (2015) find that biodiversity loss in the scenario Representative Concentration Pathway
5 (RCP)2.6 could be greater than that in RCP4.5 and RCP6.0, in which there is more climate change but less
6 land use change. Risks to biodiversity conservation and agricultural production are therefore projected to
7 result from large-scale bioenergy deployment pathways (P. Smith et al., 2013; Tavoni and Socolow, 2013).
8 One study explores an extreme mitigation strategy encouraging biofuel expansion sufficient to limit warming
9 to 1.5°C, which finds that this is more disruptive to land use and crop prices than the climate change impacts
10 of +2.0 °C world which has a larger climate signal and lower mitigation requirement (Ruane et al., 2018).
11 However, it should again be emphasized that many of the pathways explored in Chapter 2 of this report
12 follow strategies that explore how to reduce these issues. Chapter 4 provides an assessment of the land
13 footprint of various CDR technologies (Section 4.3.7).

14
15 The degree to which BECCS would have these large land-use footprints depends on the source of the
16 bioenergy used, and the scale at which BECCS is deployed. Whether there is competition with food
17 production and biodiversity depends on the governance of land use, agricultural intensification, trade,
18 demand for food (in particular meat), feed and timber, and the context of the whole supply chain (Section
19 4.3.7, Fajardy and Mac Dowell, 2017; Booth, 2018; Sterman et al., 2018).

20
21 The more recent literature reviewed in Chapter 2 explores pathways which limit warming to 2°C or below
22 and achieve a balance between sources and sinks of CO₂, using BECCS that relies on second-generation (or
23 even third generation) biofuels, or which relies on changes in diet or more generally, management of food
24 demand, or CDR options such as forest restoration (see Chapter 2, Bajželj et al., 2014). Overall this
25 literature explores how to reduce the issues of competition for land with food production and with natural
26 ecosystems (in particular forests) (see Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1, van Vuuren et al., 2009; Haberl et
27 al., 2010, 2013; Bajželj et al., 2014; Daioglou et al., 2016; Fajardy and Mac Dowell, 2017).

28
29 Some IAMs manage this transition by effectively protecting carbon stored on land and focussing on the
30 conversion of pasture area into both forest area and bioenergy cropland. Some IAMs explored 1.5°C
31 consistent pathways with demand side measures (such as dietary changes) and efficiency gains such as
32 agricultural changes (Sections 2.3.4, 2.4.4) which lead to a greatly reduced CDR deployment and
33 consequently land use impacts (van Vuuren et al., 2018). However, in reality whether this CDR (and more
34 broadly, bioenergy in general) has large adverse impacts on environmental and societal goals depends in
35 large parts on the governance of land use (Obersteiner et al., 2016; Bertram et al., 2011; Humpenöder et al.
36 2018; Section 2.3.4).

37
38 Rates of sequestration of 3.3 GtC/ha require 970 Mha of afforestation and reforestation (Smith et al., 2015).
39 Humpenöder et al. (2014) estimates that in least cost pathways afforestation would cover 2800 Mha by the
40 end of the century to constrain warming to 2°C. Hence, the amount of land considered if least-cost
41 mitigation is implemented by afforestation and reforestation could be up to 3 to 5 times greater than that
42 required by BECCS, depending on the forest management used. However, not all of the land footprint of
43 CDR need be in competition with biodiversity protection. Where reforestation is the restoration of natural
44 ecosystems, this benefits both carbon sequestration and conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services
45 (Section 4.3.7) and can contribute to the achievement of the Aichi targets under the Convention on
46 Biological Diversity (CBD) (Leadley et al., 2016). However, reforestation is often not defined in this way
47 (Stanturf et al., 2014, Section 4.3.8) and the ability to deliver biodiversity benefits is strongly dependent on

1 the precise nature of the reforestation, which has many different interpretations in different contexts and can
2 often include agroforestry rather than restoration of pristine ecosystems (Pistorious and Kiff, 2017).
3 However, ‘natural climate solutions’ defined as conservation, restoration, and improved land management
4 actions that increase carbon storage and/or avoid greenhouse gas emissions across global forests, wetlands,
5 grasslands, and agricultural lands is estimated to have the potential to provide 37% of cost-effective CO₂
6 mitigation needed through 2030 consistent with a >66% chance of holding warming to below 2°C (Griscom
7 et al., 2017).

8
9 Any reductions in agricultural production driven by climate change and/or land management decisions
10 related to CDR may (e.g., Nelson et al., 2014a; Dalin & Rodríguez-Iturbe, 2016) or may not (Muratori et al.,
11 2016) affect food prices. However, these studies do not consider the deployment of second-generation
12 bioenergy crops (instead of first-generation) for which the land footprint can be much smaller.
13 Irrespective of any mitigation-related issues, in order for ecosystems to adapt to climate change, land use
14 would also need to be carefully managed to allow biodiversity to disperse to areas that become newly
15 climatically suitable for it Section 3.4.1) as well as protecting the areas where the climate still remains
16 suitable in the future. This implies a need for a considerable expansion of the protected area network
17 (Warren et al., 2018a), either to protect existing natural habitat or to restore it (perhaps through reforestation,
18 see above). At the same time, adaptation to climate change in the agricultural sector (Rippke et al., 2016)
19 can require transformational as well as new approaches to land use management; whilst in order to meet the
20 rising future food demand of a growing human population, additional land is projected to be needed to be
21 brought into production, unless there are large increases in agricultural productivity (Tilman et al., 2011) yet
22 future rates of deforestation may be underestimated in the existing literature (Mahowald et al., 2017a).
23 Hence, reforestation may be associated with significant co-benefits if implemented so as to restore natural
24 ecosystems (*high confidence*).

25 26 27 3.6.2.2 Biophysical feedbacks on regional climate associated with land use changes


28 Changes in the biophysical characteristics of the land surface are known to have an impact on local and
29 regional climates through changes in albedo, roughness, evapotranspiration and phenology that can lead to a
30 change in temperature and precipitation. This includes changes in land use through agricultural
31 expansion/intensification (e.g., Mueller et al., 2016) or reforestation/revegetation endeavours (e.g., Feng et
32 al., 2016; Sonntag et al., 2016; Bright et al., 2017) and changes in land management (e.g., Luyssaert et al.,
33 2014; Hirsch et al., 2017) that can involve double cropping (e.g., Jeong et al., 2014; Mueller et al., 2015;
34 Seifert and Lobell, 2015), irrigation (e.g., Lobell et al, 2009; Sacks et al., 2009; Cook et al., 2011; Qian et al.,
35 2013; de Vrese et al., 2016; Pryor et al., 2016; Thiery et al., 2017), no-till farming and conservation
36 agriculture (e.g., Lobell et al., 2006; Davin et al., 2014) and wood harvest (e.g., Lawrence et al., 2012).
37 Hence, the biophysical impacts of land use changes are an important topic to assess in the context of low-
38 emissions scenarios (e.g., (van Vuuren et al., 2011b), in particular for 1.5°C warming levels (see also Cross-
39 Chapter Box 7 in this Chapter).

40
41 The magnitude of the biophysical impacts is potentially large for temperature extremes. Indeed, both changes
42 induced by modifications in moisture availability and irrigation, or by changes in surface albedo, tend to be
43 larger (i.e., stronger cooling) for hot extremes than for mean temperatures (e.g., (Seneviratne et al., 2013;
44 Davin et al., 2014; Wilhelm et al., 2015; Hirsch et al., 2017; Thiery et al., 2017). The reasons for reduced
45 moisture availability are related to a strong contribution of moisture deficits to the occurrence of hot
46 extremes in mid-latitude regions (Mueller and Seneviratne, 2012; Seneviratne et al., 2013). In the case of
47 surface albedo, cooling associated with higher albedo (e.g., in the case of no-till farming) is more effective at

1 cooling hot days because of the higher incoming solar radiation for these days (Davin et al., 2014). The
 2 overall effect of either irrigation or albedo has been found to be at the most of the order of ca. 1–2°C
 3 regionally for temperature extremes. This can be particularly important in the context of low-emissions
 4 scenarios because the overall effect is in this case of similar magnitude to the response to the greenhouse gas
 5 forcing (Hirsch et al., 2017, Figure 3.21; Seneviratne et al., 2018a).

6
 7 In addition to the biophysical feedbacks from land use change and land management on climate, there are
 8 potential consequences for particular ecosystem services. This includes climate change induced changes in
 9 crop yield (e.g., (Schlenker and Roberts, 2009; van der Velde et al., 2012; Asseng et al., 2013, 2015; Butler
 10 and Huybers, 2013; Lobell et al., 2014) which may be further exacerbated by competing demands for arable
 11 land between reforestation mitigation activities, growing crops for BECCS (Chapter 2), increasing food
 12 production to support larger populations or urban expansion (e.g., see review by Smith et al., 2010). In
 13 particular, some land management practices may have further implications for food security where some
 14 regions may have increases or decreases in yield when ceasing tillage (Pittelkow et al., 2014).

15
 16 We note that the biophysical impacts of land use in the context of mitigation pathways is an emerging
 17 research topic. This topic as well as the overall role of land use change for climate change projections and
 18 socio-economic pathways will be addressed in depth in the upcoming IPCC Special Report on Climate
 19 Change and Land due in 2019.



21
 22 **Figure 3.22:** Regional temperature scaling with carbon dioxide (CO₂) concentration (ppm) over 1850 to 2099 for two
 23 different regions as defined in the Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters
 24 to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX): Central Europe (CEU) (a) and Central North America
 25 (CNA) (b). Solid lines correspond to the regional average annual maximum daytime temperature (TX_x)
 26 anomaly and dashed lines correspond to the global mean temperature anomaly, where all temperature
 27 anomalies are relative to 1850–1870 and units are degrees Celsius. The black line in all panels denotes the
 28 3-member control ensemble mean with the grey shaded regions corresponding to the ensemble range. The
 29 colored lines correspond to the 3-member ensemble means of the experiments corresponding to albedo

1 +0.02 (cyan), albedo +0.04 (purple), albedo + 0.08 (orange), albedo +0.10 (red), irrigation on (blue), and
2 irrigation with albedo +0.10 (green). Adapted from Hirsch et al. (2017).
3
4

5 3.6.2.3 Atmospheric compounds (aerosols and methane)

6 There are multiple pathways that could be used to limit anthropogenic climate change, and the details of the
7 pathways will change the climate impacts on humans and ecosystems. Anthropogenic driven changes in
8 aerosols cause important modifications to global climate (Bindoff et al., 2013a; Boucher et al., 2013b; P. Wu
9 et al., 2013; Sarojini et al., 2016; H. Wang et al., 2016). Enforcement of strict air quality policies may lead to
10 a large decrease in cooling aerosols emissions in the next few decades. These aerosol emission reductions
11 may cause a comparable warming to the increase in greenhouse gases by mid-21st century in the low CO₂
12 pathways (Kloster et al., 2009; Navarro et al., 2017), especially in the low CO₂ pathways (Cross Chapter Box
13 1; Sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.1). Because aerosol effects on the energy budget are regional, strong regional
14 changes in precipitation changes from aerosols may occur if aerosols emissions are reduced for air quality or
15 as a co-benefit from switches to sustainable energy sources (H. Wang et al., 2016). Thus regional impacts,
16 especially on precipitation, are very sensitive to 1.5°C-consistent pathways (Z. Wang et al., 2017).
17

18 Pathways which rely strong on reductions in methane (CH₄) versus CO₂ will reduce warming in the short-
19 term because methane is such a stronger and shorter-lived greenhouse gas, but will be warmer in the long
20 term because of the much longer residence time of CO₂ (Myhre et al., 2013; Pierrehumbert, 2014). In
21 addition, the dominant loss mechanism for methane is atmospheric photooxidation. This conversion modifies
22 ozone formation and destruction in the troposphere and stratosphere, and therefore modifies the contribution
23 of ozone to radiative forcing, as well as feedbacks onto the oxidation rate of methane itself (Myhre et al.,
24 2013). Focusing on pathways and policies which both improve air quality and reduce climate impacts can
25 serve to provide multiple co-benefits (Shindell et al., 2017), and these pathways are discussed in detail in
26 Sections 4.3.7 and 5.4.1; and Cross Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5.
27

28 Atmospheric aerosols and gases can also modify the land and ocean uptake of anthropogenic carbon dioxide,
29 but some compounds enhance uptake, while others reduce uptake (Ciais et al., 2013) (Section 2.6.2). While
30 CO₂ emissions tend to encourage greater uptake of carbon by the land and the ocean (Ciais et al., 2013),
31 methane emissions can enhance ozone pollution, depending on nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds,
32 and other organic species concentrations, and ozone tends to reduce land productivity (Myhre et al., 2013; B.
33 Wang et al., 2017). Aside from inhibiting land vegetation productivity, ozone may also alter the CO₂, CH₄
34 and nitrogen (N₂O) exchange at the land-atmosphere interface and transform the global soil system from a
35 sink to a source of carbon (B. Wang et al., 2017). Aerosols and associated nitrogen-based compounds tend to
36 enhance the uptake of carbon dioxide in land and ocean systems through the deposition of nutrients and
37 modification of climate (Ciais et al., 2013; Mahowald et al., 2017b).
38

39 **[START BOX Cross-Chapter Box 7]**

40 **Cross-Chapter Box 7: Land-Based Carbon Dioxide Removal, in Relation to 1.5°C Warming**

41
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43 Rogelj (Austria/Belguim), Sonia I. Seneviratne (Switzerland), Raphael Slade (United Kingdom), Rachel
44 Warren (United Kingdom).
45

46 Climate and land form a complex system characterised by multiple feedback processes and the potential for
47 non-linear responses to perturbation. Climate determines land cover and the distribution of vegetation

1 affecting above and below ground carbon stocks. At the same time, land cover influences global climate
2 through altered biogeochemical processes (e.g. atmospheric composition and nutrient flow into oceans), and
3 regional climate through changing biogeophysical processes (including albedo, hydrology, transpiration and
4 vegetation structure) (Forseth, 2010).

5
6 Greenhouse Gas (GHG) fluxes related to land use are reported in the Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land
7 Use sector (AFOLU) and comprise about 25% (about 10–12 GtCO_{2eq}yr⁻¹) of anthropogenic GHG emissions
8 (P. Smith et al., 2014). Reducing emissions from land use, and land use change are thus an important
9 component of low-emissions mitigation pathways (Clarke et al., 2014), particularly as land-use emissions
10 can be influenced by human actions such as deforestation, afforestation, fertilisation, irrigation, harvest, and
11 other aspects of cropland, grazing land and livestock management (Paustian et al., 2006; Griscom et al.,
12 2017; Houghton and Nassikas, 2018).

13
14 In the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, the vast majority of scenarios assessed with a 66% or better chance of
15 limiting global warming to 2°C by 2100 included Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) – typically about 10
16 GtCO₂ per year in 2100 or about 200–400 GtCO₂ over the course of the century (Smith et al., 2015; van
17 Vuuren et al., 2016). These Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) results were predominately achieved by
18 using bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and/or afforestation and reforestation (AR).
19 Virtually all scenarios that either limit peak or end-of-century warming to 1.5°C also use land intensive CDR
20 technologies (Rogelj et al., 2015; Holz et al., 2017; Kriegler et al., 2017; Fuss et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al.,
21 2018). Again, afforestation and reforestation (AR) (Sections 2.3, 4.3.7); and BECCS (Sections 4.3.2., 4.3.7)
22 predominate. Other CDR options such as the application of biochar to soil, soil carbon sequestration, and
23 enhanced weathering (Section 4.3.7) are not yet widely incorporated in IAMs, but their deployment would
24 also necessitate the use of land and/or changes in land management.

25
26 IAMs provide a simplified representation of land use and, with only a few exceptions, they do not include
27 biophysical feedback processes (e.g. albedo and evapotranspiration effects) (Kreidenweis et al., 2016)
28 despite the importance of these processes for regional climate, in particular hot extremes (Seneviratne et al.,
29 2018c; section 3.6.2.2). The extent, location, and impacts of large-scale land-use change described by
30 existing IAMs can also be widely divergent depending on model structure, scenario parameters, modelling
31 objectives, and assumptions (including land availability and productivity) (Prestele et al., 2016; Alexander et
32 al., 2017; Popp et al., 2017; Seneviratne et al., 2018d). Despite these limitations, IAM scenarios effectively
33 highlight the extent and nature of potential land-use transitions implicit in limiting warming to 1.5°C .

34
35 Cross-Chapter Box 7 Table 1, presents a comparison of the five CDR options assessed in this report. This
36 illustrates that if deployed at a scale -e.g. 12 GtCO₂yr⁻¹ in 2100-, BECCS and AR would have a substantial
37 land and water footprint. Whether this footprint results in adverse impacts, for example on biodiversity or
38 food production, depends on the existence and effectiveness of measures to conserve land carbon stocks,
39 limit the expansion of agriculture at the expense of natural ecosystems, and increase agriculture productivity
40 (Bonsch et al., 2016; Obersteiner et al., 2016; Bertram et al., 2018; Humpenöder et al., 2018). In comparison,
41 the land and water footprints of enhanced weathering, soil carbon sequestration and biochar application are
42 expected to be far less per GtCO₂ sequestered. These options may offer potential co-benefits by providing an
43 additional source of nutrients or reducing N₂O emissions, but they are also associated with potential side-
44 effects. Enhanced weathering would require massive mining activity, and providing feedstock for biochar
45 would require additional land, even though a proportion of the required biomass is expected to come from
46 residues (Woolf et al., 2010; Smith, 2016). For the terrestrial CDR options permanence and saturation are
47 important considerations, making their viability and long-term contributions to carbon reduction targets

1 uncertain.

2
3 The technical, political, and social feasibility of scaling up and implementing land-intensive CDR
4 technologies (Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1) is recognised to present considerable potential barriers to
5 future deployment (Boucher et al., 2013a; Fuss et al., 2014, 2018; Anderson and Peters, 2016; Williamson,
6 2016; Vaughan and Gough, 2016; Minx et al., 2017, 2018; Nemet et al., 2018; Strefler et al., 2018; Vaughan
7 et al., 2018). To investigate the implications of restricting CDR options should these barriers prove difficult
8 to overcome IAM studies (Section 2.3.4) have developed scenarios that limit (either implicitly or explicitly)
9 the use of BECCS and bioenergy (Krey et al., 2014; Bauer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018), or BECCS and
10 afforestation (Strefler et al., 2018). Alternative strategies to limit future reliance on CDR have also been
11 examined including increased electrification, agricultural intensification, behavioral change and dramatic
12 improvements in energy and material efficiency (Bauer et al., 2018; Grübler, 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018).
13 Somewhat counterintuitively, scenarios that seek to limit the deployment of BECCs may result in increased
14 land use through greater deployment of bioenergy, and afforestation (Krey et al., 2014; Krause et al., 2017;
15 Bauer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018) (Chapter 2, Box 2.1). Scenarios aiming to minimize the total human
16 land footprint (including land for food, energy, and climate mitigation) also result in land use change, for
17 example by postulating that increases in agricultural efficiency and changes in diet can enable land use, for
18 example by postulating that increases in agricultural efficiency and changes in diet can enable land use
19 switching from food crop production to energy crop production without altering the overall agricultural area
20 (Grübler, 2018).

21
22 The impacts of changing land use are highly context, location and scale dependent (Robledo- Abad et al.,
23 2017). The supply of biomass for CDR (e.g. energy crops) has received particular attention. The literature
24 identifies regional examples of where the use of land to produce biofuels might be sustainably increased
25 (Jaiswal et al., 2017), where biomass markets could contribute to the provision of ecosystem services (Dale
26 et al., 2017), and where bioenergy could increase the resilience of production systems and contribute to rural
27 development (Kline et al., 2017). Yet studies of global biomass potential provide only limited insight into the
28 local feasibility of supplying large quantities of biomass on a global scale (Slade et al., 2014). Concerns
29 about large scale use of biomass for CDR include a range of potential consequences including: greatly
30 increased demand for freshwater use, increased competition for land, loss of biodiversity and/or impacts on
31 food security (Heck et al., 2018; Section 3.6.2.1). The short versus long term carbon impacts of substituting
32 biomass for fossil fuels (in large part determined by feedstock choice) also remain a source of contention
33 (Schulze et al., 2012; Jonker et al., 2014; Booth, 2018; Sterman et al., 2018).

34
35 AR can also present trade-offs between biodiversity, carbon sequestration and water use, and has a higher
36 land footprint per ton of CO₂ removed (Cunningham et al., 2015; Naudts et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2018). For
37 example, changing forest management to strategies towards faster growing species, greater residue
38 extraction, and shorter rotations may have a negative impact on biodiversity (de Jong et al., 2014). In
39 contrast, reforestation of degraded land with native trees can have substantial benefits for biodiversity
40 (Section 3.6). Despite these constraints the potential for increased carbon sequestration through improved
41 land stewardship measures is considered to be substantial (Griscom et al., 2017).

42
43 Evaluating the synergies and trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation actions, resulting land and climate
44 impacts, and the myriad issues related to land-use governance will be essential to better understand the future
45 role of CDR technologies. This will be further addressed in the IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and
46 Land (SRCCCL) due to be published in 2019.

Key messages:

Cost-effective strategies to limit peak or end-of-century warming to 1.5°C all include enhanced GHG removals in the AFOLU sector as part of their portfolio of measures (*high agreement, robust evidence*).

Large-scale deployment of land-based CDR would have far reaching implications for land and water availability (*high agreement, robust evidence*). This may impact food production, biodiversity and the provision of other ecosystem services (*high agreement, medium evidence*)

The impacts of deploying land-based CDR at scale can be reduced if a wider portfolio of CDR options is deployed, and if increased mitigation effort focusses on strongly limiting demand for land, energy and material resources including lifestyle and dietary change (*high agreement, medium evidence*).

Afforestation and reforestation may be associated with significant co-benefits if implemented appropriately, but feature large land water footprints if deployed at scale (*medium agreement, medium evidence*).

Cross-Chapter Box 7, Table 1: Comparison of land-based carbon removal options

Sources: ^a assessed ranges by Fuss et al. (2018); see Figures in Section 4.3.7 for full literature range; ^b based on 2100 estimate for mean potentials by (Smith et al., 2015). Note that biophysical impacts of land-based CDR options besides albedo changes (e.g., through changes in evapotranspiration related to irrigation or land cover/use type) are not displayed.

Option	Potentials ^a	Cost ^a	Required land ^b	Required water ^b	Impact on nutrients ^b	Impact on albedo ^b	Saturation & permanence ^a
	<i>GtCO₂</i> <i>y⁻¹</i>	<i>\$ per</i> <i>tCO₂</i>	<i>Mha</i> <i>GtCO₂⁻¹</i>	<i>km³</i> <i>GtC</i> <i>O₂⁻¹</i>	<i>Mt N,</i> <i>P,</i> <i>K y⁻¹</i>	<i>No units</i>	<i>No units</i>
<i>BECCS</i>	0.5-5	100-200	31-58	60	Variable	Variable, depends on source of biofuel (higher albedo for crops than for forests) and on land management (e.g., no-till farming for crops)	Long-term governance of storage; limits on rates of bioenergy production and carbon sequestration
<i>Afforestation & Reforestation</i>	0.5-3.6	5-50	80	92	0.5	Negative; or reduced GHG benefit where not negative	Saturation of forests; vulnerable to disturbance; post-AR forest management essential

<i>Enhanced Weathering</i>	2-4	50-200	3	0.4	0	0	Saturation of soil; residence time from months to geological time scale
<i>Biochar</i>	0.3-2	30-120	16-100	0	N:8.2, P:2.7, K:19.1	0.08–0.12	Mean residence times between decades to centuries depending on soil type, management, and environmental conditions
<i>Soil Carbon Sequestration</i>	2.3-5	0-100	0	0	N:21.8, P:5.5, K:4.1	0 ¹	Soil sinks saturate and can reverse if poor management practices were to resume

[END BOX Cross-Chapter Box 7]

3.6.3 Implications beyond the end of the century

3.6.3.1 Sea ice

Sea ice is often cited as a tipping point in the climate system (Lenton, 2012). Detailed modelling of sea ice (Schroeder and Connolley, 2007; Sedláček et al., 2011; Tietsche et al., 2011), however, suggests that summer sea ice can return within a few years after its artificial removal for climates in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Further studies (Armour et al., 2011; Boucher et al., 2012; Ridley et al., 2012) remove sea ice by raising CO₂ concentrations and study subsequent regrowth by lowering CO₂. These studies also suggest changes in Arctic sea ice are neither irreversible nor exhibit bifurcation behavior. It is therefore plausible that the extent of Arctic sea ice may quickly re-equilibrate to end-of-century climate in the event of an overshoot scenario.

3.6.3.2 Sea level

The impacts of policy decisions related to anthropogenic climate change will have a profound impact on sea level not only for the remainder of this century but for many millennia to come (Clark et al., 2016). On these long timescales, 50 m of sea level rise are potentially possible (Clark et al., 2016). While it is *virtually certain* that sea level will continue to rise well beyond 2100, the amount of rise depends on future cumulative emissions (Church et al., 2013) as well as their profile over time (Bouttes et al., 2013; Mengel et al., 2018). Marzeion et al. (2018) find that 28–44% of present-day glacier volume is unsustainable in the present-day climate, so that it would eventually (over the course of a few centuries) melt, even if there were no further climate change. Some components of sea level rise, such as thermal expansion, are only reversible on centennial timescales (Bouttes et al., 2013; Zickfeld et al., 2013), while the contribution from ice sheets may not be reversible under any plausible future scenario (see below).

Based on the sensitivities summarized by Levermann et al. (2013), the contributions of thermal expansion (0.20–0.63 m °C⁻¹) and glaciers (0.21 m °C⁻¹ falling at higher degrees of warming mostly because of the depletion of glacier mass, with a possible total of ~0.6 m) amount to 0.5–1.2 m and 0.6–1.7 m in 1.5 and 2°C warmer worlds, respectively. The bulk of Sea Level Rise (SLR) on greater than centennial timescales will therefore be contributed by the two continental ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica, whose existence is threatened on multi-millennial timescales.

For Greenland, where melting from the ice sheet's surface is important, a well-documented instability exists

1 where the surface of a thinning ice sheet encounters progressively warmer air temperatures that further
2 promote melt and thinning. A useful indicator associated with this instability is the threshold at which annual
3 mass loss from the ice sheet by surface melt exceeds mass gain by snowfall. Previous estimates (Gregory and
4 Huybrechts, 2006) put this threshold about 1.9°C to 5.1°C above preindustrial period. More recent analyses,
5 however, suggest that this threshold sits between 0.8°C and 3.2°C with a best estimate at 1.6°C (Robinson et
6 al., 2012). The continued decline of the ice sheet after this threshold has been passed is highly dependent on
7 future climate and varies between about 80% loss after 10,000 years to complete loss after as little as 2000
8 years (contributing ~6 m to SLR).

9
10 The Antarctic ice sheet, in contrast, loses the mass gained by snowfall as outflow and subsequent melt to the
11 ocean (either directly from the underside of floating ice shelves or indirectly by the melt of calved icebergs).
12 The long-term existence of this ice sheet is also affected by a potential instability (the Marine Ice Sheet
13 Instability, MISI), which links outflow (or mass loss) from the ice sheet to water depth at the grounding line
14 (the point at which grounded ice starts to float and becomes an ice shelf) so that retreat into deeper water (the
15 bedrock underlying much of Antarctica slopes downwards towards the centre of the ice sheet) leads to
16 further increases in outflow and promotes yet further retreat (Schoof, 2007). More recently, a variant on this
17 mechanism has been postulated in which an ice cliff forms at the grounding line which retreats rapidly
18 through fracture and iceberg calving (DeConto and Pollard, 2016). There is a growing body of evidence
19 (Golledge et al., 2015; DeConto and Pollard, 2016) that large-scale retreat may be avoided in emission
20 scenarios such as Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP)2.6 but that higher-emission RCP scenarios
21 could lead to the loss of the West Antarctic ice sheet and sectors in East Antarctica, although the duration
22 (centuries or millennia) and amount of mass loss during such as collapse is highly dependent on model
23 details and no consensus yet exists. Current thinking (Schoof, 2007) suggests that retreat may be irreversible,
24 although a rigorous test has yet to be made. In this context, overshoot scenarios, especially of higher
25 magnitude or longer duration, could be anticipated to increase the risk of such irreversible retreat.

26
27 The assessment also noted that the collapse of marine sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet could lead to Global
28 Mean Sea Level (GMSL) rise above the likely range, and that there was *medium confidence* that this
29 additional contribution ‘would not exceed several tenths of a metre during the 21st century’ (Church et al.,
30 2013).

31
32 The multi-centennial evolution of the Antarctic ice sheet is considered in papers by DeConto and Pollard
33 (2016) and Golledge et al. (2015). Both suggest that RCP2.6 is the only RCP scenario leading to long-term
34 contributions to GMSL of below 1.0 m. The long-term committed future of Antarctica (and GMSL
35 contribution at 2100) are complex and require further detailed process-based modelling, however a
36 threshold in this contribution may be present close to 1.5°C.

37 38 39 3.6.3.3 Permafrost

40 The slow rate of permafrost thaw introduces a lag between the transient degradation of near-surface
41 permafrost and contemporary climate, so that the equilibrium response is expected to be 25–38% greater
42 than the transient response simulated in climate models (Slater and Lawrence, 2013). The long-term,
43 equilibrium Arctic permafrost loss to global warming is analyzed by Chadburn et al. (2017). They use an
44 empirical relation between recent mean annual air temperatures and the area underlain by permafrost coupled
45 to CMIP5 stabilization projections to 2300 for RCP2.6 and RCP4.5. Their estimate of the sensitivity of
46 permafrost to warming is 2.9–5.0 million km² °C⁻¹ (1 standard deviation confidence interval), which suggests
47 that stabilizing climate at 1.5°C as opposed to 2°C would reduce the area of eventually permafrost loss by

1 roughly 2 million km² (stabilizing at 56–83% as opposed to 43–72% of 1960–1990 levels). This work
2 combined with the assessment of Collins et al. (2013) on the link of global warming and permafrost loss,
3 leads to the assessment that permafrost extent would be appreciably greater in a 1.5°C world compared to a
4 2°C world (*medium confidence, limited evidence*).

7 **3.7 Knowledge gaps**

8
9 Most scientific literature specific to global warming of 1.5°C is only just emerging. This has led to
10 differences in the amount of information available and gaps across the various sections of this chapter. In
11 general, the number of impact studies specifically focused on 1.5°C lags behind climate change projections in
12 general, due in part to the dependence of the former on the latter. There are also insufficient studies focusing
13 on regional changes, impacts and consequences at +1.5°C and +2°C of global warming.

14
15 The following gaps have been identified with respect to tools, methodologies and understanding in the
16 current scientific literature specific to Chapter 3. The gaps identified here are not comprehensive but
17 highlight general areas for improved understanding, especially of global warming at 1.5°C as compared to
18 2°C and higher.

21 **3.7.1 Gaps in Methods and Tools**

- 23 • Regional and global climate model simulations for low-emission scenarios such as a 1.5°C world.
- 24
- 25 • Robust probabilistic models which separate the relatively small signal between 1.5°C versus 2°C from
26 background noise, and which handle the many uncertainties associated with non-linearities,
27 innovations, overshoot, local scales, latent or lagging responses in climate.
- 28
- 29 • Projections of risks under a range of climate and development pathways required to understand how
30 development choices affect the magnitude and pattern of risks, and to provide better estimates of the
31 range of uncertainties.
- 32
- 33 • More complex and integrated socio-ecological models for predicting the response of terrestrial
34 ecosystems to climate and models which are increasingly capable of separating climate effects from
35 those associated with human activities.
- 36
- 37 • Tools for informing local and regional decision-making especially when the signal is ambiguous at 1.5°C
38 and/or reverses sign at higher levels of global warming.
- 39

41 **3.7.2 Gaps in Understanding**

43 ***Earth systems and 1.5°C:***

- 45 • The cumulative effects of multiple stresses and risks (e.g., increased storm intensity interacting with sea
46 level rise and the effect on coastal people; feedback on wetlands due to climate change and human

1 activities).

- 2
- 3 • Feedbacks associated with changes in land use/cover for low-emissions scenarios, for example,
4 feedback from changes in forest cover, food production, and biofuel production, Bio-Energy with
5 Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), and associated unquantified biophysical impacts.
6
 - 7 • The distinct impacts of different overshoot scenarios depending on (a) the peak temperature of the
8 overshoot, (b) the length of the overshoot period, and (c) the associated rate of change in global
9 temperature over the time period of the overshoot.

10

11 ***Physical and chemical characteristics of a 1.5°C world:***

- 12
- 13 • Critical thresholds for extreme events (e.g., drought, inundation) between 1.5°C and 2°C, for different
14 climate models and projections. All aspects of storm intensity and frequency as a function of climate
15 change, especially for 1.5°C and 2°C worlds, and the impact of changing storminess on storm surge,
16 damage and coastal flooding at regional and local scales.
17
 - 18 • The timing and implications of the release of stored carbon in Arctic permafrost in a 1.5°C world and for
19 climate stabilization by the end of the century.
 - 20
 - 21 • Antarctic ice sheet dynamics, global sea level, and links between seasonal and year-long sea ice in both
22 polar regions.
23

24 **Terrestrial and freshwater systems**

- 25
- 26 • The dynamics between climate change, freshwater resources, and socioeconomic impacts for lower
27 levels of warming.
28
 - 29 • How the health of vegetation is likely to change, carbon storage in plant communities and landscapes,
30 and phenomena such as the fertilization effect.
31
 - 32 • The risks associated with species' maladaptation in response to climatic changes (e.g., effect of late
33 frosts), and questions associated with issues such as the consequences of species advancing their spring
34 phenology in response to warming, and the interaction between climate change, range shifts and local
35 adaptation in a 1.5°C world.
36
 - 37 • The biophysical impacts of land use in the context of mitigation pathways.
38

39 **Ocean Systems**

- 40
- 41 • Deep sea processes and risks to deep sea habitats and ecosystems.
42
 - 43 • Changes in ocean chemistry in a 1.5°C world, including how decreasing ocean oxygen content, ocean
44 acidification, and changes to activity of multiple ion species, will affect natural and human systems.
45
 - 46 • How ocean circulation is changing towards a 1.5°C and 2°C world, for example, vertical mixing, deep

1 ocean processes, currents, and their impacts on weather patterns at regional to local scales.

- 2
- 3 • The impacts of changing ocean conditions at 1.5°C and 2°C warming on food webs, disease, invading
 - 4 species, coastal protection, fisheries and human well-being, especially as organisms modify their
 - 5 biogeographical ranges within a changing ocean.
 - 6
 - 7 • Specific linkages between food security and changing coastal and ocean resources.
 - 8

9 **Human systems**

- 10
- 11 • The impacts of global and regional climate change at 1.5°C on food distribution, nutrition, poverty,
 - 12 tourism, coastal infrastructure, and public health, particularly for developing nations.
 - 13
 - 14 • Health and well-being risks in the context of socio-economic and climate change at 1.5°C, especially in
 - 15 key areas such as occupational health, air quality and infectious disease.
 - 16
 - 17 • Micro-climates at urban/city scales and their associated risks for natural and human systems, within
 - 18 cities and interactions with surrounding areas. For example, current projections do not integrate
 - 19 adaptation to projected warming by taking into account cooling that could be achieved through a
 - 20 combination of revised building codes, zoning, and land use to build more reflective roofs and urban
 - 21 surfaces that reduce urban heat islands.
 - 22
 - 23 • Implications of climate change at 1.5°C on livelihoods and poverty, on rural communities, indigenous
 - 24 groups and marginalised people.
 - 25
 - 26 • The changing levels of risk in terms of extreme events (including storms and heat events), especially
 - 27 with respect to people being displaced or having to migrate away from sensitive and exposed systems
 - 28 such as small islands, low lying coasts and deltas.
 - 29
 - 30
 - 31
 - 32

Cross-Chapter Box 8: 1.5°C Warmer Worlds

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Introduction


The Paris Agreement includes goals of stabilizing Global Mean Surface Temperature (GMST) well below 2°C and 1.5°C above preindustrial period, in the longer term. There are several aspects, however, that remain open regarding what a ‘1.5°C warmer world’ could be like, in terms of mitigation (Chapter 2) and adaptation (Chapter 4), as well as in terms of projected warming and associated regional climate change (Chapter 3), overlaid on anticipated and differential vulnerabilities (Chapter 5). **Alternative ‘1.5°C warmer worlds’ resulting from mitigation and adaptation choices, as well as from climate variability (climate ‘noise’), can be vastly different** as highlighted in this Cross-Chapter Box. In addition, the range of models underlying 1.5°C projections can be substantial and needs factoring in.

Key questions³:


- **What is a 1.5°C global mean warming, how is it measured, and what temperature increase does it imply for single locations and at specific times?** GMST corresponds to the globally averaged temperature of the Earth derived from point-scale ground observations or computed in climate models (Chapters 1 and 3). GMST is additionally defined over a given time frame, for example, averaged over a month, a year, or multiple decades. Because of climate variability, a climate-based global mean temperature typically needs to be defined over several decades (typically 20 or 30 years; Chapter 3, Section 3.2). Hence, whether or when global temperature reaches 1.5°C depends to some extent on the choice of preindustrial reference period, whether 1.5°C refers to total or human-induced warming, and which variables and coverage are used to define GMST change (Chapter 1). By definition, because GMST is an average in time and space, there will be locations and time periods in which 1.5°C warming is exceeded, even if the global mean temperature warming is at 1.5°C. In some locations, these differences can be particularly large (Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 1).
- **What is the impact of different climate models for projected changes in climate at 1.5°C global warming?** The range between single model simulations of projected regional changes at 1.5°C GMST warming can be substantial for regional responses (Chapter 3, Section 3.3). For instance, for the warming of cold temperature extremes in a 1.5°C warmer world, some model simulations project a 3°C warming and others more than 6°C warming in the Arctic land areas (Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 2). For warm temperature extremes in the contiguous United States, the range of model simulations includes colder temperatures than pre-industrial (-0.3°C) and a warming of 3.5°C (Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 2). Some regions display an even larger range (e.g., 1–6°C regional warming in hot extremes in Central Europe at 1.5°C warming, Chapter 3, Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). This large spread is due both to modelling

³FOOTNOTE: Part of this discussion is based on Seneviratne et al. (2018e)

1 uncertainty and internal climate variability. While the range is large, it also highlights risks that can be
 2 avoided with near certainty in a 1.5°C warmer world compared to worlds at higher levels of warming
 3 (e.g., an 8°C warming in cold extremes in the Arctic is not reached at 1.5°C global warming in the multi-
 4 model ensemble, but could happen at 2°C global warming, Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 2). Inferred
 5 projected ranges of regional responses (mean value, minimum and maximum) for different mitigation
 6 scenarios from Chapter 2 are displayed in Cross-Chapter Box 8, Table 1.
 7



8
 9
 10 **Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 1: Range of projected realized temperature at 1.5°C (due to stochastic noise and**
 11 **model-based spread).** Temperature with a 25% chance of occurrence at any location within 10-year time frames
 12 corresponding to GMST anomalies of 1.5°C (Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) multi-model
 13 ensemble). The plots display at each location the 25th percentile (Q25, left) and 75th percentile (Q75, right) values of
 14 mean temperature (Tmean), yearly maximum day-time temperature (TXx), yearly minimum night-time temperature
 15 (TNn), sampled from all time frames with GMST anomalies of 1.5°C in Representative Concentration Pathway
 16 (RCP)8.5 model simulations of the CMIP5 ensemble. From (Seneviratne et al., 2018b).
 17



Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 2: Spread of projected multi-model changes in minimum annual night-time temperature (TNn) in the Arctic land (left) and in maximum annual day-time temperature (TXx) in the contiguous United States as a function of mean global warming in climate simulations. The multi-model range (due to model spread and internal climate variability) is indicated in red shading (minimum and maximum value based on climate model simulations). The multi-model mean value is displayed with solid red and blue lines for two emissions pathways (blue : Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP)4.5; red : RCP8.5). The dashed red line indicates projections for a 1.5°C warmer world. The dashed black line displays the 1:1 line. [after Seneviratne et al., 2016].

- What is the impact of emissions pathways with, versus without, an overshoot?** All mitigation pathways projecting less than 1.5°C global warming over or at the end of the 21st century, include some probability of overshooting 1.5°C. These pathways include some time periods with higher warming than 1.5°C in the course of the coming decades and/or some probability of not reaching 1.5°C (Chapter 2; Section 2.2). This is inherent to the difficulty of limiting global warming to 1.5°C given that we are already very close to this warming level. The implications of overshooting are large for risks to natural and human systems, especially if the temperature at peak warming is high, because some risks may be long-lasting and irreversible, such as the loss of many ecosystems (Chapter 3, Box 3.4). The chronology of emission pathways and their implied warming is also important for the more slowly evolving parts of the Earth system, such as those associated with sea level rise. In addition, for several types of risks, the rate of change may be of most relevance (Loarie et al., 2009; LoPresti et al., 2015) with thus potentially large risks in case of a rapid rise to overshooting temperatures, even if a decrease to 1.5°C may be achieved at the end of the 21st century or later. On the other hand, if overshoot is to be minimized, the remaining equivalent CO₂ budget available for emissions has to be very small, which implies that large, immediate, and unprecedented global efforts to mitigate GHGs are required (Cross-Chapter Box 8, Table 1; Chapter 4).
- What is the probability of reaching 1.5°C global warming if emissions compatible with 1.5°C pathway are followed?** Emissions pathways in a “prospective scenario” (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.3, and Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1 on “Scenarios and pathways”) compatible with a 1.5°C global warming, are determined based on their probability of reaching 1.5°C by 2100 (Chapter 2, Section 2.1) given current knowledge of the climate system response. These probabilities cannot be quantified precisely, but are typically 50–66% in 1.5°C-consistent pathways (Section 1.2.3). This implies a one-in-

1 two to one-in-three probability that warming exceeds 1.5°C even under a 1.5°C-consistent pathway,
2 including some possibility of being substantially over this value (generally about 5–10% probability, see
3 Cross-Chapter Box 8, Table 1, and Seneviratne et al., 2018b). These alternative outcomes need to be
4 factored into the decision-making process. To address this issue, “adaptive” mitigation scenarios are those
5 in which emissions are continually adjusted to achieve a temperature goal (Millar et al., 2017). The set of
6 dimensions involved in mitigation options (Chapter 4) is complex and need systemic approaches to be
7 successful. Adaptive scenarios could be facilitated by the Global Stocktake mechanism established in the
8 Paris Agreement, and thereby transfer the risk of higher-than-expected warming to a risk of faster-than-
9 expected mitigation efforts. However, there are some limits to the feasibility of such approaches, because
10 some investments (e.g. in infrastructure) are long-term and also because the actual departure from an
11 aimed pathway will need to be detected against the backdrop of internal climate variability, typically over
12 several decades (Haustein et al., 2017; Seneviratne et al., 2018b). Avoiding impacts that depend on
13 atmospheric composition as well as GMST (Baker et al., 2018) would also require limits on atmospheric
14 CO₂ concentrations in the event of a lower-than-expected GMST response.

- 15
16 • **How can the transformation towards a 1.5°C warmer world be implemented?** This can be achieved
17 in a variety of ways such as decarbonizing the economy with an emphasis on demand reductions and
18 sustainable lifestyles, or, alternatively, with an emphasis on large-scale technological solutions, amongst
19 many other options (Chapter 2, Sections 2.3 and 2.4; Chapter 4, Sections 4.1 and 4.4.4). Different
20 portfolios of mitigation measures come with distinct synergies and trade-offs for other societal objectives.
21 Integrated solutions and approaches are required to achieve multiple societal objectives simultaneously
22 (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5.4, for a set of synergies and trade-offs).
- 23
24 • **What determines risks and opportunities in 1.5°C warmer worlds?** The risks to natural, managed,
25 and human systems in a 1.5°C warmer world will depend not only on uncertainties in the regional climate
26 that results from this level of warming, but also very strongly upon the methods that humanity uses to
27 limit warming to 1.5°C global warming. This is particularly the case for natural ecosystems and
28 agriculture (see Cross-Chapter Box 7 in this Chapter and Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2). The risks to human
29 systems will also depend on the magnitude and effectiveness of policies and measures implemented to
30 increase resilience to the risks of climate change and will depend on development choices over coming
31 decades that will influence underlying vulnerabilities and capacities of communities and institutions for
32 responding and adapting.
- 33
34 • **Which aspects are not considered, or only partly considered, in the mitigation scenarios from**
35 **Chapter 2?** These include biophysical impacts of land use, water constraints on energy infrastructure,
36 and regional implications of choices of specific scenarios for tropospheric aerosol concentrations or the
37 modulation of concentrations of short-lived climate forcers (Greenhouse Gases (Chapter 3, Section 3.6.3)).
38 Such aspects of development pathways need to be factored into comprehensive assessments of the
39 regional implications of mitigation and adaptation measures. On the other hand, some of these aspects are
40 assessed in Chapter 4 as possible options for mitigation and adaptation to a 1.5°C warmer world.
- 41
42 • **Are there commonalities to all 1.5°C warmer worlds?** Human-driven warming linked to CO₂
43 emissions is near irreversible over time frames of 1000 years or more (Matthews and Caldeira, 2008;
44 Solomon et al., 2009). The global mean temperature of the Earth responds to the cumulative amount of
45 CO₂ emissions. Hence all **1.5°C stabilization scenarios require both net CO₂ emissions and multi-gas**
46 **CO₂-forcing-equivalent emissions to be zero** at some point (Chapter 2, Section 2.2). This is also the

1 case for stabilization scenarios at higher levels of warming (e.g., at 2°C), the only difference would be the
2 time at which the net CO₂ budget is zero.
3

- 4 • **Hence, a transition to decarbonisation of energy use is necessary in all scenarios.** It should be noted
5 that **all scenarios of Chapter 2 include approaches for Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR)** in order to
6 achieve the net-zero CO₂ emission budget. **Most of these use Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)** in
7 addition to reforestation, to varying degrees (Chapter 4, Section 4.3.7). Some potential pathways to 1.5°C
8 warming in 2100 would minimize the need for CDR (Obersteiner et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018).
9 Taking into account the implementation of CDR, the CO₂-induced warming by 2100 is determined by the
10 difference between the total amount of CO₂ generated (that can be reduced by early decarbonisation) and
11 the total amount permanently stored out of the atmosphere, for example by geological sequestration
12 (Chapter 4, Section 4.3.7).
13
- 14 • **What are possible storylines of ‘warmer worlds’ at 1.5°C vs higher levels of warming? Cross-**
15 **Chapter Box 8, Table 2,** displays possible storylines based on the scenarios of Chapter 2, the impacts of
16 Chapters 3 and 5, and the options of Chapter 4. These storylines are not intended to be comprehensive of
17 all possible future outcomes. Rather, they are intended as plausible scenarios of alternative warmer
18 worlds, with two storylines that either include stabilization at 1.5°C (Scenario 1) or close to 1.5°C
19 (Scenario 2), and one missing this goal and consequently only including reductions of CO₂ emissions and
20 efforts towards stabilization at higher temperatures (Scenario 3).
21

22 **Summary:**

23
24 **There is no single ‘1.5°C warmer world’. Important aspects to consider (beside that of global**
25 **temperature) are the possible occurrence of an overshoot and its associated peak warming and**
26 **duration, how stabilization of global surface temperature at 1.5°C is achieved, how policies might be**
27 **able to influence the resilience of human and natural systems, and the nature of the regional and sub-**
28 **regional risks.**
29

30 The implications of overshooting are large for risks to natural and human systems, especially if the
31 temperature at peak warming is high, because some risks may be long-lasting and irreversible, such as the
32 loss of many ecosystems. In addition, for several types of risks, the rate of change may be of most relevance
33 with thus potentially large risks in case of a rapid rise to overshooting temperatures, even if a decrease to
34 1.5°C may be achieved at the end of the 21st century or later. If overshoot is to be minimized, the remaining
35 equivalent CO₂ budget available for emissions has to be very small, which implies that large, immediate, and
36 unprecedented global efforts to mitigate GHGs are required.
37

38 The time frame to initiate major mitigation measures is essential in order to reach a 1.5°C (or even a 2°C)
39 global stabilization of climate warming (see consistent cumulative CO₂ emissions up to peak warming,
40 Cross-Chapter Box 8, Table 1). If mitigation pathways are not rapidly activated, much more expensive and
41 complex adaptation measures would have to be taken to avoid the impacts of higher global warming on the
42 Earth system.
43

44 **Cross-Chapter Box 8, Table 1:** Different worlds resulting from 1.5°C and 2°C mitigation (prospective) pathways,
45 including 66% (probable) best-case outcome, and 5% worst-case outcome, based on Chapter 2 scenarios and Chapter 3
46 assessments of changes in regional climate. Note that the pathway characteristics estimates are based on computations

1 with the MAGICC model (Meinshausen et al., 2011) consistent with its set-up used in AR5 WGIII (Clarke et al., 2014),
 2 but are uncertain and will be subject to updates and adjustments (see Chapter 2 for details).

		B1.5_LOS (below 1.5°C with low overshoot) with 2/3 “probable best-case outcome” ^{3a}	B1.5_LOS (below 1.5°C with low overshoot) with 1/20 “worst-case outcome” ^{3b}	L20 (lower than 2°C) with 2/3 “probable best-case outcome” ^{3a}	L20 (lower than 2°C) with 1/20 “worst-case outcome” ^{3b}
General characteristics of pathway	Overshoot > 1.5°C in 21 st century ^c	Yes (51/51)	Yes (51/51)	Yes (72/72)	Yes (72/72)
	Overshoot > 2°C in 21 st century	No (0/51)	Yes (37/51)	No (72/72)	Yes (72/72)
	Cumulative CO ₂ emissions up to peak warming (relative to 2016) ^d	610–760	590–750	1150–1460	1130–1470
	Cumulative CO ₂ emissions up to 2100 (relative to 2016) ^d [GtCO ₂]	170–560		1030–1440	
	Global GHG emissions in 2030 ^d [GtCO ₂ y-1]	19–23		31–38	
	Years of global net zero CO ₂ emissions ^d	2055–2066		2082–2090	
Possible climate range at peak warming (regional+global)	Global mean temperature anomaly at peak warming	1.7°C (1.66–1.72°C)	2.05°C (2.00–2.09°C)	2.11°C (2.05–2.17°C)	2.67°C (2.59–2.76°C)
	Warming in the Arctic ^e (TNn ^f)	4.93°C (4.36, 5.52)	6.02°C (5.12, 6.89)	6.24°C (5.39, 7.21)	7.69°C (6.69, 8.93)
	Warming in the Central North America ^e (TXx ^g)	2.65°C (1.92, 3.15)	3.11°C (2.37, 3.63)	3.18°C (2.50, 3.71)	4.06°C (3.35, 4.63)
	Warming in Amazon region ^e (TXx)	2.55°C (2.23, 2.83)	3.07°C (2.74, 3.46)	3.16°C (2.84, 3.57)	4.05°C (3.62, 4.46)
	Drying in the Mediterranean region ^e	-1.11 (-2.24, -0.41)	-1.28 (-2.44, -0.51)	-1.38 (-2.58, -0.53)	-1.56 (-3.19, -0.67)
	Increase in heavy precipitation events ^e in Southern Asia ^g	9.94% (6.76, 14.00)	11.94% (7.52, 18.86)	12.68% (7.71, 22.39)	19.67% (11.56, 27.24)
Possible climate range in 2100 (regional+global)	Global mean temperature warming in 2100	1.46°C (1.41–1.51°C)	1.87°C (1.81–1.94°C)	2.06°C (1.99–2.15°C)	2.66°C (2.56–2.76°C)
	Warming in the Arctic ⁱ (TNn)	4.28°C (3.71, 4.77)	5.50°C (4.74, 6.21)	6.08°C (5.20, 6.94)	7.63°C (6.66, 8.90)
	Warming in Central North America ⁱ (TXx)	2.31°C (1.56, 2.66)	2.83°C (2.03, 3.49)	3.12°C (2.38, 3.67)	4.06°C (3.33, 4.59)
	Warming in Amazon region ⁱ (TXx)	2.22°C (2.00, 2.45)	2.76°C (2.50, 3.07)	3.10°C (2.75, 3.49)	4.03°C (3.62, 4.45)
	Drying in the Mediterranean region ⁱ	-0.95 (-1.98, -0.30)	-1.10 (-2.17, -0.51)	-1.26 (-2.43, -0.52)	-1.55 (-3.17, -0.67)
	Increase in heavy precipitation events in Southern Asia ⁱ	8.38% (4.63, 12.68)	10.34% (6.64, 16.07)	12.02% (7.41, 19.62)	19.72% (11.34, 26.95)

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 4 **Cross-Chapter Box 8, Table 2:** Storylines of possible worlds resulting from different mitigation options. The
 5 storylines build upon Cross-Chapter Box 8, Table 1, and the assessments of Chapters 1-5. These are only a few
 6 of possible storylines; their choice is for illustrative purposes.

<p>Scenario 1 [one possible storyline among best-case scenarios]:</p> <p>Mitigation: Early move to decarbonisation, decarbonisation designed to</p>	<p>In 2020, strong participation and support for the Paris Agreement and its ambitious goals for reducing CO₂ emissions by an almost unanimous international community led to a time frame for net-zero emissions that is compatible with halting of global temperature warming to 1.5°C by 2100.</p> <p>There is strong participation in all major world regions at national, state and/or city levels. Transport is strongly decarbonized through a shift to electric vehicles, with more cars with electric than combustion engines being sold by 2025 (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3). Several industry-sized plants for carbon capture and storage are installed and tested in the 2020s (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2;</p>
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<p>minimise land footprint, coordination and rapid action of world's nations towards 1.5°C goal by 2100</p> <p>Internal climate variability: Probable (66%) best-case outcome for global and regional climate responses.</p>	<p>Chapter 4, Sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.7). Competition for land between bioenergy cropping, food production, and biodiversity conservation is minimised by sourcing bioenergy for carbon capture and storage from agricultural wastes, algae, and kelp farms (Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2). Agriculture is intensified in countries with coordinated planning associated with a drastic decrease in food wastage (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2). This leaves many natural ecosystems relatively intact, supporting continued provision of most ecosystem services, although relocation of species toward higher latitudes and altitudes resulted in changes in local biodiversity in many regions, particularly in mountain, tropical coastal, and Arctic ecosystems (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3). Adaptive measures such as the establishment of corridors for the movement of species and parts of ecosystems become a central practice within conservation management (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2). The movement of species presents new challenges for resource management as novel ecosystems, and pests and disease, increase (Cross-chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3). Crops are grown on marginal land and no-till agriculture deployed, and large areas are reforested with native trees (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4; Chapter 3, Section 3.6.2; Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2). Societal preference for healthy diets reduces meat consumption and associated GHG emissions (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2; Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3).</p> <p>By 2100, global mean temperature is on average 0.5°C warmer than it was in 2018 (Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1). Only a minor temperature overshoot occurs during the century (Chapter 2, Section 2.2). In mid-latitudes, frequent hot summers and precipitation events tend to be more intense (Chapter 3, Section 3.3). Coastal communities struggle with increased inundation associated with rising sea levels and more frequent and intense heavy rainfall (Chapter 3, Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.9; Chapter 5, Box 5.3 and Section 5.3.2; Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2), and some respond by moving, in many cases, with consequences for urban areas. In the Tropics, in particular in mega-cities, there are frequent deadly heatwaves whose risks are reduced by proactive adaptation (Chapter 3, Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4.8; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.8), overlaid on a suite of development challenges and limits in disaster risk management (Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3; Chapter 5, Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2; Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5). Glaciers extent decreases in most mountainous areas (Chapter 3, Sections 3.3.5 and 3.5.4). Reduced Arctic sea ice opens up new shipping lanes and commercial corridors (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.8; Chapter 4, Box 4.3). Small Island Developing States (SIDS), Coastal and low-lying areas have faced significant changes but have largely persisted in most regions (Chapter 3; Sections 3.3.9 and 3.5.4; Box 3.5). The Mediterranean area becomes drier (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.4 and Box 3.2) and irrigation of crops expands, drawing the water table down in many areas (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.6). The Amazon is reasonably well preserved (through avoided risk of droughts (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.4 and Section 3.4.3; Chapter 4, Box 4.3) and reduced deforestation (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4; Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2)) and the forest services are working with the pattern observed at the beginning of the 21st century (Chapter 4, Box 4.3). While some climate hazards become more frequent (Chapter 3, Section 3.3), timely adaptation measures help reduce the associated risks for most, although poor and disadvantaged groups continue to experience high climate risks to their livelihoods and wellbeing (Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1; Cross-Chapter Box 12 in chapter 5; Chapter 3, Boxes 3.4 and 3.5; Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3). Summer sea ice has not</p>
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	<p>completely disappeared from the Arctic (3.4.4.7) and coral reefs having been driven to a low level (10-30% of levels in 2018) have partially recovered after extensive dieback by 2100 (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.4.10 and Box 3.4). The Earth system, while warmer, is still recognizable compared to the 2000s and no major tipping points are reached (Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2.5). Crop yields remain relatively stable (Chapter 3, Section 3.4). Aggregate economic damage of climate change impacts is relatively small, although there are some local losses associated with extreme weather events (Chapter 3, Section 3.5; Chapter 4). Human well-being remains overall similar to that in 2020 (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2).</p>
<p>Scenario 2 [one possible storyline among mid-case scenarios]:</p> <p>Mitigation: Delayed action (ambitious targets reached only after warmer decade in the 2020s due to internal climate variability), overshoot at 2°C, decrease towards 1.5°C afterward, with no efforts to minimize the land and water footprints of bioenergy.</p> <p>Internal climate variability: First, 10% worst-case outcome (2020s), then normal internal climate variability</p>	<p>The international community continues to largely support the Paris Agreement and agrees in 2020 on reduction targets for CO₂ emissions and time frames for net-zero emissions. However, these targets are not ambitious enough to reach stabilization at 2°C warming, let alone 1.5°C.</p> <p>In the 2020s, internal climate variability leads to higher warming than projected, in a reverse development to what happened in the so-called “hiatus” period of the 2000s. Temperatures are regularly above 1.5°C warming although radiative forcing is consistent with a warming of 1.2°C or 1.3°C. Deadly heatwaves in major cities (Chicago, Kolkata, Beijing, Karachi, São Paulo), droughts in Southern Europe, South Africa and the Amazon region, and major flooding in Asia, all intensified by the global and regional warming (Chapter 3, Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4 and 3.4.8; Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4), lead to increasing levels of public unrest and political destabilization (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1). An emergency global summit in 2025 moves to much more ambitious climate targets. Costs for rapidly phasing out fossil fuel use and infrastructure, while rapidly expanding renewables to reduce emissions, are much higher than in Scenario 1 due to a failure to support economic measures to drive the transition (Chapter 4). Disruptive technologies become crucial to face up to the adaptation measures needed (Chapter 4, Section 4.4.4).</p> <p>Temperature peaks at 2°C by the middle of the century before decreasing again due to intensive implementation of bioenergy plants with carbon capture and storage (Chapter 2), without efforts to minimize the land and water footprint of the bioenergy production (Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3). Reaching 2°C for several decades eliminates or severely damages key ecosystems such as coral reefs and tropical forests (Chapter 3, Section 3.4). The elimination of coral reef ecosystems and the deterioration of their calcified frameworks, as well as serious losses of coastal ecosystems such as mangrove forests and seagrass beds (Chapter 3, Box 3.4, Box 3.5, 3.4.4.10, 3.4.5), leads to much reduced levels of coastal defence from storms, winds and waves increases the vulnerability and risks facing communities in tropical and sub-tropical regions with consequences for many coastal communities (Chapter 5, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5) These impacts are being amplified by steadily rising sea levels (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.9) and intensifying storms (Section 3.4.4.3). The intensive area required for the production of bioenergy combined with increasing water stress sets pressures on food prices (Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3), driving elevated rates of food insecurity, hunger, and poverty (Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2; Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3; Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4). Crop yields decline significantly in the tropics, leading to prolonged famines in some African countries (Chapter 3, Section</p>

	<p>3.4; Chapter 4 Section 4.3.2). Food trumps environment in terms of importance in most countries with the result that natural ecosystems decrease in abundance due to climate change as well as of land-use change (Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3). The ability to implement adaptive action to prevent the loss of ecosystems is frustrated under the circumstances and is consequently minimal (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.4.10). Many natural ecosystems, in particular in the Mediterranean, are lost due to the combined effects of climate change and land use change, and extinction rates increase greatly (Chapter 3, Section 3.4 and Box 3.2).</p> <p>By 2100, temperature has decreased but is still higher than 1.5°C, and the yields of some tropical crops are recovering (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3). Several of the remaining natural ecosystems experience irreversible climate-change related damages whilst others have been lost to land use change, with very rapid increases in the rate of species extinctions (Chapter 3, Section 3.4; Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3; Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4). Migration, forced displacement, and loss of identity are extensive in some countries, reversing some achievements in sustainable development and human security (Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2). Aggregate economic impacts of climate change damage are small, but the loss in ecosystem services creates large economic losses (Chapter 4, Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). The health and well-being of people generally decrease from 2020, while the levels of poverty and disadvantage increase very significantly (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1).</p>
<p>Scenario 3 [one possible storyline among worst-case scenarios]:</p> <p>Mitigation: Uncoordinated action, major actions late in the 21st century, 3°C warming in 2100.</p> <p>Internal climate variability: First unusual (ca. 10%) best-case scenario for one decade, then normal internal climate variability</p>	<p>In 2020, despite past pledges, the international support for the Paris Agreement starts to wane. In the years that follow, CO₂ emissions are reduced at local and national level but efforts are limited and not always successful.</p> <p>Radiative forcing increases and, due to chance, the most extreme events tend to happen in less populated regions thus not increasing global concerns. Nonetheless, there are more frequent heatwaves in several cities and less snow in mountain resorts in the Alps, Rockies, and Andes (Chapter 3, Section 3.3). 1.5°C warming is reached by 2030, but no major changes in policies occur. Starting with an intense El Niño-La Niña phase in the 2030s, several catastrophic years occur while global temperature warming starts to approach 2°C. There are major heatwaves on all continents, with deadly consequences in tropical regions and Asian megacities, especially for those ill-equipped for protecting themselves and their communities from the effects of extreme temperatures (Chapter 3, Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.4.8). Droughts occur in regions bordering the Mediterranean Sea, Central North America, the Amazon region and southern Australia, some of which are due to natural variability and others to enhanced greenhouse forcing (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.4; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2; Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4). Intense floodings occur in high-latitude and tropical regions, in particular in Asia, following increases in heavy precipitation events (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3). Major ecosystems (coral reefs, wetlands, forests) are destroyed over that period (Chapter 3, Section 3.4) with massive disruption to local livelihoods (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2 and Box 5.3; Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5). An unprecedented drought leads to large impacts on the Amazon rain forest (Chapter 3, Sections 3.3.4 and 3.4), which is also affected by deforestation (Chapter 2). A hurricane with intense rainfall and associated with high storm surges (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.6) destroys a large part of Miami. A 2-year drought in the Great Plains and a concomitant drought in Eastern Europe and Russia decrease global crop production (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.4), resulting in major increases in food prices and eroding food security. Poverty levels</p>

increase to a very large scale and risk and incidence of starvation increase very significantly as food stores dwindle in most countries; human health suffers (**Chapter 3, Section 3.4.6.1; Chapter 4, Sections 4.3.2 and 4.4.3; Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1**).

There are high levels of public unrest and political destabilization due to the increasing climatic pressures, resulting in some countries becoming dysfunctional (**Chapter 4, Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2**). The main countries responsible for the CO₂ emissions design rapidly conceived mitigation plans and try to install plants for carbon capture and storage, in some cases without sufficient prior testing (**Chapter 4, Section 4.3.6**). Massive investments in renewable energy often happen too late and are uncoordinated; energy prices soar as a result of the high demand and lack of infrastructure. In some cases, demand cannot be met, leading to further delays. Some countries propose to consider sulphate-aerosol based SRM (**Chapter 4, Section 4.3.8**), however intensive international negotiations on the topic take substantial time and are inconclusive, because of overwhelming concerns about potential impacts to monsoon rainfall and risks in case of termination (**Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 5**). Global and regional temperatures continue to strongly increase while mitigation solutions are being developed and implemented.

Global mean warming reaches 3°C by 2100 but is not yet stabilized despite major decreases in yearly CO₂ emissions, as a net-zero CO₂ emissions budget could not yet be achieved and because of the long life-time of CO₂ concentrations (**Chapters 1, 2 and 3**). The world as it was in 2020 is no longer recognizable, with decreasing life expectancy, reduced outdoor labour productivity, and lower quality of life in many regions because of too frequent heatwaves and other climate extremes (**Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3**). Droughts and water resources stress renders agriculture economically un-viable in some regions (**Chapter 3, Section 3.4; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2**) and contributes to increases in poverty (**Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1; Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5**). Progress on the sustainable development goals is largely undone and poverty rates reach new highs (**Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3**). Major conflicts take place (**Chapter 3, Section 3.4.9.6; Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1**). Almost all ecosystems experience irreversible impacts, species extinction rates are high in all regions, forest fires escalate, and biodiversity strongly decreases, resulting in extensive losses to ecosystem services. These losses exacerbate poverty and reduce quality of life (**Chapter 3, Section 3.4; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2**). Life, for many indigenous and rural groups, becomes untenable in their ancestral lands (**Chapter 4, Box 4.3; Chapter 5, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5**). The retreat of the West Antarctic ice sheet accelerates (**Chapter 3, Sections 3.3 and 3.6**), leading to more rapid SLR (**Chapter 3, Section 3.3.9; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2**). Several small island states give up hope to survive in their place and look to an increasingly fragmented global community for refuge (**Chapter 3, Box 3.5; Chapter 5, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5**). Aggregate economic damages are substantial owing to the combined effects of climate changes, political instability, and losses of ecosystem services (**Chapter 4, Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2; Chapter 3, Box 3.6 and Section 3.5.2.4**). The general health and well-being of people substantially decreased compared to the conditions in 2020 and continues to worsen over the following decades (**Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3**).

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1 **Frequently Asked Questions**

2 **FAQ 3.1:** What are the impacts of 1.5°C and 2°C of warming?

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5 **Summary:** *The impacts of climate change are being felt in every inhabited continent and in the oceans. But they are not spread uniformly across the globe, and different parts of the world experience impacts differently. An average warming of 1.5°C across the whole globe raises the risk of heatwaves and heavy rainfall events, amongst many other potential impacts. Limiting warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C can help reduce these risks. But the impacts the world experiences will depend on the specific greenhouse gas emission ‘pathway’ taken. The consequences of temporarily overshooting 1.5°C and returning later in the century, for example, could be larger than if temperature stabilizes below 1.5°C. The size and duration of an overshoot will also affect future impacts.*

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14 Human activity has warmed the world by ~1°C since pre-industrial times, and the impacts of this warming are already been felt in many parts of the world. This warming in global temperature is the average of many thousands of temperature measurements taken over the world’s land and oceans. But temperatures aren’t changing at the same speed everywhere. Warming is greatest on continents and is particularly strong in the Arctic in the cold season and mid-latitude regions in the warm season. This is due to self-amplifying mechanisms which increase resulting warming, for instance due to snow and ice melt reducing the reflectivity of solar radiation at the surface, or soil moisture drying leading to less evaporative cooling in the interior of continents. This means that some parts of the world have already experienced temperatures above 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.

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24 Extra warming on top of the ~1°C we have seen so far would amplify the risks and associated impacts, with implications for the world and its inhabitants. This would be the case even if the total warming is held at 1.5°C, just half a degree above where we are now, and would be further amplified at 2°C global warming. Reaching 2°C instead of 1.5°C global warming would lead to substantial warming of extreme hot days in all land regions. It would also lead to an increase in heavy rainfall events in some regions, particularly in the high latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere, potentially raising the risk of flooding. In addition, some regions are projected to become drier at 2°C vs 1.5°C global warming, for example the Mediterranean region. The impacts of any additional warming would also include stronger melting of ice sheets and glaciers, as well as increased sea level rise, which would continue long after the stabilization of atmospheric CO₂ concentrations.

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35 Change in climate means and extremes have knock on effects for the societies and ecosystems living on the planet. Climate change is projected to be a poverty multiplier, which means that its impacts make the poor poorer and increase the total number of people living in poverty. The 0.5°C rise in global temperatures that we have experienced in the past 50 years has contributed to shifts in the distribution of plant and animal species, decreasing crop yields and leading to more frequent wildfires. Similar changes can be expected for further rises in global temperature.

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42 Essentially, the lower the rise in global temperature above preindustrial levels, the lower the risks to human societies and natural ecosystems. Put another way, limiting warming to 1.5°C can be understood in terms of ‘avoided impacts’ compared to higher levels of warming. Many of the impacts of climate change assessed in this report have lower associated risks at 1.5°C compared to 2°C.

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46 Thermal expansion of the oceans, resulting from the delayed ocean mixing, means sea level will continue to rise even if global temperature is limited to 1.5°C, but this would be lower than in a 2°C world. Ocean


1 acidification, the process by which excess CO₂ is dissolving into oceans and making them more acidic, is
 2 expected to be less damaging in a world where CO₂ emissions are reduced and warming is stabilised at 1.5°C
 3 compared to 2°C. The prospect for coral reefs in a 1.5°C world of less damaging than that of a 2°C world,
 4 too.

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 6 The impacts of climate change that we experience in future will also be affected by factors other than the
 7 change in temperature. The consequences of 1.5°C warming will additionally depend on the specific
 8 greenhouse gas emissions ‘pathway’ that is followed and the extent to which adaptation can reduce
 9 vulnerability. This IPCC Special Report uses a number of ‘pathways’ to explore different possibilities for
 10 limiting global warming to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. One type of pathway sees global temperature
 11 stabilize at, or just below, 1.5°C. Another sees global temperature temporarily exceed 1.5°C before coming
 12 back down later in the century (known as an ‘overshoot’ pathway).

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 14 Such pathways would have different associated impacts, so it is important to distinguish between them for
 15 planning adaptation and mitigation strategies. For example, impacts from an overshoot pathway could be
 16 larger than impacts from a stabilization pathway. The size and duration of an overshoot would also have
 17 consequences for the impacts the world experiences. For example, pathways that overshoot 1.5°C run a
 18 greater risk of passing through ‘tipping points’. These are thresholds beyond which certain impacts can no
 19 longer be avoided, even if temperatures are brought back down later on. An example is the collapse of the
 20 Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets on the time scale of centuries and millennia.

FAQ3.1: Impact of 1.5°C and 2.0°C global warming

Temperature rise is not uniform across the world. Some regions will experience greater increases in hot days and decreases in cold nights than others



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 22 **FAQ 3.1, Figure 1:** Temperature change is not uniform across the globe. Projected change in average temperature of
 23 the annual hottest day (top) and the annual coldest night (bottom) with 1.5°C global warming (left)
 24 and 2°C global warming (right) compared to pre-industrial levels.
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Chapter 4: Strengthening and implementing the global response

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Executive Summary

Limiting warming to 1.5°C would require transformative systemic change, integrated with sustainable development. Such change would require the upscaling and acceleration of the implementation of far-reaching, multi-level and cross-sectoral climate mitigation and addressing barriers. Such systemic change would need to be linked to complementary adaptation actions, including transformational adaptation, especially for pathways that temporarily overshoot 1.5°C {Chapter 2, Chapter 3, 4.2.1, 4.4.5, 4.5} (medium evidence, high agreement). Current national pledges on mitigation and adaptation are not enough to stay below the Paris Agreement temperature limits and achieve its adaptation goals. While transitions in energy efficiency, carbon intensity of fuels, electrification and land use change are underway in various countries, limiting warming to 1.5°C will require a greater scale and pace of change to transform energy, land, urban and industrial systems globally. {4.3, 4.4, Cross-Chapter Box CB9 in this Chapter}

Although multiple communities around the world are demonstrating the possibility of implementation consistent with 1.5°C pathways {Boxes 4.1-4.10}, very few countries, regions, cities, communities or businesses can currently make such a claim (high confidence). To strengthen the global response, almost all countries would need to significantly raise their level of ambition. Implementation of this raised ambition would require enhanced institutional capabilities in all countries, including building the capability to utilise Indigenous and local knowledge (medium evidence, high agreement). In developing countries and for poor and vulnerable people, implementing the response would require financial, technological and other forms of support to build capacity, for which additional local, national and international resources would need to be mobilised (high confidence). However, public, financial, institutional and innovation capabilities currently fall short of implementing far-reaching measures at scale in all countries (high confidence). Transnational networks that support multi-level climate action are growing, but challenges in their scale-up remain. {4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, Box 4.1, Box 4.2, Box 4.7}

Adaptation needs will be lower in a 1.5°C world compared to a 2°C world (high confidence) {Chapter 3; Cross-Chapter Box CB11 in this Chapter}. Learning from current adaptation practices and strengthening them through adaptive governance {4.4.1}, lifestyle and behavioural change {4.4.3} and innovative financing mechanisms {4.4.5} can help their mainstreaming within sustainable development practices. Preventing maladaptation, drawing on bottom-up approaches {Box 4.6} and using Indigenous knowledge {Box 4.3} would effectively engage and protect vulnerable people and communities. While adaptation finance has increased quantitatively, significant further expansion would be needed to adapt to 1.5°C. Qualitative gaps in the distribution of adaptation finance, readiness to absorb resources and monitoring mechanisms undermine the potential of adaptation finance to reduce impacts. {Chapter 3, 4.4.2, 4.4.5, 4.6}

System transitions

The energy system transition that would be required to limit global warming to 1.5°C is underway in many sectors and regions around the world (medium evidence, high agreement). The political, economic, social and technical feasibility of solar energy, wind energy and electricity storage technologies has improved dramatically over the past few years, while that of nuclear energy and Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS) in the electricity sector have not shown similar improvements. {4.3.1}

Electrification, hydrogen, bio-based feedstocks and substitution, and in several cases carbon dioxide capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS), would lead to the deep emissions reductions required in energy-intensive industry to limit warming to 1.5°C. However, those options are limited by institutional, economic and technical constraints, which increase financial risks to many incumbent firms (medium evidence, high agreement). Energy efficiency in industry is more economically feasible and an enabler of industrial system transitions but would have to be complemented with Greenhouse Gas (GHG)-neutral processes or Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) to make energy-intensive industry consistent with 1.5°C (high confidence). {4.3.1, 4.3.4}

1 **Global and regional land-use and ecosystems transitions and associated changes in behaviour that**
2 **would be required to limit warming to 1.5°C can enhance future adaptation and land-based**
3 **agricultural and forestry mitigation potential. Such transitions could, however, carry consequences for**
4 **livelihoods that depend on agriculture and natural resources {4.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box CB6 in**
5 **chapter 3}. Alterations of agriculture and forest systems to achieve mitigation goals could affect current**
6 **ecosystems and their services and potentially threaten food, water and livelihood security. While this could**
7 **limit the social and environmental feasibility of land-based mitigation options, careful design and**
8 **implementation could enhance their acceptability and support sustainable development objectives (*medium***
9 ***evidence, medium agreement*). {4.3.2, 4.5.3}**

10 **Changing agricultural practices can be an effective climate adaptation strategy.** A diversity of
11 adaptation options exists, including mixed crop-livestock production systems which can be a cost-effective
12 adaptation strategy in many global agriculture systems (*robust evidence, medium agreement*). Improving
13 irrigation efficiency could effectively deal with changing global water endowments, especially if achieved
14 via farmers adopting new behaviour and water-efficient practices rather than through large-scale
15 infrastructure (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Well-designed adaptation processes such as
16 community-based adaptation can be effective depending upon context and levels of vulnerability. {4.3.2,
17 4.5.3}

18 **Improving the efficiency of food production and closing yield gaps have the potential to reduce**
19 **emissions from agriculture, reduce pressure on land and enhance food security and future mitigation**
20 **potential (*high confidence*).** Improving productivity of existing agricultural systems generally reduces the
21 emissions intensity of food production and offers strong synergies with rural development, poverty reduction
22 and food security objectives, but options to reduce absolute emissions are limited unless paired with demand-
23 side measures. Technological innovation including biotechnology, with adequate safeguards, could
24 contribute to resolving current feasibility constraints and expand the future mitigation potential of
25 agriculture. {4.3.2, 4.4.4}

26 **Dietary choices towards foods with lower emissions and requirements for land, along with reduced**
27 **food loss and waste, could reduce emissions and increase adaptation options (*high confidence*).**
28 Decreasing food loss and waste and behavioural change around diets could lead to effective mitigation and
29 adaptation options (*high confidence*) by reducing both emissions and pressure on land, with significant co-
30 benefits for food security, human health and sustainable development {4.3.2, 4.4.5, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 5.4.2}, but
31 evidence of successful policies to modify dietary choices remains limited.

32 **Mitigation and Adaptation Options and other Measures**

33 **A mix of mitigation and adaptation options implemented in a participatory and integrated manner**
34 **can enable rapid, systemic transitions in urban and rural areas that are necessary elements of an**
35 **accelerated transition to 1.5°C worlds. Such options and changes are most effective when aligned with**
36 **economic and sustainable development, and when local and regional governments are supported by**
37 **national governments {4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.3},** Various mitigation options are expanding rapidly across many
38 geographies. Although many have development synergies, not all income groups have so far benefited from
39 them. Electrification, end-use energy efficiency and increased share of renewables, amongst other options,
40 are lowering energy use and decarbonising energy supply in the built environment, especially in buildings.
41 Other rapid changes needed in urban environments include demotorisation and decarbonisation of transport,
42 including the expansion of electric vehicles, and greater use of energy-efficient appliances (*medium*
43 *evidence, high agreement*). Technological and social innovations can contribute to limiting warming to
44 1.5°C, e.g. by enabling the use of smart grids, energy storage technologies and general-purpose technologies,
45 such as Information and Communication Technology (ICT) that can be deployed to help reduce emissions.
46 Feasible adaptation options include green infrastructure, resilient water and urban ecosystem services, urban
47 and peri-urban agriculture, and adapting buildings and land use through regulation and planning (*medium*
48 *evidence, medium to high agreement*). {4.3.3}

1 **Synergies can be achieved across systemic transitions through several overarching adaptation options**
2 **in rural and urban areas.** Investments in health, social security and risk sharing and spreading are cost-
3 effective adaptation measures with high potential for scaling-up (*medium evidence, medium to high*
4 *agreement*). Disaster risk management and education-based adaptation have lower prospects of scalability
5 and cost-effectiveness (*medium evidence, high agreement*) but are critical for building adaptive capacity.
6 {4.3.5, 4.5.3}

7
8 **Converging adaptation and mitigation options can lead to synergies and potentially increase cost**
9 **effectiveness, but multiple trade-offs can limit the speed of and potential for scaling up.** Many examples
10 of synergies and trade-offs exist in all sectors and system transitions. For instance, sustainable water
11 management (*high evidence, medium agreement*) and investment in green infrastructure (*medium evidence,*
12 *high agreement*) to deliver sustainable water and environmental services and to support urban agriculture are
13 less cost-effective but can help build climate resilience. Achieving the governance, finance and social
14 support required to enable these synergies and to avoid trade-offs is often challenging, especially when
15 addressing multiple objectives, and appropriate sequencing and timing of interventions. {4.3.2, 4.3.4, 4.4.1,
16 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.4}

17
18 **Though CO₂ dominates long-term warming, the reduction of warming Short-Lived Climate Forcers**
19 **(SLCFs), such as methane and black carbon, can in the short term contribute significantly to limiting**
20 **warming to 1.5°C. Reductions of black carbon and methane would have substantial co-benefits (*high***
21 ***confidence*), including improved health due to reduced air pollution. This, in turn, enhances the**
22 **institutional and socio-cultural feasibility of such actions.** Reductions of several warming SLCFs are
23 constrained by economic and social feasibility (*low evidence, high agreement*). As they are often co-emitted
24 with CO₂, achieving the energy, land and urban transitions necessary to limit warming to 1.5°C would see
25 emissions of warming SLCFs greatly reduced. {2.3.3.2, 4.3.6}

26
27 **Most CDR options face multiple feasibility constraints, that differ between options, limiting the**
28 **potential for any single option to sustainably achieve the large-scale deployment in 1.5°C-consistent**
29 **pathways in Chapter 2 (*high confidence*).** Those 1.5°C pathways typically rely on Bioenergy with Carbon
30 Capture and Storage (BECCS), Afforestation and Reforestation (AR), or both, to neutralise emissions that
31 are expensive to avoid, or to draw down CO₂ emissions in excess of the carbon budget {Chapter 2}. Though
32 BECCS and AR may be technically and geophysically feasible, they face partially overlapping yet different
33 constraints related to land use. The land footprint per tonne CO₂ removed is higher for AR than for BECCS,
34 but in the light of low current deployment, the speed and scales required for limiting warming to 1.5°C pose
35 a considerable implementation challenge, even if the issues of public acceptance and missing economic
36 incentives were to be resolved (*high agreement, medium evidence*). The large potentials of afforestation and
37 their co-benefits if implemented appropriately (e.g. on biodiversity, soil quality) will diminish over time, as
38 forests saturate (*high confidence*). The energy requirements and economic costs of Direct Air Carbon
39 Capture and Storage (DACCS) and enhanced weathering remain high (*medium evidence, medium*
40 *agreement*). At the local scale, soil carbon sequestration has co-benefits with agriculture and is cost-effective
41 even without climate policy (*high confidence*). Its potential global feasibility and cost effectiveness appears
42 to be more limited. {4.3.7}

43
44 **Uncertainties surrounding Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) measures constrain their potential**
45 **deployment.** These uncertainties include: technological immaturity; limited physical understanding about
46 their effectiveness to limit global warming; and a weak capacity to govern, legitimise, and scale such measures.
47 Some recent model-based analysis suggests SRM would be effective but that it is too early to evaluate its
48 feasibility. Even in the uncertain case that the most adverse side-effects of SRM can be avoided, public
49 resistance, ethical concerns and potential impacts on sustainable development could render SRM
50 economically, socially and institutionally undesirable (*low agreement, medium evidence*). {4.3.8, Cross-
51 Chapter Box CB10 in this Chapter}

1 **Enabling Rapid and Far-reaching Change**

2
3 **The speed and scale of transitions and of technological change required to limit warming to 1.5°C has**
4 **been observed in the past within specific sectors and technologies {4.2.2.1}. But the geographical and**
5 **economic scales at which the required rates of change in the energy, land, urban, infrastructure and**
6 **industrial systems would need to take place, are larger and have no documented historic precedent**
7 *(limited evidence, medium agreement)*. To reduce inequality and alleviate poverty, such transformations
8 would require more planning and stronger institutions (including inclusive markets) than observed in the
9 past, as well as stronger coordination and disruptive innovation across actors and scales of governance. {4.3,
10 4.4}

11
12 **Governance consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C and the political economy of adaptation and**
13 **mitigation can enable and accelerate systems transitions, behavioural change, innovation and**
14 **technology deployment** *(medium evidence, medium agreement)*. For 1.5°C-consistent actions, an effective
15 governance framework would include: accountable multi-level governance that includes non-state actors
16 such as industry, civil society and scientific institutions; coordinated sectoral and cross-sectoral policies that
17 enable collaborative multi-stakeholder partnerships; strengthened global-to-local financial architecture that
18 enables greater access to finance and technology; and addresses climate-related trade barriers; improved
19 climate education and greater public awareness; arrangements to enable accelerated behaviour change;
20 strengthened climate monitoring and evaluation systems; and reciprocal international agreements that are
21 sensitive to equity and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). System transitions can be enabled by
22 enhancing the capacities of public, private and financial institutions to accelerate climate change policy
23 planning and implementation, along with accelerated technological innovation, deployment and upkeep.
24 {4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4}

25
26 **Behaviour change and demand-side management can significantly reduce emissions, substantially**
27 **limiting the reliance on CDR to limit warming to 1.5°C {Chapter 2, 4.4.3}**. Political and financial
28 stakeholders may find climate actions more cost-effective and socially acceptable, if multiple factors
29 affecting behaviour are considered, including aligning them with people's core values *(medium evidence,*
30 *high agreement)*. Behaviour- and lifestyle-related measures and demand-side management have already led
31 to emission reductions around the world and can enable significant future reductions *(high confidence)*.
32 Social innovation through bottom-up initiatives can result in greater participation in the governance of
33 systems transitions and increase support for technologies, practices and policies that are part of the global
34 response to 1.5°C. {Chapter 2, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, Figure 4.3}

35
36 **This rapid and far-reaching response required to keep warming below 1.5°C and enhance the adaptive**
37 **capacity to climate risks needs large investments in low-emission infrastructure and buildings that are**
38 **currently underinvested, along with a redirection of financial flows towards low-emission investments**
39 **(robust evidence, high agreement)**. An estimated annual incremental investment of 1% to 1.5% of global
40 Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) for the energy sector is indicated; and 1.7% to 2.5% of global GFCF
41 for other development infrastructure that could also address SDG implementation. Though quality policy
42 design and effective implementation may enhance efficiency, they cannot substitute for these investments.
43 {2.5.2, 4.2.1}

44
45 **Enabling this investment requires the mobilisation and better integration of a range of policy**
46 **instruments** that include: the reduction of socially inefficient fossil fuel subsidy regimes and innovative
47 price and non-price national and international policy instruments and would need to be complemented by de-
48 risking financial instruments and the emergence of long-term low-emission assets. These instruments would
49 aim to reduce the demand for carbon-intensive services and shift market preferences away from fossil fuel-
50 based technology. Evidence and theory suggest that carbon pricing alone, in the absence of sufficient
51 transfers to compensate their unintended distributional cross-sector, cross-nation effects, cannot reach the
52 levels needed to trigger system transitions *(robust evidence, medium agreement)*. But, embedded in
53 consistent policy-packages, they can help mobilise incremental resources and provide flexible mechanisms
54 that help reduce the social and economic costs of the triggering phase of the transition *(robust evidence,*
55 *medium agreement)*. {4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5}

1 **Increasing evidence suggests that a climate-sensitive realignment of savings and expenditure towards**
2 **low-emission, climate-resilient infrastructure and services requires an evolution of global and national**
3 **financial systems.** Estimates suggest that, in addition to climate-friendly allocation of public investments, a
4 potential redirection of 5% to 10% of the annual capital revenues¹ is necessary {4.4.5, Table 1 in Box 4.8}.
5 This could be facilitated by a change of incentives for private day-to-day expenditure and the redirection of
6 savings from speculative and precautionary investments, towards long-term productive low-emission assets
7 and services. This implies the mobilisation of institutional investors and mainstreaming of climate finance
8 within financial and banking system regulation. Access by developing countries to low-risk and low-interest
9 finance through multilateral and national development banks would have to be facilitated (*medium evidence,*
10 *high agreement*). New forms of public-private partnerships may be needed with multilateral, sovereign and
11 sub-sovereign guarantees to de-risk climate-friendly investments, support new business models for small-scale
12 enterprises and help households with limited access to capital. Ultimately, the aim is to promote a portfolio
13 shift towards long-term low-emission assets, that would help redirect capital away from potential stranded
14 assets (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). {4.4.5}

16 Knowledge Gaps

17
18 **Knowledge gaps around implementing and strengthening the global response to climate change would**
19 **need to be urgently resolved if the transition to 1.5°C worlds is to become reality.** Remaining questions
20 include: how much can be realistically expected from innovation, behaviour and systemic political and
21 economic change in improving resilience, enhancing adaptation and reducing GHG emissions? How can
22 rates of changes be accelerated and scaled up? What is the outcome of realistic assessments of mitigation and
23 adaptation and transitions that are compliant with sustainable development, poverty eradication and
24 addressing inequality? What are life-cycle emissions and prospects of early-stage CDR options? How can
25 climate and sustainable development policies converge, and how can they be organised within a global
26 governance framework and financial system, based on principles of justice and ethics (including Common
27 But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC)), reciprocity and partnership?
28 To what extent limit warming to 1.5°C needs a harmonisation of macro-financial and fiscal policies, that
29 could include financial regulators such as central banks? How can different actors and processes in climate
30 governance reinforce each other, and hedge against the fragmentation of initiatives? {4.1, 4.4.1, 4.3.7, 4.4.5,
31 4.6}

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¹ Annual capital revenues are the paid interests plus the increase of the asset value.

4.1 Accelerating the Global Response to Climate Change

This chapter discusses how the global economy and socio-technical and socio-ecological systems can transition to 1.5°C-consistent pathways and adapt to warming of 1.5°C. In the context of systemic transitions, the chapter assesses adaptation and mitigation options, including Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR), and potential Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) remediative measures (Section 4.3), as well as the enabling conditions that would facilitate implementing the rapid and far-reaching global response (Section 4.4), and render the options more or less feasible (Section 4.5).

The impacts of 1.5°C warmer worlds, while less than in a 2°C warmer world, would require complementary adaptation and development action, typically at local and national scale. From a mitigation perspective, 1.5°C-consistent pathways require immediate action on a greater and global scale so as to achieve net-zero emissions by mid-century, or earlier (Chapter 2). This chapter and Chapter 5 highlight the potential that combined mitigation, development and poverty reduction offer for accelerated decarbonisation.

The global context is an increasingly interconnected world, with the human population growing from the current 7.6 billion to over 9 billion by mid-century (UN, 2017). There has been a consistent growth of global economic output, wealth and trade with a significant reduction in extreme poverty. These trends could continue for the next few decades (Burt et al., 2014), potentially supported by new and disruptive information and communication, and nano- and bio-technologies. They however co-exist with rising inequality (Piketty, 2014), exclusion and social stratification, and regions locked in poverty traps (Deaton, 2013) that could fuel social and political tensions.

The aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis generated a challenging environment on which leading economists have issued repeated alerts about the ‘discontents of globalisation’ (Stiglitz, 2002), ‘depression economics’ (Krugman, 2009), an excessive reliance of export-led development strategies (Rajan, 2011), and risks of ‘secular stagnation’ due to the ‘saving glut’ that slows down the flow of global savings towards productive 1.5°C-consistent investments (Summers, 2016). Each of these impacts the implementation of both 1.5°C-consistent pathways and sustainable development (Chapter 5).

The range of mitigation and adaptation actions that can be deployed in the short run are well-known: for example, low-emission technologies, new infrastructure, energy efficiency measures in buildings, industry and transport; transformation of fiscal structures; reallocation of investments and human resources towards low-emission assets; sustainable land and water management, ecosystem restoration, enhancement of adaptive capacities to climate risks and impacts, disaster risk management; research and development; and mobilisation of new, traditional and Indigenous knowledge.

The convergence of short-term development co-benefits of mitigation and adaptation to address ‘everyday development failures’ (e.g., institutions, market structures and political processes) (Hallegatte et al., 2016; Pelling et al., 2018) could enhance the adaptive capacity of key systems at risk (e.g., water, energy, food, biodiversity, urban, regional and coastal systems) to 1.5°C climate impact (Chapter 3). The issue is whether aligning 1.5°C-consistent pathways with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will secure support for accelerated change and a new growth cycle (Stern, 2013, 2015). It is difficult to imagine how a 1.5°C world would be attained unless the SDG on cities and sustainable urbanisation is attained in developing countries (Revi, 2016), or without reforms in the global financial intermediation system.

Unless affordable and environmentally and socially acceptable CDR become feasible and available at scale well before 2050, 1.5°C-consistent pathways will be difficult to realise, especially in overshoot scenarios. The social costs and benefits of 1.5°C-consistent pathways depend on the depth and timing of policy responses and their alignment with short term and long-term development objectives, through policy packages that bring together a diversity of policy instruments, including public investment (Campiglio 2016; Winkler and Dubash 2015; Grubb et al. 2014).

Whatever its potential long-term benefits, a transition to a 1.5°C world may suffer from a lack of broad political and public support, if it exacerbates existing short-term economic and social tensions, including

1 unemployment, poverty, inequality, financial tensions, competitiveness issues and the loss of economic value
2 of carbon-intensive assets (Mercuri et al., 2018). The challenge is therefore how to strengthen climate
3 policies without inducing economic collapse or hardship, and to make them contribute to reducing some of
4 the ‘fault lines’ of the world economy (Rajan, 2011).

5
6 This chapter reviews literature addressing the alignment of climate with other public policies (e.g., fiscal,
7 trade, industrial, monetary, urban planning, infrastructure, innovation) and with a greater access to basic
8 needs and services, defined by the SDGs. It also reviews how de-risking low-emission investments and the
9 evolution of the financial intermediation system can help reduce the ‘savings glut’ (Arezki et al., 2016) and
10 the gap between cash balances and long-term assets (Aglietta et al., 2015b) to support more sustainable and
11 inclusive growth.

12
13 As the transitions associated with 1.5°C-consistent pathways require accelerated and coordinated action, in
14 multiple systems across all world regions, they are inherently exposed to risks of freeriding and moral
15 hazards. A key governance challenge is how the convergence of voluntary domestic policies can be
16 organised via aligned global, national and sub-national governance, based on reciprocity (Ostrom and
17 Walker, 2005) and partnership (UN, 2016), and how different actors and processes in climate governance
18 can reinforce each other to enable this (Gupta, 2014; Andonova et al., 2017). The emergence of polycentric
19 sources of climate action and transnational and subnational networks that link these efforts (Abbott et al.,
20 2012) offer the opportunity to experiment and learn from different approaches, thereby accelerating
21 approaches led by national governments (Cole, 2015; Jordan et al., 2015).

22
23 Section 4.2 of this chapter outlines existing rates of change and attributes of accelerated change. Section 4.3
24 identifies global systems, and their components, that offer options for this change. Section 4.4 documents the
25 enabling conditions that influence the feasibility of those options, including economic, financial and policy
26 instruments that could trigger the transition to 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Section 4.5 assesses mitigation
27 and adaptation options for feasibility, strategies for implementation and synergies and trade-offs between
28 mitigation and adaptation.

31 **4.2 Pathways Compatible with 1.5°C: Starting Points for Strengthening Implementation**

32 **4.2.1 Implications for Implementation of 1.5°C-consistent Pathways**

33
34
35 The 1.5°C-consistent pathways assessed in Chapter 2 form the basis for the feasibility assessment in section
36 4.3. A wide range of 1.5°C-consistent pathways from both Integrated Assessment Modelling (IAM),
37 supplemented by other literature, are assessed by Chapter 2 (Sections 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5). The most
38 common feature shared by these pathways is their requirement for faster and more radical changes compared
39 to 2°C and higher warming pathways.

40
41 A variety of 1.5°C-consistent technological options and policy targets is identified in the assessed modelling
42 literature (Sections 2.3, 2.4, 2.5). These technology and policy options include energy demand reduction,
43 greater penetration of low-emission and carbon-free technologies as well as electrification of transport and
44 industry, and reduction of land-use change. Both the detailed integrated modelling pathway literature and a
45 number of broader sectoral and bottom-up studies provide examples of how these sectoral technological and
46 policy characteristics can be broken down sectorally for 1.5°C-consistent pathways (see Table 4.1).

47
48 Both the integrated pathway literature and the sectoral studies agree on the need for rapid transitions in the
49 production and use of energy across various sectors, to be consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C.
50 The pace of these transitions are particularly significant for the supply mix and electrification, with sectoral
51 studies projecting a higher pace of change compared to IAMs (Table 4.1). These trends and transformation
52 patterns create opportunities and challenges for both mitigation and adaptation (Sections 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.2),
53 and have significant implications for the assessment of feasibility and enablers, including governance,
54 institutions, and policy instruments addressed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.

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Table 4.1: Sectoral indicators of the pace of transformation in 1.5°C-consistent pathways, based on selected integrated pathways assessed in Chapter 2 (from the scenario database) and sectoral studies reviewed in Chapter 2 that assess mitigation transitions consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. Values for ‘1.5C low OS’ and ‘1.5C high OS’ indicate the median and the interquartile ranges for 1.5°C scenarios distinguishing high and low overshoot. S1, S2, S5 and LED represent the four illustrative pathway archetypes selected for this assessment (see Section 2.1 and Supplementary Material 4.SM.1 for detailed description).

		Energy		Buildings	Transport		Industry
		Share of renewable in primary energy [%]	Share of renewable in electricity [%]	Change in energy demand for buildings (2010 baseline) [%]	Share of low carbon fuels (electricity, hydrogen and biofuel) in transport [%]	Share of electricity in transport [%]	Industrial emissions reductions (based on current level) [%]
IAM Pathways 2030	1.5C low OS	29 (35; 25)	53 (59; 44)	-3 (5; -8)	10 (15; 8)	5 (7; 3)	40 (50; 30)
	1.5C high OS	24 (27; 20)	43 (54; 37)	-17 (-12; -20)	7 (8; 6)	3 (5; 3)	18 (28; -13)
	S1	29	58	-8	NA	4	49
	S2	29	48	-14	5	4	19
	S5	14	25	NA	3	1	NA
	LED	37	60	30	NA	21	42
Sectorial studies 2030	Löffler et al. (2017)	50	78				
	Rockström et al. (2017)	20					
	Kuramochi et al. (2017)						20
	IEA (2017)	20	47	7	16	6	14
	WBCSD (2017)			-11			
IAM Pathways 2050	1.5C low OS	58 (67; 50)	76 (85; 69)	-19 (2; -37)	53 (65; 34)	23 (30; 17)	79 (89; 71)
	1.5C high OS	62 (68; 47)	82 (88; 64)	-37 (-13; -51)	38 (44; 27)	18 (23; 14)	68 (81; 54)
	S1	58	81	-21	NA	34	74
	S2	53	63	-25	26	23	73
	S5	67	70	NA	53	10	NA
	LED	73	77	45	NA	59	91
Sectorial studies 2050	Löffler et al. (2017)	100	100		98		
	Rockström et al. (2017)		100				
	Figueres et al. (2017)						50
	Kuramochi et al. (2017)		100				
	IEA (2017)	29	74	11	59	31	20
	WBCSD (2017)						

9

10

4.2.1.1 Challenges and Opportunities for Mitigation Along the Reviewed Pathways

12

4.2.1.1.1 Greater scale, speed and change in investment patterns

There is agreement in the literature reviewed by Chapter 2 that staying below 1.5°C would entail significantly greater transformation in terms of energy systems, lifestyles and investments patterns compared to 2°C-consistent pathways. Yet there is *limited evidence* and *low agreement* regarding the magnitudes and costs of the investments (Sections 2.5.1, 2.5.2 and 4.4.5). Based on the IAM literature reviewed in Chapter 2, climate policies in line with limiting warming to 1.5°C would require a marked upscaling of supply-side energy system investments between now and mid-century, reaching levels of between 1.6–3.8 trillion USD

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1 yr⁻¹ globally with an average of about 3.5 trillion USD yr⁻¹ over 2016-2050 (see Figure 2.27). This can be
2 compared to an average of about 3.0 trillion USD yr⁻¹ over the same period for 2°C-consistent pathways
3 (also in Figure 2.27).
4

5 Not only the level of investment but also the type and speed of sectoral transformation would be impacted by
6 the transitions associated with 1.5°C-consistent pathways. IAM literature projects that investments in low-
7 emission energy overtake fossil-fuel investments globally by 2025 in 1.5°C-consistent pathways (Section
8 2.5.2). The projected low-emission investments in electricity generation allocations over the period 2016–
9 2050 are: solar (0.09–1.0 trillion USD yr⁻¹), wind (0.1–0.35 trillion USD yr⁻¹), nuclear (0.1–0.25 trillion
10 USD yr⁻¹), and transmission, distribution, and storage (0.3–1.3 trillion USD yr⁻¹). In contrast, investments in
11 fossil-fuel extraction and unabated fossil electricity generation along a 1.5°C-consistent pathway are
12 projected to drop by 0.3-0.85 trillion USD yr⁻¹ over the period 2016–2050, with investments in unabated coal
13 generation projected to halt by 2030 in most 1.5°C-consistent pathways (Section 2.5.2). Estimates of
14 investments in other infrastructure are currently unavailable, but they could be considerably larger in volume
15 than solely those in the energy sector (Section 4.4.5).
16
17

18 4.2.1.1.2 *Greater policy design and decision-making implications*

19 1.5°C-consistent pathways raise multiple challenges for effective policy design and responses to address the
20 scale, speed, and pace of mitigation technology, finance and capacity building needs. They also need to deal
21 with their distributional implications, while addressing adaptation to residual climate impacts (see
22 Chapter 5). The available literature indicates that 1.5°C-consistent pathways would require robust, stringent
23 and urgent transformative policy interventions targeting the decarbonisation of energy supply, electrification,
24 fuel switching, energy efficiency, land-use change, and lifestyles (Sections 2.5, 4.4.2, 4.4.3). Examples of
25 effective approaches to integrate mitigation with adaptation in the context of sustainable development and to
26 deal with distributional implications proposed in the literature include the utilisation of dynamic adaptive
27 policy pathways (Haasnoot et al., 2013; Mathy et al., 2016) and transdisciplinary knowledge systems
28 (Bendito and Barrios, 2016).
29

30 Yet, even with good policy design and effective implementation, 1.5°C-consistent pathways would incur
31 higher costs. Projections of the magnitudes of global economic costs associated with 1.5°C-consistent
32 pathways and their sectoral and regional distributions from the currently assessed literature are scant, yet
33 suggestive. For example, IAM simulations assessed in Chapter 2 project (with a probability greater than
34 50%) that marginal abatement costs, typically represented in IAMs through a carbon price, would increase
35 by about threefold by 2050 under a 1.5°C-consistent pathway compared to a 2°C-consistent pathway
36 (Section 2.5.2, Figure 2.26). Managing these costs and distributional effects would require an approach that
37 takes account of unintended cross-sector, cross-nation, and cross-policy trade-offs during the transition
38 (Droste et al., 2016; Stiglitz et al., 2017; Pollitt, 2018; Sands, 2018; Siegmeier et al., 2018).
39
40

41 4.2.1.1.3 *Greater sustainable development implications*

42 Few studies address the relations between the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and the Sustainable
43 Developments Goals (SDGs) (O'Neill et al., 2015; Riahi et al., 2017). Nonetheless, literature on potential
44 synergies and trade-offs between 1.5°C-consistent mitigation pathways and sustainable development
45 dimensions is emerging (Sections 2.5.3, 5.4). Areas of potential trade-offs include reduction in final energy
46 demand in relation to SDG 7 (the universal clean energy access goal) and increase of biomass production in
47 relation to land use, water resources, food production, biodiversity and air quality (Sections 2.4.3, 2.5.3).
48 Strengthening the institutional and policy responses to deal with these challenges are discussed in Section 4.4
49 together with the linkage between disruptive changes in the energy sector and structural changes in other
50 infrastructure (transport, building, water and telecommunication) sectors. A more in-depth assessment of the
51 complexity and interfaces between 1.5°C-consistent pathways and sustainable development is presented in
52 Chapter 5.
53
54

4.2.1.2 *Implications for Adaptation Along the Reviewed Pathways*

Climate variability and uncertainties in the underlying assumptions in Chapter 2's IAMs as well as in model comparisons complicate discerning the implications for climate impacts, adaptation options and avoided adaptation investments at the global level of 2°C compared to 1.5°C warming (James et al., 2017; Mitchell et al., 2017).

Incremental warming from 1.5°C to 2°C would lead to significant increases in temperature and precipitation extremes in many regions (Section 3.3.2, 3.3.3). Those projected changes in climate extremes under both warming levels, however, depend on the emissions pathways, as they have different greenhouse gas (GHG)/aerosol forcing ratios. Impacts are sector-, system- and region-specific, as described in Chapter 3. For example, precipitation-related impacts reveal distinct regional differences (Sections 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.4.2). Similarly, regional reduction in water availability and the lengthening of regional dry spells have negative implications for agricultural yields depending on crop types and world regions (see for example Sections 3.3.4, 3.4.2, 3.4.6).

Adaptation helps reduce impacts and risks. However, adaptation has limits. Not all systems can adapt, and not all impacts can be reversed (Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5). For example, tropical coral reefs are projected to be at risk of severe degradation due to temperature-induced bleaching (Box 3.4).

4.2.2 *System Transitions and Rates of Change*

Society-wide transformation involves socio-technical transitions and social-ecological resilience (Gillard et al., 2016). Transitional adaptation pathways would need to respond to low-emission energy and economic systems, and the socio-technical transitions for mitigation involve removing barriers in social and institutional processes that could also benefit adaptation (Pant et al., 2015; Geels et al., 2017; Ickowitz et al., 2017). In this chapter, transformative change is framed in mitigation around socio-technical transitions, and in adaptation around socio-ecological transitions. In both instances, emphasis is placed on the enabling role of institutions (including markets, and formal and informal regulation). 1.5°C-consistent pathways and adaptation needs associated with warming of 1.5°C imply both incremental and rapid, disruptive and transformative changes.

4.2.2.1 *Mitigation: Historical Rates of Change and State of Decoupling*

Realising 1.5°C-consistent pathways would require rapid and systemic changes on unprecedented scales (see Chapter 2 and Section 4.2.1). This section examines whether the needed rates of change have historical precedents and are underway.

Some studies conduct a de-facto validation of IAM projections. For CO₂ emission intensity over 1990–2010, this resulted in the IAMs projecting declining emission intensities while actual observations showed an increase. For individual technologies (in particular solar energy), IAM projections have been conservative regarding deployment rates and cost reductions (Creutzig et al., 2017), suggesting that IAMs do not always impute actual rates of technological change resulting from influence of shocks, broader changes and mutually reinforcing factors in society and politics (Geels and Schot, 2007; Daron et al., 2015; Sovacool, 2016; Battiston et al., 2017).

Other studies extrapolate historical trends into the future (Höök et al., 2011; Fouquet, 2016), or contrast the rates of change associated with specific temperature limits in IAMs (such as those in Chapter 2) with historical trends to investigate plausibility of emission pathways and associated temperature limits (Wilson et al., 2013; Gambhir et al., 2017; Napp et al., 2017). When metrics are normalised to Gross Domestic Product (GDP; as opposed to other normalisation metrics such as primary energy), low-emission technology deployment rates used by IAMs over the course of the coming century are shown to be broadly consistent with past trends, but rates of change in emission intensity are typically overestimated (Wilson et al., 2013;

1 Loftus et al., 2014; van Sluisveld et al., 2015). This bias is consistent with the findings from the ‘validation’
2 studies cited above, suggesting that IAMs may under-report the potential for supply-side technological
3 change assumed in 1.5°-consistent pathways, but may be more optimistic about the systemic ability to realise
4 incremental changes in reduction of emission intensity as a consequence of favourable energy efficiency
5 payback times (Wilson et al., 2013). This finding suggests that barriers and enablers other than costs and
6 climate limits play a role in technological change, as also found in the innovation literature (Hekkert et al.,
7 2007; Bergek et al., 2008; Geels et al., 2016b).

8
9 One barrier to a greater rate of change in energy systems is that economic growth in the past has been
10 coupled to the use of fossil fuels. Disruptive innovation and socio-technical changes could enable the
11 decoupling of economic growth from a range of environmental drivers, including the consumption of fossil
12 fuels, as represented by 1.5°C-consistent pathways (UNEP, 2014; Newman, 2017). This may be relative
13 decoupling due to rebound effects that see financial savings generated by renewable energy used in the
14 consumption of new products and services (Jackson and Senker, 2011; Gillingham et al., 2013), but in 2015
15 and 2016 total global GHG emissions have decoupled absolutely from economic growth (IEA, 2017g; Peters
16 et al., 2017). A longer data trend would be needed before stable decoupling can be established. The observed
17 decoupling in 2015 and 2016 was driven by absolute declines in both coal and oil use since the early 2000s
18 in Europe, in the past seven years in the United States and Australia, and more recently in China (Newman,
19 2017). In 2017, decoupling in China reversed by 2% due to a drought and subsequent replacement of
20 hydropower with coal-fired power (Tollefson, 2017), but this reversal is expected to be temporary (IEA,
21 2017c). Oil consumption in China is still rising slowly, but absolute decoupling is ongoing in megacities like
22 Beijing (Gao and Newman, 2018) (see Box 4.9).

23 24 25 4.2.2.2 *Transformational Adaptation*

26
27 In some regions and places, incremental adaptation would not be sufficient to mitigate the impacts of climate
28 change on social-ecological systems (see Chapter 3). Transformational adaptation would then be required
29 (Bahadur and Tanner, 2014; Pant et al., 2015; Gillard, 2016; Gillard et al., 2016; Colloff et al., 2017;
30 Termeer et al., 2017). Transformational adaptation refers to actions aiming at adapting to climate change
31 resulting in significant changes in structure or function that go beyond adjusting existing practices (Dowd et
32 al., 2014; IPCC, 2014a; Few et al., 2017), including approaches that enable new ways of decision-making on
33 adaptation (Colloff et al., 2017). Few studies have assessed the potentially transformative character of
34 adaptation options (Pelling et al., 2015; Rippke et al., 2016; Solecki et al., 2017), especially in the context of
35 warming of 1.5°C.

36
37 Transformational adaptation can be adopted at a large scale, can lead to new strategies in a region or
38 resource system, transform places and potentially shifts locations (Kates et al., 2012). Some systems might
39 require transformational adaptation at 1.5°C. Implementing adaptation policies in anticipation of 1.5°C
40 would require transformation and flexible planning of adaptation (sometimes called adaptation pathways)
41 (Rothman et al., 2014; Smucker et al., 2015; Holland, 2017; Gajjar et al., 2018), an understanding of the
42 varied stakeholders involved and their motives, and knowledge of less visible aspects of vulnerability based
43 on social, cultural, political, and economic factors (Holland, 2017). Transformational adaptation would seek
44 deep and long-term societal changes that influence sustainable development (Chung Tiam Fook, 2017; Few
45 et al., 2017).

46
47 Adaptation requires multidisciplinary approaches integrating scientific, technological and social dimensions.
48 For example, a framework for transformational adaptation, and the integration of mitigation and adaptation
49 pathways can transform rural indigenous communities to address risks of climate change and other stressors
50 (Thornton and Comberti, 2017). In villages in rural Nepal, transformational adaptation has taken place with
51 villagers changing their agricultural and pastoralist livelihood strategies after years of lost crops due to
52 changing rain patterns and degradation of natural resources (Thornton and Comberti, 2017). Instead, they are
53 now opening stores, hotels, and tea shops. In another case, the arrival of an oil pipeline altered traditional
54 Alaskan communities’ livelihoods. With growth of oil production, investments were made for rural
55 development. A later drop in oil production decreased these investments. Alaskan Indigenous populations

1 are also dealing with impacts of climate change, such as sea level rise, which is altering their livelihood
2 sources. Transformational adaptation is taking place by changing the energy matrix to renewable energy, in
3 which indigenous people apply their knowledge to achieve environmental, economic, and social benefits
4 (Thornton and Comberti, 2017).

7 4.2.2.3 *Disruptive Innovation*

8
9 Demand-driven disruptive innovations that emerge as the product of political and social changes across
10 multiple scales can be transformative (Seba, 2014; Christensen et al., 2015; Green and Newman, 2017a).
11 Such innovations would lead to simultaneous, profound changes in behaviour, economies and societies
12 (Seba, 2014; Christensen et al. 2015), but are difficult to predict in supply-focussed economic models (Geels
13 et al., 2016a; Pindyck, 2017). Rapid socio-technical change has been observed in the solar industry (Creutzig
14 et al. (2017). Similar changes to socio-ecological systems can stimulate adaptation and mitigation options
15 that lead to more climate-resilient systems (Adger et al., 2005; Ostrom, 2009; Gillard et al., 2016) (see the
16 Alaska and Nepal examples in Section 4.2.2.2). The increase in roof-top solar and energy storage technology
17 as well as the increase in passive housing and net zero-emissions buildings are further examples of such
18 disruptions (Green and Newman, 2017b). Both roof-top solar and energy storage have benefitted from
19 countries' economic growth strategy and associated price declines in photovoltaic technologies, particularly
20 in China (Hsu et al., 2017; Shrivastava and Persson, 2018), as well as from new information and
21 communication technologies (Kooimey et al., 2013), rising demand for electricity in urban areas, and global
22 concern regarding greenhouse gas emissions (Azeiteiro et al., 2017; Lutz and Mutarak, 2017; Wamsler,
23 2017).

24
25 System co-benefits can create the potential for mutually enforcing and demand-driven climate responses
26 (Jordan et al., 2015; Hallegatte and Mach, 2016; Pelling et al., 2018), and rapid and transformational change
27 (Cole, 2015; Geels et al., 2016b; Hallegatte and Mach, 2016; Peters et al., 2017). Examples of co-benefits
28 include gender equality, agricultural productivity (Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner-Kerr, 2015), reduced
29 indoor air pollution (Satterthwaite and Bartlett, 2017), flood buffering (Colenbrander et al., 2017), livelihood
30 support (Shaw et al., 2014; Üрге-Vorsatz et al., 2014), economic growth (GCEC, 2014; Stiglitz et al., 2017),
31 social progress (Steg et al., 2015; Hallegatte and Mach, 2016) and social justice (Ziervogel et al., 2017;
32 Patterson et al., 2018).

33
34 Innovations that disrupt entire systems may leave firms and utilities with stranded assets as the transition can
35 happen very quickly (IPCC, 2014b; Kossoy et al., 2015). This may have consequences for fossil fuels that
36 are rendered 'unburnable' (McGlade and Ekins, 2015) and fossil fuel-fired power and industry assets that
37 would become obsolete (Caldecott, 2017; Farfan and Breyer, 2017). The presence of multiple barriers and
38 enablers operating in a system implies that rapid change, whether the product of many small changes
39 (Sterling et al., 2017; Termeer et al., 2017) or large-scale disruptions, is seldom an insular or discrete
40 process. This finding informs the multi-dimensional nature of feasibility in Cross-Chapter Box 3 in
41 Chapter 1 which is applied in Section 4.5. Climate responses that are aligned with multiple feasibility
42 dimensions and combine adaptation and mitigation interventions with non-climate benefits can accelerate
43 change and reduce risks and costs (Fazey et al., 2018). Also political, social and technological influences on
44 energy transitions, for example, can accelerate them faster than narrow techno-economic analysis suggests is
45 possible (Kern and Rogge, 2016), but could also introduce new constraints and risks (Geels et al., 2016b;
46 Sovacool, 2016; Eyre et al., 2018).

47
48 Disruptive innovation and technological change may play a role in mitigation and in adaptation. The next
49 section assesses mitigation and adaption options in energy, land and ecosystem, urban and infrastructure and
50 industrial systems.

4.3 Systemic Changes for 1.5°C-Consistent Pathways

Section 4.2 emphasises the importance of systemic change for 1.5°C-consistent pathways. This section translates this into four main system transitions: energy, land and ecosystem, urban and infrastructure, and industrial system transitions. This section assesses the mitigation, adaptation and carbon dioxide removal options that offer the potential for such change within those systems, based on options identified by Chapter 2 and risks and impacts in Chapter 3.

The section puts more emphasis on those adaptation options (Sections 4.3.1-4.3.5) and mitigation options (Sections 4.3.1-4.3.4, 4.3.6 and 4.3.7) that are 1.5°C-relevant and have developed considerably since AR5. They also form the basis for the mitigation and adaptation feasibility assessments in Section 4.5. Section 4.3.8 discusses solar radiation modification methods.

This section emphasises that no single solution or option can enable a global transition to 1.5°C-consistent pathways or adapting to projected impacts. Rather, accelerating change, much of which is already starting or underway, in multiple global systems, simultaneously and at different scales, could provide the impetus for these system transition. The feasibility of individual options as well as the potential for synergies and reduce trade-offs will vary according to context and the local enabling conditions. These are explored at a high level in Section 4.4. Policy packages that bring together multiple enabling conditions can provide building blocks for a strategy to scale-up implementation and intervention impacts.

4.3.1 Energy System Transitions

This section discusses the feasibility of mitigation and adaptation options related to the energy system transition. As only options relevant to 1.5°C and with significant changes since AR5 are discussed, which means that for options like hydropower and geothermal energy, the chapter refers to AR5 and does not provide a discussion. Socio-technical inertia of energy options for 1.5°C-consistent pathways are increasingly being surmounted as fossil fuels start to be phased out. Supply-side mitigation and adaptation options, energy demand-side options, including energy efficiency in buildings and transportation, are discussed in Section 4.3.3, options around energy use in industry are discussed in Section 4.3.4.

Section 4.5 assesses the feasibility in a systematic manner based on the approach outlined in Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1.

4.3.1.1 Renewable Electricity: Solar and Wind

All renewable energy options have seen considerable advances over the years since AR5, but solar energy and both onshore and offshore wind energy have had dramatic growth trajectories. They appear well underway to contribute to 1.5°C-consistent pathways (REN21, 2012; IEA, 2017c; IRENA, 2017b).

The largest growth driver for renewable energy since AR5 has been the dramatic reduction in the cost of solar PV (REN21, 2012). This has made rooftop solar competitive in sunny areas between 45° north and south (Green and Newman, 2017b), though IRENA (2018) suggests it is cost effective in many other places too. Solar Photovoltaics (PV) with batteries have been cost effective in many rural and developing areas (Pueyo and Hanna, 2015; Szabó et al., 2016; Jimenez, 2017), for example 19 million people in Bangladesh now have solar-battery electricity in remote villages and are reporting positive experiences on safety and ease of use (Kabir et al., 2017). Small-scale distributed energy projects are being implemented in developed and developing cities where residential and commercial rooftops offer potential for consumers becoming producers (called prosumers) (ACOLA, 2017; Kotilainen and Saari, 2018). Such prosumers could contribute significantly to electricity generation in sun-rich areas like California (Kurdgelashvili et al., 2016) or Sub-Saharan Africa in combination with micro-grids and mini-grids Bertheau et al. (2017). It could also contribute to universal energy access (SDG 7) as shown by (IEA, 2017c).

1
2 The feasibility of renewable energy options depends to a large extent on geophysical characteristics of the
3 area where the option is implemented. However, technological advances and policy instruments make
4 renewable energy options increasingly attractive in other areas. For example, solar PV is deployed
5 commercially in areas with low solar insolation, like North-Western Europe (Nyholm et al., 2017).
6 Feasibility also depends on grid adaptations (e.g., storage, see below) as renewables grow (IEA, 2017c). For
7 regions with high energy needs, such as industrial areas (see section 4.3.4), high-voltage DC transmission
8 across long distances would be needed (MacDonald et al., 2016).

9
10 Another important factor affecting feasibility is public acceptance, in particular for wind energy and other
11 large-scale renewable facilities (Yenneti and Day, 2016; Rand and Hoen, 2017; Gorayeb et al., 2018) that
12 raise landscape management (Nadaï and Labussière, 2017) and distributional justice (Yenneti and Day,
13 2016) challenges. Research indicates that financial participation and community engagement can be effective
14 in mitigating resistance (Brunes and Ohlhorst, 2011; Rand and Hoen, 2017) (see Section 4.4.3).

15
16 Bottom-up studies estimating the use of renewable energy in the future, either at the global or at the national
17 level, are plentiful, especially in the grey literature. It is hotly debated whether a fully renewable energy or
18 electricity system, with or without biomass, is possible (Jacobson et al., 2015, 2017) or not (Clack et al.,
19 2017; Heard et al., 2017), and by what year. Scale-up estimates vary with assumptions about costs and
20 technological maturity, as well as local geographical circumstances and the extent of storage used (REN21,
21 2012; Ghorbani et al., 2017). Several countries have adopted targets of 100% renewable electricity (IEA,
22 2017c) as this meets multiple social, economic and environmental goals and contribute to mitigation of
23 climate change (REN21, 2012).

24 25 26 4.3.1.2 *Bioenergy and Biofuels*

27
28 Bioenergy is renewable energy from biomass. Biofuel is biomass-based energy used in transport. Chapter 2
29 suggests that pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C would enable supply of 67–310 (median 150) EJ yr⁻¹ (see
30 Table 2.8) from biomass. Most scenarios find that Bioenergy is combined with Carbon Dioxide Capture and
31 Storage (CCS, BECCS) if it is available but also find robust deployment of bioenergy independent of the
32 availability of CCS (see Section 2.3.4.2 and 4.3.7 for a discussion of BECCS). Detailed assessments indicate
33 that deployment is similar for 2°C-consistent pathways (Chum et al., 2011; P. Smith et al., 2014; Creutzig et
34 al., 2015). There is however *high agreement* that the sustainable bioenergy potential in 2050 would be
35 restricted to around 100 EJ yr⁻¹ (Slade et al., 2014; Creutzig et al., 2015b). Sustainable deployment at this or
36 higher levels envisioned by 1.5°C-consistent pathways may put significant pressure on available land, food
37 production and prices (Popp et al., 2014b; Persson, 2015; Kline et al., 2017; Searchinger et al., 2017),
38 preservation of ecosystems and biodiversity (Creutzig et al., 2015b; Holland et al., 2015; Santangeli et al.,
39 2016) as well as potential water and nutrient constraints (Gerbens-Leenes et al., 2009; Gheewala et al., 2011;
40 Bows and Smith, 2012; Smith and Torn, 2013; Bonsch et al., 2016; Lampert et al., 2016; Mouratiadou et al.,
41 2016; Smith et al., 2016b; Wei et al., 2016; Mathioudakis et al., 2017); but there is still *low agreement* on
42 these interactions (Robledo-Abad et al., 2017). Some of the disagreement on the sustainable capacity for
43 bioenergy stems from global versus local assessments. Global assessments may mask local dynamics that
44 exacerbate negative impacts and shortages while at the same time niche contexts for deployment may avoid
45 trade-offs and exploit co-benefits more effectively. In some regions of the world (e.g., the case of Brazilian
46 ethanol, see Box 4.7, where land may be less of a constraint, the use of bioenergy is mature and the industry
47 is well developed), land transitions could be balanced with food production and biodiversity to enable a
48 global impact on CO₂ emissions (Jaiswal et al., 2017).

49
50 The carbon intensity of bioenergy, key for both bioenergy as an emission-neutral energy system and BECCS
51 as a Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) measure, is still a matter of debate (Buchholz et al., 2016; Liu et al.,
52 2018) and depends on management (Pyörälä et al., 2014; Torssonen et al., 2016; Baul et al., 2017;
53 Kilpeläinen et al., 2017); direct and indirect land use change emissions (Plevin et al., 2010; Schulze et al.,

1 2012; Harris et al., 2015; Repo et al., 2015; DeCicco et al., 2016; Qin et al., 2016)²; considered feedstock
2 and time frame (Zanchi et al., 2012; Daioglou et al., 2017; Booth, 2018; Sterman et al., 2018), as well as the
3 availability of coordinated policies and management to minimise negative side effects and trade-offs,
4 particularly those around food security (Stevanović et al., 2017) and livelihood and equity considerations
5 (Creutzig et al., 2013; Calvin et al., 2014) .
6

7 Biofuels are a part of the transport sector in some cities and countries, and may be deployed as a mitigation
8 option for aviation, shipping and freight transport (see Section 4.3.3.5) as well as industrial decarbonisation
9 (IEA, 2017g) (Section 4.3.4) though only Brazil has mainstreamed ethanol as a substantial, commercial
10 option. Lower emissions and reduced urban air pollution have been achieved there by use of ethanol and
11 biodiesel as fuels (Hill et al., 2006; Salvo et al., 2017) (see Box 4.7).
12

13 4.3.1.3 Nuclear Energy

14 Many scenarios in Chapter 2 and in AR5 (Bruckner et al., 2014) project an increase in the use of nuclear
15 power, while others project a decrease. The increase can be realised through existing mature nuclear
16 technologies or new options (generation III/IV reactors, breeder reactors, new uranium and thorium fuel
17 cycles, small reactors or nuclear cogeneration).
18

19 Even though historically scalability and speed of scaling of nuclear plants have been high in many nations,
20 such rates are currently not achieved anymore. In the 1960s and 1970s, France implemented a programme to
21 rapidly get 80% of its power from nuclear in about 25 years (IAEA, 2018), but the current time-lag between
22 the decision date and the commissioning of plants is observed to be 10-19 years (Lovins et al., 2018). The
23 current deployment pace of nuclear energy is constrained by social acceptability in many countries due to
24 concerns over risks of accidents and radioactive waste management (Bruckner et al., 2014). Though
25 comparative risk assessment shows health risks are low per unit of electricity production (Hirschberg et al.,
26 2016), and land requirement is lower than that of other power sources (Cheng and Hammond, 2017), the
27 political processes triggered by societal concerns depend on the country-specific means of managing the
28 political debates around technological choices and their environmental impacts (Gregory et al., 1993). Such
29 differences in perception (Kim and Chung, 2017) explain why the 2011 Fukushima incident resulted in a
30 confirmation or acceleration of phasing out nuclear energy in five countries (Roh, 2017) while 30 other
31 countries have continued using nuclear energy, amongst which 13 are building new nuclear capacity
32 including China, India and the United Kingdom (IAEA, 2017; Yuan et al., 2017).
33
34

35 Costs of nuclear power have increased over time in some developed nations, principally due to market
36 conditions where increased investment risks of high-capital expenditure technologies have become significant.
37 ‘Learning by doing’ processes often failed to compensate for this trend because they were slowed down by the
38 absence of standardisation and series effects (Grubler, 2010). What are and have been the costs of nuclear
39 power is debated in the literature (Lovering et al., 2016; Koomey et al., 2017). Countries with liberalised
40 markets that continue to develop nuclear employ de-risking instruments through long-term contracts with
41 guaranteed sale prices (Finon and Roques, 2013). For instance, the United Kingdom works with public
42 guarantees covering part of the upfront investment costs of newly planned nuclear capacity. This dynamic
43 differs in countries such as China and South Korea, where monopolistic conditions in the electric system allow
44 for reducing investment risks, deploying series effects and enhancing the engineering capacities of users due
45 to stable relations between the security authorities and builders (Schneider et al., 2017).
46

47 The safety of nuclear plants depends upon the public authorities of each country. However, because
48 accidents affect worldwide public acceptance of this industry, questions have been raised about the risk of
49 economic and political pressures weakening the safety of the plants (Finon, 2013; Budnitz, 2016). This raises
50 the issue of international governance of civil nuclear risks and reinforced international cooperation involving
51 governments, companies and engineering (Walker and Lönnroth, 1983; Thomas, 1988; Finon, 2013), based

² While there is high agreement that indirect Land Use Change (iLUC) could occur, there is low agreement about the actual extent of Iluc (P. Smith et al., 2014; Versteegen et al., 2015; David, 2017)

1 on the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

4 4.3.1.4 Energy Storage

6 The growth in electricity storage for renewables has been around Grid Flexibility Resources (GFR) that
7 would enable several places to source more than half their power from non-hydro renewables (Komarnicki,
8 2016). Ten types of GFRs within smart grids have been developed largely since AR5 as renewables have
9 tested grid stability (Blaabjerg et al., 2004; IRENA, 2013; IEA, 2017d; Majzoobi and Khodaei, 2017) though
10 demonstrations of how to do this without hydro or natural gas-based power back-up are still needed. Pumped
11 hydro comprised 150 GW of storage capacity in 2016, and grid-connected battery storage just 1.7 GW, but
12 the latter grew between 2015 to 2016 by 50% (REN21, 2012). Battery storage has been the main growth
13 feature in energy storage since AR5 (Breyer et al., 2017). This appears to be the result of significant cost
14 reductions due to mass production for Electric Vehicles (EVs) (Nykqvist and Nilsson, 2015; Dhar et al.,
15 2017). Although costs and technical maturity look increasingly positive, the feasibility of battery storage is
16 challenged by concerns over the availability of resources and the environmental impacts of its production
17 (Peters et al., 2017). Lithium, a common element in the earth's crust, does not appear to be restricted and
18 large increases in production have happened in recent years with eight new mines in Western Australia
19 where most lithium is produced (GWA, 2016). Emerging battery technologies may provide greater
20 efficiency and recharge rates (Belmonte et al., 2016) but remain significantly more expensive due to speed
21 and scale issues compared to lithium ion batteries (Dhar et al., 2017; IRENA, 2017a).

23 Research and demonstration of energy storage in the form of thermal and chemical systems continues, but
24 large scale commercial systems are rare (Pardo et al., 2014). Renewably derived synthetic liquid (like
25 methanol and ammonia) and gas (like methane and hydrogen) are increasingly being seen as a feasible
26 storage options for renewable energy (producing fuel for use in industry during times when solar and wind
27 are abundant) (Bruce et al., 2010; Jiang et al., 2010; Ezeji, 2017) but, in the case of carbonaceous storage
28 media, would need a renewable source of carbon to make a positive contribution to GHG reduction (von der
29 Assen et al., 2013; Abanades et al., 2017) (see also Section 4.3.4.5). The use of electric vehicles as a form of
30 storage has been modelled and evaluated as an opportunity, and demonstrations are emerging (Dhar et al.,
31 2017; Green and Newman, 2017a), but challenges to upscaling remain.

34 4.3.1.5 Options for Adapting Electricity Systems to 1.5°C

36 Climate change has started to disrupt electricity generation and, if climate change adaptation options are not
37 considered, it is predicted that these disruptions will be lengthier and more frequent (Jahandideh-Tehrani et
38 al., 2014; Bartos and Chester, 2015; Kraucunas et al., 2015; van Vliet et al., 2016). Adaptation would both
39 secure vulnerable infrastructure and ensure the necessary generation capacity (Minville et al., 2009; Eisenack
40 and Stecker, 2012; Schaeffer et al., 2012; Cortekar and Groth, 2015; Murrant et al., 2015; Panteli and
41 Mancarella, 2015; Goytia et al., 2016). The literature shows *high agreement* that climate change impacts
42 need to be planned for in the design of any kind of infrastructure, especially in the energy sector (Nierop,
43 2014), including interdependencies with other sectors that require electricity to function, including water,
44 data, telecommunications and transport (Fryer, 2017).

46 Recent research has developed new frameworks and models that aim to assess and identify vulnerabilities in
47 energy infrastructure and create more proactive responses (Francis and Bekera, 2014; Ouyang and Dueñas-
48 Osorio, 2014; Arab et al., 2015; Bekera and Francis, 2015; Knight et al., 2015; Jeong and An, 2016; Panteli
49 et al., 2016; Perrier, 2016; Erker et al., 2017; Fu et al., 2017). Assessments of energy infrastructure
50 adaptation, while limited, emphasise the need for redundancy (Liu et al. 2017). The implementation of
51 controllable and islandable microgrids including the use of residential batteries, and can increase resiliency,
52 especially after extreme weather events (Qazi and Young Jr., 2014; Liu et al., 2017). Hybrid renewables-
53 based power systems with non-hydro capacity, such as with high-penetration wind generation, could provide
54 the required system flexibility (Canales et al., 2015). Overall, there is *high agreement* that hybrid systems,
55 taking advantage of an array of sources and time of use strategies, can help make electricity generation more

1 resilient (Parkinson and Djilali, 2015), given that energy security standards are in place (Almeida Prado et
2 al., 2016).

3
4 Interactions between water and energy are complex (IEA, 2017g). Water scarcity patterns and electricity
5 disruptions will differ across regions. There is *high agreement* that mitigation and adaptation options for
6 thermal electricity generation (if that remains fitted with CCS) need to consider increasing water shortages,
7 taking into account other factors such as ambient water resources and demand changes in irrigation water
8 (Hayashi et al., 2018). Increasing the efficiency of power plants can reduce emissions and water needs
9 (Eisenack and Stecker, 2012; van Vliet et al., 2016), but applying CCS would increase water consumption
10 (Koornneef et al 2012). The technological, economic, social and institutional feasibility of efficiency
11 improvements is high, but insufficient to limit temperature rise to 1.5°C (van Vliet et al., 2016).

12
13 In addition, a number of options for water cooling management systems have been proposed, such as
14 hydraulic measures (Eisenack and Stecker, 2012) and alternative cooling technologies (Chandel et al., 2011;
15 Eisenack and Stecker, 2012; Bartos and Chester, 2015; Murrant et al., 2015; Bustamante et al., 2016; van
16 Vliet et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2017b). There is *high agreement* on the technological and economic
17 feasibility of these technologies as their absence can severely impact the functioning of the power plant as
18 well as safety and security standards.

19 20 21 4.3.1.6 Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage in the Power Sector

22
23 The AR5 (IPCC, 2014b) as well as Section 2.4.2 assign significant emission reductions over the course of
24 this century to CO₂ capture and storage (CCS) in the power sector. This section focuses on CCS in the fossil-
25 fuelled power sector; Section 4.3.4 discusses CCS in non-power industry, and Section 4.3.7 bioenergy with
26 CCS (BECCS). Section 2.4.2 puts the cumulative CO₂ stored from fossil-fuelled power at 410 (199–470
27 interquartile range) GtCO₂ over this century. Such modelling suggests that CCS in the power sector can
28 contribute to cost-effective achievement of emission reduction requirements for limiting warming to 1.5°C.
29 CCS may also offer employment and political advantages for fossil fuel-dependent economies (Kern et al.,
30 2016), but may entail more limited co-benefits than other mitigation options (that, e.g., generate power) and
31 therefore for its business case and economic feasibility relies on climate policy incentives. Since 2017, two
32 CCS projects in the power sector capture 2.4 MtCO₂ annually, while 30 MtCO₂ is captured annually in all
33 CCS projects (Global CCS Institute, 2017).

34
35 The technological maturity of CO₂ capture options in the power sectors has improved considerably
36 (Abanades et al., 2015; Bui et al., 2018), but costs have not come down between 2005 and 2015 due to
37 limited learning in commercial settings and increased energy and resources costs (Rubin et al., 2015).
38 Storage capacity estimates vary greatly, but Section 2.4.2 as well as literature (V. Scott et al., 2015) indicate
39 that perhaps 10,000 GtCO₂ could be stored in underground reservoirs. Regional availability of this may not
40 be sufficient, and it requires efforts to have this storage and the corresponding infrastructure available at the
41 necessary rates and times (de Coninck and Benson, 2014). CO₂ retention in the storage reservoir was
42 recently assessed as 98% over 10,000 years for well-managed reservoirs, and 78% for poorly regulated ones
43 Alcade et al 2018. A paper reviewing 42 studies on public perception of CCS (Seigo et al., 2014) found that
44 social acceptance of CCS is predicted by trust, perceived risks and benefits. The technology itself mattered
45 less than the social context of the project. Though insights on communication of CCS projects to the general
46 public and inhabitants of the area around the CO₂ storage sites have been documented over the years, project
47 stakeholders are not consistently implementing these lessons, although some projects have observed good
48 practices (Ashworth et al., 2015).

49
50 CCS in the power sector is hardly being realised at scale, mainly because the incremental costs of capture,
51 and the development of transport and storage infrastructures are not sufficiently compensated by market or
52 government incentives (IEA, 2017c). In both full-scale projects in the power sector, part of the capture costs
53 are compensated for by revenues from Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) (Global CCS Institute, 2017),
54 demonstrating that EOR helps developing CCS further. EOR is a technique that uses CO₂ to mobilise more
55 oil out of depleting oil fields, leading to additional CO₂ emissions by combusting the additionally recovered

1 oil (Cooney et al., 2015).

4 4.3.2 Land and Ecosystem Transitions

6 This section assesses the feasibility of mitigation and adaptation options related to land use and ecosystems.
7 Land transitions are grouped around agriculture and food, ecosystems and forests, and coastal systems.

10 4.3.2.1 Agriculture and Food

12 In a 1.5°C world, local yields are projected to decrease in tropical regions that are major food producing
13 areas of the world (West Africa, South-East Asia, South-Asia, and Central and northern South America)
14 (Schleussner et al., 2016). Some high-latitude regions may benefit from the combined effects of elevated
15 CO₂ and temperature because their average temperatures are below optimal temperature for crops. In both
16 cases there are consequences for food production and quality (Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3 on Food
17 Security), conservation agriculture, irrigation, food wastage, bioenergy and the use of novel technologies.

19 **Food production and quality.** Increased temperatures, including 1.5°C warming, would affect the
20 production of cereals such as wheat and rice, impacting food security (Schleussner et al., 2016). There is
21 *medium agreement* that elevated CO₂ concentrations can change food composition, with implications for
22 nutritional security (Taub et al., 2008; Högy et al., 2009; DaMatta et al., 2010; Loladze, 2014; De Souza et
23 al., 2015), with the effects being different depending on the region (Medek et al., 2017).

25 Meta-analyses of the effects of drought, elevated CO₂, and temperature conclude that at 2°C local warming
26 and above, aggregate production of wheat, maize, and rice are expected to decrease in both temperate and
27 tropical areas (Challinor et al., 2014). These production losses could be lowered if adaptation measures are
28 taken (Challinor et al., 2014), such as developing varieties better adapted to changing climate conditions.

30 Adaptation options can help ensure access to sufficient, quality food. These include conservation agriculture,
31 improved livestock management, increasing irrigation efficiency, agroforestry and management of food loss
32 and waste. Complementary adaptation and mitigation options, for example, the use of climate services
33 (Section 4.3.5), bioenergy (Section 4.3.1) and biotechnology (Section 4.4.4) can also serve to reduce
34 emissions intensity and the carbon footprint of food production.

36 **Conservation Agriculture (CA).** Soil management that reduces the disruption of soil structure and biotic
37 processes by minimising tillage. A recent meta-analysis showed that no-till practices work well in water-
38 limited agroecosystems when implemented jointly with residue retention and crop rotation but may by
39 themselves decrease yields in other situations (Pittelkow et al., 2014). Additional climate adaptations
40 include adjusting planting times and crop varietal selection and improving irrigation efficiency. Adaptations
41 such as these may increase wheat and maize yields by 7–12% under climate change (Challinor et al., 2014).
42 CA can also help build adaptive capacity (*medium evidence, medium agreement*) (H. Smith et al., 2017;
43 Pradhan et al., 2018) and have mitigation co-benefits through improved fertiliser use or efficient use of
44 machinery and fossil fuels (Harvey et al., 2014; Cui et al., 2018; Pradhan et al., 2018). CA practices can also
45 raise soil carbon and therefore remove CO₂ from the atmosphere (Poeplau and Don 2015; Vicente-Vicente et
46 al. 2016; Aguilera et al. 2013). However, CA adoption can be constrained by inadequate institutional
47 arrangements and funding mechanisms (Harvey et al., 2014; Baudron et al., 2015; Li et al., 2016; Dougill et
48 al., 2017; Smith et al., 2017b).

50 **Sustainable intensification** of agriculture consists of agricultural systems with increased production per unit
51 area but with management of the range of potentially adverse impacts on the environment (Pretty and
52 Bharucha, 2014). Sustainable intensification can increase the efficiency of inputs and enhance health and
53 food security (Ramankutty et al., 2018).

55 **Livestock management.** Livestock are responsible for more GHG emissions than all other food sources.

1 Emissions are caused by feed production, enteric fermentation, animal waste, land-use change and livestock
2 transport and processing. Some estimates indicate that livestock supply chains could account for 7.1 GtCO₂,
3 equivalent to 14.5% of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Gerber et al., 2013). Cattle (beef,
4 milk) are responsible for about two-thirds of that total, largely due to methane emissions resulting from
5 rumen fermentation (Gerber et al., 2013; Opio et al., 2013).

6
7 Despite ongoing gains in livestock productivity and volumes, the increase of animal products in global diets
8 is restricting overall agricultural efficiency gains because of inefficiencies in the conversion of agricultural
9 primary production (e.g., crops) in the feed-animal products pathway (Alexander et al., 2017), offsetting the
10 benefits of improvements in livestock production systems (Clark and Tilman, 2017).

11
12 There is increasing agreement that overall emissions from food systems could be reduced by targeting the
13 demand for meat and other livestock products, particularly where consumption is higher than suggested by
14 human health guidelines. Adjusting diets to meet nutritional targets could bring large co-benefits, through
15 GHG mitigation and improvements in the overall efficiency of food systems (Erb et al., 2009; Tukker et al.,
16 2011; Tilman and Clark, 2014; van Dooren et al., 2014; Ranganathan et al., 2016). Dietary shifts could
17 contribute one-fifth of the mitigation needed to hold warming below 2°C, with one-quarter of low-cost
18 options (Griscom et al., 2017). There, however, remains limited evidence of effective policy interventions to
19 achieve such large-scale shifts in dietary choices, and prevailing trends are for increasing rather than
20 decreasing demand for livestock products at the global scale (Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012;
21 OECD/FAO, 2017). How the role of dietary shift could change in 1.5°C-consistent pathways is also not clear
22 (see Chapter 2).

23
24 Adaptation of livestock systems can include a suite of strategies such as using different breeds and their wild
25 relatives to develop a genetic pool resilient to climatic shocks and longer-term temperature shifts (Thornton
26 and Herrero, 2014), improving fodder and feed management (Bell et al., 2014; Havet et al., 2014) and
27 disease prevention and control (Skuce et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2016). Most interventions that improve the
28 productivity of livestock systems and enhance adaptation to climate changes would also reduce the emissions
29 intensity of food production, with significant co-benefits for rural livelihoods and security of food supply
30 (Gerber et al., 2013; FAO & NZAGRC, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). Whether such reductions in emission
31 intensity result in lower or higher absolute GHG emissions depends on overall demand for livestock
32 products, indicating the relevance of integrating supply-side with demand-side measures within food security
33 objectives (Gerber et al., 2013; Bajželj et al., 2014). Transitions in livestock production systems (e.g., from
34 extensive to intensive) can also result in significant emission reductions as part of broader land-based
35 mitigation strategies (Havlik et al., 2014).

36
37 Overall, there is *high agreement* that farm strategies that integrate mixed crop-livestock systems can improve
38 farm productivity and have positive sustainability outcomes (Havet et al., 2014; Thornton and Herrero, 2014;
39 Herrero et al., 2015; Weindl et al., 2015). Shifting towards mixed crop-livestock systems is estimated to
40 reduce agricultural adaptation costs to 0.3% of total production costs while abating deforestation by 76
41 million ha globally, making it a highly cost-effective adaptation option with mitigation co-benefits (Weindl
42 et al., 2015). Evidence from various regions supports this (Thornton and Herrero, 2015), although the
43 feasible scale varies between regions and systems, as well as being moderated by overall demand in specific
44 food products. In Australia, some farmers have successfully shifted to crop-livestock systems where, each
45 year, they allocate land and forage resources in response to climate and price trends (Bell et al., 2014).
46 However, there can be some unintended negative impacts of such integration, including an increased burdens
47 on women, higher requirements of capital, competing uses of crop residues (e.g., feed vs. mulching vs.
48 carbon sequestration) and higher requirements of management skills, which can be a challenge across several
49 low income countries (Thornton and Herrero, 2015; Thornton et al., 2018). Finally, the feasibility of
50 improving livestock efficiency is dependent on socio-cultural context and acceptability: there remain
51 significant issues around widespread adoption of crossbred animals, especially by smallholders (Thornton et
52 al., 2018).

53
54 **Irrigation efficiency.** Irrigation efficiency is especially critical since water endowments are expected to
55 change, with 20–60 Mha of global cropland being projected to revert from irrigated to rain fed land, while

1 other areas will receive higher precipitation in shorter time spans thus affecting irrigation demand (Elliott et
2 al., 2014). While increasing irrigation system efficiency is necessary, there is mixed evidence on how to
3 enact efficiency improvements (Fader et al., 2016; Herwehe and Scott, 2017). Physical and technical
4 strategies include building large-scale reservoirs or dams, renovating or deepening irrigation channels,
5 building on-farm rainwater harvesting structures, lining ponds, channels and tanks to reduce losses through
6 percolation and evaporation, and investing in small infrastructure such as sprinkler or drip irrigation sets
7 (Varela-Ortega et al., 2016; Sikka et al., 2018). Each strategy has differing costs and benefits relating to
8 unique biophysical, social, and economic contexts. Other concerns relating to the increase of irrigation
9 efficiency discuss fostering irrigation dependency, hence increasing climate sensitivity, which may be
10 maladaptive in the long-term (Lindoso et al., 2014).

11
12 Improvements in irrigation efficiency would need to be supplemented with ancillary activities, such as
13 shifting to crops that require less water, and improving soil and moisture conservation (Fader et al., 2016;
14 Hong and Yabe, 2017; Sikka et al., 2018). Currently, the feasibility of improving irrigation efficiency is
15 constrained by issues of replicability across scale and sustainability over time (Burney and Naylor, 2012),
16 institutional barriers and inadequate market linkages (Pittock et al., 2017).

17
18 Growing evidence suggests that investing in behavioural shifts towards using irrigation technology such as
19 micro-sprinklers or drip irrigation, is an effective and quick adaptation strategy (Varela-Ortega et al., 2016;
20 Herwehe and Scott, 2017; Sikka et al., 2018) as opposed to large dams which have high financial, ecological
21 and social costs (Varela-Ortega et al., 2016). While improving irrigation efficiency is technically feasible (R.
22 Fishman et al., 2015) and has clear benefits for environmental values (Pfeiffer and Lin, 2014; R. Fishman et
23 al., 2015), feasibility is regionally differentiated as shown by examples as diverse as Kansas (Jägermeyr et
24 al., 2015), India (R. Fishman et al., 2015) and Africa (Pittock et al., 2017).

25
26 **Agroforestry.** The integration of trees and shrubs into crop and livestock systems, when properly managed,
27 can potentially restrict soil erosion, facilitate water infiltration, improve soil physical properties and buffer
28 against extreme events (Lasco et al., 2014; Mbow et al., 2014; Quandt et al., 2017; Sida et al., 2018). There
29 is *medium evidence* and *high agreement* on the feasibility of agroforestry practices that enhance productivity,
30 livelihoods and carbon storage (Lusiana et al., 2012; K Murthy, 2013; Coulibaly et al., 2017; Sida et al.,
31 2018), including from indigenous production systems (Coq-Huelva et al., 2017), with variation by region,
32 agroforestry type, and climatic conditions (Place et al., 2012; Coe et al., 2014; Mbow et al., 2014; Iiyama et
33 al., 2017; Abdulai et al., 2018). Long-term studies examining the success of agroforestry, however, are rare
34 (Coe et al., 2014; Meijer et al., 2015; Brockington et al., 2016; Zomer et al., 2016).

35
36 The extent to which agroforestry practices at farm-level could be scaled up globally while satisfying growing
37 food demand is relatively unknown. Agroforestry adoption has been relatively low and uneven (Jacobi et al.,
38 2017; Hernández-Morcillo et al., 2018), with constraints including the expense of establishment and lack of
39 reliable financial support, insecure land tenure, landowner's lack of experience with trees, complexity of
40 management practices, fluctuating market demand and prices for different food and fibre products, the time
41 and knowledge required for management, low intermediate benefits to offset revenue lags, and inadequate
42 market access (Pattanayak et al., 2003; Mercer, 2004; Sendzimir et al., 2011; Valdivia et al., 2012; Coe et al.,
43 2014; Meijer et al., 2015; Coulibaly et al., 2017; Jacobi et al., 2017).

44
45 **Managing food loss and waste.** The way food is produced, processed and transported strongly influences
46 GHG emissions. Around one-third of the food produced on the planet is not consumed (FAO, 2013)
47 affecting food security and livelihoods (See Cross-Chapter Box 6 on Food Security in Chapter 3). Food
48 wastage is a combination of food loss—decrease in mass and nutritional value of food due to poor
49 infrastructure, logistics, and lack of storage technologies and management – and food waste that derives
50 from inappropriate human consumption that leads to food spoilage associated with inferior quality or
51 overproduction. Food wastage could lead to an increase in emissions estimated to 1.9–2.5 GtCO₂-eq yr⁻¹ (Hiç
52 et al., 2016).

53
54 Decreasing food wastage has high mitigation and adaptation potential and could play an important role in
55 land transitions towards 1.5°C, provided that reduced food waste results in lower production-side emissions

1 rather than increased consumption (Foley et al., 2011). There is *medium agreement* that a combination of
2 individual-institutional behaviour (Refsgaard and Magnussen, 2009; Thornton and Herrero, 2014), and
3 improved technologies and management (Lin et al., 2013; Papargyropoulou et al., 2014) can transform food
4 waste into products with marketable value. Institutional behaviour depends on investment and policies,
5 which if adequately addressed could enable mitigation and adaptation co-benefits, in a relatively short time.
6

7 **Novel technologies.** New molecular biology tools have been developed that can lead to fast and precise
8 genome modification (De Souza et al., 2016; Scheben et al., 2016) (e.g., CRISPR Cas 9 (Ran et al., 2013;
9 Schaeffer and Nakata, 2015). Such genome editing tools may moderately assist in mitigation and adaptation
10 of agriculture in relation to climate changes, CO₂ elevation, drought and flooding (DaMatta et al., 2010; De
11 Souza et al., 2015, 2016). These tools could contribute to developing new plant varieties that can adapt to
12 warming of 1.5°C and overshoot, potentially avoiding some of the costs of crop shifting (Schlenker and
13 Roberts, 2009; De Souza et al., 2016). However, biosafety concerns and government regulatory systems can
14 be a major barrier to the use of these tools as this increases the time and cost of turning scientific discoveries
15 into ready applicable technologies (Andow and Zwahlen, 2006; Maghari and Ardekani, 2011).
16

17 The strategy of reducing enteric methane emissions by ruminants through the development of inhibitors or
18 vaccines has already been attempted with some successes, although the potential for application at scale and
19 in different situations remains uncertain. A methane inhibitor has been demonstrated to reduce methane from
20 feedlot systems by 30% over a 12-week period (Hristov et al., 2015) with some productivity benefits but the
21 ability to apply it in grazing systems will depend on further technological developments as well as costs and
22 incentives. A vaccine could potentially modify the microbiota of the rumen and be applicable even in
23 extensive grazing systems by reducing the presence of methanogenic micro-organisms (Wedlock et al.,
24 2013) but has not yet been successfully demonstrated to reduce emissions in live animals. Selective breeding
25 for lower-emitting ruminants is becoming rapidly feasible, offering small but cumulative emissions
26 reductions without requiring substantial changes in farm systems (Pickering et al., 2015).
27

28 Technological innovation in culturing marine and freshwater micro and macro flora has significant potential
29 to expand food, fuel and fibre resources, and could reduce impacts on land and conventional agriculture
30 (Greene et al., 2017).
31

32 Technological innovation could assist in increased agricultural efficiency (e.g., via precision agriculture),
33 decrease food wastage and genetics that enhance plant adaptation traits (Section 4.4.4). Technological and
34 associated management improvements may be ways to increase the efficiency of contemporary agriculture to
35 help produce enough food to cope with population increases in a 1.5°C warmer world, and help reduce the
36 pressure on natural ecosystems and biodiversity.
37

38 39 4.3.2.2 *Forests and Other Ecosystems*

40
41 **Ecosystem restoration.** Biomass stocks in tropical, subtropical, temperate and boreal biomes currently hold
42 1085, 194, 176, 190 Gt CO₂, respectively. Conservation and restoration can enhance these natural carbon
43 sinks (Erb et al., 2017).
44

45 Recent studies explore options for conservation, restoration and improved land management estimating up to
46 23 GtCO₂ (Griscom et al., 2017). Mitigation potentials are dominated by reduced rates of deforestation,
47 reforestation and forest management, and concentrated in tropical regions (Houghton, 2013; Canadell and
48 Schulze, 2014; Grace et al., 2014; Houghton et al., 2015; Griscom et al., 2017). Much of the literature
49 focuses on REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) as an institutional
50 mechanism. However, restoration and management activities need not be limited to REDD+ and locally
51 adapted implementation may keep costs low, capitalise on co-benefits and ensure consideration of competing
52 for socio-economic goals (Jantke et al., 2016; Ellison et al., 2017; Perugini et al., 2017; Spencer et al., 2017).
53

54 Half of the estimated potential can be achieved at <100 USD/tCO₂; a third of the cost-effective potential <10
55 USD/tCO₂ (Griscom et al., 2017). Variation of costs in projects aiming to reduce emissions from

1 deforestation is high when considering opportunity and transaction costs (Dang Phan et al., 2014; Overmars
2 et al., 2014; Ickowitz et al., 2017; Rakatama et al., 2017).

3
4 However, the focus on forests raises concerns of cross-biome leakage (*medium evidence, low agreement*)
5 (Popp et al., 2014a; Strassburg et al., 2014; Jayachandran et al., 2017) and encroachment on other
6 ecosystems (Veldman et al., 2015). Reducing rates of deforestation limits the land available for agriculture
7 and grazing with trade-offs between diets, higher yields and food prices (Erb et al., 2016a; Kreidenweis et
8 al., 2016). Restoration and conservation are compatible with biodiversity (Rey Benayas et al., 2009; Jantke et
9 al., 2016) and water resources; in the tropics, reducing rates of deforestation maintains cooler surface
10 temperatures (Perugini et al., 2017) and rainfall (Ellison et al., 2017).

11
12 Its multiple potential co-benefits have made REDD+ important for local communities, biodiversity and
13 sustainable landscapes (Ngendakumana et al., 2017; Turnhout et al., 2017). There is *low agreement* on
14 whether climate impacts will reverse mitigation benefits of restoration (Le Page et al., 2013) by increasing
15 the likelihood of disturbance (Anderegg 2015), or reinforce them through carbon fertilisation (P. Smith et al.,
16 2014).

17
18 Emerging regional assessments offer new perspectives for upscaling. Strengthening coordination, additional
19 funding sources, and access and disbursement points increase the potential of REDD+ in working towards
20 2°C and 1.5°C targets (Well and Carrapatoso, 2017). While there are indications that land tenure (Sunderlin
21 et al., 2014) has a positive impact, a meta-analysis by (Wehkamp et al., 2018a) shows that there is *medium*
22 *evidence* and *low agreement* on which aspects of governance improvements are supportive of conservation.
23 Local benefits, especially for indigenous communities, will only be accrued if land tenure is respected and
24 legally protected, which is not often the case (Sunderlin et al., 2014; Brugnach et al., 2017). Although
25 payments for reduced rates of deforestation may benefit the poor, the most vulnerable populations could
26 have limited, uneven access (Atela et al., 2014) and face lower opportunity costs from deforestation
27 (Ickowitz et al., 2017).

28
29 **Community-based Adaptation (CbA).** There is *medium evidence* and *high agreement* for the use of CbA.
30 The specific actions to take will depend upon the location, context, and vulnerability of the specific
31 community. CbA is defined as ‘a community-led process, based on communities’ priorities, needs,
32 knowledge, and capacities, which aim to empower people to plan for and cope with the impacts of climate
33 change’ (Reid et al., 2009). The integration of CbA with Ecosystems-based Adaptation (EbA) has been
34 increasingly promoted, especially in efforts to alleviate poverty (Mannke, 2011; Reid, 2016).

35
36 Despite the potential and advantages of both CbA and EbA, including knowledge exchange, information
37 access and increased social capital and equity; institutional and governance barriers still constitute a
38 challenge for local adaptation efforts (Wright et al., 2014; Fernández-Giménez et al., 2015).

39
40 **Wetland management.** In wetland ecosystems, temperature rise has direct and irreversible impacts on
41 species functioning and distribution, ecosystem equilibrium and services, and second order impacts on local
42 livelihoods (see Section 3.4.3). The structure and function of wetland systems are changing due to climate
43 change. Wetland management strategies, including adjustments in infrastructural, behavioural, and
44 institutional practices have clear implications for adaptation (Colloff et al., 2016b; Finlayson et al., 2017;
45 Wigand et al., 2017)

46
47 Despite international initiatives on wetland restoration and management through the Ramsar Convention on
48 Wetlands, policies have not been effective (Finlayson, 2012; Finlayson et al., 2017). Institutional reform
49 such as flexible, locally relevant governance, drawing on principles of adaptive co-management, and multi-
50 stakeholder participation becomes increasingly necessary for effective wetland management (Capon et al.,
51 2013; Finlayson et al., 2017).

4.3.2.3 Coastal Systems

Managing coastal stress. Particularly to allow for the landward relocation of coastal ecosystems under a transition to 1.5°C, planning for climate change would need to be integrated with the use of coastlines by humans (Saunders et al., 2014; Kelleway et al., 2017). Adaptation options for managing coastal stress include coastal hardening through the building of seawalls and the re-establishment of coastal ecosystems such as mangroves (André et al., 2016; Cooper et al., 2016). While the feasibility of the solutions is high, they are expensive to scale (*robust evidence, medium agreement*).

There is *low evidence* and *high agreement* that reducing the impact of local stresses (Halpern et al., 2015) will improve the resilience of marine ecosystems as they transition to a 1.5°C world (O’Leary et al., 2017). Approaches to reducing local stresses are considered feasible, cost-effective and highly scalable. Ecosystem resilience may be increased through alternative livelihoods (e.g., sustainable aquaculture), which are among a suite of options for building resilience in coastal ecosystems. These options enjoy high levels of feasibility yet are expensive, which stands in the way of scalability (*robust evidence, medium agreement*) (Hiwasaki et al., 2015; Brugnach et al., 2017).

Working with coastal communities has the potential for improving the resilience of coastal ecosystems. Combined with the advantages of using Indigenous knowledge to guide transitions, solutions can be more effective when undertaken in partnership local communities, cultures, and knowledge (See Box 4.3).

Restoration of coastal ecosystems and fisheries. Marine restoration is expensive compared to terrestrial restoration, and the survival of projects is currently low, with success depending on the ecosystem and site, rather than the size of the financial investment (Bayraktarov et al., 2016). Mangrove replanting shows evidence of success globally, with numerous examples of projects that have established forests (Kimball et al., 2015; Bayraktarov et al., 2016).

Efforts with reef-building corals have been attempted with a low level of success (Bayraktarov et al., 2016). Technologies to help re-establish coral communities are limited (Rinkevich, 2014), as are largely untested disruptive technologies (e.g., genetic manipulation, assisted evolution) (van Oppen et al., 2015). Current technologies also have trouble scaling given the substantial costs and investment required (Bayraktarov et al., 2016).

(Johannessen and Macdonald, 2016) report the ‘blue carbon’ sink to be 0.4–0.8% of global anthropogenic emissions. However, this does not adequately account for post-depositional processes and could overestimate removal potentials, subject to a risk of reversal. Seagrass beds will thus not contribute significantly to enabling 1.5°C-consistent pathways.

4.3.3 Urban and Infrastructure System Transitions

There will be approximately 70 million additional urban residents every year through to the mid part of this century (UN, 2014). The majority of these new urban citizens will reside in small and medium sized cities in low- and middle-income countries (Cross-Chapter Box13 in Chapter 5). The combination of urbanisation and economic and infrastructure development could account for an additional 226 GtCO₂ by 2050 (Bai et al. 2018). However, urban systems can harness the mega-trends of urbanisation, digitalisation, financialisation and growing sub-national commitment to smart cities, green cities, resilient cities, sustainable cities and adaptive cities, for the type of transformative change required by 1.5°C-consistent pathways (Revi and Rosenzweig, 2013; Parag and Sovacool, 2016; Roberts, 2016; Wachsmuth et al., 2016; Revi, 2017; Solecki et al., 2018). There is a growing number of urban climate responses driven by cost-effectiveness, development, work creation and inclusivity considerations (Floater et al., 2014; Revi et al., 2014a; Villarroel Walker et al., 2014; Kennedy et al., 2015; Rodríguez, 2015; Newman et al., 2017; UN-Habitat, 2017; Westphal et al., 2017) (Solecki et al. 2013; Ahern et al. 2014; McGranahan et al. 2016; Dodman et al. 2017a).

1 In addition, low-carbon cities could reduce the need to deploy Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) and Solar
2 Radiation Modification (SRM) (Fink, 2013; Thomson and Newman, 2016).

3
4 Cities are also places in which the risks associated with warming of 1.5°C, such as heat stress, terrestrial and
5 coastal flooding, new disease vectors, air pollution and water scarcity, will coalesce (see Section 3.3)
6 (Dodman et al., 2017a; Satterthwaite and Bartlett, 2017). Unless adaptation and mitigation efforts are
7 designed around the need to decarbonise urban societies in the developed world and provide low-carbon
8 solutions to the needs of growing urban populations in developing countries, they will struggle to deliver the
9 pace or scale of change required by 1.5°C-consistent pathways (Hallegatte et al., 2013; Villarroel Walker et
10 al., 2014; Roberts, 2016; Solecki et al., 2018). The pace and scale of urban climate responses can be
11 enhanced by attention to social equity (including gender equity), urban ecology (Brown and McGranahan,
12 2016; Wachsmuth et al., 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2016a) and participation in sub-national networks for climate
13 action (Cole, 2015; Jordan et al., 2015).

14
15 The long-lived urban transport, water and energy systems that will be constructed in the next three decades
16 to support urban populations in developing countries and to retrofit cities in developed countries will have to
17 be different to that built in Europe and North America in the 20th century, if they are to support the required
18 transitions (Freire et al., 2014; Cartwright, 2015; McPhearson et al., 2016; Roberts, 2016; Lwasa, 2017).
19 Recent literature identifies energy, infrastructure, appliances, urban planning, transport and adaptation
20 options as capable of facilitating systemic change. It is these aspects of the urban system that are discussed
21 below and from which options in Section 4.5 are selected.

22 23 24 4.3.3.1 *Urban Energy Systems*

25
26 Urban economies tend to be more energy intensive than national economies due to higher levels of *per*
27 *capita* income, mobility and consumption (Kennedy et al., 2015; Broto, 2017; Gota et al., 2018). However,
28 some urban systems have begun decoupling development from the consumption of fossil fuel powered
29 energy through energy efficiency, renewable energy and locally managed smart-grids (Dodman, 2009; Freire
30 et al., 2014; Eyre et al., 2018; Glazebrook and Newman, 2018a).

31
32 The rapidly expanding cities of Africa and Asia, where energy poverty currently undermines adaptive capacity
33 (Westphal et al., 2017; Satterthwaite et al., 2018), have the opportunity to benefit from recent price changes in
34 renewable energy technologies to enable clean energy access to citizens (SDG 7) (Cartwright, 2015; Watkins,
35 2015; Lwasa, 2017; Kennedy et al., 2018; Teferi and Newman, 2018). This will require strengthened energy
36 governance in these countries (Eberhard et al., 2017). Where renewable energy displaces paraffin, wood fuel
37 or charcoal feedstocks in informal urban settlements, it provides the co-benefits of improved indoor air quality,
38 reduced fire-risk and reduced deforestation, all of which can enhance adaptive capacity and strengthen demand
39 for this energy (Newham and Conradie, 2013; Winkler, 2017; Kennedy et al., 2018; Teferi and Newman,
40 2018).

41 42 43 4.3.3.2 *Urban Infrastructure, Buildings and Appliances*

44
45 Buildings are responsible for 32% of global energy consumption (IEA, 2016c) and have a large energy
46 saving potential with available and demonstrated technologies such as energy efficiency improvements in
47 technical installations and in thermal insulation (Toleikyte et al., 2018) and energy sufficiency (Thomas et
48 al., 2017). (Kuramochi et al., 2017) show that 1.5°C-consistent pathways require building emissions to be
49 reduced by 80–90% by 2050, new construction to be fossil-free and near-zero energy by 2020, and an
50 increased rate of energy refurbishment of existing buildings to 5% per annum in OECD (Organisation for
51 Economic Co-operation and Development) countries (see also Section 4.2.1).

52
53 Chapter 2 based on the IEA-ETP (IEA, 2017g) identifies large saving potential in heating and cooling
54 through improved building design, efficient equipment, lighting and appliances. Several examples of net zero
55 energy in buildings are now available (Wells et al., 2018). In existing buildings, refurbishment enables

1 energy saving (Semprini et al., 2017; Brambilla et al., 2018; D’Agostino and Parker, 2018; Sun et al., 2018)
2 and cost savings (Toleikyte et al., 2018; Zangheri et al., 2018).

3
4 Reducing the embodied energy in buildings material provides further energy and GHG savings (Cabeza et
5 al., 2013; Oliver and Morecroft, 2014; Koezjakov et al., 2018), in particular through bio-based materials
6 (Lupíšek et al., 2015) and wood construction (Ramage et al., 2017). The United Nations Environment
7 Programme (UNEP³) estimates that improving embodied energy, thermal performance, and direct energy use
8 of buildings can reduce emissions by 1.9 GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ (UNEP, 2017b), with an additional reduction of
9 3 GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ through energy efficient appliances and lighting (UNEP, 2017b). Further increasing the
10 energy efficiency of appliances and lighting, heating and cooling offers the potential for further savings
11 (Parikh and Parikh, 2016; Garg et al., 2017).

12
13 Smart technology, drawing on the Internet of Things (IoT) and building information modelling, offer
14 opportunities to accelerate energy efficiency in buildings and cities (Moreno-Cruz and Keith, 2013; Hoy,
15 2016) (see also Section 4.4.4). Some developing country cities are drawing on these technologies to adopt
16 ‘leapfrog’ infrastructure, buildings and appliances to pursue low-carbon development (Newman et al., 2017;
17 Teferi and Newman, 2017) (Cross-Chapter Box 13 in Chapter 5).

18 19 20 4.3.3.3 *Urban Transport and Urban Planning*

21
22 Urban form impacts demand for energy (Sims et al., 2014) and other welfare related factors: a meta-analysis
23 of 300 papers reported energy savings of 26 USD per person per year attributable to a 10% increase in urban
24 population density (Ahlfeldt and Pietrostefani, 2017). Significant reductions in car use are associated with
25 dense, pedestrianised cities and towns and medium-density transit corridors (Newman and Kenworthy, 2015;
26 Newman et al., 2017) relative to low-density cities in which car dependency is high (Kenworthy and
27 Schiller, 2018). Combined dense urban forms and new mass transit systems in Shanghai and Beijing have
28 yielded less car use (Gao and Newman, 2018) (see Box 4.9). Compact cities also create the passenger density
29 required to make public transport more financially viable (Ahlfeldt and Pietrostefani, 2017; Rode et al.,
30 2017) and enable combinations of cleaner fuel feed stocks and urban smart-grids, in which vehicles form
31 part of the storage capacity (Oldenbroek et al., 2017). Similarly, the spatial organisation of urban energy
32 influenced the trajectories of urban development in cities as diverse as Hong Kong, Bengaluru and Maputo
33 (Broto, 2017).

34
35 The informal settlements of middle- and low-income cities where urban density is more typically associated
36 with a range of water- and vector-borne health risks, may provide a notable exception to the adaptive
37 advantages of urban density (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2013; Lilford et al., 2017) unless new approaches and
38 technologies are harnessed to accelerate slum upgrading (Teferi and Newman, 2017)

39
40 Scenarios consistent with 1.5°C pathways, depend on an almost 40% reduction in final energy use by the
41 transport sector by 2050 (Chapter 2, Figure 2.12). In one analysis the phasing out of fossil fuel passenger
42 vehicle sales by 2035-2050 was identified as a benchmark for aligning with 1.5°C-consistent pathways
43 (Kuramochi et al., 2017). Reducing emissions from transport has lagged the power sector (Sims et al., 2014;
44 Creutzig et al., 2015a) but evidence since AR5 suggests that cities are urbanising and re-urbanising in ways
45 that co-ordinate transport sector adaptation and mitigation (Colenbrander et al., 2017; Newman et al., 2017;
46 Salvo et al., 2017; Gota et al., 2018). The global transport sector could reduce 4.7GtCO₂e yr⁻¹ (4.1–5.3) by
47 2030. This is significantly more than is predicted by Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs; UNEP, 2017b).
48 Such a transition depends on cities that enable modal shifts, avoided journeys, provide incentives for uptake
49 of improved fuel efficiency and changes in urban design that encourage walkable cities, non-motorised
50 transport and shorter commuter distances (IEA, 2016a; Mittal et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2016; Li and Loo,
51 2017). In at least four African cities, 43 Asian cities and 54 Latin American cities, Transit Oriented
52 Development (TOD), has emerged as an organising principle for urban growth and spatial planning
53 (Colenbrander et al., 2017; Lwasa, 2017; BRT Data, 2018). This trend is important to counter the rising

³ Currently called UN Environment.

1 demand for private cars in developing country cities (OECD, 2016b). In India TOD has been combined with
2 localized solar PV installations and new ways of financing rail expansion (Sharma, 2018).

3
4 Cities pursuing sustainable transport benefit from reduced air pollution, congestion and road fatalities and
5 are able to harness the relationship between transport systems, urban form, urban energy intensity and social
6 cohesion (Goodwin and Van Dender, 2013; Newman and Kenworthy, 2015; Wee, 2015)

7
8 Technology and electrification trends since AR5 make carbon efficient urban transport easier (Newman et
9 al., 2016), but realising urban transport's contribution to a 1.5°C-consistent pathways will require the type of
10 governance that can overcome the financial, institutional, behavioural and legal barriers to change (Geels,
11 2014; Bakker et al., 2017).

12
13 Adaptation to a 1.5°C world is enabled by urban design and spatial planning policies that consider extreme
14 weather conditions and reduce displacement by climate related disasters (UNISDR, 2009; UN-Habitat, 2011;
15 Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2013).

16
17 Building codes and technology standards for public lighting, including traffic lights (Beccali et al., 2015),
18 play a critical role in reducing carbon emissions, enhancing urban climate resilience and managing climate
19 risk (Steenhof and Sparling, 2011; Parnell, 2015; Shapiro, 2016; Evans et al., 2017). Building codes can
20 support the convergence to zero emissions from buildings (Wells et al., 2018), and can be used retrofit the
21 existing building stock for energy efficiency (Ruparathna et al., 2016).

22
23 The application of building codes and standards for 1.5°C-consistent pathways will require improved
24 enforcement, which can be a challenge in developing countries where inspection resources are often limited
25 and codes are poorly tailored to local conditions (Ford et al., 2015c; Chandel et al., 2016; Eisenberg, 2016;
26 Shapiro, 2016; Hess and Kelman, 2017; Mavhura et al., 2017). In all countries, building codes can be
27 undermined by industry interests, and can be maladaptive if they prevent buildings or land use from evolving
28 to reduce climate impacts (Eisenberg, 2016; Shapiro, 2016).

29
30 The deficit in building codes and standards in middle-income and developing country cities need not be a
31 constraint to more energy-efficient and resilient buildings (Tait and Euston-Brown, 2017). For example, the
32 relatively high price that poor households pay for unreliable and at times dangerous household energy in
33 African cities has driven the uptake of renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies in the absence
34 of regulations or fiscal incentives (Eberhard et al., 2011, 2016; Cartwright, 2015; Watkins, 2015). The
35 Kuyasa Housing Project in Khayelitsha, one of Cape Town's poorest suburbs, created significant mitigation
36 and adaptation benefits by installing ceilings, solar water heaters and energy efficient lightbulbs in houses
37 independent of the formal housing or electrification programme (Winkler, 2017).

38 39 40 4.3.3.4 *Electrification of Cities and Transport*

41
42 The electrification of urban systems, including transport, has shown global progress since AR5 (IEA, 2016a;
43 Kennedy et al., 2018; Kenworthy and Schiller, 2018). High growth rates are now appearing in electric
44 vehicles (Figure 4.1), electric bikes and electric transit (IEA, 2018), which would need to displace fossil-fuel
45 powered passenger vehicles by 2035–2050 to remain in line with 1.5°C-consistent pathways. China's 2017
46 Road Map calls for 20% of new vehicle sales to be electric. India is aiming for exclusively electric vehicles
47 (EVs) by 2032 (NITI Aayog and RMI, 2017). Globally, EV sales were up 42% in 2016 relative to 2015, and
48 in the United States EV sales were up 36% over the same period (Johnson and Walker, 2016).




Figure 4.1: Increase of the global electric car stock by country (2013–2017). Source: (IEA, 2018). Based on IEA data from Global EV Outlook 2018 © OECD/IEA 2018, IEA Publishing.

The extent of electric railways in and between cities has expanded since AR5 (IEA, 2016a; Mittal et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2016; Li and Loo, 2017). In high income cities there is *medium evidence* for the decoupling of car use and wealth since AR5 (Newman, 2017). In cities where private vehicle ownership is expected to increase, less carbon-intensive fuel sources and reduced car journeys will be necessary as well as electrification of all modes of transport (Mittal et al., 2016; van Vuuren et al., 2017). Some recent urban data show a decoupling of urban growth and GHG emissions (Newman and Kenworthy, 2015) and that ‘peak car’ has been reached in Shanghai and Beijing (Gao and Kenworthy, 2017) and beyond (Manville et al., 2017) (also see Box 4.9).

An estimated 800 cities globally have operational bike-share schemes (E. Fishman et al., 2015) and China had 250 million e-bikes in 2017 (Newman et al., 2017). Advances in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) offer cities the chance to reduce urban transport congestion and fuel consumption by making better use of the urban vehicle fleet through car sharing, driverless cars and coordinated public transport, especially when electrified (Wee, 2015; Glazebrook and Newman, 2018b). Advances in ‘big-data’ can assist in creating a better understanding of the connections between cities, green infrastructure, environmental services and health (Jennings et al., 2016) and improve decision-making in urban development (Lin et al., 2017).

4.3.3.5 Shipping, Freight and Aviation

International transport hubs, including airports and ports and the associated mobility of people, are major economic contributors to most large cities even while under the governance of national authorities and international legislation. Shipping, freight and aviation systems have grown rapidly and little progress has been made since AR5 on replacing fossil fuels, though some trials are continuing (Zhang, 2016; Bouman et al., 2017; EEA, 2017). Aviation emissions do not yet feature in IAMs (Bows-Larkin, 2015), but could be reduced by between a third and two-thirds through energy efficiency measures and operational changes (Dahlmann et al., 2016). On shorter inter-city trips, aviation could be replaced by high-speed electric trains drawing on renewable energy (Åkerman, 2011). Some progress has been made on the use of electricity in planes and shipping (Grewe et al., 2017) though no commercial applications have arisen. Studies indicate that biofuels are the most viable means of decarbonising intercontinental travel, given their technical characteristics, energy content and affordability (Wise et al., 2017). The lifecycle emissions of bio-based jet fuels and marine fuels can be considerable (Cox et al., 2014; IEA, 2017g) depending on their location (Elshout et al., 2014), but can be reduced by feedstock and conversion technology choices (de Jong et al., 2017).

In recent years the potential for transport to use synfuels, such as ethanol, methanol, methane, ammonia and hydrogen, created from renewable electricity and CO₂, has gained momentum but has not yet demonstrated benefits on a scale consistent with 1.5°C pathways (Ezeji, 2017; Fasihi et al., 2017). Decarbonising the fuel

1 used by the world's 60,000 large vessels faces governance barriers and the need for a global policy (Bows
2 and Smith, 2012; IRENA, 2015; Rehmatulla and Smith, 2015). Low-emission marine fuels could
3 simultaneously address sulphur and black carbon issues in ports and around waterways and accelerate the
4 electrification of all large ports (Bouman et al., 2017; IEA, 2017g).

7 4.3.3.6 *Climate-Resilient Land Use*

9 Urban land use influences energy intensity, risk exposure and adaptive capacity (Carter et al., 2015; Araos et
10 al., 2016a; Ewing et al., 2016; Newman et al., 2016; Broto, 2017). Accordingly, urban land-use planning can
11 contribute to climate mitigation and adaptation (Parnell, 2015; Francesch-Huidobro et al., 2017) and the
12 growing number of urban climate adaptation plans provide instruments for planning (Carter et al., 2015;
13 Dhar and Khirfan, 2017; Siders, 2017; Stults and Woodruff, 2017). Adaptation plans can reduce exposure to
14 urban flood risk that, in a 1.5°C world, could double relative to 1976–2005 (Alfieri et al., 2017), reduce heat
15 stress (Section 3.5.5.8), fire risk (Section 3.4.3.4) and sea-level rise (Section 3.4.5.1) (Schleussner et al.,
16 2016).

18 Cities can reduce their risk exposure by considering investment in infrastructure and buildings that are more
19 resilient to warming of 1.5°C or beyond. Where adaptation planning and urban planning generate the type of
20 local participation that enhances capacity to cope with risks, they can be mutually supportive processes
21 (Archer et al., 2014; Kettle et al., 2014; Campos et al., 2016; Chu et al., 2017; Siders, 2017; Underwood et
22 al., 2017). Not all adaptation plans are reported as effective (Measham et al., 2011; Hetz, 2016; Woodruff
23 and Stults, 2016; Mahlkow and Donner, 2017), especially in developing country cities (Kiunsi, 2013). Where
24 adaptation planning further marginalises poor citizens through limited local control over establishing
25 adaptation priorities, or the displacement of impacts onto poorer communities, justice, equity, and broad
26 participation would need to be considered in the dimensions of successful urban risk reduction, and
27 recognition of the political economy of adaptation (Archer, 2016; Shi et al., 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2016a,
28 2017; Chu et al., 2017).

31 4.3.3.7 *Green Urban Infrastructure and Ecosystem Services*

33 Integrating and promoting green urban infrastructure (including street trees, parks, green roofs and facades,
34 water features) into city planning can be difficult (Leck et al., 2015) and increases urban resilience to
35 impacts of 1.5°C warming (Table 4.2) in ways that can be more cost effective than conventional
36 infrastructure (Culwick and Bobbins (2016) (Cartwright et al., 2013).

38 **Table 4.2:** Green urban infrastructure and benefits.

Green infrastructure	Adaptation benefits	Mitigation benefits	References
Urban trees planting, urban parks	Reduced heat island effect, psychological benefits	Less cement, reduced air-conditioning	(Demuzere et al., 2014; Mullaney et al., 2015; Soderlund and Newman, 2015; Beaudoin and Gosselin, 2016; Green et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2017)
Permeable surfaces	Water recharge	Less cement in city, some bio-sequestration, less water pumping	(Liu et al., 2014; Lamond et al., 2015; Skougaard Kaspersen et al., 2015; Voskamp and Van de Ven, 2015; Costa et al., 2016; Mguni et al., 2016; Xie et al., 2017)
Forest retention, and urban agricultural land	Flood mediation, healthy lifestyles	Air pollution reduction	(Nowak et al., 2006; Tallis et al., 2011; Elmqvist et al., 2013; Buckeridge, 2015; Culwick and Bobbins, 2016; Panagopoulos et al., 2016; Stevenson et al., 2016; White et al., 2017)
Wetland restoration,	Reduced urban flooding, Low	Some bio-sequestration, Less	(Cartwright et al., 2013; Elmqvist et al., 2015; Brown and McGranahan, 2016; Camps-Calvet et al., 2016;

riparian buffer zones	skilled local work, Sense of place	energy spent on water treatment	Culwick and Bobbins, 2016; McPhearson et al., 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2016b; Collas et al., 2017; F. Li et al., 2017)
Biodiverse urban habitat	Psychological benefits, inner-city recreation	Carbon sequestration	(Beatley, 2011; Elmqvist et al., 2015; Brown and McGranahan, 2016; Camps-Calvet et al., 2016; McPhearson et al., 2016; Collas et al., 2017; F. Li et al., 2017)

1
2 Realising climate benefits from urban green infrastructure sometimes requires a city-region perspective
3 (Wachsmuth et al., 2016). Where the urban impact on ecological systems in and beyond the city is
4 appreciated, the potential for transformative change exists (Soderlund and Newman, 2015; Ziervogel et al.,
5 2016a), and a locally appropriate combination of green space, ecosystem goods and services and the built
6 environment can increase the set of urban adaptation options (Puppim de Oliveira et al., 2013).
7

8 Milan, Italy, a city with deliberate urban greening policies, planted 10,000 hectares of new forest and green
9 areas over the last two decades (Sanesi et al., 2017). The accelerated growth of urban trees, relative to rural
10 trees, in several regions of the world is expected to decrease tree longevity (Pretzsch et al., 2017), requiring
11 monitoring and additional management of urban trees if their contribution to urban ecosystem based
12 adaptation and mitigation is to be maintained in a 1.5°C world (Buckeridge, 2015; Pretzsch et al., 2017).
13

14 15 4.3.3.8 *Sustainable Urban Water and Environmental Services*

16
17 Urban water supply and wastewater treatment is energy intensive, and currently accounts for significant
18 GHG emissions (Nair et al., 2014). Cities can integrate sustainable water resource management and the
19 supply of water services in ways that support mitigation, adaptation and development through waste-water
20 recycling and storm water diversion (Xue et al., 2015; Poff et al., 2016). Governance and finance challenges
21 complicate balancing sustainable water supply and rising urban demand, particularly in low-income cities
22 (Bettini et al., 2015; Deng and Zhao, 2015; Hill Clarvis and Engle, 2015; Lemos, 2015; Margerum and
23 Robinson, 2015).

24 Urban surface sealing with impervious materials affects the volume and velocity of run-off and flooding
25 during intense rainfall (Skougaard Kaspersen et al., 2015), but urban design in many cities now seeks to
26 mediate run-off, encourage groundwater recharge and enhance water quality (Liu et al., 2014; Lamond et al.,
27 2015; Voskamp and Van de Ven, 2015; Costa et al., 2016; Mguni et al., 2016; Xie et al., 2017). Challenges
28 remain for managing intense rainfall events that are reported to be increasing in frequency and intensity in
29 some locations (Ziervogel et al., 2016b) and urban flooding is expected to increase at 1.5°C warming (Alfieri
30 et al., 2017). This risk falls disproportionately on women and poor people in cities (Mitlin, 2005; Chu et al.,
31 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2016b; Chant et al., 2017; Dodman et al., 2017a, b).

32 Nexus approaches that highlight urban areas as socio-ecological systems, can support policy coherence
33 (Rasul and Sharma, 2016) and sustainable urban livelihoods (Biggs et al., 2015). The Water-Energy-Food
34 (WEF) nexus is especially important to growing urban populations (Tacoli et al., 2013; Lwasa et al., 2014;
35 Villarroel Walker et al., 2014).
36

37 38 4.3.4 *Industrial Systems Transitions*

39
40 Industry consumes about one third of global final energy and contributes, directly and indirectly, about one
41 third of global GHG emissions (IPCC, 2014b). If global temperatures are to remain under 1.5°C, modelling
42 indicates that industry cannot emit more than 2 GtCO₂ in 2050, corresponding > 70% GHG emission
43 reduction compared to 2010 (see Figures 2.20 and 2.21). Moreover, the consequences of climate change of
44 1.5°C or more pose substantial challenges for industrial diversity. This section will first briefly discuss the
45 limited literature on adaptation options for industry. Subsequently, new literature since AR5 on the
46 feasibility of industrial mitigation options will be discussed.
47

48 Research assessing adaptation actions by industry indicates that only a small fraction of corporations have

1 developed adaptation measures. Studies of adaptation in the private sector remain limited (Agrawala et al.,
2 2011; Linnenluecke et al., 2015; Averchenkova et al., 2016; Bremer and Linnenluecke, 2016; Pauw et al.,
3 2016a) and for 1.5°C are largely absent. This knowledge gap is particularly evident for medium-sized
4 enterprises and in low- and middle-income nations (Surminski, 2013).
5

6 Depending on the industrial sector, mitigation consistent with 1.5°C would mean, across industries, a
7 reduction of final energy demand by one-third, an increase of the rate of recycling of materials and the
8 development of a circular economy in industry (Lewandowski, 2016; Linder and Williander, 2017), the
9 substitution of materials in high-carbon products with those made up of renewable materials (e.g., wood
10 instead of steel or cement in the construction sector, natural textile fibres instead of plastics), and a range of
11 deep emission reduction options, including use of bio-based feedstocks, low-emission heat sources,
12 electrification of production processes, and/or capture and storage of all CO₂ emissions by 2050 (Åhman et
13 al., 2016). Some of the choices for mitigation options and routes for GHG-intensive industry are discrete and
14 potentially subject to path dependency: if an industry goes one way (e.g., in keeping existing processes), it
15 will be harder to transition to process change (e.g., electrification) (Bataille et al., 2018). In the context of
16 rising demand for construction, an increasing share of industrial production may be based in developing
17 countries (N. Li et al., 2017), where current efficiencies may be lower than in developed countries, and
18 technical and institutional feasibility may differ (Ma et al., 2015).
19

20 Except for energy efficiency, costs of disruptive change associated with hydrogen- or electricity-based
21 production, bio-based feedstocks and Carbon Dioxide Capture, (Utilisation) and Storage (CC(U)S) for trade-
22 sensitive industrial sectors (in particular the iron and steel, petrochemical and refining industries) make
23 policy action by individual countries challenging because of competitiveness concerns (Åhman et al., 2016;
24 Nabernegg et al., 2017).
25

26 Table 4.3 provides an overview of applicable mitigation options for key industrial sectors.
27

28 **Table 4.3:** Overview of different mitigation options potentially consistent with 1.5°C and applicable to main industrial
29 sectors, including examples of application (Napp et al., 2014; Boulamanti and Moya, 2017; Wesseling et
30 al., 2017).
31

	Iron/steel	Cement	Refineries and petrochemicals	Chemicals
Process and energy efficiency	Can make a difference on of between 10% and 50%, depending on the plant. Relevant but not enough for 1.5°C			
Bio-based	Coke can be made from biomass instead of coal	Partial (only energy-related emissions)	Biomass can replace fossil feedstocks	
Circularity & substitution	More recycling and replacement by low-emission materials, including alternative chemistries for cement		Limited potential	
Electrification & hydrogen	Direct reduction with hydrogen. Heat generation through electricity	Partial (only electrified heat generation)	Electrified heat and hydrogen generation	
CCS	Possible for process emissions and energy. Reduces emissions by 80-95%, and become negative when combined with biofuel		Can be applied to energy emissions and different stacks but not on emissions of products in the use phase (e.g., gasoline)	

32 33 34 4.3.4.1 Energy Efficiency 35

36 Isolated efficiency implementation in energy-intensive industries is a necessary but insufficient condition for
37 deep emission reductions (Napp et al., 2014; Aden, 2017). Various options specific to different industries are
38 available. In general, their feasibility depends on lowering capital costs and raising awareness and expertise
39 (Wesseling et al., 2017). General purpose technologies, such as ICT, and energy management tools can

1 improve the prospects of energy efficiency in industry (see Section 4.4.4).

2
3 Cross-sector technologies and practices, which play a role in all industrial sectors including Small- and
4 Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and non-energy intensive industry, also offer potential for considerable
5 energy efficiency improvements. They include motor systems (for example electric motors, variable speed
6 drives, pumps, compressors and fans), responsible for about 10% of industrial energy consumption with an
7 energy efficiency improvement potential of around 20–25%, worldwide (Napp et al., 2014); steam systems,
8 responsible for about 30% of industrial energy consumption and energy saving potentials of about 10%
9 (Hasanbeigi et al., 2014; Napp et al., 2014). Waste heat recovery from industry has substantial potential for
10 energy efficiency and emission reduction (Forman et al., 2016). Low awareness and competition from other
11 investments limit the feasibility of such options (Napp et al., 2014).

12 13 14 4.3.4.2 *Substitution and Circularity*

15
16 Recycling materials and developing a circular economy can be institutionally challenging as it requires
17 advanced capabilities (Henry et al., 2006) and organisational changes (Cooper- Searle et al., 2018), but has
18 advantages in terms of cost, health, governance and environment (Ali et al., 2017). An assessment of the
19 impacts on energy use and environmental issues is not available, but substitution could play a large role in
20 reducing emissions (Åhman et al., 2016) although its potential depends on the demand for material, and the
21 turnover of for example in buildings (Haas et al., 2015). Material substitution and CO₂ storage options are
22 under development, for example, the use of algae and renewable energy for carbon fibre production, which
23 could become a net sink of CO₂ (Arnold et al., 2018).

24 25 26 4.3.4.3 *Bio-Based Feedstocks*

27
28 Bio-based feedstock processes could be partly seen as part of the circular materials economy (see Section
29 above). In several sectors, bio-based feedstocks would leave the production process of materials relatively
30 untouched, and a switch would not affect the product quality, making the option more attractive. However,
31 energy requirements for processing bio-based feedstocks are often high, costs are also still higher, and the
32 emissions over the full lifecycle, both upstream and downstream, could be significant (Wesseling et al.,
33 2017). Bio-based feedstocks may put pressure on natural resources by increasing land demand, biodiversity
34 impacts beyond bioenergy demand for electricity, transport and buildings (Slade et al., 2014), and, partly as a
35 result, face barriers in public acceptance (Sleenhoff et al., 2015).

36 37 38 4.3.4.4 *Electrification and Hydrogen*

39
40 Electrification of manufacturing processes would constitute a significant technological challenge and a more
41 disruptive innovation in industry than bio-based or CCS options, to get to very low or zero emissions, except
42 potentially in steel-making (Philibert, 2017). The disruptive characteristics could potentially lead to stranded
43 assets, and could reduce political feasibility and industry support (Åhman et al., 2016). Electrification of
44 manufacturing would require further technological development in industry, as well as an ample supply of
45 cost-effective low-emission electricity (Philibert, 2017).

46
47 Low-emission hydrogen can be produced either by natural gas with CCS, by electrolysis of water powered
48 by zero-emission electricity, or potentially in the future by generation IV nuclear reactors. Feasibility of
49 electrification and use of hydrogen in production processes or fuel cells is affected by technical development
50 in terms of efficient hydrogen production and electrification of processes, by geophysical factors related to
51 the availability of low-emission electricity (MacKay, 2013), by associated public perception and by
52 economic feasibility, except in areas with ample solar and/or wind resources (Philibert, 2017; Wesseling et
53 al., 2017).

4.3.4.5 *CO₂ Capture, Utilisation and Storage in Industry*

CO₂ capture in industry is generally considered more feasible than CCS in the power sector (Section 4.3.1) or from bioenergy sources (Section 4.3.7), although CCS in industry faces similar barriers. Almost all of the current full-scale (>1MtCO₂ yr⁻¹) CCS projects capture CO₂ from industrial sources, including the Sleipner project in Norway, which has been injecting CO₂ from a gas facility in an offshore saline formation since 1996 (Global CCS Institute, 2017). Compared to the power sector, retrofitting CCS on existing industrial plants would leave the production process of materials relatively untouched (Åhman et al., 2016), though significant investments and modifications still have to be made. Some industries, in particular cement, emit CO₂ as inherent process emissions and can therefore not reduce emissions to zero without CC(U)S. CO₂ stacks in some industries have a high economic and technical feasibility for CO₂ capture as the CO₂ concentration in the exhaust gases is relatively high (IPCC, 2005; Leeson et al., 2017), but others require strong modifications in the production process, limiting technical and economic feasibility, though costs remain lower than other deep GHG reduction options (Rubin et al., 2015). There are indications that the energy use in CO₂ capture through amine solvents (for solvent regeneration) can decrease by around 60%, from 5 GJ tCO₂⁻¹ in 2005 to 2 GJ tCO₂⁻¹ in the best-performing pilot plants (Idem et al., 2015), increasing both technical and economic potential for this option. The heterogeneity of industrial production processes might point to the need for specific institutional arrangements to incentivise industrial CCS (Mikunda et al., 2014), and may decrease institutional feasibility.

The contribution of Carbon Dioxide Utilisation (CCU) to limiting warming to 1.5°C depends on the origin of CO₂ (fossil, biogenic or atmospheric), the source of electricity for converting the CO₂ or regenerating catalysts, and the lifetime of the product. Review studies indicate that carbon dioxide utilisation in industry has a small role to play in limiting warming to 1.5°C because of the limited potential of re-using CO₂ with currently available technologies and the re-emission of CO₂ when used as a fuel (IPCC, 2005; Mac Dowell et al., 2017). However, there are new developments, in particular in CO₂ use as a feedstock for carbon-based materials that would isolate CO₂ from the atmosphere for a long time and greater availability of low-cost, low-emission electricity. The conversion of CO₂ to fuels using zero-emission electricity has a lower technical, economic and environmental feasibility than direct CO₂ capture and storage from industry (Abanades et al., 2017), although the economic prospects have improved recently (Philibert, 2017).

4.3.5 *Overarching Adaptation Options Supporting Adaptation Transitions*

This section assesses overarching adaptation options, which are specific solutions from which actors can choose and make decisions to reduce climate vulnerability and build resilience. We examine their feasibility in the context of transitions of energy, land and ecosystem, urban and infrastructure, and industrial systems here, and further in Section 4.5. These options can contribute to creating an enabling environment for adaptation (see Table 4.4 and Section 4.4).

4.3.5.1 *Disaster Risk Management (DRM)*

DRM is a process for designing, implementing and evaluating strategies, policies and measures to improve the understanding of disaster risk, and promoting improvement in disaster preparedness, response and recovery (IPCC, 2012). There is increased demand to integrate DRM and adaptation (Howes et al., 2015; Kelman et al., 2015; Serrao-Neumann et al., 2015; Archer, 2016; Rose, 2016; van der Keur et al., 2016; Kelman, 2017; Wallace, 2017) to reduce vulnerability, but institutional, technical and financial capacity challenges in frontline agencies constitute constraints (*medium evidence, high agreement*) (Eakin et al., 2015; Kita, 2017; Wallace, 2017).

4.3.5.2 *Risk Sharing and Spreading*

Risks associated with 1.5°C warming (Section 3.4) have the potential to increase the demand for options that

1 share and spread financial burdens. Formal, market-based (re)insurance spreads risk and provides a financial
2 buffer against the impact of climate hazards (Linnerooth-Bayer and Hochrainer-Stigler, 2015; Wolfrom and
3 Yokoi-Arai, 2015; O'Hare et al., 2016; Glaas et al., 2017; Patel et al., 2017). As an alternative to traditional
4 indemnity-based insurance, index-based micro-crop and livestock insurance programmes have been rolled
5 out in regions with less developed insurance markets (Aker et al., 2016, 2017; Jensen and Barrett, 2017).
6 There is *medium evidence* and *medium agreement* on the feasibility of insurance for adaptation, with
7 financial, social, and institutional barriers to implementation and uptake, especially in low-income nations
8 (García Romero and Molina, 2015; Joyette et al., 2015; Lashley and Warner, 2015; Jin et al., 2016). Social
9 protection programmes include cash and in-kind transfers to protect poor and vulnerable households from the
10 impact of economic shocks, natural disasters and other crises (World Bank, 2017b), and can build generic
11 adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability when combined with a comprehensive climate risk management
12 approach (*medium evidence, medium agreement*) (Devereux, 2016; Lemos et al., 2016).

15 4.3.5.3 *Education and Learning*

16 Educational adaptation options motivate adaptation through building awareness (Butler et al., 2016; Myers et
17 al., 2017), leveraging multiple knowledge systems (Pearce et al., 2015; Janif et al., 2016), developing
18 participatory action research and social learning processes (Butler and Adamowski, 2015; Ensor and Harvey,
19 2015; Butler et al., 2016; Thi Hong Phuong et al., 2017; Ford et al., 2018), strengthening extension services,
20 and building learning and knowledge sharing mechanisms through community-based platforms, international
21 conferences and knowledge networks (Vinke-de Kruijf and Pahl-Wostl, 2016) (*medium evidence, high
22 agreement*).

26 4.3.5.4 *Population Health and Health System Adaptation Options*

27 Until mid-century, climate change will exacerbate existing health challenges (Section 3.4.7). Enhancing
28 current health services includes providing access to safe water and improved sanitation, enhancing access to
29 essential services such as vaccination, and developing or strengthening integrated surveillance systems
30 (WHO, 2015). Combining these with iterative management can facilitate effective adaptation (*medium
31 evidence, high agreement*).

35 4.3.5.5 *Indigenous Knowledge*

36 There is *medium evidence* and *high agreement* that Indigenous knowledge is critical for adaptation,
37 underpinning adaptive capacity through the diversity of Indigenous agro-ecological and forest management
38 systems, collective social memory, repository of accumulated experience, and social networks (Hiwasaki et
39 al., 2015; Pearce et al., 2015; Mapfumo et al., 2016; Sherman et al., 2016; Ingty, 2017) (Box 4.3). It is
40 threatened by acculturation, dispossession of land rights and land grabbing, rapid environmental changes,
41 colonisation, and social change, increasing vulnerability to climate change, which climate policy can
42 exacerbate if based on limited understanding of Indigenous worldviews (Thornton and Manasfi, 2010; Ford,
43 2012; Nakashima et al., 2012; McNamara and Prasad, 2014). Many scholars argue that recognition of
44 Indigenous rights, governance systems and laws is central to adaptation, mitigation and sustainable
45 development (Magni, 2017; Thornton and Comberti, 2017; Pearce, 2018).

49 4.3.5.6 *Human Migration*

50 Human migration, whether planned, forced or voluntary, is increasingly gaining attention as a response,
51 particularly where climatic risks are becoming severe (Section 3.4.10.2). There is *medium evidence* and *low
52 agreement* as to whether migration is adaptive, in relation to cost effectiveness (Grecequet et al., 2017) and
53 scalability (Brzoska and Fröhlich, 2016; Gemenne and Blocher, 2017; Grecequet et al., 2017) concerns.
54 Migrating can have mixed outcomes on reducing socio-economic vulnerability (Birk and Rasmussen, 2014;
55

1 Kothari, 2014; Adger et al., 2015; Betzold, 2015; Kelman, 2015; Grecequet et al., 2017; Melde et al., 2017;
 2 World Bank, 2017a, 2018b) and its feasibility is constrained by low political and legal acceptability, and
 3 inadequate institutional capacity (Betzold, 2015; Methmann and Oels, 2015; Brzoska and Fröhlich, 2016;
 4 Gemenne and Blocher, 2017; Grecequet et al., 2017; Yamamoto et al., 2017).

7 4.3.5.7 Climate Services

8
 9 There is *medium evidence* and *high agreement* that climate services can play a critical role in aiding
 10 adaptation decision making (Vaughan and Dessai, 2014; Wood et al., 2014; Lourenço et al., 2016; Trenberth
 11 et al., 2016; Singh et al., 2017; Vaughan et al., 2018). The higher uptake of short-term climate information
 12 such as weather advisories and daily forecasts contrast with lesser use of longer-term information such as
 13 seasonal forecasts and multi-decadal projections (Singh et al., 2017; Vaughan et al., 2018). Climate service
 14 interventions have met challenges with scaling-up due to low capacity, inadequate institutions, and
 15 difficulties in maintaining systems beyond pilot project stage (Sivakumar et al., 2014; Tall et al., 2014;
 16 Gebru et al., 2015; Singh et al., 2016b), and technical, institutional, design, financial and capacity barriers to
 17 the application of climate information for better decision-making remain (WMO, 2015; Briley et al., 2015;
 18 L. Jones et al., 2016; Lourenço et al., 2016; Snow et al., 2016; Harjanne, 2017; Singh et al., 2017; C.J. White
 19 et al., 2017).

20
 21 **Table 4.4:** Assessment of overarching adaptation options in relation to enabling conditions. For more details, see
 22 Supplementary Material 4.SM.2.
 23

Option	Enabling Conditions	Examples
Disaster risk management (DRM)	Governance and institutional capacity: supports post-disaster recovery and reconstruction (Kelman et al., 2015; Kull et al., 2016).	Early warning systems (Anaconda et al., 2015), and monitoring of dangerous lakes and surrounding slopes (including using remote sensing) offer DRM opportunities (Emmer et al., 2016; Milner et al., 2017).
Risk sharing and spreading: insurance	Institutional capacity and finance: buffers climate risk (Wolfrom and Yokoi-Arai, 2015; O'Hare et al., 2016; Glaas et al., 2017; Jenkins et al., 2017; Patel et al., 2017).	In 2007, the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility was formed to pool risk from tropical cyclones, earthquakes, and excess rainfalls (Murphy et al., 2012; CCRIF, 2017).
Risk sharing and spreading: social protection programmes	Institutional capacity and finance: builds generic adaptive capacity and reduces social vulnerability (Weldegebriel and Prowse, 2013; Eakin et al., 2014; Lemos et al., 2016; Schwan and Yu, 2017).	In sub-Saharan Africa, cash transfer programmes targeting poor communities have proven successful in smoothing household welfare and food security during droughts, strengthening community ties, and reducing debt levels (del Ninno et al., 2016; Asfaw et al., 2017; Asfaw and Davis, 2018).
Education and learning	Behavioural change and institutional capacity: social learning strengthens adaptation and affects longer-term change (Clemens et al., 2015; Ensor and Harvey, 2015; Henly-Shepard et al., 2015).	Participatory scenario planning is a process by which multiple stakeholders work together to envision future scenarios under a range of climatic conditions (Oteros-Rozas et al., 2015; Butler et al., 2016; Flynn et al., 2018).
Population health and health system	Institutional capacity: 1.5°C warming will primarily exacerbate existing health challenges (K.R. Smith et al., 2014), which can be targeted by enhancing health services.	Heat wave early warning and response systems coordinate the implementation of multiple measures in response to predicted extreme temperatures (e.g. public announcements, opening public cooling shelters, distributing information on heat stress symptoms) (Knowlton et al., 2014; Takahashi et al., 2015; Nitschke et al., 2016, 2017).
Indigenous knowledge	Institutional capacity and behavioural change: knowledge of environmental conditions helps communities detect and monitor change (Johnson et al., 2015; Mistry and Berardi, 2016; Williams et al., 2017).	Options such as integration of Indigenous knowledge into resource management systems and school curricula, are identified as potential adaptations (Cunsolo Willox et al., 2013; McNamara and Prasad, 2014; MacDonald et al., 2015; Pearce et al., 2015; Chambers et al., 2017; Inamara and Thomas, 2017).

Human migration	Governance: revising and adopting migration issues in national disaster risk management policies, National Adaptation Plans and NDCs (Kuruppu and Willie, 2015; Yamamoto et al., 2017).	In dryland India, populations in rural regions already experiencing 1.5°C warming are migrating to cities (Gajjar et al., 2018) but are inadequately covered by existing policies (Bhagat, 2017).
Climate services	Technological innovation: rapid technical development (due to increased financial inputs and growing demand) is enabling quality of climate information provided (WMO, 2015; Rogers and Tsirkunov, 2010; Clements et al., 2013; Perrels et al., 2013; Gasc et al., 2014; Roudier et al., 2016).	Climate services are seeing wide application in sectors such as agriculture, health, disaster management, insurance (Lourenço et al., 2016; Vaughan et al., 2018) with implications for adaptation decision-making (Singh et al., 2017).

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[START CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 9 HERE]

Cross-Chapter Box 9: Risks, Adaptation Interventions, and Implications for Sustainable Development and Equity Across Four Social-Ecological Systems: Arctic, Caribbean, Amazon, and Urban

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This box presents four case studies from different social-ecological systems as examples of risks of 1.5°C warming and higher (Chapter 3); adaptation options that respond to these risks (Chapter 4); and their implications for poverty, livelihoods and sustainability (Chapter 5). It is not yet possible to generalise adaptation effectiveness across regions due to a lack of empirical studies and monitoring and evaluation of current efforts.

Arctic

The Arctic is undergoing the most rapid climate change globally (Larsen et al., 2014), warming by 1.9°C over the last 30 years (Walsh, 2014; Grosse et al., 2016). For 2°C warming relative to pre-industrial levels, chances of an ice-free Arctic during summer are substantially higher than at 1.5°C (see Sections 3.3.5 and 3.3.8), with permafrost melt, increased instances of storm surge, and extreme weather events anticipated along with later ice freeze up, earlier break up, and a longer ice free open water season (Bring et al., 2016; DeBeer et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2016; Chadburn et al., 2017; Melvin et al., 2017). Negative impacts on health, infrastructure, and economic sectors (AMAP, 2017a, b, 2018) are projected, although the extension of the summer ocean shipping season has potential economic opportunities (Ford et al., 2015b; Dawson et al., 2016; K.Y. et al., 2018).

Communities, many with Indigenous roots, have adapted to environmental change, developing or shifting harvesting activities and patterns of travel and transitioning economic systems (Forbes et al., 2009; Wenzel, 2009; Ford et al., 2015a; Pearce et al., 2015), although emotional and psychological effects have been documented (Cunsolo Willox et al., 2012; Cunsolo and Ellis, 2018). Besides climate change (Keskitalo et al., 2011; Loring et al., 2016), economic and social conditions can constrain the capacity to adapt unless resources and cooperation are available from public and private sector actors (AMAP, 2017a, 2018)(see Box 5.3Section). In Alaska, the economic impacts of climate change on public infrastructure are significant, estimated at 5.5 billion USD to 4.2 billion USD from 2015 to 2099, with adaptation efforts halving these estimates (Melvin et al., 2017). Marginalisation, colonisation, and land dispossession provide broader underlying challenges facing many communities across the circumpolar north in adapting to change (Ford et al., 2015a; Sejersen, 2015) (see Section 4.3.5).

Adaptation opportunities include alterations to building codes and infrastructure design, disaster risk management, and surveillance (Ford et al., 2014a; AMAP, 2017a, b; Labbé et al., 2017). Most adaptation initiatives are currently occurring at local levels in response to both observed and projected environmental

1 changes as well as social and economic stresses (Ford et al., 2015a). In a recent study of Canada, most
2 adaptations were found to be in the planning stages (Labbé et al., 2017). Studies have suggested that a
3 number of the adaptation actions are not sustainable, lack evaluation frameworks, and hold potential for
4 maladaptation (Loboda, 2014; Ford et al., 2015a; Larsson et al., 2016). Utilising Indigenous and local
5 knowledge and stakeholder engagement can aid the development of adaptation policies and broader
6 sustainable development, along with more proactive and regionally coherent adaptation plans and actions,
7 and regional cooperation (e.g. through the Arctic Council) (Larsson et al., 2016; AMAP, 2017a; Melvin et
8 al., 2017; Forbis Jr and Hayhoe, 2018) (see Section 4.3.5).

9 10 **Caribbean SIDS and Territories**

11 Extreme weather, linked to tropical storms and hurricanes, represent one of the largest risks facing Caribbean
12 island nations (Section 3.4.5.3). Non-economic damages include detrimental health impacts, forced
13 displacement and destruction of cultural heritages. Projections of increased frequency of the most intense
14 storms at 1.5°C and higher warming levels (Wehner et al., 2018; Section 3.3.6; Box 3.5) are a significant
15 cause for concern, making adaptation a matter of survival (Mycoo, 2017).

16
17 Despite a shared vulnerability arising from commonalities in location, circumstance and size (Bishop and
18 Payne, 2012; Nurse et al., 2014), adaptation approaches are nuanced by differences in climate governance,
19 affecting vulnerability and adaptive capacity (see Section 4.4.1). Three cases exemplify differences in
20 disaster risk management.

21
22 **Cuba:** Together with a robust physical infrastructure and human resource base (Kirk, 2017), Cuba has
23 implemented an effective civil defence system for emergency preparedness and disaster response, centred
24 around community mobilisation and preparedness (Kirk, 2017). Legislation to manage disasters, an efficient
25 and robust early warning system, emergency stockpiles, adequate shelter system and continuous training and
26 education of the population help create a ‘culture of risk’ (Isayama and Ono, 2015; Lizarralde et al., 2015)
27 which reduces vulnerability to extreme events (Pichler and Striessnig, 2013). Cuba’s infrastructure is still
28 susceptible to devastation, as seen in the aftermath of the 2017 hurricane season.

29
30 **United Kingdom Outer Territories (UKOT):** All UKOT have developed National Disaster Preparedness
31 Plans (PAHO/WHO, 2016) and are part of the Caribbean Disaster Risk Management Program which aims to
32 improve disaster risk management within the health sector. Different vulnerability levels across the UKOT
33 (Lam et al., 2015) indicate the benefits of greater regional cooperation and capacity-building, not only within
34 UKOT, but throughout the Caribbean (Forster et al., 2011). While sovereign states in the region can directly
35 access climate funds and international support, Dependent Territories are reliant on their controlling states
36 (Bishop and Payne, 2012). There tends to be low-scale management for environmental issues in UKOT,
37 which increases UKOT’s vulnerability. Institutional limitations, lack of human and financial resources, and
38 limited long-term planning are identified as barriers to adaptation (Forster et al., 2011).

39
40 **Jamaica:** Disaster management is coordinated through a hierarchy of national, parish and community
41 disaster committees under the leadership of the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management
42 (ODPEM). ODPEM coordinates disaster preparedness and risk reduction efforts among key state and non-
43 state agencies (Grove, 2013). A National Disaster Committee provides technical and policy oversight to the
44 ODPEM and is comprised of representatives from multiple stakeholders (Osei, 2007). Most initiatives are
45 primarily funded through a mix of multi-lateral and bi-lateral loan and grant funding focusing on
46 strengthening technical and institutional capacities of state and research-based institutions and supporting
47 integration of climate change considerations into national and sectoral development plans (Robinson, 2017).

48
49 To improve climate change governance in the region, Pittman et al 2015 suggest incorporating holistic and
50 integrated management systems, improving flexibility in collaborative processes, implementing monitoring
51 programs, and increasing the capacity of local authorities. Implementation of the 2030 Sustainable
52 Development Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can contribute to addressing the risks
53 related with extreme events (Box 5.3).

The Amazon

Terrestrial forests, such as the Amazon, are sensitive to changes in the climate, particularly drought (Laurance and Williamson, 2001) which might intensify through the 21st century (Marengo and Espinoza, 2016) (Section 3.5.5.6).

The poorest communities in the region face substantial risks with climate change, and barriers and limits to adaptive capacity (Maru et al., 2014; Pinho et al., 2014, 2015; Brondízio et al., 2016). The Amazon is considered a hotspot with interconnections between increasing temperature, decreased precipitation and hydrological flow (Betts et al., 2018) (Sections 3.3.2.2, 3.3.3.2 and 3.3.5), low levels of socioeconomic development (Pinho et al., 2014), and high levels of climate vulnerability (Darela et al., 2016). Limiting temperature warming to 1.5°C could increase food and water security in the region compared to 2°C (Betts et al., 2018), reduce the impact on poor people and sustainable development, and make adaptation easier (O'Neill et al., 2017) particularly in the Amazon (Bathiany et al., 2018) (Section 5.2.2).

Climate policy in many Amazonian nations has focused on forests as carbon sinks (Soares-Filho et al., 2010). In 2009, the Brazilian National Policy on Climate Change acknowledged adaptation as a concern and the government sought to mainstream adaptation into public administration. Brazil's National Adaptation Plan sets guidelines for sectoral adaptation measures, primarily by developing capacity building, plans, assessments and tools to support adaptive decision making. Adaptation is increasingly being presented as having mitigation co-benefits in the Brazilian Amazon (Gregorio et al., 2016), especially within ecosystem-based adaptation (Locatelli et al., 2011). In Peru's Framework Law for Climate Change, every governmental sector will consider climatic conditions as potential risks and/or opportunities to promote economic development and to plan adaptation.

Drought and flood policies have had limited effectiveness in reducing vulnerability (Marengo et al., 2013). In the absence of effective adaptation, achieving the SDGs will be challenging, mainly in poverty, health, water and sanitation, inequality and gender equality (Section 5.2.3).

Urban systems

Around 360 million people reside in urban coastal areas where precipitation variability is exposing inadequacies of urban infrastructure and governance, with the poor especially vulnerable (Reckien et al., 2017)(Cross-Chapter Box 13 in Chapter 5). Urban systems have seen growing adaptation action (Revi et al., 2014b; Araos et al., 2016b; Amundsen et al., 2018). Developing cities spend more on health and agriculture-related adaptation options while developed cities spend more on energy and water (Georgeson et al., 2016). Current adaptation activities are lagging in emerging economies which are major centres of population growth facing complex interrelated pressures on investment in health, housing and education (Georgeson et al., 2016; Reckien et al., 2017).

New York: Adaptation plans are undertaken across government levels, sectors and departments (NYC Parks, 2010; Vision 2020 Project Team, 2011; The City of New York, 2013), and have been advanced by an expert science panel that is obligated by local city law to provide regular updates on policy relevant climate science (NPCC, 2015). Federal initiatives include 2013's Rebuild By Design competition to promote resilience through infrastructural projects (HUD, 2013). In 2013 the Mayor's office, in response to Hurricane Sandy, published the city's adaptation strategy (The City of New York, 2013). In 2015, the OneNYC Plan for a Strong and Just City (OneNYC Team, 2015) laid out a strategy for urban planning through a justice and equity lens. In 2017, new climate resiliency guidelines proposed that new construction must include sea level rise projections into planning and development (The City of New York, 2017). Although this attention to climate-resilient development may help reduce income inequality, its full effect could be constrained, if a policy focus on resilience obscures analysis of income redistribution for the poor (Fainstein, 2018).

Kampala: Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) has the statutory responsibility for managing the city. The Kampala Climate Change Action Strategy (KCCAS) is responding to climatic impacts of elevated temperature and more intense, erratic rain. KCCAS has considered multi-scale and temporal aspects of response (Chelleri et al., 2015; Douglas, 2017; Fraser et al., 2017), strengthened community adaptation (Lwasa, 2010; Dobson, 2017), responded to differential adaptive capacities (Waters and Adger, 2017) and

1 believes in participatory processes and bridging of citywide linkages (KCCA, 2016). Analysis of the
2 implications of uniquely adapted local solutions (e.g., motorcycle taxis) suggests sustainability can be
3 enhanced when planning recognises the need to adapt to uniquely local solutions (Evans et al., 2018).
4

5 **Rotterdam:** The Rotterdam Climate Initiative (RCI) was launched to reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG)
6 emissions and climate-proof Rotterdam (RCI, 2017). Rotterdam has an integrated adaptation strategy, built
7 on flood management, accessibility, adaptive building, urban water systems and urban climate, defined
8 through Rotterdam Climate Proof and Rotterdam Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (RCI, 2008, 2013).
9 Governance mechanisms that enabled integration of flood risk management plans with other policies, citizen
10 participation, institutional eco-innovation, and focussing on green infrastructure (Albers et al., 2015; Dircke
11 and Molenaar, 2015; de Boer et al., 2016a; Huang-Lachmann and Lovett, 2016) have contributed to effective
12 adaptation (Ward et al., 2013). Entrenched institutional characteristics constrain the response framework
13 (Francesch-Huidobro et al., 2017) but emerging evidence suggests that new governance arrangements and
14 structures can potentially overcome these barriers in Rotterdam (Hölscher et al., 2018).
15

16 **[END CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 9 HERE]**
17

18 4.3.6 Short Lived Climate Forcers

19 The main Short-Lived Climate Forcer (SLCF) emissions that cause warming are methane (CH₄), other
20 precursors of tropospheric ozone (i.e., carbon monoxide (CO), Non-Methane Volatile Organic Compounds
21 (NMVOC)), black carbon (BC) and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) (Myhre et al., 2013). SLCFs also include
22 emissions that lead to cooling, such as sulphur dioxide (SO₂) and organic carbon (OC). Nitrogen oxides
23 (NO_x) can have both warming and cooling effects, by affecting ozone (O₃) and CH₄, depending on timescale
24 and location (Myhre et al., 2013).
25

26 Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1 provides a discussion of role of SLCFs in comparison to long-lived
27 GHGs. Chapter 2 shows that 1.5°C-consistent pathways require stringent reductions in CO₂ and CH₄, and
28 that non-CO₂ climate forcers reduce carbon budgets by ~2200 GtCO₂ per degree of warming attributed to
29 them (see Chapter 2 Annex).
30

31 Reducing non-CO₂ emissions is part of most mitigation pathways (IPCC, 2014c). All current GHG emissions
32 and other forcing agents affect the rate and magnitude of climate change over the next few decades, while
33 long-term warming is mainly driven by CO₂ emissions. CO₂ emissions result in a virtually permanent
34 warming, while temperature change from SLCFs disappears within decades after emissions of SLCFs are
35 ceased. Any scenario that fails to reduce CO₂ emissions to net zero would not limit global warming, even if
36 SLCFs are reduced, due to accumulating CO₂-induced warming that overwhelms SLCFs' mitigation benefits
37 in a couple of decades (Shindell et al., 2012; Schmale et al., 2014) and see Section 2.3.3.1).
38

39 Mitigation options for warming SLCFs often overlap with other mitigation options, especially since many
40 warming SLCFs are co-emitted with CO₂. SLCFs are generally mitigated in 1.5°C- or 2°C-consistent
41 pathways as an integral part of an overall mitigation strategy (Chapter 2). For example, section 2.3 indicates
42 that most very low-emissions pathways include a transition away from the use of coal and natural gas in the
43 energy sector and oil in transportation, which coincides with emission reduction strategies related to methane
44 from the fossil fuel sector and BC from the transportation sector. Much SLCF emission reduction aims at
45 BC-rich sectors and considers the impacts of several co-emitted SLCFs (Bond et al., 2013; Sand et al., 2015;
46 Stohl et al., 2015). However, it is uncertain whether such strategies would lead to additional long-term
47 climate benefits compared to BC emissions reductions achieved through CO₂ mitigation and associated co-
48 control on BC-rich sectors in 1.5°C and 2°C pathways (Rogelj et al., 2014).
49

50 Some studies have evaluated the focus on SLCFs in mitigation strategies and point towards trade-offs
51 between short-term SLCF benefits and lock in of long-term CO₂ warming (Smith and Mizrahi, 2013;
52 Pierrehumbert, 2014). Reducing fossil fuel combustion will reduce aerosols levels, and thereby cause
53 warming from removal of cooling effects (Myhre et al., 2013; Xu and Ramanathan, 2017; Samset et al.,
54

2018). Recent studies have also found lower temperature effects of BC than what can be expected from the direct radiative forcing alone, thus questioning the effectiveness of targeted BC mitigation for climate change mitigation (Myhre et al., 2013; Baker et al., 2015; Stjern et al., 2017; Samset et al., 2018).

Table 4.5 provides an overview of three warming SLCFs and their emission sources, with examples of options for emission reductions and associated co-benefits.

Table 4.5: Overview of main characteristics of three warming Short-Lived Climate Forcers (SLCFs) (core information based on (Pierrehumbert, 2014) and (Schmale et al., 2014); rest of the details as referenced).

SLCF compound	Atmospheric lifetime	Annual global emission	Main anthropogenic emission sources	Examples of options to reduce emissions consistent with 1.5°C	Examples of co-benefits based on (Haines et al., 2017) unless specified otherwise
Methane	On the order of 10 years	0.3 GtCH ₄ (2010) (Pierrehumbert, 2014)	Fossil fuel extraction and transportation Land-use change Livestock and rice cultivation Waste and wastewater	Managing manure from livestock Intermittent irrigation of rice Capture and usage of fugitive methane Dietary change For more: see Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.	Reduction of tropospheric ozone (Shindell et al., 2017a) Health benefits of dietary changes Increased crop yields Improved access to drinking water
HFCs	Months to decades, depending on the gas	0.35 GtCO ₂ -eq (2010) (Velders et al., 2015)	Air conditioning Refrigeration Construction material	Alternatives to HFCs in air-conditioning and refrigeration applications	Greater energy efficiency (Mota-Babiloni et al., 2017)
Black carbon	Days	~7 Mt (2010) (Klimont et al., 2017)	Incomplete combustion of fossil fuels or biomass in vehicles (esp. diesel), cook stoves or kerosene lamps Field and biomass burning	Fewer and cleaner vehicles Reducing agricultural biomass burning Cleaner cook stoves, gas-based or electric cooking Replacing brick and coke ovens Solar lamps For more see Section 4.3.4	Health benefits of better air quality Increased education opportunities Reduced coal consumption for modern brick kilns Reduced deforestation

A wide range of options to reduce SLCF emissions was extensively discussed in AR5 (IPCC, 2014b). Fossil fuel and waste sector methane mitigation options have high cost-effectiveness, producing a net profit over a few years, considering market costs only. Moreover, reducing roughly one-third to one-half of all human-caused emissions has societal benefits greater than mitigation costs when considering environmental impacts only (UNEP, 2011; Höglund-Isaksson, 2012; IEA, 2017b; Shindell et al., 2017a). Since AR5, new options for methane, such as those related to shale gas, have been included in mitigation portfolios (e.g., Shindell et al. 2017b).

Reducing BC emissions and co-emissions has sustainable development co-benefits, especially around human health (Stohl et al., 2015; Haines et al., 2017; Aakre et al., 2018), avoiding premature deaths and increasing crop yields (Scovronick et al., 2015; Peng et al., 2016). Additional benefits include lower likelihood of non-linear climate changes and feedbacks (Shindell et al., 2017a) and temporarily slowing down the rate of sea level rise (Hu et al., 2013). Interventions to reduce BC offer tangible local air quality benefits, increasing the

1 likelihood of local public support (Eliasson, 2014; Venkataraman et al., 2016) (see Section 5.4.1.2). Limited
 2 interagency co-ordination, poor science-policy interactions (Zusman et al., 2015), and weak policy and
 3 absence of inspections and enforcement (Kholod and Evans, 2016) are among barriers that reduce the
 4 institutional feasibility of options to reduce vehicle-induced BC emissions. A case study for India shows that
 5 switching from biomass cook stoves to cleaner gas stoves (based on liquefied petroleum gas or natural gas)
 6 or to electric cooking stoves is technically and economically feasible in most areas, but faces barriers in user
 7 preferences, costs and the organisation of supply chains (Jeuland et al., 2015). Similar feasibility
 8 considerations emerge in switching in lighting from kerosene wick lamps to solar lanterns, from current low-
 9 efficiency brick kilns and coke ovens to cleaner production technologies; and from field burning of crop
 10 residues to agricultural practices using deep-sowing and mulching technologies (Williams et al., 2011;
 11 Wong, 2012).

12
 13 The radiative forcing from HFCs are currently small but have been growing rapidly (Myhre et al., 2013). The
 14 Kigali amendment (from 2016) to the Montreal Protocol set out a global accord for phasing out these
 15 compounds (Höglund-Isaksson et al., 2017). HFC mitigation options include alternatives with reduced
 16 warming effects, ideally combined with improved energy efficiency so as to simultaneously reduce CO₂ and
 17 co-emissions (Shah et al., 2015). Costs for most of HFC's mitigation potential are estimated to be below
 18 USD₂₀₁₀ 60 tCO₂-eq⁻¹, and the remainder below roughly double that number (Höglund-Isaksson et al., 2017).

19
 20 Reductions in SLCFs can provide large benefits towards sustainable development, beneficial for social,
 21 institutional and economic feasibility. Strategies that reduce SLCFs can provide benefits that include
 22 improved air quality (for example (Anenberg et al., 2012)) and crop yields (for example (Shindell et al.,
 23 2012)), energy access, gender equality and poverty eradication (for example (Shindell et al., 2012; Haines et
 24 al., 2017)). Institutional feasibility can be negatively affected by an information deficit, with the absence of
 25 international frameworks for integrating SLCFs into emissions accounting and reporting mechanisms being a
 26 barrier for policy-making to address SLCF emissions (Venkataraman et al., 2016). The incentives for
 27 reducing SLCFs are particularly strong for small groups of countries, and such a collaboration could increase
 28 feasibility and effectiveness of SLCF mitigation options (Aakre et al., 2018).

31 4.3.7 Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR)

32
 33 CDR methods refer to a set of techniques for removing CO₂ from the atmosphere. In the context of 1.5°C-
 34 consistent pathways (Chapter 2), they serve to offset residual emissions that take longer to abate or to
 35 compensate for emissions occurring after running out of the 1.5°C carbon budget. See Cross-Chapter Box 7
 36 in Chapter 3 for a synthesis of land-based CDR options. Cross-cutting issues and uncertainties are
 37 summarised in Table 4.6.

40 4.3.7.1 Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)

41
 42 BECCS has been assessed in previous IPCC reports (IPCC, 2005; P. Smith et al., 2014; Minx et al., 2017)
 43 and has been incorporated into integrated assessment models (Clarke et al., 2014). In the meantime, 1.5°C
 44 pathways without BECCS have emerged (Bauer et al., 2018; Grübler, 2018; Mousavi and Blesl, 2018; van
 45 Vuuren et al., 2018). Still, models indicate that 3.7–8 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ (interquartile range) and 14 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹
 46 (median) would be removed by BECCS by 2050 and 2100, respectively, with some models starting BECCS
 47 in 2030 already (Section 2.3.4). BECCS is constrained by sustainable bioenergy potentials (Sections 4.3.1.2,
 48 5.4.3 and Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3), and availability of safe storage for CO₂ (Section 4.3.1.6).
 49 Literature estimates for BECCS mitigation potentials in 2050 range from 1–85 GtCO₂⁴. Fuss et al. (2018)
 50 narrow this range to 0.5–5 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ (*medium agreement, high evidence*) (Figure 4.3), thus falling below
 51 the upper end of 1.5°C pathways. This is, among other things, related to sustainability concerns (Boysen et

⁴ As more bottom-up literature exists on bioenergy potentials, this exercise explored the bioenergy literature and converted those estimates to BECCS potential with 1EJ of bioenergy yielding 0.02–0.05 GtCO₂ emission reduction. For the bottom-up literature references for the potentials range, please refer to Supplementary Material 4.SM.3 Table 1.

1 al., 2017; Heck et al., 2018; Henry et al., 2018).


2
3 Assessing BECCS deployment in 2°C pathways (of about 12 GtCO₂-eq yr⁻¹, here considered as a lower
4 deployment limit for 1.5°C, Smith et al. (2016b) estimate a land-use intensity of 0.3–0.5 ha tCO₂-eq⁻¹ yr⁻¹
5 using forest residues, 0.16 ha CO₂-eq⁻¹ yr⁻¹ for agricultural residues, and 0.03–0.1 ha tCO₂-eq⁻¹ yr⁻¹ for
6 purpose-grown energy crops. The average amount of BECCS in these pathways requires 25–46% of arable
7 and permanent crop area in 2100. Land area estimates differ in scale and are not necessarily a good indicator
8 of competition with, e.g., food production, because requiring a smaller land area for the same potential could
9 indicate that high-productivity agricultural land is used. In general, the literature shows *low agreement* on
10 the availability of land (Fritz et al., 2011); see (Erb et al., 2016b) for recent advances. Productivity, food
11 production and competition with other ecosystem services and land use by local communities are important
12 factors for the design of regulation. These potentials and trade-offs are not homogeneously distributed across
13 regions. However, (Robledo-Abad et al., 2017) find that regions with higher potentials are understudied,
14 given their potential contribution. Researchers have expressed the need to complement global assessments
15 with regional, geographically explicit bottom-up studies of biomass potentials and socio-economic impacts
16 (e.g., de Wit and Faaij 2010; Kraxner et al., 2014; Baik et al., 2018).

17
18 Energy production, land and water footprints show wide ranges in bottom-up assessments due to differences
19 in technology, feedstock and other parameters (–1–150 EJ yr⁻¹ of energy, 109–990 Mha, 6–79 MtN, 218–
20 4758 km³ yr⁻¹ of water per GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ (Smith and Torn, 2013; Smith et al., 2016b; Fajardy and Mac Dowell,
21 2017) and are not comparable to IAM pathways which consider system effects (Bauer et al., 2018). Global
22 impacts on nutrients and albedo are difficult to quantify (Smith et al., 2016b). BECCS competes with other
23 land-based CDR and mitigation measures for resources (Chapter 2).


24
25 There is uncertainty about the feasibility of timely upscaling. CCS (see Section 4.3.1) is largely absent from
26 the nationally determined contributions (Spencer et al., 2015) and lowly ranked in investment priorities
27 (Fridahl, 2017). Although there are dozens of small-scale BECCS demonstrations (Kemper, 2015) and a full
28 scale project capturing 1 MtCO₂ exists (Finley, 2014), this is well below the numbers associated with 1.5°C
29 or 2°C-compatible pathways (IEA, 2016a; Peters et al., 2017). Although the majority of BECCS cost
30 estimates are below 200 USD tCO₂⁻¹ (Figure 4.3), estimates vary widely. Economic incentives for ramping
31 up large CCS or BECCS infrastructure are weak (Bhave et al., 2017). The 2050 average investment costs for
32 such a BECCS infrastructure for bio-electricity and biofuels are estimated at 138 and 123 billion USD yr⁻¹,
33 respectively (Smith et al., 2016b).

34
35 BECCS deployment is further constrained by bioenergy's carbon accounting, land, water and nutrient
36 requirements (Section 4.3.1), its compatibility with other policy goals and limited public acceptance of both
37 bioenergy and CCS (Section 4.3.1). Current pathways are believed to have inadequate assumptions on the
38 development of societal support and governance structures (Vaughan and Gough, 2016).
39 However, removing BECCS and CCS from the portfolio of available options significantly raises mitigation
40 costs (Kriegler et al., 2013) (Bauer et al., 2018).

Panel A - Estimated costs and 2050 potentials



Panel B - Literature estimates on costs, potentials (2050) and side effects



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Figure 4.2: Evidence on Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) abatement costs, 2050 deployment potentials, and key side effects. Panel A presents estimates based on a systematic review of the bottom up literature (Fuss et al., 2018), corresponding to dashed blue boxes in Panel B. Dashed lines represent saturation limits for the corresponding technology. Panel B shows the percentage of papers at a given cost or potential estimate. Reference year for all potential estimates is 2050, while all cost estimates preceding 2050 have been

1 included (as early as 2030, older estimates are excluded if they lack a base year and thus cannot be made
2 comparable). Ranges have been trimmed to show detail (see Fuss et al., 2018) for the full range). Costs
3 refer only to abatement costs. Icons for side-effects are allocated only if a critical mass of papers
4 corroborates their occurrence

5 *Notes: For references please see Supplementary Material Table 4.SM.3. Direct Air Carbon Dioxide*
6 *Capture and Storage (DACCS) is theoretically only constrained by geological storage capacity, estimates*
7 *presented are considering upscaling and cost challenges. BECCS potential estimates are based on*
8 *bioenergy estimates in the literature ($EJ\ yr^{-1}$), converted to $GtCO_2$ following footnote 3. Potentials cannot*
9 *be added up, as CDR options would compete for resources (e.g., land). SCS - Soil Carbon Sequestration;*
10 *OA - Ocean Alkalinisation; EW- Enhanced Weathering; DACCS - Direct Air Carbon Dioxide Capture*
11 *and Storage; BECCS - Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage; AR - Afforestation*
12

13 14 4.3.7.2 Afforestation and Reforestation (AR)

15
16 Afforestation implies planting trees on land not forested for a long time (e.g., over the last 50 years in the
17 context of the Kyoto Protocol), while reforestation implies re-establishment of forest formations after a
18 temporary condition with less than 10% canopy cover due to human-induced or natural perturbations.
19 Houghton et al. (2015) estimate about 500 Mha could be available for the re-establishment of forests on
20 lands previously forested, but not currently used productively. This could sequester at least $3.7\ GtCO_2\ yr^{-1}$
21 for decades. The full literature range gives 2050 potentials of $1\text{--}7\ GtCO_2\ yr^{-1}$ (*low evidence, medium*
22 *agreement*), narrowed down to $0.5\text{--}3.6\ GtCO_2\ yr^{-1}$ based on a number of constraints (Fuss et al., 2018).
23 Abatement costs are estimated to be low compared to other CDR options, $5\text{--}50\ USD\ tCO_2\ eq^{-1}$ (*robust*
24 *evidence, high agreement*). Yet, realising such large potentials comes at higher land and water footprints than
25 BECCS, although there would be a positive impact on nutrients, and the energy requirement would be
26 negligible (Smith et al., 2016b; Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3). The 2030 estimate by Griscom et al.
27 (2017) is up to $17.9\ GtCO_2\ yr^{-1}$ for reforestation with significant co-benefits (Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter
28 3).
29

30 Biogenic storage is not as permanent as emission reductions of geological storage. In addition, forest sinks
31 saturate, a process which typically occurs in decades to centuries compared to the thousands of years of
32 residence time of CO_2 stored geologically (Smith et al., 2016a) and is subject to disturbances that can be
33 exacerbated by climate change (e.g. drought, forest fires and pests) (Seidl et al., 2017). Handling this
34 requires careful forest management. There is much practical experience with AR, facilitating upscaling but
35 with two caveats: AR potentials are heterogeneously distributed (Bala et al., 2007), partly because the
36 planting of less reflective forests results in higher net-absorbed radiation and localised surface warming in
37 higher latitudes (Bright et al., 2015; Jones et al., 2015), and forest governance structures and monitoring
38 capacities can be bottlenecks and are usually not considered in models (Wang et al., 2016; Wehkamp et al.,
39 2018b). There is *medium agreement* on the positive impacts of AR on ecosystems and biodiversity due to
40 different forms of afforestation discussed in the literature: afforestation of grassland ecosystems or
41 diversified agricultural landscapes with monocultures or invasive alien species can have significant negative
42 impacts on biodiversity, water resources, etc. (P. Smith et al., 2014), while forest ecosystem restoration
43 (forestry and agroforestry) with native species have positive social and environmental impacts (Cunningham
44 et al., 2015; Locatelli et al., 2015; Paul et al., 2016); See Section 4.3.2).
45

46 Synergies with other policy goals are possible (see also Section 4.5.4); for example land spared by diet shifts
47 could be afforested (Röös et al., 2017) or used for energy crops (Grübler, 2018). Such land-sparing strategies
48 could also benefit other land-based CDR options.
49

50 51 4.3.7.3 Soil Carbon Sequestration and Biochar

52
53 At local scales there is *robust evidence* that Soil Carbon Sequestration (SCS, e.g., agroforestry, De Stefano
54 and Jacobson, 2018), restoration of degraded land (Griscom et al., 2017), or conservation agriculture
55 management practices (Aguilera et al., 2013; Poehlau and Don, 2015; Vicente-Vicente et al., 2016) have co-
56 benefits in agriculture and that many measures are cost-effective even without supportive climate policy.

1 Evidence at global scale for potentials and especially costs is much lower. The literature spans cost ranges of
2 –40–100 USD tCO₂⁻¹ (negative costs relating to the multiple co-benefits of SCS, such as increased
3 productivity and resilience of soils (P. Smith et al., 2014) and 2050 potentials are estimated between 1–11
4 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹, narrowed down to 2–5 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ considering that studies above 5 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ often do not apply
5 constraints, while estimates lower than 2 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ mostly focus on single practices (Fuss et al., 2018).
6

7 SCS has negligible water and energy requirements (Smith, 2016), affects nutrients and food security
8 favourably (*high agreement, robust evidence*) and can be applied without changing current land use thus
9 making it socially more acceptable than CDR options with a high land footprint. However, soil sinks saturate
10 after 10–100 years, depending on the SCS option, soil type and climate zone (Smith, 2016).
11

12 Biochar is formed by recalcitrant (i.e., very stable) organic carbon obtained from pyrolysis which applied to
13 soil can increase soil carbon sequestration leading to improved soil fertility properties.⁵ Looking at the full
14 literature range, the global potential in 2050 lies between 1–35 Gt CO₂ yr⁻¹ (*low agreement, low evidence*),
15 but considering limitations in biomass availability and uncertainties due to a lack of large-scale trials of
16 biochar application to agricultural soils under field conditions, Fuss et al. (2018) lower the 2050 range to
17 0.3–2 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹. This potential is below previous estimates (e.g., Woolf et al., 2010), which additionally
18 consider the displacement of fossil fuels through biochar. Permanence depends on soil type and biochar
19 production temperatures, varying between a few decades and several centuries (Fang et al., 2014). Costs are
20 30–120 USD tCO₂⁻¹ (*medium agreement, medium evidence*) (McCarl et al., 2009; McGlashan et al., 2012;
21 McLaren, 2012; Smith, 2016).
22

23 Water requirements are low and at full theoretical deployment, up to 65 EJ yr⁻¹ of energy could be generated
24 as a side product (Smith, 2016). Positive side effects include a favourable effect on nutrients and reduced
25 N₂O emissions (Cayuela et al., 2014; Kammann et al., 2017). However, 40–260 Mha are needed to grow the
26 biomass for biochar for implementation at 0.3 GtCO₂-eq yr⁻¹ (Smith, 2016), even though it is also possible to
27 use residues (e.g., Windeatt et al., 2014). Biochar is further constrained by the maximum safe holding
28 capacity of soils (Lenton, 2010) and the labile nature of carbon sequestered in plants and soil at higher
29 temperatures (Wang et al., 2013).
30
31

32 4.3.7.4 Enhanced Weathering (EW) and Ocean Alkalinisation

33

34 Weathering is the natural process of rock decomposition via chemical and physical processes in which CO₂
35 is spontaneously consumed and converted to solid or dissolved alkaline bicarbonates and/or carbonates
36 (IPCC 2005). The process is controlled by temperature, reactive surface area, interactions with biota and, in
37 particular, water solution composition. CDR can be achieved by accelerating mineral weathering through the
38 distribution of ground-up rock material over land (Hartmann and Kempe, 2008; Wilson et al., 2009; Köhler
39 et al., 2010; Renforth, 2012; ten Berge et al., 2012; Manning and Renforth, 2013; Taylor et al., 2016),
40 shorelines (Hangx and Spiers, 2009; Montserrat et al., 2017) or the open ocean (House et al., 2007; Harvey,
41 2008; Köhler et al., 2013; Hauck et al., 2016). Ocean alkalinisation adds alkalinity to marine areas to locally
42 increase the CO₂ buffering capacity of the ocean (González and Ilyina, 2016; Renforth and Henderson,
43 2017).
44

45 In the case of land application of ground minerals, the estimated CDR potential range is 0.72–95 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹
46 (Hartmann and Kempe, 2008; Köhler et al., 2010; Hartmann et al., 2013; Taylor et al., 2016; Strefler et al.,
47 2018) (*low evidence, low agreement*). Marine application of ground minerals is limited by feasible rates of
48 mineral extraction, grinding and delivery, with estimates of 1–6 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ (Köhler et al., 2013; Hauck et
49 al., 2016; Renforth and Henderson, 2017) (*low evidence, low agreement*). Agreement is low due to a variety
50 of assumptions and unknown parameter ranges in the applied modelling procedures that would need to be
51 verified by field experiments (Fuss et al., 2018). As with other CDR options, scaling and maturity are

⁵ Other pyrolysis products that can achieve net CO₂ removals are bio-oil (pumped into geological storages) and permanent-pyrogas (capture and storage of CO₂ from gas combustion) (Werner et al., 2018)

1 challenges, with deployment at scale potentially requiring decades (NRC, 2015a), considerable costs in
2 transport and disposal (Hangx and Spiers, 2009; Strefler et al., 2018) and mining (NRC, 2015a; Strefler et
3 al., 2018)⁶.

4
5 Site-specific cost estimates vary depending on the chosen technology for rock grinding – an energy-intensive
6 process (Köhler et al., 2013; Hauck et al., 2016) – material transport and rock source (Renforth, 2012;
7 Hartmann et al., 2013), ranging from 15–40 USD tCO₂⁻¹ to 3,460 USD tCO₂⁻¹ (Schuiling and Krijgsman,
8 2006; Köhler et al., 2010; Taylor et al., 2016, *limited evidence, low agreement*; Figure 4.2). The evidence
9 base for costs of ocean alkalisation and marine enhanced weathering is sparser than the land applications.
10 The ocean alkalisation potential is assessed to be 0.1–10 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ with costs of 14– >500 USD tCO₂⁻¹
11 (Renforth and Henderson, 2017).

12
13 The main side effects of terrestrial EW are an increase in water pH (Taylor et al., 2016), the release of heavy
14 metals like Ni and Cr, and plant nutrients like K, Ca, Mg, P and Si (Hartmann et al., 2013), and changes in
15 hydrological soil properties. Respirable particle sizes, though resulting in higher potentials, can have impacts
16 on health (Schuiling and Krijgsman, 2006; Taylor et al., 2016); utilisation of wave-assisted decomposition
17 through deployment on coasts could avert the need for fine grinding (Hangx and Spiers, 2009; Schuiling and
18 de Boer, 2010). Side effects of marine EW and ocean alkalisation are the potential release of heavy metals
19 like Ni and Cr (Montserrat et al., 2017). Increasing ocean alkalinity helps counter ocean acidification
20 (Albright et al., 2016; Feng et al., 2016). Ocean alkalisation could affect ocean biogeochemical functioning
21 (González and Ilyina, 2016). A further caveat of relates to saturation state and the potential to trigger
22 spontaneous carbonate precipitation.⁷ While the geochemical potential to remove and store CO₂ is quite
23 large, *limited evidence* on the preceding topics makes it difficult to assess the true capacity, net benefits and
24 desirability of EW and ocean alkalinity addition in the context of CDR.

25 26 27 4.3.7.5 Direct Air Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (DACCS)

28
29 Capturing CO₂ from ambient air through chemical processes with subsequent storage of the CO₂ in
30 geological formations is independent of source and timing of emissions, and can avoid competition for land.
31 Yet, this is also the main challenge: while the theoretical potential for DACCS is mainly limited by the
32 availability of safe and accessible geological storage, the CO₂ concentration in ambient air is 100–300 times
33 lower than at gas- or coal-fired power plants (Sanz-Pérez et al., 2016) thus requiring more energy than flue
34 gas CO₂ capture (Pritchard et al., 2015). This appears to be the main challenge to DACCS (Sanz-Pérez et al.,
35 2016; Barkakaty et al., 2017).

36
37 Studies explore alternative techniques to reduce the energy penalty of DACCS (van der Giesen et al., 2017).
38 Energy consumption could be up to 12.9 GJ tCO₂-eq⁻¹; translating into an average of 156 EJ yr⁻¹ by 2100
39 (current annual global primary energy supply is 600 EJ); water requirements are estimated to average 0.8–
40 24.8 km³ GtCO₂-eq⁻¹ yr⁻¹ (Smith et al., 2016, based on Socolow et al., 2011).

41
42 However, the literature shows *low agreement* and is fragmented (Broehm et al., 2015). This fragmentation is
43 reflected in a large range of cost estimates: from 20–1,000 USD tCO₂⁻¹ (Keith et al., 2006; Pielke, 2009;
44 House et al., 2011; Ranjan and Herzog, 2011; Simon et al., 2011; Goepfert et al., 2012; Holmes and Keith,
45 2012; Zeman, 2014; Sanz-Pérez et al., 2016; Sinha et al., 2017). The interquartile range (see Figure 4.2) is
46 40–449 USD tCO₂⁻¹; there is lower agreement and a smaller evidence base at the lower end of the cost range.

47
48 Research and efforts by small-scale commercialisation projects focus on utilisation of captured CO₂ (Wilcox

⁶ It has also been suggested that ocean alkalinity can be increased through accelerated weathering of limestone (Rau and Caldeira, 1999; Rau, 2011; Chou et al., 2015) or electrochemical processes (House et al., 2007; Rau, 2008; Rau et al., 2013b; Lu et al., 2015). However, these techniques have not been proven at large scale either (Renforth and Henderson, 2017).

⁷ This analysis relies on the assessment in Fuss et al. (2018b), which provides more detail on saturation and permanence.

et al., 2018). Given that only a few IAM scenarios incorporate DACCS (e.g., Chen and Tavoni 2013; Strefler et al. 2018a) its possible role in cost-optimised 1.5°C scenarios is not yet fully explored. Given the technology's early stage of development (McLaren, 2012; NRC, 2015a; Nemet et al., 2018) and few demonstrations (Holmes et al., 2013; Rau et al., 2013; Agee et al., 2016), deploying the technology at scale is still a considerable challenge though both optimistic (Lackner et al., 2012) and pessimistic outlooks exist (Pritchard et al., 2015).

4.3.7.6 Ocean Fertilisation

Nutrients can be added to the ocean resulting in increased biologic production, leading to carbon fixation in the sunlit ocean and subsequent sequestration in the deep ocean or sea floor sediments. The added nutrients can be either micronutrients (such as iron) or macronutrients (such as nitrogen and/or phosphorous) (Harrison 2017). There is *limited evidence* and *low agreement* on the readiness of this technology to contribute to rapid decarbonisation (Williamson et al. 2012). Only small-scale field experiments and theoretical modelling have been conducted (e.g., McLaren (2012)). The full range of CDR potential estimates is 15.2 ktCO₂ yr⁻¹ (Bakker et al. 2001) for a spatially constrained field experiment to 4.4 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ (Sarmiento and Orr 1991) following a modelling approach, but Fuss et al. (2018b) consider the potential to be extremely limited given the evidence and existing barriers. Due to scavenging of iron, the iron addition only leads to inefficient use of the nitrogen in exporting carbon (Aumont and Bopp 2006; Zahariev et al. 2008; Zeebe 2005).

Cost estimates range from 2 USD tCO₂⁻¹ (for iron fertilization) (Boyd and Denman 2008) to 457 USD tCO₂⁻¹ (Harrison 2013). Jones (2014) proposed values greater than 20 USD tCO₂⁻¹ for nitrogen fertilisation. Fertilisation is expected to impact food webs by stimulating its base organisms (Matear 2004), and extensive algal blooms may cause anoxia (Matear 2004; Russell et al. 2012; Sarmiento and Orr 1991) and deep water oxygen decline (Matear 2004), with negative impacts on biodiversity. Nutrient inputs can shift ecosystem production from an iron-limited system to a P, N-, or Si-limited system depending on the location (Bertram 2010; Matear 2004) and non-CO₂ GHGs may increase (Bertram 2010; Sarmiento and Orr 1991; Matear 2004). The greatest theoretical potential for this practice is the Southern Ocean, posing challenges for monitoring and governance (Robinson et al. 2014). The London Protocol of the International Maritime Organization has asserted authority for regulation of ocean fertilisation (Strong et al. 2009), which is widely viewed as a, *de facto moratorium* on commercial ocean fertilisation activities.

There is *low agreement* in the technical literature on the permanence of CO₂ in the ocean, with estimated residence times of 1,600 years to millennia, especially if injected or buried in or below the sea floor (Williams and Druffel, 1987; Jones, 2014). Storage at the surface would mean that the carbon would be rapidly released after cessation (Aumont and Bopp 2006; Zeebe 2005).

Table 4.6: Cross-cutting issues and uncertainties across Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) options aspects and uncertainties

<i>Area of uncertainty</i>	<i>Cross-cutting issues and uncertainties</i>
Technology upscaling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDR options are at different stages of technological readiness (McLaren, 2012) and differ with respect to scalability. Nemet et al. (2018) find >50% of the CDR innovation literature concerned with the earliest stages of the innovation process (R&D) identifying a dissonance between the large CO₂ removals needed in 1.5°C pathways and the long-time periods involved in scaling up novel technologies. Lack of post-R&D literature, including incentives for early deployment, niche markets, scale-up, demand, and public acceptance.
Emerging and niche technologies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> For BECCS, there are niche opportunities with high efficiencies and fewer trade-offs (e.g., sugar and paper processing facilities (Möllersten et al., 2003), district heating (Kärki et al., 2013; Ericsson and Werner, 2016), industrial and municipal waste (Sanna et al., 2012). Turner et al. (2018) constrain potential using

	<p>sustainability considerations and overlap with storage basins to avoid the CO₂ transportation challenge, providing a possible, though limited entry point for BECCS.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The impacts on land use, water, nutrients and albedo of BECCS could be alleviated using marine sources of biomass that could include aqua-cultured micro and macro flora (Hughes et al., 2012; Lenton, 2014) • Regarding captured CO₂ as a resource is discussed as an entry point for CDR. However, this does not necessarily lead to carbon removals, particularly if the CO₂ is sourced from fossil fuels and/or if the products do not store the CO₂ for climate-relevant horizons (von der Assen et al. 2013) (see also Section 4.3.4.5). • Methane⁸ is a much more potent GHG than CO₂ (Montzka et al., 2011), associated with difficult-to-abate emissions in industry and agriculture, outgassing from lakes, wetlands, and oceans (Lockley, 2012; Stolaroff et al., 2012). Enhancing processes that naturally remove methane, either by chemical or biological decomposition (Sundqvist et al., 2012), has been proposed to remove CH₄. There is low confidence that existing technologies for methane removal are economically or energetically suitable for large-scale air capture (Boucher and Folberth, 2010). Methane removal potentials are limited due to its low atmospheric concentration and its low chemical reactivity at ambient conditions.
Ethical aspects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preston (2013) identifies distributive and procedural justice, permissibility, moral hazard (Shue, 2018), and hubris as ethical aspects that could apply to large-scale CDR deployment. • There is a lack of reflection on the climate futures produced by recent modelling and implying very different ethical costs/risks and benefits (Minx et al., 2018).
Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existing governance mechanisms are scarce and either targeted at particular CDR options (e.g., ocean-based) or aspects (e.g., concerning indirect land-use change (iLUC) associated with bioenergy upscaling) and often the mechanisms are at national or regional scale (e.g., EU). Regulation accounting for iLUC by formulating sustainability criteria (e.g., the EU Renewable Energy Directive) has been assessed as insufficient in avoiding leakage (e.g., Frank et al., 2013) • An international governance mechanism is only in place for R&D of Ocean Fertilisation within the Convention on Biological Diversity (IMO, 1972, 1996, CBD, 2008, 2010). • Burns and Nicholson (2017) propose a human rights-based approach to protect those potentially adversely impacted by CDR options.
Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The CDR potentials that can be realised are constrained by the lack of policy portfolios incentivising large-scale CDR (Peters and Geden, 2017). • Near-term opportunities could be supported through modifying existing policy mechanisms (Lomax et al., 2015). • Scott and Geden (2018) sketch three possible routes for limited progress, (1) at EU-level, (2) at EU Member State level, and (3) at private sector level, noting the implied paradigm shift this would entail. • EU may struggle to adopt policies for CDR deployment on the scale or time-frame envisioned by IAMs (Geden et al., 2018). • Social impacts of large-scale CDR deployment (Buck, 2016) require policies taking these into account.
Carbon cycle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On long time scales, natural sinks could reverse (C.D. Jones et al., 2016) • No robust assessments yet of the effectiveness of CDR in reverting climate change (Tokarska and Zickfeld, 2015; Wu et al., 2015; Keller et al., 2018), see also Section 2.2.2 and 2.6.2.

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4.3.8 Solar Radiation Modification (SRM)

⁸ Current work (e.g. de Richter et al. 2017) examines other technologies considering non-CO₂ GHGs like N₂O.

1 This report refrains from using the term ‘geoengineering’ and separates SRM from CDR and other
2 mitigation options (see Section 1.4.1 and Glossary).

3
4 Table 4.6 gives an overview of SRM methods and characteristics. For a more comprehensive discussion of
5 currently proposed SRM methods, and their implications for geophysical quantities and sustainable
6 development, see Cross-Chapter Box 10 in this Chapter. This section assesses the feasibility, from an
7 institutional, technological, economic and social-cultural viewpoint, focusing on Stratospheric Aerosol
8 Injection (SAI) unless otherwise indicated, as most available literature is about SAI.

9
10 Some of the literature on SRM appears in the forms of commentaries, policy briefs, viewpoints and opinions
11 (e.g., (Horton et al., 2016; Keith et al., 2017; Parson, 2017)). This assessment covers original research rather
12 than viewpoints, even if the latter appear in peer-reviewed journals.

13
14
15 **Table 4.7:** Overview of the main characteristics of the most-studied SRM methods
16

	Stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI)	Marine cloud brightening (MCB)	Cirrus cloud thinning (CCT)	Ground-based albedo modification (GBAM)
Description of SRM method	Injection of a gas in the stratosphere, which then converts to aerosols. Injection of other particles also considered.	Spraying sea salt or other particles into marine clouds, making them more reflective.	Seeding to promote nucleation, reducing optical thickness and cloud lifetime, to allow more outgoing longwave radiation to escape into space.	Whitening roofs, changes in land use management (e.g., no-till farming), change of albedo at a larger scale (covering glaciers or deserts with reflective sheeting and changes in ocean albedo).
Radiative forcing efficiencies	1–4 TgS W ⁻¹ m ² yr ⁻¹	100–295 Tg dry sea salt W ⁻¹ m ² yr ⁻¹	Not known	Small on global scale, up to 1–3°C on regional scale
Amount needed for 1°C overshoot	2–8 TgS yr ⁻¹	70 Tg dry sea salt yr ⁻¹	Not known	0.04–0.1 albedo change in agricultural and urban areas
SRM specific impacts on climate variables	Changes in precipitation patterns and circulation regimes; in case of SO ₂ injection disruption to stratospheric chemistry (for instance NO _x depletion and changes in methane lifetime); increase in stratospheric water vapour and tropospheric-stratospheric ice formation affecting cloud microphysics.	Regional rainfall responses; reduction in hurricane intensity	Low-level cloud changes; tropospheric drying; intensification of the hydrological cycle	Impacts on precipitation in monsoon areas; could target hot extremes
SRM specific impacts on human/natural systems	In case of SO ₂ injection - stratospheric ozone loss (which could also have a positive effect – a net reduction in global mortality due	Reduction in the number of mild crop failures		

	to competing health impact pathways) and significant increase of surface UV			
Maturity of science	Volcanic analogues <i>High agreement</i> amongst simulations <i>Robust evidence</i> on ethical, governance and sustainable development limitations	Observed in ships tracks Several simulations confirm mechanism Regionally limited	No clear physical mechanism <i>Limited evidence and low agreement</i> several simulations	Natural and land-use analogues Several simulations confirm mechanism <i>High agreement</i> to influence on regional temperature Land use costly
Key references	(Robock et al., 2008; Heckendorn et al., 2009; Tilmes et al., 2012, 2016; Pitari et al., 2014; Crook et al., 2015; C.J. Smith et al., 2017; Visioni et al., 2017a, b; Eastham et al., 2018; Plazzotta et al., 2018)	(Salter et al., 2008; Alterskjær et al., 2012; Jones and Haywood, 2012; Latham et al., 2012, 2013; Kravitz et al., 2013; Crook et al., 2015; Parkes et al., 2015; Ahlm et al., 2017)	(Storelvmo et al., 2014; Kristjánsson et al., 2015; Jackson et al., 2016; Kärcher, 2017; Lohmann and Gasparini, 2017)	(Irvine et al., 2011; Akbari et al., 2012; Jacobson and Ten Hoeve, 2012; Davin et al., 2014; Crook et al., 2015, 2016; Seneviratne et al., 2018)

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SRM could reduce some of the global risks of climate change related to temperature rise (Izrael et al., 2014; MacMartin et al., 2014), rate of sea level rise (Moore et al., 2010), sea-ice loss (Berdahl et al., 2014) and frequency of extreme storms in the North Atlantic and heatwaves in Europe (Jones et al., 2018). SRM also holds risks of changing precipitation and ozone concentrations and potentially reductions in biodiversity (Pitari et al., 2014; Visioni et al., 2017a; Trisos et al., 2018). Literature only supports SRM as a supplement to deep mitigation, for example in overshoot scenarios (Smith and Rasch, 2013; MacMartin et al., 2018).

4.3.8.1 Governance and Institutional Feasibility

There is *robust evidence* but *medium agreement* for unilateral action potentially becoming a serious SRM governance issue (Weitzman, 2015; Rabitz, 2016), as some argue that enhanced collaboration might emerge around SRM (Horton, 2011). An equitable institutional or governance arrangement around SRM would have to reflect views of different countries (Heyen et al., 2015; Robock, 2016) and be multilateral because of the risk of termination, and risks that implementation or unilateral action by one country or organisation will produce negative precipitation or extreme weather effects across borders (Lempert and Prosnitz, 2011; Dilling and Hauser, 2013; NRC, 2015b). Some have suggested that the governance of research and field experimentation can help clarify uncertainties surrounding deployment of SRM (Long and Shepherd, 2014; Parker, 2014; NRC, 2015c; Caldeira and Bala, 2017; Lawrence and Crutzen, 2017), and that SRM is compatible with democratic processes (Horton et al., 2018) or not (Szerszynski et al., 2013; Owen, 2014).

Several possible institutional arrangements have been considered for SRM governance: under the UNFCCC (in particular under the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)) or the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) (Honegger et al., 2013; Nicholson et al., 2018), or through a consortium of states (Bodansky, 2013; Sandler, 2017). Voice in SRM diplomacy, prevention of unilateral action by others and benefits from research collaboration might be reasons for states to join an international governance framework for SRM (Lloyd and Oppenheimer, 2014).

Alongside SBSTA, the WMO, UNESCO and UN Environment could play a role in governance of SRM (Nicholson et al., 2018). Each of these organisations has relevance with respect to the regulatory framework (Bodley et al., 2012; Williamson and Bodley, 2016). The UNCBD gives guidance that ‘that no climate-related geo-engineering activities that may affect biodiversity take place’ (UNCBD, 2010).

4.3.8.2 Economic and Technological Feasibility

The literature on engineering cost of SRM is limited and may be unreliable in the absence of testing or deployment. There is *high agreement* that cost of SAI (not taking into account indirect and social costs, research and development costs and monitoring expenses) may be in the range of 1–10 billion USD yr⁻¹ for injection of 1–5 MtS to achieve cooling of 1–2 W m⁻² (Robock et al., 2009; McClellan et al., 2012; Ryaboshapko and Revokatova, 2015; Moriyama et al., 2016), suggesting that cost-effectiveness may be high if side-effects are low or neglected (McClellan et al., 2012). The overall economic feasibility of SRM also depends on externalities and social costs (Moreno-Cruz and Keith, 2013; Mackerron, 2014), climate sensitivity (Kosugi, 2013), option value (Arino et al., 2016), presence of climate tipping points (Eric Bickel, 2013) and damage costs as a function of the level of SRM (Bahn et al., 2015; Heutel et al., 2018). Modelling of game-theoretic, strategic interactions of states under heterogeneous climatic impacts shows *low agreement* on the outcome and viability of a cost-benefit analysis for SRM (Ricke et al., 2015; Weitzman, 2015).

For SAI, there is *high agreement* that aircrafts after some modifications could inject millions of tons of SO₂ in the lower stratosphere (~20 km; (Davidson et al., 2012; McClellan et al., 2012; Irvine et al., 2016).

4.3.8.3 Social Acceptability and Ethics

Ethical questions around SRM include those of international responsibilities for implementation, financing, compensation for negative effects, the procedural justice questions of who is involved in decisions, privatisation and patenting, welfare, informed consent by affected publics, intergenerational ethics (because SRM requires sustained action in order to avoid termination hazards), and the so-called ‘moral hazard’ (Burns, 2011; Whyte, 2012; Gardiner, 2013; Lin, 2013; Buck et al., 2014; Klepper and Rickels, 2014; Morrow, 2014; Wong, 2014; Reynolds, 2015; Lockley and Coffman, 2016; McLaren, 2016; Suarez and van Aalst, 2017; Reynolds et al., 2018). The literature shows *low agreement* on whether SRM research and deployment may lead policy-makers to reduce mitigation efforts and thus imply a moral hazard (Linnér and Wibeck, 2015). SRM might motivate individuals (as opposed to policymakers) to reduce their GHG emissions (Merk et al., 2016), but even a subtle difference in the articulation of information about SRM can influence subsequent judgements of favourability (Corner and Pidgeon, 2014). The argument that SRM research increases the likelihood of deployment (the ‘slippery slope’ argument), is also made (Parker, 2014; Quaas et al., 2017; Bellamy and Healey, 2018).

Unequal representation and deliberate exclusion are plausible in decision-making on SRM, given diverging regional interests and the anticipated low resource requirements to deploy SRM (Ricke et al., 2013). Whyte (2012) argues that the concerns, sovereignties, and experiences of Indigenous peoples may particularly be at risk.

The general public can be characterised as ignorant and worried about SRM (Carr et al., 2013; Parkhill et al., 2013; Wibeck et al., 2017). An emerging literature discusses public perception of SRM, showing a lack of knowledge and unstable opinions (Scheer and Renn, 2014). The perception of controllability affects legitimacy and public acceptability of SRM experiments (Bellamy et al., 2017). In Germany, laboratory work on SRM is generally approved of, field research much less so, and immediate deployment is largely rejected (Merk et al., 2015; Braun et al., 2017). Various factors could explain variations in the degree of rejection of SRM between Canada, China, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Visschers et al., 2017).

[START CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 10 HERE]

Cross-Chapter Box 10: Solar Radiation Modification in the Context of 1.5°C Mitigation Pathways


Authors: Anastasia Revokatova (Russian Federation), Heleen de Coninck (The Netherlands), Piers Forster (UK), Veronika Ginzburg (Russian Federation), Jatin Kala (Australia), Diana Liverman (USA), Maxime Plazzotta (France), Roland Séférian (France), Sonia I. Seneviratne (Switzerland), Jana Sillmann (Norway).

Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) refers to a range of radiation modification measures not related to Greenhouse Gas (GHG) mitigation, which seek to limit global warming (see Section 1.4.1). Most methods involve reducing the solar incoming radiation reaching the surface, but others also act on the longwave radiation budget reducing optical thickness and cloud lifetime (see Table 4.6). In the context of this report, SRM is assessed in terms of its potential to limiting warming below 1.5°C in temporary overshoot scenarios as a way to reduce elevated temperatures and associated impacts (Irvine et al., 2016; Keith and Irvine, 2016; Chen and Xin, 2017; Sugiyama et al., 2017a; Vioni et al., 2017a; MacMartin et al., 2018). The inherent variability of the climate system would make it difficult to detect the efficacy or side-effects of SRM intervention when deployed in such a temporary scenario (Jackson et al., 2015).

A. Potential SRM timing and magnitude

Published SRM approaches are summarised in Table 4.6. The timing and magnitude of potential SRM deployment depends on the temperature overshoot associated with mitigation pathways. All overshooting pathways make use of carbon dioxide removal. Therefore, if considered, SRM would only be deployed as a supplement measure to large-scale carbon dioxide removal (Section 2.3).

Cross-Chapter Box 10, Figure 1 below illustrates an example of how a hypothetical SRM deployment based on Stratospheric Aerosols Injection (SAI) could be used to limit warming below 1.5°C using an ‘adaptive SRM’ approach (e.g., Kravitz et al. 2011; Tilmes et al., 2016), where global mean temperature exceeds 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial level by mid-century and returns below before 2100 with a 66% likelihood (see Chapter 2). In all such limited adaptive deployment scenarios, deployment of SRM only commences under conditions in which CO₂ emissions have already fallen substantially below their peak level and are continuing to fall. In order to hold warming to 1.5°C, a hypothetical SRM deployment could span from one to several decades with the earliest possible threshold exceedance occurring before mid-century. Over this duration, SRM has to compensate for warming that exceeds 1.5°C (displayed with hatching on panel a) with a decrease in radiative forcing (panel b) which could be achieved with a rate of SAI varying between 0–5.9 MtSO₂ yr⁻¹ (panel c) (Robock et al., 2008; Heckendorn et al., 2009).



Cross-Chapter Box 10, Figure 1: Evolution of hypothetical SRM deployment (based on SAI) in the context of 1.5°C-consistent pathways. (a) Range of median temperature outcomes as simulated by MAGICC (see in Section 2.2) given the range of CO₂ emissions (b) and other climate forcers for mitigation pathways exceeding 1.5°C at mid-century and returning below by 2100 with a 66% likelihood. Geophysical characteristics are represented by the magnitude of radiative forcing (c) and the amount of stratospheric SO₂ injection (d) that are required to keep the global median temperature below 1.5°C during the temperature overshoot (given by the blue hatching on panel a). SRM surface radiative forcing has been diagnosed using a mean cooling efficiency of 0.3°C (W⁻¹ m²) of Plazzotta et al. (2018). Magnitude and timing of SO₂ injection have been derived from published estimates of Heckendorn et al. (2009) and Robock et al. (2008).

SAI is the most researched SRM method with *high agreement* that it could limit warming to below 1.5°C (Tilmes et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2018). The response of global temperature to SO₂ injection, however, is uncertain and varies depending on the model parametrisation and emission scenarios (Jones et al., 2011; Kravitz et al., 2011; Izrael et al., 2014; Crook et al., 2015; Niemeier and Timmreck, 2015; Tilmes et al., 2016; Kashimura et al., 2017). Uncertainty also arises due to the nature and the optical properties of injected aerosols.

Other approaches are less well researched but the literature suggests that Ground-Based Albedo Modification (GBAM), Marine Cloud Brightening (MCB) or Cirrus Cloud Thinning (CCT) are not assessed to be able to substantially reduce overall global temperature (Irvine et al., 2011; Seneviratne et al., 2018). However, these SRM approaches are known to create spatially heterogeneous forcing and potentially more spatially heterogeneous climate effects, which may be used to mitigate regional climate impacts. This may be of most relevance in the case of GBAM when applied to crop and urban areas (Seneviratne et al. 2018). Most of the literature on regional mitigation has focused on GBAM in relationship with land-use land cover changes scenarios. Both models and observations suggest that there is a *high agreement* that GBAM would result in

1 cooling over the region of changed albedo, and in particular reduce hot extremes (Irvine et al., 2011; Akbari
2 et al., 2012; Jacobson and Ten Hoeve, 2012; Davin et al., 2014; Crook et al., 2015, 2016; Alkama and
3 Cescatti, 2016; Seneviratne et al., 2018). In comparison, there is a *limited evidence* on the ability of MCB or
4 CCT to mitigate regional climate impacts of 1.5°C warming because the magnitude of the climate response
5 to MCB or CCT remains uncertain and the processes are not fully understood (Lohmann and Gasparini,
6 2017).

8 **B. General consequence and impacts of solar radiation modification**

9 It has been proposed that deploying SRM as a supplement to mitigation may reduce increases in global
10 temperature-related extremes and rainfall intensity, and lessen the loss of coral reefs from increasing sea-
11 surface temperatures (Keith and Irvine, 2016), but it would not address or even worsen (Tjiputra et al., 2016)
12 negative effects from continued ocean acidification.

13
14 Another concern with SRM is the risk of a ‘termination shock’ or ‘termination effect’ when suddenly
15 stopping SRM, which might cause rapid temperature rise and associated impacts (Jones et al., 2013; Izrael et
16 al., 2014; McCusker et al., 2014; Robock, 2016), most noticeably biodiversity loss (Trisos et al., 2018). The
17 severity of the termination effect has recently been debated (Parker and Irvine, 2018) and depends on the
18 degree of SRM cooling. This report only considers limited SRM in the context of mitigation pathways to
19 1.5°C. Other risks of SRM deployment could be associated with the lack of testing of the proposed
20 deployment schemes (e.g. (Schäfer et al., 2013)). Ethical aspects and issues related to the governance and
21 economics are discussed in Section 4.3.8.

23 **C. Consequences and impacts of SRM on the carbon budget**

24 Because of its effects on surface temperature, precipitation and surface shortwave radiation, SRM would also
25 alter the carbon budget pathways to 1.5°C or 2°C (Eliseev, 2012; Keller et al., 2014; Keith et al., 2017;
26 Lauvset et al., 2017).

27
28 Despite the large uncertainties in the simulated climate response to SRM, current model simulations suggest
29 that SRM would lead to altered carbon budgets compatible with 1.5°C or 2°C. The 6 CMIP5 models
30 investigated simulated an increase of natural carbon uptake by land biosphere and, to a smaller extent, by the
31 oceans (*high agreement*). The multi-model mean of this response suggests an increase of the RCP4.5 carbon
32 budget of about 150 GtCO₂ after 50 years of SO₂ injection with a rate of 4 TgS yr⁻¹, which represents about 4
33 years of CO₂ emissions at the current rate (36 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹). However, there is uncertainty around quantitative
34 determination of the effects that SRM or its cessation has on the carbon budget due to a lack of
35 understanding of the radiative processes driving the global carbon cycle response to SRM (Ramachandran et
36 al., 2000; Mercado et al., 2009; Eliseev, 2012; Xia et al., 2016), uncertainties about how the carbon cycle
37 will respond to termination effects of SRM, and uncertainties in climate-carbon cycle feedbacks
38 (Friedlingstein et al., 2014).

40 **D. Sustainable development and SRM**

41 There are few studies investigating potential implications of SRM for sustainable development. These are
42 based on a limited number of scenarios and hypothetical considerations, mainly referring to benefits from
43 lower temperatures (Irvine et al., 2011; Nicholson, 2013; Anshelm and Hansson, 2014; Harding and Moreno-
44 Cruz, 2016). Other studies suggest negative impacts from SRM implementation concerning issues related to
45 regional disparities (Heyen et al., 2015), equity (Buck, 2012), fisheries, ecosystems, agriculture, and
46 termination effects (Robock, 2012; Morrow, 2014; Wong, 2014). If SRM is initiated by the richer nations,
47 there might be issues with local agency, and possibly worsening conditions for those suffering most under
48 climate change (Buck et al., 2014). In addition, ethical issues related to testing SRM have been raised (e.g.,
49 (Lenferna et al., 2017)). Overall, there is *high agreement* that SRM would affect many development issues
50 but *limited evidence* on the degree of influence, and how it manifests itself across regions and different levels
51 of society.

53 **E. Overall feasibility of SRM**

54 If mitigation efforts do not keep global mean temperature below 1.5°C, SRM can potentially reduce the
55 climate impacts of a temporary temperature overshoot, in particular extreme temperatures, rate of sea level

1 rise and intensity of tropical cyclones, alongside intense mitigation and adaptation efforts. While theoretical
2 developments show that SRM is technically feasible (see Section 4.3.8.2), global field experiments have not
3 been conducted and most of the knowledge about SRM is based on imperfect model simulations and some
4 natural analogues. There are also considerable challenges to the implementation of SRM associated with
5 disagreements over the governance, ethics, public perception, and distributional development impacts (Boyd,
6 2016; Preston, 2016; Asayama et al., 2017; Sugiyama et al., 2017b; Svoboda, 2017; McKinnon, 2018;
7 Talberg et al., 2018) (see Section 4.3.8). Overall, the combined uncertainties surrounding the various SRM
8 approaches, including technological maturity, physical understanding, potential impacts, and challenges of
9 governance, constrain the ability to implement SRM in the near future.

10
11
12 **[END CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 10 HERE]**

13 14 15 **4.4 Implementing Far-Reaching and Rapid Change**

16
17 The feasibility of 1.5°C-compatible pathways is contingent upon enabling conditions for systemic change
18 (see Cross Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1). Section 4.3 identifies the major systems, and options within those
19 systems, that offer the potential for change to align with 1.5°C pathways.

20
21 AR5 identifies enabling conditions as influencing the feasibility of climate responses (Kolstad et al., 2014).
22 This section draws on 1.5°C-specific and related literature on rapid and scale-up change, to identify the
23 enabling conditions that influence the feasibility of adaptation and mitigation options assessed in Section 4.5.
24 Examples from diverse regions and sectors are provided to illustrate how these conditions could enable or
25 constrain the implementation of incremental, rapid, disruptive and transformative mitigation and adaptation
26 consistent with 1.5°C pathways.

27
28 Coherence between the enabling conditions holds potential to enhance feasibility of 1.5°C-consistent
29 pathways and adapting to the consequences. This includes better alignment across governance scales
30 (OECD/IEA/NEA/ITF, 2015; Geels et al., 2017), enabling multi-level governance (Cheshmehzangi, 2016;
31 Revi, 2017; Tait and Euston-Brown, 2017) and nested institutions (Abbott, 2012). It also includes inter-
32 disciplinary actions, combined adaptation and mitigation action (Göpfert et al., 2018) and science-policy
33 partnerships (Vogel et al., 2007; Hering et al., 2014; Roberts, 2016; Figueres et al., 2017; Leal Filho et al.,
34 2018). These partnerships are difficult to establish and sustain, but can generate trust (Cole, 2015; Jordan et
35 al., 2015) and inclusivity that ultimately can provide durability and the realisation of co-benefits for
36 sustained rapid change (Blanchet, 2015; Ziervogel et al., 2016a).

37 38 **4.4.1 Enhancing Multi-Level Governance**

39
40 Addressing climate change and implementing responses to 1.5°C-consistent pathways will need to engage
41 with various levels and types of governance (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006; Kern and Alber, 2009;
42 Christoforidis et al., 2013; Romero-Lankao et al., 2018). AR5 highlighted the significance of governance as
43 a means of strengthening adaptation and mitigation and advancing sustainable development (Fleurbaey et al.,
44 2014). Governance is defined in the broadest sense as the ‘processes of interaction and decision making
45 among actors involved in a common problem’ (Kooiman 2003, Hufty 2011) (Fleurbaey et al., 2014). This
46 definition goes beyond notions of formal government or political authority and integrates other actors,
47 networks, informal institutions and communities.

48 49 50 **4.4.1.1 Institutions and their Capacity to Invoke Far-Reaching and Rapid Change**

51
52 Institutions, the rules and norms that guide human interactions (Section 4.4.2), enable or impede the
53 structures, mechanisms and measures that guide mitigation and adaptation. Institutions, understood as the
54 ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990), exert direct and indirect influence over the viability of 1.5°C-consistent
55 pathways (Munck et al., 2014; Willis, 2017). Governance would be needed to support wide-scale and

1 effective adoption of mitigation and adaptation options. Institutions and governance structures are
2 strengthened when the principle of the ‘commons’ is explored as a way of sharing management and
3 responsibilities (Ostrom et al., 1999; Chaffin et al., 2014; Young, 2016). Institutions would need to be
4 strengthened to interact amongst themselves, and to share responsibilities for the development and
5 implementation of rules, regulations and policies (Ostrom et al., 1999; Wejs et al., 2014; Craig et al., 2017),
6 with the goal of ensuring that these embrace equity, justice, poverty alleviation and sustainable development,
7 enabling a 1.5°C world (Reckien et al., 2017; Wood et al., 2017).

8
9 Several authors have identified different modes of cross-stakeholder interaction in climate policy, including
10 the role played by large multinational corporations, small enterprises, civil society and non-state actors.
11 Ciplet et al. (2015) argue that civil society is to a great extent the only reliable motor for driving institutions
12 to change at the pace required. Kern and Alber (2009) recognise different forms of collaboration relevant to
13 successful climate policies beyond the local level. Horizontal collaboration (e.g., transnational city networks)
14 and vertical collaboration within nation-states can play an enabling role (Ringel, 2017). Vertical and
15 horizontal collaboration requires synergistic relationships between stakeholders (Ingold and Fischer, 2014;
16 Hsu et al., 2017). The importance of community participation is emphasised in literature, and in particular
17 the need to take into account equity and gender considerations (Chapter 5) (Graham et al., 2015; Bryan et al.,
18 2017; Wangui and Smucker, 2017). Participation often faces implementation challenges and may not always
19 result in better policy outcomes. Stakeholders, for example, may not view climate change as a priority and
20 may not share the same preferences, potentially creating a policy deadlock (Preston et al., 2013, 2015; Ford
21 et al., 2016).

22 23 24 4.4.1.2 *International Governance*

25
26 International treaties help strengthen policy implementation, providing a medium and long-term vision
27 (Obergassel et al., 2016). International climate governance is organised via many mechanisms, including
28 international organisations, treaties and conventions, for example, UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement and the
29 Montreal Protocol. Other multilateral and bilateral agreements, such as trade agreements, also have a bearing
30 on climate change.

31
32 There are significant differences between global mitigation and adaptation governance frames. Mitigation
33 tends to be global by its nature and it is based on the principle of the climate system as a global commons
34 (Ostrom et al., 1999). Adaptation has traditionally been viewed as a local process, involving local authorities,
35 communities, and stakeholders (Khan, 2013; Preston et al., 2015), although is now recognised to be a multi-
36 scaled, multi-actor process that transcends from local and sub-national, to national and international scales
37 (Mimura et al., 2014; UNEP, 2017a). National governments provide a central pivot for coordination,
38 planning, determining policy (Section 4.4.5) priorities and distributing resources. National governments are
39 accountable to the international community through international agreements. Yet, many of the impacts of
40 climate change are transboundary, so that bilateral and multilateral cooperation are needed (Nalau et al.,
41 2015; Donner et al., 2016; Magnan and Ribera, 2016; Tilleard and Ford, 2016; Lesnikowski et al., 2017).
42 The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol demonstrates that a global environmental agreement
43 facilitating common but differentiated responsibilities is possible (Sharadin, 2018). This was operationalised
44 by developed countries acting first, with developing countries following and benefiting from leap-frogging
45 the trial-and-error stages of innovative technology development.

46
47 Work on international climate governance has focused on the nature of ‘climate regimes’ and coordinating
48 the action of nation-states (Aykut, 2016) organised around a diverse set of instruments: i) binding limits
49 allocated by principles of historical responsibility and equity, ii) carbon prices, emissions quotas, iii) pledges
50 and review of policies and measures or iv) a combination of these options (Stavins, 1988; Grubb, 1990;
51 Pizer, 2002; Newell and Pizer, 2003).

52
53 Literature on the Kyoto Protocol provides two important insights for 1.5°C transition: the challenge of
54 agreeing on rules to allocate emissions quotas (Shukla, 2005; Caney, 2012; Winkler et al., 2013; Gupta,
55 2014; Méjean et al., 2015) and a climate-centric vision (Shukla, 2005; Winkler et al., 2011), separated from

1 development issues which drove resistance from many developing nations (Roberts and Parks, 2006). For the
2 former, a burden sharing approach led to an adversarial process among nations to decide who shall be
3 allocated ‘how much’ of the remainder of the emissions budget (Caney, 2014; Ohndorf et al., 2015; Roser et
4 al., 2015; Giménez-Gómez et al., 2016). Industry group lobbying, further contributed to reducing space for
5 manoeuvre of some major emitting nations (Newell and Paterson, 1998; Levy and Egan, 2003; Dunlap and
6 McCright, 2011; Michaelowa, 2013; Geels, 2014).

7
8 Given the political unwillingness to continue with the Kyoto Protocol approach a new approach was
9 introduced in the Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun Agreements, and finally in the Paris Agreement. The
10 transition to 1.5°C requires carbon neutrality and thus going beyond the traditional framing of climate as a
11 ‘tragedy of the commons’ to be addressed via cost-optimal allocation rules, which demonstrated a low
12 probability of enabling a transition to 1.5°C consistent pathways (Patt, 2017). The Paris Agreement, built on
13 a ‘pledge and review’-system is thought to be more effective in securing trust (Dagnet et al., 2016), enables
14 effective monitoring and timely reporting on national actions (including adaptation), allowing for
15 international scrutiny and persistent efforts of civil society and non-state actors to encourage action in both
16 national and international contexts (Allan and Hadden, 2017; Bäckstrand and Kuypers, 2017; Höhne et al.,
17 2017; Lesnikowski et al., 2017; Maor et al., 2017; UNEP, 2017a), with some limitations (Nieto et al., 2018).

18
19 The paradigm shift enabled at Cancun succeeded by focusing on the objective of ‘equitable access to
20 sustainable development’ (Hourcade et al., 2015). The use of ‘pledge and review’ now underpins the Paris
21 Agreement. This consolidates multiple attempts to define a governance approach that relies on National
22 Determined Contributions (NDCs) and on means for a ‘facilitative model’ (Bodansky and Diringer, 2014) to
23 reinforce them. This enables a regular, iterative, review of NDCs allowing countries to set their own
24 ambitions after a global stocktake and more flexible, experimental forms of climate governance, which may
25 provide room for higher ambition, and be consistent with the needs of governing for a rapid transition to
26 close the emission gap (Cléménçon, 2016; Falkner, 2016) (Cross-Chapter Box 11 in this Chapter). Beyond a
27 general consensus on the necessity of Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) mechanisms as a
28 key element of a climate regime (Ford et al., 2015b; van Asselt et al., 2015), some authors emphasise
29 different governance approaches to implement the Paris Agreement. Through market mechanisms under
30 Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and the new proposed sustainable development mechanism, it allows the
31 space to harness the lowest cost mitigation options worldwide. This may incentivise policymakers to
32 enhance mitigation ambition by speeding up climate action as part of ‘climate regime complex’ (Keohane
33 and Victor, 2011) of loosely interrelated global governance institutions. In the Paris Agreement, the
34 Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) principle could be
35 expanded and revisited under a ‘sharing the pie’ paradigm (Ji and Sha, 2015) as a tool to open innovation
36 processes towards alternative development pathways (Chapter 5).

37
38 COP16 in Cancun was also the first time in the UNFCCC that adaptation was recognised to have similar
39 priority as mitigation. The Paris Agreement recognises the importance of adaptation action and cooperation
40 to enhance such action. (Chung Tiam Fook, 2017; Lesnikowski et al., 2017) suggest that the Paris
41 Agreement is explicit about multilevel adaptation governance, outlines stronger transparency mechanisms,
42 links adaptation to development and climate justice, and is hence, suggestive of greater inclusiveness of non-
43 state voices and the broader contexts of social change.

44
45 1.5°C-consistent pathways require further exploration of conditions of trust and reciprocity amongst nation
46 states (Schelling, 1991; Ostrom and Walker, 2005). Some authors (Colman et al., 2011; Courtois et al., 2015)
47 suggest a departure from the vision of actors acting individually in the pursuit of self-interest to that of
48 iterated games with actors interacting over time showing that reciprocity, with occasional forgiveness and
49 initial good faith, can lead to win-win outcomes and to cooperation as a stable strategy (Axelrod and
50 Hamilton, 1981).

51
52 Regional cooperation plays an important role in the context of global governance. Literature on climate
53 regimes has only started exploring innovative governance arrangements including: coalitions of transnational
54 actors including state, market and non-state actors (Bulkeley et al., 2012; Hovi et al., 2016; Hagen et al.,
55 2017; Hermwille et al., 2017; Roelfsema et al., 2018) and groupings of countries, as a complement to the

1 UNFCCC (Abbott and Snidal, 2009; Biermann, 2010; Zelli, 2011; Nordhaus, 2015). Climate action requires
2 multi-level governance from the local and community level to national, regional and international levels.
3 Box 4.1 shows the role of sub-national authorities, e.g. regions and provinces in facilitating urban climate
4 action, while Box 4.2 shows that climate governance can be organised across hydrological and not only
5 political units as well.

8 4.4.1.3 *Sub-National Governance*

10 Local governments can play a key role (Melica et al., 2018; Romero-Lankao et al., 2018) in influencing
11 mitigation and adaptation strategies. It is important to understand how rural and urban areas, small islands,
12 informal settlements and communities might intervene to reduce climate impacts (Bulkeley et al., 2011),
13 either by implementing climate objectives defined at higher government levels, taking initiative
14 autonomously or collectively (Aall et al., 2007; Reckien et al., 2014; Araos et al., 2016a; Heidrich et al.,
15 2016). Local governance faces the challenge of reconciling local concerns with global objectives. Local
16 governments could coordinate and develop effective local responses, and could pursue procedural justice in
17 ensuring community engagement and more effective policies around energy and vulnerability reduction
18 (Moss et al., 2013; Fudge et al., 2016). They can enable more participative decision-making (Barrett, 2015;
19 Hesse, 2016). Fudge et al. (2016) argue that local authorities are well-positioned to involve the wider
20 community in: designing and implementing climate policies, engaging with sustainable energy generation,
21 e.g., by supporting energy communities (Slee, 2015), and the delivery of demand-side measures and
22 adaptation implementation.

24 By 2050, it is estimated three billion people will be living in slums and informal settlements:
25 neighbourhoods without formal governance, on un-zoned land developments and in places that are exposed
26 to climate-related hazards (Bai et al., 2018). Emerging research is examining how citizens can contribute
27 informally to governance with rapid urbanisation and weaker government regulation (Sarmiento and Tilly,
28 2018). It remains to be seen how the possibilities and consequences of alternative urban governance models
29 for large, complex problems and addressing inequality and urban adaptation will be managed (Amin and
30 Cirolia, 2018; Bai et al., 2018; Sarmiento and Tilly, 2018).

32 Expanding networks of cities sharing experiences on coping with climate change and drawing economic and
33 development benefits from climate change responses represent a recent institutional innovation. This could
34 be complemented by efforts of national governments through national urban policies to enhance local
35 climate action (Broekhoff et al., 2018). Over the years, non-state actors have set up several transnational
36 climate governance initiatives to accelerate the climate response, for example ICLEI (1990), C-40 (2005),
37 the Global Island Partnership (2006) and the Covenant of Mayors (2008) (Gordon and Johnson, 2017; Hsu et
38 al., 2017; Ringel, 2017; Kona et al., 2018; Melica et al., 2018) and to exert influence on national
39 governments and the UNFCCC (Bulkeley, 2005). However, (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2017) find low
40 effectiveness of over 100 of such mitigation initiatives.

43 4.4.1.4 *Interactions and Processes for Multi-Level Governance*

45 Literature has proposed multi-level governance in climate change as an enabler for systemic transformation
46 and effective governance, as the concept is thought to allow for combining decisions across levels, sectors
47 and institutional types at the same level (Romero-Lankao et al., 2018) with multi-level reinforcement and the
48 mobilisation of economic interests at different levels of governance (Janicke and Quitzow, 2017). These
49 governance mechanisms are based on accountability and transparency rules and participation and
50 coordination across and within these levels.

52 A study of 29 European countries showed that the rapid adoption and diffusion of adaptation policymaking is
53 largely driven by internal factors, at the national and sub-national levels (Massey et al., 2014). An
54 assessment of national level adaptation in 117 countries (Berrang-Ford et al., 2014), find good governance to
55 be the one of the strongest predictors of national adaptation policy. An analysis of climate response by 200

1 large and medium-sized cities across eleven European countries find that factors such as membership of
2 climate networks, population size, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and adaptive capacity act as
3 drivers of mitigation and adaptation plans (Reckien et al., 2015).

4
5 Adaptation policy has seen growth in some areas (Massey et al., 2014; Lesnikowski et al., 2016), although
6 efforts to track adaptation progress are constrained by an absence of data sources on adaptation (Berrang-
7 Ford et al. 2011; Ford and Berrang-Ford 2016; Magnan and Ribera 2016; Magnan 2016). Many developing
8 countries have made progress in formulating national policies, plans and strategies on responding to climate
9 change. The NDCs have been identified as one such institutional mechanism (Magnan et al., 2015; Kato and
10 Ellis, 2016; Peters et al., 2017) (Cross-Chapter Box 11 in this Chapter).

11
12 To overcome barriers to policy implementation, local conflicts of interest or vested interests, strong
13 leadership and agency is needed by political leaders. As shown by the Covenant of Mayors initiative (Box
14 4.1), political leaders with a vision for the future of the local community can succeed in reducing GHG
15 emissions, when they are supported by civil society (Rivas et al., 2015; Croci et al., 2017; Kona et al., 2018).
16 Any political vision would need to be translated into an action plan, of which elements could be describing
17 policies and measures needed to achieve transition, the human and financial resources needed, milestones,
18 and appropriate measurement and verification processes (Azevedo and Leal, 2017). Discussing the plan with
19 stakeholders and civil society, including citizens and right of participation for minorities, and having them
20 provide input and endorse it, is found to increase the likelihood of success (Rivas et al., 2015; Wamsler,
21 2017). However, as described by Nightingale (2017) and Green (2016), struggles over natural resources and
22 adaptation governance both at the national and community levels would need to be addressed too, ‘in
23 politically unstable contexts, where power and politics shape adaptation outcomes’.

24
25 **[START BOX 4.1 HERE]**

26
27 **Box 4.1: Multi-Level Governance in the EU Covenant of Mayors: Example of the Provincia di**
28 **Foggia**

29
30 Since 2005, cities have emerged as a locus of institutional and governance climate innovation (Melica et al.,
31 2018) and are driving responses to climate change (Roberts, 2016). Many cities have adopted more
32 ambitious Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emission reduction targets than countries (Kona et al., 2018), with an
33 overall commitment of GHG emission reduction targets by 2020 of 27%, almost 7 percentage points higher
34 than the minimum target for 2020 (Kona et al., 2018). The Covenant of Mayors (CoM) is an initiative in
35 which municipalities voluntarily commit to CO₂ emission reduction. The participation of small
36 municipalities has been facilitated by the development and testing of a new multi-level governance model
37 involving Covenant Territorial Coordinators (CTCs), i.e., provinces and regions, which commit to providing
38 strategic guidance, financial and technical support to municipalities in their territories. Results from the 315
39 monitoring inventories submitted shows an achievement of 23% reduction in emissions (compared to an
40 average year 2005) of more than half of the cities under a CTC schema (Kona et al., 2018).

41
42 The Province of Foggia, acting as a CTC, gave support to 36 municipalities to participate in the CoM and to
43 prepare Sustainable Energy Action Plans (SEAPs). The Province developed a common approach to prepare
44 SEAPs, provided data to compile municipal emission inventories (Bertoldi et al., 2018) and guided the
45 signatory to identify an appropriate combination of measures to curb GHG emissions programme. The local
46 Chamber of Commerce had a key role also in the implementation of these projects by the municipalities
47 (Lombardi et al., 2016). The joint action by the province and the municipalities in collaboration with the
48 local business community could be seen as an example of multi-level governance (Lombardi et al., 2016).

49
50 Researchers have investigated local forms of collaboration within local government, with the active
51 involvement of citizens and stakeholders, and acknowledge that public acceptance is key to the successful
52 implementation of policies (Larsen and Gunnarsson-Östling, 2009; Musall and Kuik, 2011; Pollak et al.,
53 2011; Christoforidis et al., 2013; Pasimeni et al., 2014; Lee and Painter, 2015). Achieving ambitious targets
54 would need leadership, enhanced multi-level governance, vision and widespread participation in
55 transformative change (Castán Broto and Bulkeley, 2013; Rosenzweig et al., 2015; Castán Broto, 2017;

Fazey et al., 2017; Wamsler, 2017; Romero-Lankao et al., 2018). The Section 5.6.4 case studies of climate-resilient development pathways, at state and community scales, show that participation, social learning and iterative decision-making are governance features of strategies that deliver mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development in a fair and equitable manner. Other insights include that incremental voluntary changes are amplified through community networking, poly-centric governance (Dorsch and Flachsland, 2017) and partnerships and long-term change to governance systems at multiple levels (Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014; Lövbrand et al., 2017; Pichler et al., 2017; Termeer et al., 2017).

[END BOX 4.1 HERE]

Multilevel governance includes adaptation across local, regional, and national scales (Adger et al., 2005). The whole-of-government approach to understanding and influencing climate change policy design and implementation puts analytical emphasis on how different levels of government and different types of actors (e.g., public and private) can constrain or support local adaptive capacity (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2011), including the role of the civil society. National governments, for example, have been associated with enhancing adaptive capacity through building awareness of climate impacts, encouraging economic growth, providing incentives, establishing legislative frameworks conducive to adaptation, and communicating climate change information (Berrang-Ford et al., 2014; Massey et al., 2014; Austin et al., 2015; Henstra, 2016; Massey and Huitema, 2016). Local governments, on the other hand, are responsible for delivering basic services and utilities to the urban population, and protecting their integrity from the impacts of extreme weather (Austin et al., 2015; Cloutier et al., 2015; Nalau et al., 2015; Araos et al., 2016b). National policies and transnational governance could be seen as complementary, rather than competitors, and strong national policies favour sub- and non-state actors to engage transnationally (Andonova et al., 2017). Local initiatives are complementary with higher level policies and can be integrated in the multi-level governance system (Fuhr et al., 2018).

A multilevel approach considers that adaptation planning is affected by scale mismatches between the local manifestation of climate impacts and the diverse scales at which the problem is driven (Shi et al., 2016). Multilevel approaches may be relevant in low-income countries where limited financial resources and human capabilities within local governments often lead to greater dependency on national governments and other (donor) organisations, to strengthen adaptation responses (Donner et al., 2016; Adenle et al., 2017). National governments or international organisations may motivate urban adaptation externally through broad policy directives or projects by international donors. Municipal governments on the other hand work within the city to spur progress on adaptation. Individual political leadership in municipal government, for example, has been cited as a factor driving adaptation policy of early adapters in Quito, Ecuador, and Durban, South Africa (Anguelovski et al., 2014), and for adaptation more generally (Smith et al., 2009). Adaptation pathways can help identify maladaptive actions (Juhola et al., 2016; Magnan et al., 2016; Gajjar et al., 2018) and encourage social learning approaches across multiple levels of stakeholders in sectors such as marine biodiversity and water supply (Bosomworth et al., 2015; Butler et al., 2015; van der Brugge and Roosjen, 2015).

Box 4.2 exemplifies how multilevel governance has been used for watershed management in different basins, given the impacts on water sources (Section 3.4.2).

[START BOX 4.2 HERE]

Box 4.2: Watershed Management in a 1.5°C World

Water management is necessary if the global community would adapt to 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Cohesive planning that includes numerous stakeholders will be required to improve access, utilisation and efficiency of water use and ensure hydrologic viability.

Response to drought and El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) in Southern Guatemala

Hydro-meteorological events, including the ENSO, have impacted Central America (Steinhoff et al., 2014; Chang et al., 2015; Maggioni et al., 2016) and are projected to increase in frequency during a 1.5°C

1 transition (Wang et al., 2017). The 2014–2016 ENSO damaged agriculture, seriously impacting rural
2 communities.

3
4 In 2016, the Climate Change Institute, in conjunction with local governments, the private sector,
5 communities and human rights organisations, established dialogue tables for different watersheds to discuss
6 water usage amongst stakeholders and plans to mitigate the effects of drought, ameliorate social tension, and
7 map water use of watersheds at risk. The goal was to encourage better water resource management and to
8 enhance ecological flow through improved communication, transparency, and coordination amongst users.
9 These goals were achieved in 2017 when each previously affected river reached the Pacific Ocean with at
10 least its minimum ecological flow (Guerra, 2017).

11 **Drought management through the Limpopo Watercourse Commission**

12 The governments sharing the Limpopo river basin (Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe)
13 formed the Limpopo Watercourse Commission in 2003 (Nyagwambo et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2013). It has an
14 advisory body comprised of working groups that assess water use and sustainability, decides national level
15 distribution of water access, and supports disaster and emergency planning. The Limpopo basin delta is
16 highly vulnerable (Tessler et al., 2015), and is associated with a lack of infrastructure and investment
17 capacity, requiring increased economic development together with plans for vulnerability reduction (Tessler
18 et al., 2015) and water rights (Swatuk, 2015). The high vulnerability is influenced by gender inequality,
19 limited stakeholder participation and institutions to address unequal water access (Mehta et al., 2014). The
20 implementation of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) would need to consider pre-existing
21 social, economic, historical and cultural contexts (Merrey, 2009; Mehta et al., 2014). The Commission
22 therefore could play a role in improving participation and in providing an adaptable and equitable strategy
23 for cross-border water sharing (Ekblom et al., 2017).

24 **Flood management in the Danube**

25
26 The Danube River Protection Convention is the official instrument for cooperation on transboundary water
27 governance between the countries that share the Danube Basin. The International Commission for the
28 Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR) provides a strong science-policy link through expert working
29 groups dealing with issues including governance, monitoring and assessment and flood protection (Schmeier,
30 2014). The Trans-National Monitoring Network (TNMN) was developed to undertake comprehensive
31 monitoring of water quality (Schmeier, 2014). Monitoring of water quality constitutes almost 50% of
32 ICPDR's scientific publications, which also works on governance, basin planning, monitoring, and IWRM,
33 indicating the importance. The ICPDR is an example of IWRM 'coordinating groundwater, surface water
34 abstractions, flood management, energy production, navigation, and water quality' (Hering et al., 2014).

35
36
37 **[END BOX 4.2 HERE]**

38
39
40
41 **[START CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 11 HERE]**

42 **Cross-Chapter Box 11: Consistency Between Nationally Determined Contributions and 1.5°C Scenarios**

43
44
45 **Authors:** Paolo Bertoldi (Italy), Michel den Elzen (Netherlands), James Ford (Canada/UK), Richard Klein
46 (Netherlands/Germany), Debora Ley (Guatemala/Mexico), Timmons Roberts (USA), Joeri Rogelj
47 (Austria/Belgium).

48 **Mitigation**


49 *1. Introduction*

50
51 There is *high agreement* that Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are important for the global
52 response to climate change and represent an innovative bottom-up instrument in climate change governance
53 (Section 4.4.1), with contributions from all signatory countries (den Elzen et al., 2016; Rogelj et al., 2016;
54 Vandyck et al., 2016; Luderer et al., 2018; Vrontisi et al., 2018). The global emission projection resulting

1 from full implementation of the NDCs represent an improvement compared to business as usual (Rogelj et al., 2016) and current policies scenarios to 2030 (den Elzen et al., 2016; Vrontisi et al., 2018). Most G20 economies would require new policies and actions to achieve their NDC targets (den Elzen et al., 2016; Vandyck et al., 2016; Kuramochi et al., 2017; UNEP, 2017b).

2. The effect of NDCs on global Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions

7 Several studies estimate global emission levels that would be achieved under the NDCs (e.g., den Elzen et al., 2016; Luderer et al., 2016; Rogelj et al., 2016, 2017; Vandyck et al., 2016; Rose et al., 2017; Vrontisi et al., 2018). Rogelj et al. (2016) and (UNEP, 2017b) concluded that the full implementation of the unconditional and conditional NDCs are expected to result in global GHG emissions of about 55 (52–58) and 53 (50–54) GtCO₂-eq yr⁻¹, respectively (Cross-Chapter Box 11, Figure 1 below).



15
16
17 **Cross-Chapter Box 11, Figure 1:** GHG emissions are all expressed in units of CO₂-equivalence computed with 100-year Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) reported in IPCC SAR, while the emissions of the 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios in Table 2.4 are reported using the 100-year GWPs reported in IPCC AR4, and are hence about 3% higher. Using IPCC AR4 instead of SAR GWP values is estimated to result in a 2-3% increase in estimated 1.5°C and 2°C emissions levels in 2030. Source: based on Rogelj et al. (2016) and UNEP (2017b).

3. The effect of NDCs on temperature increase and carbon budget

26 Estimates of global average temperature increase are 2.9–3.4°C above preindustrial levels with a greater than 66% probability by 2100 (Rogelj et al., 2016; UNEP, 2017b), under a full implementation of unconditional NDCs and a continuation of climate action similar to that of the NDCs. Full implementation of the conditional NDCs would lower the estimates by about 0.2°C by 2100. As an indication of the carbon budget implications of NDC scenarios, Rogelj et al. (2016) estimated cumulative emissions in the range of 690 to 850 GtCO₂ for the period 2011–2030 if the NDCs are successfully implemented. The carbon budget for post-2010 till 2100 emissions compatible with staying below 1.5°C with a 50–66% probability was estimated at 550–600 GtCO₂ (Clarke et al., 2014; Rogelj et al., 2016), which will be well exceeded by 2030 at full implementation of the NDCs. This estimate has been updated (Section 2.2 and Section 2.3.1).

4. *The 2030 emissions gap with 1.5°C and urgency of action*

As the 1.5°C pathways require reaching carbon neutrality by mid-century, the NDCs alone are not sufficient, as they have a time horizon until 2030. (Rogelj et al., 2016; Hof et al., 2017) have used results or compared NDC pathways with emissions pathways produced by Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) assessing the contribution of NDCs to achieve the 1.5°C targets. There is *high agreement* that current NDC emission levels are not in line with pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C by the end of the century (Rogelj et al., 2016, 2017; Hof et al., 2017; UNEP, 2017b; Vrontisi et al., 2018). The median 1.5°C emissions gap (>66% chance) for the full implementation of both the conditional and unconditional NDCs for 2030 is 26 (19–29) to 28 (22–33) GtCO₂-eq (Cross-Chapter Box 11, Figure 1 above).

Studies indicate important trade-offs of delaying global emissions reductions (Sections 2.3.5 and 2.5.1). AR5 identified flexibility in 2030 emission levels when pursuing a 2°C objective (Clarke et al., 2014) indicating that strongest trade-offs for 2°C pathways could be avoided if emissions are limited to below 50 GtCO₂-eq yr⁻¹ in 2030 (here computed with the GWP-100 metric of the IPCC SAR). New scenario studies show that full implementation of the NDCs by 2030 would imply much deeper and faster emission reductions beyond 2030 in order to meet 2°C, and also higher costs and efforts of negative emissions (Fujimori et al., 2016; Sanderson et al., 2016; Rose et al., 2017; van Soest et al., 2017; Luderer et al., 2018). However, no flexibility has been found for 1.5°C pathways (Luderer et al., 2016; Rogelj et al., 2017) indicating that post-2030 emissions reductions required to remain within a 1.5°C compatible carbon budget during the 21st century (Section 2.2) are not within the feasible operating space of IAMs. This indicates that failing to reach a 1.5°C pathway are significantly increased (Riahi et al., 2015), if near-term ambition is not strengthened beyond the level implied by current NDCs.

Accelerated and stronger short-term action and enhanced longer-term national ambition going beyond the NDCs would be needed for 1.5°C-consistent pathways. Implementing deeper emissions reduction than current NDCs would imply action towards levels identified in Section 2.3.3, either as part of or over-delivering on NDCs.

5. *The impact of uncertainties on NDC emission levels*

The measures proposed in NDCs are not legally binding (Nemet et al., 2017), further impacting estimates of anticipated 2030 emission levels. The aggregation of targets results in high uncertainty (Rogelj et al., 2017), which could be reduced with clearer guidelines for compiling future NDCs focused more on energy accounting (Rogelj et al., 2017) and increased transparency and comparability (Pauw et al., 2018).

Many factors would influence NDCs global aggregated effects, including: (1) variations in socioeconomic conditions, (Gross Domestic Product, GDP, and population growth), (2) uncertainties in historical emission inventories, (3) conditionality of certain NDCs, (4) definition of NDC targets as ranges instead of single values, (5) the way in which renewable energy targets are expressed, and (6) the way in which traditional biomass use is accounted for. Additionally, there are land-use mitigation uncertainties (Forsell et al., 2016; Grassi et al., 2017). Land-use options play a key role in many country NDCs, however, many analyses on NDCs do not use country estimates on land-use emissions, but use model estimates, mainly because of the large difference in estimating the "anthropogenic" forest sink between countries and models (Grassi et al., 2017).

7. *Comparing countries' NDC ambition (equity, cost optimal allocation and other indicators)*

Various assessment frameworks have been proposed to analyse, benchmark and compare NDCs, and indicate possible strengthening, based on equity and other indicators (Aldy et al., 2016; den Elzen et al., 2016; Höhne et al., 2017; Jiang et al., 2017; Holz et al., 2018). There is large variation in conformity/fulfillment with equity principles across NDCs and countries. Studies use assessment frameworks based on six effort sharing categories in the AR5 (Clarke et al., 2014) with the principles of 'responsibility', 'capability' and 'equity' (Höhne et al., 2017; Pan et al., 2017; Robiou du Pont et al., 2017). There is an important methodological gap in the assessment of the NDCs' fairness and equity implications, partly due to lack of information on countries' own assessment (Winkler et al., 2017). Implementation of Article 2.2 of the Paris Agreement could reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated

responsibilities and respective capabilities, due to different national circumstances and different interpretations of equity principles (Lahn, 2017; Lahn and Sundqvist, 2017).

Adaptation

The Paris Agreement recognises adaptation by establishing a global goal for adaptation (Kato and Ellis, 2016; Rajamani, 2016; Kinley, 2017; Lesnikowski et al., 2017; UNEP, 2017a). This is assessed qualitatively, as achieve a temperature goal, would determine the level of ambition of addressing adaptation to consequent risks and impacts (Rajamani, 2016). Countries can include domestic adaptation goals in their NDCs, which together with National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) give countries flexibility to design and adjust their adaptation trajectories as their needs evolve and as progress is evaluated over time. A challenge for assessing progress on adaptation globally is the aggregation of many national adaptation actions and approaches. Knowledge gaps still remain about how to design measurement frameworks that generate and integrate national adaptation data without placing undue burdens on countries (UNEP, 2017a).

The Paris Agreement stipulates that adaptation communications shall be submitted as a component of or in conjunction with other communications, such as an NDC, a NAP, or a National Communication. Of the 197 Parties to the UNFCCC, 140 NDCs have an adaptation component, almost exclusively from developing countries. NDC adaptation components could be an opportunity for enhancing adaptation planning and implementation by highlighting priorities and goals (Kato and Ellis, 2016). At the national level they provide momentum for the development of NAPs and raise the profile of adaptation (Pauw et al., 2016b, 2018). The Paris Agreement's transparency framework includes adaptation, through which 'adaptation communication' and accelerated adaptation actions are submitted and reviewed every five years (Hermwille, 2016; Kato and Ellis, 2016). This framework, unlike others used in the past, is applicable to all countries taking into account differing capacities amongst Parties (Rajamani, 2016).

Adaptation measures presented in qualitative terms include sectors, risks and vulnerabilities that are seen as priorities by the Parties. Sectoral coverage of adaptation actions identified in NDCs is uneven, with adaptation primarily reported to focus on the water sector (71% of NDCs with adaptation component), agriculture (63%), and health (54%), and biodiversity/ecosystems (50%) (Pauw et al., 2016b, 2018).

[END CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 11 HERE]

4.4.2 *Enhancing Institutional Capacities*

The implementation of sound responses and strategies to enable a transition to 1.5°C world would require strengthening governance and scaling up institutional capacities, particularly in developing countries (Adenle et al., 2017; Rosenbloom, 2017). Building on the characterisation of governance in Section 4.4.1, this section examines the necessary institutional capacity to implement actions to limit warming to 1.5°C and adapt to the consequences. This takes into account a plurality of regional and local responses, as institutional capacity is highly context-dependent (North, 1990; Lustick et al., 2011).

Institutions would need to interact with one another and align across scales to ensure that rules and regulations are followed (Chaffin and Gunderson, 2016; Young, 2016). The institutional architecture required for a 1.5°C world would include the growing proportion of the world's population that live in peri-urban and informal settlements and engage in informal economic activity (Simone and Pieterse, 2017). This population, amongst the most exposed to perturbed climates in the world (Hallegatte et al., 2017), is also beyond the direct reach of some policy instruments (Jaglin, 2014; Thieme, 2017). Strategies that accommodate the informal rules of the game adopted by these populations have large chances of success (McGranahan et al., 2016; Kaika, 2017).

The goal for strengthening implementation is to ensure that these rules and regulations embrace equity, equality and poverty alleviation along 1.5°C-consistent pathways (mitigation) and enables the building of

1 adaptive capacity that together, will enable sustainable development and poverty reduction.

2
3 Rising to the challenge of a transition to a 1.5°C world would require enhancing institutional climate change
4 capacities along multiple dimensions presented below.

7 *4.4.2.1 Capacity for Policy Design and Implementation*

8
9 The enhancement of institutional capacity for integrated policy design and implementation has long been
10 among the top items on the UN agenda of addressing global environmental problems and sustainable
11 development (UNEP, 2005) (see Section 5.5).

12
13 Political stability, an effective regulatory and enforcement framework (e.g., institutions to impose sanctions,
14 collect taxes and to verify building codes), access to a knowledge base and the availability of resources,
15 would be needed at various governance levels, to address a wide range of stakeholders, and their concerns.
16 The strengthening of the global response would need to support these with different interventions, in the
17 context of sustainable development (Pasquini et al., 2015) (Section 5.5.1).

18
19 Given the scale of change needed to achieve 1.5°C, strengthening the response capacity of relevant
20 institutions are best addressed in ways that take advantage of existing decision-making processes in local and
21 regional governments and within cities and communities (Romero-Lankao et al., 2013), and draw upon
22 diverse knowledge sources including Indigenous and local knowledge (Nakashima et al., 2012; Smith and
23 Sharp, 2012; Mistry and Berardi, 2016; Tschakert et al., 2017). Examples of successful local institutional
24 processes and the integration of local knowledge in climate-related decisions making are provided in Box 4.3
25 and Box 4.4.

26
27 Implementing 1.5°C-relevant strategies would require well-functioning legal frameworks to be in place, in
28 conjunction with clearly defined mandates, rights and responsibilities to enable the institutional capacity to
29 deliver (Romero-Lankao et al., 2013). As an example, current rates of urbanisation occurring in cities with a
30 lack of institutional capacity for effective land-use planning, zoning and infrastructure development, result in
31 unplanned, informal urban settlements which are vulnerable to climate impacts. It is common for 30–50% of
32 urban populations in low-income nations to live in informal settlements with no regulatory infrastructure
33 (Revi et al., 2014b). For example, in Huambo (Angola), a classified ‘urban’ area extends 20km west of the
34 city and is predominantly made up of ‘unplanned’ urban settlements (Smith and Jenkins, 2015).

35
36 Internationally, the Paris Agreement process has aimed at enhancing the capacity of decision-making
37 institutions in developing countries to support effective implementation. These efforts are particularly
38 reflected in Article 11 of the Paris Agreement on capacity building (the creation of the Paris Committee on
39 Capacity Building), Article 13 (the creation of the Capacity Building Initiative on Transparency), as well as
40 Article 15 on compliance (UNFCCC, 2015).

41
42 **[START BOX 4.3 HERE]**

44 **Box 4.3: Indigenous Knowledge and Community Adaptation**

45
46 Indigenous knowledge refers to the understandings, skills and philosophies developed by societies with long
47 histories of interaction with their natural surroundings (UNESCO, 2017). This knowledge can underpin the
48 development of adaptation and mitigation strategies (Ford et al., 2014b; Green and Minchin, 2014; Pearce et
49 al., 2015; Savo et al., 2016).

50
51 Climate change is an important concern for the Maya, who depend on climate knowledge for their
52 livelihood. In Guatemala, the collaboration between the Mayan K'iché population of the Nahualate river
53 basin and the Climate Change Institute has resulted in a catalogue of Indigenous knowledge, used to identify
54 indicators for watershed meteorological forecasts (Yax L. and Álvarez, 2016). These indicators are relevant
55 but would need continuous assessment if their continued reliability is to be confirmed (Nyong et al., 2007;

Alexander et al., 2011; Mistry and Berardi, 2016). For more than ten years, Guatemala has maintained an ‘Indigenous Table for Climate Change’, to enable the consideration of indigenous knowledge in disaster management and adaptation development.

In Tanzania, increased variability of rainfall is challenging Indigenous and local communities (Mahoo et al., 2015; Sewando et al., 2016). The majority of agro-pastoralists use Indigenous knowledge to forecast seasonal rainfall, relying on observations of plant phenology, bird, animal, and insect behaviour, the sun and moon, and wind (Chang'a et al., 2010; Elia et al., 2014; Shaffer, 2014). Increased climate variability has raised concerns about the reliability of these indicators (Shaffer, 2014), therefore, initiatives have focused on the co-production of knowledge, through involving local communities in monitoring and discussing the implications of indigenous knowledge and meteorological forecasts (Shaffer, 2014), and creating local forecasts by utilising the two sources of knowledge (Mahoo et al., 2013). This has resulted in increased documentation of Indigenous knowledge, understanding of relevant climate information amongst stakeholders, and adaptive capacity at the community-level (Mahoo et al., 2013, 2015; Shaffer, 2014).

The Pacific Islands and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are vulnerable to the effects of climate change, but the cultural resilience of Pacific Island inhabitants is also recognized (Nunn et al., 2017). In Fiji and Vanuatu, strategies used to prepare for cyclones include building reserve emergency supplies, and utilising farming techniques to ensure adequate crop yield to combat potential losses from a cyclone or drought (McNamara and Prasad, 2014; Granderson, 2017; Pearce et al., 2017). Social cohesion and kinship are important in responding and preparing for climate-related hazards, including the role of resource sharing, communal labour, and remittances (McMillen et al., 2014; Gawith et al., 2016; Granderson, 2017). There is a concern that Indigenous knowledge will weaken, a process driven by westernisation and disruptions in established bioclimatic indicators and traditional planning calendars (Granderson, 2017). In some urban settlements, it has been noted that cultural practices (e.g., prioritising the quantity of food over the quality of food) can lower food security through dispersing limited resources and by encouraging the consumption of cheap but nutrient-poor foods (McCubbin et al., 2017) (See Cross-Chapter Box 6 on Food Security in Chapter 3). Indigenous practices also encounter limitations, particularly in relating to sea level rise (Nunn et al., 2017).

[END BOX 4.3 HERE]

[START BOX 4.4 HERE]

Box 4.4: Manizales, Colombia: Supportive National Government and Localised Planning and Integration as an Enabling Condition for Managing Climate and Development Risks

Institutional reform in the city of Manizales, Colombia helps identify three important features of an enabling environment: integrating climate change adaptation, mitigation and disaster risk management at the city-scale; the importance of decentralised planning and policy formulation within a supportive national policy environment; and the role of a multi-sectoral framework in mainstreaming climate action in development activities.

Manizales is exposed to risks caused by rapid development and expansion in a mountainous terrain exposed to seismic activity and periodic wet and dry spells. Local assessments expect climate change to amplify the risk of disasters (Carreño et al., 2017). The city is widely recognised for its longstanding urban environmental policy (Biomanizales) and local environmental action plan (Bioplan), and has been integrating environmental planning in its development agenda for nearly two decades (Velásquez Barrero, 1998; Hardoy and Velásquez Barrero, 2014). When the city’s environmental agenda was updated in 2014 to reflect climate change risks, assessments were conducted in a participatory manner at the street and neighbourhood level (Hardoy and Velásquez Barrero, 2016).

The creation of a new Environmental Secretariat assisted in coordination and integration of environmental policies, disaster risk management, development and climate change (Leck and Roberts, 2015). Planning in Manizales remains mindful of steep gradients, through its longstanding Slope Guardian

1 programme that trains women and keeps records of vulnerable households. Planning also looks to include
2 mitigation opportunities and enhance local capacity through participatory engagement (Hardoy and
3 Velásquez Barrero, 2016).

4
5 Manizales' mayors were identified as important champions for much of these early integration and
6 innovation efforts. Their role may have been enabled by Colombia's history of decentralised approaches to
7 planning and policy formulation, including establishing environmental observatories (for continuous
8 environmental assessment) and participatory tracking of environmental indicators. Multi-stakeholder
9 involvement has both enabled and driven progress, and has enabled the integration of climate risks in
10 development planning (Hardoy and Velásquez Barrero, 2016).

11
12 **[END BOX 4.4 HERE]**

13 14 15 4.4.2.2 *Monitoring, Reporting, and Review Institutions*

16
17 One of the novel features of the new climate governance architecture emerging from the 2015 Paris
18 Agreement is the transparency framework in Article 13 committing countries, based on capacity, to provide
19 regular progress reports on national pledges to address climate change (UNFCCC, 2015). Many countries
20 will rely on public policies and existing national reporting channels to deliver on their NDCs under the Paris
21 Agreement. Scaling up the mitigation and adaptation efforts in these countries to be consistent with 1.5°C
22 would put significant pressure on the need to develop, enhance and streamline local, national and
23 international climate change reporting and monitoring methodologies and institutional capacity in relation to
24 mitigation, adaptation, finance, and Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) inventories (Ford et al., 2015b; Lesnikowski
25 et al., 2015; Schoenefeld et al., 2016). Consistent with this direction, the provision of the information to the
26 stocktake under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement would contribute to enhancing reporting and transparency
27 (UNFCCC, 2015). Nonetheless, approaches, reporting procedures, reference points, and data sources to
28 assess progress on implementation across and within nations are still largely underdeveloped (Ford et al.,
29 2015b; Araos et al., 2016b; Magnan and Ribera, 2016; Lesnikowski et al., 2017). The availability of
30 independent private and public reporting and statistical institutions is integral to oversight, effective
31 monitoring, reporting and review. The creation and enhancement of these institutions would be an important
32 contribution to an effective transition to a low-emission world.

33 34 35 4.4.2.3 *Financial Institutions*

36
37 IPCC AR5 assessed that to enable a transition to a 2°C pathway, the volume of climate investments would
38 need to be transformed along with changes in the pattern of general investment behaviour towards low-
39 emissions. The report argued that, compared to 2012, annually up to a trillion dollars in additional
40 investment in low-emission energy and energy efficiency measures may be required until 2050 (Blanco et
41 al., 2014; IEA, 2014a). Financing of 1.5°C would present an even greater challenge, addressing financing of
42 both existing and new assets, which would require significant transitions to the type and structure of
43 financial institutions as well as to the method of financing (Cochrani et al., 2014; Ma, 2014). Both public and
44 private financial institutions would be needed to contribute to the large resource mobilisation needed for
45 1.5°C, yet, in the ordinary course of business, these transitions may not be expected. On one hand, private
46 financial institutions could face the scale-up risk, for example the risks associated with commercialisation
47 and scaling up of renewable technologies to accelerate mitigation (Wilson, 2012; Hartley and Medlock,
48 2013) and/or price risk, such as carbon price volatility that carbon markets could face. In contrast, traditional
49 public financial institutions are limited by both structure and instruments, while concessional financing
50 would require taxpayer support for subsidisation. Special efforts and innovative approaches would be needed
51 to address these challenges, for example the creation of special institutions that underwrite the value of
52 emission reductions using auctioned price floors (Bodnar et al., 2018) to deal with price volatility.

53
54 Financial institutions are equally important for adaptation. Linnerooth-Bayer and Hochrainer-Stigler (2015)
55 discuss the benefits of financial instruments in adaptation, including the provision of post-disaster finances

1 for recovery and pre-disaster security necessary for climate adaptation and poverty reduction. Pre-disaster
2 financial instruments and options include insurance, such as index-based weather insurance schemes,
3 catastrophe bonds, and laws to encourage insurance purchasing. The development and enhancement of
4 microfinance institutions to ensure social resilience and smooth transitions in the adaptation to climate
5 change impacts could be an important local institutional innovation (Hammill et al., 2008).

8 *4.4.2.4 Co-Operative Institutions and Social Safety Nets*

10 Effective co-operative institutions and social safety nets may help address energy access, adaptation, as well
11 as distributional impacts during the transition to 1.5°C-consistent pathways and enabling sustainable
12 development. Not all countries have the institutional capabilities to design and manage these. Social capital
13 for adaptation in the form of bonding, bridging, and linking social institutions has proved to be effective in
14 dealing with climate crises at the local, regional, and national levels (Aldrich et al., 2016).

16 The shift towards sustainable energy systems in transitioning economies could impact the livelihoods of
17 large populations, in traditional and legacy employment sectors. The transition of selected EU Member
18 States to biofuels, for example, caused anxiety among farmers, who lacked confidence in the biofuel crop
19 market. Enabling contracts between farmers and energy companies, involving local governments, helped
20 create an atmosphere of confidence during the transition (McCormick and Käberger, 2007).

22 How do broader socio-economic processes influence urban vulnerabilities and thereby underpin climate
23 change adaptation? This is a systemic challenge originating from a lack of collective societal ownership of
24 the responsibility for climate risk management. Numerous explanations, help explain this from competing
25 time-horizons due to self-interest of stakeholders to a more ‘rational’ conception of risk assessment,
26 measured across a risk-tolerance spectrum (Moffatt, 2014).

28 Self-governing and self-organised institutional settings where equipment and resource systems are
29 commonly owned and managed can potentially generate a much higher diversity of administration solutions,
30 than other institutional arrangements where energy technology and resource systems are either owned and
31 administered individually in market settings or via a central authority (e.g., the state). They can also increase
32 the adaptability of technological systems, while reducing their burden on the environment (Labanca, 2017).
33 Educational, learning and awareness-building institutions can help strengthen the societal response to climate
34 change (Butler et al., 2016; Thi Hong Phuong et al., 2017).

37 *4.4.3 Enabling Lifestyle and Behavioural Change*

39 Humans are at the centre of global climate change: their actions cause anthropogenic climate change, and
40 social change is key to effectively respond to climate change (Vlek and Steg, 2007; Dietz et al., 2013; ISSC
41 and UNESCO, 2013; Hackmann et al., 2014). Chapter 2 shows that 1.5°C-consistent pathways assume
42 substantial changes in behaviour. This section assesses the potential of behaviour change, as the Integrated
43 Assessment Models (IAMs) applied in Chapter 2 do not comprehensively assess this potential.

45 Table 4.8 shows examples of mitigation and adaptation actions relevant for 1.5°C-consistent pathways.
46 Reductions in population growth can reduce overall carbon demand and mitigate climate change
47 (Bridgeman, 2017), particularly when population growth is accompanied with increases in affluence and
48 carbon-intensive consumption (Rosa and Dietz, 2012; Clayton et al., 2017). Mitigation actions with a
49 substantial carbon emission reduction potential (see Figure 4.3) that individuals may readily adopt would
50 have the most climate impact (Dietz et al., 2009).

1 **Table 4.8:** Examples of mitigation and adaptation behaviours relevant for 1.5°C (Dietz et al., 2009; Jabeen, 2014;
 2 Taylor et al., 2014; Araos et al., 2016b; Steg, 2016; Stern et al., 2016b; Creutzig et al., 2018)
 3

Climate action	Type of action	Examples
Mitigation	Implementing resource efficiency in building	Insulation Low-carbon building materials
	Adopting low-emission innovations	Electric vehicles Heat pumps, district heating and cooling
	Adopting energy efficient appliances	Energy-efficient heating or cooling Energy-efficient appliances
	Energy-saving behaviour	Walking or cycling rather than drive short distances Using mass transit rather than flying Lower temperature for space heating Line drying of laundry Reducing food waste
	Buying products and materials with low GHG emissions during production and transport	Reducing meat and dairy consumption Buying local, seasonal food Replacing aluminium products by low-GHG alternatives
	Organisational behaviour	Designing low-emission products and procedures Replacing business travel by videoconferencing
Adaptation	Growing different crops and raising different animal varieties	Using crops with higher tolerance for higher temperatures or CO ₂ elevation
	Flood protective behaviour	Elevating barriers between rooms Building elevated storage spaces Building drainage channels outside the home
	Heat protective behaviour	Staying hydrated Moving to cooler places Installing green roofs
	Efficient water use during water shortage crisis	Rationing water Constructing wells or rainwater tanks
Mitigation & adaptation	Adoption of renewable energy sources	Solar PV Solar water heaters
	Citizenship behaviour	Engage through civic channels to encourage or support planning for low-carbon climate-resilient development

4
5




Figure 4.3: Examples of mitigation behaviour and their GHG emission reduction potential. Mitigation potential assessments are printed in different units. Based on [1] Carlsson-Kanyama and González (2009); [2] Tuomisto and Teixeira de Mattos (2011); [3] Springmann et al. (2016); [4] Nijland and Meerkerk (2017); [5] Woodcock et al. (2009); [6] Salon et al. (2012); [7] Dietz et al. (2009); [8] Mulville et al. (2017); [9] Huebner and Shipworth (2017); [10] Jaboyedoff et al. (2004); [11] Pellegrino et al. (2016); [12] Nägele et al. (2017).

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1 Various policy approaches and strategies can encourage and enable climate actions by individuals and
2 organisations. Policy approaches would be more effective when they address key contextual and psycho-
3 social factors influencing climate actions, which differ across contexts and individuals (Steg and Vlek, 2009;
4 Stern, 2011). This suggests that diverse policy approaches would be needed in 1.5°C-consistent pathways in
5 different contexts and regions. Combinations of policies that target multiple barriers and enabling factors
6 simultaneously can be more effective (Nissinen et al., 2015).

7
8 In the US and Europe, GHG emissions are lower when legislators have strong environmental records (Jensen
9 and Spoon, 2011; Dietz et al., 2015). Political elites affect public concern about climate change: pro-climate
10 action statements increased concern, while anti-climate action statements and anti-environment voting
11 reduced public concern about climate change (Brulle et al., 2012). In the European Union, individuals worry
12 more about climate change and engage more in climate actions in countries where political party elites are
13 united rather than divided in their support for environmental issues (Sohlberg, 2017).

14
15 This section discusses how to enable and encourage behaviour and lifestyle changes that strengthen
16 implementation of 1.5°C-consistent pathways by assessing psycho-social factors related to climate action, as
17 well as the effects and acceptability of policy approaches targeting climate actions that are consistent with
18 1.5°C. Box 4.5 and Box 4.6 illustrate how these have worked in practice.

19 20 21 *4.4.3.1 Factors Related to Climate Actions*

22
23 Mitigation and adaptation behaviour is affected by many factors that shape which options are feasible and
24 considered by individuals. Besides contextual factors (see other sub-sections in Section 4.4), these include
25 abilities and different types of motivation to engage in behaviour.

26 27 *4.4.3.1.1 Ability to engage in climate action*

28 Individuals more often engage in adaptation (Gebrehiwot and van der Veen, 2015; Koerth et al., 2017) and
29 mitigation behaviour (Pisano and Lubell, 2017) when they are or feel more capable to do so. Hence, it is
30 important to enhance ability to act on climate change, which depends on income and knowledge, among
31 other things. A higher income is related to higher CO₂ emissions; higher income groups can afford more
32 carbon-intensive lifestyles (Lamb et al., 2014; Dietz et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015). Yet, low-income groups
33 may lack resources to invest in energy efficient technology and refurbishments (Andrews-Speed and Ma,
34 2016) and adaptation options (Wamsler, 2007; Fleming et al., 2015b; Takahashi et al., 2016). Adaptive
35 capacity further depends on gender roles (Jabeen, 2014; Bunce and Ford, 2015), technical capacities and
36 knowledge (Feola et al., 2015; Eakin et al., 2016; Singh et al., 2016b).

37
38 Knowledge of the causes and consequences of climate change and on ways to reduce GHG emissions is not
39 always accurate (Bord et al., 2000; Whitmarsh et al., 2011; Tobler et al., 2012), which can inhibit climate
40 actions, even when people would be motivated to act. For example, people overestimate savings from low-
41 energy activities, and underestimate savings from high-energy activities (Attari et al., 2010). They know
42 little about ‘embodied’ energy (i.e., energy needed to produce products; Tobler et al., 2011), including meat
43 (de Boer et al., 2016b). Some people mistake weather for climate (Reynolds et al., 2010), or conflate climate
44 risks with other hazards, which can inhibit adequate adaptation (Taylor et al., 2014).

45
46 More knowledge on adaptation is related to higher engagement in adaptation actions in some circumstances
47 (Bates et al., 2009; van Kasteren, 2014; Hagen et al., 2016). How adaptation is framed in the media can
48 influence the types of options viewed as important in different contexts (Boykoff et al., 2013; Moser, 2014;
49 Ford and King, 2015).

50
51 Knowledge is important, but is often not sufficient to motivate action (Trenberth et al., 2016). Climate
52 change knowledge and perceptions are not strongly related to mitigation actions (Hornsey et al., 2016).
53 Direct experience of events related to climate change influences climate concerns and actions (Blennow et
54 al., 2012; Taylor et al., 2014), more so than second-hand information (Spence et al., 2011; Myers et al.,

1 2012; Demski et al., 2017); high impact events with low frequency are remembered more than low impact
2 regular events (Meze-Hausken, 2004; Singh et al., 2016b; Sullivan-Wiley and Short Gianotti, 2017).
3 Personal experience with climate hazards strengthens motivation to protect oneself (Jabeen, 2014) and
4 enhances adaptation actions (Bryan et al., 2009; Berrang-Ford et al., 2011; Demski et al., 2017), although
5 this does not always translate into proactive adaptation (Taylor et al., 2014). Collectively constructed notions
6 of risk and expectations of future climate variability shape risk perception and adaptation behaviour (Singh
7 et al., 2016b). People with particular political views and those who emphasise individual autonomy may
8 reject climate science knowledge and believe that there is widespread scientific disagreement about climate
9 change (Kahan, 2010; O'Neill et al., 2013), inhibiting support for climate policy (Ding et al., 2011;
10 McCright et al., 2013). This may explain why extreme weather experiences enhances preparedness to reduce
11 energy use among left- but not right-leaning voters (Ogunbode et al., 2017).

12 13 14 4.4.3.1.2 *Motivation to engage in climate action*

15 Climate actions are more strongly related to motivational factors, reflecting individuals' reasons for actions,
16 such as values, ideology and worldviews than to knowledge (Hornsey et al., 2016). People consider various
17 types of costs and benefits of actions (Gözl and Hahnel, 2016), and focus on consequences that have
18 implications for the values they find most important (Dietz et al., 2013; Hahnel et al., 2015; Steg, 2016). This
19 implies that different individuals consider different consequences when making choices. People who
20 strongly value protecting the environment and other people generally more strongly consider climate impact
21 and act more on climate change than those who strongly endorse hedonic and egoistic values (Taylor et al.,
22 2014; Steg, 2016). People are more prone to adopt sustainable innovations when they are more open to new
23 ideas (Jansson, 2011; Wolske et al., 2017). Further, a free-market ideology is associated with weaker climate
24 change beliefs (McCright and Dunlap, 2011; Hornsey et al., 2016), and a capital-oriented culture tends to
25 promote activity associated with GHG emissions (Kasser et al., 2007).

26
27 Some Indigenous populations believe it is arrogant to predict the future, and some cultures have belief
28 systems that interpret natural phenomena as sentient, where thoughts and words are believed to influence the
29 future, with people reluctant to talk about negative future possibilities (Natcher et al., 2007; Flynn et al.,
30 2018). Integrating these considerations into the design of adaptation and mitigation policy is important
31 (Cochran et al., 2013; Chapin et al., 2016; Brugnach et al., 2017; Flynn et al., 2018).

32
33 People are more prone to act on climate change when individual benefits of actions exceed costs (Steg and
34 Vlek, 2009; Kardooni et al., 2016; Wolske et al., 2017). For this reason, people generally prefer adoption of
35 energy-efficient appliances above energy consumption reductions; the latter is perceived as more costly
36 (Poortinga et al., 2003; Steg et al., 2006), although transaction costs can inhibit the uptake of mitigation
37 technology (Mundaca, 2007). Decentralised renewable energy systems are evaluated most favourably when
38 they guarantee independence, autonomy, control and supply security (Ecker, 2017).

39
40 Besides, social costs and benefits affect climate action (Farrow et al., 2017). People engage more in climate
41 actions when they think others expect them to do so and when others act as well (Nolan et al., 2008; Le Dang
42 et al., 2014; Truelove et al., 2015; Rai et al., 2016), and when they experience social support (Singh et al.,
43 2016a; Burnham and Ma, 2017; Wolske et al., 2017). Discussing effective actions with peers also
44 encourages climate action (Esham and Garforth, 2013), particularly when individuals strongly identify with
45 their peers (Biddau et al., 2012; Fielding and Hornsey, 2016). Further, individuals may engage in mitigation
46 actions when they think doing so would enhance their reputation (Milinski et al., 2006; Noppers et al., 2014;
47 Kastner and Stern, 2015). Such social costs and benefits can be addressed in climate policy (see Section
48 4.4.3.2).

49
50 Feelings affect climate action (Brosch et al., 2014). Negative feelings related to climate change can
51 encourage adaptation action (Kerstholt et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2017), while positive feelings associated
52 with climate risks may inhibit protective behaviour (Lefevre et al., 2015). Individuals are more prone to
53 engage in mitigation actions when they worry about climate change (Verplanken and Roy, 2013), and when
54 they expect to derive positive feelings from such actions (Pelletier et al., 1998; Taufik et al., 2016).

1 Furthermore, collective consequences affect climate actions (Balcombe et al., 2013; Dóci and Vasileiadou,
2 2015; Kastner and Stern, 2015). People are motivated to see themselves as morally right, which encourages
3 mitigation actions (Steg et al., 2015), particularly when long-term goals are salient (Zaval et al., 2015) and
4 behavioural costs are not too high (Diekmann and Preisendörfer, 2003). Individuals are more prone to
5 engage in climate actions when they believe climate change is occurring, when they are aware of threats
6 caused by climate change and by their inaction, and when they think they can engage in actions that will
7 reduce these threats (Esham and Garforth, 2013; Arunrat et al., 2017; Chatrchyan et al., 2017). The more
8 individuals are concerned about climate change and aware of the negative climate impact of their behaviour,
9 the more they feel responsible for and think their actions can help reduce such negative impacts, which can
10 strengthen their moral norms to act accordingly (Steg and de Groot, 2010; Jakovcevic and Steg, 2013; Chen,
11 2015; Ray et al., 2017; Wolske et al., 2017; Woods et al., 2017). Individuals may engage in mitigation
12 actions when they see themselves as supportive of the environment (i.e. strong environmental self-identity)
13 (Fielding et al., 2008; van der Werff et al., 2013b; Kashima et al., 2014; Barbarossa et al., 2017); a strong
14 environmental identity strengthens intrinsic motivation to engage in mitigation actions both at home (van der
15 Werff et al., 2013a) and at work (Ruepert et al., 2016). Environmental self-identity is strengthened when
16 people realise they engaged in mitigation actions, which can in turn promote further mitigation actions (van
17 der Werff et al., 2014b).

18
19 Individuals are less prone to engage in adaptation behaviour themselves when they rely on external measures
20 such as government interventions (Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006; Wamsler and Brink, 2014a; Armah et
21 al., 2015; Burnham and Ma, 2017) or perceive themselves as protected by god (Gandure et al., 2013; Dang et
22 al., 2014; Cannon, 2015).

23 24 25 4.4.3.1.3 *Habits, heuristics and biases*

26 Decisions are often not based on weighing costs and benefits, but on habit or automaticity, both of
27 individuals (Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2000; Kloeckner et al., 2003) and within organisations (Dooley, 2017)
28 and institutions (Munck et al., 2014). When habits are strong, individuals are less perceptive of information
29 (Verplanken et al., 1997; Aarts et al., 1998), and may not consider alternatives as long as outcomes are good
30 enough (Maréchal, 2010). Habits are mostly only reconsidered when the situation changed significantly
31 (Fujii and Kitamura, 2003; Maréchal, 2010; Verplanken and Roy, 2016). Hence, strategies that create the
32 opportunity for reflection and encourage active decisions can break habits (Steg et al., 2017).

33
34 Individuals can follow heuristics, or ‘rules of thumb’, in making inferences rather than thinking through all
35 implications of actions, which demands less cognitive resources, knowledge and time (Preston et al., 2013;
36 Frederiks et al., 2015; Gillingham and Palmer, 2017). For example, people tend to think that larger and
37 visible appliances use more energy, which is not always accurate (Cowen and Gatersleben, 2017). They
38 underestimate energy used for water heating and overestimate energy used for lighting (Stern, 2014). When
39 facing choice overload, people may choose the easiest or first available option, which can inhibit energy
40 saving behaviour (Stern and Gardner, 1981; Frederiks et al., 2015). As a result, individuals and firms often
41 strive for satisficing (‘good enough’) outcomes with regard to energy decisions (Wilson and Dowlatabadi,
42 2007; Klotz, 2011), which can inhibit investments in energy efficiency (Decanio, 1993; Frederiks et al.,
43 2015).

44
45 Besides, biases play a role. In Mozambique, farmers displayed omission biases (unwillingness to take
46 adaptation actions with potentially negative consequences to avoid personal responsibility for losses), while
47 policymakers displayed action biases (wanting to demonstrate positive action despite potential negative
48 consequences; Patt and Schröter, 2008). People tend to place greater value on relative losses than gains
49 (Kahneman, 2003). Perceived gains and losses depend on the reference point or status-quo (Kahneman,
50 2003). Loss aversion and the status-quo bias prevent consumers from switching electricity suppliers (Ek and
51 Söderholm, 2008), to time-of-use electricity tariffs (Nicolson et al., 2017), and to accept new energy systems
52 (Leijten et al., 2014).

53
54 Owned inefficient appliances and fossil fuel-based electricity can act as endowments, increasing their value
55 compared to alternatives (Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008; Dinner et al., 2011). Uncertainty and loss

1 aversion lead consumers to undervalue future energy savings (Greene, 2011) and savings from energy
2 efficient technologies (Kolstad et al., 2014). Uncertainties about the performance of products and illiquidity
3 of investments can drive consumers to postpone (profitable) energy efficient investments (Sutherland, 1991;
4 van Soest and Bulte, 2001). People with a higher tendency to delay decisions may engage less in energy
5 saving actions (Lillemo, 2014). Training energy auditors in loss-aversion increased their clients' investments
6 in energy efficiency improvements (Gonzales et al., 1988). Engagement in energy saving and renewable
7 energy programmes can be enhanced if participation is set as a default option (Pichert and Katsikopoulos,
8 2008; Ölander and Thøgersen, 2014; Ebeling and Lotz, 2015).

11 4.4.3.2 *Strategies and Policies to Promote Actions on Climate Change*

13 Policy can enable and strengthen motivation to act on climate change via top-down or bottom-up approaches,
14 through informational campaigns, regulatory measures, financial (dis)incentives, and infrastructural and
15 technological changes (Adger et al., 2003; Steg and Vlek, 2009; Henstra, 2016).

17 Adaptation efforts tend to focus on infrastructural and technological solutions (Ford and King, 2015) with
18 lower emphasis on socio-cognitive and finance aspects of adaptation. For example, flooding policies in cities
19 focus on infrastructure projects and regulation such as building codes, and hardly target individual or
20 household behaviour (Araos et al., 2016b; Georgeson et al., 2016).

22 Current mitigation policies emphasise infrastructural and technology development, regulation, financial
23 incentives and information provision (Mundaca and Markandya, 2016) that can create conditions enabling
24 climate action, but target only some of the many factors influencing climate actions (see Section 4.4.5.1).
25 They fall short of their true potential if their social and psychological implications are overlooked (Stern et
26 al., 2016a). For example, promising energy-saving or low carbon technology may not be adopted or not be
27 used as intended (Pritoni et al., 2015) when people lack resources and trustworthy information (Stern, 2011;
28 Balcombe et al., 2013).

30 Financial incentives or feedback on financial savings can encourage climate action (Santos, 2008; Bolderdijk
31 et al., 2011; Maki et al., 2016) (see Box 4.5), but are not always effective (Delmas et al., 2013), and can be
32 less effective than social rewards (Handgraaf et al., 2013) or emphasising benefits for people and the
33 environment (Bolderdijk et al., 2013b; Asensio and Delmas, 2015; Schwartz et al., 2015). The latter can
34 happen when financial incentives reduce a focus on environmental considerations and weaken intrinsic
35 motivation to engage in climate action (Evans et al., 2012; Agrawal et al., 2015; Schwartz et al., 2015).
36 Besides, pursuing small financial gains is perceived to be less worth the effort than pursuing equivalent CO₂
37 emission reductions (Bolderdijk et al., 2013b; Dogan et al., 2014). Also, people may not respond to financial
38 incentives (e.g., to improve energy efficiency) because they do not trust the organisation sponsoring
39 incentive programmes (Mundaca, 2007) or when it takes too much effort to receive the incentive (Stern et
40 al., 2016a).

42 [START BOX 4.5 HERE]

44 **Box 4.5: How Pricing Policy has Reduced Car Use in Singapore, Stockholm and London**

46 In Singapore, Stockholm and London, car ownership, car use, and Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions have
47 reduced because of pricing and regulatory policies and policies facilitating behaviour change. Notably,
48 acceptability of these policies has increased as people experienced their positive effects.

50 Singapore implemented electronic road pricing in the central business district and at major expressways, a
51 vehicle quota and registration fee system, and investments in mass transit. In the vehicle quota system
52 introduced in 1990, registration of new vehicles is conditional upon a successful bid (via auctioning) (Chu,
53 2015), costing about 50,000 USD in 2014 (LTA, 2015). The registration tax incentivises purchases of low-
54 emission vehicles via a feebate system. As a result, per capita transport emissions (approximately 1.25
55 tCO₂/yr⁻¹) and car ownership (107 vehicles per 1000 capita) (LTA, 2017) are substantially lower than in

1 cities with comparable income levels. Modal share of public transport was 63% during peak hours in 2013
2 (LTA, 2013).

3
4 The Stockholm congestion charge implemented in 2007 (after a trial in 2006) reduced kilometres driven in
5 the inner city by 16%, and outside the city by 5%; traffic volumes reduced by 20% and remained constant
6 across time despite economic and population growth (Eliasson, 2014). CO₂ emissions from traffic reduced
7 by 2–3% in Stockholm county. Vehicles entering or leaving the city centre were charged during weekdays
8 (except for holidays). Charges were 1–2€ (maximum 6€ per day), being higher during peak hours; taxis,
9 emergency vehicles and busses were exempted. Before introducing the charge, public transport and parking
10 places near mass transit stations were extended. The aim and effects of the charge were extensively
11 communicated to the public. Acceptability of the congestion charge was initially low, but gained support of
12 about two-thirds of the population and all political parties after the scheme was implemented (Eliasson,
13 2014), which may be related to earmarking the revenues to constructing a motorway tunnel. After the trial,
14 people believed that the charge had more positive effects on environmental, congestion and parking
15 problems while costs increased less than they anticipated beforehand (Schuitema et al., 2010a). The initially
16 hostile media eventually declared the scheme to be a success.

17
18 In 2003, a congestion charge was implemented in the Greater London area, with an enforcement and
19 compliance scheme and an information campaign on the functioning of the scheme. Vehicles entering,
20 leaving, driving or parking on a public road in the zone at weekdays at daytime pay a congestion charge of
21 8£ (until 2005 5£), with some exemptions. Revenues were invested in London's bus network (80%), cycling
22 facilities, and road safety measures (Leape, 2006). The number of cars entering the zone decreased by 18%
23 in 2003 and 2004. In the charging zone, vehicle kilometres driven decreased by 15% in the first year and a
24 further 6% a year later, while CO₂ emissions from road traffic reduced by 20% (Santos, 2008).

25 26 **[END BOX 4.5 HERE]**

27
28 While providing information on the causes and consequences of climate change or on effective climate
29 actions, generally increases knowledge, it often does not encourage engagement in climate actions by
30 individuals (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Ünal et al., 2017) or organisations (Anderson and Newell, 2004).
31 Similarly, media coverage on the UN Climate Summit slightly increased knowledge about the conference
32 but did not enhance motivation to engage personally in climate protection (Brüggemann et al., 2017). Fear-
33 inducing representations of climate change may inhibit action when they make people feel helpless and
34 overwhelmed (O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Energy-related recommendations and feedback (e.g., via
35 performance contracts, energy audits, smart metering) are more effective to promote energy conservation,
36 load shifting in electricity use and sustainable travel choices when framed in terms of losses rather than gains
37 (Gonzales et al., 1988; Wolak, 2011; Bradley et al., 2016; Bager and Mundaca, 2017).

38
39 Credible and targeted information at the point of decision can promote climate action (Stern et al., 2016a).
40 For example, communicating the impacts of climate change is more effective when provided right before
41 adaptation decisions are taken (e.g., before the agricultural season) and when bundled with information on
42 potential actions to ameliorate impacts, rather than just providing information on climate projections with
43 little meaning to end users (e.g., weather forecasts, seasonal forecasts, decadal climate trends) (Dorward et
44 al., 2015; Singh et al., 2017). Similarly, heat action plans that provide early alerts and advisories combined
45 with emergency public health measures can reduce heat-related morbidity and mortality (Benmarhnia et al.,
46 2016).

47
48 Information provision is more effective when tailored to the personal situation of individuals, demonstrating
49 clear impacts, and resonating with individuals' core values (Daamen et al., 2001; Abrahamse et al., 2007;
50 Bolderdijk et al., 2013a; Dorward et al., 2015; Singh et al., 2017). Tailored information prevents information
51 overload, and people are more motivated to consider and act upon information that aligns with their core
52 values and beliefs (Campbell and Kay, 2014; Hornsey et al., 2016). Also, tailored information can remove
53 barriers to receive and interpret information faced by vulnerable groups, such as the elderly during heat
54 waves (Vandentorren et al., 2006; Keim, 2008). Further, prompts can be effective when they serve as
55 reminders to perform a planned action (Osbaldiston and Schott, 2012).

1
2 Feedback provision is generally effective in promoting mitigation behaviour within households (Abrahamse
3 et al., 2005; Delmas et al., 2013; Karlin et al., 2015) and at work (Young et al., 2015), particularly when
4 provided in real-time or immediately after the action (Abrahamse et al., 2005), which makes the implications
5 of one's behaviour more salient (Tiefenbeck et al., 2016). Simple information is more effective than detailed
6 and technical data (Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007; Ek and Söderholm, 2010; Frederiks et al., 2015). Energy
7 labels (Banerjee and Solomon, 2003; Stadelmann, 2017), visualisation techniques (Pahl et al., 2016), and
8 ambient persuasive technology (Midden and Ham, 2012) can encourage mitigation actions by providing
9 information and feedback in a format that immediately makes sense and hardly requires users' conscious
10 attention.

11
12 Social influence approaches that emphasise what other people do or think can encourage climate action
13 (Clayton et al., 2015), particularly when they involve face-to-face interaction (Abrahamse and Steg, 2013).
14 For example, community approaches, where change is initiated from the bottom-up, can promote adaptation
15 (see Box 4.6) and mitigation actions (Middlemiss, 2011; Seyfang and Haxeltine, 2012; Abrahamse and Steg,
16 2013), especially when community ties are strong (Weenig and Midden, 1991). Furthermore, providing
17 social models of desired actions can encourage mitigation action (Osbaldiston and Schott, 2012; Abrahamse
18 and Steg, 2013). Social influence approaches that do not involve social interaction, such as social norm,
19 social comparison and group feedback, are less effective, but can be easily administered on a large scale at
20 low costs (Allcott, 2011; Abrahamse and Steg, 2013).

21
22 **[START BOX 4.6 HERE]**

23 **Box 4.6: Bottom-up Initiatives: Adaptation Responses Initiated by Individuals and Communities**

24
25
26 To effectively adapt to climate change, bottom-up initiatives by individuals and communities are essential, in
27 addition to efforts of governments, organisations, and institutions (Wamsler and Brink, 2014a). This box
28 presents examples of bottom-up adaptation responses and behavioural change.

29
30 Fiji increasingly faces a lack of freshwater due to decreasing rainfall and rising temperatures (Deo, 2011;
31 IPCC, 2014a). While some villages have access to boreholes, these are not sufficient to supply the
32 population with freshwater. Villagers are adapting by rationing water, changing diets, and setting up inter-
33 village sharing networks (Pearce et al., 2017). Some villagers take up wage employment to buy food instead
34 of growing it themselves (Pearce et al., 2017). In Kiribati, residents adapt to drought by purchasing rainwater
35 tanks and constructing additional wells (Kuruppu and Liverman, 2011). An important factor that motivated
36 residents of Kiribati to adapt to drought was the perception that they could effectively adapt to the negative
37 consequences of climate change (Kuruppu and Liverman, 2011).

38
39 In the Philippines, seismic activity has caused some islands to flood during high tide. While the municipal
40 government offered affected island communities the possibility to relocate to the mainland, residents
41 preferred to stay and implement measures themselves in their local community to reduce flood damage
42 (Laurice Jamero et al., 2017). Migration is perceived as undesirable because island communities have strong
43 place-based identities (Mortreux and Barnett, 2009). Instead, these island communities have adapted to
44 flooding by constructing stilted houses and raising floors, furniture, and roads to prevent water damage
45 (Laurice Jamero et al., 2017). While inundation was in this case caused by seismic activity, this example
46 indicates how island-based communities may respond to rising sea levels caused by climate change.

47
48 Adaptation initiatives by individuals may temporarily reduce the impacts of climate change and enable
49 residents to cope with changing environmental circumstances. However, they may not be sufficient to sustain
50 communities' way of life in the long term. For instance, in Fiji and Kiribati, freshwater and food are
51 projected to become even scarcer in the future, rendering individual adaptations ineffective. Moreover,
52 individuals can sometimes engage in behaviour that may be maladaptive over larger spatio-temporal scales.
53 For example, in the Philippines, many islanders adapt to flooding by elevating their floors using coral stone
54 (Laurice Jamero et al., 2017). Over time, this can harm the survivability of their community, as coral reefs
55 are critical for reducing flood vulnerability (Ferrario et al., 2014). In Maharashtra, India, on-farm ponds are

1 promoted as rainwater harvesting structures to adapt to dry spells during the monsoon season. However,
2 some individuals fill these ponds with groundwater, leading to depletion of water tables and potentially
3 maladaptive outcomes in the long run (Kale, 2015).
4

5 Integration of individuals' adaptation initiatives with top-down adaptation policy is critical (Butler et al.,
6 2015), as failing to do so may lead individual actors to mistrust authority and can discourage them from
7 undertaking adequate adaptive actions (Wamsler and Brink, 2014a).
8

9 **[END BOX 4.6 HERE]**

10
11 Goal setting can promote mitigation action, when goals are not set too low or too high (Loock et al., 2013).
12 Commitment strategies where people make a pledge to engage in climate actions can encourage mitigation
13 behaviour (Abrahamse and Steg, 2013; Lokhorst et al., 2013), particularly when individuals also indicate
14 how and when they will perform the relevant action and anticipate how to cope with possible barriers (i.e.,
15 implementation intentions) (Bamberg, 2000, 2002). Such strategies take advantage of individuals' desire to
16 be consistent (Steg, 2016). Similarly, hypocrisy strategies that make people aware of inconsistencies between
17 their attitudes and behaviour can encourage mitigation actions (Osbaldiston and Schott, 2012).
18

19 Actions that reduce climate risks can be rewarded and facilitated, while actions that increase climate risks
20 can be punished and inhibited, and behaviour change can be voluntary (e.g., information provision) or
21 imposed (e.g., by law); voluntary changes that involve rewards are more acceptable than imposed changes
22 that restrict choices (Eriksson et al., 2006, 2008; Steg et al., 2006; Dietz et al., 2007). Policies punishing
23 maladaptive behaviour can increase vulnerability when they reinforce socio-economic inequalities that
24 typically produce the maladaptive behaviour in the first place (W.N. Adger et al., 2003). Change can be
25 initiated by governments at various levels, but also by individuals, communities, profit-making
26 organisations, trade organisations, and other non-governmental actors (Lindenberg and Steg, 2013;
27 Robertson and Barling, 2015; Stern et al., 2016b).
28

29 Strategies can target intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation. It may be particularly important to enhance
30 intrinsic motivation so that people voluntarily engage in climate action over and again (Steg, 2016).
31 Endorsement of mitigation and adaptation actions are positively related (Brügger et al., 2015; Carrico et al.,
32 2015); both are positively related to concern about climate change (Brügger et al., 2015). Strategies that
33 target general antecedents that affect a wide range of actions, such as values, identities, worldviews, climate
34 change beliefs, awareness of climate impacts of one's actions and feelings of responsibility to act on climate
35 change, can encourage consistent actions on climate change (van Der Werff and Steg, 2015; Hornsey et al.,
36 2016; Steg, 2016). Initial climate actions can lead to further commitment to climate action (Juhl et al., 2017),
37 when people learn that such actions are easy and effective (Lauren et al., 2016), when they engaged in the
38 initial behaviour for environmental reasons (Peters et al., 2018), hold strong pro-environmental values and
39 norms (Thøgersen, J., Ölander, 2003), and when initial actions make them realise they are an
40 environmentally-sensitive person, motivating them to act on climate change in subsequent situations so as to
41 be consistent (van der Werff et al., 2014a; Lacasse, 2015, 2016). Yet, some studies suggest that people may
42 feel licensed not to engage in further mitigation actions when they believe they already did their bit
43 (Truelove et al., 2014).
44
45

46 *4.4.3.3 Acceptability of Policy and System Changes*

47
48 Public acceptability can shape, enable or prevent policy and system changes. Acceptability reflects the extent
49 to which policy or system changes are evaluated (un)favourably. Acceptability is higher when people expect
50 more positive and less negative effects of policy and system changes (Perlaviciute and Steg, 2014; Demski et
51 al., 2015; Drews and Van den Bergh, 2016), including climate impacts (Schuitema et al., 2010b). Because of
52 this, policy 'rewarding' climate actions is more acceptable than policy 'punishing' actions that increase
53 climate risks (Steg et al., 2006; Eriksson et al., 2008). Pricing policy is more acceptable when revenues are
54 earmarked for environmental purposes (Steg et al., 2006; Sælen and Kallbekken, 2011), or redistributed
55 towards those affected (Schuitema and Steg, 2008). Acceptability can increase when people experience

1 positive effects after a policy has been implemented (Schuitema et al., 2010a; Eliasson, 2014; Weber, 2015);
2 effective policy trials can thus build public support for climate policy.

3
4 Climate policy and renewable energy systems are more acceptable when people strongly value other people
5 and the environment, or support egalitarian worldviews, left-wing or green political ideologies (Drews and
6 Van den Bergh, 2016), and less acceptable when people strongly endorse self-enhancement values, or
7 support individualistic and hierarchical worldviews (Dietz et al., 2007; Perlaviciute and Steg, 2014; Drews
8 and Van den Bergh, 2016). Solar radiation modification is more acceptable when people strongly endorse
9 self-enhancement values, and less acceptable when they strongly value other people and the environment
10 (Vischers et al., 2017). Climate policy is more acceptable when people believe climate change is real, when
11 they are concerned about climate change (Hornsey et al., 2016), when they think their actions may reduce
12 climate risks, and when they feel responsible to act on climate change (Steg et al., 2005; Eriksson et al.,
13 2006; Jakovcevic and Steg, 2013; Drews and Van den Bergh, 2016; Kim and Shin, 2017). Stronger
14 environmental awareness is associated with a preference for governmental regulation and behaviour change,
15 rather than free market and technological solutions (Poortinga et al., 2002).

16
17 Climate policy is more acceptable when costs and benefits are distributed equally, when nature and future
18 generations are protected (Sjöberg and Drottz-Sjöberg, 2001; Schuitema et al., 2011; Drews and Van den
19 Bergh, 2016), and when fair procedures have been followed, including participation by the public (Dietz,
20 2013; Bernauer et al., 2016a; Bidwell, 2016) or public society organisations (Bernauer and Gampfer, 2013).
21 Providing benefits to compensate affected communities for losses due to policy or systems changes enhanced
22 public acceptability in some cases (Perlaviciute and Steg, 2014), although people may disagree on what
23 would be a worthwhile compensation (Aitken, 2010; Cass et al., 2010), or feel they are being bribed (Cass et
24 al., 2010; Perlaviciute and Steg, 2014).

25
26 Public support is higher when individuals trust responsible parties (Perlaviciute and Steg, 2014; Drews and
27 Van den Bergh, 2016). Yet, public support for multilateral climate policy is not higher than for unilateral
28 policy (Bernauer and Gampfer, 2015); public support for unilateral, non-reciprocal climate policy is rather
29 strong and robust (Bernauer et al., 2016b). Public opposition may result from a culturally valued landscape
30 being affected by adaptation or mitigation options, such as renewable energy development (Warren et al.,
31 2005; Devine-wright and Howes, 2010) or coastal protection measures (Kimura, 2016), particularly when
32 people have formed strong emotional bonds with the place (Devine-Wright, 2009, 2013).

33
34 Climate actions may reduce human wellbeing when such actions involve more costs, effort or discomfort.
35 Yet, some climate actions enhance wellbeing, such as technology that improves daily comfort and nature-
36 based solutions for climate adaptation (Wamsler and Brink, 2014b). Further, climate action may enhance
37 wellbeing (Kasser and Sheldon, 2002; Xiao et al., 2011; Schmitt et al., 2018) because pursuing meaning by
38 acting on climate change can make people feel good (Venhoeven et al., 2013, 2016; Taufik et al., 2015),
39 more so than merely pursuing pleasure.

40 41 42 **4.4.4 Enabling Technological Innovation**

43
44 This section focuses on the role of technological innovation in limiting warming to 1.5°C, and how
45 innovation can contribute to strengthening implementation to move towards or to adapt to 1.5°C worlds. This
46 assessment builds on information of technological innovation and related policy debates in and after AR5
47 (Somanathan et al., 2014).

48 49 50 **4.4.4.1 The Nature of Technological Innovations**

51
52 Technological systems have their own dynamics. New technologies have been described as emerging as part
53 of a 'socio-technical system' that is integrated with social structures and that itself evolves over time (Geels
54 and Schot, 2007). This progress is cumulative and accelerating (Kauffman, 2002; Arthur, 2009). To illustrate
55 such a process of co-evolution: the progress of computer simulation enables us to understand climate,

1 agriculture, and material sciences better, contributing to upgrading food production and quality, microscale
2 manufacturing techniques, and leading to much faster computing technologies, resulting for instance in
3 better performing Photovoltaic (PV) cells.
4

5 A variety of technological developments have and will, contribute to 1.5°C-consistent climate action or the
6 lack of it. They can do this, e.g., in the form of applications such as smart lighting systems, more efficient
7 drilling techniques making fossil fuels cheaper, or precision agriculture. As discussed in Section 4.3.1, costs
8 of PV (IEA, 2017f) and batteries (Nykqvist and Nilsson, 2015) have sharply dropped. In addition, costs of
9 fuel cells (Iguma and Kidoshi, 2015; Wei et al., 2017) and shale gas and oil (Wang et al., 2014; Mills, 2015)
10 have come down as a consequence of innovation.
11

12 13 4.4.4.2 *Technologies as Enablers of Climate Action* 14

15 Since AR5, literature has emerged as to how much future GHG emission reductions can be enabled by the
16 rapid progress of General Purpose Technologies (GPTs), consisting of Information and Communication
17 Technologies (ICT) including Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Internet-of-Things (IoT), nanotechnologies,
18 biotechnologies, robotics, and so forth (World Economic Forum, 2015; OECD, 2017c). Although these may
19 contribute to limiting warming to 1.5°C, the potential environmental, social and economic impacts of new
20 technologies are uncertain.
21

22 Rapid improvement of performance and cost reduction is observed for many GPTs. They include AI,
23 sensors, internet, memory storage and micro-electro mechanical systems. The latter GPTs are not usually
24 categorised as climate technologies, but they can impact GHG emissions.
25

26 Progress of GPT could help reducing GHG emissions more cost-effectively. Examples are shown in Table
27 4.9. It may however, result in more emissions by increasing the volume of economic activities, with
28 unintended negative consequence on sustainable development. While ICT increases electricity consumption
29 (Aebischer and Hilty, 2015), the energy consumption of ICT is usually dwarfed by the energy saving by ICT
30 (Koomey et al., 2013; Malmodin et al., 2014), but rebound effects and other sustainable development
31 impacts may be significant. An appropriate policy framework that accommodates such impacts and their
32 uncertainties could address the potential negative impacts by GPT (Jasanoff, 2007).
33

34 GHG emission reduction potentials in relation to GPTs were estimated for passenger cars using a
35 combination of three emerging technologies: electric vehicles, car sharing, and self-driving. GHG emission
36 reduction potential is reported, assuming generation of electricity with low GHG emissions (Greenblatt and
37 Saxena, 2015; ITF, 2015; Viegas et al., 2016; Fulton et al., 2017). It is also possible that GHG emissions
38 increase due to an incentive to car use. Appropriate policies such as urban planning and efficiency
39 regulations could contain such rebound effects (Wadud et al., 2016).
40

41 Estimating emission reductions by GPT is difficult due to substantial uncertainties, including projections of
42 future technological performance, costs, penetration rates, and induced human activity. Even if a technology
43 is available, the establishment of business models might not be feasible (Linder and Williander, 2017).
44 Indeed, studies show a wide range of estimates, ranging from deep emission reductions to possible increases
45 in the emissions due to the rebound effect (Larson and Zhao, 2017).
46

47 GPT could also enable climate adaptation, in particular through more effective climate disaster risk
48 management and improved weather forecasting.
49
50
51
52
53

Table 4.9: Examples of technological innovations relevant to 1.5°C enabled by General Purpose Technologies (GPT).
 Note: Lists of enabling GPT or adaptation/mitigation options are not exhaustive, and the GPTs by themselves do not reduce emissions or increase climate change resilience.

Sector	Examples of mitigation/adaptation technological innovation	Enabling GPT
Buildings	Energy and CO ₂ efficiency of logistics, warehouse and shops (GeSI, 2015; IEA, 2017a)	IoT, AI
	Smart lighting and air conditioning (IEA, 2016b, 2017a)	IoT, AI, nanotechnology
Industry	Energy efficiency improvement by industrial process optimisation (IEA, 2017a)	Robots, IoT
	Bio-based plastic production by bio-refinery (OECD, 2017c)	Biotechnology
	New materials from bio-refineries (Fornell et al., 2013; McKay et al., 2016)	ICT, Biotechnology
Transport	Electric vehicles, car sharing, automation (Greenblatt and Saxena, 2015; Fulton et al., 2017)	IoT, AI, nanotechnology
	Bio-based diesel fuel by bio-refinery (OECD, 2017c)	Biotechnology
	Second Generation Bioethanol potentially coupled to Carbon Capture Systems (de Souza et al., 2014; Rochedo et al., 2016)	ICT, Biotechnology
	Logistical optimisation, and electrification of trucks by overhead line (IEA, 2017e)	IoT, AI
	Reduction of transport needs by remote education, health, and other services (GeSI, 2015; IEA, 2017a)	ICT
	Energy saving by lightweight aircraft components (Beyer, 2014; Faludi et al., 2015; Verhoef et al., 2018)	Additive manufacturing (3D printing)
Electricity	Solar PV manufacturing (Nemet, 2014)	Nanotechnology
	Smart grids and grid flexibility to accommodate intermittent renewables (Heard et al., 2017)	IoT, AI
	Plasma confinement for nuclear fusion (Baltz et al., 2017)	AI
Agriculture	Precision agriculture (improvement of energy and resource efficiency including reduction of fertiliser use and N ₂ O emissions) (Pierpaoli et al., 2013; Brown et al., 2016; Schimmelpfennig and Ebel, 2016)	Biotechnology ICT, AI
	Methane inhibitors (methanogenic vaccines) that reduce dairy livestock emissions (Wollenberg et al., 2016)	Biotechnology
	Engineering C3 into C4 photosynthesis to improve agricultural production and productivity (Schuler et al., 2016)	Biotechnology
	Genome editing using CRISPR to improve/adapt crops to a changing climate (Gao, 2018)	Biotechnology
Disaster reduction and adaptation	Weather forecasting and early warning systems, in combination with user knowledge (Hewitt et al., 2012; Lourenço et al., 2016)	ICT
	Climate risk reduction (Upadhyay and Bijalwan, 2015)	ICT
	Rapid assessment of disaster damage (Kryvasheyev et al., 2016)	ICT

Government policy usually plays a role in promoting or limiting GPTs, or science and technology in general. It has impacts on climate action, because the performance of further climate technologies will partly depend on the progress of GPTs. Governments have established institutions for achieving many social, and sometimes conflicting goals, including economic growth and addressing climate change (OECD, 2017c), which include investment in basic R&D that can help develop game changing technologies (Shayegh et al., 2017). Governments are also needed to create an enabling environment for the growth of scientific and technological ecosystems necessary for GPT development (Tassey, 2014).

4.4.4.3 The Role of Government in 1.5°C-Consistent Climate Technology Policy

While literature on 1.5°C-specific innovation policy is absent, a growing body of literature indicates that governments aim to achieve social, economic and environmental goals by promoting science and a broad range of technologies through ‘mission-driven’ innovation policies, based on differentiated national priorities

1 (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). Governments can play a role in advancing climate technology via a
2 ‘technology push’ policy on the technology supply side (e.g., R&D subsidies), and by ‘demand pull’ policy
3 on the demand side (e.g., energy efficiency regulation), and these policies can be complemented by enabling
4 environments (Somanathan et al., 2014). Governments may also play a role in removing existent support for
5 incumbents (Kivimaa and Kern, 2016). A growing literature indicates that policy mixes, rather than single
6 policy instruments, are more effective in addressing climate innovation challenges ranging from technologies
7 in the R&D phase to those ready for diffusion (Veugelers, 2012; Quitzow, 2015; Rogge et al., 2017;
8 Rosenow et al., 2017). Such innovation policies can help address two kinds of externalities: environmental
9 externalities and proprietary problems (GEA, 2012; IPCC, 2014b; Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2017). To
10 avoid ‘picking winners’, governments often maintain a broad portfolio of technological options (Kverndokk
11 and Rosendahl, 2007) and work in close collaboration with the industrial sector and society in general. Some
12 governments have achieved relative success in supporting innovation policies (Grubler et al., 2012;
13 Mazzucato, 2013) that addressed climate-related R&D (see Box 4.7 on bioethanol in Brazil).

14
15 **[START BOX 4.7 HERE]**

16 **Box 4.7: Bioethanol in Brazil: Innovation and Lessons for Technology Transfer**

17
18 The use of sugarcane as a bioenergy source started in Brazil in the 1970s. Government and multinational car
19 factories modified car engines nationwide so that vehicles running only on ethanol could be produced. As
20 demand grew, production and distribution systems matured and costs came down (Soccol et al., 2010). After
21 a transition period in which ethanol-only and gasoline-only cars were used, the flex-fuel era started in 2003,
22 when all gasoline was blended with 25% ethanol (de Freitas and Kaneko, 2011). By 2010, around 80% of the
23 car fleet in Brazil had been converted to use flex-fuel (Goldemberg, 2011; Su et al., 2015).

24
25 More than forty years of combining technology push and market pull measures led to the deployment of
26 ethanol production, transportation and distribution systems across Brazil, leading to a significant decrease in
27 CO₂ emissions (Macedo et al., 2008). Examples of innovations include: 1) the development of
28 environmentally well-adapted varieties of sugarcane; 2) the development and scaling up of sugar
29 fermentation in a non-sterile environment, and 3) the development of adaptations of car engines to use
30 ethanol as a fuel isolated or in combination with gasoline (Amorim et al., 2011; de Freitas and Kaneko,
31 2011; de Souza et al., 2014). Public procurement, public investment in R&D and mandated fuel blends
32 accompanying these innovations were also crucial (Hogarth, 2017). In the future, innovation could lead to
33 viable partial carbon dioxide removal through deployment of BECCS associated with the bioethanol
34 refineries (Fuss et al., 2014; Rochedo et al., 2016) (see Section 4.3.7).

35
36 Ethanol appears to reduce urban car emission of health-affecting ultrafine particles by 30% compared to
37 gasoline-based cars, but increases ozone (Salvo et al., 2017). During the 1990s, when sugarcane burning was
38 still prevalent, particulate pollution had negative consequences for human health and the environment
39 (Ribeiro, 2008; Paraiso and Gouveia, 2015). While (Jaiswal et al., 2017) report bioethanol’s limited impact
40 on food production and forests in Brazil, despite the large scale, and attribute this to specific agro-ecological
41 zoning legislation, various studies report adverse effects of bioenergy production through forest substitution
42 by croplands (Searchinger et al., 2008), as well as impacts on biodiversity, water resources, and food security
43 (Rathore et al., 2016). For new generation biofuels, feasibility and life cycle assessment studies can provide
44 information on their impacts on environmental, economic, and social factors (Rathore et al., 2016).

45
46 Brazil and the European Union have tried to replicate Brazil’s bioethanol experience in climatically suitable
47 African countries. Although such technology transfer achieved relative success in Angola and Sudan, the
48 attempts to set up bioethanol value chains did not pass the phase of political deliberations and feasibility
49 studies elsewhere in Africa. Lessons learned include the need of political and economic stability of the donor
50 country (Brazil) and the necessity of market creation to attract investments in first-generation biofuels
51 alongside a safe legal and policy environment for improved technologies (Afionis et al., 2014; Favretto et al.,
52 2017).

53
54 **[END BOX 4.7 HERE]**

1 Funding for R&D could come from various sources, including the general budget, energy or resource
2 taxation, or emission trading schemes (see Section 4.4.5). Investing in climate-related R&D has as an
3 additional benefit of building capabilities to implement climate mitigation and adaptation technologies
4 (Ockwell et al., 2015). Countries regard innovation in general and climate technology specifically as a
5 national interests issue, and addressing climate change primarily as in the global interest. Reframing part of
6 climate policy as technology or industrial policy might therefore contribute to resolving the difficulties that
7 continue to plague emission target negotiations (Faehn and Isaksen, 2016; Fischer et al., 2017; Lachapelle et
8 al., 2017).

9
10 Climate technology transfer to emerging economies has happened regardless of international treaties, as
11 these countries have been keen to acquire them, and companies have an incentive to access emerging
12 markets to remain competitive (Glachant and Dechezleprêtre, 2016). However, the complexity of this
13 transfer processes is high and they have to be conducted carefully by governments and institutions (Favretto
14 et al., 2017). It is noticeable that the impact of the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) on innovation is
15 contested; recent work (based on lower carbon prices than anticipated for 1.5°C-consistent pathways)
16 indicates that it is limited (Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2016) but earlier assessments (Blanco et al., 2014)
17 indicate otherwise.

18 19 20 4.4.4.4 *Technology Transfer in the Paris Agreement*

21
22 Technology development and transfer is recognised as an enabler of both mitigation and adaptation in
23 Article 10 in the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) as well as in Article 4.5 of the original text of the
24 UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 1992). As previous sections have focussed on technology development and diffusion,
25 this section focuses on technology transfer. Technology transfer can adapt technologies to local
26 circumstances, reduce financing costs, develop indigenous technology, and build capabilities to operate,
27 maintain, adapt and innovate on technology globally (Ockwell et al., 2015; de Coninck and Sagar, 2017).
28 Technology cooperation could decrease global mitigation cost, and enhance developing countries' mitigation
29 contributions (Huang et al., 2017a).

30
31 The international institutional landscape around technology development and transfer includes the UNFCCC
32 (via its technology framework and technology mechanism including the Climate Technology Centre and
33 Network (CTCN)), the United Nations (a technology facilitation mechanism for the SDGs) and a variety of
34 non-UN multilateral and bilateral cooperation initiatives such as the Consultative Group on International
35 Agricultural Research (CGIAR, founded in the 1970s), and numerous initiatives of companies, foundations,
36 governments and non-governmental and academic organisations. Moreover, in 2015, twenty countries
37 launched an initiative called 'Mission Innovation', seeking to double their energy R&D funding. At this
38 point it is difficult to evaluate whether Mission Innovation achieved its objective (Sanchez and Sivaram,
39 2017). At the same time, the private sector started an initiative called the 'Breakthrough Energy Coalition'.

40
41 Most technology transfer is driven by through markets by the interests of technology seekers and technology
42 holders, in particular in regions with well-developed institutional and technological capabilities such as
43 developed and emerging nations (Glachant and Dechezleprêtre, 2016). However, the current international
44 technology transfer landscape has gaps, in particular in reaching out to least-developed countries, where
45 institutional and technology capabilities are limited (de Coninck and Puig, 2015; Ockwell and Byrne, 2016).
46 On the one hand, literature suggests that the management or even monitoring of all these UN, bilateral,
47 private and public initiatives may fail to lead to better results. On the other hand, it is probably more cost-
48 effective to adopt a strategy of 'letting a thousand flowers bloom', by challenging and enticing researchers in
49 the public and the private sector to direct innovation towards low-emission and adaptation options (Haselip
50 et al., 2015). This can be done at the same time as mission-oriented research is adopted in parallel by the
51 scientific community (Mazzucato, 2018).

52
53 At COP 21, the UNFCCC requested the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)
54 to initiate the elaboration of the technology framework established under the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC,
55 2015). Among other things, the technology framework would 'provide overarching guidance for the work of

1 the Technology Mechanism in promoting and facilitating enhanced action on technology development and
2 transfer in order to support the implementation of this Agreement' (this Agreement being the Paris
3 Agreement). An enhanced guidance issued by the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) for preparing a
4 Technology Action Plan (TAP) supports the new technology framework as well as Parties' long-term vision
5 on technology development and transfer, reflected in the Paris Agreement (TEC, 2016).
6
7

8 **4.4.5 Strengthening Policy Instruments and Enabling Climate Finance**

9

10 Triggering rapid and far-reaching change in technical choices and institutional arrangements, consumption
11 and lifestyles, infrastructure, land use and spatial patterns implies the ability to scale-up policy signals to
12 enable the decoupling of GHGs emission, and economic growth and development (Section 4.2.2.3). Such a
13 scale-up would also imply that potential short-term negative responses by populations and interest groups,
14 that could block these changes from the outset, would need to be prevented or overcome. This section
15 describes the size and nature of investment needs and the financial challenge over the coming two decades in
16 the context of 1.5°C warmer worlds, assesses the potential and constraints of three categories of policy
17 instruments that respond to the challenge, and explains the conditions for using them synergistically. The
18 policy and finance instruments discussed in this section relate to Section 4.4.1 (on governance) and other
19 Sections in 4.4.
20
21

22 **4.4.5.1 The Core Challenge: Cost Efficiency, Coordination of Expectations and Distributive Effects**

23

24 Box 4.8 shows that the average estimates by seven models of annual investments needs in the energy system
25 is around 2.38 trillion USD₂₀₁₀ (1,38 to 3,25) between 2016 and 2035. This represents between 2.53% (1.6%
26 to 4%) of the world GDP in Market Exchange Rates (MER) and 1.7% of the world GDP in purchasing
27 power parity (PPP). OECD investment assessments for a 2°C-consistent transition suggest that including
28 investments in transportation and in other infrastructure would increase the investment needs by a factor of
29 three. Other studies not included in Box 4.8, in particular by the World Economic Forum (World Economic
30 Forum, 2013) and the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate (GCEC, 2014) confirm these orders
31 of magnitude of investment.
32

33 **[START BOX 4.8 HERE]**
34

35 **Box 4.8: Investment Needs and the Financial Challenge of Limiting Warming to 1.5°C**

36

37 The peer-reviewed literature that estimates the investment needs to scale up the response to limit warming to
38 1.5°C is limited (see Section 4.6). This box attempts to bring together available estimates of the order of
39 magnitude of these investments to provide the context for global and national financial mobilisation policy
40 and related institutional arrangements.
41

42 Table 1 in this box presents mean annual investments up to 2035, based on three studies (after clarifying
43 their scope and harmonising their metrics): an ensemble of six integrated assessment models (See Chapter
44 2); an OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) scenario for a 2°C limit (OECD,
45 2017a) and scenarios from the International Energy Agency (IEA) (IEA, 2016c). All three sources provide
46 estimates for the energy sector for various for mitigation scenarios. The OECD estimate also covers
47 transportation and other infrastructure (water, sanitation, and telecommunication), which are essential to
48 deliver the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG7 on clean energy access, and enhance
49 the adaptive capacity to climate change.
50
51
52
53
54

1 **Box 4.8, Table 1:** Estimated annualised mitigation investment needed to stay well below 2°C (2015–2035 in trillion
 2 USD at market exchange rates)
 3

	Energy investments	Of which demand side	Transport	Other infra-structures	Total	Ratio to MER GDP
IAM Baseline (mean)	1.96	0.24			1.96	1.8%
IAM NDC (mean)	2.04	0.28			2.04	1.9%
IAM 2°C (mean)	2.19	0.38			2.19	2.1%
IAM 1.5°C (mean)	2.32	0.45			2.32	2.2%
IEA NDC	2.40	0.72	0.35		2.40	2.3%
IEA 1.5°C	2.76	1.13	0.55		2.76	2.7%
Mean IAM-IEA, 1.5°C	2.38	0.54			2.38	2.53%
Min IAM-IEA, 1.5°C	1.38	0.38			1.38	1.6%
Max IAM-IEA, 1.5°C	3.25	1.13			3.25	4.0%
<i>OECD Baseline</i>	<i>1.91</i>	<i>0.36</i>	<i>2.46</i>	<i>1.37</i>	<i>5.74</i>	<i>5.4%</i>
<i>OECD 2°C</i>	<i>2.13</i>	<i>0.40</i>	<i>2.73</i>	<i>1.52</i>	<i>6.38</i>	<i>6.0%</i>

4
 5 The mean incremental share of annual mitigation investments to stay well below 2°C is 0.36% (between 0.2–
 6 1%) of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over 2015–2035. Since Gross Fixed Capital Formation
 7 (GFCF) is about 24% of global GDP, the estimated incremental energy investments between a baseline and a
 8 1.5°C transition would be approximately 1.5% (between 0.8–4.2%) of projected total world investments.
 9 Given the uncertainty in these estimates, decision-makers could lower the probability of the most pessimistic
 10 assumptions by implementing policies to accelerate technical change (Section 4.4.5).
 11

12 While total incremental investment for a 2°C-consistent pathway, including for transportation and other
 13 infrastructure, is estimated at 2.5% of global GFCF, there is no comprehensive study or estimate of these
 14 investments for a 1.5°C limit. For a 1.5°C-consistent pathway, the anticipated incremental ‘other
 15 investments’ might be lower thanks to lower investment needs in adaptation.
 16

17 The issue, from a macroeconomic perspective, is whether these investments would be funded by higher
 18 savings at the costs of lower consumption. This would mean a 0.5% reduction in consumption for the energy
 19 sector for 1.5°C. Note that for a 2°C scenario, this reduction would be 0.8% if we account for the investment
 20 needs of all infrastructure sectors. Assuming a constant saving ratio, this can be enabled by reallocating
 21 existing capital flows towards infrastructure. In addition to these incremental investments, the amount of
 22 redirected investments is relevant from a financial perspective. In the reported Integrated Assessment Model
 23 (IAM) energy sector scenarios, about three times the incremental investments is redirected. There is no such
 24 assessment for the other sectors. The OECD report suggests that these ratios might be higher.
 25

26 These orders of magnitude of investment can be compared to the available statistics of the global stock of
 27 386 trillion USD of financial capital, which consists of 100 trillion USD in bonds (SIFMA, 2017), around 60
 28 trillion USD in equity (The World Bank Data, 2018), and 226 trillion USD of loans managed by the banking
 29 system (IIF, 2017)(World Bank, 2018a). The long term rate of return (interest plus increase of shareholder
 30 value) is about 3% on bonds, 5% on bank lending, 7% on equity, leading to a weighted mean cost of capital
 31 of 3.4% in real terms (5.4% in nominal terms). Using 3.4% as a lower bound and 5% as a higher bound
 32 (following (Piketty, 2014)) and taking a conservative assumption that global financial capital grows at the
 33 same rate as global GDP, the estimated financial capital revenues would be between 16.8 and 25.4 trillion
 34 USD.
 35

36 Assuming that a quarter of these investments comes from public funds (as estimated by the World Bank
 37 (World Bank, 2018a)), the amount of private resources needed to enable an energy sector transition is
 38 between 3.3% and 5.3% of annual capital income and between 5.6% and 8.3% of these revenues for all

1 infrastructure to meet the 2°C target and the SDGs.

2
3 Since the financial system has limited fungibility across budget lines, changing the partitioning of
4 investments is not a zero-sum game. An effective policy regime could encourage investment managers to
5 change their asset allocation. Part of the challenge may lie in increasing the pace of financing of low-
6 emission assets to compensate for a possible 38% decrease, by 2035, in the value of fossil fuel assets (energy
7 sector and indirect holdings in downstream uses like automobiles) (Mercure et al., 2018).

8
9
10 **[END BOX 4.8 HERE]**

11
12 The average increase of investment in the energy sector resulting from Box 4.8 represents a mean value of
13 1.5% of the global Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) compared with the baselines scenario in Market
14 Exchange Rate (MER) and a little over 1% in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Including infrastructure
15 investments would raise this to 2.5% and 1.7% respectively⁹.

16
17 These incremental investments could be funded through a drain on consumption (Bowen et al., 2017) which
18 would necessitate between 0.68% and 0.45% lower global consumption than in the baseline. But,
19 consumption at constant savings/consumption ratio can alternatively be funded by shifting savings towards
20 productive adaptation and mitigation investments, instead of real-estate sector and liquid financial products.
21 This response depends upon whether it is possible to close the global investment funding gap for
22 infrastructure that potentially inhibits growth, through structural changes in the global economy. In this case,
23 investing more in infrastructures would not be an incremental cost in terms of development and welfare
24 (IMF, 2014; Gurara et al., 2017)

25
26 Investments in other (non-energy system) infrastructure to meet development and poverty reduction goals
27 can strengthen the adaptive capacity to address climate change, and is difficult to separate from overall
28 sustainable development and poverty alleviation investments (Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017). The
29 magnitude of potential climate change damages is related to pre-existing fragility of impacted societies
30 (Hallegatte et al., 2007). Enhancing infrastructure and service provision would lower this fragility, for
31 example through the provision of universal (water, sanitation, telecommunication) service access (Arezki et
32 al., 2016).

33
34 The main challenge is thus not just a lack of mobilisation of aggregate resources but of redirection of savings
35 towards infrastructure, and the further redirection of these infrastructure investments towards low-emission
36 options. If emission-free assets emerge fast enough to compensate for the devaluation of high-emission
37 assets, the sum of the required incremental and redirected investments in the energy sector would (up to
38 2035) be equivalent to between 3.3% and 5.3% of the average annual revenues of the private capital stock
39 (see Box 4.8) and to 5.6% and 8.3%, including all infrastructure investments.

40
41 The interplay between mechanisms of financial intermediation and the private risk-return calculus is a major
42 barrier to realising these investments (Sirkis et al., 2015). This obstacle is not specific to climate mitigation
43 investments but also affects infrastructure and has been characterised as the gap between the ‘propensity to
44 save’ and the ‘propensity to invest’ (Summers, 2016). The issue is whether new financial instruments could
45 close this gap and inject liquidity into the low-emission transition, thereby unlocking new economic
46 opportunities (GCEC, 2014; NCE, 2016). By offsetting the crowding-out of other private and public
47 investments (Pollitt and Mercure, 2017) the ensuing ripple effect could reinforce growth and the
48 sustainability of development (King, 2011; Teulings and Baldwin, 2014) and potentially triggering a new
49 growth cycle (Stern, 2013, 2015). In this case, a massive mobilisation of low-emission investments would

⁹ A calculation in MER tends indeed to underestimate the world GDP and its growth by giving a lower weight to fast growing developing countries whereas a calculation in PPP tends to overestimate it. The difference between the value of two currencies in PPP and MER should vanish as the gap of the income levels of the two concerned countries decreases. Accounting for this trend in modelling is challenging.

1 require a significant effort, but may be complementary to sustainable development investments.

2 This uncertain but potentially positive outcome might be constrained by the higher energy costs of low-
3 emission options in the energy and transportation sectors. The price envelope of worldwide marginal
4 abatement costs for 1.5°C-consistent pathways reported in Chapter 2 is 135–475 USD tCO₂⁻¹ in 2030 and
5 245–1100 USD tCO₂⁻¹ in 2050, which is between two or three times higher than for a 2°C limit.

6 These figures are consistent with the dramatic reduction in the unit costs of some low-emission technical
7 options (for example solar PV, LED lighting) over the past decade (OECD, 2017c) (see Section 4.3.1). Yet,
8 there are multiple constraints to a system-wide energy transition. Lower costs of some supply and demand-
9 side options does not always result in a proportional decrease in energy system costs. The adoption of
10 alternative options can be slowed down by increasing costs of decommissioning existing infrastructure,
11 inertia of market structures, cultural habits and by risk-adverse user behaviour (see Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.3).
12 Learning-by-doing processes and R&D can accelerate the cost-efficiency of low-emission technology but
13 often imply higher early-phase costs. The German energy transition resulted in high consumer prices for
14 electricity in Germany (Kreuz and Müsgens, 2017) and needed strong accompanying measures to succeed.

15
16 One key issue is that energy costs can propagate across sectors amplifying overall production costs. During
17 the early stage of a low-emission transition, an increase in the prices of non-energy goods could cause lower
18 consumer purchasing power and final demand. A rise of energy prices has a proportionally greater impact in
19 developing countries that are in a catch-up phase, with strong dependence on energy-intensive sectors
20 (Crassous et al., 2006; Luderer et al., 2012) and a higher ratio of energy to labour cost (Waisman et al.,
21 2012). This explains why with lower carbon prices, similar emission reductions are reached in South Africa
22 (Altieri et al., 2016) and Brazil (La Rovere et al., 2017a) compared to developed countries. However, three
23 distributional issues emerge.

24
25 First, in the absence of countervailing policies, higher energy costs have an adverse effect on the distribution
26 of welfare (see also Chapter 5). The negative impact is inversely correlated with the level of income
27 (Harberger, 1984; Fleurbaey and Hammond, 2004) and positively correlated with the share of energy in the
28 households budget, which is high for low- and middle- income households (Proost and Van Regemorter,
29 1995; Barker and Kohler, 1998; West and Williams, 2004; Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha, 2011). Moreover,
30 climatic conditions and the geographical conditions of human settlements matter for heating and mobility
31 needs (see Chapter 5). Medium-income populations in the suburbs, remote and low-density regions can be as
32 vulnerable as residents of low-income urban areas. Poor households with low levels of energy consumption
33 are also impacted by price increases of non-energy goods caused by the propagation of energy costs (Combet
34 et al., 2010; Dubois, 2012). These impacts are generally not offset by non-market co-benefits of climate
35 policies for the poor (Baumgärtner et al., 2017).

36
37 A second matter of concern is the distortion of international competition and employment implications in
38 case of uneven carbon constraints, especially for energy-intensive industries (Demailly and Quirion, 2008).
39 Some of these industries are not highly exposed to international competition because of their very high
40 transportation costs per unit value added (Sartor, 2013; Branger et al., 2016), but other industries could suffer
41 severe shocks, generate ‘carbon leakage’ through cheaper imports from countries with lower carbon
42 constraints (Branger and Quirion, 2014) and weaken the surrounding regional industrial fabric with
43 economy-wide and employment implications.

44
45 A third challenge is the depreciation of assets whose value is based on the valuation of fossil energy
46 resources of which future revenues may decline precipitously with higher carbon prices (Waisman et al.,
47 2013; Jakob and Hilaire, 2015; McGlade and Ekins, 2015) and on emission-intensive capital stocks
48 (Guivarch and Hallegatte, 2011; OECD/IEA/NEA/ITF, 2015; Pfeiffer et al., 2016). This raises issues of
49 changes in industrial structure, adaptation of worker skills and of stability of financial, insurance and social
50 security systems. These systems are in part based on current holdings of carbon-based assets whose value
51 might decrease by 38% by the mid-2030s (Mercure et al., 2018). This stranded asset challenge may be
52 exacerbated by a decline of export revenues of fossil fuel producing countries and regions (Waisman et al.,
53 2013; Jakob and Hilaire, 2015; McGlade and Ekins, 2015).

54

1 These distributional issues, if addressed carefully and expeditiously, could affect popular sensitivity towards
 2 climate policies. Addressing them could mitigate adverse macroeconomic effects on economic growth and
 3 employment that could undermine the potential benefits of a redirection of savings and investments towards
 4 1.5°C-consistent pathways.

5 Strengthening policy instruments for a low-emission transition would thus need to reconcile three objectives:
 6 i) handling the short-term frictions inherent to this transition in an equitable way, ii) minimising these
 7 frictions by lowering the cost of avoided GHGs emissions, and iii) coordinating expectations of multiple
 8 stakeholders at various decision-making levels to accelerate the decline in costs of emission reduction,
 9 efficiency and decoupling options and maximising their co-benefits (see the practical example of lowering
 10 car use in cities in Box 4.9).

11

12 Three categories of policy tools would be available to meet the distributional challenges: carbon pricing,
 13 regulatory instruments and information and financial tools,. Each of them has its own strength and
 14 weaknesses, and in a 1.5°C perspective, policy tools would have to be both upscale and better coordinated in
 15 packages in a synergistic manner.

16

17 **[START BOX 4.9 HERE]**


18

19 **Box 4.9: Emerging cities and ‘peak car use’: Evidence of decoupling in Beijing**

20

21 The phenomenon of ‘peak car use’, or reductions in per capita car use, provides hope for continuing
 22 reductions in greenhouse gas from oil consumption (Millard-Ball and Schipper, 2011; Newman and
 23 Kenworthy, 2011; Goodwin and Van Dender, 2013). The phenomenon has been mostly associated with
 24 developed cities apart from some early signs in Eastern Europe, Latin America and China (Newman and
 25 Kenworthy, 2015). New research indicates that peak car is now also underway in China (Gao and Newman,
 26 2018).


27 China’s rapid urban motorisation has resulted from strong economic growth, fast urban development and the
 28 prosperity of the Chinese automobile industry (Gao and Kenworthy, 2015). However, recent data (Gao and
 29 Newman, 2018) suggest the first signs of a break in the growth of car use expressed in percentage of daily
 30 trips as the growth in mass transit, primarily caused by the expansion of Metro systems, is becoming more
 31 significant (see Box 4.9, Figure 1).



32

1 **Box 4.9, Figure 1:** The modal split data in Beijing between 1986 and 2014. Source: (Gao and Newman, 2018).

2
3 Chinese urban fabrics, featuring traditional dense linear forms and mixed land use, favour mass transit
4 systems over automobiles (Gao and Newman, 2018). The data show that the decline in car use did not
5 impede economic development but Vehicle Kilometres of Travel (VKT) growth has decoupled absolutely
6 from GDP as shown in Box 4.9, Figure 2 below.
7



8 **Box 4.9, Figure 2:** Peak car in Beijing: relationships between economic performance and private automobile use in
9 Beijing from 1986 to 2014. VKT is Vehicle Kilometres of Travel. Source: (Gao and Newman, 2018).
10

11 **[END BOX 4.9 HERE]**

12 4.4.5.2 Carbon Pricing: Necessity and Constraints

13
14
15 For long, economic literature has argued that climate and energy policy only grounded in regulation,
16 standards and public funding of R&D is at risk of being influenced by political and administrative
17 arbitrariness, which could raise the costs of implementation. This literature has argued that it may be more
18 efficient to make these costs explicit through carbon taxes and carbon trading, securing the abatement of
19 emissions in places and sectors where it is cheapest (IPCC, 1995, 2001; Gupta et al., 2007; Somanathan et
20 al., 2014).
21
22

23 In a frictionless world, a unique world carbon price could minimise the social costs of the low carbon
24 transition by equating the marginal costs of abatement across all sources of emissions. This implies that
25 investors will be able to make the right choices under perfect foresight and that domestic and international
26 compensatory transfers offset the adverse distributional impacts of higher energy prices and their
27 consequences on economic activity. In the absence of transfers targeted in function of countries market
28 structures (Boeters, 2014), carbon prices are no longer optimal (Böhringer et al. 2009; Böhringer and
29 Alexeeva-Talebi 2013) and need to be differentiated by jurisdiction (Chichilnisky and Heal, 2000; Sheeran,
30 2006) in function of the countries' social welfare function. This differentiation could in turn raise concerns
31 of distortions in international competition (Hourcade et al., 2001; Stavins et al., 2014).

32 Obstacles to enforcing a unique world carbon price in the short-run would not necessarily crowd out explicit
33 national carbon pricing, for three reasons. First, it could restrain an emissions rebound due to a higher
34 consumption of energy services enabled by efficiency gains, if energy prices do not change (Greening et al.,
35 2000; Fleurbaey and Hammond, 2004; Sorrell et al., 2009; Guivarch and Hallegatte, 2011; Chitnis and
36 Sorrell, 2015; Freire-González, 2017). Second, it could hedge against the arbitrariness of regulatory policies.
37 Third, 'revenue neutral' recycling, at a constant share of taxes on GDP, into lowering some existing taxes

1 compensates at least part of the propagation effect of higher energy costs (Stiglitz et al., 2017). The
2 substitution by carbon taxes of taxes that cause distortions on the economy can counteract the regressive
3 effect of higher energy prices. For example, offsetting increased carbon prices with lower labour taxes can
4 potentially decrease labour costs (without affecting salaries), enhance employment and reduce the
5 attractiveness of informal economic activity (Goulder, 2013).

6
7 The conditions under which an economic gain along with climate benefit (a ‘double dividend’) can be
8 expected are well documented (Goulder, 1995; Bovenberg, 1999; Mooij, 2000)
9 . In the context of OECD countries, the literature examines how carbon taxation could substitute for other
10 taxes to fund the social security system (Combet, 2013). The same general principles apply for countries that
11 are building their social welfare system such as China (Li and Wang, 2012) or Brazil (La Rovere et al.,
12 2017a) but an optimal recycling scheme could differ based on the structure of the economy (Lefèvre et al.
13 2018).

14
15 In every country the design of carbon pricing policy implies a balance between incentivising low-carbon
16 behaviour and mitigating the adverse distributional consequences of higher energy prices (Combet et al.,
17 2010). Carbon taxes can offset these effects if their revenues are redistributed through rebates to poor
18 households. Other options include the reduction of value added taxes for basic products or direct benefit
19 transfers to enable poverty reduction (see (Winkler et al., 2017) for South Africa and (Grottera et al., 2016)
20 for Brazil). This is possible because higher income households pay more in absolute terms, even though their
21 carbon tax burden is a relatively smaller share of their income (Arze del Granado et al., 2012).

22
23 Ultimately, the pace of increase of carbon prices would depend on the pace at which they can be embedded
24 in a consistent set of fiscal and social policies. This is why, after a quarter century of academic debate and
25 experimentation (see IPCC WGIII reports since the SAR), a gap persists with respect to ‘switching carbon
26 prices’ needed to trigger rapid changes. In 2016, only 15% of global emissions are covered by carbon
27 pricing, three-quarters of which with prices below 10 USD tCO₂⁻¹ (World Bank, 2016). This is too low to
28 outweigh the ‘noise’ from the volatility of oil markets (in the range of 100 USD tCO₂⁻¹ over the past decade),
29 of other price dynamics (interest rates, currency exchange rates and real estate prices) and of regulatory
30 policies in energy, transportation and industry. For example, the dynamics of mobility depend upon a trade-
31 off between housing prices and transportation costs in which the price of real estate and the inert
32 endowments in public transport play as important a role as liquid fuel prices (Lampin et al., 2013).

33
34 These considerations apply to attempts to secure a minimum price in carbon trading systems (Wood and
35 Jotzo, 2011; Fell et al., 2012; Fuss et al., 2018) and to the reduction of fossil fuel subsidies. Estimated at 650
36 billion USD in 2015 (Coady et al., 2017), they represent 25–30% of government revenues in forty (mostly
37 developing) countries (IEA, 2014b). Reducing these subsidies would contribute to reaching 1.5°C-consistent
38 pathways, but raises similar issues as carbon pricing around long-term benefits and short-term costs (Jakob et
39 al., 2015; Zeng and Chen, 2016), as well as social impacts.

40
41 Explicit carbon prices are thus a necessary ‘lubricant’ to accommodate the general equilibrium effects
42 of higher energy prices but may not suffice to trigger the low-carbon transition because of a persistent
43 ‘implementation gap’ between the aspirational carbon prices and those that can practically be
44 enforced. When systemic changes, such as those needed for 1.5°C-consistent pathways, are at play on
45 many dimensions of development, price levels ‘depend on the path and the path depends on political
46 decisions’ (Dréze and Stern, 1990).

47 48 49 *4.4.5.3 Regulatory measures and information flows*

50
51 Regulatory instruments are a common tool for improving energy efficiency and enhancing renewable energy
52 in OECD countries (e.g., US, Japan, Korea, Australia, the EU) and, more recently, in developing countries
53 (M.H. Scott et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2017) including constraints on the import of products banned in other
54 countries (Knoop and Lechtenböhmer, 2017).

1 For energy efficiency, these instruments include end-use standards and labelling for domestic appliances,
2 lighting, electric motors, water heaters and air-conditioners. They are often complemented by mandatory
3 efficiency labels to attract consumers' attention and stimulate the manufacture of more efficient products
4 (Girod et al., 2017). Experience shows that these policy instruments are effective only if they are regularly
5 reviewed to follow technological developments, as in the 'Top Runner' programme for domestic appliances
6 in Japan (Sunikka-Blank and Iwafune, 2011).

7
8 In four countries, efficiency standards (e.g. miles/gallon or level of CO₂ emission per km) have been used in
9 the transport sector, for light and heavy-duty vehicles, which have spill-overs for the global car industry. In
10 the EU (Ajanovic and Haas, 2017) and the US (Sen et al., 2017) vehicle manufacturers need to meet an
11 annual CO₂ emission target for their entire new vehicle fleet. This allows them to compensate through the
12 introduction of low-emission vehicles for the high-emission ones in the fleet. This leads to increasingly
13 efficient fleets of vehicles over time, but does not necessarily limit the driven distance.

14
15 Building codes that prescribe efficiency requirements for new and existing buildings have been adopted in
16 many OECD countries (Evans et al., 2017) and are regularly revised to increase their efficiency per unit of
17 floor space. Building codes can avoid the lock-in of rapidly urbanising countries to poorly performing
18 buildings that remain in use for the next 50–100 years (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2014). In OECD countries,
19 however, their main role is to incentivise the retrofit of existing buildings. In addition of the convergence of
20 these codes to Net Zero Energy Buildings (D'Agostino, 2015), a new focus should be placed, in the context
21 of 1.5°C-consistent pathways, on public and private co-ordination to achieve better integration of building
22 policies with the promotion of low-emission transportation modes (Bertoldi, 2017).

23
24 The efficacy of regulatory instruments can be reinforced by economic incentives, such as feed-in tariffs
25 based on the quantity of renewable energy produced, subsidies or tax exemptions for energy savings
26 (Bertoldi et al., 2013; Ritzenhofen and Spinler, 2016; García-Álvarez et al., 2017; Pablo-Romero et al.,
27 2017), fee-bates, and 'bonus-malus' that foster the penetration of low-emission options (Butler and Neuhoff,
28 2008). Economic incentives can also be combined with direct use market-based instruments, for example
29 combining, in the United States and, in some EU countries, carbon trading schemes with Energy Savings
30 Obligations for energy retailers (Haoqi et al., 2017), or with Green Certificates for renewable energy
31 portfolio standards (Upton and Snyder, 2017). Scholars have investigated caps on utilities' energy sales
32 (Thomas et al., 2017) and emission caps at a personal level (Fawcett et al., 2010).

33
34 In combination with the funding of public research institutes, grants or subsidies also support R&D, where
35 risk and the uncertainty about long-term perspectives can reduce the private sector's willingness to invest in
36 low-emission innovation (see also Section 4.4.4). Subsidies can take the form of rebates on Value-Added
37 Tax (VAT), of direct support to investments (e.g. renewable energy or refurbishment of buildings) or feed-in
38 tariffs (Mir-Artigues and del Río, 2014). They can be provided by the public budget, via consumption levies,
39 or via the revenues of carbon taxes or pricing. Fee-bates, introduced in some countries (for example for cars),
40 have had a neutral impact on public budgets by incentivising low-emission products and penalising high-
41 emission ones (de Haan et al., 2009).

42
43 All policy instruments can benefit from information campaigns (e.g., TV ads) tailored to specific end-users.
44 A vast majority of public campaigns on energy and climate have been delivered through mass-media
45 channels, and advertising-based approaches (Corner and Randall, 2011; Doyle, 2011). Although some
46 authors report large savings obtained by such campaigns, most agree that the effects are short-lived and
47 decrease over time (Bertoldi et al., 2016). Recently, focus has been placed on the use of social norms to
48 motivate behavioural changes (Allcott, 2011; Alló and Loureiro, 2014). More on strategies to change
49 behaviour can be found in section 4.4.3.

50 51 52 *4.4.5.4 Scaling-up Climate Finance and De-Risking Low-Emission Investments*

53
54 The redirection of savings towards low-emission investments may be constrained by enforceable carbon
55 prices, implementation of technical standards and the short-term bias financial systems (Miles, 1993;

1 Bushee, 2001; Black and Fraser, 2002). The many causes of this bias are extensively analysed in economic
2 literature (Tehrani and Waagelein, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000)
3 including their link with prevailing patterns of economic globalisation (Krugman, 2009; Rajan, 2011) and the
4 chronic under-investment in long-term infrastructure (IMF, 2014). Emerging literature explores how to
5 overcome this through reforms targeted to bridge the gap between short-term cash balances and long-term
6 low-emission assets and to reduce the risk-weighted capital costs of climate-resilient investments. This gap
7 was qualified by the Governor of the Bank of England as a Tragedy of the Horizons (Carney, 2016) that
8 constitutes a threat to the stability of the financial system, is confirmed by the literature (Arezki et al., 2016;
9 Christophers, 2017). This potential threat would encompass the impact of climate events on the value of
10 assets (Battiston et al., 2017), liability risks (Heede, 2014) and the transition risk due to devaluation of
11 certain classes of assets (Platinga and Scholtens, 2016).

12
13 The financial community's attention to climate change grew after COP 15 (ESRB ASC, 2016). This led to
14 the introduction of climate-related risk disclosure in financial portfolios (UNEP, 2015) placing it on the
15 agenda of G20 Green Finance Study Group and of the Financial Stability Board. This led to the creation of
16 low-carbon financial indices that investors could consider as a 'free option on carbon' to hedge against risks
17 of stranded carbon intensive assets (Andersson et al., 2016). This could also accelerate the emergence of
18 climate-friendly financial products such as green or climate bonds, The estimated value of the Green bonds
19 market in 2017 is USD 200 billion (BNEF, 2017). The bulk of these investments are in renewable energy,
20 energy efficiency and low-emission transport (Lazurko and Venema, 2017), with only 4% for adaptation
21 (OECD, 2017b). One major issue is whether individual strategies based on improved climate-related
22 information alone will enable the financial system to allocate capital in an optimal way (Christophers, 2017)
23 since climate change is a systemic risk (Schoenmaker and van Tilburg, 2016) (CISL, 2015).

24
25 The readiness of financial actors to reduce investments in fossil fuels is a real trend (Platinga and
26 Scholtens, 2016; Ayling and Gunningham, 2017) but they may not resist the attractiveness of carbon-
27 intensive investments in many regions. Hence, decarbonising an investment portfolio is not synonymous
28 with investing massively in low-emission infrastructure. Scaling up climate-friendly financial products
29 may depend upon a business context conducive to the reduction of the risk-weighted capital costs of low-
30 emission projects. The typical leverage of public funding mechanisms for low-emission investment is low
31 (2 to 4) compared with (10 to 15) in other sectors (Maclean et al., 2008; Ward et al., 2009; MDB, 2016).
32 This is due to the interplay of the uncertainty of emerging low-emission technologies in the midst of their
33 learning-by-doing cycle, and of uncertain future revenues due to volatility of fossil fuel prices (Roques et
34 al., 2008; Gross et al., 2010) and of uncertainty around regulatory policies. This inhibits low-emission
35 investments by corporations functioning under a 'shareholder value business regime' (Berle and Means,
36 1932; Froud et al., 2000; Roe, 2001) and actors with restricted access to capital (e.g. cities, local
37 authorities, SMEs and households).

38
39 De-risking policy instruments to enable low-emission investment encompass interest rate subsidies, fee-
40 bates, tax breaks, concessional loans from development banks, and public investment funds, including
41 revolving funds. Given the constraints on public budgets, public guarantees can be used to secure high
42 leverage of public financing. They imply a full direct burden on public budgets only in case of default of
43 the project. They could back for example various forms of Green Infrastructure Funds (De Gouvello and
44 Zelenko, 2010; Emin et al., 2014; Studart and Gallagher, 2015)¹⁰.

45
46 The risk of defaulting can be mitigated by strong Measurement, Reporting and Verifying (MRV) systems
47 (Bellassen et al., 2015) and by the use of notional prices recommended in public economics and currently
48 in use in France and the UK, to calibrate public support to the provision of public goods in case of
49 persisting distortions in pricing (Stiglitz et al., 2017). Some suggest linking these notional prices to
50 'social, economic and environmental value of voluntary mitigation actions' recognised by the COP21
51 Decision accompanying the Paris Agreement (paragraph 108) (Hourcade et al., 2015; La Rovere et al.,
52 2017b; Shukla et al., 2017), in order to incorporate the co-benefits of mitigation.

53

¹⁰ One prototype is the World Bank's Pilot Auction Facility on Methane and Climate Change

1 Such public guarantees ultimately amount to money issuance backed by low-emission projects as
2 collateral. This explains the potentially strong link between global climate finance and the evolution of
3 the financial and monetary system. Amongst suggested mechanisms for this evolution are the use of
4 International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) Special Drawing Rights to fund the paid-in capital of the Green
5 Climate Fund (Bredenkamp and Pattillo, 2010) and the creation of carbon remediation assets at a
6 predetermined face value per avoided tonne of emissions (Aglietta et al., 2015a, b). Such a predetermined
7 value could hedge against the fragmentation of climate finance initiatives and support the emergence of
8 financial products backed by a new class of long-term assets.

9
10 Combining public guarantees at a predetermined value of avoided emissions, in addition to improving the
11 consistency of non-price measures, could support the emergence of financial products backed by a new
12 class of certified assets to attract savers in search of safe and ethical investments (Aglietta et al., 2015b).
13 It could hedge against the fragmentation of climate finance initiatives and provide a mechanism to
14 compensate for the 'stranded' assets caused by divestment in carbon-based activities and in lowering the
15 systemic risk of stranded assets (Safarzyńska and van den Bergh, 2017). These new assets could also
16 facilitate a low-carbon transition for fossil-fuel producers and help them to overcome the 'resource curse'
17 (Ross, 2015; Venables, 2016).

18
19 Blended injection of liquidity has monetary implications. Some argue that this questions the premise that
20 money should remain neutral (Annicchiarico and Di Dio, 2015, 2016; Nikiforos and Zezza, 2017).
21 Central Banks or financial regulators could act as a facilitator of last resort for low-emission financing
22 instruments, that could in turn lower the systemic risk of stranded assets (Safarzyńska and van den Bergh,
23 2017). This may, in time, lead to the use of carbon-based monetary instruments to diversify reserve
24 currencies (Jaeger et al., 2013) and differentiate reserve requirements (Rozenberg et al., 2013) in the
25 perspective of a Climate Friendly Bretton Woods (Sirkis et al., 2015; Stua, 2017).

26 27 28 *4.4.5.5 Financial Challenge for Basic Needs and Adaptation Finance*

29
30 Adaptation finance is difficult to quantify for two reasons. The first is that it is very difficult to isolate
31 specific investment needs to enhance climate resilience from the provision of basic infrastructure that are
32 currently underinvested (IMF, 2014; Gurara et al., 2017). The UNEP (2016) estimate of investment needs on
33 adaptation in developing countries between 140–300 billion USD yr⁻¹ in 2030, a major part being investment
34 expenditures that are complementary with SDG-related investments focussed on universal access to
35 infrastructure and services and meeting basic needs. Many climate adaptation-centric financial incentives are
36 relevant to non-market services, offering fewer opportunities for market revenues while they contribute to
37 creating resilience to climate impacts.

38 Hence, adaptation investments and the provision of basic needs would typically have to be supported by
39 national and sub-national government budgets together with support from overseas development assistance
40 and multilateral development banks (Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub, 2011; Adenle et al., 2017; Robinson
41 and Dornan, 2017), and a slow increase of dedicated NGO and private climate funds (Nakhoda and Watson,
42 2016). Even though the UNEP estimates of the costs of adaptation might be lower in a 1.5°C world (Climate
43 Analytics, 2015) they would be higher than the UNEP 22.5 USD billion estimates of the bilateral and
44 multilateral funding for climate change adaptation in 2014. Currently, 18–25% of climate finance flows to
45 adaptation in developing countries (OECD, 2015, 2016a; Shine and Campillo, 2016). It remains fragmented,
46 with small proportions flowing through UNFCCC channels (AdaptationWatch, 2015; Roberts and
47 Weikmans, 2017).

48
49 Means of raising resources for adaptation, achieving the SDG and meeting basic needs (Durand et al., 2016;
50 Roberts et al., 2017) include the reduction of fossil fuel subsidies (Jakob et al., 2016), increasing revenues
51 from carbon taxes (Jakob et al., 2016), levies on international aviation and maritime transport and share of
52 the proceeds of financial arrangements supporting mitigation activities (Keen et al., 2013). Each have
53 different redistribution implications. Challenges, however, include the efficient use of resources, the
54 emergence of long-term assets using infrastructure as collateral and the capacity to implement small-scale

1 adaptation and the mainstreaming of adaptation in overall development policies. There is thus a need for
2 greater policy coordination (Fankhauser and McDermott, 2014; Morita and Matsumoto, 2015; Sovacool
3 et al., 2015, 2017; Lemos et al., 2016; Adenle et al., 2017; Peake and Ekins, 2017) that includes robust
4 mechanisms for tracking, reporting, and ensuring transparency of adaptation finance (Donner et al., 2016;
5 Pauw et al., 2016a; Roberts and Weikmans, 2017; Trabacchi and Buchner, 2017) and its consistency with the
6 provision of basic needs (Hallegatte et al., 2016).

9 *4.4.5.6 Towards Integrated Policy Packages and Innovative Forms of Financial Cooperation*

10 Carbon prices, regulation and standards, improved information and appropriate financial instruments can
11 work synergistically to meet the challenge of ‘making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards
12 low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development’, as in Article 2 in the Paris Agreement.
13

14
15 There is growing attention to combine the use of policy instruments that actually address three
16 domains of action: the behavioural changes, the economic optimisation and the long-term strategies
17 (Grubb et al., 2014). For example, de-risking low-emission investments would result in higher
18 volumes of low-emission investments, and would in turn lead to a lower switching price for the
19 same climate ambition (Hirth and Steckel, 2016). In the reverse direction, higher explicit carbon
20 prices may generate more low-emission projects for a given quantum of de-risking. For example,
21 efficiency standards for housing can increase the efficacy of carbon prices and overcome the barriers
22 coming from the high discount rates used by households (Parry et al., 2014), while explicit and
23 notional carbon prices can lower the risk of arbitrary standards. The calibration of innovative
24 financial instruments to notional carbon prices could encourage large multinational companies to
25 increase their level of internal carbon prices (UNEP, 2016). These notional prices could be higher than
26 explicit carbon prices because they redirect new hardware investments without an immediate impact
27 on existing capital stocks and associated interests.

28
29 Literature however shows that conflicts between poorly articulated policy instruments can undermine
30 their efficiency (Lecuyer and Quirion, 2013; Bhattacharya et al., 2017; García-Álvarez et al., 2017). As has
31 been illustrated in Europe, commitment uncertainty and lack of credibility of regulation have consistently led
32 to low carbon prices in the case of the EU Emission Trading System (ETS; Koch et al., 2014; 2016). A
33 comparative study shows how these conflicts can be avoided by policy packages that integrate many
34 dimensions of public policies and are designed to match institutional and social context of each country and
35 region (Bataille et al., 2015).

36
37 Even though policy packages depend upon domestic political processes, they might not reinforce the NDCs
38 at a level consistent with the 1.5°C transition without a conducive international setting where international
39 development finance plays a critical role. Section 4.4.1 explores the means of mainstreaming climate finance
40 in the current evolution of the lending practices of national and multilateral bank (Badré, 2018). This could
41 facilitate the access of developing countries to loans via bond markets at low interest rates,
42 encouragement of the emergence of new business models for infrastructure, and encouragement of
43 financial markets to support small-scale investments (Déau and Touati, 2017).

44
45 These financial innovations may involve non-state public actors like cities and regional public authorities
46 that govern infrastructure investment, enable energy and food systems transitions and manage urban
47 dynamics (Cartwright, 2015). They would help for example in raising USD 4.5–5.4 trillion yr⁻¹ from 2015 to
48 2030 announced by the Cities Climate Finance Leadership Alliance (CCFLA, 2016) to achieve the
49 commitments by the Covenant of Mayors of many cities to long-term climate targets (Kona et al., 2018).

50
51 The evolution of global climate financial cooperation may involve Central Banks, financial regulatory
52 authorities, multilateral and commercial banks. There are still knowledge gaps about the form,
53 structure and potential of these arrangements. They could be viewed as a form of a burden-sharing
54 between high, medium and low-income countries to enhance, the deployment of ambitious Nationally

1 Determined Contributions (NDCs), and new forms of Common But Differentiated Responsibility and
 2 Respective Capabilities (Edenhofer et al., 2015; Hourcade et al., 2015; Ji and Sha, 2015).

3 4 5 **4.5 Integration and Enabling Transformation**

6 7 **4.5.1 Assessing Feasibility of Options for Accelerated Transitions**

8
9 Chapter 2 shows that 1.5°C-consistent pathways involve rapid, global climate responses to reach net-zero
 10 emissions by mid-century or earlier. Chapter 3 identifies climate change risks and impacts to which the
 11 world would need to adapt to, during these transitions and additional risks and impacts during potential
 12 1.5°C overshoot pathways. The feasibility of these pathways is contingent upon systemic change (Section
 13 4.3) and enabling conditions (Section 4.4), including policy packages. This section assesses the feasibility of
 14 options (technologies, actions and measures) that form parts of global systems under transition that make up
 15 1.5°C-consistent pathways (Section 4.3).

16
17 Following the assessment framework developed in Chapter 1, economic and technological; institutional and
 18 socio-cultural; and environmental and geophysical feasibility are considered, and applied in to system
 19 transitions (Sections 4.3.1–4.3.4), overarching adaptation options (Section 4.3.5) and to Carbon Dioxide
 20 Removal (CDR) options (Section 4.3.7). This is done to assess the multi-dimensional feasibility of
 21 mitigation and adaptation options that have seen considerable development and change since AR5. In the
 22 case of adaptation, the assessed AR5 options are typically clustered, for example, all options related to
 23 energy infrastructure resilience, independently of the generation source, are categorised as ‘resilience of
 24 power infrastructure’.

25
26 Table 4.10 presents sets of indicators against which the multi-dimensional feasibility of individual adaptation
 27 options relevant to limiting warming of 1.5°C, and mitigation options along 1.5°C-consistent pathways, are
 28 assessed.

29
30 **Table 4.10:** Sets of indicators against which the feasibility of adaptation and mitigation are assessed, for each feasibility
 31 dimension (in Sections 4.3.1-4.3.4, 4.3.5 and 4.3.7)
 32

	Characteristics	Adaptation indicators	Mitigation indicators
	Economic	Micro-economic viability Macro-economic viability Socio-economic vulnerability reduction potential Employment & productivity enhancement potential	Cost-effectiveness Absence of distributional effects Employment & productivity enhancement potential
	Technological	Technical resource availability Risks mitigation potential	Technical scalability Maturity Simplicity Absence of risk
	Institutional	Political acceptability Legal & regulatory feasibility Institutional capacity & administrative feasibility Transparency & accountability potential	Political acceptability Legal & administrative feasibility Institutional capacity Transparency & accountability potential
	Socio-cultural	Social co-benefits (health, education) Socio-cultural acceptability Social & regional inclusiveness Intergenerational equity	Social co-benefits (health, education) Public acceptance Social & regional inclusiveness Intergenerational equity Human capabilities

	Environmental/ecological	Ecological capacity Adaptive capacity/ resilience building potential	Reduction of air pollution Reduction of toxic waste Reduction of water use Improved biodiversity
	Geophysical	Physical feasibility Land use change enhancement potential Hazard risk reduction potential	Physical feasibility (physical potentials) Limited use of land Limited use of scarce (geo)physical resources Global spread

1 The feasibility assessment takes the following steps. First, each of the mitigation and adaptation options is
 2 assessed along the relevant indicators grouped around six feasibility dimensions: economic, technological,
 3 institutional, socio-cultural, environmental/ecological and geophysical. Three types feasibility groupings
 4 were assessed from the underlying literature: first, if the indicator could block the feasibility of this option,
 5 second, if the indicator has neither a positive, nor a negative effect on the feasibility of the option or the
 6 evidence is mixed, and third if the indicator does not pose any barrier to the feasibility of this option. The full
 7 assessment of each option under each indicator, including the literature references on which the assessment
 8 is based, can be found in supplementary materials 4.SM.4.2 and 4.SM.4.3. When appropriate, it is indicated
 9 that there is no evidence (NE), limited evidence (LE) or that the indicator is not applicable to the option
 10 (NA).

11 Next, for each feasibility dimension and option, the overall feasibility for a given dimension is assessed as
 12 the mean of combined scores of the relevant underlying indicators, and classified into ‘insignificant barriers’
 13 (2.5 to 3), ‘mixed or moderate but still existent barriers’ (1.5 to 2.5) or ‘significant barriers’ (below 1.5) to
 14 feasibility. Indicators assessed as NA, LE or NE are not included in this overall assessment (see
 15 supplementary material 4.SM.4.1 for the averaging and weighing guidance).

16 The results are summarised in Table 4.11 (for mitigation options) and Table 4.12 (for adaptation options) for
 17 each of the six feasibility dimensions: where dark shading indicates few feasibility barriers; moderate
 18 shading indicates that there are some barriers and light shading that multiple barriers, in this dimension, may
 19 block implementation.

20 A three-step process of independent validation and discussion by authors and reviewers was undertaken to
 21 make this assessment as robust as possible within the scope of this special report. It must however, be
 22 recognised that this is an indicative assessment at global scale, and both policy and implementation at
 23 regional, national and local level would need to adapt and build on this knowledge, within the particular
 24 local context and constraints.

27 **4.5.2 Implementing Mitigation**

29 This section builds on the insights on mitigation options in Section 4.3, applies the assessment methodology
 30 along feasibility dimensions and indicators explained in Section 4.5.1, and synthesises the assessment of the
 31 enabling conditions in Section 4.4.

34 **4.5.2.1 Assessing of Mitigation Options for Limiting Warming to 1.5°C Against Feasibility Dimensions**

36 An assessment of the degree to which examples of 1.5°C-relevant mitigation options face barriers to
 37 implementation, and on which contexts this depends, is summarised in Table 4.11. An explanation of the
 38 approach is given in Section 4.5.1 and in supplementary material 4.SM.4.1. Selected options were mapped
 39 onto system transitions and clustered through an iterative process of literature review, expert feedback, and
 40 responses to reviewer comments. The detailed assessment and the literature underpinning the assessment can

1 be found in supplementary material 4.SM.4.2.

2

3 The feasibility framework in Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1 highlights that the feasibility of mitigation
4 and adaptation options depends on many factors. Many of those are captured in the indicators in Table 4.10,
5 but many depend on the specific context in which an option features. Since this Special Report did not have
6 the mandate, space nor the literature base to undertake a regionally specific assessment. Hence the
7 assessment is caveated as providing a broad indication of where the global barriers are likely to ignoring
8 significant regional diversity. Regional and context-specific literature is also just emerging as recorded in
9 knowledge gaps (Section 4.6). Nevertheless, in Table 4.11, an indicative attempt has been made to capture
10 some relevant contextual information. The 'context' column indicates what contextual factors may affect the
11 feasibility of an option, including regional differences. For instance, solar irradiation in an area impacts the
12 cost-effectiveness of solar Photovoltaic (PV), so solar irradiation is mentioned in this column.

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Table 4.11: Feasibility assessment of examples of 1.5°C-relevant mitigation options with dark shading signifying the absence of barriers in the feasibility dimension, moderate shading that on average, the dimension does not have a positive, nor a negative effect on the feasibility of the option, and faint shading the presence of potentially blocking barriers. No shading means that not sufficient literature could be found to make the assessment. Evidence and agreement assessment is undertaken at the option level. The context column on the far right indicates how the assessment might change if contextual factors are different. For the methodology and literature basis, see supplementary material 4.SM.4.1 and 4.SM.4.2.

System	Mitigation option	Evidence	Agreement	Ec	Tec	Inst	Soc	Env	Geo	Context
Energy system transitions	Wind energy (on-shore & off-shore)	Robust	Medium							Wind regime, economic status, space for windfarms and enhanced by legal framework for independent power producers affect uptake; cost-effectiveness affected by incentive regime.
	Solar PV	Robust	High							Cost-effectiveness affected by solar irradiation and incentive regime. Also enhanced by legal framework for independent power producers affect uptake.
	Bioenergy	Robust	Medium							Depends on availability of biomass and land and capability to manage sustainable land use. Distributional effects depend on the agrarian (or other) system used to produce feedstock.
	Electricity storage	Robust	High							Batteries universal but grid flexible resources vary with area's level of development
	Power sector CCS	Robust	High							Varies with local CO2 storage capacity, presence of legal framework, level of development and quality of public engagement
	Nuclear energy	Robust	High							Electricity market organisation, legal framework, standardisation & know-how, country's 'democratic fabric', institutional and technical capacity, and safety culture of public and private institutions
Land & ecosystem transitions	Reduced food wastage & efficient food production	Robust	High							Will depend on the combination of individual and institutional behaviour
	Dietary shifts	Medium	High							Depends on individual behaviour, education, cultural factors and institutional support
	Sustainable intensification of agriculture	Medium	High							Depends on development and deployment of new technologies
	Ecosystems restoration	Medium	High							Depends on location and institutional factors
Urban	Land-use & urban planning	Robust	Medium							Varies with urban fabric, not geography or economy; requires capacitated local government and legitimate tenure system

	Electric cars and buses	Medium	High							Varies with degree of government intervention; requires capacity to retrofit “fuelling” stations
	Sharing schemes	Limited	Medium							Historic schemes universal new ones depend on ICT status; undermined by high crime and low levels of law enforcement
	Public transport	Robust	Medium							Depends on presence of existing ‘informal’ taxi systems, which may be more cost effective and affordable than capital intensive new build schemes, as well as (local) government capabilities
	Non-motorised transport	Robust	High							Viability rests on linkages with public transport, cultural factors, climate and geography
	Aviation & shipping	Medium	Medium							Varies with technology, governance and accountability
	Smart Grids	Medium	Medium							Varies with economic status and presence or quality of existing grid
	Efficient appliances	Medium	High							Adoption varies with economic status and policy framework
	Low/zero-energy buildings	Medium	High							Depends on size of existing building stock and growth of building stock
Industrial system transitions	Energy efficiency	Robust	High							Potentials and adoption depends on existing efficiency, energy prices and interest rates, as well as government incentives.
	Bio-based & circularity	Medium	Medium							Faces barriers in terms of pressure on natural resources and biodiversity. Product substitution depends on market organisation and government incentivisation.
	Electrification & hydrogen	Medium	High							Depends on availability of large-scale, cheap, emission-free electricity (electrification, hydrogen) or CO2 storage nearby (hydrogen). Manufacturers' appetite to embrace disruptive innovations
	Industrial CCUS	Robust	High							High concentration of CO2 in exhaust gas improve economic and technical feasibility of CCUS in industry. CO2 storage or reuse possibilities.
Carbon dioxide removal	BECCS	Robust	Medium							Depends on biomass availability, CO2 storage capacity, legal framework, economic status and social acceptance
	DACCS	Medium	Medium							Depends on CO2-free energy, CO2 storage capacity, legal framework, economic status and social acceptance
	Afforestation & reforestation	Robust	High							Depends on location, mode of implementation, and economic and institutional factors

Soil carbon sequestration & biochar	Robust	High	■	■				■	Depends on location, soil properties, time span
Enhanced weathering	Medium	Low		■				■	Depends on CO2-free energy, economic status and social acceptance

1

1 4.5.2.2 *Enabling Conditions for Implementation of Mitigation Options Towards 1.5°C*

2
3 The feasibility assessment highlights six dimensions that could help inform an agenda that could be
4 addressed by the areas discussed in Section 4.4: governance, behaviour and lifestyles, innovation, enhancing
5 institutional capacities, policy and finance. For instance, Section 4.4.3 on behaviour offers strategies for
6 addressing public acceptance problems, and how changes can be more effective when communication and
7 the actions relate to people's values. This section synthesises the findings in Section 4.4 in an attempt to link
8 them to the assessment in Table 4.11. The literature on which the discussion is based is found in Section 4.4.
9

10 From Section 4.4, including the case studies presented in the Boxes 4.1 to 4.10, several main messages can
11 be constructed. For instance, governance would have to be multi-level and engaging different actors, while
12 being efficient, and choosing the type of cooperation based on the specific systemic challenge or option at
13 hand. If institutional capacity for financing and governing the various transitions is not urgently built, many
14 countries would lack the ability to change pathways from a high-emission scenario to a low- or zero-
15 emission scenario. In terms of innovation, governments, both national and multilateral, can contribute to the
16 mitigation-purposed application of general purpose technologies. If this is not managed, some emission
17 reduction could happen autonomously, but it may not lead to a 1.5°C-consistent pathway. International
18 cooperation on technology, including technology transfer where this does not happen autonomously, is
19 needed and can help creating the innovation capabilities in all countries to be able to operate, maintain, adapt
20 and regulate a portfolio of mitigation technologies. Case studies in the various sub-sections highlight the
21 opportunities and challenges of doing this in practice. They indicate that it can be done in specific
22 circumstances .
23

24 A combination of behaviour-oriented pricing policies and financing options can help change technologies
25 and social behaviour as it challenges the existing, high-emission socio-technical regime on multiple levels
26 across feasibility characteristics. For instance, for dietary change, a combination of supply-side measures
27 with value-driven communication and economic instruments may help make a lasting transition, while only
28 an economic instrument, such as enhanced prices or taxation, may not be as robust.
29

30 Governments could benefit from enhanced carbon prices, as a price and innovation incentive and also source
31 of additional revenue to correct distributional effects and subsidise the development of new, cost-effective
32 negative-emission technology and infrastructure. However, there is *high evidence* and *medium agreement*
33 that pricing alone is insufficient. Even if prices rise significantly, they typically incentivise incremental
34 change, but typically fail to provide the impetus for private actors to take the risk of engaging in the
35 transformational changes that would be needed to limit warming to 1.5°C. Apart from the incentives to
36 change behaviour and technology, financial systems are an indispensable element of a systemic transition. If
37 financial markets do not acknowledge climate risk and the risk of transitions, they could be organised by
38 regulatory financial institutions, such as central banks.
39

40 Strengthening implementation revolves around more than addressing barriers to feasibility. A system
41 transition, be it in energy, industry, land or a city, requires changing the core parameters of a system. These
42 relate, as introduced in Section 4.2 and further elaborated in Section 4.4, to how actors cooperate, how
43 technologies are embedded, how resources are linked, how cultures relate and what values people associate
44 with the transition and the current regime.
45

46 4.5.3 *Implementing Adaptation*

47 Article 7 of the Paris Agreement provides an aspirational global goal for adaptation, of 'enhancing adaptive
48 capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability' (UNFCCC, 2015). Adaptation implementation
49 is gathering momentum in many regions, guided by national NDC's and National Adaptation Plans (see
50 Cross-Chapter Box 11 in this Chapter).
51
52

53
54 Operationalising adaptation in a set of regional environments on pathways to a 1.5°C world, requires
55 strengthened global and differentiated regional and local capacities. It also needs rapid and decisive

1 adaptation actions to reduce the costs and magnitude of potential climate impacts (Vergara et al., 2015).

2
3 This could be facilitated by: i) enabling conditions, especially improved governance, economic measures and
4 financing (Section 4.4); ii) enhanced clarity on adaptation options to help identify strategic priorities,
5 sequencing and timing of implementation (Section 4.3); iii) robust monitoring and evaluation frameworks;
6 and iv) political leadership (Magnan et al., 2015; Magnan and Ribera, 2016; Lesnikowski et al., 2017;
7 UNEP, 2017a).

8 9 10 *4.5.3.1 Feasible Adaptation Options*

11 This section summarises the feasibility (defined in Cross-Chapter Box 3, Table 1 in Chapter 1 and Table 4.4)
12 of select adaptation options using evidence presented across this chapter and in supplementary material
13 4.SM.4.3 and the expert-judgement of its authors (Table 4.12). The options assessed respond to risks and
14 impacts identified in Chapter 3. They were selected based on options identified in AR5 (Noble et al., 2014),
15 focusing on those relevant to 1.5°C-compatible pathways, where sufficient literature exists. Selected options
16 were mapped onto system transitions and clustered through an iterative process of literature review, expert
17 feedback, and responses to reviewer comments.

18
19 Besides gaps in the literature around crucial adaptation questions on the transition to a 1.5°C world (Section
20 4.6), there is inadequate current literature to undertake a spatially differentiated assessment (Cross-Chapter
21 Box 3 in Chapter 1). There are also limited baselines for exposure, vulnerability and risk to help policy and
22 implementation prioritisation. Hence, the compiled results can at best provide a broad framework to inform
23 policymaking. Given the bottom-up nature of most adaptation implementation evidence, care needs to be
24 taken in generalising these findings.

25
26 Options are considered as part of a systemic approach, recognising that no single solution exists to limit
27 warming to 1.5°C and adapting to its impacts. To respond to the local and regional context, and synergies
28 and trade-offs between adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development, packages of options suited to
29 local enabling conditions, can be implemented.

30
31 Table 4.12 summarises the feasibility assessment through its six dimensions with levels of evidence and
32 agreement, and indicates how the feasibility of an adaptation option may be differentiated by certain
33 contextual factors (last column).
34
35

Table 4.12: Feasibility assessment of examples of 1.5°C-relevant adaptation options with dark shading signifying the absence of barriers in the feasibility dimension, moderate shading that on average, the dimension does not have a positive, nor a negative effect on the feasibility of the option, and light shading the presence of potentially blocking barriers. No shading means that not sufficient literature could be found to make the assessment. NA signifies that the dimension is not applicable to that adaptation option. For methodology and literature basis, see supplementary material 4.SM.4.

System	Adaptation option	Evidence	Agreement	Ec	Tec	Inst	Soc	Env	Geo	Context
Energy system transitions	Power infrastructure, including water	Medium	High							Depends on existing power infrastructure, all generation sources and with intensive water requirements
Land & ecosystem transitions	Conservation agriculture	Medium	Medium							Depends on irrigated/rainfed system, ecosystem characteristics, crop type, other farming practices
	Efficient irrigation	Medium	Medium							Depends on agricultural system, technology used, regional institutional and biophysical context
	Efficient livestock	Limited	High							Dependent on livestock breeds, feed practices, and biophysical context (e.g. carrying capacity)
	Agroforestry	Medium	High							Depends on knowledge, financial support, and market conditions
	Community-based adaptation	Medium	High							Focus on rural areas and combined with ecosystems-based adaptation, does not include urban settings
	Ecosystem restoration & avoided deforestation	Robust	Medium							Mostly focused on existing and evaluated REDD+ projects
	Biodiversity management	Medium	Medium							Focus on hotspots of biodiversity vulnerability and high connectivity
	Coastal defense & hardening	Robust	Medium							Depends on locations that require it as a first adaptation option
	Sustainable aquaculture	Limited	Medium							Depends on locations at risk and socio-cultural context
Urban & infrastructure system transitions	Sustainable land-use & urban planning	Medium	Medium							Depends on nature of planning systems and enforcement mechanisms
	Sustainable water management	Robust	Medium							Balancing sustainable water supply and rising demand especially in low-income countries
	Green infrastructure & ecosystem services	Medium	High							Depends on reconciliation of urban development with green infrastructure

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	Building codes & standards	Limited	Medium	Adoption requires legal, educational, and enforcement mechanisms to regulate buildings
Industrial system transitions	Intensive industry infrastructure resilience and water management	Limited	High	Depends on intensive industry, existing infrastructure and using or requiring high demand of water
Overarching adaptation options	Disaster risk management	Medium	High	Requires institutional, technical, and financial capacity in frontline agencies and government
	Risk spreading and sharing	Medium	Medium	Requires well developed financial structures and public understanding
	Climate services	Medium	High	Depends on climate information availability and usability, local infrastructure and institutions, national priorities
	Indigenous knowledge	Medium	High	Dependent on recognition of Indigenous rights, laws, and governance systems
	Education and learning	Medium	High	Existing education system, funding
	Population health and health system	Medium	High	Requires basic health services and infrastructure
	Social safety nets	Medium	Medium	Type and mechanism of safety net, political priorities, institutional transparency
	Human migration	Medium	Low	Hazard exposure, political and socio-cultural acceptability (in destination), migrant skills and social networks

1
2 When considered jointly, the description of adaptation options (Section 4.3), the feasibility assessment
3 (summarised in Table 4.12), and discussion of enabling conditions (Section 4.4) show us how options can be
4 implemented and lead towards transformational adaptation if and when needed.
5

6 The adaptation options for energy system transitions focus on existing power infrastructure resilience and
7 water management, when required, for any type of generation source. These options are not sufficient for the
8 far-reaching transformations required in the energy sector, which have tended to focus on technologies to
9 shift from a fossil-based to a renewable energy system (Erlinghagen and Markard, 2012; Muench et al.,
10 2014; Brand and von Gleich, 2015; Monstadt and Wolff, 2015; Child and Breyer, 2017; Hermwille et al.,
11 2017). There is also need for integration of this with social-ecological systems transformations to
12 increase the resilience of the energy sector, for which appropriate enabling conditions, such as for
13 technological innovations, are fundamentally important. Institutional capacities can be enhanced by
14 expanding the role of actors as transformation catalysts (Erlinghagen and Markard, 2012). The integration of
15 ethics and justice within these transformations can help attain the SDG7 on clean energy access (Jenkins et
16 al., 2018), while inclusion of the cultural dimension and cultural legitimacy (Amars et al., 2017) can provide
17 a more substantial base for societal transformation. Strengthening policy instruments and regulatory
18 frameworks and enhancing multi-level governance that focusses on resilience components can help secure
19 these transitions (Exner et al., 2016).
20

21 For land and ecosystem transitions, conservation agriculture, efficient irrigation, agroforestry, ecosystem
22 restoration and avoided deforestation, and coastal defence and hardening have between *medium and robust*
23 *evidence* with *medium to high agreement*. The other options assessed have limited or no evidence across one
24 or more of the feasibility dimensions. Community-based adaptation is assessed as an option many
25 opportunities with *medium evidence* and *high agreement* though faces scaling barriers. Given the structural
26 changes these options may require, transformational adaptation may be implied in some regions, involving
27 enhanced multi-level governance and institutional capacities by enabling anticipatory and flexible decision-
28 making systems that access and develop collaborative networks (Dowd et al., 2014), tackling root causes of
29 vulnerability (Chung Tiam Fook, 2017), and developing synergies between development and climate change
30 (Burch et al., 2017). Case studies show the use of transformational adaptation approaches for fire
31 management (Colloff et al., 2016a), floodplain and wetland management (Colloff et al., 2016b), and forest
32 management (Chung Tiam Fook, 2017), in which the strengthening of policy instruments and climate
33 finance are also required.
34

35 There is growing recognition of the need for transformational adaptation within the agricultural sector but
36 limited evidence on how to facilitate processes of deep, systemic change (Dowd et al., 2014). Case studies
37 demonstrate that transformational adaptation in agriculture requires a sequencing and overlap between
38 incremental and transformational adaptation actions (Hadarits et al., 2017; Termeer et al., 2017), e.g.,
39 incremental improvements to crop management while new crop varieties are being researched and field
40 tested (Rippke et al., 2016). Broader considerations include addressing stakeholder values and attitudes
41 (Fleming et al., 2015a), understanding and leveraging the role of social capital, collaborative networks, and
42 information (Dowd et al., 2014), and being inclusive with rural and urban communities, and the social,
43 political, and cultural environment (Rickards and Howden, 2012). Transformational adaptation in agriculture
44 systems could have significant economic and institutional costs (Mushtaq, 2016), along with potential
45 unintended negative consequences (Davidson, 2016; Rippke et al., 2016; Gajjar et al., 2018; Mushtaq, 2018),
46 and a need to focus on the transitional space between incremental and transformational adaptation (Hadarits
47 et al., 2017), as well as the timing of the shift from one to the other (Läderach et al., 2017).
48

49 Within urban and infrastructure transitions, green infrastructure and sustainable water management are
50 assessed as the most feasible options, followed by sustainable land-use and urban planning. The need for
51 transformational adaptation in urban settings arises from the root causes of poverty, failures in sustainable
52 development, and a lack of focus on social justice (Revi et al., 2014a; Parnell, 2015; Simon and Leck, 2015;
53 Shi et al., 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2016a; Burch et al., 2017), with the focus on governance structures and the
54 inclusion of equity and justice (Bos et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2016; Hölscher et al., 2018).
55

1 Current implementation of Urban Ecosystems-based Adaptation (EbA) lacks a systems perspective of
2 transformations and consideration of the normative and ethical aspects of EbA (Brink et al., 2016).
3 Flexibility within urban planning could help deal with the multiple uncertainties of implementing adaptation
4 (Radhakrishnan et al., 2018) (Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2014), for example, urban adaptation pathways were
5 implemented in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in New York, which is considered as tipping point that led
6 to the implementation of transformational adaptation practices.

7
8 Adaptation options for industry focus on infrastructure resilience and water management. Like with energy
9 system transitions, technological innovation would be required, but also the enhancement of institutional
10 capacities. Recent research illustrates transformational adaptation within industrial transitions focusing on
11 the role of different actors and tools driving innovation, and points to the role of Nationally Appropriate
12 Mitigation Actions in avoiding lock-ins and promoting system innovation (Boodoo and Olsen, 2017), the
13 role of private sector in sustainability governance in the socio-political context (Burch et al., 2016), and of
14 green entrepreneurs driving transformative change in the green economy (Gibbs and O'Neill, 2014). (Lim-
15 Camacho et al., 2015) suggest an analysis of the complete lifecycle of supply chains as a means of
16 identifying additional adaptation strategies, as opposed to the current focus on a part of the supply chain.
17 Chain-wide strategies can modify the rest of the chain and present a win-win with commercial objectives.

18
19 The assessed adaptation options also have mitigation synergies and tradeoffs (assessed in Section 4.5.4) that
20 need to be carefully considered, while planning climate action.

21 22 23 *4.5.3.2 Monitoring and Evaluation*

24
25 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) in adaptation implementation can promote accountability and
26 transparency of adaptation financing, facilitate policy learning and the share good practices, pressure
27 laggards, and guide adaptation planning. The majority of research on M&E focuses on specific policies or
28 programmes, and has typically been driven by the needs of development organisations, donors, and
29 governments to measure the impact and attribution of adaptation initiatives (Ford and Berrang-Ford, 2016).
30 There is growing research examining adaptation progress across nations, sectors, and scales (Austin et al.
31 2016; Heidrich et al. 2016; Lesnikowski et al. 2016; Reckien et al. 2014; Robinson 2017; Araos et al.
32 2016a,b). Responding to need for global, regional and local adaptation, developing indicators and
33 standardised approaches to evaluate and compare adaptation over time and across regions, countries, and
34 sectors would enhance comparability and learning. A number of constraints continue to hamper progress on
35 adaptation M&E, including a debate on what actually constitutes adaptation for purposes of assessing
36 progress (Dupuis and Biesbroek 2013; Biesbroek et al. 2015), absence of comprehensive and systematically
37 collected data on adaptation to support longitudinal assessment and comparison (Lesnikowski et al. 2016;
38 Ford et al. 2015), lack of agreement on indicators to measure (Lesnikowski et al. 2015; Bours et al. 2015;
39 Brooks et al. 2013), and challenges of attributing altered vulnerability to adaptation actions (UNEP 2017;
40 Bours et al. 2015; Ford et al. 2013).

41 42 43 *4.5.4 Synergies and Trade-Offs Between Adaptation and Mitigation*

44
45 Implementing a particular mitigation or adaptation option may affect the feasibility and effectiveness of
46 other mitigation and adaptation options. Supplementary Material 4.SM.5.1 provides examples of possible
47 positive impacts (synergies) and negative impacts (trade-offs) of mitigation options for adaptation. For
48 example, renewable energy sources such as wind energy and solar PV combined with electricity storage can
49 increase resilience due to distributed grids, thereby enhancing both mitigation and adaptation. Yet, as another
50 example, urban densification may reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, enhancing mitigation, but can
51 also intensify heat island effects and inhibit restoration of local ecosystems if not accounted for, thereby
52 increasing adaptation challenges.

53 The table in Supplementary Material 4.SM.5.2 provides examples of synergies and trade-offs of adaptation
54 options for mitigation. It shows, for example, that conservation agriculture can reduce some GHG emissions

1 and thus enhance mitigation, but at the same time increase other GHG emissions thereby reducing mitigation
2 potential. As another example, agroforestry can reduce GHG emissions through reduced deforestation and
3 fossil fuel consumption, but has a lower carbon sequestration potential compared with natural and secondary
4 forest.

5 Maladaptive actions could increase the risk of adverse climate-related outcomes, for example, biofuel targets
6 could lead to indirect land use change and influence local food security, through a shift in land use abroad in
7 response to increased domestic biofuel demand, increasing global GHG emissions, rather than decreasing it.

8 Various options enhance both climate change mitigation and adaptation, and would hence serve two 1.5°C-
9 related goals: reducing emissions while adapting to the associated climate change. Examples of such options
10 are reforestation, urban and spatial planning, and land and water management.

11 Synergies between mitigation and adaptation may be enhanced, and trade-offs reduced, by considering
12 enabling conditions (Section 4.4), while trade-offs can be amplified when enabling conditions are not
13 considered (C.A. Scott et al., 2015). For example, information that is tailored to the personal situation of
14 individuals and communities, including climate services, that are credible and targeted at the point of
15 decision making, can enable and promote both mitigation and adaptation actions (Section 4.4.3). Similarly,
16 multi-level governance and community participation, respectively, can enable and promote both adaptation
17 and mitigation actions (Section 4.4.1). Governance, policies and institutions can facilitate the implementation
18 of the Water-Energy-Food (WEF) nexus (Rasul and Sharma, 2016). The WEF can enhance food, water and
19 energy security, particularly in cities with agricultural production areas (Biggs et al., 2015), electricity
20 generation with intensive water requirements (Conway et al 2015), and in agriculture (El Gafy et al., 2017)
21 and livelihoods (Biggs et al., 2015). Such a nexus approach can reduce the transport energy that is embedded
22 in food value chains (Villaruel Walker et al., 2014), providing diverse sources of food in the face of
23 changing climates (Tacoli et al., 2013). Urban agriculture, where integrated, can mitigate climate change and
24 support urban flood management (Angotti, 2015; Bell et al., 2015; Biggs et al., 2015; Gwedla and
25 Shackleton, 2015; Lwasa et al., 2015; Y.C.E. Yang et al., 2016; Sanesi et al., 2017). In the case of electricity
26 generation, enabling conditions through a combination of carefully selected policy instruments can maximize
27 the synergic benefits between low GHG energy production and water for energy (Shang et al., 2018).
28 Despite the multiple benefits of maximising synergies between mitigation and adaptations options through
29 the WEF nexus approach (Chen and Chen, 2016), there are implementation challenges given institutional
30 complexity, political economy, and interdependencies between actors (Leck et al., 2015).

31 **[START BOX 4.10 HERE]**

32

33 **Box 4.10: Bhutan: Synergies and Trade-Offs in Economic Growth, Carbon Neutrality and Happiness**

34

35 Bhutan has three national goals, improving: its Gross National Happiness Index (GNHI), economic growth
36 (Gross Domestic Product, GDP) and carbon neutrality. These goals increasingly interact and raise questions
37 about whether they can be sustainably maintained into the future. Interventions in this enabling environment
38 are required to comply with all three goals.

39

40 Bhutan is well known for its GNHI, which is based on a variety of indicators covering psychological well-
41 being, health, education, cultural and community vitality, living standards, ecological issues and good
42 governance (RGoB, 2012; Schroeder and Schroeder, 2014; Ura, 2015). The GNHI is a precursor to the
43 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Allison, 2012; Brooks, 2013) and reflects local enabling
44 environments. The GNHI has been measured twice, in 2010 and 2015, and this showed an increase of 1.8%
45 (CBS, 2016). Like most emerging countries, Bhutan wants to increase its wealth and become a middle-
46 income country (RGoB, 2013, 2016), while it remains carbon-neutral, a goal which has been in place since
47 2011 at COP 19 and was reiterated in its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (NEC, 2015). Bhutan
48 achieves its current carbon-neutral status through hydropower and forest cover (Yangka and Diesendorf,
49 2016) which are part of their resilience and adaptation strategy.

50

51 Nevertheless, Bhutan faces rising Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. Transport and industry are the largest

1 growth areas (NEC, 2011). Bhutan’s carbon-neutral status would be threatened by 2037 by business-as-usual
2 approaches to economic growth (Yangka and Newman, 2018). Increases in hydropower are being planned
3 based on climate change scenarios that suggest sufficient water supply will be available (NEC, 2011). Forest
4 cover is expected to remain sufficient to maintain co-benefits. The biggest challenge is to electrify both
5 freight and passenger transport (ADB, 2013). Bhutan wants to be a model for achieving economic growth
6 consistent with limiting climate change to 1.5°C and improving its Gross National Happiness (Michaelowa
7 et al., 2018) through synthesizing all three goals and improving its adaptive capacity.
8
9 **[END BOX 4.10 HERE]**
10

4.6 Knowledge Gaps and Key Uncertainties

The global response to limiting warming to 1.5°C is a new knowledge area, that has emerged after the Paris Agreement. This sections presents a number of knowledge gaps that have emerged from the assessment of mitigation, adaptation and Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) options and Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) measures, enabling conditions, and synergies and tradeoffs. Illustrative questions that emerge synthesising the more comprehensive Table 4.14 below include: how much can be realistically expected from innovation, behaviour and systemic political and economic change in improving resilience, enhancing adaptation and reducing GHG emissions? How can rates of changes be accelerated and scaled up? What is the outcome of realistic assessments of mitigation and adaptation land transitions that are compliant with sustainable development, poverty eradication and addressing inequality? What are life-cycle emissions and prospects of early-stage CDR options? How can climate and sustainable development policies converge, and how can they be organised within a global governance framework and financial system, based on principles of justice and ethics (CBDR-RC), reciprocity and partnership? To what extent limit warming to 1.5°C needs a harmonization of macro-financial and fiscal policies, that could include Central banks? How can different actors and processes in climate governance reinforce each other, and hedge against the fragmentation of initiatives?

These knowledge gaps are highlighted in Table 4.13 along with a cross-reference to the respective sections in the last column.

Table 4.13: Knowledge gaps and uncertainties

<i>Knowledge area</i>		<i>Mitigation</i>	<i>Adaptation</i>	<i>Reference</i>
1.5°C pathways and ensuing change		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of literature specific to 1.5°C on investment costs with detailed breakdown by technology. Lack of literature specific to 1.5°C on mitigation costs in terms of GDP and welfare. Lack of literature on distributional implications of 1.5°C compared to 2°C or business-as-usual at sectoral and regional levels. Limited 1.5°C-specific case studies for mitigation Limited knowledge on the systemic and dynamic aspects of transitions to 1.5°C, including how vicious or virtuous circles might work, how self-reinforcing aspects can be actively introduced and managed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of literature specific to 1.5°C on adaptation costs and need Lack of literature on what overshoot means for adaptation Lack of knowledge on avoided adaptation investments associated with limiting warming to 1.5°C, 2°C or business-as-usual Limited 1.5°C-specific case studies for adaptation Scant literature examining current or future adaptation options, or examining what different climate pathways mean for adaptation success Need for transformational adaptation at 1.5°C and beyond remains largely unexplored 	4.2
Options to achieve and	Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The shift to variable renewables that many countries are implementing is just reaching a level where large-scale storage systems or other grid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Relatively little literature on individual adaptation options since AR5 	4.3.1

adapt to 1.5°C		<p>flexibility options, e.g., demand response, are required to enable resilient grid systems, thus, new knowledge on the opportunities and issues associated with scaling up zero carbon grids would be needed including knowledge about how zero carbon electric grids can integrate with the full scale electrification of transport systems.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CCS suffers mostly from uncertainty about the feasibility of timely upscaling, both due to lack of regulatory capacity and concerns about storage safety and cost. • There is not much literature on the distributional implications of large-scale bioenergy deployment, the assessment of environmental feasibility is hampered by a diversity of contexts of individual studies (type of feedstock, technology, land availability), which could be improved through emerging meta-studies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No evidence on socio-cultural acceptability of adaptation options • Lack of regional research on the implementation of adaptation options. 	
	Land & ecosystems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More knowledge would be needed on how land-based mitigation can be reconciled with land demands for adaptation and development. • While there is now more literature on the underlying mechanisms of land transitions, data is often insufficient to draw robust conclusions, and uncertainty about land availability • The lack of data counts on social and institutional information (largest knowledge gap indicated for ecosystems restoration in Table 4.11), which is therefore not widely integrated in land use modelling. • Examples of successful policy implementation and institutions related to land-based mitigation leading to co-benefits for adaptation and development are missing from the literature 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional information on some options does not exist, especially in the case of land use transitions. • Limited research examining socio-cultural perspectives and impacts of adaptation options, especially for efficient irrigation, coastal defense and hardening, agroforestry and biodiversity management • Lack of longitudinal, regional studies assessing the impacts of certain adaptation options such as conservation agriculture and shifting to efficient livestock systems. • More knowledge is needed on the cost-effectiveness and scalability of various adaptation options. For example, there is no evidence for the macro-economic viability of Community-based Adaptation (CbA) and biodiversity management, nor on employment and productivity enhancement 	4.3.2

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is relatively little scientific literature on the effects of dietary shifts and reduction of food wastage on mitigation, especially regarding the institutional, technical and environmental concerns 	<p>potential for biodiversity management and coastal defense and hardening.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More knowledge is needed on risk mitigation and the potential of biodiversity management. • Lack of evidence of the political acceptability of efficient livestock • Limited evidence on legal and regulatory feasibility of conservation agriculture and no evidence on coastal defense and hardening • For transparency and accountability potential, there is limited evidence for conservation agriculture and no evidence for biodiversity management, coastal defense and hardening and sustainable aquaculture • No evidence on hazard risk reduction potential of conservation agriculture and biodiversity management. 	
Urban systems & infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited evidence of effective land use planning in low income cities where tenure and land zoning is contested, and the risks of trying to implement land use planning under communal tenure. • Limited evidence on the governance of public transport from an accountability and transparency perspective • Limited evidence on relationship between toxic waste and public transport. • Limited evidence on the impacts of electric vehicles and non-motorised urban transport as most schemes are too new. • As changes in shipping and aviation have been limited to date, limited evidence of social impacts. • Knowledge about how to facilitate disruptive, demand-based innovations that may be transformative in urban systems, is needed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional and sectoral adaptation cost assessments are missing, particularly in the context of welfare losses of households, across time and space. • More knowledge is needed on the political economy of adaptation, particularly on how to impute different types of cost and benefit in a consistent manner, on adaptation performance indicators that could stimulate investment, and the impact of adaptation interventions on socio-economic, and other types, of inequality. • More evidence would be needed on hot-spots, for example the growth of peri-urban areas populated by large informal settlements. • Major uncertainties emanate from the lack of knowledge on the integration of climate adaptation and mitigation, disaster risk management, and urban poverty alleviation. • There is limited evidence on the institutional, technological and economic feasibility of green 	4.3.3	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The urban form implications of combined changes from electric, autonomous and shared/public mobility systems, is needed. • Considering distributional consequences of climate responses is an on-going need. • Knowledge gaps in the application and scale-up of combinations of new smart technologies, sustainable design, advanced construction techniques and new insulation materials, renewable energy and behaviour change in urban settlements. • The potential for leapfrog technologies to be applied to slums and new urban developments in developing countries is weak. 	<p>infrastructure and environmental services and for socio-cultural and environmental feasibility of codes and standards</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In general, there is no evidence for the employment and productivity enhancement potential of most adaptation options. • There is limited evidence on the economic feasibility of sustainable water management. 	
Industry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of knowledge on potential for scaling up and global diffusion of zero- and low-emission technologies in industry • Questions remain on the socio-cultural feasibility of industry options, including human capacity and private sector acceptance of new, radically different technologies from current well-developed practices, as well as distributional effects of potential new business models • As the industrial transition unfolds, lack of knowledge on its dynamic interactions with other sectors, in particular with the power sector (and infrastructure) for electrification of industry, with food production and other users of biomass in case of bio-based industry developments, and with CDR technologies in the case of CC(U)S. • Life-cycle assessment-based comparative analysis of CCUS options are missing, as well as life-cycle information on electrification and hydrogen. • Impacts of industrial system transitions are not well understood, especially on employment, identity and well-being, in particular in the case of substitution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very limited evidence on how industry would adapt to the consequences of 1.5 or 2°C temperature increases, in particular large and immobile industrial clusters in low-lying areas and availability of transportation and (cooling) water resources and infrastructure. • There is limited evidence on the economic, institutional and socio-cultural feasibility of adaptation options available to industry. 	4.3.4

		of conventional , high-carbon industrial products with lower-carbon alternatives, as well as electrification and use of hydrogen.		
	Short-lived climate forcers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited evidence of co-benefits and trade-offs of SLCF reduction (e.g., better health outcomes, agricultural productivity improvements). Integration of SLCFs into emissions accounting and international reporting mechanisms enabling a better understanding of the links between black carbon, air pollution, climate change and agricultural productivity. 		4.3.6
	CDR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A bottom-up analysis of CDR options, indicates that there are still key uncertainties around the individual technologies. This – includes Ocean-based options will be assessed in depth in the IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (SROCC). Assessments of environmental aspects are missing, especially for ‘newer’ options like Enhanced Weathering or Direct Air Carbon Capture. In order to obtain more information on realistically available and sustainable removal potentials, more bottom-up, regional studies, also taking into account also social issues, would be needed. These can better inform the modeling of 1.5°C pathways. Knowledge gaps on issues of governance and public acceptance, the impacts of large-scale removals on the carbon cycle, the potential to accelerate deployment and upscaling, and means of incentivisation. Knowledge gaps on integrated systems of renewable energy and CDR technologies such as enhanced weathering and DACCS 		4.3.7

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge gaps on the use of captured CO₂ is generating negative emissions and as mitigation option. 		
	Overarching Adaptation Options	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is no evidence on technical and institutional feasibility of educational options • There is limited evidence on employment and productivity enforcement potential of climate services • There is limited evidence on socio-cultural acceptability of social safety nets • There is a small but growing literature on human migration as an adaptation strategy. Scant literature on the cost effectiveness of migration. 		4.3.5
Enabling conditions	Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As technological changes have begun to accelerate, there is lack of knowledge on new mechanisms that can enable private enterprise to mainstream this activity and reasons for success and failure need to be researched. • Research is thin on effective multi-level governance in particular in developing countries, including participation by civil society, women and minorities Gaps in knowledge remain pertaining to partnerships within local governance arrangements that may act as mediators and drivers for achieving global ambition and local action. • Methods for assessing contribution and aggregation of non-state actors in limiting warming to 1.5°C • Knowledge gap on an enhanced framework for assessment of the ambition of NDCs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ability to identify explanatory factors affecting the progress of climate policy is constrained by a lack of data on adaptation actions across nations, regions, and sectors, compounded by an absence of frameworks for assessing progress. Most hypotheses on what drives adaptation remain untested. • Limited empirical assessment of how governance affects adaptation across cases • Focus on ‘success’ stories and leading adaptors overlooks lessons from situations where no or unsuccessful adaptation is taking place 	4.4.1
	Institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of 1.5°C-specific literature • Role of regulatory financial institutions and their capacity to guarantee financial stability of economies when investments potentially face risks both because of climate impacts and because of the systems transitions if lower temperature scenarios are pursued. • Knowledge gaps on how to build capabilities across all countries and regions globally to implement, maintain, manage, govern and further develop mitigation options for 1.5°C. • While importance of Indigenous and local knowledge is recognized, the ability to scale up beyond the local remains challenging and little examined • There is a lack of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of adaptation measures, with most studies enumerating M&E challenges and emphasising the importance of context and social learning. Very few studies evaluate 		4.4.2

		whether and why an adaptation initiative has been effective. One of the challenges of M&E for both mitigation and adaptation is a lack of high quality information for modellings. Adaptation M&E is additionally challenged by limited understanding on what indicators to measure and how to attribute altered vulnerability to adaptation actions.	
Lifestyle and behavioural change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Whereas mitigation pathways studies address (implicitly or explicitly) the reduction or elimination of market failures (e.g., external costs, information asymmetries) <i>via</i> climate or energy policies, no study addresses behavioural change strategies in the relationship with mitigation and adaptation actions in the 1.5°C context. Limited knowledge on GHG emission reduction potential of diverse mitigation behaviour across the world. Most studies on factors enabling lifestyle changes have been conducted in high income countries, more knowledge needed from low- and middle-income countries, and the focus is typically on enabling individual behavior change, far less on enabling change in organisations and political systems Limited understanding and treatment of behavioural change and the potential effects of related policies in ambitious mitigation pathways, e.g., in Integrated Assessment Models. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Knowledge gaps on factors enabling adaptation behaviour, except for behaviour in agriculture. Little is known about cognitive and motivational factors promoting adaptive behavior. Little is known about how potential adaptation actions might affect behavior to influence vulnerability outcomes 	4.4.3
	Lack of insight on what can enable changes in adaptation and mitigation behaviour in organisations and political systems.		
Technological innovation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quantitative estimates for mitigation and adaptation potentials at economy or sector scale as a result of the combination of general purpose technologies and mitigation technologies have been scarce, except for some evidence in the transport sector. Evidence on the role of international organisations, including the UNFCCC, in building capabilities and enhancing technological innovation for 1.5°C, except for some parts of the transport sector. Technology transfer trials to enable leapfrog applications in developing countries have limited evidence 		4.4.4
Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> More empirical research would be needed to derive robust conclusions on effectiveness of policies for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Understanding of what policies work (and do not work) is limited for adaptation in general and for 	4.4.5

		enabling transition to 1.5°C and on which factors aid decision-makers seeking to ratchet up their NDCs	1.5°C in particular, beyond specific case studies.	
	Finance	Knowledge gaps persist with respect to the instruments to match finance to its most effective use in mitigation and adaptation.		4.4.5
Synergies and tradeoffs between adaptation and mitigation		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong claims are made with respect to synergies and trade-offs, but there is little knowledge to underpin these, especially of co-benefits by region. • Water-energy conservation relationships of individual conservation measures in industries other than the water and energy sectors have not been investigated in detail. • There is no evidence on synergies with adaptation of CCS in the power sector and of enhanced weathering under carbon dioxide removal. • There is no evidence on trade-offs with adaptation of low and zero-energy buildings, and circularity and substitution and bio-based industrial system transitions. • There is no evidence of synergies or trade-offs with mitigation of CbA • There is no evidence of trade-offs with mitigation of the built environment, on adaptation options for industrial energy, and climate services 		4.5.4
SRM		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In spite of increasing attention to the different SRM measures and their potential to keep global temperature below 1.5°C, knowledge gaps remain not only with respect to the physical understanding of SRM options, but also concerning ethical issues. • We do not know how to govern SRM in order to avoid unilateral action and how to prevent possible reductions in mitigation ('moral hazard'). 		4.3.8

1
2

1 **Frequently Asked Questions**

2 3 **FAQ 4.1: What transitions could enable limiting global warming to 1.5°C?**

4
5 ***Summary:** In order to limit warming to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels, the world would need to transform*
6 *in a number of complex and connected ways. While transitions towards lower greenhouse gas emissions are*
7 *underway in some cities, regions, countries, businesses and communities, there are few that are currently*
8 *consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. Meeting this challenge would require a rapid escalation in the*
9 *current scale and pace of change, particularly in the coming decades. There are many factors that affect the*
10 *feasibility of different adaptation and mitigation options that could help limit warming to 1.5°C and*
11 *adapting to the consequences.*

12 There are actions across all sectors can substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This Special Report
13 assesses energy, land and ecosystems, urban and infrastructure, and industry in developed and developing
14 nations to see how they would need to be transformed to limit warming to 1.5°C. Examples of actions
15 include shifting to low- or zero-emission power generation, such as renewables; changing food systems, such
16 as diet changes away from land-intensive animal products; electrifying transport and developing ‘green
17 infrastructure’, such as building green roofs, or improving energy efficiency by smart urban planning, which
18 will change the layout of many cities.

19 Because these different actions are connected, a ‘whole systems’ approach would be needed for the type of
20 transformations that could limit warming to 1.5°C. This means that all relevant companies, industries and
21 stakeholders would need to be involved to increase the support and chance of successful implementation. As
22 an illustration, the deployment of low-emission technology (e.g., renewable energy projects or a bio-based
23 chemical plants) would depend upon economic conditions (e.g., employment generation or capacity to
24 mobilise investment), but also on social/cultural conditions (e.g., awareness and acceptability) and
25 institutional conditions (e.g., political support and understanding).

26 To limit warming to 1.5°C, mitigation would have to be large-scale and rapid. Transitions can be
27 transformative or incremental, and they often, but not always, go hand in hand. Transformative change can
28 arise from growth in demand for a new product or market, such that it displaces an existing one. This is
29 sometimes called ‘disruptive innovation’. For example, high demand for LED lighting is now making more
30 energy-intensive, incandescent lighting near-obsolete, with the support of policy action that spurred rapid
31 industry innovation. Similarly, smart phones have become global in use within ten years. But electric cars,
32 which were released around the same time, have not been adopted so quickly because the bigger, more
33 connected transport and energy systems are harder to change. Renewable energy, especially solar and wind,
34 is considered to be disruptive by some as it is rapidly being adopted and is transitioning faster than predicted.
35 But its demand is not yet uniform. Urban systems that are moving towards transformation are coupling solar
36 and wind with battery storage and electric vehicles in a more incremental transition, though this would still
37 require changes in regulations, tax incentives, new standards, demonstration projects and education
38 programmes to enable markets for this system to work.

39 Transitional changes are already underway in many systems but limiting warming to 1.5°C would require a
40 rapid escalation in the scale and pace of transition, particularly in the next 10-20 years. While limiting
41 warming to 1.5°C would involve many of the same types of transitions as limiting warming to 2°C, the pace
42 of change would need to be much faster. While the *pace* of change that would be required to limit warming
43 to 1.5°C can be found in the past, there is no historical precedent for the *scale* of the necessary transitions, in
44 particular in a socially and economically sustainable way. Resolving such speed and scale issues would
45 require people’s support, public-sector interventions and private-sector cooperation.


46 Different types of transitions carry with them different associated costs and requirements for institutional or
47 governmental support. Some are also easier to scale up than others, and some need more government support
48 than others. Transitions between, and within, these systems are connected and none would be sufficient on
49 its own to limit warming to 1.5°C.

1 The ‘feasibility’ of adaptation and mitigation options or actions within each system that together can limit
 2 warming to 1.5°C within the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty requires
 3 careful consideration of multiple different factors. These factors include: (i) whether sufficient natural
 4 systems and resources are available to support the various options for transitioning (known as *environmental*
 5 *feasibility*); (ii) the degree to which the required technologies are developed and available (known as
 6 *technological feasibility*); (iii) the economic conditions and implications (known as *economic feasibility*);
 7 (iv) what are the implications for human behaviour and health (known as *social/cultural feasibility*); and (v)
 8 what type of institutional support would be needed, such as governance, institutional capacity and political
 9 support (known as *institutional feasibility*). An additional factor (vi - known as the *geophysical feasibility*)
 10 addresses the capacity of physical systems to carry the option, for example whether it is geophysically
 11 possible to implement large-scale afforestation consistent with 1.5°C.

12 Promoting enabling conditions, such as finance, innovation and behaviour change, would reduce barriers to
 13 the options, make the required speed and scale of the system transitions more likely, and therefore would
 14 increase the overall feasibility limiting warming to 1.5°C.

FAQ4.1: The different feasibility dimensions towards limiting warming to 1.5°C

Assessing the feasibility of different adaptation and mitigation options/actions requires consideration across six dimensions.



15

16

17 **FAQ4.1, Figure 1:** The different dimensions to consider when assessing the ‘feasibility’ of adaptation and mitigation
 18 options or actions within each system that can help to limit warming to 1.5°C. These are: (i) the environmental
 19 feasibility; (ii) the technological feasibility; (iii) the economic feasibility; (iv) the social/cultural feasibility; (v) the
 20 institutional feasibility; and (vi) the geophysical feasibility.

21

1 FAQ 4.2: What are Carbon Dioxide Removal and negative emissions?

2

3 ***Summary:** Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) refers to the process of removing CO₂ from the atmosphere.*
4 *Since this is the opposite of emissions, practices or technologies that remove CO₂ are often described as*
5 *achieving ‘negative emissions’. The process is sometimes referred to more broadly as Greenhouse Gas*
6 *Removal if it involves removing gases other than CO₂. There are two main types of CDR: either enhancing*
7 *existing natural processes that remove carbon from the atmosphere (e.g., by increasing its uptake by trees,*
8 *soil, or other ‘carbon sinks’) or using chemical processes to, for example, capture CO₂ directly from the*
9 *ambient air and storing it elsewhere (i.e., underground). All CDR methods are at different stages of*
10 *development and some are more conceptual than others, as they have not been tested at scale.*

11 Limiting warming to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels would require unprecedented rates of transformation in
12 many areas, including in the energy and industrial sectors, for example. Conceptually, it is possible that
13 techniques to draw CO₂ out of the atmosphere (known as Carbon Dioxide Removal, or CDR) could
14 contribute to limiting warming to 1.5°C. One use of CDR could be to compensate for greenhouse gas
15 emissions from sectors that cannot completely decarbonise, or which may take a long time to do so.

16 If global temperature temporarily overshoots 1.5°C, CDR would be required to reduce the atmospheric
17 concentration of CO₂ to bring global temperature back down. To achieve this temperature reduction, the
18 amount of CO₂ drawn out of the atmosphere would need to be greater than the amount entering the
19 atmosphere, resulting in ‘net negative emissions’. This would involve a greater amount of CDR than
20 stabilising atmospheric CO₂ concentration – and, therefore, global temperature – at a certain level. The larger
21 and longer an overshoot, the greater the reliance on practices that remove CO₂ from the atmosphere.


22 There are a number of CDR methods, each with different potentials for achieving negative emissions, as well
23 as different associated costs and side effects. They are also at differing levels of development, with some
24 more conceptual than others. One example of a CDR method in the demonstration phase is a process known
25 as Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), in which atmospheric CO₂ is absorbed by plants
26 and trees as they grow and then the plant material (biomass) is burned to produce bioenergy. The CO₂
27 released in the production of bioenergy is captured before it reaches the atmosphere and stored in geological
28 formations deep underground on very long timescales. Since the plants absorb CO₂ as they grow and the
29 process does not emit CO₂, the overall effect can be to reduce atmospheric CO₂.

30 Afforestation (planting new trees) and reforestation (replanting trees where they previously existed) are also
31 considered forms of CDR because they enhance natural CO₂ ‘sinks’. Another category of CDR techniques
32 uses chemical processes to capture CO₂ from the air and store it away on very long timescales. In a process
33 known as Direct Air Carbon Capture and Storage (DACCS), CO₂ is extracted directly from the air and stored
34 in geological formations deep underground. Converting waste plant material into a charcoal-like substance
35 called biochar and burying it in soil can also be used to store carbon away from the atmosphere for decades
36 to centuries.

37 There can be beneficial side effects of some types of CDR, other than removing CO₂ from the atmosphere.
38 For example, restoring forests or mangroves can enhance biodiversity and protect against flooding and
39 storms. But there could also be risks involved with some CDR methods. For example, deploying BECCS at
40 large scale would require a large amount of land to cultivate the biomass required for bioenergy. This could
41 have consequences for sustainable development if the use of land competes with producing food to support a
42 growing population, biodiversity conservation, or land rights. There are also other considerations. For
43 example, there are uncertainties about how much it would cost to deploy DACCS as a CDR technique, given
44 that removing CO₂ from the air requires considerable energy.

FAQ4.2: Carbon dioxide removal and negative emissions

Examples of some CDR / negative emissions techniques and practices



1

2 **FAQ4.2, Figure 1:** Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) refers to the process of removing CO₂ from the atmosphere.
 3 There are a number of CDR techniques, each with different potential for achieving 'negative emissions', as well as
 4 different associated costs and side effects.

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1 FAQ 4.3: Why is adaptation important in a 1.5°C warmer world?

2 **Summary:** *Adaptation is the adjustment process to current or expected changes in climate and its effects.*
3 *Even though climate change is a global problem, its impacts are experienced differently across the world.*
4 *This means that responses are often specific to the local context, and so people in different regions are*
5 *adapting in different ways. A rise in global temperature from 1°C to 1.5°C, and beyond, increases the need*
6 *for adaptation. Therefore, stabilising global temperatures at 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels would require*
7 *a smaller adaptation effort than for 2°C. Despite many successful examples around the world, progress in*
8 *adaptation is, in many regions, in its infancy and unevenly distributed globally.*

9 Adaptation refers to the process of adjustment to actual or expected changes in climate and its effects. Since
10 different parts of the world are experiencing the impacts of climate change differently, there is similar
11 diversity in how people in a given region are adapting to those impacts.

12 The world is already experiencing the impacts from 1°C of global warming above preindustrial levels and
13 there are many examples of adaptation to impacts associated with this warming. Examples of adaptation
14 efforts taking place around the world include investing in flood defences such as building sea walls or
15 restoring mangroves, efforts to guide development away from high risk areas, modifying crops to avoid yield
16 reductions, and using social learning (social interactions that changes understanding on the community level)
17 to modify agricultural practices, amongst many others. Adaptation also involves building capacity to respond
18 better to climate change impacts, including making governance more flexible and strengthening financing
19 mechanisms such as providing different types of insurance.

20 In general, an increase in global temperature from present day to 1.5°C or 2°C (or higher) above
21 preindustrial temperatures would increase the need for adaptation. Therefore, stabilising global temperature
22 increase at 1.5°C would require a smaller adaptation effort than for 2°C.

23 Since adaptation is still in early stages in many regions, this raises questions about the capacity of vulnerable
24 communities to cope with any amount of further warming. Successful adaptation can be supported at the
25 national and sub-national levels, with national governments playing an important role in coordination,
26 planning, determining policy priorities, and distributing resources and support. Given that the need for
27 adaptation can be very different from one community to the next, the kinds of measures that can successfully
28 reduce climate risks will also depend heavily on the local context.

29 When done successfully, adaptation can allow individuals to adjust to the impacts of climate change in ways
30 that minimise negative consequences and maintain their livelihoods. This could involve, for example, a
31 farmer switching drought-tolerant crops to deal with increasing occurrences of heat waves. In some cases,
32 however, the impacts of climate change could result in entire systems changing significantly, such as moving
33 to an entirely new agricultural system in areas where the climate is no longer suitable for current practices.
34 Constructing sea walls to stop flooding due to sea level rising from climate change is another example of
35 adaptation, but developing city planning to change how flood water is managed throughout the city would be
36 an example of transformational adaptation. These actions require significantly more institutional, structural,
37 and financial support. While this kind of transformational adaptation wouldn't be needed everywhere in a
38 1.5°C world, the scale of change needed would be challenging to implement, as it requires additional support
39 such as through financial assistance and behavioural change. Few empirical examples exist to date.


40 Examples from around the world show that adaptation is an iterative process. Adaptation pathways describe
41 how communities can make decisions about adaptation in an ongoing and flexible way. Such pathways allow
42 for pausing, evaluating the outcomes of specific adaptation actions, and modifying the strategy as
43 appropriate. Due to their flexible nature, adaptation pathways can help to identify the most effective ways to
44 minimise the impacts of present and future climate change for a given local context. This is important since
45 adaptation can sometimes exacerbate vulnerabilities and existing inequalities if poorly designed. The
46 unintended negative consequences of adaptation that can sometimes occur is known as 'maladaptation'.
47 Maladaptation can be seen if a particular adaptation option has negative consequences for some (e.g.,

1 rainwater harvesting upstream might reduce water availability downstream) or if an adaptation intervention
 2 in the present has trade-offs in the future (e.g., desalination plants may improve water availability in the
 3 present but have large energy demands over time).

4 While adaptation is important to reduce the negative impacts from climate change, adaptation measures on
 5 their own are not enough to prevent climate change impacts entirely. The more global temperature rises, the
 6 more frequent, severe, and erratic the impacts will be, and adaptation may not protect against all risks.
 7 Examples of where limits may be reached include substantial loss of coral reefs, massive range losses for
 8 terrestrial species, more human deaths from extreme heat, and losses of coastal-dependent livelihoods in low
 9 lying islands and coasts.

FAQ4.3: Adaptation in a warming world

Adapting to further warming requires action at national & sub-national levels and can mean different things to different people in different contexts



10

11 **FAQ4.3, Figure 1:** Examples of adaptation and transformational adaptation. Adapting to further warming requires
 12 action at national & sub-national levels and can mean different things to different people in different contexts. While
 13 transformational adaptation wouldn't be needed everywhere in a world limited to 1.5°C warming, the scale of change
 14 needed would be challenging to implement.

15

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Chapter 5: Sustainable Development, Poverty Eradication and Reducing Inequalities

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Executive Summary

This chapter takes sustainable development as the starting point and focus for analysis. It considers the broad and multifaceted bi-directional interplay between sustainable development, including its focus on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality in their multidimensional aspects, and climate actions in a 1.5°C warmer world. These fundamental connections are embedded in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The chapter also examines synergies and trade-offs of adaptation and mitigation options with sustainable development and the SDGs and offers insights into possible pathways, especially climate-resilient development pathways toward a 1.5°C warmer world.

Sustainable Development, Poverty, and Inequality in a 1.5°C Warmer World

Limiting global warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C would make it markedly easier to achieve many aspects of sustainable development, with greater potential to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Impacts avoided with the lower temperature limit could reduce the number of people exposed to climate risks and vulnerable to poverty by 62 to 457 million, and lessen the risks of poor people to experience food and water insecurity, adverse health impacts, and economic losses, particularly in regions that already face development challenges (*medium evidence, medium agreement*) {5.2.2, 5.2.3}. Avoided impacts between 1.5°C and 2°C warming would also make it easier to achieve certain SDGs, such as those that relate to poverty, hunger, health, water and sanitation, cities, and ecosystems (SDGs 1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 14, and 15) (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.2.3, Table 5.2 available at the end of the chapter }.

Compared to current conditions, 1.5°C of global warming would nonetheless pose heightened risks to eradicating poverty, reducing inequalities and ensuring human and ecosystem well-being (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Warming of 1.5°C is not considered ‘safe’ for most nations, communities, ecosystems and sectors and poses significant risks to natural and human systems as compared to current warming of 1°C (*high confidence*) {Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5}. The impacts of 1.5°C would disproportionately affect disadvantaged and vulnerable populations through food insecurity, higher food prices, income losses, lost livelihood opportunities, adverse health impacts, and population displacements (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.2.1}. Some of the worst impacts on sustainable development are expected to be felt among agricultural and coastal dependent livelihoods, indigenous people, children and the elderly, poor labourers, poor urban dwellers in African cities, and people and ecosystems in the Arctic and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.2.1 Box 5.3, Chapter 3 Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}.

Climate Adaptation and Sustainable Development

Prioritisation of sustainable development and meeting the SDGs is consistent with efforts to adapt to climate change (*high confidence*). Many strategies for sustainable development enable transformational adaptation for a 1.5°C warmer world, provided attention is paid to reducing poverty in all its forms and to promoting equity and participation in decision-making (*medium evidence, high agreement*). As such, sustainable development has the potential to significantly reduce systemic vulnerability, enhance adaptive capacity, and promote livelihood security for poor and disadvantaged populations (*high confidence*) {5.3.1}.

Synergies between adaptation strategies and the SDGs are expected to hold true in a 1.5°C warmer world, across sectors and contexts (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Synergies between adaptation and sustainable development are significant for agriculture and health, advancing SDGs 1 (extreme poverty), 2 (hunger), 3 (healthy lives and well-being), and 6 (clean water) (*robust evidence, medium agreement*) {5.3.2}. Ecosystem- and community-based adaptation, along with the incorporation of indigenous and local knowledge, advances synergies with SDGs 5 (gender equality), 10 (reducing inequalities), and 16 (inclusive societies), as exemplified in drylands and the Arctic (*high evidence, medium agreement*) {5.3.2, Box 5.1, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 4}.

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1
2 **Adaptation strategies can result in trade-offs with and among the SDGs (*medium evidence, high***
3 ***agreement*)**. Strategies that advance one SDG may create negative consequences for other SDGs, for
4 instance SDGs 3 versus 7 (health and energy consumption) and agricultural adaptation and SDG 2 (food
5 security) versus SDGs 3, 5, 6, 10, 14, and 15 (*medium evidence, medium agreement*) {5.3.2}.

6
7 **Pursuing place-specific adaptation pathways toward a 1.5°C warmer world has the potential for**
8 **significant positive outcomes for well-being, in countries at all levels of development (*medium evidence,***
9 ***high agreement*)**. Positive outcomes emerge when adaptation pathways (i) ensure a diversity of adaptation
10 options based on people’s values and trade-offs they consider acceptable, (ii) maximise synergies with
11 sustainable development through inclusive, participatory, and deliberative processes, and (iii) facilitate
12 equitable transformation. Yet, such pathways would be difficult to achieve without redistributive measures to
13 overcome path dependencies, uneven power structures, and entrenched social inequalities (*medium evidence,*
14 *high agreement*) {5.3.3}.

15 Mitigation and Sustainable Development

16
17
18 **The deployment of mitigation options consistent with 1.5°C pathways leads to multiple synergies**
19 **across a range of sustainable development dimensions. At the same time, the rapid pace and**
20 **magnitude of change that would be required to limit warming to 1.5°C, if not carefully managed,**
21 **would lead to trade-offs with some sustainable development dimensions (*high confidence*)**. The number
22 of synergies between mitigation response options and sustainable development exceeds the number of trade-
23 offs in energy demand and supply sectors, Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) and for
24 oceans (*very high confidence*) {Figure 5.2, Table 5.2 available at the end of the chapter }. 1.5°C pathways
25 indicate robust synergies particularly for the SDGs 3 (health), 7 (energy), 12 (responsible consumption and
26 production), and 14 (oceans) (*very high confidence*) {5.4.2, Figure 5.3}. For SDGs 1 (poverty), 2 (hunger), 6
27 (water), and 7 (energy), there is a risk of trade-offs or negative side-effects from stringent mitigation actions
28 compatible with 1.5°C (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.4.2}.

29
30 **Appropriately designed mitigation actions to reduce energy demand can advance multiple SDGs**
31 **simultaneously. Pathways compatible with 1.5°C that feature low energy demand show the most**
32 **pronounced synergies and the lowest number of trade-offs with respect to sustainable development**
33 **and the SDGs (*very high confidence*)**. Accelerating energy efficiency in all sectors has synergies with SDG
34 7, 9, 11, 12, 16, 17 {5.4.1, Figure 5.2, Cross-Chapter Box 12, Table 1} (*robust evidence, high agreement*).
35 Low demand pathways, which would reduce or completely avoid the reliance on Bioenergy with Carbon
36 Capture and Storage (BECCS) in 1.5°C pathways, would result in significantly reduced pressure on food
37 security, lower food prices, and fewer people at risk of hunger (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.4.2,
38 Figure 5.3}.

39
40 **The impacts of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) options on SDGs depend on the type of options and**
41 **the scale of deployment (*high confidence*)**. If poorly implemented, CDR options such as bioenergy,
42 BECCS and AFOLU would lead to trade-offs. Appropriate design and implementation requires considering
43 local people’s needs, biodiversity, and other sustainable development dimensions (*very high confidence*)
44 {5.4.1.3, Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3}.

45
46 **The design of the mitigation portfolios and policy instruments to limit warming to 1.5°C will largely**
47 **determine the overall synergies and trade-offs between mitigation and sustainable development**
48 **(*very high confidence*)**. **Redistributive policies that shield the poor and vulnerable can resolve trade-**
49 **offs for a range of SDGs (*medium evidence, high agreement*)**. Individual mitigation options are associated
50 with both positive and negative interactions with the SDGs (*very high confidence*) {5.4.1}. However,
51 appropriate choices across the mitigation portfolio can help to maximize positive side-effects while
52 minimizing negative side-effects (*high confidence*) {5.4.2, 5.5.2}. Investment needs for complementary
53 policies resolving trade-offs with a range of SDGs are only a small fraction of the overall mitigation
54 investments in 1.5°C pathways (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.4.2, Figure 5.4}. Integration of

1 mitigation with adaptation and sustainable development compatible with 1.5°C requires a systems
2 perspective (*high confidence*) {5.4.2, 5.5.2}.

3
4 **Mitigation measures consistent with 1.5°C create high risks for sustainable development in countries
5 with high dependency on fossil fuels for revenue and employment generation (*high confidence*).** These
6 risks are caused by the reduction of global demand affecting mining activity and export revenues and
7 challenges to rapidly decrease high carbon intensity of the domestic economy (*robust evidence, high
8 agreement*) {5.4.1.2, Box 5.2}. Targeted policies that promote diversification of the economy and the energy
9 sector could ease this transition (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.4.1.2, Box 5.2}.

10 **Sustainable Development Pathways to 1.5°C**

11
12
13 **Sustainable development broadly supports and often enables the fundamental societal and systems
14 transformations that would be required for limiting warming to 1.5°C (*high confidence*).** Simulated
15 pathways that feature the most sustainable worlds (e.g., Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP)1) are
16 associated with relatively lower mitigation and adaptation challenges and limit warming to 1.5°C at
17 comparatively lower mitigation costs. In contrast, development pathways with high fragmentation, inequality
18 and poverty (e.g., SSP3) are associated with comparatively higher mitigation and adaptation challenges. In
19 such pathways, it is not possible to limit warming to 1.5°C for the vast majority of the integrated assessment
20 models (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.5.2}. In all SSPs, mitigation costs substantially increase in
21 1.5°C pathways compared to 2°C pathways. No pathway in the literature integrates or achieves all 17 SDGs
22 (*high confidence*) {5.5.2}. Real-world experiences at the project level show that the actual integration
23 between adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development is challenging as it requires reconciling trade-
24 offs across sectors and spatial scales (*very high confidence*) {5.5.1}.

25
26 **Without societal transformation and rapid implementation of ambitious greenhouse gas reduction
27 measures, pathways to limiting warming to 1.5°C and achieving sustainable development will be
28 exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to achieve (*high confidence*).** The potential for pursuing such
29 pathways differs between and within nations and regions, due to different development trajectories,
30 opportunities, and challenges (*very high confidence*) {5.5.3.2, Figure 5.1}. Limiting warming to 1.5°C would
31 require all countries and non-state actors to strengthen their contributions without delay. This could be
32 achieved through sharing of efforts based on bolder and more committed cooperation, with support for those
33 with the least capacity to adapt, mitigate, and transform (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.5.3.1,
34 5.5.3.2}. Current efforts toward reconciling low-carbon trajectories and reducing inequalities, including
35 those that avoid difficult trade-offs associated with transformation, are partially successful yet demonstrate
36 notable obstacles (*medium evidence, medium agreement*) {5.5.3.3 Box 5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in this
37 Chapter}.

38
39 **Social justice and equity are core aspects of climate-resilient development pathways for
40 transformational social change. Addressing challenges and widening opportunities between and within
41 countries and communities would be necessary to achieve sustainable development and limit warming
42 to 1.5°C, without making the poor and disadvantaged worse off (*high confidence*).** Identifying and
43 navigating inclusive and socially acceptable pathways toward low-carbon, climate-resilient futures is a
44 challenging yet important endeavour, fraught with moral, practical, and political difficulties and inevitable
45 trade-offs (*very high confidence*) {5.5.2, 5.5.3.3 Box 5.3}. It entails deliberation and problem-solving
46 processes to negotiate societal values, well-being, risks, and resilience and determine what is desirable and
47 fair, and to whom (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Pathways that encompass joint, iterative planning and
48 transformative visions, for instance in Pacific SIDS like Vanuatu and in urban contexts, show potential for
49 liveable and sustainable futures (*high confidence*) {5.5.3.1, 5.5.3.3, Figure 5.5, Box 5.3, Cross-Chapter Box
50 13 in this Chapter}.

51
52 **The fundamental societal and systemic changes to achieve sustainable development, eradicate poverty
53 and reduce inequalities while limiting warming to 1.5°C would require a set of institutional, social,
54 cultural, economic and technological conditions to be met (*high confidence*).** The coordination and

1 monitoring of policy actions across sectors and spatial scales is essential to support sustainable development
2 in 1.5°C warmer conditions (*very high confidence*) {5.6.2, Box 5.3}. External funding and technology
3 transfer better support these efforts when they consider recipients' context-specific needs (*medium evidence,*
4 *high agreement*) {5.6.1}. Inclusive processes can facilitate transformations by ensuring participation,
5 transparency, capacity building, and iterative social learning (*high confidence*) {5.5.3.3, Cross-Chapter Box
6 13, 5.6.3}. Attention to power asymmetries and unequal opportunities for development, among and within
7 countries is key to adopting 1.5°C-compatible development pathways that benefit all populations (*high*
8 *confidence*) {5.5.3, 5.6.4, Box 5.3}. Re-examining individual and collective values could help spur urgent,
9 ambitious, and cooperative change (*medium evidence, high agreement*) {5.5.3, 5.6.5}.

5.1 Scope and Delineations

This chapter takes sustainable development as the starting point and focus for analysis, considering the broader bi-directional interplay and multifaceted interactions between development patterns and climate actions in a 1.5°C warmer world and in the context of eradicating poverty and reducing inequality. It assesses the impacts of keeping temperatures at or below 1.5°C global warming above pre-industrial levels on sustainable development and compares the avoided impacts to 2°C (Section 5.2). It then examines the interactions, synergies and trade-offs of adaptation (Section 5.3) and mitigation (Section 5.4) measures with sustainable development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The chapter offers insights into possible pathways toward a 1.5°C warmer world, especially through climate-resilient development pathways providing a comprehensive vision across different contexts (Section 5.5). We also identify the conditions that would be needed to simultaneously achieve sustainable development, poverty eradication, the reduction of inequalities, and the 1.5°C climate objective (Section 5.6).

5.1.1 Sustainable Development, SDGs, Poverty Eradication and Reducing Inequalities

Chapter 1 (see Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1) defines sustainable development as ‘development that meets the needs of the present and future generations’ through balancing economic, social and environmental considerations, and then introduces the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which sets out 17 ambitious goals for sustainable development for all countries by 2030. These Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are: no poverty (SDG 1), zero hunger (SDG 2), good health and well-being (SDG 3), quality education (SDG 4), gender equality (SDG 5), clean water and sanitation (SDG 6), affordable and clean energy (SDG 7), decent work and economic growth (SDG 8), industry, innovation and infrastructure (SDG 9), reduced inequalities (SDG 10), sustainable cities and communities (SDG 11), responsible consumption and production (SDG 12), climate action (SDG 13), life below water (SDG 14), life on land (SDG 15), peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16), and partnerships for the goals (SDG 17).

The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) included extensive discussion of links between climate and sustainable development, especially in Chapter 13 (Olsson et al., 2014) and Chapter 20 (Denton et al., 2014) in WGII and Chapter 4 (Fleurbay et al., 2014) in WGIII. However, the AR5 preceded the 2015 adoption of the SDGs and the literature that argues for their fundamental links to climate (Wright et al., 2015; Salleh, 2016; von Stechow et al., 2016; Hammill and Price-Kelly, 2017; ICSU, 2017; Maupin, 2017; Gomez-Echeverri, 2018).

The SDGs build on efforts under the UN Millennium Development Goals to reduce poverty, hunger and other deprivations. According to the UN, the Millennium Development Goals were successful in reducing poverty and hunger and improving water security (UN, 2015a). However, critics argued that they failed to address within-country disparities, human rights, and key environmental concerns, focused only on developing countries, and had numerous measurement and attribution problems (Langford et al., 2013; Fukuda-Parr et al., 2014). While improvements in water security, slums, and health may have reduced some aspects of climate vulnerability, increases in incomes were linked to rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and thus to a trade-off between development and climate change (Janetos et al., 2012; UN, 2015a; Hubacek et al., 2017).

While the SDGs capture many important aspects of sustainable development, including the explicit goals of poverty eradication and reducing inequality, there are direct connections from climate to other measures of sustainable development including multidimensional poverty, equity, ethics, human security, well-being, and climate-resilient development (Bebbington and Larrinaga, 2014; Robertson, 2014; Redclift and Springett, 2015; Barrington-Leigh, 2016; Helliwell et al., 2018; Kirby and O’Mahony, 2018) (see Glossary). The UN proposes sustainable development as ‘eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, combating inequality within and among countries, preserving the planet, creating sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and fostering social inclusion’ (UN, 2015b). There is *robust evidence* of the links between climate change and poverty (see Chapter 1, Cross-Chapter Box 4). The AR5 concluded with *high confidence*


1 that disruptive levels of climate change would preclude reducing poverty (Denton et al., 2014; Fleurbaey et
 2 al., 2014). International organisations have since stated that climate changes ‘undermine the ability of all
 3 countries to achieve sustainable development’ (UN, 2015b) and can reverse or erase improvements in living
 4 conditions and decades of development (Hallegatte et al., 2016).

5
 6 Climate warming has unequal impacts on different people and places as a result of differences in regional
 7 climate changes, vulnerabilities and impacts, and these differences then result in unequal impacts on
 8 sustainable development and poverty (Section 5.2). Responses to climate change also interact in complex
 9 ways with goals of poverty reduction. The benefits of adaptation and mitigation projects and funding may
 10 accrue to some and not others, responses may be costly and unaffordable to some people and countries, and
 11 projects may disadvantage some individuals, groups and development initiatives (Sections 5.3 and 5.4;
 12 Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4).

15 5.1.2 Pathways to 1.5°C

16
 17 Pathways to 1.5°C (see Chapter 1, Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1, Glossary) include ambitious reductions
 18 in emissions and strategies for adaptation that are transformational, as well as complex interactions with
 19 sustainable development, poverty eradication, and reducing inequalities. The AR5 WGII introduced the
 20 concept of climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs) (see Glossary) which combine adaptation and
 21 mitigation to reduce climate change and its impacts, and emphasise the importance of addressing structural,
 22 intersecting inequalities, marginalisation, and multidimensional poverty to ‘transform [...] the development
 23 pathways themselves toward greater social and environmental sustainability, equity, resilience, and justice’
 24 (Olsson et al., 2014). This chapter assesses literature on CRDPs relevant to 1.5°C global warming (Section
 25 5.5.3), to understand better the possible societal and systems transformations (see Glossary) that reduce
 26 inequality and increase well-being (Figure 5.1). It also summarises the knowledge on conditions to achieve
 27 such transformations, including changes in technologies, culture, values, financing, and institutions that
 28 support low-carbon and resilient pathways and sustainable development (Section 5.6).

29
 30 [INSERT FIGURE 5.1 HERE]
 31



32
 33
 34 **Figure 5.1:** Climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs) (green arrows) between a current world in which
 35 countries and communities exist at different levels of development (A) and future worlds that range from

1 climate-resilient (bottom) to unsustainable (top) (D). CRDPs involve societal transformation rather than
2 business-as-usual approaches, and all pathways involve adaptation and mitigation choices and trade-offs
3 (B). Pathways that achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030 and beyond, strive for net zero
4 emissions around mid-21st century, and stay within the global 1.5°C warming target by the end of the 21st
5 century, while ensuring equity and well-being for all, are best positioned to achieve climate-resilient
6 futures (C). Overshooting on the path to 1.5°C will make achieving CRDPs and other sustainable
7 trajectories more difficult; yet, the limited literature does not allow meaningful estimates.
8
9

10 **5.1.3 Types of evidence**

11
12 We use a variety of sources of evidence to assess the interactions of sustainable development and the SDGs
13 with the causes, impacts, and responses to climate change of 1.5°C warming. We build on Chapter 3 to
14 assess the sustainable development implications of impacts at 1.5°C and 2°C, and Chapter 4 to examine the
15 implications of response measures. We assess scientific and grey literature, with a post-AR5 focus, and data
16 that evaluate, measure, and model sustainable development-climate links from various perspectives,
17 quantitatively and qualitatively, across scales, and through well documented case studies.
18

19 Literature that explicitly links 1.5°C global warming to sustainable development across scales remains
20 scarce; yet, we find relevant insights in many recent publications on climate and development that assess
21 impacts across warming levels, the effects of adaptation and mitigation response measures, and interactions
22 with the SDGs. Relevant evidence also stems from emerging literature on possible pathways, overshoot, and
23 enabling conditions (see Glossary) for integrating sustainable development, poverty eradication, and
24 reducing inequalities in the context of 1.5°C.
25
26

27 **5.2 Poverty, Equality, and Equity Implications of a 1.5°C Warmer World**

28
29 Climate change could lead to significant impacts on extreme poverty by 2030 (Hallegatte et al., 2016;
30 Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017). The AR5 concluded, with *very high confidence*, that climate change and
31 climate variability worsen existing poverty and exacerbate inequalities, especially for those disadvantaged by
32 gender, age, race, class, caste, indigeneity and (dis)ability (Olsson et al., 2014). New literature on these links
33 is substantial, showing that the poor will continue to experience climate change severely, and climate change
34 will exacerbate poverty (Fankhauser and Stern, 2016; Hallegatte et al., 2016; O'Neill et al., 2017a;
35 Winsemius et al., 2018) (*very high confidence*). The understanding of regional impacts and risks of 1.5°C
36 global warming and interactions with patterns of societal vulnerability and poverty remains limited. Yet,
37 identifying and addressing poverty and inequality is at the core of staying within a safe and just space for
38 humanity (Raworth, 2017; Bathiany et al., 2018). Building on relevant findings from Chapter 3 (see Section
39 3.4), this section examines anticipated impacts and risks of 1.5°C and higher warming on sustainable
40 development, poverty, inequality, and equity (see Glossary).
41
42

43 **5.2.1 Impacts and Risks of a 1.5°C Warmer World: Implications for Poverty and Livelihoods**

44
45 Global warming of 1.5°C will have consequences for sustainable development, poverty and inequalities. This
46 includes residual risks, limits to adaptation, and losses and damages (Cross-Chapter Box 12 in this Chapter;
47 see Glossary). Some regions have already experienced a 1.5°C warming with impacts on food and water
48 security, health, and other components of sustainable development (*medium evidence, medium agreement*)
49 (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4). Climate change is also already affecting poorer subsistence communities
50 through decreases in crop production and quality, increases in crop pests and diseases, and disruption to
51 culture (Savo et al., 2016). It disproportionately affects children and the elderly and can increase gender
52 inequality (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014; Vinyeta et al., 2015; Carter et al., 2016; Hanna and Oliva, 2016; Li et
53 al., 2016).
54

1 At 1.5°C warming, compared to current conditions, further negative consequences are expected for poor
2 people, and inequality and vulnerability (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Hallegatte and Rozenberg
3 (2017) report that, by 2030 (roughly approximating a 1.5°C warming), 122 million additional people could
4 experience extreme poverty, based on a ‘poverty scenario’ of limited socio-economic progress, comparable
5 to the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP)4 (inequality), mainly due to higher food prices and declining
6 health, with substantial income losses for the poorest 20% across 92 countries. Pretis et al. (2018) estimate
7 negative impacts on economic growth in lower-income countries at 1.5°C warming, despite uncertainties.
8 Impacts are likely to occur simultaneously across livelihood, food, human, water, and ecosystem security
9 (Byers et al., 2018) (*limited evidence, high agreement*), but the literature on interacting and cascading effects
10 remains scarce (Hallegatte et al., 2014; O’Neill et al., 2017b; Reyner et al., 2017a, b).

11
12 Chapter 3 outlines future impacts and risks for ecosystems and human systems, many of which could also
13 undermine sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty and hunger, and protect health and
14 ecosystems. Chapter 3 findings (see Section 3.5.2.1) suggest increasing Reasons for Concern from moderate
15 to high at a warming of 1.1 to 1.6°C, including for indigenous people, their livelihoods, and ecosystems in
16 the Arctic (O’Neill et al., 2017b). In 2050, based on the Hadley Centre Climate Prediction Model 3
17 (HadCM3) and the Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) A1b scenario (roughly comparable to
18 1.5°C warming), 450 million more flood-prone people would be exposed to doubling in flood frequency, and
19 global flood risk would increase substantially (Arnell and Gosling, 2016). For droughts, poor people are
20 expected to be more exposed (85% in population terms) in a warming scenario greater >1.5°C for several
21 countries in Asia and Southern and Western Africa (Winsemius et al., 2018). In urban Africa, a 1.5°C
22 warming could expose many households to water poverty and increased flooding (Pelling et al., 2018). At
23 1.5°C warming, fisheries-dependent and coastal livelihoods, of often disadvantaged populations, would
24 suffer from the loss of coral reefs (see Chapter 3, Box 3.4).

25
26 Global heat stress is projected to increase in a 1.5°C warmer world and by 2030, compared to 1961-1990,
27 climate change could be responsible for additional annual deaths of 38,000 people from heat stress,
28 particularly among the elderly, and 48,000 from diarrhoea, 60,000 from malaria, and 95,000 from childhood
29 undernutrition (WHO, 2014). Each 1°C increase could reduce work productivity by 1 to 3% for people
30 working outdoors or without air conditioning, typically the poorer segments of the workforce (Park et al.,
31 2015).

32
33 The regional variation in the ‘warming experience at 1.5°C’ (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1) is large (see
34 Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2). Declines in crop yields are widely reported for Africa (60% of observations), with
35 serious consequences for subsistence and rain-fed agriculture and food security (Savo et al., 2016). In
36 Bangladesh, by 2050, damages and losses are expected for poor households dependent on freshwater fish
37 stocks due to lack of mobility, limited access to land, and strong reliance on local ecosystems (Dasgupta et
38 al., 2017). Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are expected to experience challenging conditions at 1.5°C
39 warming due to increased risk of internal migration and displacement and limits to adaptation (see Chapter 3,
40 Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in this Chapter). An anticipated decline of marine fisheries of 3 million
41 metric tonnes per degree warming would have serious regional impacts for the Indo-Pacific region and the
42 Arctic (Cheung et al., 2016).

43
44

45 **5.2.2 Avoided Impacts of 1.5°C versus 2°C Warming for Poverty and Inequality**

46
47 Avoided impacts between 1.5°C and 2°C warming are expected to have significant positive implications for
48 sustainable development, and reducing poverty and inequality. Using the SSPs (see Chapter 1, Cross-Chapter
49 Box 1 in Chapter 1; Section 5.5.2), Byers et al. (2018) model the number of people exposed to multi-sector
50 climate risks and vulnerable to poverty (income < \$10/day), comparing 2°C and 1.5°C; the respective
51 declines are from 86 million to 24 million for SSP1 (sustainability), from 498 million to 286 million for
52 SSP2 (middle of the road), and from 1220 million to 763 million for SSP3 (regional rivalry), which suggests
53 overall 62-457 million less people exposed and vulnerable at 1.5°C warming. Across the SSPs, the largest
54 populations exposed and vulnerable are in South Asia (Byers et al., 2018). The avoided impacts on poverty

1 at 1.5°C relative to 2°C are projected to depend at least as much or more on development scenarios than on
2 warming (Wiebe et al., 2015; Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017).

3
4 Limiting warming to 1.5°C is expected to reduce the people exposed to hunger, water stress, and disease in
5 Africa (Clements, 2009). It is also expected to limit the number of poor people exposed to floods and
6 droughts at higher degrees of warming, especially in African and Asian countries (Winsemius et al., 2018).
7 Challenges for poor populations relating to food and water security, clean energy access, and environmental
8 well-being are projected to be less at 1.5°C, particularly for vulnerable people in Africa and Asia (Byers et
9 al., 2018). The overall projected socio-economic losses compared to present day are less at 1.5°C (8% loss of
10 gross domestic product per capita) compared to 2°C (13%), with lower-income countries projected to
11 experience greater losses, which may increase economic inequality between countries (Pretis et al., 2018).

14 **5.2.3 Risks from 1.5°C versus 2°C Global Warming and the Sustainable Development Goals**

15
16 The risks that can be avoided by limiting global warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C have many complex
17 implications for sustainable development (ICSU, 2017; Gomez-Echeverri, 2018). There is *high confidence*
18 that constraining warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C would reduce risks for unique and threatened
19 ecosystems, safeguarding the services they provide for livelihoods and sustainable development, and making
20 adaptation much easier (O'Neill et al., 2017b), particularly in Central America, the Amazon, South Africa,
21 and Australia (Schleussner et al., 2016; O'Neill et al., 2017b; Reyer et al., 2017b; Bathiany et al., 2018).

22
23 In places that already bear disproportionate economic and social challenges to their sustainable development,
24 people will face lower risks at 1.5°C compared to 2°C. These include North Africa and the Levant (less
25 water scarcity), West Africa (less crop loss), South America and South-East Asia (less intense heat), and
26 many other coastal nations and island states (lower sea-level rise, less coral reef loss) (Schleussner et al.,
27 2016; Betts et al., 2018). The risks for food, water, and ecosystems, particularly in subtropical regions such
28 as Central America, and countries such as South Africa and Australia, are expected to be lower at 1.5°C than
29 at 2°C warming (Schleussner et al., 2016). Less people would be exposed to droughts and heat waves and the
30 associated health impacts in countries such as Australia and India (King et al., 2017; Mishra et al., 2017).

31
32 Limiting warming to 1.5°C will make it markedly easier to achieve the SDGs for poverty eradication, water
33 access, safe cities, food security, healthy lives, and inclusive economic growth, and will help to protect
34 terrestrial ecosystems and biodiversity (*medium evidence, high agreement*) (Table 5.2 available at the end of
35 the chapter)). For example, limiting species loss and expanding climate refugia will make it easier to achieve
36 SDG 15 (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3). One indication of how lower temperatures benefit the SDGs is to
37 compare the impacts of Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP)4.5 (lower emissions) and RCP8.5
38 (higher emissions) on the SDGs (Ansutege et al., 2015). A low emissions pathway allows for greater
39 success in achieving SDGs for reducing poverty and hunger, providing access to clean energy, reducing
40 inequality, ensuring education for all, and making cities more sustainable. Even at lower emissions, a
41 medium risk of failure exists to meet goals for water and sanitation, and marine and terrestrial ecosystems.

42
43 Action on climate change (SDG 13), including slowing the rate of warming, would help reach the goals for
44 water, energy, food, and land (SDGs 6, 7, 2, and 15) (Obersteiner et al., 2016; ICSU, 2017) and contribute to
45 poverty eradication (SDG 1) (Byers et al., 2018). Although the literature that connects 1.5°C to the SDGs is
46 limited, stabilising warming at 1.5°C by the end of the century is expected to increase the chances of
47 achieving the SDGs by 2030, with greater potentials to eradicate poverty, reduce inequality, and foster equity
48 (*limited evidence, medium agreement*). There are no studies on overshoot and dimensions of sustainable
49 development, although literature on 4°C suggests the impacts would be severe (Reyer et al., 2017b).

Table 5.1: Sustainable development implications of avoided impacts between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming

Impacts	Chapter 3 section	1.5°C	2°C	Sustainable development goals (SDGs) more easily achieved when limiting warming to 1.5°C
Water scarcity	3.4.2.1	4% more people exposed to water stress	8% more people exposed to water stress with 184-270 million people more exposed	SDG 6 water availability for all
	Table 3.4	496 (range 103-1159) million people exposed and vulnerable to water stress	586 (range 115-1347) million people exposed and vulnerable to water stress	
Ecosystems	3.4.3 Table 3.4	Around 7% of land area experiences biome shifts	Around 13% (range 8-20%) of land area experiences biome shifts	SDG 15 to protect terrestrial ecosystems and halt biodiversity loss
	Box 3.5	70-90% of coral reefs at risk from bleaching	99% of coral reefs at risk from bleaching	
Coastal cities	3.4.5.2	Less cities and coasts exposed to sea level rise and extreme events	More people and cities exposed to flooding	SDG 11 to make cities and human settlements safe and resilient
	3.4.5.1	31-69 million people exposed to coastal flooding	32-79 million exposed to coastal flooding	
Food systems	3.4.6 and Box 3.1	Significant declines in crop yields avoided, some yields may increase	Average crop yields decline	SDG 2 to end hunger and achieve food security
	Table 3.4	32-36 million people exposed to lower yields	330-396 million people exposed to lower yields	
Health	3.4.7	Lower risk of temperature related morbidity and smaller mosquito range	Higher risks of temperature related morbidity and mortality and larger range of mosquitoes	SDG 3 to ensure healthy lives for all
	Table 3.4	3546-4508 million people exposed to heatwaves	5417-6710 million people exposed to heatwaves	

[INSERT CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 12 HERE]

Cross-Chapter Box 12: Residual risks, limits to adaptation and loss and damage

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Introduction

Residual climate-related risks, limits to adaptation, and loss and damage (see Glossary) are increasingly assessed in the scientific literature (van der Geest and Warner, 2015; Boyd et al., 2017; Mechler et al., 2018). The AR5 (IPCC, 2013; Oppenheimer et al., 2014) documented impacts that have been detected and attributed to climate change, projected increasing climate-related risks with continued global warming, and recognised barriers and limits to adaptation. It recognised that adaptation is constrained by biophysical, institutional, financial, social, and cultural factors, and that the interaction of these factors with climate change can lead to soft adaptation limits (adaptive actions currently not available) and hard adaptation limits (adaptive actions appear infeasible leading to unavoidable impacts) (Klein et al., 2014).

Loss and damage - concepts and perspectives

“Loss and Damage” (L&D) has been discussed in international climate negotiations for three decades (INC,

1991; Calliari, 2016; Vanhala and Hestbaek, 2016). A work programme on L&D was established as part of the Cancun Adaptation Framework in 2010 supporting developing countries particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts (UNFCCC, 2010). Conference of the Parties (COP) 19 in 2013 established the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) as a formal part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) architecture (UNFCCC, 2013). It acknowledges that L&D “includes, and in some cases involves more than, that which can be reduced by adaptation” (UNFCCC, 2013). The Paris Agreement recognised “the importance of averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change” through Article 8 (UNFCCC, 2015).

There is no one definition of L&D in climate policy, and analysis of policy documents and stakeholder views has demonstrated ambiguity (Vanhala and Hestbaek, 2016; Boyd et al., 2017). UNFCCC documents suggest that L&D is associated with adverse impacts of climate change on human and natural systems, including impacts from extreme events and slow-onset processes (UNFCCC, 2011, 2013, 2015). Some documents focus on impacts in developing or particularly vulnerable countries (UNFCCC, 2011, 2013). They refer to economic (loss of assets and crops) and non-economic (biodiversity, culture, health) impacts, the latter also being an action area under the WIM workplan, and irreversible and permanent loss and damage. Lack of clarity of what the term addresses (avoidance through adaptation and mitigation, unavoidable losses, climate risk management, existential risk) was expressed among stakeholders, with further disagreement ensuing about what constitutes anthropogenic climate change *versus* natural climate variability (Boyd et al., 2017).

Limits to adaptation and residual risks

The AR5 described adaptation limits as points beyond which actors’ objectives are compromised by intolerable risks threatening key objectives such as good health or broad levels of well-being, thus requiring transformative adaptation for overcoming soft limits (Dow et al., 2013; Klein et al., 2014) (see Chapter 4, Sections 4.2.2.3 and 4.5.3; Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4; Section 5.3.1). The AR5 WGII risk tables, based on expert judgment, depicted the potential for, and the limits of, additional adaptation to reduce risk. Near-term (2030-2040) risks can be used as a proxy for 1.5°C warming by the end of the century, and compared to longer-term (2080-2100) risks associated with an approximate 2°C warming. Building on the AR5 risk approach, Cross-Chapter Box 12, Figure 1 provides a stylised application example to poverty and inequality.

[INSERT CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 12, FIGURE 1 HERE]



Cross-Chapter Box 12, Figure 1 Stylised reduced risk levels due to avoided impacts between 2°C and 1.5°C warming (in solid red-orange), additional avoided impacts with adaptation under 2°C (striped orange) and under 1.5°C (striped yellow), and unavoidable impacts (losses) with no or very limited potential for adaptation (grey), extracted from the AR5 WGII risk tables (Field et al., 2014), and underlying chapters by Adger et al. (2014) and Olsson et al. (2014). For some systems and sectors (A), achieving 1.5°C could reduce risks to low (with adaptation) from very high (without adaptation) and high (with adaptation) under 2°C. For other areas (C), no or very limited adaptation potential is anticipated, suggesting limits, with the same risks for 1.5°C and 2°C. Other risks are projected to be medium under 2°C with further potential for reduction, especially with adaptation, to very low levels (B).

Limits to adaptation, residual risks, and losses in a 1.5°C warmer world

The literature on risks at 1.5°C (versus 2°C and more) and potentials for adaptation remains limited, particularly for specific regions, sectors, and vulnerable and disadvantaged populations. Adaptation potential at 1.5°C and 2°C is rarely assessed explicitly, making an assessment of residual risk challenging. Substantial progress has been made since the AR5 to assess which climate change impacts on natural and human systems can be attributed to anthropogenic emissions (Hansen and Stone, 2016) and to examine the influence of anthropogenic emissions on extreme weather events (NASEM, 2016), and on consequent impacts on human life (Mitchell et al., 2016), but less so on monetary losses and risks (Schaller et al., 2016). There has also been some limited research to examine local-level limits to adaptation (Warner and Geest, 2013; Filho and Nalau, 2018). What constitutes losses and damages is context-dependent and often requires place-based research into what people value and consider worth protecting (Barnett et al., 2016; Tschakert et al., 2017). Yet, assessments of non-material and intangible losses are particularly challenging, such as loss of sense of place, belonging, identity, and damages to emotional and mental wellbeing (Serdeczny et al., 2017; Wewerinke-Singh, 2018a). Warming of 1.5°C is not considered ‘safe’ for most nations, communities, ecosystems, and sectors and poses significant risks to natural and human systems as compared to current warming of 1°C (*high confidence*) (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Box 3.4, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3). Table 5.2, drawing on findings from Chapters 3, 4 and 5, presents examples of soft and hard limits in natural and human systems in the context of 1.5°C and 2°C of warming.

Cross-Chapter Box 12, Table 1: Soft and hard adaptation limits in the context of 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming

System/Region	Example	Soft Limit	Hard Limit
Coral reefs	Loss of 70-90% of tropical coral reefs by mid-century under 1.5°C scenario (total loss under 2°C scenario) (see Chapter 3, Sections 3.4.4 and 3.5.2.1, Box 3.4)		✓
Biodiversity	6% of insects, 8% of plants and 4% of vertebrates lose over 50% of the climatically determined geographic range at 1.5°C (18% of insects, 16% of plants, 8% of vertebrates at 2°C) (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3.3)		✓
Poverty	24-357 million people exposed to multi-sector climate risks and vulnerable to poverty at 1.5°C (86-1,220 million at 2°C) (see Section 5.2.2)	✓	
Human health	Twice as many megacities exposed to heat stress at 1.5°C compared to present, potentially exposing 350 million additional people to deadly heat wave conditions by 2050 (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4.8)	✓	✓
Coastal livelihoods	Large-scale changes in oceanic systems (temperature, acidification) inflict damage and losses to livelihoods, income, cultural identity and health for coastal-dependent communities at 1.5°C (potential higher losses at 2°C) (see Chapter 3, Sections 3.4.4, 3.4.5, 3.4.6.3, Box 3.4, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6; Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5; Section 5.2.3)	✓	✓
Small Island Developing States	Sea level rise and increased wave run up combined with increased aridity and decreased freshwater availability at 1.5°C warming potentially leaving several atoll islands uninhabitable (see Chapter 3, Sections 3.4.3, 3.4.5, Box 3.5; Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 9)		✓

Approaches and policy options to address residual risk and loss and damage

Conceptual and applied work since the AR5 has highlighted the synergies and differences with adaptation and disaster risk reduction policies (van der Geest and Warner, 2015; Thomas and Benjamin, 2017), suggesting more integration of existing mechanisms, yet careful consideration is advised for slow-onset and

1 potentially irreversible impacts and risk (Mechler and Schinko, 2016). Scholarship on justice and equity has
2 provided insight on compensatory, distributive, and procedural equity considerations for policy and practice
3 to address loss and damage (Roser et al., 2015; Wallimann-Helmer, 2015; Huggel et al., 2016). A growing
4 body of legal literature considers the role of litigation in preventing and addressing loss and damage and
5 finds that litigation risks for governments and business are bound to increase with improved understanding
6 of impacts and risks as climate science evolves (*high confidence*) (Mayer, 2016; Banda and Fulton, 2017;
7 Marjanac and Patton, 2018; Wewerinke-Singh, 2018b). Policy proposals include international support for
8 experienced losses and damages (Crosland et al., 2016; Page and Heyward, 2017), addressing climate
9 displacement, donor-supported implementation of regional public insurance systems (Surminski et al., 2016)
10 and new global governance systems under the UNFCCC (Biermann and Boas, 2017).

11 [END CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 12]
12
13
14

15 5.3 Climate Adaptation and Sustainable Development 16

17 Adaptation will be extremely important in a 1.5°C warmer world since substantial impacts will be felt in
18 every region (*high confidence*) (Chapter 3, Section 3.3), even if adaptation needs will be lower than in a 2°C
19 warmer world (see Chapter 4, Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.5, 4.5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 4). Climate
20 adaptation options comprise structural, physical, institutional, and social responses, with their effectiveness
21 depending largely on governance (see Glossary), political will, adaptive capacities, and availability of
22 finance (Betzold and Weiler, 2017; Sonwa et al., 2017; Sovacool et al., 2017) (see Chapter 4, Sections 4.4.1
23 to 4.4.5). Even though the literature is scarce on the expected impacts of future adaptation measures on
24 sustainable development specific to warming experiences of 1.5°C, this section assesses available literature
25 on how (i) prioritising sustainable development enhances or impedes climate adaptation efforts (Section
26 5.3.1); (ii) climate adaptation measures impact sustainable development and the Sustainable Development
27 Goals (SDGs) in positive (synergies) or negative (trade-offs) ways (Section 5.3.2); and (iii) adaptation
28 pathways towards a 1.5°C warmer world affect sustainable development, poverty, and inequalities (Section
29 5.3.3). The section builds on Chapter 4 (see Section 4.3.5) regarding available adaptation options to reduce
30 climate vulnerability and build resilience (see Glossary) in the context of 1.5°C-compatible trajectories, here
31 with emphasis on sustainable development implications.
32
33

34 5.3.1 Sustainable Development in Support of Climate Adaptation 35

36 Making sustainable development a priority, and meeting the SDGs, is consistent with efforts to adapt to
37 climate change (*very high confidence*). Sustainable development is effective in building adaptive capacity if
38 it addresses poverty and inequalities, social and economic exclusion, and inadequate institutional capacities
39 (Noble et al., 2014; Abel et al., 2016; Colloff et al., 2017). Four ways in which sustainable development
40 leads to effective adaptation are described below.
41

42 Firstly, sustainable development enables transformational adaptation (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.2) when
43 an integrated approach is adopted, with inclusive, transparent decision making, rather than addressing current
44 vulnerabilities as stand-alone climate problems (Mathur et al., 2014; Arthurson and Baum, 2015; Shackleton
45 et al., 2015; Lemos et al., 2016; Antwi-Agyei et al., 2017b). Ending poverty in its multiple dimensions (SDG
46 1) is often a highly effective form of climate adaptation (Fankhauser and McDermott, 2014; Leichenko and
47 Silva, 2014; Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017). However, ending poverty is not sufficient, and the positive
48 outcome as an adaptation strategy depends on whether increased household wealth is actually directed
49 towards risk reduction and management strategies (Nelson et al., 2016), as shown in urban municipalities
50 (Colenbrander et al., 2017; Rasch, 2017) and agrarian communities (Hashemi et al., 2017), and whether
51 finance for adaptation is made available (Section 5.6.1).
52

53 Secondly, local participation is effective when wider socio-economic barriers are addressed via multi-scale
54 planning (McCubbin et al., 2015; Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner-Kerr, 2015; Toole et al., 2016). This is

1 the case, for instance, when national education efforts (SDG 4) (Muttarak and Lutz, 2014; Striessnig and
2 Loichinger, 2015) and indigenous knowledge (Nkomwa et al., 2014; Pandey and Kumar, 2018) enhance
3 information sharing, which also builds resilience (Santos et al., 2016; Martinez-Baron et al., 2018) and
4 reduces risks for maladaptation (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018; Gajjar et al., 2018).

5
6 Thirdly, development promotes transformational adaptation when addressing social inequalities (Section
7 5.5.3, 5.6.4), as in SDGs 4, 5, 16, and 17 (O'Brien et al., 2015; K. O'Brien, 2016). For example, SDG 5
8 supports measures that reduce women's vulnerabilities and allow women to benefit from adaptation (Antwi-
9 Agyei et al., 2015; Van Aelst and Holvoet, 2016; Cohen, 2017). Mobilisation of climate finance, carbon
10 taxation, and environmentally-motivated subsidies can reduce inequalities (SDG 10), advance climate
11 mitigation and adaptation (Chancel and Picketty, 2015), and be conducive to strengthening and enabling
12 environments for resilience building (Nhamo, 2016; Halonen et al., 2017).

13
14 Fourthly, when sustainable development promotes livelihood security, it enhances the adaptive capacities of
15 vulnerable communities and households. Examples include SDG 11 supporting adaptation in cities to reduce
16 harm from disasters (Kelman, 2017; Parnell, 2017); access to water and sanitation (SDG 6) with strong
17 institutions (SDG 16) (Rasul and Sharma, 2016); SDG 2 and its targets that promote adaptation in
18 agricultural and food systems (Lipper et al., 2014); and targets for SDG 3 such as reducing infectious
19 diseases and providing health cover are consistent with health-related adaptation (ICSU, 2017; Gomez-
20 Echeverri, 2018).

21
22 Sustainable development has the potential to significantly reduce systemic vulnerability, enhance adaptive
23 capacity, and promote livelihood security for poor and disadvantaged populations (*high confidence*).
24 Transformational adaptation (see Chapter 4, Sections 4.2.2.2 and 4.5.3) would require development that
25 takes into consideration multidimensional poverty and entrenched inequalities, local cultural specificities,
26 and local knowledge in decision-making, thereby making it easier to achieve the SDGs in a 1.5°C warmer
27 world (*medium evidence, high agreement*).

30 5.3.2 Synergies and Trade-offs between Adaptation Options and Sustainable Development

31
32 There are short-, medium-, and long-term positive impacts (synergies) and negative impacts (trade-offs)
33 between the dual goal of keeping temperatures below 1.5°C global warming and achieving sustainable
34 development. The extent of synergies between development and adaptation goals will vary by the
35 development process adopted for a particular SDG and underlying vulnerability contexts (*medium evidence,*
36 *high agreement*). Overall, the impacts of adaptation on sustainable development, poverty eradication, and
37 reducing inequalities in general, and the SDGs specifically, are expected to be largely positive, given that the
38 inherent purpose of adaptation is to lower risks. Building on Chapter 4 (see Section 4.3.5), this section
39 examines synergies and trade-offs between adaptation and sustainable development for some key sectors and
40 approaches, also.

41
42 *Agricultural adaptation:* The most direct synergy is between SDG 2 (zero hunger) and adaptation in
43 cropping, livestock, and food systems, designed to maintain or increase production (Lipper et al., 2014;
44 Rockström et al., 2017). Farmers with effective adaptation strategies tend to enjoy higher food security and
45 experience lower levels of poverty (FAO, 2015; Douxchamps et al., 2016; Ali and Erenstein, 2017).
46 Vermeulen et al. (2016) report strong positive returns on investment across the world from agricultural
47 adaptation with side benefits for environment and economic well-being. Well-adapted agricultural systems
48 contribute to safe drinking water, health, biodiversity, and equity goals (DeClerck et al., 2016; Myers et al.,
49 2017). Climate-smart agriculture has synergies with food security, though it can be biased towards
50 technological solutions, may not be gender sensitive, and can create specific challenges for institutional and
51 distributional aspects (Lipper et al., 2014; Arakelyan et al., 2017; Taylor, 2017).

52
53 At the same time, adaptation options increase risk for human health, oceans, and access to water if fertiliser
54 and pesticides are used without regulation or when irrigation reduces water availability for other purposes

1 (Shackleton et al., 2015; Campbell et al., 2016). When agricultural insurance and climate services overlook
2 the poor, inequality may rise (Dinku et al., 2014; Carr and Owusu-Daaku, 2015; Carr and Onzere, 2017;
3 Georgeson et al., 2017a). Agricultural adaptation measures may increase workloads, especially for women,
4 while changes in crop mix can result in loss of income or culturally inappropriate food (Carr and Thompson,
5 2014; Thompson-Hall et al., 2016; Bryan et al., 2017), and they may benefit farmers with more land to the
6 detriment of land-poor farmers, as seen in the Mekong River Basin (see Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in
7 Chapter 3).

8
9 *Adaptation to protect human health:* Adaptation options in the health sector are expected to reduce morbidity
10 and mortality (Arbuthnott et al., 2016; Ebi and Del Barrio, 2017). Heat-early-warning systems help lower
11 injuries, illnesses, and deaths (Hess and Ebi, 2016), with positive impacts for SDG 3. Institutions better
12 equipped to share information, indicators for detecting climate-sensitive diseases, improved provision of
13 basic health care services, and coordination with other sectors also improve risk management, thus reducing
14 adverse health outcomes (Dasgupta et al., 2016; Dovie et al., 2017). Effective adaptation creates synergies
15 via basic public health measures (K.R. Smith et al., 2014; Dasgupta, 2016) and health infrastructure
16 protected from extreme weather events (Watts et al., 2015). Yet, trade-offs can occur when adaptation in one
17 sector leads to negative impacts in another sector. Examples include the creation of urban wetlands through
18 flood control measures which can breed mosquitoes, and migration eroding physical and mental well-being,
19 hence adversely affecting SDG 3 (K.R. Smith et al., 2014; Watts et al., 2015). Similarly, increased use of air
20 conditioning enhances resilience to heat stress (Petkova et al., 2017); yet it can result in higher energy
21 consumption, undermining SDG 13.

22
23 *Coastal adaptation:* Adaptation to sea-level rise remains essential in coastal areas even under a climate
24 stabilisation scenario of 1.5°C (Nicholls et al., 2018). Coastal adaptation to restore ecosystems (for instance
25 by planting mangrove forests) support SDGs for enhancing life and livelihoods on land and oceans (see
26 Chapter 4, Sections 4.3.2.3). Synergistic outcomes between development and relocation of coastal
27 communities are enhanced by participatory decision-making and settlement designs that promote equity and
28 sustainability (Voorn et al., 2017). Limits to coastal adaptation may rise, for instance in low-lying islands in
29 the Pacific, Caribbean, and Indian Ocean, with attendant implications for loss and damage (see Chapter 3
30 Box 3.5, Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter 12 in Chapter 5, Box 5.3).

31
32 *Migration as adaptation:* Migration has been used in various contexts to protect livelihoods from challenges
33 related to climate change (Marsh, 2015; Jha et al., 2017), including through remittances (Betzold and Weiler,
34 2017). Synergies between migration and the achievement of sustainable development depend on adaptive
35 measures and conditions in both sending and receiving regions (Fatima et al., 2014; McNamara, 2015;
36 Entzinger and Scholten, 2016; Ober and Sakdapolrak, 2017; Schwan and Yu, 2017). Adverse developmental
37 impacts arise when vulnerable women or the elderly are left behind or if migration is culturally disruptive
38 (Wilkinson et al., 2016; Albert et al., 2017; Islam and Shamsuddoha, 2017).

39
40 *Ecosystem-based adaptation (EBA):* EBA can offer synergies with sustainable development (Morita and
41 Matsumoto, 2015; Ojea, 2015; Szabo et al., 2015; Brink et al., 2016; Butt et al., 2016; Conservation
42 International, 2016; Huq et al., 2017), although assessments remain difficult (Doswald et al., 2014) (see
43 Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.2). Examples include mangrove restoration reducing coastal vulnerability,
44 protecting marine and terrestrial ecosystems, and increasing local food security; as well as watershed
45 management reducing flood risks and improving water quality (Chong, 2014). In drylands, EBA practices,
46 combined with community-based adaptation, have shown how to link adaptation with mitigation to improve
47 livelihood conditions of poor farmers (Box 5.1). Synergistic developmental outcomes arise where EBA is
48 cost effective, inclusive of indigenous and local knowledge, and easily accessible by the poor (Ojea, 2015;
49 Daigneault et al., 2016; Estrella et al., 2016). Payment for ecosystem services can provide incentives to land
50 owners and natural resource managers to preserve environmental services with synergies with SDGs 1 and
51 13 (Arriagada et al., 2015), when implementation challenges are overcome (Calvet-Mir et al., 2015; Wegner,
52 2016; Chan et al., 2017). Trade-offs include loss of other economic land use types, tension between
53 biodiversity and adaptation priorities, and conflicts over governance (Wamsler et al., 2014; Ojea, 2015).

1 *Community-based adaptation (CBA)*: CBA (see Chapter 4, Sections 4.3.3.2) enhances resilience and
2 sustainability of adaptation plans (Ford et al., 2016; Fernandes-Jesus et al., 2017; Grantham and Rudd, 2017;
3 Gustafson et al., 2017). Yet, negative impacts occur if it fails to fairly represent vulnerable populations and
4 to foster long-term social resilience (Ensor, 2016; Taylor Aiken et al., 2017). Mainstreaming CBA into
5 planning and decision-making enables the attainment of SDG 5, 10, and 16 (Archer et al., 2014; Reid and
6 Huq, 2014; Vardakoulias and Nicholles, 2014; Cutter, 2016; Kim et al., 2017). Incorporating multiple forms
7 of indigenous and local knowledge (ILK) is an important element of CBA, as shown for instance in the
8 Arctic region (Apgar et al., 2015; Armitage, 2015; Pearce et al., 2015; Chief et al., 2016; Cobbinah and
9 Anane, 2016; Ford et al., 2016) (see Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 9, Box 4.3, Section 4.3.5.5). ILK can be
10 synergistic with achieving SDGs 2, 6, and 10 (Ayers et al., 2014; Lasage et al., 2015; Regmi and Star, 2015;
11 Berner et al., 2016; Chief et al., 2016; Murtinho, 2016; Reid, 2016).

12
13 There are clear synergies between adaptation options and several SDGs, such as poverty eradication,
14 elimination of hunger, clean water, and health (*robust evidence, high agreement*) as well-integrated
15 adaptation supports sustainable development (Eakin et al., 2014; Weisser et al., 2014; Adam, 2015; Smucker
16 et al., 2015). Substantial synergies are observed in the agricultural and health sectors, and in ecosystem-based
17 adaptations. However, particular adaptation strategies can lead to adverse consequences for developmental
18 outcomes (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Adaptation strategies that advance one SDG can result in
19 trade-offs with other SDGs, for instance, agricultural adaptation to enhance food security (SDG 2) causing
20 negative impacts for health, equality, and healthy ecosystems (SDGs 3, 5, 6, 10, 14 and 15), and resilience to
21 heat stress increasing energy consumption (SDGs 3 and 7), and high-cost adaptation in resource-constrained
22 contexts (*medium evidence, medium agreement*).

23 24 25 **5.3.3 Adaptation Pathways toward a 1.5°C Warmer World and Implications for Inequalities**

26
27 In a 1.5°C warmer world, adaptation measures and options would need to be intensified, accelerated, and
28 scaled up. This entails not only the right ‘mix’ of options (asking ‘right for whom and for what?’) but also a
29 forward-looking understanding of dynamic trajectories, that is adaptation pathways (see Chapter 1, Cross-
30 Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1), best understood as decision-making processes over sets of potential action
31 sequenced over time (Câmpeanu and Fazey, 2014; Wise et al., 2014). Given the scarcity of literature on
32 adaptation pathways that navigate place-specific warming experiences at 1.5°C, this section presents insights
33 into current local decision making for adaptation futures. This grounded evidence shows that choices
34 between possible pathways, at different scales and for different groups of people, are shaped by uneven
35 power structures and historical legacies that create their own, often unforeseen change (Fazey et al., 2016;
36 Bosomworth et al., 2017; Lin et al., 2017; Murphy et al., 2017; Pelling et al., 2018).

37
38 Pursuing a place-specific adaptation pathway approach toward a 1.5°C warmer world harbours the potential
39 for significant positive outcomes, with synergies for well-being possibilities to ‘leap-frog the SDGs’ (J.R.A.
40 Butler et al., 2016), in countries at all levels of development (*medium evidence, high agreement*). It allows
41 for identifying local, socially-salient tipping points before they are crossed, based on what people value and
42 trade-offs that are acceptable to them (Barnett et al., 2014, 2016; Gorddard et al., 2016; Tschakert et al.,
43 2017). Yet, evidence also reveals adverse impacts that reinforce rather than reduce existing social
44 inequalities and hence may lead to poverty traps (Nagoda, 2015; Warner et al., 2015; Barnett et al., 2016;
45 J.R.A. Butler et al., 2016; Godfrey-Wood and Naess, 2016; Pelling et al., 2016; Albert et al., 2017; Murphy
46 et al., 2017) (*medium evidence, high agreement*).

47
48 Past development trajectories as well as transformational adaptation plans can constrain adaptation futures
49 by reinforcing dominant political-economic structures and processes, and narrowing option spaces; this leads
50 to maladaptive pathways that preclude alternative, locally-relevant, and sustainable development initiatives
51 and increase vulnerabilities (Warner and Kuzdas, 2017; Gajjar et al., 2018). Such dominant pathways tend to
52 validate the practices, visions, and values of existing governance regimes and powerful members of a
53 community while devaluing those of less privileged stakeholders. Examples from Romania, the Solomon
54 Islands, and Australia illustrate such pathway dynamics in which individual economic gains and prosperity

1 matter more than community cohesion and solidarity; this discourages innovation, exacerbates inequalities,
2 and further erodes adaptive capacities of the most vulnerable (Davies et al., 2014; Fazey et al., 2016;
3 Bosomworth et al., 2017). In the city of London, United Kingdom, the dominant adaptation and disaster risk
4 management pathway promotes resilience that emphasises self-reliance; yet, it intensifies the burden on low-
5 income citizens, the elderly, migrants, and others unable to afford flood insurance or protect themselves
6 against heat waves (Pelling et al., 2016). Adaptation pathways in the Bolivian Altiplano have transformed
7 subsistence farmers into world-leading quinoa producers, but loss of social cohesion and traditional values,
8 dispossession, and loss of ecosystem services now constitute undesirable trade-offs (Chelleri et al., 2016).

9
10 A narrow view of adaptation decision making, for example focused on technical solutions, tends to crowd
11 out more participatory processes (Lawrence and Haasnoot, 2017; Lin et al., 2017), obscures contested
12 values, and reinforces power asymmetries (Bosomworth et al., 2017; Singh, 2018). A situated and context-
13 specific understanding of adaptation pathways that galvanises diverse knowledge, values, and joint
14 initiatives, helps to overcome dominant path dependencies, avoid trade-offs that intensify inequities, and
15 challenge policies detached from place (Fincher et al., 2014; Wyborn et al., 2015; Murphy et al., 2017;
16 Gajjar et al., 2018). These insights suggest that adaptation pathway approaches to prepare for 1.5°C warmer
17 futures would be difficult to achieve without considerations for inclusiveness, place-specific trade-off
18 deliberations, redistributive measures, and procedural justice mechanisms to facilitate equitable
19 transformation (*medium evidence, high agreement*).

20
21 [INSERT BOX 5.1 HERE]

22 **Box 5.1:** Ecosystem- and Community-based Practices in Drylands

23
24
25 Drylands face severe challenges in building climate resilience (Fuller and Lain, 2017), yet, small-scale
26 farmers can play a crucial role as agents of change through ecosystem- and community-based practices that
27 combine adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development.

28
29 Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration (FMNR) of trees in cropland is practised in 18 countries across Sub-
30 Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Timor-Leste, India, and Haiti and has, for example, permitted the restoration
31 of over five million hectares of land in the Sahel (Niang et al., 2014; Bado et al., 2016). In Ethiopia, the
32 Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions (MERET) programme, which entails community-
33 based watershed rehabilitation in rural landscapes, supported around 648,000 people, resulting in the
34 rehabilitation of 25,400,000 hectares of land in 72 severely food-insecure districts across Ethiopia during
35 2012–2015 (Gebrehaweria et al., 2016). In India, local farmers have benefitted from watershed programmes
36 across different agro-ecological regions (Singh et al., 2014; Datta, 2015).

37
38 These low-cost, flexible community-based practices represent low-regrets adaptation and mitigation
39 strategies. These strategies often contribute to strengthened ecosystem resilience and biodiversity, increased
40 agricultural productivity and food security, reduced household poverty and drudgery for women, and
41 enhanced agency and social capital (Niang et al., 2014; Francis et al., 2015; Kassie et al., 2015; Mbow et al.,
42 2015; Reij and Winterbottom, 2015; Weston et al., 2015; Bado et al., 2016; Dumont et al., 2017). Small
43 check dams in dryland areas and conservation agriculture can significantly increase agricultural output
44 (Kumar et al., 2014; Agoramoorthy and Hsu, 2016; Pradhan et al., 2018). Mitigation benefits have also been
45 quantified (Weston et al., 2015); for example, FMNR over five million hectares in Niger has sequestered 25–
46 30 Mtonnes of carbon over 30 years (Stevens et al., 2014).

47
48 However, several constraints hinder scaling-up efforts: inadequate attention to the socio-technical processes
49 of innovation (Grist et al., 2017; Scoones et al., 2017), difficulties in measuring the benefits of an innovation
50 (Coe et al., 2017), farmers' inability to deal with long-term climate risk (Singh et al., 2017), and difficulties
51 for matching practices with agro-ecological conditions and complementary modern inputs (Kassie et al.,
52 2015). Key conditions to overcome these challenges include: developing agroforestry value chains and
53 markets (Reij and Winterbottom, 2015) and adaptive planning and management (Gray et al., 2016). Others
54 include inclusive processes giving greater voice to women and marginalised groups (MRFCJ, 2015a; UN

1 Women and MRFCJ, 2016; Dumont et al., 2017), strengthening of community land and forest rights
2 (Stevens et al., 2014; Vermeulen et al., 2016) and co-learning among communities of practice at different
3 scales (Coe et al., 2014; Reij and Winterbottom, 2015; Sinclair, 2016; Binam et al., 2017; Dumont et al.,
4 2017; Epule et al., 2017).

5
6 [END BOX 5.1]
7
8

9 **5.4 Mitigation and Sustainable Development**

10 The AR5 WGIII examined the potential of various mitigation options for specific sectors (energy supply,
11 industry, buildings, transport, and Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU)); it provided a
12 narrative of dimensions of sustainable development and equity as a framing for evaluating climate responses
13 and policies, respectively, in Chapters 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 (IPCC, 2014a). This section builds on analysis of
14 Chapters 2 and 4 of this report to re-assess mitigation and sustainable development in the context of 1.5°C
15 global warming as well as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
16
17
18

19 **5.4.1 Synergies and Trade-offs between Mitigation Options and Sustainable Development**

20
21 Adopting stringent climate mitigation options can generate multiple positive non-climate benefits that have
22 the potential to reduce the costs of achieving sustainable development (IPCC, 2014b; Ürge-Vorsatz et al.,
23 2014, 2016; Schaeffer et al., 2015; von Stechow et al., 2015). Understanding the positive impacts (synergies)
24 but also the negative impacts (trade-offs) is key for selecting mitigation options and policy choices that
25 maximise the synergies between mitigation and developmental actions (Hildingsson and Johansson, 2015;
26 Nilsson et al., 2016; Delponte et al., 2017; van Vuuren et al., 2017b; McCollum et al., 2018).
27 Aligning mitigation response options to sustainable development objectives can ensure public acceptance
28 (IPCC, 2014a), encourage faster action (Lechtenboehmer and Knoop, 2017), and support the design of
29 equitable mitigation (Holz et al., 2017; Winkler et al., 2018) that protect human rights (MRFCJ, 2015b)
30 (Section 5.5.3).
31

32 This sub-section assesses available literature on the interactions of individual mitigation options (see Chapter
33 2, Sections 2.3.1.2, Chapter 4, Sections 4.2 and 4.3) with sustainable development and the SDGs and
34 underlying targets. Table 5.2 (available at the end of the chapter) presents an assessment of these synergies
35 and trade-offs and the strength of the interaction using an SDG-interaction score (see Glossary) (McCollum
36 et al., 2018), with evidence and agreements levels. Figure 5.2 presents the information of Table 5.2
37 (available at the end of the chapter), showing gross (not net) interactions with the SDGs. This detailed
38 assessment of synergies and trade-offs of individual mitigation options with the SDGs (Table 5.2 a–d
39 (available at the end of the chapter), Figure 5.2) reveals that the number of synergies exceeds that of trade-
40 offs. Mitigation response options in the energy demand sector, AFOLU, and oceans have more positive
41 interactions with a larger number of SDGs compared to those on the energy supply side (*robust evidence,*
42 *high agreement*).
43
44

45 **5.4.1.1 Energy Demand: Mitigation Options to Accelerate Reduction in Energy Use and Fuel Switch**

46
47 For mitigation options in the energy demand sectors, the number of synergies with all sixteen SDGs exceeds
48 the number of trade-off (Figure 5.2, also Table 5.2 (available at the end of the chapter)) (*robust evidence,*
49 *high agreement*). Most of the interactions are of reinforcing nature, hence facilitating the achievement of the
50 goals.
51

52 Accelerating energy efficiency in all sectors, which is a necessary condition for a 1.5°C warmer world (see
53 Chapters 2 and 4), has synergies with a large number of SDGs (Figure 5.2, Table 5.2 (available at the end of

1 the chapter)) (*robust evidence, high agreement*). The diffusion of efficient equipment and appliances across
2 end use sectors has synergies with international partnership (SDG 17) and participatory and transparent
3 institutions (SDG 16) because innovations and deployment of new technologies require trans-national
4 capacity building and knowledge sharing. Resource and energy savings support sustainable production and
5 consumption (SDG 12), energy access (SDG 7), innovation and infrastructure development (SDG 9), and
6 sustainable city development (SDG 11). Energy efficiency supports the creation of decent jobs by new
7 service companies providing services for energy efficiency, but the net employment effect of efficiency
8 improvement remains uncertain due to macro-economic feedback (SDG 8) (McCollum et al., 2018).
9

10 In the buildings sector, accelerating energy efficiency by way of, for example, enhancing the use of efficient
11 appliances, refrigerant transition, insulation, retrofitting, and low- or zero-energy buildings generates
12 benefits across multiple SDG targets. For example, improved cook stoves make fuel endowments last longer
13 and hence reduce deforestation (SDG 15), support equal opportunity by reducing school absences due to
14 asthma among children (SDGs 3 and 4), and empower rural and indigenous women by reducing drudgery
15 (SDG 5) (Derbez et al., 2014; Lucon et al., 2014; Maidment et al., 2014; Scott et al., 2014; Cameron et al.,
16 2015; Fay et al., 2015; Liddell and Guiney, 2015; Shah et al., 2015; Sharpe et al., 2015; Wells et al., 2015;
17 Willand et al., 2015; Hallegatte et al., 2016; Kusumaningtyas and Aldrian, 2016; Berrueta et al., 2017;
18 McCollum et al., 2017) (*robust evidence, high agreement*).
19

20 In energy-intensive processing industries, 1.5°C-compatible trajectories require radical technology
21 innovation through maximum electrification, shift to other low-emission energy carriers such as hydrogen or
22 biomass, integration of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and innovations for Carbon Capture and
23 Utilisation (CCU) (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.4.5). These transformations have strong synergies with
24 innovation and sustainable industrialisation (SDG 9), supranational partnerships (SDGs 16 and 17) and
25 sustainable production (SDG 12). However, possible trade-offs due to risks of CCS-based carbon leakage,
26 increased electricity demands, and associated price impacts affecting energy access and poverty (SDGs 7 and
27 1) would need careful regulatory attention (Wesseling et al., 2017). In the mining industry, energy efficiency
28 can be synergetic or face trade-offs with sustainable management (SDG 6), depending on the option retained
29 for water management (Nguyen et al., 2014). Substitution and recycling are also an important driver of
30 1.5°C-compatible trajectories in industrial systems (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.4.2). Structural changes and
31 reorganisation of economic activities in industrial park/clusters following the principles of industrial
32 symbiosis (circular economy) improves the overall sustainability by reducing energy and waste (Fan et al.,
33 2017; Preston and Lehne, 2017) and reinforce responsible production and consumption (SDG 12) through
34 recycling, water use efficiency (SDG 6), energy access (SDG 7), and ecosystem service value enhancement
35 (SDG 15) (Karner et al., 2015; Zeng et al., 2017).
36

37 In the transport sector, deep electrification may trigger increases of electricity prices and adversely affect
38 poor populations (SDG 1), unless pro-poor redistributive policies are in place (Klausbrückner et al., 2016).
39 In cities, governments can lay the foundations for compact, connected low-carbon cities, which are an
40 important component of 1.5°C-compatible transformations (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3) and show synergies
41 with sustainable cities (SDG 11) (Colenbrander et al., 2016).
42

43 Behavioural responses are important determinants of the ultimate outcome of energy efficiency on emission
44 reductions and energy access (SDG 7) and their management requires a detailed understanding of the drivers
45 of consumption and the potential for and barriers to absolute reductions (Fuchs et al., 2016). Notably, the
46 rebound effect tends to offset the benefits of efficiency for emission reductions through growing demand for
47 energy services (Sorrell, 2015; Suffolk and Poortinga, 2016). However, high rebound can help in providing
48 faster access to affordable energy (SDG 7.1) where the goal is to reduce energy poverty and unmet energy
49 demand (Chakravarty et al., 2013)(see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3). Comprehensive policy design, including
50 rebound suppressing policies such as carbon price and policies that encourage awareness building and
51 promotional material design, are needed to tap the full potential of energy savings, as applicable to 1.5°C
52 warming context (Chakravarty and Tavoni, 2013; IPCC, 2014b; Karner et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2015;
53 Altieri et al., 2016; Santarius et al., 2016) and to address policy-related trade-offs and welfare-enhancing
54 benefits (Chakravarty et al., 2013; Chakravarty and Roy, 2016; Gillingham et al., 2016) (*robust evidence,*

1 *high agreement*).

2
3 Other behavioural responses will affect the interplay between energy efficiency and sustainable
4 development. Building occupants reluctant to change their habits may miss out on welfare-enhancing energy
5 efficiency opportunities (Zhao et al., 2017). Preferences for new products and premature obsolescence for
6 appliances is expected to affect sustainable consumption and production adversely (SDG 12) with
7 ramifications for resource use efficiency (Echegaray, 2016). User behaviour change towards increased
8 physical activity, less reliance on motorised travel over short distances, and the use of public transport would
9 help to decarbonise the transport sector in a synergetic manner with SDGs 3, 11, and 12 (Shaw et al., 2014;
10 Ajanovic, 2015; Chakrabarti and Shin, 2017) while reducing inequality in access to basic facilities (SDG 10)
11 (Lucas and Pangbourne, 2014; Kagawa et al., 2015). However, infrastructure design and regulations would
12 need to ensure road safety and address risks of road accidents for pedestrians (Hwang et al., 2017; Khreis et
13 al., 2017) to ensure sustainable infrastructure growth in human settlements (SDGs 9 and 11) (Lin et al.,
14 2015; SLoCaT, 2017).

15 16 17 5.4.1.2 *Energy Supply: Accelerated Decarbonisation*

18
19 Decreasing the share of coal in energy supply in line with 1.5°C-compatible scenarios (see Chapter 2,
20 Section 2.4.2) reduces adverse impacts of upstream supply-chain activities, in particular air and water
21 pollution, and coal mining accidents, and enhances health by reducing air pollution, notably in cities,
22 showing synergies with SDGs 3, 11 and 12 (Yang et al., 2016; UNEP, 2017).

23
24 Fast deployment of renewables like solar and wind, hydro, modern biomass, together with the decrease of
25 fossil fuels in energy supply (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2.1), is aligned with the doubling of renewables in
26 the global energy mix (SDG 7.2). Renewables could also support progress on SDGs 1, 10, 11, and 12 and
27 supplement new technology (Chaturvedi and Shukla, 2014; Rose et al., 2014; Smith and Sagar, 2014; Riahi
28 et al., 2015; IEA, 2016; McCollum et al., 2017; van Vuuren et al., 2017a) (*robust evidence, high agreement*).

29 However, some trade-offs with the SDGs can emerge from offshore installations, particularly SDG 14 in
30 local contexts (McCollum et al., 2017). Moreover, trade-offs between renewable energy production and
31 affordability (SDG 7) (Labordena et al., 2017) and other environmental objectives would need to be
32 scrutinised for potential negative social outcomes. Policy interventions through regional cooperation building
33 (SDG 17) and institutional capacity (SDG 16) can enhance affordability (SDG 7) (Labordena et al.,
34 2017). The deployment of small-scale renewables, or off-grid solutions for people in remote areas (Sánchez
35 and Izzo, 2017), has strong potential for synergies with access to energy (SDG 7), but the actualisation of
36 these potentials requires measures to overcome technology and reliability risks associated with large-scale
37 deployment of renewables (Giwa et al., 2017; Heard et al., 2017). Bundling energy-efficient appliances and
38 lighting with off-grid renewables can lead to substantial cost reduction while increasing reliability (IEA,
39 2017). Low-income populations in industrialised countries are often left out of renewable energy generation
40 schemes, either because of high start-up costs or lack of home ownership (UNRISD, 2016).

41
42 Nuclear energy, the share of which increases in most of the 1.5°C-compatible pathways (see Chapter 2,
43 Section 2.4.2.1), can increase the risks of proliferation (SDG 16), have negative environmental effects (e.g.,
44 for water use, SDG 6), and have mixed effects for human health when replacing fossil fuels (SDGs 7 and 3)
45 (see Cross-Chapter Box 12, Table 1). The use of fossil CCS, which plays an important role in deep
46 mitigation pathways (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2.3), implies continued adverse impacts of upstream supply-
47 chain activities in the coal sector, and because of lower efficiency of CCS coal power plants (SDG 12),
48 upstream impacts and local air pollution are likely to be exacerbated (SDG 3). Furthermore, there is a non-
49 negligible risk of carbon dioxide leakage from geological storage and the carbon dioxide transport
50 infrastructure (SDG 3) (Table 5.2 (available at the end of the chapter)).

51
52 Economies dependent upon fossil fuel-based energy generation and/or export revenue are expected to be
53 disproportionately affected by future restrictions on the use of fossil fuels, under stringent climate goals and
54 higher carbon prices; this includes impacts on employment, stranded assets, resources left underground,

1 lower capacity use, and early phasing out of large infrastructure already under construction (Johnson et al.,
2 2015; McGlade and Ekins, 2015; UNEP, 2017; Spencer et al., 2018) (Box 5.2) (*robust evidence, high*
3 *agreement*). Investment in coal continues to be attractive in many countries as it is a mature technology,
4 provides cheap energy supply, large-scale employment, and energy security (Jakob and Steckel, 2016; Vogt-
5 Schilb and Hallegatte, 2017; Spencer et al., 2018). Hence, accompanying policies and measures would be
6 required to ease job losses and correct for relatively higher prices of alternative energy (Oosterhuis and Ten
7 Brink, 2014; Oei and Mendelevitch, 2016; Garg et al., 2017; HLCCP, 2017; Jordaan et al., 2017; OECD,
8 2017; UNEP, 2017; Blondeel and van de Graaf, 2018; Green, 2018). Research on historical transitions shows
9 that managing the impacts on workers through retraining programs is essential in order to align the phase
10 down of mining industries with meeting ambitious climate targets, and the objectives of a ‘just transition’
11 (Galgóczi, 2014; Caldecott et al., 2017; Healy and Barry, 2017). This aspect is even more important in
12 developing countries where the mining workforce is largely semi- or un-skilled (Altieri et al., 2016; Tung,
13 2016). Ambitious emission reduction targets can unlock very strong decoupling potentials in industrialised
14 fossil exporting economies (Hatfield-Dodds et al., 2015).

15

16 [START BOX 5.2 HERE]

17

Box 5.2: Challenges and Opportunities of Low-Carbon Pathways in Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) Countries

19

20

21 The Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) region (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab
22 Emirates) is characterised by high dependency on hydrocarbon resources (natural oil and gas), with high
23 risks of socio-economic impacts of policies and response measures to address climate change. The region is
24 also vulnerable to the decrease of the global demand and price of hydrocarbons as a result of climate change
25 response measures. The projected declining use of oil and gas under low emissions pathways creates risks of
26 significant economic losses for the GCC region (e.g., Waisman et al., 2013; Van de Graaf and Verbruggen,
27 2015; Al-Maamary et al., 2016; Bauer et al., 2016), given that natural gas and oil revenues contributed to
28 ~70% of government budgets and > 35% of the gross domestic product in 2010 (Callen et al., 2014).

29

30 The current high energy intensity of the domestic economies (Al-Maamary et al., 2017), triggered mainly by
31 low domestic energy prices (Alshehry and Belloumi, 2015), suggests specific challenges for aligning
32 mitigation towards 1.5°C-consistent trajectories, which would require strong energy efficiency and economic
33 development for the region.

34

35 Economies of the region are highly reliant on fossil fuel for their domestic activities. Yet, the renewables
36 deployment potentials are large, deployment is already happening (Cugurullo, 2013; IRENA, 2016), and
37 positive economic benefits can be envisaged (Sgouridis et al., 2016). Nonetheless, the use of renewables is
38 currently limited by economics and structural challenges (Lilliestam and Patt, 2015; Griffiths, 2017a).
39 Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is also envisaged with concrete steps towards implementation (Alsheyab,
40 2017; Ustadi et al., 2017); yet, the real potential of this technology in terms of scale and economic
41 dimensions is still uncertain.

42

43 Beyond the above mitigation-related challenges, human societies and fragile ecosystems of the region are
44 highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, such as water stress (Evans et al., 2004; Shaffrey et al.,
45 2009), desertification (Bayram and Öztürk, 2014), sea level rise affecting vast low costal lands, and high
46 temperature and humidity with future levels potentially beyond adaptive capacities (Pal and Eltahir, 2016). A
47 low-carbon pathway that manages climate-related risks within the context of sustainable development
48 requires an approach that jointly addresses both types of vulnerabilities (Al Ansari, 2013; Lilliestam and
49 Patt, 2015; Babiker, 2016; Griffiths, 2017b).

50

51 The Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for GCC countries identified energy efficiency,
52 deployment of renewables, and technology transfer to enhance agriculture, food security, protection of
53 marine, and management of water and costal zones (Babiker, 2016). Strategic vision documents, such as
54 Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030”, identify emergent opportunities for energy price reforms, energy efficiency,

1 turning emissions in valuable products, and deployment of renewables and other clean technologies, if
2 accompanied with appropriate policies to manage the transition and in the context of economic
3 diversification (Luomi, 2014; Atalay et al., 2016; Griffiths, 2017b; Howarth et al., 2017).

4
5 [END BOX 5.2 HERE]

6 7 8 5.4.1.3 *Land-based Agriculture, Forestry and Ocean: Mitigation Response Options and Carbon Dioxide* 9 *Removal*

10
11 In the AFOLU sector, dietary change towards global healthy diets, that is, a shift from over-consumption of
12 animal-related to plant-related diets, and food waste reduction (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.1) are in synergy
13 with SDGs 2 and 6, and SDG 3 through lower consumption of animal products and reduced losses and waste
14 throughout the food system, contributing to achieving SDGs 12 and 15 (Bajželj et al., 2014; Bustamante et
15 al., 2014; Tilman and Clark, 2014; Hiç et al., 2016).

16
17 Power dynamics plays an important role in achieving behavioural change and sustainable consumption
18 (Fuchs et al., 2016). In forest management (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.2), encouraging responsible sourcing
19 of forest products and securing indigenous land tenure has the potential to increase economic benefits by
20 creating decent jobs (SDG 8), maintaining biodiversity (SDG 15), facilitating innovation and upgrading
21 technology (SDG 9), and responsible and just decision making (SDG 16) (Ding et al., 2016; WWF, 2017)
22 (*medium evidence, high agreement*).

23
24 Emerging evidence indicates that future mitigation efforts that would be required to reach stringent climate
25 targets, particularly those associated with Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) (e.g., Bioenergy with Carbon
26 Capture and Storage (BECCS) and afforestation and reforestation), may also impose significant constraints
27 upon poor and vulnerable communities (SDG 1) via increased food prices and competition for arable land,
28 land appropriation, and dispossession (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2014; Hunsberger et al., 2014; Work,
29 2015; Muratori et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2016; Burns and Nicholson, 2017; Corbera et al., 2017) with
30 disproportionate negative impacts upon rural poor and indigenous populations (SDG 1) (Grubert et al., 2014;
31 Grill et al., 2015; Zhang and Chen, 2015; Fricko et al., 2016; Johansson et al., 2016; Aha and Ayitey, 2017;
32 De Stefano et al., 2017; Shi et al., 2017) (Section 5.4.2.2, Table 5.3 2 (available as a supplementary pdf at the
33 end of the chapter), Figure 5.32) (*robust evidence, high agreement*). Crops for bioenergy may increase
34 irrigation needs and exacerbate water stress with negative associated impacts on SDGs 6 and 10 (Boysen et
35 al., 2017).

36
37 Ocean Iron Fertilisation (OIF) and enhanced weathering have two-way interactions with life under water and
38 on land and food security (SDGs 2, 14, and 15) (Table 5.2 (available at the end of the chapter)).

39 Development of blue carbon resources through coastal (mangrove) and marine (seaweed) vegetative
40 ecosystems encourages integrated water resource management (SDG 6) (Vierros, 2017), promotes life on
41 land (SDG 15) (Potouroglou et al., 2017); poverty reduction (SDG 1) (Schirmer and Bull, 2014; Lamb et al.,
42 2016) and food security (SDG 2) (Ahmed et al., 2017a, b; Duarte et al., 2017; Sondak et al., 2017; Vierros,
43 2017; Zhang et al., 2017).

44
45 [INSERT FIGURE 5.2 HERE]




Figure 5.2: Synergies and trade-offs and gross Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)-interaction with individual mitigation options. The top three wheels represent synergies and the bottom three wheels show trade-offs. The colours on the border of the wheels correspond to the SDGs listed above, starting at the 9 o'clock position, with reading guidance in the top-left corner with the quarter circle (Note 1). Mitigation (climate action, SDG 13) is at the centre of the circle. The coloured segments inside the circles can be counted to arrive at the number of synergies (green) and trade-offs (red). The length of the coloured segments shows the strength of the synergies or trade-offs (Note 3) and the shading indicates confidence (Note 2). Various mitigation options within the energy demand sector, energy supply sector, and land and ocean sector, and how to read them within a segment are shown in grey (Note 4). See also Table 5.2 (available at the end of the chapter).

5.4.2 Sustainable Development Implications of 1.5°C and 2°C Mitigation Pathways

While previous sections have focused on individual mitigation options and their interaction with sustainable development and the SDGs, this section takes a systems perspective. Emphasis is on quantitative pathways depicting path-dependent evolutions of human and natural systems over time. Specifically, the focus is on fundamental transformations and thus stringent mitigation policies consistent with 1.5°C or 2°C, and the differential synergies and trade-offs with respect to the various sustainable development dimensions.

Both 1.5°C and 2°C pathways would require deep cuts in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and large-scale changes of energy supply and demand, as well as in agriculture and forestry systems (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4). For the assessment of the sustainable development implications of these pathways, we draw upon studies that show the aggregated impact of mitigation for multiple sustainable development dimensions (Grubler et al., 2018; McCollum et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018) and across multiple Integrated Assessment

1 Modelling (IAM) frameworks. Often these tools are linked to disciplinary models covering specific SDGs in
2 more detail (Cameron et al., 2016; Rao et al., 2017; Grubler et al., 2018; McCollum et al., 2018). Using
3 multiple IAMs and disciplinary models is important for a robust assessment of the sustainable development
4 implications of different pathways. Emphasis is on multi-regional studies, which can be aggregated to the
5 global scale. The recent literature on 1.5°C mitigation pathways has begun to provide quantifications for a
6 range of sustainable development dimensions, including air pollution and health, food security and hunger,
7 energy access, water security, and multidimensional poverty and equity.

10 5.4.2.1 *Air Pollution and Health*

11
12 Greenhouse gases and air pollutants are typically emitted by the same sources. Hence, mitigation strategies
13 that reduce GHGs or the use of fossil fuels typically also reduce emissions of pollutants, such as particulate
14 matter (e.g., PM_{2.5} and PM₁₀), black carbon (BC), sulphur dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen oxides (NO_x), and other
15 harmful species (Clarke et al., 2014) (Figure 5.3), causing adverse health and ecosystem effects at various
16 scales (Kusumaningtyas and Aldrian, 2016).

17
18 Mitigation pathways typically show that there are significant synergies for air pollution, and that the
19 synergies increase with the stringency of the mitigation policies (Amann et al., 2011; Rao et al., 2016;
20 Klimont et al., 2017; Shindell et al., 2017; Markandya et al., 2018). Recent multi-model comparisons
21 indicate that mitigation pathways consistent with 1.5°C would result in higher synergies with air pollution
22 compared to pathways that are consistent with 2°C (Figures 5.4 and 5.5). Shindell et al. (2018) indicate that
23 health benefits worldwide over the century of 1.5°C pathways could be in the range of 110 to 190 million
24 fewer premature deaths compared to 2°C pathways. The synergies for air pollution are highest in the
25 developing world, particularly in Asia. In addition to significant health benefits, there are also economic
26 benefits from mitigation, reducing the investment needs in air pollution control technologies by about 35%
27 globally (or about 100 billion US\$2015 per year to 2030 in 1.5°C pathways) (McCollum et al., 2018) (Figure
28 5.4).

31 5.4.2.2 *Food Security and Hunger*

32
33 Stringent climate mitigation pathways in line with ‘well below 2°C’ or ‘1.5°C’ goals often rely on the
34 deployment of large-scale land-related measures, like afforestation and/or bioenergy supply (Popp et al.,
35 2014; Rose et al., 2014; Creutzig et al., 2015). These land-related measures can compete with food
36 production and hence raise food security concerns (Section 5.4.1.3) (P. Smith et al., 2014). Mitigation studies
37 indicate that so-called ‘single-minded’ climate policy, aiming solely at limiting warming to 1.5°C or 2°C
38 without concurrent measures in the food sector, can have negative impacts for global food security
39 (Hasegawa et al., 2015; McCollum et al., 2018). Impacts of 1.5°C mitigation pathways can be significantly
40 higher than those of 2°C pathways (Figures 5.4 and 5.5). An important driver of the food security impacts in
41 these scenarios is the increase of food prices and the effect of mitigation on disposable income and wealth
42 due to GHG pricing. A recent study indicates that, on aggregate, the price and income effects on food may be
43 bigger than the effect due to competition over land between food and bioenergy (Hasegawa et al., 2015).

44
45 In order to address the issue of trade-offs with food security, mitigation policies would need to be designed
46 in a way that shields the population at risk of hunger, including through the adoption of different
47 complementary measures, such as food price support. The investment needs of complementary food price
48 policies are found to be globally relatively much smaller than the associated mitigation investments of 1.5°C
49 pathways (Figure 5.3) (McCollum et al., 2018). Besides food support price, other measures include
50 improving productivity and efficiency of agricultural production systems (FAO and NZAGRC, 2017a, b;
51 Frank et al., 2017) and programs focusing on forest land-use change (Havlík et al., 2014). All these lead to
52 additional benefits of mitigation, improving resilience and livelihoods.

53
54 van Vuuren et al. (2018) and Grubler et al. (2018) show that 1.5°C pathways without reliance on BECCS can

1 be achieved through a fundamental transformation of the service sectors which would significantly reduce
2 energy and food demand (see Chapter 2, Sections 2.1.1, 2.3.1, and 2.4.3). Such low energy demand (LED)
3 pathways would result in significantly reduced pressure on food security, lower food prices, and put fewer
4 people at risk of hunger. Importantly, the trade-offs with food security would be reduced by the avoided
5 impacts in the agricultural sector due to the reduced warming associated with the 1.5°C pathways (see
6 Chapter 3, Section 3.5). However, such feedbacks are not comprehensively captured in the studies on
7 mitigation.

10 5.4.2.3 *Lack of Energy Access/Energy Poverty*

11 A lack of access to clean and affordable energy (especially for cooking) is a major policy concern in many
12 countries, especially in those in South Asia and Africa where major parts of the population still rely
13 primarily on solid fuels for cooking (IEA and World Bank, 2017). Scenario studies which quantify the
14 interactions between climate mitigation and energy access indicate that stringent climate policy which
15 would affect energy prices could significantly slow down the transition to clean cooking fuels, such as
16 liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) or electricity (Cameron et al., 2016).

17
18 Estimates across six different IAMs (McCollum et al., 2018) indicate that, in the absence of compensatory
19 measures, the number of people without access to clean cooking fuels may increase. Re-distributional
20 measures, such as subsidies on cleaner fuels and stoves, could compensate for the negative effects of
21 mitigation on energy access. Investment costs of the re-distributional measures in 1.5°C pathways (on
22 average around 120 billion per year to 2030; Figure 5.4) are much smaller than the mitigation investments of
23 1.5°C pathways (McCollum et al., 2018). The recycling of revenues from climate policy might act as a
24 means to help finance the costs of providing energy access to the poor (Cameron et al., 2016).

28 5.4.2.4 *Water Security*

29
30 Transformations towards low-emissions energy and agricultural systems can have major implications for
31 freshwater demand as well as water pollution. The scaling up of renewables and energy efficiency as
32 depicted by low emissions pathways would, in most instances, lower water demands for thermal energy
33 supply facilities ('water-for-energy') compared to fossil energy technologies, and thus reinforce targets
34 related to water access and scarcity (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1). However, some low-carbon options such
35 as bioenergy, centralised solar power, nuclear, and hydropower technologies could, if not managed properly,
36 have counteracting effects that compound existing water-related problems in a given locale (Byers et al.,
37 2014; Fricko et al., 2016; IEA, 2016; Fujimori et al., 2017a; McCollum et al., 2017; Wang, 2017).



38
39 Under stringent mitigation efforts, the demand for bioenergy can result in a substantial increase of water
40 demand for irrigation, thereby potentially contributing to water scarcity in water-stressed regions (Berger et
41 al., 2015; Bonsch et al., 2016; Jägermeyr et al., 2017). However, this risk can be reduced by prioritising rain-
42 fed production of bioenergy (Hayashi et al., 2015, 2018; Bonsch et al., 2016), but might have adverse effects
43 for food security (Boysen et al., 2017).

44
45 Reducing food and energy demand without compromising the needs of the poor emerges as a robust strategy
46 for both water conservation and GHG emissions reductions (von Stechow et al., 2015; IEA, 2016; Parkinson
47 et al., 2016; Grubler et al., 2018). The results underscore the importance of an integrated approach when
48 developing water, energy, and climate policy (IEA, 2016).

49
50 Estimates across different models for the impacts of stringent mitigation pathways on energy-related water
51 uses seem ambiguous. Some pathways show synergies (Mouratiadou et al., 2018) while others indicate
52 trade-offs and thus increases of water use due to mitigation (Fricko et al., 2016). The signal depends on the
53 adopted policy implementation or mitigation strategies and technology portfolio. A number of adaptation
54 options exist (e.g., dry cooling), which can effectively reduce electricity-related water trade-offs (Fricko et

1 al., 2016; IEA, 2016). Similarly, irrigation water use will depend on the regions where crops are produced,
 2 the sources of bioenergy (e.g., agriculture vs. forestry) and dietary change induced by climate policy.
 3 Overall, and also considering other water-related SDGs, including access to safe drinking water and
 4 sanitation as well as waste-water treatment, investments into the water sector seem to be only modestly
 5 affected by stringent climate policy compatible with 1.5°C (Figure 5.4) (McCollum et al., 2018).
 6
 7

[INSERT FIGURE 5.3 HERE]




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Figure 5.3: Sustainable development implications of mitigation actions in 1.5°C pathways. Panel (a) shows ranges for 1.5°C pathways for selected sustainable development dimensions compared to the ranges of 2°C pathways and baseline pathways. The panel (a) depicts interquartile and the full range across the scenarios for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2 (hunger), SDG 3 (health), SDG 6 (water), SDG 7 (energy), SDG 13 (climate), and SDG 15 (land). Progress towards achieving the SDGs is denoted by arrow symbols (increase or decrease of indicator). Black horizontal lines show 2015 values for comparison. Note that sustainable development effects are estimated for the effect of mitigation and do not include benefits from avoided impacts (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5). Low energy demand (LED) denotes estimates from a pathway with extremely low energy demand reaching 1.5°C without Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS). Panel (b) presents the resulting full range for synergies and trade-offs of 1.5°C pathways compared to the corresponding baseline scenarios. The y-axis in panel (b) indicates the factor change in the 1.5°C pathway compared to the baseline. Note that the figure shows gross impacts of mitigation and does not include feedbacks due to avoided impacts. The realisation of the side-effects will critically depend on local circumstances and implementation practice. Trade-offs across many sustainable development dimensions can be reduced through complementary/re-distributional measures. The figure is not comprehensive and focuses on those sustainable development dimensions for which quantifications across models are available. Sources: 1.5°C pathways database of Chapter 2 (Grubler et al., 2018; McCollum et al., 2018).

[INSERT FIGURE 5.4 HERE]



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Figure 5.4: Investment into mitigation up until 2030 and implications for investments for four sustainable development dimensions. Cross-hatched bars show the median investment in 1.5°C pathways across results from different models, and solid bars for 2°C pathways, respectively. Whiskers on bars represent minima and maxima across estimates from six models. Clean water and air pollution investments are available only from one model. Mitigation investments show the change in investments across mitigation options compared to the baseline. Negative mitigation investments (grey bars) denote disinvestment (reduced investment needs) into fossil fuel sectors compared to the baseline. Investments for different

1 sustainable development dimensions denote the investment needs for complementary measures in order to
2 avoid trade-offs (negative impacts) of mitigation. Negative sustainable development investments for air
3 pollution indicate cost savings, and thus synergies of mitigation for air pollution control costs. The values
4 compare to about US\$(2010) 2 trillion (range of 1.4 to 3 trillion) of total energy-related investments in the
5 1.5°C pathways. Source: estimates from CD-LINKS scenarios summarised by McCollum et al. (2018).
6

7 In summary, the assessment of mitigation pathways shows that, to meet the 1.5°C target, a wide range of
8 mitigation options would need to be deployed (see Chapter 2, Sections 2.3 and 2.4). While pathways aiming
9 at 1.5°C are associated with high synergies for some sustainable development dimensions (such as human
10 health and air pollution, forest preservation), the rapid pace and magnitude of the required changes would
11 also lead to increased risks for trade-offs for other sustainable development dimensions (particularly food
12 security) (Figures 5.4 and 5.5). Synergies and trade-offs are expected to be unevenly distributed between
13 regions and nations (Box 5.2), though little literature has formally examined such distributions under 1.5°C
14 consistent mitigation scenarios. Reducing these risks requires smart policy designs and mechanisms that
15 shield the poor and redistribute the burden so that the most vulnerable are not affected. Recent scenario
16 analyses show that associated investments for reducing the trade-offs for, for example, food, water and
17 energy access to be significantly lower than the required mitigation investments (McCollum et al., 2018).
18 Fundamental transformation of demand, including efficiency and behavioural changes, can help to
19 significantly reduce the reliance on risky technologies, such as BECCS, and thus reduce the risk of potential
20 trade-offs between mitigation and other sustainable development dimensions (von Stechow et al., 2015;
21 Grubler et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018). Reliance on demand-side measures only, however, would not
22 be sufficient for meeting stringent targets, such as 1.5°C and 2°C (Clarke et al., 2014).
23
24

25 **5.5 Sustainable Development Pathways to 1.5°C**

26
27 This section assesses what is known in the literature on development pathways that are sustainable and
28 climate-resilient and relevant to a 1.5°C warmer world. Pathways, transitions from today's world to
29 achieving a set of future goals (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.3, Cross-Chapter Box 1), follow broadly two main
30 traditions: first, as integrated pathways describing the required societal and systems transformations,
31 combining quantitative modelling and qualitative narratives at multiple spatial scales (global to sub-
32 national); and second, as country- and community-level, solution-oriented trajectories and decision-making
33 processes about context- and place-specific opportunities, challenges, and trade-offs. These two notions of
34 pathways offer different, though complementary, insights into the nature of 1.5°C-relevant trajectories and
35 the short-term actions that enable long-term goals. Both highlight to varying degrees the urgency, ethics, and
36 equity dimensions of possible trajectories and society- and system-wide transformations, yet at different
37 scales, building on Chapter 2 (see Section 2.4) and Chapter 4 (see Section 4.5).
38
39

40 **5.5.1 Integration of Adaptation, Mitigation, and Sustainable Development**

41
42 Insights into climate-compatible development (see Glossary) illustrate how integration between adaptation,
43 mitigation, and sustainable development works in context-specific projects, how synergies are achieved, and
44 what challenges are encountered during implementation (Stringer et al., 2014; Suckall et al., 2014; Antwi-
45 Agyei et al., 2017a; Bickersteth et al., 2017; Kalafatis, 2017; Nunan, 2017). The operationalisation of
46 climate-compatible development, including climate-smart agriculture and carbon-forestry projects (Lipper et
47 al., 2014; Campbell et al., 2016; Quan et al., 2017), shows multi-level and multi-sector trade-offs involving
48 'winners' and 'losers' across governance levels (Kongsager and Corbera, 2015; Naess et al., 2015; Ficklin et
49 al., 2017; Karlsson et al., 2017; Tanner et al., 2017; Taylor, 2017; Wood, 2017) (*high confidence*). Issues of
50 power, participation, values, equity, inequality, and justice transcend case study examples of attempted
51 integrated approaches (Nunan, 2017; Phillips et al., 2017; Stringer et al., 2017; Wood, 2017), also reflected
52 in policy frameworks for integrated outcomes (Stringer et al., 2014; Di Gregorio et al., 2017; Few et al.,
53 2017; Tanner et al., 2017).
54

1 Ultimately, reconciling trade-offs between development needs and emission reductions towards a 1.5°C
2 warmer world requires a dynamic view of the interlinkages between adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable
3 development (Nunan, 2017). This entails recognition of the ways in which development contexts shape the
4 choice and effectiveness of interventions, limit the range of responses afforded to communities and
5 governments, and potentially impose injustices upon vulnerable groups (UNRISD, 2016; Thornton and
6 Comberti, 2017). A variety of approaches, both quantitative and qualitative, exist to examine possible
7 sustainable development pathways under which climate and sustainable development goals can be achieved,
8 and synergies and trade-offs for transformation identified (Sections 5.3 and 5.4).
9

11 *5.5.2 Pathways for Adaptation, Mitigation, and Sustainable Development*

12
13 This section focuses on the growing body of pathways literature describing the dynamic and systemic
14 integration of mitigation and adaptation with sustainable development in the context of a 1.5°C warmer
15 world. These studies are critically important for the identification of ‘enabling’ conditions under which
16 climate and the SDGs can be achieved, and thus help the design of transformation strategies that maximise
17 synergies and avoid potential trade-offs (Sections 5.3 and 5.4). Full integration of sustainable development
18 dimensions is, however, challenging, given their diversity and the need for high temporal, spatial, and social
19 resolution to address local effects, including heterogeneity related to poverty and equity (von Stechow et al.,
20 2015). Research on long-term climate change mitigation and adaptation pathways has covered individual
21 SDGs to different degrees. Interactions between climate and other SDGs have been explored for SDGs 2, 3,
22 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 14, and 15 (Clarke et al., 2014; Abel et al., 2016; von Stechow et al., 2016; Rao et al., 2017)
23 while interactions with SDGs 1, 5, 11, and 16 remain largely underexplored in integrated long-term scenarios
24 (Zimm et al., 2018).
25

26 Quantitative pathways studies now better represent ‘nexus’ approaches to assess sustainable development
27 dimensions. In such approaches (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3.8), a sub-set of sustainable development
28 dimensions are investigated together because of their close relationships (Welsch et al., 2014; Conway et al.,
29 2015; Keairns et al., 2016; Parkinson et al., 2016; Rasul and Sharma, 2016; Howarth and Monasterolo,
30 2017). Compared to single objective climate-SDG assessments (Section 5.4.2), nexus solutions attempt to
31 integrate complex interdependencies across diverse sectors in a systems approach for consistent analysis.
32 Recent pathways studies show how water, energy, and climate (SDGs 6, 7 and 13) interact (Parkinson et al.,
33 2016; McCollum et al., 2018), calling for integrated water-energy investment decisions to manage systemic
34 risks. For instance, the provision of bioenergy, important in many 1.5°C-consistent pathways, can help
35 resolve ‘nexus challenges’ by alleviating energy security concerns, but can also have adverse ‘nexus
36 impacts’ on food security, water use, and biodiversity (Lotze-Campen et al., 2014; Bonsch et al., 2016).
37 Policies that improve the resource use efficiency across sectors can maximise synergies for sustainable
38 development (Bartos and Chester, 2014; McCollum et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018). Mitigation
39 compatible with 1.5°C can significantly reduce impacts and adaptation needs in the nexus sectors compared
40 to 2°C (Byers et al., 2018). In order to avoid trade-offs due to high carbon pricing of 1.5°C pathways,
41 regulation in specific areas may complement price-based instruments. Such combined policies generally lead
42 also to more early action maximizing synergies and avoiding some of the adverse climate effects for
43 sustainable development (Bertram et al., 2018).
44

45 The comprehensive analysis of climate change in the context of sustainable development requires suitable
46 reference scenarios that lend themselves to broader sustainable development analyses. The Shared
47 Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (O’Neill et al., 2017a; Riahi et al., 2017) (Chapter 1, Cross-Chapter Box 1
48 in Chapter 1) constitute an important first step in providing a framework for the integrated assessment of
49 adaptation and mitigation and their climate-development linkages (Ebi et al., 2014). The five underlying SSP
50 narratives (O’Neill et al., 2017a) map well into some of the key SDG dimensions, with one of the pathways
51 (SSP1) explicitly depicting sustainability as the main theme (van Vuuren et al., 2017b).
52

53 To date, no pathway in the literature proves to achieve all 17 SDGs because several targets are not met or not
54 sufficiently covered in the analysis, hence resulting in a sustainability gap (Zimm et al., 2018). The SSPs

1 facilitate the systematic exploration of different sustainable dimensions under ambitious climate objectives.
2 SSP1 proves to be in line with eight SDGs (3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 15) and several of their targets in a 2°C
3 warmer world (van Vuuren et al., 2017b; Zimm et al., 2018). But, important targets for SDGs 1, 2, and 4
4 (i.e., people living in extreme poverty, people living at the risk of hunger, and gender gap in years of
5 schooling) are not met in this scenario.
6

7 The SSPs show that sustainable socio-economic conditions will play a key role in reaching stringent climate
8 targets (Riahi et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018). Recent modelling work has examined 1.5°C-consistent,
9 stringent mitigation scenarios for 2100 applied to the SSPs, using six different Integrated Assessment
10 Models (IAMs). Despite limitations of these models which are coarse approximations of reality, robust
11 trends can be identified (Rogelj et al., 2018). SSP1 - which depicts broader “sustainability” as well as
12 enhancing equity and poverty reductions - is the only pathway where all models could reach 1.5°C and is
13 associated with the lowest mitigation costs across all SSPs. A decreasing number of models was successful
14 for SSP2, SSP4, and SSP5, respectively, indicating distinctly higher risks of failure due to high growth and
15 energy intensity as well as geographical and social inequalities and uneven regional development. And
16 reaching 1.5°C has even been found infeasible in the less sustainable SSP3 - “regional rivalry” (Fujimori et
17 al., 2017b; Riahi et al., 2017). All these conclusions hold true if a 2°C objective is considered (Calvin et al.,
18 2017; Fujimori et al., 2017b; Popp et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017). Rogelj et al. (2018) also show that fewer
19 scenarios are, however, feasible across different SSPs in case of 1.5°C, and mitigation costs substantially
20 increase in 1.5°C pathways compared to 2°C pathways.
21

22 There is a wide range of SSP-based studies focusing on the connections between adaptation/impacts and
23 different sustainable development dimensions (Hasegawa et al., 2014; Ishida et al., 2014; Arnell et al., 2015;
24 Bowyer et al., 2015; Burke et al., 2015; Lemoine and Kapnick, 2016; Rozenberg and Hallegatte, 2016;
25 Blanco et al., 2017; Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017; O'Neill et al., 2017a; Rutledge et al., 2017; Byers et al.,
26 2018).

27 New methods for projecting inequality and poverty (downscaled to sub-national rural and urban levels as
28 well as spatially-explicit levels) have enabled advanced SSP-based assessments of locally sustainable
29 development implications of avoided impacts and related adaptation needs. For instance, Byers et al. (2018)
30 find that, in a 1.5°C warmer world, a focus on sustainable development can reduce the climate risk exposure
31 of populations vulnerable to poverty by more than an order of magnitude (Section 5.2.2). Moreover,
32 aggressive reductions in between-country inequality may decrease the emissions intensity of global
33 economic growth (Rao and Min, 2018). This is due to the higher potential for decoupling of energy from
34 income growth in lower-income countries, due to high potential for technological advancements that reduce
35 the energy intensity of growth of poor countries - critical also for reaching 1.5°C in a socially and
36 economically equitable way. Participatory downscaling of SSPs in several European Union countries and in
37 Central Asia shows numerous possible pathways of solutions to the 2-1.5°C goal, depending on differential
38 visions (Tàbara et al., 2018). Other participatory applications of the SSPs, for example in West Africa
39 (Palazzo et al., 2017) and the south-eastern United States (Absar and Preston, 2015), illustrate the potentially
40 large differences in adaptive capacity within regions and between sectors.
41

42 Harnessing the full potential of the SSP framework to inform sustainable development requires (1) further
43 elaboration and extension of the current SSPs to cover sustainable development objectives explicitly; (2) the
44 development of new or variants of current narratives that would facilitate more SDG-focused analyses with
45 climate as one objective (among other SDGs) (Riahi et al., 2017); (3) scenarios with high regional resolution
46 (Fujimori et al., 2017b); (4) a more explicit representation of institutional and governance change associated
47 with the SSPs (Zimm et al., 2018); and (5) a scale-up of localised and spatially-explicit vulnerability, poverty
48 and inequality estimates, which have emerged in recent publications based on the SSPs (Byers et al., 2018)
49 and are essential to investigate equity dimensions (Klinsky and Winkler, 2018).
50

52 **5.5.3 Climate-Resilient Development Pathways**


53

54 This section assesses the literature on pathways as solution-oriented trajectories and decision-making

1 processes for attaining transformative visions for a 1.5°C warmer world. It builds on climate-resilient
 2 development pathways (CRDPs) introduced in the AR5 (Olsson et al., 2014) (Section 5.1.2) as well as
 3 growing literature (e.g., Eriksen et al., 2017; Johnson, 2017; Orindi et al., 2017; Kirby and O'Mahony, 2018;
 4 Solecki et al., 2018) that uses CRDPs as a conceptual and aspirational idea for steering societies towards
 5 low-carbon, prosperous, and ecologically safe futures. Such a notion of pathways foregrounds decision-
 6 making processes at local to national levels to situate transformation, resilience, equity, and well-being in the
 7 complex reality of specific places, nations, and communities (Harris et al., 2017; Ziervogel et al., 2017;
 8 Fazey et al., 2018; Gajjar et al., 2018; Klinsky and Winkler, 2018; Patterson et al., 2018; Tàbara et al., 2018).

9
 10 Pathways compatible with 1.5°C warming are not merely scenarios to envision possible futures but processes
 11 of deliberation and implementation that address societal values, local priorities, and inevitable trade-offs.
 12 This includes attention to politics and power that perpetuate business-as-usual trajectories (K. O'Brien, 2016;
 13 Harris et al., 2017), the politics that shape sustainability and capabilities of everyday life (Agyeman et al.,
 14 2016; Schlosberg et al., 2017), and ingredients for community resilience and transformative change (Fazey et
 15 al., 2018). Chartering CRDPs encourages locally-situated and problem-solving processes to negotiate and
 16 operationalise resilience 'on the ground' (Beilin and Wilkinson, 2015; Harris et al., 2017; Ziervogel et al.,
 17 2017). This entails contestation, inclusive governance, and iterative engagement of diverse populations with
 18 varied needs, aspirations, agency, and rights claims, including those most affected, to deliberate trade-offs in
 19 a multiplicity of possible pathways (see Figure 5.65) (Stirling, 2014; Vale, 2014; Walsh-Dilley and Wolford,
 20 2015; Biermann et al., 2016; J.R.A. Butler et al., 2016; K.L. O'Brien, 2016; Harris et al., 2017; Jones and
 21 Tanner, 2017; Mapfumo et al., 2017; Rosenbloom, 2017; Gajjar et al., 2018; Klinsky and Winkler, 2018;
 22 Lyon, 2018; O'Brien, 2018; Tàbara et al., 2018) (*high confidence*).

23
 24 [INSERT FIGURE 5.6 5 HERE]
 25



26
 27
 28 **Figure 5.5:** Pathways into the future, with path dependencies and iterative problem-solving and decision-making (after
 29 Fazey et al. (2016).
 30

31 32 5.5.3.1 Transformations, Equity, and Well-being

33
 34 Most literature related to CRDPs invokes the concept of transformation, underscoring the need for urgent
 35 and far-reaching changes in practices, institutions, and social relations in society. Transformations toward a
 36 1.5°C warmer world would need to address considerations for equity and well-being, including in trade-off
 37 decisions (see Figure 5.1).

1
2 To attain the anticipated *transformations*, all countries as well as non-state actors would need to strengthen
3 their contributions, through bolder and more committed cooperation and equitable effort-sharing (Rao, 2014;
4 Frumhoff et al., 2015; Ekwurzel et al., 2017; Holz et al., 2017; Millar et al., 2017; Shue, 2017; Robinson and
5 Shine, 2018) (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Sustaining decarbonisation rates at a 1.5°C-compatible
6 level would be unprecedented and not possible without rapid transformations to a net-zero-emissions global
7 economy by mid-century or the later half of the century (see Chapters 2 and 4). Such efforts would entail
8 overcoming technical, infrastructural, institutional, and behavioural barriers across all sectors and levels of
9 society (Pfeiffer et al., 2016; Seto et al., 2016) and defeating path dependencies, including poverty traps
10 (Boonstra et al., 2016; Enqvist et al., 2016; Haider et al., 2017; Lade et al., 2017). Transformation also
11 entails ensuring that 1.5°C-compatible pathways are inclusive and desirable, build solidarity and alliances,
12 and protect vulnerable groups, including against disruptions of transformation (Patterson et al., 2018).

13
14 There is growing emphasis on the role of *equity, fairness, and justice* (see Glossary) regarding context-
15 specific transformations and pathways to a 1.5°C warmer world (Shue, 2014; Thorp, 2014; Dennig et al.,
16 2015; Moellendorf, 2015; Klinsky et al., 2017b; Roser and Seidel, 2017; Sealey-Huggins, 2017; Klinsky and
17 Winkler, 2018; Robinson and Shine, 2018) (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Consideration for what is
18 equitable and fair suggests the need for stringent decarbonisation and up-scaled adaptation that do not
19 exacerbate social injustices, locally and at national levels (Okereke and Coventry, 2016), uphold human
20 rights (Robinson and Shine, 2018), are socially desirable and acceptable (von Stechow et al., 2016;
21 Rosenbloom, 2017), address values and beliefs (O'Brien, 2018), and overcome vested interests (Normann,
22 2015; Patterson et al., 2016). Attention is often drawn to huge disparities in the cost, benefits, opportunities,
23 and challenges involved in transformation within and between countries, and the fact that the suffering of
24 already poor, vulnerable, and disadvantaged populations may be worsened, if care to protect them is not
25 taken (Holden et al., 2017; Klinsky and Winkler, 2018; Patterson et al., 2018).

26
27 *Well-being for all* (Dearing et al., 2014; Raworth, 2017) is at the core of an ecologically safe and socially just
28 space for humanity, including health and housing to peace and justice, social equity, gender equality, and
29 political voices (Raworth, 2017). It is in alignment with transformative social development (UNRISD, 2016)
30 and the 2030 Agenda of 'leaving no one behind'. The social conditions to enable well-being for all are to
31 reduce entrenched inequalities within and between countries (Klinsky and Winkler, 2018), rethink prevailing
32 values, ethics and behaviours (Holden et al., 2017), allow people to live a life in dignity while avoiding
33 actions that undermine capabilities (Klinsky and Golub, 2016), transform economies (Popescu and Ciurlau,
34 2016; Tàbara et al., 2018), overcome uneven consumption and production patterns (Dearing et al., 2014;
35 Häyhä et al., 2016; Raworth, 2017) and conceptualise development as well-being rather than mere economic
36 growth (Gupta and Pouw, 2017) (*medium evidence, high agreement*).

37 38 39 5.5.3.2 *Development Trajectories, Sharing of Efforts, and Cooperation*

40
41 The potential for pursuing sustainable and climate-resilient development pathways toward a 1.5°C warmer
42 world differs between and within nations, due to differential development achievements and trajectories, and
43 opportunities and challenges (Figure 5.1) (*very high confidence*). There are clear differences between high-
44 income countries where social achievements are high, albeit often with negative effects on the environment,
45 and most developing nations where vulnerabilities to climate change are high and social support and life
46 satisfaction are low, especially in the Least Developed Countries (Sachs et al., 2017; O'Neill et al., 2018).
47 Differential starting points for CRDPs between and within countries, including path dependencies (Figure
48 5.5), call for sensitivity to context (Klinsky and Winkler, 2018). For the developing world, limiting warming
49 to 1.5°C also means potentially severely curtailed development prospects (Okereke and Coventry, 2016) and
50 risks to human rights from both climate action and inaction to achieve this goal (Robinson and Shine, 2018)
51 (Section 5.2). Within-country development differences remain, despite efforts to ensure inclusive societies
52 (Gupta and Arts, 2017; Gupta and Pouw, 2017). Cole et al. (2017), for instance, show how differences
53 between provinces in South Africa constitute barriers to sustainable development trajectories and for
54 operationalising nation-level SDGs, across various dimensions of social deprivation and environmental

1 stress, reflecting historic disadvantages.

2
3 Moreover, various equity and effort- or burden-sharing approaches to climate stabilisation in the literature
4 allow to sketch national potentials for a 1.5°C warmer world (e.g., CSO Review, 2015; Meinshausen et al.,
5 2015; Okereke and Coventry, 2016; Anand, 2017; Bexell and Jönsson, 2017; Holz et al., 2017; Otto et al.,
6 2017; Pan et al., 2017; Robiou du Pont et al., 2017; Kartha et al., 2018; Winkler et al., 2018). Many
7 approaches build on the AR5 ‘responsibility-capacity-need’ assessment (Clarke et al., 2014), complement
8 other proposed national-level metrics for capabilities, equity, and fairness (Heyward and Roser, 2016;
9 Klinsky et al., 2017a), or fall under the wider umbrella of fair share debates on responsibility, capability, and
10 right to development in climate policy (Fuglestedt and Kallbekken, 2016). Importantly, different principles
11 and methodologies generate different calculated contributions, responsibilities, and capacities (Skeie et al.,
12 2017).

13
14 The notion of nation-level fair shares is now also discussed in the context of limiting global warming to
15 1.5°C, and the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (see Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in
16 Chapter 4) (CSO Review, 2015; Mace, 2016; Holz et al., 2017; Pan et al., 2017; Robiou du Pont et al., 2017;
17 Kartha et al., 2018; Winkler et al., 2018). A study by Pan et al. (2017) concluded that all countries would
18 need to contribute to ambitious emission reduction and that current pledges for 2030 by seven out of eight
19 high-emitting countries would be insufficient to meet 1.5°C. Emerging literature on justice-centred pathways
20 to 1.5°C points toward ambitious emission reductions domestically and committed cooperation
21 internationally whereby wealthier countries support poorer ones, technologically, financially, and otherwise
22 to enhance capacities (Okereke and Coventry, 2016; Holz et al., 2017; Robinson and Shine, 2018; Shue,
23 2018). These findings suggest that equitable and 1.5°C-compatible pathways would require fast action across
24 all countries at all levels of development rather than late accession of developing countries (as assumed
25 under SSP3, see Chapter 2), with external support for prompt mitigation and resilience-building efforts in the
26 latter (*medium evidence, medium agreement*).

27
28 Scientific advances since the AR5 now also allow to determine contributions to climate change for non-state
29 actors (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1) and their potential to contribute to CRDPs (*medium evidence, medium*
30 *agreement*). This includes cities (Bulkeley et al., 2013, 2014; Byrne et al., 2016), businesses (Heede, 2014;
31 Frumhoff et al., 2015; Shue, 2017), transnational initiatives (Castro, 2016; Andonova et al., 2017), and
32 industries. Recent work demonstrates the contributions of 90 industrial carbon producers to global
33 temperature and sea level rise, and their responsibilities to contribute to investments in and support for
34 mitigation and adaptation (Heede, 2014; Ekwurzel et al., 2017; Shue, 2017) (Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2).

35
36 At the level of groups and individuals, equity in pursuing climate resilience for a 1.5°C warmer world means
37 addressing disadvantage, inequities, and empowerment that shape transformative processes and pathways
38 (Fazey et al., 2018), and deliberate efforts to strengthen the capabilities, capacities, and well-being of poor,
39 marginalised, and vulnerable people (Byrnes, 2014; Tokar, 2014; Harris et al., 2017; Klinsky et al., 2017a;
40 Klinsky and Winkler, 2018). Community-driven CRDPs can flag potential negative impacts of national
41 trajectories on disadvantaged groups, such as low-income families and communities of colour (Rao, 2014).
42 They emphasise social equity, participatory governance, social inclusion, and human rights, as well as
43 innovation, experimentation, and social learning (see Glossary) (*medium evidence, high agreement*)
44 (Sections 5.5.3.3 and 5.6).

45 46 47 5.5.3.3 Country and Community Strategies and Experiences

48
49 There are many possible pathways toward climate-resilient futures (O’Brien, 2018; Tàbara et al., 2018).
50 Literature depicting different sustainable development trajectories in line with CRDPs is growing with some
51 specific to 1.5°C global warming. Most experiences to date are at local and sub-national levels (Cross-
52 Chapter Box 13 in this Chapter) while state-level efforts align largely with green economy trajectories or
53 planning for climate resilience (Box 5.3). Due to the fact that these strategies are context-specific, the
54 literature is scarce on comparisons, efforts to scale up, and systematic monitoring.

1
2 States can play an enabling or hindering role in transitions to 1.5°C warmer worlds (Patterson et al., 2018).
3 The literature on strategies to reconcile low-carbon trajectories with sustainable development and ecological
4 sustainability through green growth, inclusive growth, de-growth, post-growth, and development as well-
5 being shows *low agreement* (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5). Efforts that align best with CRDPs are described as
6 ‘transformational’ and ‘strong’ (Ferguson, 2015). Some view ‘thick green’ perspectives as enabling equity,
7 democracy, and agency building (Lorek and Spangenberg, 2014; Stirling, 2014; Ehresman and Okereke,
8 2015; Buch-Hansen, 2018), others show how green economy and sustainable development pathways can
9 align (Brown et al., 2014; Georgeson et al., 2017b), and how a green economy can help link the SDGs with
10 NDCs, for instance in Mongolia, Kenya, and Sweden (Shine, 2017). Others still critique the continuous
11 reliance on market mechanisms (Wanner, 2014; Brockington and Ponte, 2015), and disregard for equity and
12 distributional and procedural justice (Stirling, 2014; Bell, 2015).

13
14 Country-level pathways and achievements vary significantly (*robust evidence, medium agreement*). For
15 instance, the Scandinavian countries rank top in the Global Green Economy Index (Dual Citizen LLC, 2016),
16 although they also tend to show high spill-over effects (Holz et al., 2017) and transgress their biophysical
17 boundaries (O’Neill et al., 2018). State-driven efforts in non-member countries of the Organisation for
18 Economic Co-operation and Development include Ethiopia’s ‘Climate-resilient Green Economy Strategy’,
19 Mozambique’s ‘Green Economy Action Plan’, and Costa Rica’s ecosystem- and conservation-driven green
20 transition paths. China and India have adopted technology and renewables pathways (Brown et al., 2014;
21 Death, 2014, 2015, 2016; Khanna et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2015; Kim and Thurbon, 2015; Wang et al., 2015;
22 Weng et al., 2015). Brazil promotes low per-capita GHG emissions, clean energy sources, green jobs,
23 renewables, and sustainable transportation while slowing rates of deforestation (Brown et al., 2014; La
24 Rovere, 2017) (see Chapter 4, Box 4.7). Yet, concerns remain regarding persistent inequalities, ecosystem
25 monetisation, lack of participation in green-style projects (Brown et al., 2014), and labour conditions and
26 risk of displacement in the sugarcane ethanol sector (McKay et al., 2016). Experiences with low-carbon
27 development pathways in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) highlight the crucial role of identifying
28 synergies across scale, removing institutional barriers, and ensuring equity and fairness in distributing
29 benefits as part of the right to development (Rai and Fisher, 2017).

30
31 In small islands states, for many of which climate change hazards and impacts at 1.5°C pose significant risks
32 to sustainable development (see Chapter 3 Box 3.5, Chapter 4 Box 4.3, Box 5.3), examples of CRDPs have
33 emerged since the AR5. This includes the SAMOA Pathway: SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (see
34 Chapter 4, Box 4.3) (UN, 2014a; Government of Kiribati, 2016; Steering Committee on Partnerships for
35 SIDS and UNDESA, 2016; Lefale et al., 2017) and the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific,
36 a leading example of integrated regional climate change adaptation planning for mitigation and sustainable
37 development, disaster risk management and low carbon economies (FRDP, 2016). Small islands of the
38 Pacific vary significantly in their capacity and resources to support effective integrated planning (McCubbin
39 et al., 2015; Barnett and Walters, 2016; Cvitanovic et al., 2016; Hemstock, 2017; Robinson and Dornan,
40 2017). Vanuatu (Box 5.3) has developed a significant coordinated national adaptation plan to advance the
41 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, respond to the Paris Agreement, and reduce the risk of disasters
42 in line with the Sendai targets (UNDP, 2016; Republic of Vanuatu, 2017).

43
44 [START BOX 5.3 HERE]

45 46 **Box 5.3:** Republic of Vanuatu – National Planning for Development and Climate Resilience

47
48 The Republic of Vanuatu is leading Pacific Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to develop a nationally
49 coordinated plan for climate-resilient development in the context of high exposure to hazard risk (MCCA,
50 2016; UNU-EHS, 2016). The majority of the population depends on subsistence, rain-fed agriculture and
51 coastal fisheries for food security (Sovacool et al., 2017). Sea level rise, increased prolonged drought, water
52 shortages, intense storms, cyclone events, and degraded coral reef environments threaten human security in a
53 1.5°C warmer world (see Chapter 3, Box 3.5) (SPC, 2015; Aipira et al., 2017). Given Vanuatu’s long history
54 of disasters, local adaptive capacity is relatively high, despite barriers to the use of local knowledge and

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1 technology, and low rates of literacy and women’s participation (McNamara and Prasad, 2014; Aipira et al.,
2 2017; Granderson, 2017). However, the adaptive capacity of Vanuatu and other SIDS is increasingly
3 constrained due to more frequent severe weather events (see Chapter 3 Box 3.5, Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter
4 Box 9 in Chapter 4) (Gero et al., 2013; Kuruppu and Willie, 2015; SPC, 2015; Sovacool et al., 2017).

5
6 Vanuatu has developed a national sustainable development plan for 2016-2030: the People’s Plan (Republic
7 of Vanuatu, 2016). This coordinated, inclusive plan of action on economy, environment, and society aims to
8 strengthen adaptive capacity and resilience to climate change and disasters. It emphasises rights of all Ni-
9 Vanuatu, including women, youth, the elderly, and vulnerable groups (Nalau et al., 2016). Vanuatu has also
10 developed a Coastal Adaptation Plan (Republic of Vanuatu, 2016), an integrated Climate Change and
11 Disaster Risk Reduction Policy (2016–2030) (SPC, 2015), and the first South Pacific National Advisory
12 Board on Climate Change & Disaster Risk Reduction (SPC, 2015; UNDP, 2016).

13
14 Vanuatu aims to integrate planning at multiple scales, and increase climate resilience by supporting local
15 coping capacities and iterative processes of planning for sustainable development and integrated risk
16 assessment (Aipira et al., 2017; Eriksson et al., 2017; Granderson, 2017). Climate-resilient development is
17 also supported by non-state partnerships, for example, the ‘Yumi stap redi long climate change’ – or the
18 Vanuatu non-governmental organisation Climate Change Adaptation Program (MacLellan, 2015). This
19 programme focuses on equitable governance, with particular attention to supporting women’s voices in
20 decision making through allied programs addressing domestic violence, and rights-based education to reduce
21 social marginalisation; alongside institutional reforms for greater transparency, accountability, and
22 community participation in decision-making (Davies, 2015; MacLellan, 2015; Sterrett, 2015; Ensor, 2016;
23 UN Women, 2016).

24
25 Power imbalances embedded in the political economy of development (Nunn et al., 2014), gender
26 discrimination (Aipira et al., 2017), and the priorities of climate finance (Cabezón et al., 2016) may
27 marginalise the priorities of local communities and influence how local risks are understood, prioritised, and
28 managed (Kuruppu and Willie, 2015; Baldacchino, 2017; Sovacool et al., 2017). However, the experience of
29 the low death toll after Cyclone Pam suggests effective use of local knowledge in planning and early
30 warning may support resilience at least in the absence of storm surge flooding (Handmer and Iveson, 2017;
31 Nalau et al., 2017). Nevertheless, the very severe infrastructure damage of Cyclone Pam 2015 highlights the
32 limits of individual Pacific SIDS efforts and the need for global and regional responses to a 1.5°C warmer
33 world (Dilling et al., 2015; Ensor, 2016; Shultz et al., 2016; Rey et al., 2017) (see Chapter 3 Box 3.5,
34 Chapter 4 Box 4.3).

35
36 [END BOX 5.3 HERE]

37
38 Communities, towns, and cities also contribute to low-carbon pathways, sustainable development and fair
39 and equitable climate resilience, often focused on processes of power, learning, and contestation as entry
40 points to more localised CRDPs (*medium evidence, high agreement*) (Cross-Chapter Box 13 in this Chapter,
41 Box 5.2). In the Scottish Borders Climate Resilient Communities Project (United Kingdom), local flood
42 management is linked with national policies to foster cross-scalar and inclusive governance, with attention to
43 systemic disadvantages, shocks and stressors, capacity building, learning for change, and climate narratives
44 to inspire hope and action, all of which are essential for community resilience in a 1.5°C warmer world
45 (Fazey et al., 2018). Narratives and storytelling are vital for realising place-based 1.5°C futures as they create
46 space for agency, deliberation, co-constructing meaning, imagination, and desirable and dignified pathways
47 (Veland et al., 2018). Engagement with possible futures, identity, and self-reliance is also documented for
48 Alaska where 1.5°C warming has already been exceeded and indigenous communities invest in renewable
49 energy, greenhouses for food security, and new fishing practices to overcome loss of sea ice, flooding, and
50 erosion (Chapin et al., 2016; Fazey et al., 2018). The Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network
51 (ACCRN) facilitates shared learning dialogues, risk-to-resilience workshops, and iterative, consultative
52 planning in flood-prone cities in India; vulnerable communities, municipal governmental agents,
53 entrepreneurs, and technical experts negotiate different visions, trade-offs, and local politics to identify
54 desirable pathways (Harris et al., 2017).

1
2 Transforming our societies and systems to limit global warming to 1.5°C and ensuring equity and well-being
3 for human populations and ecosystems in a 1.5°C warmer world would require ambitious and well-integrated
4 adaptation-mitigation-development pathways that deviate fundamentally from high-carbon, business-as-
5 usual futures (Okereke and Coventry, 2016; Arts, 2017; Gupta and Arts, 2017; Sealey-Huggins, 2017).
6 Identifying and negotiating socially acceptable, inclusive, and equitable pathways toward climate-resilient
7 futures is a challenging, yet important, endeavour, fraught with complex moral, practical, and political
8 difficulties and inevitable trade-offs (*very high confidence*). The ultimate questions are: what futures do we
9 want (Bai et al., 2016; Tàbara et al., 2017; Klinsky and Winkler, 2018; O'Brien, 2018; Veland et al., 2018),
10 whose resilience matters, for what, where, when and why (Meerow and Newell, 2016), and 'whose vision ...
11 is being pursued and along which pathways' (Gillard et al., 2016).

12
13 [START CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 13 HERE]

14 15 **Cross-Chapter Box 13: Cities and Urban Transformation**

16
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24 25 **Global Urbanisation in a 1.5°C Warmer World**

26 The concentration of economic activity, dense social networks, human resource capacity, investment in
27 infrastructure and buildings, relatively nimble local governments, close connection to surrounding rural and
28 natural environments, and a tradition of innovation provide urban areas with transformational potential
29 (Castán Broto, 2017) (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3). In this sense, the urbanisation mega-trend that will take
30 place over the next three decades, and add approximately 2 billion people to the global urban population
31 (UN, 2014b), offers opportunities for efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C.

32
33 Cities can also, however, concentrate the risks of flooding, landslides, fire, and infectious and parasitic
34 disease that are expected to heighten in a 1.5°C warmer world (Chapter 3). In African and Asian countries
35 where urbanisation rates are highest, these risks could expose and amplify pre-existing stresses related to
36 poverty, exclusion, and governance (Gore, 2015; Dodman et al., 2017; Jiang and O'Neill, 2017; Pelling et
37 al., 2018; Solecki et al., 2018). Through its impact on economic development and investment, urbanisation
38 often leads to increased consumption and environmental degradation and enhanced vulnerability, risk, and
39 impacts (Rosenzweig et al., 2018). In the absence of innovation, the combination of urbanisation and urban
40 economic development could contribute 226 GtCO₂ in emissions by 2050 (Bai et al., 2018). At the same
41 time, some new urban developments are demonstrating combined carbon and Sustainable Development
42 Goals (SDG) benefits (Wiktorowicz et al., 2018), and it is in towns and cities that building renovation rates
43 can be most easily accelerated to support the transition to 1.5°C pathways (Kuramochi et al., 2018),
44 including through voluntary programs (Van der Heijden, 2018).

45 46 **Urban Transformations and Emerging Climate-Resilient Development Pathways**

47 1.5°C pathways require action in all cities and urban contexts. Recent literature emphasises the need to
48 deliberate and negotiate how resilience and climate-resilient pathways can be fostered in the context of
49 people's daily lives, including the failings of everyday development such as unemployment, inadequate
50 housing, and growing informality, in order to acknowledge local priorities and foster transformative learning
51 (Vale, 2014; Shi et al., 2016; Harris et al., 2017; Ziervogel et al., 2017; Fazey et al., 2018; Macintyre et al.,
52 2018). Enhancing deliberate transformative capacities in urban contexts also entails new and relational forms
53 of envisioning agency, equity, resilience, social cohesion, and well-being (Gillard et al., 2016; Ziervogel et
54 al., 2016) (Section 5.5.3). Two examples of urban transformation are explored here.

1
2 The built environment, spatial planning, infrastructure, energy services, mobility, and urban-rural linkages
3 necessary in **rapidly growing cities in South Asia and Africa** in the next three decades present mitigation,
4 adaptation and development opportunities that are crucial for a 1.5°C world (Newman et al., 2017; Lwasa et
5 al., 2018; Teferi and Newman, 2018). Realising these opportunities would require the structural challenges
6 of poverty, weak and contested local governance, and low levels of local government investment to be
7 addressed on an unprecedented scale (Wachsmuth et al., 2016; Chu et al., 2017; van Noorloos and
8 Kloosterboer, 2017; Pelling et al., 2018).

9
10 Urban governance is critical to ensuring that the necessary urban transitions deliver economic growth and
11 equity (Hughes et al., 2018). The proximity of local governments to citizens and their needs can make them
12 powerful agents of climate action (Melica et al., 2018), but urban governance is enhanced when it involves
13 multiple actors (Ziervogel et al., 2016; Pelling et al., 2018), supportive national governments (Tait and
14 Euston-Brown, 2017) and sub-national climate networks (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1). Governance is
15 complicated for the urban population currently living in what is termed ‘informality’. This population is
16 expected to triple, to three billion, by 2050 (Satterthwaite et al., 2018), placing a significant portion of the
17 world’s population beyond the direct reach of formal climate mitigation and adaptation policies (Revi et al.,
18 2014). How to address the co-evolved and structural conditions that lead to urban informality and associated
19 vulnerability to 1.5°C of warming is a central question for this report. Brown and McGranahan (2016) cite
20 evidence that the informal urban “green economy” that has emerged out of necessity in the absence of formal
21 service provisions is frequently low-carbon and resource-efficient.

22
23 Realising the potential for low carbon transitions in informal urban settlements would require an express
24 recognition of the unpaid-for contributions of women in the informal economy, and new partnerships
25 between the state and communities (Ziervogel et al., 2017; Pelling et al., 2018; Satterthwaite et al., 2018).
26 There is no guarantee that these partnerships will evolve or cohere into the type of service delivery and
27 climate governance system that could steer the change on a scale required to limit to warming to 1.5°C
28 (Jaglin, 2014). However, transnational networks such as Shack/Slum Dwellers International, C40, the Global
29 Covenant of Mayors, and International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), as well as
30 efforts to combine in-country planning for Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (Andonova et al.,
31 2017; Fuhr et al., 2018) with those taking place to support the New Urban Agenda and National Urban
32 Policies, represent one step towards realising the potential (Tait and Euston-Brown, 2017). So too do “old
33 urban agendas” such as slum upgrading and universal water and sanitation provision (McGranahan et al.,
34 2016; Satterthwaite, 2016; Satterthwaite et al., 2018).

35
36 **Transition Towns (TTs)** is a type of urban transformation mainly in high-income countries. The grassroots
37 TT movement (origin in the United Kingdom) combines adaptation, mitigation, and just transitions, mainly
38 at the level of communities and small towns. It now has >1,300 registered local initiatives in >40 countries
39 (Grossmann and Creamer, 2017), many of them in the United Kingdom, the United States, and other high-
40 income countries. TTs are described as ‘progressive localism’ (Cretney et al., 2016), aiming to foster a
41 ‘communitarian ecological citizenship’ that goes beyond changes in consumption and lifestyle (Kenis, 2016).
42 They aspire to promote equitable communities resilient to the impacts of climate change, peak oil, and
43 unstable global markets; re-localisation of production and consumption; and transition pathways to a post-
44 carbon future (Feola and Nunes, 2014; Evans and Phelan, 2016; Grossmann and Creamer, 2017).

45
46 TT initiatives typically pursue lifestyle-related low-carbon living and economies, food self-sufficiency,
47 energy efficiency through renewables, construction with locally-sourced material, and cottage industries
48 (Barnes, 2015; Staggenborg and Ogrodnik, 2015; Taylor Aiken, 2016). Social and iterative learning through
49 the collective involves dialogue, deliberation, capacity building, citizen science engagements, technical re-
50 skilling to increase self-reliance, for example canning and preserving food and permaculture, future
51 visioning, and emotional training to share difficulties and loss (Feola and Nunes, 2014; Barnes, 2015; Boke,
52 2015; Taylor Aiken, 2015; Kenis, 2016; Mehmood, 2016; Grossmann and Creamer, 2017).

53
54 Important conditions for successful transition groups include flexibility, participatory democracy, care ethics,

1 inclusiveness, and consensus-building, assuming bridging or brokering roles, and community alliances and
2 partnerships (Feola and Nunes, 2014; Mehmood, 2016; Taylor Aiken, 2016; Grossmann and Creamer, 2017).
3 Smaller scale rural initiatives allow for more experimentation (Cretney et al., 2016) while those in urban
4 centres benefit from stronger networks and proximity to power structures (North and Longhurst, 2013;
5 Nicolosi and Feola, 2016). Increasingly, TTs recognise the need to participate in policy making (Kenis and
6 Mathijs, 2014; Barnes, 2015).

7
8 Despite high self-ratings of success, some TT initiatives are too inwardly focused and geographically
9 isolated (Feola and Nunes, 2014) while others have difficulties in engaging marginalised, non-white, non-
10 middle-class community members (Evans and Phelan, 2016; Nicolosi and Feola, 2016; Grossmann and
11 Creamer, 2017). In the United Kingdom, expectations of innovations growing in scale (Taylor Aiken, 2015)
12 and carbon accounting methods required by funding bodies (Taylor Aiken, 2016) undermine local resilience
13 building. Tension between explicit engagements with climate change action and efforts to appeal to more
14 people have resulted in difficult trade-offs and strained member relations (Grossmann and Creamer, 2017)
15 though the contribution to changing an urban culture that prioritises climate change can be underestimated
16 (Wiktorowicz et al., 2018).

17
18 Urban actions that can highlight the 1.5°C agenda include individual actions within homes (Werfel, 2017;
19 Buntaine and Prather, 2018), demonstration zero carbon developments (Wiktorowicz et al., 2018), new
20 partnerships between communities, government and business to build mass transit and electrify transport
21 (Glazebrook and Newman, 2018), city plans to include climate outcomes (Millard-Ball, 2013), and support
22 for transformative change across political, professional, and sectoral divides (Bai et al., 2018).

23
24 [END CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 13 HERE]

25 26 27 **5.6 Conditions for Achieving Sustainable Development, Eradicating Poverty and Reducing** 28 **Inequalities in 1.5°C Warmer Worlds**

29
30 This chapter has described the fundamental, urgent, and systemic transformations that would be needed to
31 achieve sustainable development, eradicate poverty, and reduce inequalities in a 1.5°C warmer world, in
32 various contexts and across scales. In particular, it has highlighted the societal dimensions, putting at the
33 centre people's needs and aspirations in their specific contexts. Here, we synthesise some of the most
34 pertinent enabling conditions (see Glossary) to support these profound transformations. These conditions are
35 closely interlinked and connected by the overarching concept of governance, which broadly includes
36 institutional, socioeconomic, cultural, and technological elements (see Chapter 1, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in
37 Chapter 1).

38 39 40 **5.6.1 Finance and Technology Aligned with Local Needs**

41
42 Significant gaps in green investment constrain transitions to a low-carbon economy aligned with
43 development objectives (Volz et al., 2015; Campiglio, 2016). Hence, unlocking new forms of public, private,
44 and public-private financing is essential to support environmental sustainability of the economic system
45 (Croce et al., 2011; Blyth et al., 2015; Falcone et al., 2018) (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.5). To avoid risks of
46 undesirable trade-offs with the SDGs caused by national budget constraints, improved access to international
47 climate finance is essential for supporting adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development, especially for
48 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (Shine and Campillo, 2016;
49 Wood, 2017) (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Care needs to be taken when international donors or
50 partnership arrangements influence project financing structures (Kongsager and Corbera, 2015; Purdon,
51 2015; Ficklin et al., 2017; Phillips et al., 2017). Conventional climate funding schemes, especially the Clean
52 Development Mechanism (CDM), have shown positive effects on sustainable development but also adverse
53 consequences, for example on adaptive capacities of rural households and uneven distribution of costs and

1 benefits, often exacerbating inequalities (Aggarwal, 2014; Brohé, 2014; He et al., 2014; Schade and
2 Obergassel, 2014; Smits and Middleton, 2014; Wood et al., 2016a; Horstmann and Hein, 2017; Kreibich et
3 al., 2017) (*robust evidence, high agreement*). Close consideration of recipients' context-specific needs when
4 designing financial support helps to overcome these limitations as it better aligns community needs, national
5 policy objectives, and donors' priorities, puts the emphasis on the increase of transparency and predictability
6 of support, and fosters local capacity building (Barrett, 2013; Boyle et al., 2013; Shine and Campillo, 2016;
7 Ley, 2017; Sánchez and Izzo, 2017) (*medium evidence, high agreement*).

8
9 The development and transfer of technologies is another enabler for developing countries to contribute to the
10 requirements of the 1.5°C objective while achieving climate resilience and their socioeconomic development
11 goals (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.4). International-level governance would be needed to boost domestic
12 innovation and the deployment of new technologies such as Negative Emission Technologies toward the
13 1.5°C objective (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.7), but the alignment with local needs depends on close
14 consideration of the specificities of the domestic context in countries at all levels of development (de
15 Coninck and Sagar, 2015; IEA, 2015; Parikh et al., 2018). Technology transfer supporting development in
16 developing countries would require an understanding of local and national actors and institutions (de
17 Coninck and Puig, 2015; de Coninck and Sagar, 2017; Michaelowa et al., 2018), careful attention to the
18 capacities in the entire innovation chain (Khosla et al., 2017; Olawuyi, 2017), and transfer of not only
19 equipment but also knowledge (Murphy et al., 2015) (*medium evidence, high agreement*).

20 21 22 **5.6.2 Integration of Institutions**

23
24 Multi-level governance in climate change has emerged as a key enabler for systemic transformation and
25 effective governance (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1). On the one hand, low-carbon and climate-resilient
26 development actions are often well aligned at the lowest scale possible (Suckall et al., 2015; Sánchez and
27 Izzo, 2017), and informal, local institutions are critical in enhancing the adaptive capacity of countries and
28 marginalised communities (Yaro et al., 2015). On the other hand, international and national institutions can
29 provide incentives for projects to harness synergies and avoid trade-offs (Kongsager et al., 2016).

30
31 Governance approaches that coordinate and monitor multi-scale policy actions and trade-offs across sectoral,
32 local, national, regional, and international levels are therefore best suited to implement goals toward 1.5°C
33 warmer conditions and sustainable development (Ayers et al., 2014; Stringer et al., 2014; von Stechow et al.,
34 2016; Gwimbi, 2017; Hayward, 2017; Maor et al., 2017; Roger et al., 2017; Michaelowa et al., 2018).
35 Vertical and horizontal policy integration and coordination is essential to take into account the interplay and
36 trade-offs between sectors and spatial scales (Duguma et al., 2014; Naess et al., 2015; von Stechow et al.,
37 2015; Antwi-Agyei et al., 2017a; Di Gregorio et al., 2017; Runhaar et al., 2018), enable the dialogue
38 between local communities and institutional bodies (Colenbrander et al., 2016), and involve non-state actors
39 such as business, local governments, and civil society operating across different scales (Hajer et al., 2015;
40 Labriet et al., 2015; Hale, 2016; Pelling et al., 2016; Kalafatis, 2017; Lyon, 2018) (*robust evidence, high
41 agreement*).

42 43 44 **5.6.3 Inclusive Processes**

45
46 Inclusive governance processes are critical for preparing for a 1.5°C warmer world (Fazey et al., 2018;
47 O'Brien, 2018; Patterson et al., 2018). These processes have been shown to serve the interests of diverse
48 groups of people and enhance empowerment of often excluded stakeholders, notably women and youth,
49 (MRFCJ, 2015a; Dumont et al., 2017). They also enhance social and co-learning which, in turn, facilitates
50 accelerated and adaptive management and the scaling up of capacities for resilience building (Ensor and
51 Harvey, 2015; Reij and Winterbottom, 2015; Tschakert et al., 2016; Binam et al., 2017; Dumont et al., 2017;
52 Fazey et al., 2018; Lyon, 2018; O'Brien, 2018), and provides opportunities to blend indigenous, local, and
53 scientific knowledge (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2017a; Coe et al., 2017; Thornton and Comberti, 2017) (see
54 Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5.5, Box 4.3; Section 5.3) (*robust evidence, high agreement*). Such co-learning has

1 been effective in improving deliberative decision-making processes that incorporate different values and
2 world views (Cundill et al., 2014; C. Butler et al., 2016; Ensor, 2016; Fazey et al., 2016; Gorrdard et al.,
3 2016; Aipira et al., 2017; Fook, 2017; Maor et al., 2017), and create space for negotiating diverse interests
4 and preferences (O'Brien et al., 2015; Gillard et al., 2016; DeCaro et al., 2017; Harris et al., 2017; Lahn,
5 2017) (*robust evidence, high agreement*).

6 7 8 **5.6.4 Attention to Issues of Power and Inequality**

9
10 Societal transformations to limit global warming to 1.5°C and strive for equity and well-being for all are not
11 power neutral (Section 5.5.3). Development preferences are often shaped by powerful interests that
12 determine the direction and pace of change, anticipated benefits and beneficiaries, and acceptable and
13 unacceptable trade-offs (Newell et al., 2014; Fazey et al., 2016; Tschakert et al., 2016; Winkler and Dubash,
14 2016; Wood et al., 2016b; Karlsson et al., 2017; Quan et al., 2017; Tanner et al., 2017). Each development
15 pathway, including legacies and path dependencies, creates its own set of opportunities and challenges and
16 winners and losers, both within and across countries (Figure 5.5) (Mathur et al., 2014; Ficklin et al., 2017;
17 Phillips et al., 2017; Stringer et al., 2017; Wood, 2017; Gajjar et al., 2018) (*robust evidence, high*
18 *agreement*).

19
20 Addressing the uneven distribution of power is critical to ensure that societal transformation toward a 1.5°C
21 warmer world does not exacerbate poverty and vulnerability or create new injustices but rather encourages
22 equitable transformational change (Patterson et al., 2018). Equitable outcomes are enhanced when they pay
23 attention to just outcomes for those negatively affected by change (Newell et al., 2014; Dilling et al., 2015;
24 Naess et al., 2015; Sovacool et al., 2015; Cervigni and Morris, 2016; Keohane and Victor, 2016) and
25 promote human rights, increase equality, and reduce power asymmetries within societies (UNRISD, 2016;
26 Robinson and Shine, 2018) (*robust evidence, high agreement*).

27 28 29 **5.6.5 Reconsidering Values**

30
31 The profound transformations that would be needed to integrate sustainable development and 1.5°C-
32 compatible pathways call for examining the values, ethics, attitudes, and behaviours that underpin societies
33 (Hartzell-Nichols, 2017; O'Brien, 2018; Patterson et al., 2018). Infusing values that promote sustainable
34 development (Holden et al., 2017), overcome individual economic interests and go beyond economic growth
35 (Hackmann, 2016), encourage desirable and transformative visions (Tàbara et al., 2018), and care for the less
36 fortunate (Howell and Allen, 2017) is part and parcel of climate-resilient and sustainable development
37 pathways. This entails helping societies and individuals to strive for sufficiency in resource consumption
38 within planetary boundaries alongside sustainable and equitable well-being (O'Neill et al., 2018). Navigating
39 1.5°C societal transformations, characterised by action from local to global, stresses the core commitment to
40 social justice, solidarity, and cooperation, particularly regarding the distribution of responsibilities, rights,
41 and mutual obligations between nations (Patterson et al., 2018; Robinson and Shine, 2018) (*medium*
42 *evidence, high agreement*).

43 44 45 **5.7 Synthesis and Research Gaps**

46
47 The assessment in Chapter 5 illustrates that limiting global warming to 1.5°C is fundamentally connected
48 with achieving sustainable development, poverty eradication, and reducing inequalities. It shows that
49 avoided impacts between 1.5°C and 2°C temperature stabilisation would make it easier to achieve many
50 aspects of sustainable development, although important risks would remain at 1.5°C (Section 5.2). Synergies
51 between adaptation and mitigation response measures with sustainable development and the Sustainable
52 Development Goals (SDGs) can often be enhanced when attention is paid to well-being and equity while,
53 when unaddressed, poverty and inequalities may be exacerbated (Section 5.3 and 5.4). Climate-resilient

1 development pathways (CRDPs) open up routes toward socially desirable futures that are sustainable and
2 liveable, but concrete evidence reveals complex trade-offs along a continuum of different pathways,
3 highlighting the role of societal values, internal contestations, and political dynamics (Section 5.5). The
4 transformations towards sustainable development in a 1.5°C warmer world, in all contexts, involve
5 fundamental societal and systemic changes over time and across scale, and a set of enabling conditions
6 without which the dual goal is difficult if not impossible to achieve (Sections 5.5 and 5.6).

7
8 This assessment is supported by growing knowledge on the linkages between a 1.5°C warmer world and
9 different dimensions of sustainable development. However, several gaps in the literature remain:

10
11 Limited evidence exists that explicitly examines the real-world implications of a 1.5°C warmer world (and
12 overshoots) as well as avoided impacts between 1.5°C versus 2°C for the SDGs and sustainable development
13 more broadly. Few projections are available for households, livelihoods, and communities. And literature on
14 differential localised impacts and their cross-sector interacting and cascading effects with multidimensional
15 patterns of societal vulnerability, poverty, and inequalities remains scarce. Hence, caution is needed when
16 global-level conclusions about adaptation and mitigation measures in a 1.5°C warmer world are applied to
17 sustainable development in local, national, and regional settings.

18
19 Limited literature has systematically evaluated context-specific synergies and trade-offs between and across
20 adaptation and mitigation response measures in 1.5°C-compatible pathways and the SDGs. This hampers the
21 ability to inform decision-making and fair and robust policy packages adapted to different local, regional, or
22 national circumstances. More research is required to understand how trade-offs and synergies will intensify
23 or decrease, differentially across geographic regions and time, in a 1.5°C warmer world and as compared to
24 higher temperatures.

25
26 Limited availability of interdisciplinary studies also poses a challenge for connecting the socio-economic
27 transformations and the governance aspects of low-emission, climate-resilient transformations. For example,
28 it remains unclear how governance structures enable or hinder different groups of people and countries to
29 negotiate pathway options, values, and priorities.

30
31 The literature does not demonstrate the existence of 1.5°C-compatible pathways achieving the “universal and
32 indivisible” agenda of the 17 SDGs, and hence does not show whether and how the nature and pace of
33 changes that would be required to meet 1.5°C climate stabilisation could be fully synergetic with all the
34 SDGs.

35
36 The literature on low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways in local, regional, and national
37 contexts is growing. Yet, the lack of standard indicators to monitor such pathways makes it difficult to
38 compare evidence grounded in specific contexts with differential circumstances and therefore to derive
39 generic lessons on the outcome of decisions on specific indicators. This knowledge gap poses a challenge for
40 connecting local-level visions with global-level trajectories to better understand key conditions for societal
41 and systems transformations that reconcile urgent climate action with well-being for all.

1 Frequently Asked Questions

2
3 **FAQ 5.1:** What are the connections between sustainable development and limiting global warming to
4 1.5°C?

5
6 **Summary:** *Sustainable development seeks to meet the needs of people living today without compromising the*
7 *needs of future generations, while balancing social, economic and environmental considerations. The 17 UN*
8 *Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) include targets for eradicating poverty; ensuring health, energy and*
9 *food security; reducing inequality; protecting ecosystems; pursuing sustainable cities and economies; and a*
10 *goal for climate action (SDG13). Climate change affects the ability to achieve sustainable development*
11 *goals and limiting warming to 1.5°C will help meet some sustainable development targets. Pursuing*
12 *sustainable development will influence emissions, impacts and vulnerabilities. Responses to climate change*
13 *in the form of adaptation and mitigation will also interact with sustainable development with positive effects,*
14 *known as synergies, or negative effects, known as trade-offs. Responses to climate change can be planned to*
15 *maximize synergies and limit trade-offs with sustainable development.*

16
17 For more than 25 years, the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations have embraced the
18 concept of sustainable development to promote wellbeing and meet the needs of today's population without
19 compromising the needs of future generations. This concept spans economic, social and environmental
20 objectives including poverty and hunger alleviation, equitable economic growth, access to resources, and the
21 protection of water, air and ecosystems. Between 1990 and 2015, the UN monitored a set of eight
22 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They reported progress in reducing poverty, easing hunger and
23 child mortality, and improving access to clean water and sanitation. But with millions remaining in poor
24 health, living in poverty, and facing serious problems associated with climate change, pollution and land use
25 change, the UN decided that more needed to be done. In 2015, the UN *Sustainable Development Goals*
26 (SDGs) were endorsed as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The 17 SDGs (Figure FAQ
27 5.1) apply to all countries and have a timeline for success by 2030. The SDGs seek to eliminate extreme
28 poverty and hunger; ensure health, education, peace, safe water, and clean energy for all; promote inclusive
29 and sustainable consumption, cities, infrastructure and economic growth; reduce inequality including gender
30 inequality; combat climate change and protect oceans and terrestrial ecosystems.

31
32 Climate change and sustainable development are fundamentally connected. Previous IPCC reports found that
33 climate change can undermine sustainable development, and that well-designed mitigation and adaptation
34 responses can support poverty alleviation, food security, healthy ecosystems, equality and other dimensions
35 of sustainable development. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require mitigation actions and
36 adaptation measures to be taken at all levels. These adaptation and mitigation actions would include reducing
37 emissions and increasing resilience through technology and infrastructure choices, as well as changing
38 behaviour and policy. These actions can interact with sustainable development objectives in positive ways
39 that strengthen sustainable development, known as *synergies*. Or negative ways, where sustainable
40 development is hindered or reversed, known as *trade-offs*.

41
42 An example of a synergy is sustainable forest management, which can prevent emissions from deforestation
43 and take up carbon to reduce warming at reasonable cost. It can work synergistically with other dimensions
44 of sustainable development by providing food (SDG 2), cleaning water (SDG 6) and protecting ecosystems
45 (SDG 15). Other examples of synergies are when climate adaptation measures, such as coastal or agricultural
46 projects, empower women and benefit local incomes, health and ecosystems.

47
48 An example of a trade-off can occur if ambitious climate change mitigation compatible with 1.5°C changes
49 land use in ways that have negative impacts on sustainable development. An example could be turning
50 natural forests, agricultural areas, or land under indigenous or local ownership to plantations for bioenergy
51 production. If not managed carefully, such changes could undermine dimensions of sustainable development
52 by threatening food and water security, creating conflict over land rights, and causing biodiversity loss.
53 Another trade-off could occur for some countries, assets, workers, and infrastructure already in place if a

1 switch is made from fossil fuels to other energy sources without adequate planning for such a transition.
 2 Trade-offs can be minimised if effectively managed as when care is taken to improve bioenergy crop yields
 3 to reduce harmful land-use change or where workers are retrained for employment in lower carbon sectors.
 4

5 Limiting temperatures to 1.5°C can make it much easier to achieve the SDGs, but it is also possible that
 6 pursuing the SDGs could result in trade-offs with efforts to limit climate change. There are trade-offs when
 7 people escaping from poverty and hunger consume more energy or land and thus increase emissions, or if
 8 goals for economic growth and industrialization increase fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gas
 9 emissions. Conversely, efforts to reduce poverty and gender inequalities, and to enhance food, health and
 10 water security can reduce vulnerability to climate change. Other synergies can occur when coastal and ocean
 11 ecosystem protection reduces the impacts of climate change on these systems. The sustainable development
 12 goal of affordable and clean energy (SDG 7) specifically targets access to renewable energy and energy
 13 efficiency, important to ambitious mitigation and limiting warming to 1.5°C.
 14

15 The link between sustainable development and limiting global warming to 1.5°C is recognized by the
 16 Sustainable Development Goal for climate action (SDG 13) which seeks to combat climate change and its
 17 impacts while acknowledging that the UNFCCC is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for
 18 negotiating the global response to climate change.
 19

20 The challenge is to put in place sustainable development policies and actions that reduce deprivation,
 21 alleviate poverty and ease ecosystem degradation while also lowering emissions, reducing climate change
 22 impacts and facilitating adaptation. It is important to strengthen synergies and minimize trade-offs when
 23 planning climate change adaptation and mitigation actions. Unfortunately, not all trade-offs can be avoided
 24 or minimised, but careful planning and implementation can build the enabling conditions for long-term
 25 sustainable development.
 26

FAQ5.1: The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

The link between sustainable development and limiting global warming to 1.5°C is recognised by the Sustainable Development Goal for climate action (SDG 13)



27 **FAQ 5.1, Figure 1:** Climate change action is one of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and is
 28 connected to sustainable development more broadly. Actions to reduce climate risk can interact with other sustainable
 29 development objectives in positive ways (synergies) and negative ways (trade-offs).
 30
 31
 32

1
2 **FAQ 5.2:** What are the pathways to achieving poverty reduction and reducing inequalities while reaching
3 the 1.5°C world?
4

5 ***Summary:** There are ways to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Of the pathways
6 that exist, some simultaneously achieve sustainable development. They entail a mix of measures that lower
7 emissions and reduce the impacts of climate change, while contributing to poverty eradication and reducing
8 inequalities. Which pathways are possible and desirable will differ between and within regions and nations.
9 This is due to the fact that development progress to date has been uneven and climate-related risks are
10 unevenly distributed. Flexible governance would be needed to ensure that such pathways are inclusive, fair,
11 and equitable to avoid poor and disadvantaged populations becoming worse off. ‘Climate-Resilient
12 Development Pathways’ (CRDPs) offer possibilities to achieve both equitable and low-carbon futures.
13*

14 Issues of equity and fairness have long been central to climate change and sustainable development. Equity,
15 like equality, aims to promote justness and fairness for all. This is not necessarily the same as treating
16 everyone equally, since not everyone comes from the same starting point. Often used interchangeably with
17 fairness and justice, equity implies implementing different actions in different places, all with a view to
18 creating an equal world that is fair for all and where no one is left behind.
19

20 The Paris Agreement states that it “will be implemented to reflect equity... in the light of different national
21 circumstances” and calls for “rapid reductions” of greenhouse gases to be achieved “on the basis of equity,
22 and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty”. Similarly, the United
23 Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) include targets to reduce poverty and inequalities, and to
24 ensure equitable and affordable access to health, water, and energy for all.
25

26 The principles of equity and fairness are important for considering pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C in a
27 way that is liveable for every person and species. They recognise the uneven development status between
28 richer and poorer nations, the uneven distribution of climate impacts (including on future generations), and
29 the uneven capacity of different nations and people to respond to climate risks. This is particularly true for
30 those who are highly vulnerable to climate change such as indigenous communities in the Arctic, people
31 whose livelihoods depend on agriculture or coastal and marine ecosystems, and inhabitants of small-island
32 developing states. The poorest people will continue to experience climate change through the loss of income
33 and livelihood opportunities, hunger, adverse health effects, and displacement.
34

35 Well-planned adaptation and mitigation measures are essential to avoid exacerbating inequalities or creating
36 new injustices. Pathways that are compatible with limiting warming to 1.5°C and aligned with the SDGs
37 consider mitigation and adaptation options that reduce inequalities in terms of who benefits, who pays the
38 costs, and who is affected by possible negative consequences. Attention to equity ensures that disadvantaged
39 people can secure their livelihoods and live in dignity, and that those who experience mitigation or
40 adaptation costs have financial and technical support to enable fair transitions.
41


42 Climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs) describe trajectories that pursue the dual goal of limiting
43 warming to 1.5°C while strengthening sustainable development. This includes eradicating poverty as well as
44 reducing vulnerabilities and inequalities for regions, countries, communities, businesses, and cities. These
45 trajectories entail a mix of adaptation and mitigation measures consistent with profound societal and systems
46 transformations. The goals are to meet the short-term SDGs, achieve longer-term sustainable development,
47 reduce emissions toward net zero around the middle of the century, build resilience and enhance human
48 capacities to adapt, all while paying close attention to equity and well-being for all.
49

50 The characteristics of CRDPs will differ across communities and nations, and will be based on deliberations
51 with a diverse range of people, including those most affected by climate change and by possible routes
52 toward transformation. For this reason, there are no standard methods for designing CRDPs or for
53 monitoring their progress toward climate-resilient futures. However, examples from around the world
54 demonstrate that flexible and inclusive governance structures and broad participation often help support

1 iterative decision-making, continuous learning, and experimentation. Such inclusive processes can also help
 2 to overcome weak institutional arrangements and power structures that may further exacerbate inequalities.
 3

FAQ5.2: Climate-resilient development pathways

Decision-making that achieves the United Nation Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), lowers greenhouse gas emissions, limits global warming, and enhances adaptation, could help lead to a climate-resilient world



4
 5 **FAQ 5.2, Figure 1:** Climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs) describe trajectories that pursue the dual goal of
 6 limiting warming to 1.5°C while strengthening sustainable development. Decision-making that achieves the SDGs,
 7 lowers greenhouse gas emissions and limits global warming could help lead to a climate-resilient world, within the
 8 context of enhancing adaptation.









9
 10 Ambitious actions already underway around the world can offer insight into CRDPs for limiting warming to
 11 1.5°C. For example, some countries have adopted clean energy and sustainable transport while creating
 12 environmentally friendly jobs and supporting social welfare programs to reduce domestic poverty. Other
 13 examples teach us about different ways to promote development through practices inspired by community
 14 values. For instance, *Buen Vivir*, a Latin American concept based on indigenous ideas of communities living
 15 in harmony with nature, is aligned with peace, diversity, solidarity, rights to education, health, and safe food,
 16 water, and energy, and well-being and justice for all. The Transition Movement, with origins in Europe,
 17 promotes equitable and resilient communities through low-carbon living, food self-sufficiency, and citizen
 18 science. Such examples indicate that pathways that reduce poverty and inequalities while limiting warming
 19 to 1.5°C are possible and that they can provide guidance on pathways towards socially desirable, equitable,
 20 and low-carbon futures.

21
 22
 23

1 INSERT TABLE 5.2 HERE
2
3 **Table 5.2:** Mitigation – SDG table
4



	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE
Industry	Accelerating energy efficiency improvement	↑	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★	[0]	No direct interaction			↑	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★	↑	[+1]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★
	Reduces poverty % of people living below poverty line declines from 49% to 18% in South African context. Altieri et al (2016)					Air, water pollution reduction and better health (3.9) People living in the deprived communities feel positive and predict considerable financial savings. Efficiency changes in the industrial sector that lead to reduced energy demand can lead to reduced requirements on energy supply. As water is used to convert energy into useful forms, the reduction in industrial demand is anticipated to reduce water consumption and wastewater, resulting in more clean water for other sectors and the environment. Behavioral changes in the industrial sector that lead to reduced energy demand can lead to reduced requirements on energy supply. As water is used to convert energy into useful forms, the reduction in industrial demand is anticipated to reduce water consumption and wastewater, resulting in more clean water for other sectors and the environment. Xi et al. (2013), Zhang et al. (2015), Vassolo and Doell (2005); Fricko et al. (2016); Holland et al. (2016); Nguyen et al. (2014)					Technical education, vocational training, education for sustainability (4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.7) Awareness, knowledge and technical and managerial capability are closely linked, energy audit , information for trade unions, product /appliance labeling help in sustianbility education Fernando et al. (2016), Apearing and Thollandar (2013), Roy et al. (2018)									
	Low-carbon fuel switch		[0]	No direct interaction			[0]	No direct interaction			↑	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★	↑	[+1]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★
No direct interaction					water and air pollution reduction and better health (3.9) Industries are becoming supplier of energy, waste heat , water, roof tops for solar energy generation and hence helping in improving air and water quality. Vassolo and Doell (2005); Fricko et al. (2016); Holland et al. (2016); Nguyen et al (2014), Karner et al (2015)					Technical education, vocational training, education for sustainability (4.3, 4.4, 4.7) New technplogy deployment creates demand for awareness, knowledge with technical and managerial capability otherwise acts as barrier for rapid expansion. Fernando et al. (2016), Apeaning and Thollandar (2013), Roy et al. (2018)										
Decarbonisation/ CCS/CCU		[0]	No direct interaction			[0]	No direct interaction			↓	[-1]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★★		[0]	No direct interaction			
No direct interaction					Disease and Mortality (3.1/3.2/3.3/3.4) There is a risk of CO2 leakage both from geological formations as well as from the transportation infrastructure from source to sequestration locations. IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014); Atchley et al. (2013); Apps et al. (2010); Siirila et al. (2012); Wang and Jaffe (2004); Koorneef et al. (2011); Singh et al. (2011); Hertwich et al. (2008); Weltman et al. (2010); Corsten et al.(2013)					No direct interaction										
Buildings	Behavioral response	↑	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★	[0]	No direct interaction			↑	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★★		[0]	No direct interaction		
	Poverty reduction via financial savings (1.1) People living in the deprived communities feel positive and predict considerable financial savings. Scott, Jones, and Webb (2014)					Improved warmth and comforts Home occupants reported warmth as the most important aspect of comfort which were largely temperature-related and low in energy costs. Residents living in the deprived areas expect improved warmth in their properties after energy efficiency measures are employed. Scott, Jones, and Webb (2014); Huebner, Cooper, and Jones (2013); Yue, Long, and Chen (2013); Zhao et al. 2017					No direct interaction									
	Accelerating energy efficiency improvement	↑ / ↓	[+2, -1]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★★	↑	[+2]	■■■■	⊕	★	↑	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★★★	↑	[+2]	■■■■	⊕
Poverty and Development (1.1/1.2/1.3/1.4) Energy efficiency interventions lead to cost savings which are realized due to reduced energy bills that further lead to poverty reduction. Participants with low incomes experience greater benefits. Energy efficiency and biomass strategies benefited poor more than wind and solar whose benefits are captured by industry. carbon mitigation can increase or decrease inequalities. The distributional costs of new energy policies (e.g., supporting renewables and energy efficiency) are dependent on instrument design. If costs fall disproportionately on the poor, then this could impair progress toward universal energy access and, by extension, counteract the fight to eliminate poverty. (Quote from McCollum et al., 2018), Smart Home Technology Maidment et al. (2014); Scott, Jones, and Webb (2014); Berrueta et al. (2017); McCollum et al. (2018); Cameron et al. (2016); Casillas and Kammen (2012); Fay et al. (2015); Hallegate et al. (2016); Hirth and Ueckerdt (2013); Jakob and Steckel (2014); Casillas et al (2012)					Food Security (2.1) Using the improved stoves supports local food security and has significantly impacted on food security. By making fuel lasting longer, the improved stoves also help improve food security and provide a better buffer against fuel shortages induced by climate change-related events such as droughts, floods or hurricanes (Berrueta et al. 2017). Berrueta et al. (2017)					Healthy lives and well-being for all at all ages(3.2, 3.9) Efficient cookstove improves health especially for indigenous and poor rural communities. Household energy efficiency has positive health impacts on children's respiratory health, weight, and susceptibility to illness, and the mental health of adults. Household energy efficiency improves winter warmth, lowers relative humidity with benefits for cardiovascular and respiratory health. Further improved Indoor Air Quality by thermal regulation and occupant comfort are realised. However in one instance negative health impacts (asthma) of increased household energy efficiency were also noted when housing upgrades take place without changes in occupant behaviours. Home occupants reported warmth as the most important aspect of comfort which were largely temperature-related and low in energy costs. Residents living in the deprived areas expect improved warmth in their properties after energy efficiency measures are employed. Berrueta et al. (2017); Maidment et al. (2014); Willand, Ridley, and Maller (2015); Wells et al. (2015); Cameron, Taylor, and Emmett (2015); Liddell and Guiney (2015); Sharpe et al. (2015); Derbez (2014); Djamilia, Chu, and Kumaresan (2013); Scott, Jones, and Webb (2014); Huebner, Cooper, and Jones (2013); Yue, Long, and Chen (2013); Zhao et al.					Equal Access to Educational Institutions (4.1/4.2/4.3/4.5) Household energy efficiency measures reduce school absences for children with asthma due to indoor pollution Maidment et al. (2014)					
Improved access & fuel switch to modern low-carbon energy	↑	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★★★	~ / ↓	[0, -1]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★	↑	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★★★	↑	[+1]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★
Poverty and Development (1.1/1.2/1.3/1.4) Access to modern energy forms (electricity, clean cook-stoves, high-quality lighting) is fundamental to human development since the energy services made possible by them help alleviate chronic and persistent poverty. Strength of the impact varies in the literature. (Quote from McCollum et al., 2018) McCollum et al. (2018); Bonan et al. (2014); Burling and Preonas (2016); Casillas and Kammen (2010); Cook (2011); Kirubi et al. (2009); Pachauri et al. (2012); Pueyo et al. (2013); Rao et al. (2014); Zulu and Richardson, 2013; Pode, 2013					Food Security and Agricultural Productivity (2.1/2.4) Modern energy access is critical to enhance agricultural yields/productivity, decrease post-harvest losses, and mechanize agri-processing - all of which can aid food security. However, large-scale bioenergy and food production may compete for scarce land and other inputs (e.g., water, fertilizers), depending on how and where biomass supplies are grown and the indirect land use change impacts that result. If not implemented thoughtfully, this could lead to higher food prices globally, and thus reduced access to affordable food for the poor. Enhanced agricultural productivities can ameliorate the situation by allowing as much bioenergy to be produced on as little land as possible. McCollum et al. (2018); Asadzuzaman et al. (2010); Cabraal et al. (2005); Finco and Doppler (2010); Hasegawa et al. (2015); Lotze-Campen et al. (2014); Msangi et al. (2010); Smith et al. (2013); Smith, P. et al. (2014); Sola et al. (2016); Tilman et al. (2009); van Vuuren et al. (2009)					Disease and Mortality (3.1/3.2/3.3/3.4) Access to modern energy services can contribute to fewer injuries and diseases related to traditional solid fuel collection and burning, as well as utilization of kerosene lanterns. Access to modern energy services can facilitate improved health care provision, medicine and vaccine storage, utilization of powered medical equipment, and dissemination of health-related information and education. Such services can also enable thermal comfort in homes and contribute to food preservation and safety. (Quote from McCollum et al., 2018) McCollum et al. (2018); Aranda et al. (2014); Lam et al. (2012); Lim et al. (2012); Smith et al (2013)					Equal Access to Educational Institutions (4.1/4.2/4.3/4.5) Access to modern energy is necessary for schools to have quality lighting and thermal comfort, as well as modern information and communication technologies. Access to modern lighting and energy allows for studying after sundown and frees constraints on time management that allow for higher school enrollment rates and better literacy outcomes. (Quote from McCollum et al., 2018) McCollum et al. (2018); Lipscomb et al. (2013); van de Walle et al. (2013)					

Transport	Behavioural response	Equal right to economic resources access basic services (1.1,1.4,1.a, 1.b)	Ensure Access to Safe Nutritious Food (2.1; 2.2)	Road Traffic Accidents (3.4/3.6)	Equal Safe Access to Educational Institutions (4.1/4.2/4.3/4.5)
	<p>Equal right to economic resources access basic services (1.1,1.4,1.a, 1.b)  The costs of daily mobility can have important economic stress impacts not only impacting carless family with low-mobility, but in countries with high levels of car dependence, the costs of motoring can be burdensome, raising questions of affordability for households with limited economic resources. During economic crisis public transport authorities may react by reducing levels of service and increasing fares, likely exacerbating the situation for low-income households.</p> <p>Dodson et al. (2004); Cascajo et al. (2017)</p>	<p>Ensure Access to Safe Nutritious Food (2.1; 2.2)  Low-income community residents (non-white) who lack local access to affordable, quality sources of nutrition have to travel outside their immediate neighborhood to find better sources of food to feed themselves and their families. Lack of locally available healthy food often exacerbates the rates of obesity in many of these communities since it is often difficult or expensive to travel long distances on a regular basis to shop for food.</p> <p>Lowery et al. (2016); Hillier et al. (2011); Krukowski et al. (2013); LeDoux and Vojnovic (2013); Zenk et al. (2014); Ghosh-Dastidar et al. (2014); Clifton (2004)</p>	<p>Road Traffic Accidents (3.4/3.6)  Active travel modes' (such as walking and cycling) represent strategies not only for boosting energy efficiency but also, potentially, for improving health and well-being (e.g., lowering rates of diabetes, obesity, heart disease, dementia, and some cancers). However, a risk associated with these measures is that they could increase rates of road traffic accidents, if the provided infrastructure is unsatisfactory. Overall health effects will depend on the severity of the injuries sustained from these potential accidents relative to the health benefits accruing from increased exercise (McCollum et al., 2018).</p> <p>McCollum et al. (2018); Creutzig et al. (2012); Haines and Dora (2012); Saunders et al. (2013); Shaw et al. (2014); Woodcock et al. (2009); Shaw et al. (2017); Chakrabarti and Shin (2017); Hunag et al. (2017)</p>	<p>Equal Safe Access to Educational Institutions (4.1/4.2/4.3/4.5)  Differences in road ways affects school travel safety, collaborative efforts need to address safety issues from a dual perspective, first by working to change the existing infrastructure and use of roads to better address the traffic problems that children currently face walking to school, and then to better site schools and better control the roadways and land uses around them in the future</p> <p>Chia-Yuan Yu (2015)</p>	
Accelerating energy efficiency improvement	<p>End Poverty in all its forms everywhere (1.1,1.4,1.a, 1.b)  Decarbonisation of public bus in Sweden is receiving attention more than efficiency improvement. With more electrification electricity price goes up and affordability can worsen for poor unless redistributive policies are in place.</p> <p>Xylia et al (2017)</p>	[0]	<p>Reduce illnesses from hazardous air, water and soil pollution (3.9)  Locally relevant policies targeting traffic reductions and ambitious diffusion of electric vehicles results in measured changes in non-climatic population exposure included ambient air pollution, physical activity, and noise. The transition to low-carbon equitable and sustainable transport can be fostered by numerous short- and medium-term strategies that would benefit energy security, health, productivity, and sustainability. Evidence-based approach that takes into account greenhouse gas emissions, ambient air pollutants, economic factors (affordability, cost optimisation), social factors (poverty alleviations, public health benefits), and political acceptability is needed tackle these challenges.</p> <p>Schucht et al. (2015); Figueroa et al. (2014); Peng et al. (2017); Klausbruckner et al. (2016)</p>	[0]	
Improved access & fuel switch to modern low-carbon energy	<p>End Poverty in all its forms everywhere (1.1,1.4,1.a, 1.b)  Increasingly volatile global oil prices have raised concerns for the vulnerability of households to fuel price increases. Pricing measures as a key component of sustainable transport policy need to consider equity. Pro-poor mitigation policies are needed to reduce climate impact reduce threat; for example investing more and better in infrastructure by leveraging private resources and using designs that account for future climate change and the related uncertainty. Communities in poor areas cope with and adapt to multiple-stressors including climate change. Coping strategies provide short-term relief but in the long-term may negatively affect development goals. And responses generate a trade-off between adaptation, mitigation and development. African cities with slums and due to high commuting costs many walk to work places which limit access. In Latin America tripple informality leading to low productivity and living standards.</p> <p>Dodson and Sipe (2007); Hallegate et al. (2015); Suckall, Tompkins, and Stringer (2014); Lall, Henderson, and Venables (2017); Corporacion Andina de Fomento (2017); Klausbruckner et al. (2016)</p>	<p>Ensure Access to Food Security (2.1, 2.3, 2.a, 2.b,2.c)  21 projects aiming at resilient transport infrastructure development to improve access (e.g. C40 Cities Clean Bus Declaration, UITP Declaration on Climate Leadership, Cycling Delivers on the Global Goals, Global Sidewalk Challenge) do not substantially contribute to realizing the (indirect) transport targets with mostly a rural focus: Agricultural Productivity (SDG 2) and Access to Safe Drinking Water (SDG 6)</p> <p>Partnership on Sustainable Low Carbon Transport (2017)</p>	<p>Reduce illnesses from hazardous air pollution (3.9)  Projects aiming at resilient transport infrastructure development (e.g. C40 Cities Clean Bus Declaration, UITP Declaration on Climate Leadership, Cycling Delivers on the Global Goals, Global Sidewalk Challenge) are targeting at reducing airpollution, Electric vehicles using electricity from renewables or low carbon sources combined with e-mobility options such as trolleybuses, metros, trams and electro buses, as well as promote walking and biking, especially for short distances need consideration</p> <p>Partnership on Sustainable Low Carbon Transport (2017); Ajanovic (2015)</p>	[0]	

		1 ENERGY				2 AIR QUALITY				3 HEALTH AND WELL-BEING				4 HEALTHY PEOPLE							
		INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE					
Replacing coal	Non-biomass renewables solar, wind, hydro	↑	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕	★★★	[0]		↑	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕	★★★	↑	[+1]	■■	⊕	★			
		Deployment of renewable energy and improvements in energy efficiency globally will aid climate change mitigation efforts, and this, in turn, can help to reduce the exposure of the world's poor to climate-related extreme events, negative health impacts, and other environmental shocks (McCollum et al., 2018).					No direct interaction					Promoting most types of renewables and boosting efficiency greatly aid the achievement of targets to reduce local air pollution and improve air quality; however, the order of magnitude of the effects, both in terms of avoided emissions and monetary valuation, varies significantly between different parts of the world. Benefits would especially accrue to those living in the dense urban centers of rapidly developing countries. Utilization of biomass and biofuels might not lead to any air pollution benefits, however, depending on the control measures applied. In addition, household air quality can be significantly improved through lowered particulate emissions from access to modern energy services (McCollum et al., 2018).					Decentralized renewable energy systems (e.g., home- or village-scale solar power) can support education and vocational training.				
		McCollum et al. (2018); Hallegatte et al. (2016); IPCC (2014); Riahi et al. (2012)										McCollum et al. (2018); Anenberg et al. (2013); Chaturvedi and Shukla (2014); Haines et al. (2007); IEA (2016); Kayguzuz (2011); Nemet et al. (2010); Rafaj et al. (2013); Rao et al. (2013); Rao et al. (2016); Riahi et al. (2012); Rose et al. (2014); Smith and Sagar (2014); van Vliet et al. (2012); West et al. (2013)					Anderson A., Loomba P., Orajaka I., Numfor J., Saha S., Janko S., Johnson N., Podmore R., Larsen R. (2017)				
Increased use of biomass		↑/↓	[+2,-2]	■■■	⊕⊕	★	↑/↓	[+2,-2]	■■■■	⊕⊕	★★★	↑	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕	★★★	[0]				
		Large-scale bioenergy production could lead to the creation of agricultural jobs, as well higher farm wages and more diversified income streams for farmers. Modern energy access can make marginal lands more cultivable, thus potentially generating on-farm jobs and incomes; on the other hand, greater farm mechanization can also displace labor. On the other hand, large-scale bioenergy production could alter the structure of global agricultural markets in a way that is, potentially, unfavorable to small-scale food producers. see SDG2 (McCollum et al., 2018).					Farm Employment and Incomes (2.3) Large-scale bioenergy production could lead to the creation of agricultural jobs, as well higher farm wages and more diversified income streams for farmers. Modern energy access can make marginal lands more cultivable, thus potentially generating on-farm jobs and incomes; on the other hand, greater farm mechanization can also displace labor. On the other hand, large-scale bioenergy production could alter the structure of global agricultural markets in a way that is, potentially, unfavorable to small-scale food producers. The distributional effects of bioenergy production are underexplored in the literature (McCollum et al., 2018).					Disease and Mortality (3.1/3.2/3.3/3.4), Air Pollution (3.9) Replacing coal by biomass can reduce adverse impacts of upstream supply-chain activities, in particular local air and water pollution, and prevent coal mining accidents. Improvements to local air pollution in power generation compared to coal-fired power plants depend on the technology and fuel of biomass powerplants, but could be significant when switching from outdated coal combustion technologies to state-of-the-art biogas power generation.					No direct interaction				
		McCollum et al. (2018); Balishter et al. (1991); Creutzig et al. (2013); de Moraes et al. (2010); Gohin (2008); Rud (2012); Satolo and Bacchi (2013); van der Horst and Vermeylen (2011); Corbera and Pascual (2012); Creutzig et al. (2013); Davis et al. (2013); van der Horst and Vermeylen (2011); Muys et al. (2014); Ertem, Kappler, and Neubauer (2017)					McCollum et al. (2018); Balishter et al. (1991); Creutzig et al. (2013); de Moraes et al. (2010); Gohin (2008); Rud (2012); Satolo and Bacchi (2013); van der Horst and Vermeylen (2011); Corbera and Pascual (2012); Creutzig et al. (2013); Davis et al. (2013); van der Horst and Vermeylen (2011); Muys et al. (2014); Ertem, Kappler, and Neubauer (2017)					IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014); Koorneef et al. (2011); Singh et al. (2011); Hertwich et al. (2008); Veltman et al. (2010); Corsten et al. (2013); Ashworth et al. (2012); Einsiedel et al. (2013); IPCC (2005); Miller et al. (2007); de Best-Waldhober et al. (2009); Shackley et al. (2009); Wong-Parodi and Ray (2009); Wa�oquist et al. (2009, 2010); Reiner and Nuttall (2011); Epstein et al. (2010); Burgherr et al. (2012); Chen et al. (2012); Chan and Griffiths (2010); Asfaw et al. (2013)									
Nuclear/Advanced Nuclear		[0]					[0]					↓	[-1]	■■■■	⊕⊕	★★★	[0]				
		No direct interaction					No direct interaction					Disease and Mortality (3.1/3.2/3.3/3.4) [-1] In spite of the industry's overall safety track record, a non-negligible risk for accidents in nuclear power plants and waste treatment facilities remains. The long-term storage of nuclear waste is a politically fraught subject, with no large-scale long-term storage operational worldwide. Negative impacts from upstream uranium mining and milling are comparable to those of coal, hence replacing fossil fuel combustion by nuclear power would be neutral in that aspect. Increased occurrence of childhood leukaemia in populations living within 5 km of nuclear power plants was identified by some studies, even though a direct causal relation to ionizing radiation could not be established and other studies could not confirm any correlation (low evidence/agreement in this issue).					No direct interaction				
												IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014); Cardis et al. (2006); Balonov et al. (2011); Moomaw et al. (2011a); WHO (2013); Abdelouas (2006); Al-Zoughool and Kewski (2009) cited in Sathaye et al. (2011a); Smith et al. (2013); Schnelzer et al. (2010); Tirmarche (2012); Brugge and Buchner (2011); M�ller et al. (2012); Hiyama et al. (2013); Mousseau and M�ller (2013); M�ller and Mousseau (2011); M�ller et al. (2011); von Stechow et al. (2016); Hein�vaara et al. (2010); Kaatsch et al. (2008); Sermage-Faure et al. (2012); Hoeve and Jacobson (2012)									
CCS: Bio energy		↑/↓	[+2,-2]	■■■	⊕⊕	★	↑/↓	[+1,-2]	■■■■	⊕⊕	★★★	↑/↓	[+2,-1]	■■■	⊕⊕	★★★	[0]				
		See effects of increased bioenergy use.					Farm Employment and Incomes (2.3) See increased use of biomass effects. In addition, the concern that more bioenergy (for BECCS) necessarily leads to unacceptably high food prices is not founded on large agreement in the literature. AR5, for example, finds a significantly lower effect of large-scale bioenergy deployment on food prices by mid-century than the effect of climate change on crop yields. Also, Muratori et al. (2016) show that BECCS reduces the upward pressure on food crop prices by lowering carbon prices and lowering the total biomass demand in climate change mitigation scenarios. Competition for land-use. Use of agricultural residue for bioenergy can reduce soil carbon thereby threatening agricultural productivity.					Disease and Mortality (3.1/3.2/3.3/3.4) See positive impacts of increased biomass use. On the other hand, there is a non-negligible risk of CO2 leakage both from geological formations as well as from the transportation infrastructure from source to sequestration locations.					No direct interaction				
		See literature on increased biomass use and Muratori et al. (2016), IPCC AR5 (2014), Dooley,K. & Karth�,S. (2018)										IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014); Atchley et al. (2013); Apps et al. (2010); Siirila et al. (2012); Wang and Jaffe (2004); Koorneef et al. (2011); Singh et al. (2011); Hertwich et al. (2008); Veltman et al. (2010); Corsten et al. (2013)									
Advanced coal	CCS: Fossil	[0]					[0]					↓	[-1]	■■■	⊕⊕	★★★	[0]				
		No direct interaction					No direct interaction					Disease and Mortality (3.1/3.2/3.3/3.4) [-1] The use of fossil CCS imply continued adverse impacts of upstream supply-chain activities in the coal sector, and because of lower efficiency of CCS coal power plants, upstream impacts and local air pollution are likely to be exacerbated. Furthermore, IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014); Atchley et al. (2013); Apps et al. (2010); Siirila et al. (2012); Wang and Jaffe (2004); Koorneef et al. (2011); Singh et al. (2011); Hertwich et al. (2008); Veltman et al. (2010); Corsten et al. (2013)					No direct interaction				



	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	
Agriculture & Livestock Behavioural response: Sustainable healthy diets and reduced food waste	↔ / ↓	[0,-1]	■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★	↑	[+2]	■■■■■	⊕⊕⊕⊕	★★★★	↑	[+1]	■■	⊕	★	↔ / ↓	[0]				
	Poverty and Development (1.1/1.2/1.3/1.4)					Food Security and promotion of Sustainable Agriculture(2.1/2.4/2a)					Tobacco Control (3.a/ 3.a.1)					No direct interaction					
	Cutting livestock consumption can increase food security for some if land grows food not feed, but can also undermine livelihoods and culture where livestock has long been the best use of land such as in parts of SSA.					Curbing consumer waste of major food crops (i.e., wheat, rice, and vegetables) and meats (i.e., beef, pork, and poultry) in China, USA and India alone could feed ~413 million people per year (West et al., 2014). One billion extra people could be fed if food crop losses could be halved (Kummu et al., 2012). Reducing waste, especially from meat and dairy could play a role in delivering food security and reduce the need for sustainable intensification (Smith, 2013). Dietary change toward global healthy diets could improve nutritional health, food security and reduce emissions.					Consume fewer foods with low nutritional value e.g. alcohol, (Garnett, 2011). Demand-side measures aimed at reducing the proportion of livestock products in human diets, where the consumption of animal products is higher than recommended, are associated with multiple health benefits, especially in industrialized countries (Bustamante et al., 2014).										
	IPCC WGIII, 2014					West et al.(2014), Kummu et al. (2012), Smith, P. (2013), Beddington et al. (2012), Lamb et al. (2016), Garnett, T., 2011; Bajželj et al., 2014; Tilman & Clark, 2014)					Garnett, T. (2011), Bustamante, M., et al. (2014)										
Land based greenhouse gas reduction and soil carbon sequestration	↑	[+2]	■■■■■	⊕⊕⊕⊕	★★★★	↑	[+2]	■■■■■	⊕⊕⊕⊕	★★★★	↔ / ↓	[+2,-2]	■■■	⊕⊕	★★	↔ / ↓	[+2,-2]	■■■	⊕	★	
	Poverty and Development (1.1/1.2/1.3/1.4)					Food Security, sustainable agriculture and improved nutrition					Ensure healthy lives (3.c)					Ensure inclusive and quality education(4.4/4.7)					
	Many climate smart agriculture interventions aim to improve rural livelihoods, thereby contributing to poverty alleviation. Agroforestry or integrated crop–livestock–biogas systems can substitute costly, external inputs, saving on household expenditures – or even lead to the selling of some of the products, providing the farmer with extra income, leading to increased adaptive capacity (Bogdanski, 2012).					Safe application of biotechnology, both conventional and modern methods can help to improve agricultural productivity,improving crops adaptability thereby catering to food security. Reducing tillage,eliminating fallow and keeping the soil covered with residue, cover crops or perennial vegetation help prevent soil erosion and has the potential to increase Soil Organic Matter (SOC). Efficient land management techniques can help in increasing crop yield and hence food security issues can be addressed. Yield projections are actually higher for developing countries than for developed countries, reflecting the fact that they have more “catch-up” potential (Evenson, 1999). Action is needed throughout the food system, on moderating demand, reducing waste, improving governance and producing more food. (Godfray & Garnett, 2014). Improving cropland management is the key to increase crop productivity without further degrading soil and water resources (Branca et al., 2011). Climatee Smart Agriculture practices increases productivity and priotizes food security.					Growing crops such as cassava, sorghums and millets even in harsh conditions are important to the diets of very poor people. The policy scenarios show that reduced research support, delayed industrialization, delayed biotechnology, and climate change will delay progress in reducing malnutrition of children. The “global” effects are small, but local effects for some countries, e.g., Bangladesh and Nigeria, are significant (Evenson, 1999).					Science-based actions within CSA is required to integrate data sets and sound metrics for testing hypotheses about feedback regarding climate, weather data products and agricultural productivity, such as the nonlinearity of temperature effects on crop yield and the assessment of trade-offs and synergies that arise from different agricultural intensification strategies (Steenwerth, 2014). Low commodity prices have led to declining investment in research and development, farmer education, etc. (Lamb et al., 2016).					
	Lipper et al. (2014), Bogdanski (2012), Branca et al. (2011), Campbell et al. (2014), Hammond et al. (2016), Mbow et al. (2013), Scherr et al. (2012), Steenwerth et al. (2014), Vermeulen et al. (2012)					Mtui (2011); Harvey et al. (2014); Campbell et al. (2014); West and Post (2002); Johnson et al. (2007); Harvey et al. (2014); Evenson (1999); Godfray and Garnett (2014); Branca et al. (2011); McCarthy, Lipper, and Branca (2011); Behnassi, Boussaid, and Gopichandran (2014); Lipper et al. (2014); Steenwerth (2014)					Godfray & Garnett (2014); Evenson (1999)					Steenwerth, K. L., (2014); Lamb, A., et al. (2016)					
Greenhouse gas reduction from improved livestock production and manure management systems	↑	[+2]	■■	⊕	★	↑	[+2]	■■■■■	⊕⊕⊕⊕	★★★★	↔ / ↓	[+2,-2]	■■■	⊕⊕	★★	↔ / ↓	[0]				
	Poverty reduction and minimize exposure to risk (1.5)					Food Security and promotion of Sustainable Agriculture(2.1/2.4/2a)					Ensure healthy lives (3.c)					No direct interaction					
	Mixed-farming systems, can not only farmers mitigate risks by producing a multitude of commodities, but they can also increase the productivity of both crops and animals in a more profitable and sustainable way, (Quoted from Sansoucy, R. (1995))					Fostering transitions toward more productive livestock production systems targeting land-use change appears to be the most efficient lever to deliver food availability outcomes. (Quoted from Havlik, P., et al. (2014)) Genomic selection should be able to at least double the rate of genetic gain in the dairy industry. Given the prevalence of mixed crop–livestock systems in many parts of the world, closer integration of crops and livestock in such systems can give rise to increased productivity and increased soil fertility (Thornton, 2010). Managing the indirect effects of livestock systems intensification is critical for the sustainability of the global food system: like improving productivity and their close link to land sparing (Herrero and Thornton, 2013). In East Africa pastoralists have shifted from cows to camels, which are better-adapted to survive periods of water scarcity and able to consistently provide more milk (Steenwerth et al., 2014). Scenarios where zero human-edible concentrate feed is use for livestock soil erosion potential reduces by 12%.					Bio-digestion which has positive public-health aspects, particularly where toilets are coupled with the bio-digester, and the anaerobic conditions kill pathogenic organisms as well as digest toxins. Separation processes can improve or worsen health risks related to food crops or to livestock.										
	Sansoucy (1995)					Havlik et al. (2014); Steenwerth (2014), Thornton (2010); Herrero and Thornton (2013); Steenwerth et al. (2014); Schader et al. (2015)					Sansoucy (1995); Burton (2007)										




















<p>Transport</p> <p>Behavioural response</p>	<p>Recognize Women's unpaid Work (5.1/5.4) / Opportunities for Women (5.1/5.5)</p> <p>↑ [+1] 🏠🏠 🗺️🗺️ ★★</p> <p>The average woman's trip to work differs markedly from the average man's. Working-poor mothers rely on extensive social networks creating communities of spatial necessity, bartering for basic needs to overcome transportation constraints. Women earn lower wages and so are less likely to justify longer commutes. Many women need to manage dual roles as workers and mothers. Women tend to perform multi-purpose commuting, combining both work and household needs.</p> <p>Rogalsky, 2010; Crane, 2007</p>	<p>Reduce Inequality (10.2)</p> <p>↑ [+2] 🏠🏠 🗺️🗺️ ★★</p> <p>The equity impacts of climate change mitigation measures for transport, and indeed of transport policy intervention overall, are poorly understood by policymakers. This is in large part because standard assessment of these impacts is not a statutory requirement of current policy making. Managing transport energy demand growth will have to be advanced alongside efforts in passenger travel toward reducing the deep inequalities in access to transport services that currently affect the poor worldwide. Free provision of roads and parking spaces converts vast amounts of public land and capital into underpriced space for cars, in extreme cases like Los Angeles, CA, roads and streets free for parking and driving are 20% of land area, as governments give drivers free land people drive more than they would otherwise. High levels of car dependence, and the costs of motoring can be burdensome, and lead to increasing debt, raising questions of affordability for households with limited resources, particularly low-income houses located in suburban areas.</p> <p>Lucas and Pangbourne (2014); Figueroa et al. (2014); Manville (2017); Walks (2015); Belton et al. (2017)</p>	<p>Accountable and transparent institutions at all levels (16.6, 16.8)</p> <p>↑ / ↓ [+1, -1] 🏠🏠 🗺️🗺️ ★</p> <p>With behavioural change towards walking for short distance pedestrian safety on the road might reduce unless public policy is appropriately formulated. Prevalence of high level of triple forms of informality of jobs, housing and transportation are responsible for low productivity and low standards of living as major challenge for policies targeting urban growth in Latin America.</p> <p>Partnership on Sustainable Low Carbon Transport (2017); Corporacion Andina de Fomento (2017)</p>	<p>Help promote global partnership(17.1, 17.3,17.5,17.6,17.7)</p> <p>↑ [+2] 🏠🏠 🗺️🗺️ ★</p> <p>Projects aiming at resilient transport infrastructure development (e.g. C40 Cities Clean Bus Declaration, UITP Declaration on Climate Leadership, Cycling Delivers on the Global Goals, Global Sidewalk Challenge) are happening through multistakeholder coalition</p> <p>Partnership on Sustainable Low Carbon Transport (2017)</p>
<p>Accelerating energy efficiency improvement</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory decision making (16.7)</p> <p>↑ [+2] 🏠🏠 🗺️🗺️ ★★</p> <p>In transport mitigation is necessary to conduct need assessment and stakeholder consultation to determine plausible challenges, prior to introducing a desired planning reforms. Further, the involved personnel should actively engage transport-based stakeholders during policy identification and its effective implementation to achieve desired results. User behaviour and stakeholder integration is key for successful transport policy implementation</p> <p>Aggarwal, 2017, AlSabbagh, Siu, Guehnmann, & Barrett (2017)</p>	<p>Help promote global partnership(17.1, 17.3,17.5,17.6,17.7)</p> <p>↑ [+2] 🏠🏠 🗺️🗺️ ★</p> <p>Projects aiming at resilient transport infrastructure development and technology adoption (e.g. C40 Cities Clean Bus Declaration, UITP Declaration on Climate Leadership, Cycling Delivers on the Global Goals, Global Sidewalk Challenge) are happening through multistakeholder coalition</p> <p>Partnership on Sustainable Low Carbon Transport (2017)</p>
<p>Improved access & fuel switch to modern low-carbon energy</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>Reduce Inequality (10.2)</p> <p>↑ [+2] 🏠🏠 🗺️🗺️ ★★</p> <p>The equity impacts of climate change mitigation measures for transport, and indeed of transport policy intervention overall, are poorly understood by policymakers. This is in large part because standard assessment of these impacts is not a statutory requirement of current policy making. Managing transport energy demand growth will have to be advanced alongside efforts in passenger travel toward reducing the deep inequalities in access to transport services that currently affect the poor worldwide.</p> <p>Lucas & Pangbourne, 2014; Figueroa et al. (2014)</p>	<p>Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory decision making (16.7)</p> <p>↑ / ↓ [+1, -1] 🏠🏠 🗺️🗺️ ★</p> <p>Formal transport infrastructure improvement in many cities in developing countries lead to eviction from informal settlements which need appropriate redistributive policies and cooperation and partnership with all.</p> <p>Colenrander et al 2017</p>	<p>Help promote global partnership(17.1, 17.3,17.5,17.6,17.7)</p> <p>↑ [+2] 🏠🏠 🗺️🗺️ ★</p> <p>Projects aiming at resilient transport infrastructure development (e.g. C40 Cities Clean Bus Declaration, UITP Declaration on Climate Leadership, Cycling Delivers on the Global Goals, Global Sidewalk Challenge) are happening through multistakeholder coalition</p> <p>Partnership on Sustainable Low Carbon Transport (2017)</p>

		5 GENDER EQUALITY				10 STRONG INSTITUTIONS				16 PEACE, JUSTICE AND STRONG INSTITUTIONS				17 PARTNERSHIPS FOR GOALS							
		INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE					
Replacing coal	Non-biomass renewables solar, wind, hydro		[+1]			★		[+1]			★★		[+2]			★		[+2,0]			★★
		Decentralized renewable energy systems (e.g., home- or village-scale solar power) can reduce the burden on girls and women of procuring traditional biomass.					Decentralized renewable energy systems (e.g., home- or village-scale solar power) can enable a more participatory, democratic process for managing energy-related decisions within communities. (Quote from McCollum et al., 2018)					The energy justice framework serves as an important decision-making tool in order to understand how different principles of justice can inform energy systems and policies. Islar et al. (2017) states that off-grid and micro-scale energy development offers an alternative path to fossil-fuel use and top-down resource management as they democratize the grid and increase marginalized communities' access to renewable energy, education and health care.					International cooperation (in policy) and collaboration (in science) is required for the protection of shared resources. Fragmented approaches have been shown to be more costly. Specific to SDG7, to achieve the targets for energy access, renewables, and efficiency, it will be critical that all countries: (i) are able to mobilize the necessary financial resources (e.g., via taxes on fossil energy, sustainable financing, foreign direct investment, financial transfers from industrialized to developing countries); (ii) are willing to disseminate knowledge and share innovative technologies between each other; (iii) follow recognized international trade rules while at the same time ensuring that the least developed countries are able to take part in that trade; (iv) respect each other's policy space and decisions; (v) forge new partnerships between their public and private entities and within civil society; and (vi) support the collection of high-quality, timely, and reliable data relevant to the furthering their missions. There is some disagreement in the literature on the effect of some of the above strategies, such as free trade. Regarding international agreements, "no-regrets options", where all sides gain through cooperation, are seen as particularly beneficial (e.g., nuclear test ban treaties) (McCollum et al., 2018).				
		Schwerhoff G., Sy M. (2017)					McCollum et al. (2018); Cass et al. (2010); Cumbers (2012); Kunze and Becker (2015); Walker and Devine-Wright (2008)					Islar et al. (2017)					McCollum et al. (2018); Clarke et al. (2009); Eis et al. (2016); Montreal Protocol (1989); New Climate Economy (2015); O'Neill et al. (2017); Ramaker et al. (2003); Riahi et al. (2015); Riahi et al. (2017)				
	Increased use of biomass		[0]	No direct interaction				[0]	No direct interaction				[0]	No direct interaction				[0]	No direct interaction		
	Nuclear/Advanced Nuclear		[0]	No direct interaction				[0]	No direct interaction				[0]	No direct interaction				[0]	No direct interaction		
	CCS: Bio energy		[0]	No direct interaction				[0]	No direct interaction				[0]	No direct interaction				[0]	No direct interaction		
Advanced coal	CCS: Fossil		[0]	No direct interaction				[0]	No direct interaction				[0]	No direct interaction				[0]	No direct interaction		

		5 SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION					10 REDUCE WASTE					14 CLEAN ENERGY					17 PARTNERSHIPS FOR DEVELOPMENT							
		INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE			
Agriculture & Livestock	Behavioural response: Sustainable healthy diets and reduced food waste		[0]					[0]				Strong and effective institutions and responsive decision making (16.6/ 16.7 / 16.a)	[+1,-1]	■■■■	⊕⊖	★★	Resource mobilization and Strengthen Partnership (17.1/17.14)	[+1,-1]	■■	⊕	★			
		No direct interaction					No direct interaction					Appropriate incentives to reduce food waste may require some policy innovation and experimentation, but a strong commitment for devising and monitoring them seems essential. (Quoted from Bajželj et al.(2014)) A financial incentive to minimise waste could be created through effective taxation (e.g. by taxing foods with the highest wastage rates, or by increasing taxes on waste disposal). Decision makers should try to integrate agricultural, environmental and nutritional objectives through appropriate policy measures to achieve sustainable healthy diets coupled with reduction in food waste. It is surprising that politicians and policy makers demonstrate little regarding the need of having strategies to reduce meat consumption and to encourage more sustainable eating practices in Netherlands. Bajželj et al.(2014); Lamb et al. (2016); Garnett (2011); Dagevos and Voordouw (2013)					Decision makers should try to integrate agricultural, environmental and nutritional objectives through appropriate policy measures to achieve sustainable healthy diets coupled with reduction in food waste. It is surprising that politicians and policy makers demonstrate little regarding the need of having strategies to reduce meat consumption and to encourage more sustainable eating practices in Netherlands. Garnett (2011); Dagevos and Voordouw (2013)							
Land based greenhouse gas reduction and soil carbon sequestration	Equal access, empowerment of women (5.5)	↑/~	[+2,0]	■■■	⊕⊖	★★★	Empower economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of sex (10.2)	↑/~	[+1,0]	■■■	⊕⊖	★★	Build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions (16.6/ 16.7/16.8)	↑/~	[0,-1]	■■■■	⊕⊖	★★	Resource mobilization and Strengthen multi-stakeholder Partnership	↑	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊖⊕	★★★
	Many programmes for climate smart agriculture have been used to empower women and to improve gender equality. Women often have an especially important role to play in adaptation, because of their gendered indigenous knowledge on matters such as agriculture (Terry, 2009). Without access to land, credit and agricultural technologies, women farmers face major constraints in their capacity to diversify into alternative livelihoods (Demetriades and Esplen, 2008).	In many rural societies women are sidelined from decisions regarding agriculture even when male household heads are absent, and they often lack access to important inputs such as irrigation water, credit, tools, and fertiliser. To be effective, agricultural mitigation strategies need to take these and other aspects of local gender relations into account (Terry, 2009). Women's key role in maintaining biodiversity, through conserving and domesticating wild edible plant seed, and in food crop breeding, is not sufficiently recognised in agricultural and economic policy-making; nor is the importance of biodiversity to sustainable rural livelihoods in the face of predicted climate changes (Nelson et al., 2002).	Godfray and Garnett (2014); Behnassi, Boussaid and Gopichandran (2014); Steenwerth (2014); Lipper et al. (2014); Bustamante (2014)	Climate Smart Agriculture requires more careful adjustment of agricultural practices to natural conditions, a knowledge-intensive approach, huge financial investment, and policy and institutional innovation, etc. Besides private investment quality of public investment is also important. (Behnassi et al., 2014). Sources of climate finance for CSA in developing countries, including bilateral donors, multilateral financial institutions besides public sector finance. CSA is committed to new ways of engaging in participatory research and partnerships with producers (Steenwerth, 2014).																				
Greenhouse gas reduction from improved livestock production and manure management systems	Equal access to economic resources, promote empowerment of women (5.5/5.a/5.b)	↑/~	[+2,0]	■■	⊕	★	Empower economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of sex (10.2)	↑/~	[+1,0]	■■	⊕	★	Responsible decision making (16.7)	↑	[+1]	■■	⊕	★	Improve domestic capacity for tax collection (17.1)	↑	[+2]	■■■	⊕⊖	★★
	Most of the animal farming activities such as fodder collection, feeding, are performed by women. Besides, considerable involvement and contribution of women, considerable gender inequalities also exist in Indian villages in terms of accessing natural resources, extension services, marketing opportunities and financial services as well as in exercising their decision-making powers. Therefore, there is a need to correct gender bias in livestock sector. Efforts are needed to increase the capacity of women to negotiate with confidence and meet their strategic needs. Access, control and management of small ruminants, grazing areas and feed resources empower women and lead to an overall positive impact on the welfare of the household.	Livestock ownership is increasing women's decision-making and economic power within both the household and the community. Access, control and management of small ruminants, grazing areas and feed resources empower women and lead to an overall positive impact on the welfare of the household.	Havlik, P., et al. (2014)	The role of livestock system transitions in emission reductions depends on the level of the carbon price and which emissions sector is targeted by the policies (Havlik et al., 2014). Mechanisms for effecting behavioral change in livestock systems need to be better understood by implementing combinations of incentives and taxes simultaneously in different parts of the world (Herrero and Thornton, 2013).																				

<p>Reduced deforestation, REDD+</p>	<p>Opportunities for Women (5.1/5.5)</p> <p>↑ / ↓ [+1,-1] 🗺️ 🌐 ⚙️ ★</p> <p>Women have been less involved in REDD+ initiative (pilot project) design decisions and processes than men. Girls and women have an important role in forestry activities, related to fuel-wood, forest-food and medicine. Their empowerment contributes to sustainable forestry as well as reducing inequality (Katila et al., 2017).</p> <p>Brown (2011); Larson et al. (2015); Katila et al. (2017)</p>	<p>Reduced inequality, empowerment and inclusion (10.1/10.2/10.3/10.4)</p> <p>↑ [+2] 🗺️ 🌐 ⚙️ ★</p> <p>Urges developed country to support, through multilateral and bilateral channels, the development of REDD+ national strategies or action plans and implementation (Lima et al., 2017). Girls and women have an important role in forestry activities, related to fuel-wood, forest-food and medicine. Their empowerment contributes to sustainable forestry as well as reducing inequality (Katila et al., 2017).</p> <p>Lima et al. (2017); Katila et al. (2017)</p>	<p>Build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, Responsible decision making (16.6/ 16.7/16.8)</p> <p>↑ [+2] 🗺️ 🌐 ⚙️ 🌐 🌐 🌐 ★★</p> <p>Institutional building (National Forest Monitoring Systems, Safeguard Information Systems, etc.), with full and effective participation of all relevant countries (Lima et al., 2017). REDD+ actions also deliver non-carbon benefits (e.g. local socioeconomic benefits, governance improvements, Lima et al., 2015). Forest governance is another central aspect in recent studies, including debate on decentralization of forest management, logging concessions in public owned commercially valuable forests, and timber certification, primarily in temperate forests (Bustamante et al., 2014).</p> <p>Lima et al. (2017); Lima et al. (2015); Bustamante et al. (2014)</p>	<p>Resource mobilization and Strengthen multi-stakeholder Partnership (17.1/ 17.3/17.5/17.17)</p> <p>↑ / ↓ [+1,-1] 🗺️ 🌐 ⚙️ ★</p> <p>To provide finance and technology to developing countries to support emissions reductions. Be supported by adequate and predictable financial and technology support, including support for capacity-building (Lima et al., 2017). Partnerships in the form of significant aid money from, e.g., Norway, other bilateral donors, and the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) are forthcoming (Andrew, 2017). Estimates of opportunity cost for REDD are very low. Lower costs and/or higher carbon prices could combine to protect more forests, including those with lower carbon content. Conversely, where the cost of action is high, a large amount of additional funding would be required for the forest to be protected (Miles and Kapos, 2008). Forest governance is another central aspect in recent studies, including debate on decentralization of forest management, logging concessions in public owned commercially valuable forests, and timber certification, primarily in temperate forests (Bustamante et al., 2014). Partnerships between local forest managers, community enterprises and private sector companies can support local economies and livelihoods, and boost regional and national economic growth (Katila et al., 2017).</p> <p>Lima et al. (2017); Andrew (2017); Miles and Kapos (2008); Bustamante et al. (2014); Katila et al. (2017)</p>
<p>Afforestation and reforestation</p>	<p>Opportunities for Women (5.1/5.5)</p> <p>↑ [+1] 🗺️ 🌐 ⚙️ ★</p> <p>Many women in developing countries are already prominently engaged in economic sectors related to climate adaptation and mitigation efforts such as agriculture, renewable energy, forest management and are important drivers and leaders in climate responses that are innovative and effective, benefitting not only their families but their larger communities as well. Women's participation in the decision-making process of forest management, for example, has been shown to increase rates of reforestation while decreasing the illegal extraction of forest products</p> <p>UNDESA, 2016</p>	<p>Empower economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of sex (10.2)</p> <p>↑ [+1] 🗺️ 🌐 ⚙️ ★</p> <p>Women's participation in the decision-making process of forest management, for example, has been shown to increase rates of reforestation while decreasing the illegal extraction of forest products.</p> <p>UNDESA, 2016</p>	<p>Responsible decision making (16.7)</p> <p>↑ [+1] 🗺️ 🌐 ⚙️ ★</p> <p>Land-related mitigation, such as biofuel production, as well as conservation and reforestation action can increase competition for land and natural resources so these measures should be accompanied by complementary policies. (Quoted from Epstein, A. H., & Theuer, S. L. H. (2017))</p> <p>Epstein and Theuer (2017)</p>	<p>Resource mobilization and Strengthen Partnership (17.1/17.14)</p> <p>↑ [+2] 🗺️ 🌐 ⚙️ ★★</p> <p>Financing at the national and international level is required to grow more seedlings/sapling, restore land, create awareness education factsheets, providing training of local communities regarding the benefits of afforestation and reforestation. Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol further sets a Clean Development Mechanism through which countries in Annex I earn "certified emissions reductions" through projects implemented in developing countries (Montanarella and Alva, 2015). Afforestation and reforestation in India are being carried out under various programmes, namely social forestry initiated in the early 1980s, Joint Forest Management Programme initiated in 1990, afforestation under National Afforestation and Eco-development Board (NAEB) programmes since 1992, and private farmer and industry initiated plantation forestry. If the current rate of afforestation and reforestation is assumed to continue, the carbon stock could increase of 11% by 2030 (Ravindranath, Chaturvedi, and Murthy, 2008).</p> <p>Kibria, G. (2015); Montanarella and Alva (2015); Ravindranath, Chaturvedi, and Murthy (2008)</p>
<p>Behavioural response (responsible sourcing)</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>Responsible decision making (16.7)</p> <p>↑ [+1] 🗺️ 🌐 ⚙️ ★★</p> <p>Indonesian factories may seek advantages through non-price competition—perhaps by highlighting decent working conditions or the existence of a union—or to see trade associations or government agencies promoting the country as a responsible sourcing location (Bartley, 2010). In the absence of domestic legal instruments providing incentives to improve sustainability of sourcing, it appears that initiatives to engage the major importing enterprises in developing responsible sourcing practices and policies is a practical approach. Unless initiatives involve all the major importers, they are unlikely to be successful since the high costs associated with accreditation would increase production costs for these firms relative to their competitors (Huang, Wilkes, Sun and Terheggen, 2013).</p> <p>Bartley (2010); Huang, Wilkes, Sun and Terheggen (2013)</p>	<p>Finance and trade (17.1/17.10)</p> <p>↑ [+1] 🗺️ 🌐 ⚙️ ★★</p> <p>Private certification initiatives for wood product and biomass sourcing may extend their schemes with criteria for "leakage" (external GHG effects). Also Recycling of waste wood in pellets is not yet practiced, due to unclear rules in the EU Waste Directive about overseas shipping (Sikkema et al., 2014). Engagement of Chinese government and private sector stakeholders in supply country sustainability initiatives may be the best way to support this gradual process of improvement. Although carrying out due diligence in timber sourcing can require considerable internal resources, it may be substantially less of a financial burden than the potential fines and reputational damage resulting from sourcing unknown or controversial timber (Huang, Wilkes, Sun and Terheggen, 2013).</p> <p>Sikkema et al. (2014); Huang, Wilkes, Sun, and Terheggen (2013)</p>
<p>Oceans</p>	<p>Ocean iron fertilization</p> <p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>
<p>Blue carbon</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>
<p>Enhanced Weathering</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>

		6					12					14					15					
		INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	
Industry	Accelerating energy efficiency improvement	Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)	[+2,-1]	■■■■	⊕⊕	★★	Sustainable and Efficient resource (12.2,12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 12 a)	[+1]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★★	[0]	[0]	No direct interaction	No direct interaction							
		Efficiency and behavioural changes in the industrial sector that lead to reduced energy demand can lead to reduced requirements on energy supply. As water is used to convert energy into useful forms, the reduction in industrial demand is anticipated to reduce water consumption and wastewater, resulting in more clean water for other sectors and the environment. Likewise, reducing material inputs for industrial processes through efficiency and behavioural changes will reduce water inputs in the material supply chains. In extractive industries there can be a trade off with production unless strategically managed and wastewater, resulting in more clean water for other sectors and the environment. In extractive industries there is trade off unless strategically managed. Behavioral changes in the industrial sector that lead to reduced energy demand can lead to reduced requirements on energy supply. As water is used to convert energy into useful forms, the reduction in industrial demand is anticipated to reduce water consumption and wastewater, resulting in more clean water for other sectors and the environment.					Once started leads to chain of actions within the sector and policy space to sustain the effort. Help in expansion of sustainable industrial production (Ghana)															
		Vassolo and Doell (2005); Fricko et al. (2016); Holland et al. (2016); Nguyen et al (2014)					Apeaning and Thollandar (2013); Fernando et al. (2017)															
	Low-carbon fuel switch	Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)	[+2,-2]	■■■■	⊕⊕	★★★	Sustainable production (12.2,12.3, 12.a)	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕⊕	★★★★	[0]	[0]	No direct interaction	Sustainable production (15.1,15.5,15.9,15.10)	[+1,-1]	■■	⊕	★			
	A switch to low-carbon fuels can lead to a reduction in water demand and wastewater if the existing higher-carbon fuel is associated with a higher water intensity than the lower-carbon fuel. However, in some situations the switch to a low-carbon fuel such as e.g., biofuel could increase water use compared to existing conditions if the biofuel comes from a water-intensive feedstock.					Circular economy instead of linear global economy can achieve climate goal and can help in economic growth through industrialisation which saves on resources, environment and supports small, medium and even large industries, can lead to employment generation. so new regulations, incentives, tax regime can help in achieving the goal especially in newly emerging developing countries although applicable for large industrialised countries also.								Circular economy instead of linear global economy can achieve climate goal and can help in economic growth through industrialisation which saves on resources, environment and supports small, medium and even large industries, can lead to employment generation. so new regulations, incentives, tax regime can help in achieving the goal especially in newly emerging developing countries although applicable for large industrialised countries also.								
	Hejazi et al. (2015); Song et al. (2016); Fricko et al. (2016)					Supino et al. (2015); Fan et al. (2017); Leider et al. (2015); Zheng et al. (2016); Shi et al. (2017)																
	Decarbonisation/ CCS/CCU	Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)	[+1,-1]	■■■■	⊕	★★	Sustainable production and consumption (12.1,12.6 12.a)	[+2]	■■	⊕⊕⊕⊕	★★★★	[0]	[0]	No direct interaction	Conserve and Sustainably use ocean (14.1, 14.5)	[-1]	■■	⊕	★			
	CCU/S requires access to water for cooling and processing which could contribute to localized water stress. CCS/U process can potentially be configured for increased water efficiency compared to a system without carbon capture via process integration.					EPI plants are capital intensive and are mostly operated by multinational with long investment cycles. In developed countries new investments are happening in brown fields, while in developing countries these are in green fields. Collaboration among partners and user demand change, policy change are essential for encouraging these large risky investments.								CCU/S in chemical industry faces challenge for transport cost and storage. In UK cluster region have been identified for storage under sea.								
	Meldrum et al. (2013); Fricko et al. (2016); Byers et al. (2016); Brandl et al. (2017)					Wesseling et al. (2017)																
Buildings	Behavioral response	Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★★	Responsible and sustainable consumption	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★★	[0]	[0]	No direct interaction	No direct interaction							
		Behavioral changes in the residential sector that lead to reduced energy demand can lead to reduced requirements on energy supply. As water is used to convert energy into useful forms, the reduction in residential demand is anticipated to reduce water consumption and wastewater, resulting in more clean water for other sectors and the environment.					Technological improvements alone are not sufficient to increase energy savings. Zhao et al. (2017) findings indicate that building technology and occupant behaviors interact with each other and finally affect energy consumption from home. They found that occupant habits could not take advantage of more than 50 percent of energy efficiency potential allowed by an efficient building. In the electronic segment product obsolescence represents a key challenge for sustainability. Echegaray (2015) discusses the dissonance between consumers' product durability experience, orientations to replace devices before terminal technical failure, and perceptions of industry responsibility and performance. The results from their urban sample survey indicate that technical failure is far surpassed by subjective obsolescence as a cause for fast product replacement. At the same time Liu, Oosterveer, and Spaargaren (2017) suggest that we need to go beyond individualist and structuralist perspectives to analyse sustainable consumption (i.e. combines both human agency paradigm and social structural perspective).															
		Bartos and Chester (2014); Fricko et al. (2016) Holland et al. (2016)					Zhao et al. (2017); Somerfeld, Buys, and Vine (2017); Isenhour and Feng (2016); He,															
	Accelerating energy efficiency improvement	Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★★	Sustainable Practices and Lifestyles (12.6/12.7/12.8)	[+1]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★★	[0]	[0]	No direct interaction	Reduced deforestation (15.5)	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★★			
	Efficiency changes in the residential sector that lead to reduced energy demand can lead to reduced requirements on energy supply. As water is used to convert energy into useful forms, the reduction in residential demand is anticipated to reduce water consumption and wastewater, resulting in more clean water for other sectors and the environment. A switch to low-carbon fuels in the residential sector can lead to a reduction in water demand and wastewater if the existing higher-carbon fuel is associated with a higher water intensity than the lower-carbon fuel. However, in some situations the switch to a low-carbon fuel such as e.g., biofuel could increase water use compared to existing conditions if the biofuel comes from a water-intensive feedstock. As water is used to convert energy into useful forms, energy efficiency is anticipated to reduce water consumption and wastewater, resulting in more clean water for other sectors and the environment. Subsidies for renewables are anticipated to lead to the benefits and tradeoffs outlined when deploying renewables. Subsidies for renewables could lead to improved water access and treatment if subsidies support projects that provide both water and energy services (e.g., solar desalination).					Sustainable practices adopted by public and private bodies in their operations (e.g., for goods procurement, supply chain management, and accounting) create an enabling environment in which renewable energy and energy efficiency measures may gain greater traction (McCollum et al., 2018).								Improved cook stove help halting deforestation in rural India								
	Hendrickson et al. (2014); Bartos and Chester (2014); Fricko et al. (2016); Holland et al. (2016); Bartos and Chester (2014); Bilton et al. (2011); Scott et al. (2011); Kumar et al. (2012); Kern et al. (2014); Meldrum et al. (2014); Kim et al (2017)					McCollum et al. (2018); CDP (2015); European Climate Foundation (2014); Khan et al. (2015); New Climate Economy (2015); Stefan and Paul (2008)																
	Improved access & fuel switch to modern low-carbon energy	Access to improved water and sanitation (6.1/6.2), Water efficiency and pollution prevention	[+2,-1]	■■■■	⊕⊕	★★★	Sustainable use and management of natural resource (12.2)	[+2,-1]	■■■■	⊕⊕	★★★	[0]	[0]	No direct interaction	Healthy Terrestrial Ecosystems (15.1/15.2/15.4/15.5/15.8)	[+2]	■■■■	⊕⊕⊕	★★★			
	A switch to low-carbon fuels in the residential sector can lead to a reduction in water demand and wastewater if the existing higher-carbon fuel is associated with a higher water intensity than the lower-carbon fuel. However, in some situations the switch to a low-carbon fuel such as e.g., biofuel could increase water use compared to existing conditions if the biofuel comes from a water-intensive feedstock. Improved access to energy can support clean water and sanitation technologies. If energy access is supported with water-intensive energy sources, there could be tradeoffs with water efficiency targets.					A switch to low-carbon fuels in the residential sector can lead to a reduction in water demand and wastewater if the existing higher-carbon fuel is associated with a higher water intensity than the lower-carbon fuel. However, in some situations the switch to a low-carbon fuel such as e.g., biofuel could increase water use compared to existing conditions if the biofuel comes from a water-intensive feedstock. Improved access to energy can support clean water and sanitation technologies. If energy access is supported with water-intensive energy sources, there could be tradeoffs with water efficiency targets.								Ensuring that the world's poor have access to modern energy services would reinforce the objective of halting deforestation, since firewood taken from forests is a commonly used energy resource among the poor (McCollum et al., 2018).								
	Hejazi et al. (2015); Song et al. (2016); Fricko et al. (2016); Rao and Pachauri (2017); Cibin et al. (2016)					Hejazi et al. (2015); Song et al. (2016); Fricko et al. (2016); Rao and Pachauri (2017); Cibin et al. (2016)																

<p>Transport</p> <p>Behavioural response</p>	<p>Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)  [+2]   ★★</p> <p>Behavioral changes in the transport sector that lead to reduced transport demand can lead to reduced transport energy supply. As water is used to produce a number of important transport fuels, the reduction in transport demand is anticipated to reduce water consumption and wastewater, resulting in more clean water for other sectors and the environment.</p> <p>Vidic et al. (2013); Tiedemann et al. (2016); Fricko et al. (2016); Holland et al. (2016)</p>	<p>Ensure Sustainable Consumption & Production patterns (12.3)  [+2]   ★★</p> <p>Urban carbon mitigation must consider the supply chain management of imported goods, the production efficiency within the city, the consumption patterns of urban consumers, and the responsibility of the ultimate consumers outside the city. Important for climate policy of monitoring the CO2 clusters that dominate CO2 emissions in global supply chains because they offer insights on where climate policy can be effectively directed.</p> <p>Lin et al. (2015); Kagawa et al. (2015); Felix et al (2016)</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>
<p>Accelerating energy efficiency improvement</p>	<p>Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)  [+2]   ★★★</p> <p>Similar to behavioral changes, efficiency measures in the transport sector that lead to reduced transport demand can lead to reduced transport energy supply. As water is used to produce a number of important transport fuels, the reduction in transport demand is anticipated to reduce water consumption and wastewater, resulting in more clean water for other sectors and the environment.</p> <p>Vidic et al. (2013); Tiedemann et al. (2016); Fricko et al. (2016); Holland et al. (2016)</p>	<p>Sustainable Consumption (12.2/12.8)  [+2]   ★★★</p> <p>Relational complex transport behavior resulting in significant growth in energy-inefficient car choices, as well as differences in mobility patterns (distances driven, driving styles) and actual fuel consumption between different car segments all affect the non-progress on transport decarbonisation. Consumption choices, and individual lifestyles are situated tied to the form of the surrounding urbanization. Major behavioral changes and emissions reductions requires understanding of this relational complexity, consideration of potential interactions with other policies and the local context and implementation of both command-and-control as well as market-based measures.</p> <p>Stanley, Hensher and Loader (2011); Heinonen et al. (2013); Gallego, Montero and Salas (2013); Aamaas and Peters (2017); Gössling and Metzler (2017); Azevedo and Leal (2017)</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>
<p>Improved access & fuel switch to modern low-carbon energy</p>	<p>Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)  /  [+2,-1]   ★★★</p> <p>A switch to low-carbon fuels in the transport sector can lead to a reduction in water demand and wastewater if the existing higher-carbon fuel is associated with a higher water intensity than the lower-carbon fuel. However, in some situations the switch to a low-carbon fuel such as e.g., biofuel could increase water use compared to existing conditions if the biofuel comes from a water-intensive feedstock. Transport electrification could lead to tradeoffs with water use if the electricity is provided with water intensive power generation.</p> <p>Hejazi et al. (2015); Song et al. (2016); Fricko et al. (2016)</p>	<p>Ensure Sustainable Consumption & Production patterns (12.3)  [+2]   ★★★</p> <p>Due to persistent reliance on fossil fuels, it is posited that transport is more difficult to decarbonize than other sectors. This study partially confirms that transport is less reactive to a given carbon tax than the non-transport sectors: in the first half of the century, transport mitigation is delayed by 10–30 years compared to non-transport mitigation. The extent to which earlier mitigation is possible strongly depends on implemented technologies and model structure.</p> <p>Pietzcker et al. (2013); Figueroa et al. (2014); IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014); Creutzig et al., (2015)</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>























































		INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE						
Replacing coal	Non-biomass renewables solar, wind, hydro	Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6) / Access to improved water and sanitation (6.1)	[+2,-2]			★★★★	Natural Resource Protection (12.2/12.3/12.4/12.5)	[+2]			★★★★	Marine Economies (14.7) / Marine Protection (14.1/14.2/14.4/14.5)	[2,-1]			★★★	Healthy Terrestrial Ecosystems (15.1/15.2/15.4/15.5/15.8)	[-1]			★★★	
	Wind/solar renewable energy technologies are associated with very low water requirements compared to existing thermal power plant technologies. Widespread deployment is therefore anticipated to lead to improved water efficiency and avoided thermal pollution. However, managing wind and solar variability can increase water use at thermal power plants and can cause poor water quality downstream from hydropower plants. Access to distributed renewables can provide power to improve water access, but could also lead to increased groundwater pumping and stress if mismanaged. Developing dams to support reliable hydropower production can fragment rivers and alter natural flows reducing water and ecosystem quality. Developing dams to support reliable hydropower production can result in disputes for water in basins with up- and down-stream users. Storing water in reservoirs increases evaporation, which could offset water conservation targets and reduce availability of water downstream. However, hydropower plays an important role in energy access for water supply in developing regions, can support water security, and has the potential to reduce water demands if used without reservoir storage to displace other water intensive energy processes.		Renewable energy and energy efficiency slow the depletion of several types of natural resources, namely coal, oil, natural gas, and uranium. In addition, the phasing-out of fossil fuel subsidies encourages less wasteful energy consumption; but if that is done, then the policies implemented must take care to minimize any counteracting adverse side-effects on the poor (e.g., fuel price rises). (Quote from McCollum et al., 2018)		Ocean-based energy from renewable sources (e.g., offshore wind farms, wave and tidal power) are potentially significant energy resource bases for island countries and countries situated along coastlines. Multi-use platforms combining renewable energy generation, aqua-culture, transport services and leisure activities can lay the groundwork for more diversified marine economies. Depending on the local context and prevailing regulations, ocean-based energy installations could either induce spatial competition with other marine activities, such as tourism, shipping, resources exploitation, and marine and coastal habitats and protected areas, or provide further grounds for protecting those exact habitats, therefore enabling marine protection. (Quote from McCollum et al., 2018). Hydropower disrupts the integrity and connectivity of aquatic habitats and impact the productivity of inland waters and their fisheries		Landscape and wildlife impact for wind, habitat impact for hydropower.															
		Blton et al. (2011); Scott et al. (2011); Kumar et al. (2012); Kern et al. (2014); Meldrum et al. (2014); Fricko et al. (2016); Ziv et al. (2012); Grill et al. (2015); Grubert et al. (2016); Fricko et al. (2016); De Stefano et al. (2017)		McCollum et al. (2018); Banerjee et al. (2012); Bhattacharyya et al. (2016); Cameron et al. (2016); Riahi et al. (2012); Schwanitz et al. (2014)		McCollum et al. (2018); Buck and Krause (2012); Michler-Gieluch et al. (2009); WBGU (2013); Inger et al. (2009); Matthews N., McCartney M. (2017); Cooke S.J., Allison E.H., Beard T.D., Jr., Arlinghaus R., Arthington A.H., Bartley D.M., Cowx I.G., Fuentesville C., Leonard N.J., Lorenzen K., Lynch A.J., Nguyen V.M., Youn S.-J., Taylor W.W., Welcomme R.L. (2016)		Wiser et al. (2011); Lovich and Ennen (2013); Garvin et al. (2011); Grodsky et al. (2011); Dahl et al. (2012); de Lucas et al. (2012); Dahl et al. (2012); Jain et al. (2011); Kumar et al. (2011); Alho (2011); Kunz et al. (2011); Smith et al. (2013); Ziv et al. (2012); Matthews N., McCartney M. (2017)														
Increased use of biomass		Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)	[+1,-2]			★★★★	Natural Resource Protection (12.2/12.3/12.4/12.5)	[+2]			★★★★		[0]				Healthy Terrestrial Ecosystems (15.1/15.2/15.4/15.5/15.8)	[+1,-2]			★★	
	Biomass expansion could lead to increased water stress when irrigated feedstocks and water-intensive processing steps are used. Bioenergy crops can alter flow over land and through soils as well as require fertilizer and this can reduce water availability and quality. Planting bioenergy crops on marginal lands or in some situations to replace existing crops can lead to reductions in soil erosion and fertilizer inputs, improving water quality.		Switching to renewable energy reduce the depletion of finite natural resources.		No direct interaction		Protecting terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably managing forests, halting deforestation, preventing biodiversity loss and controlling invasive alien species could potentially clash with renewable energy expansion, if that would mean constraining large-scale utilization of bioenergy or hydropower. Good governance, cross-jurisdictional coordination, and sound implementation practices are critical for minimizing trade-offs (McCollum et al., 2018).															
		Hejazi et al. (2015); Bonsch et al. (2016); Cibir et al. (2016); Song et al. (2016); Gao et al. (2017); Taniwaki (2017); Woodbury et al. (2017); Griffiths et al. (2017); Ha et al. (2017)		McCollum et al. (2018); Banerjee et al. (2012); Bhattacharyya et al. (2016); Cameron et al. (2016); Riahi et al. (2012); Schwanitz et al. (2014)				McCollum et al. (2018); Smith et al. (2010); Smith et al. (2014); Acheampong M., Ertem F.C., Kappler B., Neubauer P. (2017)														
Nuclear/Advanced Nuclear		Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)	[+2,-1]			★★★		[0]					[0]				Healthy Terrestrial Ecosystems (15.1/15.2/15.4/15.5/15.8)	[-1]			★★	
	Nuclear power generation requires water for cooling which can lead to localized water stress and the resulting cooling effluents can cause thermal pollution in rivers and oceans.		No direct interaction		No direct interaction		Safety and waste concerns, uranium mining and milling															
		Webster et al. (2013); Fricko et al. (2016); Raptis et al. (2016); Holland et al. (2016)						IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014); Visschers and Siegrist (2012); Greenberg (2013a); Kim et al. (2013); Visschers and Siegrist (2012); Bickerstaff et al. (2008); Sjoberg and Drott-Sjo- berg (2009); Corner et al. (2011); Ahearne (2011)														
CCS: Bio energy		Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)	[+1,-2]			★★	Natural Resource Protection (12.2/12.3/12.4/12.5)	[+1]			★★		[0]				Healthy Terrestrial Ecosystems (15.1/15.2/15.4/15.5/15.8)	[+1,-2]			★★	
	CCU/S requires access to water for cooling and processing which could contribute to localized water stress. However, CCS/U process can potentially be configured for increased water efficiency compared to a system without carbon capture via process integration. The bioenergy component adds the additional tradeoffs associated with bioenergy use. Large-scale bioenergy increases input demand, resulting in environmental degradation and water stress		Switching to renewable energy reduce the depletion of finite natural resources. On the other hand, the available of underground storage is limited and therefore reduces the benefits of switching from finite resources to bioenergy.		No direct interaction		Protecting terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably managing forests, halting deforestation, preventing biodiversity loss and controlling invasive alien species could potentially clash with renewable energy expansion, if that would mean constraining large-scale utilization of bioenergy or hydropower. Good governance, cross-jurisdictional coordination, and sound implementation practices are critical for minimizing trade-offs (McCollum et al., 2018). Large-scale bioenergy increases input demand, resulting in environmental degradation and water stress.															
		Meldrum et al. (2013); Fricko et al. (2016); Byers et al. (2016); Brandl et al. (2017); Dooley,K. & Kartha,S. (2018)		McCollum et al. (2018); Banerjee et al. (2012); Bhattacharyya et al. (2016); Cameron et al. (2016); Riahi et al. (2012); Schwanitz et al. (2014)				McCollum et al. (2018); Smith et al. (2010); Smith et al. (2014); Acheampong et al. (2017); Dooley and Kartha (2018)														
Advanced coal	CCS: Fossil	Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)	[+1,-2]			★★		[0]					[0]					[0]				
	CCU/S requires access to water for cooling and processing which could contribute to localized water stress. However, CCS/U process can potentially be configured for increased water efficiency compared to a system without carbon capture via process integration. Coal mining to support clean coal CCS will negatively impact water resources due to the associated water demands, wastewater and land-use requirements.		No direct interaction		No direct interaction		No direct interaction															
		Meldrum et al. (2013); Fricko et al. (2016); Byers et al. (2016); Brandl et al. (2017)																				

	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	
Agriculture & Livestock	Behavioural response: Sustainable healthy diets and reduced food waste	Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)				↑/↓	[+2,-1]	□□□□□	○○○○○	★★★★		Ensure Sustainable Consumption & Production patterns, Sustainable				
		Reduced food waste avoids direct water demand and wastewater for crops and food processing, and avoids water used for energy supply by reducing agricultural, food processing and waste management energy inputs. Healthy diets will support water efficiency targets if the shift towards healthy foods results in food supply chains that are less water intensive than the supply chains supporting the historical dietary pattern.				↑	[+2]	□□□□□	○○○○○	★★★★	[0]	No direct interaction				
		Khan et al. (2009); Bajzelj et al. (2014); Ran et al. (2016); Villarreal Walker et al. (2014);						Beddington et al. (2012); Steinfeld, H., & Gerber, P. (2010); Bajzelj et al. (2014); Ingram, J.					Kummu et al. (2012); Stehfest et al. (2009)			
Land based greenhouse gas reduction and soil carbon sequestration	Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)				↑/↓	[+1,-1]	□□□□□	○○○○○	★★★★		Ensure Sustainable Production patterns(12.3)					
	Soil carbon sequestration can alter the capacity of soils to store water, which impacts the hydrological cycle and could be positive or negative from a water perspective, dependent on existing conditions. Climate Smart Agriculture enrich linkages across sectors including management, water resources. Minimum tillage systems have been reported to reduce water erosion and thus sedimentation of water courses (Bustamante, 2014).				↑	[+1]	□	○	★	[0]	No direct interaction					
		Smith (2016); Behnassi, Boussaid and Gopichandran (2014); Bustamante (2014)						Campbell et al. (2014), Lakshmi et. al (2015)					IPCC WGIII (2014); Lamb et al. (2016); Lybbert and Sumner (2010); Harvey et al. (2014); Behnassi, Boussaid and Gopichandran (2014); Lamb et al. (2016)			
Greenhouse gas reduction from improved livestock production and manure management systems	Water use efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6)				↑/↓	[+2,-1]	□□□□□	○○○○○	★★★★		Ensure Sustainable Production patterns and restructuring taxation(12.3/12c)					
	Livestock efficiency measures are expected to reduce water required for livestock systems as well as associated livestock wastewater flows. However, efficiency measures that include agricultural intensification could increase water demands locally, leading to increased water stress if the intensification is mismanaged. Scenarios where zero human-edible concentrate feed is used for livestock, freshwater use reduces by 21%.				↑	[+1]	□□	○○	★★	[0]	No direct interaction					
		Mekonnen et al. (2013); Kong et al. (2016); Ran et al. (2016); Schader et al. (2015)						Thornton (2010); Herrero et al. (2013); Herrero and Thornton (2013); Schader et al. (2015)					Herrero, M., et al. (2013), Schader, C., et al. (2015)			

<p>Forest</p> <p>Reduced deforestation, REDD+</p>	<p>Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6) ★★</p> <p>Forest management alters the hydrological cycle which could be positive or negative from a water perspective and is dependent on existing conditions. Conservation of ecosystem services—indirectly could help countries maintain watershed integrity. Forests provide sustainable and regulated provision and helps in water purification.</p> <p>Bonsch et al. (2016); Griffiths et al. (2016); Gao et al (2017); Zomer et al. (2008); Kibria (2015); Katila et al. (2017)</p>	<p>Ensure Sustainable consumption(12.3) ★</p> <p>Reduce the human pressure on forests, including actions to address drivers of deforestation.</p> <p>Lima et al. (2017)</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>Conservation of Biodiversity, sustainability of terrestrial ecosystems ★★★</p> <p>Policies and programs for reducing deforestation and forest degradation, for rehabilitation and restoration of degraded lands can promote conservation of biological diversity. Reduce the human pressure on forests, including actions to address drivers of deforestation. Efforts by the Government of Zambia to reduce emissions by REDD+, have contributed erosion control, ecotourism and pollution valued at 2.5% of the country's GDP.</p> <p>IPCC WGIII (2014); Lima et al. (2015); Miles and Kapos (2008); Katila et al. (2017); Turpie, Warr and Ingram (2015); Epstein and Theuer (2017)</p>
<p>Afforestation and reforestation</p>	<p>Enhance water quality (6.3) ★★★</p> <p>Similar to REDD+, forest management alters the hydrological cycle which could be positive or negative from a water perspective and is dependent on existing conditions. Forest landscape restoration can have a large impact water cycles. Strategic placement of tree belts in lands affected by dryland salinity can remediate the affected lands by modifying landscape water balances. Watershed scale reforestation can result in the restoration of water quality. Fast-growing species can increase nutrient input and water inputs that can cause ecological damage and alter local hydrological patterns. Reforestation of mixed native species and in carefully chosen sites could increase biodiversity and restore waterways, reducing run-off and erosion (Dooley and Kartha, 2018).</p> <p>Kibria, G. (2015), Zomer et al. (2008); Lamb et al. (2016); Bustamante et al. (2014); Dooley and Kartha (2018)</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>Marine Economies (14.7) / Marine Protection and income generation ★</p> <p>Mangroves would help to enhance fisheries, tourism business.</p> <p>Kibria, G. (2015)</p>	<p>Conservation of Biodiversity and restoration of land (15.1/ 15.5/15.9) ★★★</p> <p>Identified large amounts of land (749 Mha) globally as biophysically suitable and meeting the CDM-AR eligibility criteria (Zomer et al., 2008). Forest landscape restoration can conserve biodiversity and reduce land degradation. Mangroves reduce impacts of disasters (cyclones/storms/floods) acting as live seawalls, enhance forest resources /biodiversity. Forest loss goal can conserve/ restore 3.9 – 8.8 m ha / year average, 77.2 – 176.9 m ha in total and 7.7 – 17.7 m ha / year in 2030 of forest area by 2030 (Wolosin, 2014). Forest and biodiversity conservation, protected area formation, and forestry-based afforestation are practices enhance resilience of forest ecosystems to climate change (IPCC, 2014). Strategic placement of tree belts in lands affected by dryland salinity can remediate the affected lands by modifying landscape water balances and protect livestock. It can restore biologically diverse communities on previously developed farmland (Bustamante et al., 2014). Large-scale restoration is likely to benefit ecosystem service provision, including recreation biodiversity conservation and flood mitigation. Reforestation of mixed native species and in carefully chosen sites could increase biodiversity, reducing run-off and erosion (Dooley and Kartha, 2018).</p> <p>Zomer et al. (2008); Kibria (2015); Dooley and Kartha (2018); Wolosin (2014); IPCC, 2014; Epstein and Theuer (2017); Bustamante et al. (2014); Lamb et al. 2016</p>
<p>Behavioural response (responsible sourcing)</p>	<p>Water efficiency and pollution prevention (6.3/6.4/6.6) ★★</p> <p>Responsible sourcing will have co-benefits for water efficiency and pollution prevention if the sourcing strategies incorporate water metrics. There is a risk that shifting supply sources could lead to increased water use in another part of the economy. At local levels, Forest certification programmes and practicing sustainable forest management (SFM) provides freshwater supplies.</p> <p>van Oel et al. (2012); Launiainen et al. (2014); Hontelez (2016)</p>	<p>Ensure Sustainable Production patterns (12.3) ★</p> <p>At local levels, Forest certification programmes and practicing sustainable forest management (SFM) provides the provision of raw materials for a 'low ecological footprint' economy.</p> <p>Hontelez J. (2016)</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>Sustainability and Conservation (15.1/15.2/15.3) ★</p> <p>At the macro level, forest certification has done little to stem the tide of forest degradation, conversion of forest land to agriculture, and illegal logging—all of which remain serious threats to Indonesian forests (Bartley, 2010). At local levels, forest certification programmes and practicing sustainable forest management (SFM) helps in biodiversity protection.</p> <p>Bartley, T. (2010); Hontelez J. (2016)</p>
<p>Oceans</p> <p>Ocean iron fertilization</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>Nutrient Pollution, Ocean Acidification, Fish Stocks, MPAs, SISD ★</p> <p>OIF could exacerbate or reduce nutrient pollution, increase the likelihood of mid-water deoxygenation, increases ocean acidification, might contribute to the rebuilding of fish stocks in producing plankton, generating therefore benefits for SISD, but might be in conflict with designing MPAs.</p> <p>Gnanadesikan et al. (2003); Jin and Gruber (2003); Denman (2008); Smetacek and Naqvi (2008); Lampitt et al. (2008); Oschlies et al. (2010); Güssow et al. (2010); Trick et al. (2010); Williamson et al. (2012)</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>
<p>Blue carbon</p>	<p>Integrated water resources management (6.3/6.5) ★</p> <p>Development of blue carbon resources (coastal and marine vegetated ecosystems) can lead to coordinated management of water in coastal areas.</p> <p>Vierros et al. (2013)</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>Ocean Acidification, Nutrient Pollution (14.3, 14.1) ★★★</p> <p>Mangroves could buffer acidification in their immediate vicinity, Seaweeds have not been able to mitigate the effect on ocean foraminifera</p> <p>Sippo et al. (2016); Pettit et al. (2015)</p>	<p>conservation of Biodiversity and restoration of land (15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.4, 15.9) ★★★</p> <p>average difference of 31 mm per year in elevation rates between areas with seagrass and unvegetated areas (case study areas Scotland, Kenya, Tanzania and Saudi Arabia); Mangroves fostering sediment accretion of about 5mm a year)</p> <p>Potouroglou et al (2017); Alongi (2012)</p>
<p>Enhanced Weathering</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>[0]</p> <p>No direct interaction</p>	<p>Ocean Acidification, Nutrient Pollution (14.3, 14.1) ★★★</p> <p>Enhanced weathering (either by spreading lime or quicklime (in combination with CCS) over the ocean or olivine at beaches or the catchment area of rivers) opposes ocean acidification. "End-of-century ocean acidification is reversed under RCP4.5 and reduced by about two-thirds under RCP8.5; additionally, surface ocean aragonite saturation state, a key control on coral calcification rates, is maintained above 3.5 throughout the low latitudes, thereby helping maintain the viability of tropical coral reef ecosystems (Tick et al. 2010)" However, also marine biology would be affected, in particular if spreading olivine is used which actually works rather like ocean (iron) fertilization.</p> <p>Köhler et al. (2010); Hartmann et al. (2013); Köhler et al. (2013); Paquay und Zeebe (2013); Taylor et al. (2015); Smith et al. (2015)</p>	<p>Protect inland freshwater systems (14.1) ★</p> <p>Olivine can contain toxic metals such as nickel which could accumulate in the environment or disrupt the local ecosystem by changing the pH of the water (in case of spreading in the catchment area of rivers).</p> <p>Hartmann et al. (2013)</p>

<p>Behavioural response</p>	<p>Energy savings (7.3, 7a, 7b) [+2] **</p> <p>Behavioural response will reduce the volume of transport needs and, by extension, energy demand.</p> <p>Ahmad S., Puppim de Oliveira J.A., 2016; Figueroa M.J., Ribeiro S.K., 2013</p>	<p>Promote Sustained, inclusive economic growth (8.3) [-2] **</p> <p>Policy contradictions (e.g. standards, efficient technologies leading to increased electricity prices leading the poor to switch away from clean(er) fuels); unintended outcomes (e.g. redistribution of income generated by carbon taxes) results in contradiction to the primary aims of (productive) job creation and poverty alleviation, and in trade-offs between mitigation adaptation and development policies. Detailed assessment of consequences of mitigation policies requires developing methods and reliable evidence to enable policymakers to more systematically identify how different social groups may be affected by the different available policy options.</p> <p>(Klausbruckner, Annegarn, Henneman, & Rafaj, 2016); (Lucas & Pangbourne, 2014);(Suckall, Tompkins, & Stringer, 2014)</p>	<p>Build Resilient Infrastructure (9.1) [+2,-2] **</p> <p>As people prefer more mass transportation, integrating train lines, a tram line, BRTs, gondola lift systems, a bicycle-sharing systems and hybrid buses and telecommuting need for new infrastructure increases</p> <p>Dulac (2013); Aamaas and Peters (2017); Martínez-Jaramillo et al. (2017); Xylia et al. (2017)</p>	<p>Make cities & Human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient (11.2) [+2] **</p> <p>Climate change threatens to worsen poverty, therefore pro-poor mitigation policies are needed to reduce this threat; for example investing more and better in infrastructure by leveraging private resources and using designs that account for future climate change and the related uncertainty</p> <p>Hallegate et al. (2015); Ahmad and Puppim de Oliveira (2016)</p>
<p>Accelerating energy efficiency improvement</p>	<p>Energy savings (7.3, 7a, 7b) [+2] **</p> <p>Accelerating efficiency in tourism transport reduces energy demand (china)</p> <p>Shukxin et al (2016)</p>	<p>Promote Sustained, inclusive economic growth (8.3) [+2,-2] **</p> <p>Significant opportunities to slow travel growth and improve efficiency exist and, similarly, alternatives to petroleum exist but have different characteristics in terms of availability, cost, distribution, infrastructure, storage, and public acceptability. Production of new technologies, fuels and infrastructure can favour economic growth, however, efficient financing of increased capital spending and infrastructure is critical.</p> <p>Gouldson et al. (2015); Karkatsoulset al. (2016)</p>	<p>Build Resilient Infrastructure (9.1) [+2,-2] **</p> <p>Combining promotion of mass transportation, integrating train lines, a tram line, BRTs, gondola lift systems, a bicycle-sharing systems and hybrid buses and telecommuting, reduce traffic and significantly contribute to meet climate targets a comprehensive package of complementary mitigation options is necessary for deep and sustained emission reductions. In sweden public bus fleet is aiming more towards decarbonisation compared to efficiency</p> <p>Dulac (2013); Aamaas and Peters (2017); Martínez-Jaramillo et al. (2017); Xylia et al. (2017)</p>	<p>Make cities sustainable (11.2,11.3) [+2] **</p> <p>Two most important elements of making cities sustainable are efficient building and transport (case of Macau).</p> <p>Song et al. (2016)</p>
<p>Improved access & fuel switch to modern low-carbon energy</p>	<p>Increase share of renewable (7.2) [+2] **</p> <p>Biofuel increase share of renewables but can perform poorly if too many countries increase their use of biofuel, whereas electrification performs best when many other countries implement this technology. The strategies are not mutually exclusive and simultaneous implementation of some provides synergies for national energy security. Therefore, important to consider result of material and contextual factors that co-evolve. Electric vehicles using electricity from renewables or low carbon sources combined with e-mobility options such as trolleybuses, metros, trams and electro buses, as well as promote walking and biking, especially for short distances need consideration</p> <p>Månsson (2016); Ajanovic (2015); Wolfram et al. (2017); Alahakoon (2017)</p>	<p>Promote Sustained, inclusive economic growth (8.3) [+2,-2] **</p> <p>the decarbonisation of the freight sector tends to occur in the second part of the century and that the sector decarbonises by a lower extent than the rest of the economy. Decarbonising road freight on a global scale remains a challenge even when notable progress in biofuels and electric vehicles has been accounted for.</p> <p>Carrara and Longden (2016); Creutzig et al. (2015); IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014)</p>	<p>Help building inclusive infrastructure (9.1, 9.a) [+2] **</p> <p>Lack of appropriate infrastructure lead to limited access to job for urban poor (africa, Latin America, India)</p> <p>Gouldson et al. (2015); Figueroa, Fulton and Tiwari (2013); Vasconcellos and Mendonça (2016); Lall et al. (2017)</p>	<p>Make cities & Human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient (11.2) [+2] **</p> <p>in rapidly growing cities, the carbon savings from investments at scale, in cost-effective low-carbon measures could be quickly overwhelmed – in as little as 7 years – by the impacts of sustained population and economic growth, highlighting the need to build capacities that enable the exploitation not only of the economically attractive options in the short term but also of those deeper and more structural changes that are likely to be needed in the longer term. With hybrid electric vehicles, plug-in electric vehicles there is emerging new concepts in transportation such as electric highways</p> <p>Gouldson et al. (2015); Figueroa, Fulton and Tiwari (2013); Vasconcellos and Mendonça (2016); Alahakoon (2017)</p>

		 7 AFFORDABLE AND CLEAN ENERGY				 8 DECENT WORK AND ECONOMIC GROWTH				 9 INDUSTRY, INNOVATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE				 11 SUSTAINABLE CITIES AND COMMUNITIES								
		INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	
Replacing coal	Non-biomass renewables solar, wind, hydro		[+3]			★★★★		[0]			★★		[0,-1]			★★		[+2]			★★★	
		Decarbonization of the energy system through an up-scaling of renewables will greatly facilitate access to clean, affordable and reliable energy. Hydropower plays an increasingly important role for the global electricity supply. This mitigation option is in line with the targets of SDG7 under the caveat of a transition to modern biomass.					Decarbonization of the energy system through an up-scaling of renewables and energy efficiency is consistent with sustained economic growth and resource decoupling. Long-term scenarios point towards slight consumption losses caused by a rapid and pervasive expansion of such energy solutions. Whether sustainable growth, as an overarching concept, is attainable or not is more disputed in the literature. Existing literature is also undecided as to whether or not access to modern energy services causes economic growth (McCollum et al., 2018).					A rapid up-scaling of renewable energies could necessitate the early retirement of fossil energy infrastructure (e.g., power plants, refineries, pipelines) on a large-scale. The implications of this could in some cases be negative, unless targeted policies can help alleviate the burden on industry (McCollum et al., 2018).					Deployment of renewable energy and improvements in energy efficiency globally will aid climate change mitigation efforts, and this, in turn, can help to reduce the exposure of people to certain types of disasters and extreme events (McCollum et al., 2018).					
		Cherian (2015); Rogelj (2013); Cherian (2015); Jingura and Kamusoko (2016)					McCollum et al. (2018); Bonan et al. (2014); Clarke et al. (2014); Jackson and Senker (2011); New Climate Economy (2014); OECD (2017); York and McGee (2017)					McCollum et al. (2018); Bertram et al. (2015); Fankhauser et al. (2008); Guivarch et al. (2011); Johnson et al. (2015)					McCollum et al. (2018); Daut et al. (2013); Hallegatte et al. (2016); IPCC (2014); Riahi et al. (2012); Tully (2006)					
Increased use of biomass			[+3]			★★★★		[+1]			*		[+1]			★★		[0]	No direct interaction			
		Increased use of modern biomass will facilitate access to clean, affordable and reliable energy. This mitigation option is in line with the targets of SDG7.					Decarbonization of the energy system through an up-scaling of renewables will greatly facilitate access to clean, affordable and reliable energy.					Access to modern and sustainable energy will be critical to sustain economic growth.										
		Cherian A. (2015); Jingura R.M., Kamusoko R. (2016); Rogelj (2013)					Jingura R.M., Kamusoko R. (2016)					Jingura and Kamusoko (2016); Shahbazet al. (2016)										
Nuclear/Advanced Nuclear			[1]			★★		[1]			★★		[1]			★★★		[0]	No direct interaction			
		Increased use of nuclear power can provide stable baseload power supply and reduce price volatility.					Local employment impact and reduced price volatility					Legacy cost of waste and abandoned reactors										
		IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014)					IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014)					IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014); Marra and Palmer (2011); Greenberg, (2013a); Schwenk-Ferrero (2013a); Skipperud et al. (2013); Tyler et al. (2013a)										
CCS: Bio energy			[+2]			★★★★		[+1]			*		[+1]			*		[0]	No direct interaction			
		Increased use of modern biomass will facilitate access to clean, affordable and reliable energy.					See positive impacts of bio-energy use.					See positive impacts of bio-energy use and CCS/CCU in industrial demand.										
		IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014)																				
Advanced coal	CCS: Fossil		[+2]			★★★★		[1]			★★★		[+1]			*		[0]	No direct interaction			
		Advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology is in line with the targets of SDG7.					Lock-in of human and physical capital in the fossil-resources industry					See positive impacts of CCS/CCU in industrial demand.										
		IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014)					IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014); Vergragt et al. (2011); Markusson et al. (2012); IPCC (2005); Benson et al. (2005); Fankhauser et al. (2008); Shackley and Thompson (2012); Johnson et al. (2015); Bertram et al. (2015)															

		10 AFFORDABLE AND CLEAN ENERGY				8 RESILIENT ECONOMIC GROWTH				9 INDUSTRY, INNOVATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE				11 CLIMATE ACTION										
		INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE	INTERACTION	SCORE	EVIDENCE	AGREEMENT	CONFIDENCE								
Agriculture & Livestock	Behavioural response: Sustainable healthy diets and reduced food waste	↑	[+1]	Energy Efficiency, universal access (7.1,7.3)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	★	↑	[+1]	Sustained and inclusive economic growth (8.2)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	★★★	↑	[+1]	Infrastructure building and promotion of inclusive industrialization (9.1/ 9.2)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	★★★	[0]	No interaction	
	Land based greenhouse gas reduction and soil carbon sequestration	↑	[+1]	Sustainable and modern energy (7.b)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	★★★	↑ / ↓	[+2,-1]	Sustainable Growth (8.2)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	★★	↑ / ↓	[+2,-2]	Infrastructure building, promotion of inclusive industrialization and innovation (9.1/ 9.2)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	★★★	[0]	no direct interaction	
	Greenhouse gas reduction from improved livestock production and manure management systems	↑	[+1]	Energy Efficiency (7.3)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	↑	[+1]	Sustainable Economic Growth (8.4)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	↑	[+2]	Technological upgradation and Innovation (9.2)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	★★★	[0]
Forest	Reduced deforestation, REDD+	↑ / ↓	[+1,-1]	Energy Efficiency (7.3)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	★	↑	[+1]	Sustainable Economic Growth (8.4)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	★	↑ / ↓	[+1,-1]	Infrastructure building ,promotion of inclusive industrialization (9.1/ 9.2/9.5)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	★	[0]	No direct interaction	
	Afforestation and reforestation	↑	[+1]	Energy Conservation (7.3/7.b)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	★	↑	[+2]	Decent job creation and Sustainable economic growth (8.3/8.4)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	★★	[0]								[0]	No direct interaction
	Behavioural response (responsible sourcing)	↑	[+1]	Universal access (7.3)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	★	↑	[+2]	Decent job creation and Sustainable economic growth (8.3/8.4)	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	★	↑	[+2]	Technological upgradation and Innovation,promotion of inclusive industrialization	Ⓜ	Ⓢ	Ⓢ	★	↑	[+2]	Improving air quality, green and public spaces (11.6,11.7, 11a, 11b)
Oceans	Ocean iron fertilization	[0]	No direct interaction					[0]	No direct interaction					[0]	No direct interaction							[0]	No direct interaction	
	Blue carbon	[0]	No direct interaction					[0]	No direct interaction					[0]	No direct interaction							[0]	No direct interaction	
	Enhanced Weathering	[0]	No direct interaction					[0]	No direct interaction					[0]	No direct interaction							[0]	No direct interaction	

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Glossary

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Notes: TSU compiled version. Note that subterms are in italics beneath main terms.

1.5°C-consistent emissions pathways

See Pathways.

1.5°C warmer worlds

Projected worlds in which global warming has reached and, unless otherwise indicated, been limited to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. There is no single 1.5°C warmer world and projections of 1.5°C warmer worlds look different depending on whether it is considered on a near-term transient trajectory or at climate equilibrium after several millennia, and, in both cases, if it occurs with or without overshoot. Within the 21st century, several aspects play a role for the assessment of risk and potential impacts in 1.5°C warmer worlds: the possible occurrence, magnitude and duration of an overshoot, the way in which emissions reductions are achieved, the ways in which policies might be able to influence the resilience of human and natural systems, and the nature of the regional and sub-regional risks. Beyond the 21st century, several elements of the climate system would continue to change even if the global mean temperatures remain stable, including further increases of sea level.

2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

A UN resolution in September 2015 adopting a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity in a new global development framework anchored in 17 Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2015).

See also Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Acceptability of policy or system change

The extent to which a policy or system change is evaluated unfavourably or favourably, or rejected or supported, by members of the general public (public acceptability) or politicians or governments (political acceptability). Acceptability may vary from totally unacceptable/fully rejected to totally acceptable/fully supported; individuals may differ in how acceptable policies or system changes are believed to be.

Adaptability

See Adaptive capacity.

Adaptation

In human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, the process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects; human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects.

Incremental adaptation

Adaptation that maintains the essence and integrity of a system or process at a given scale. [Footnote: This definition builds from the definition used in Park et al. (2012).]

Transformational adaptation

Adaptation that changes the fundamental attributes of a socio-ecological system in anticipation of climate change and its impacts.

Adaptation limits

The point at which an actor's objectives (or system needs) cannot be secured from intolerable risks through adaptive actions.

Hard adaptation limit - No adaptive actions are possible to avoid intolerable risks.

Soft adaptation limit - Options are currently not available to avoid intolerable risks through adaptive action.

See also Adaptation options, Adaptive capacity, and Maladaptive actions (Maladaptation).

Adaptation behaviour

See Human behaviour.

Adaptation limits

See Adaptation.

Adaptation options

The array of strategies and measures that are available and appropriate for addressing adaptation. They include a wide range of actions that can be categorized as structural, institutional, ecological or behavioural.

See also Adaptation, Adaptive capacity, and Maladaptive actions (Maladaptation).

Adaptation pathways

See Pathways.

Adaptive capacity

The ability of systems, institutions, humans and other organisms to adjust to potential damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to respond to consequences. [Footnote: This glossary entry builds from definitions used in previous IPCC reports and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005).]

See also Adaptation, Adaptation options, and Maladaptive actions (Maladaptation).

Adaptive governance

See Governance.

Aerosol

A suspension of airborne solid or liquid particles, with a typical size between a few nanometres and 10 µm that reside in the atmosphere for at least several hours. The term aerosol, which includes both the particles and the suspending gas, is often used in this report in its plural form to mean aerosol particles. Aerosols may be of either natural or anthropogenic origin. Aerosols may influence climate in several ways: through both interactions that scatter and/or absorb radiation and through interactions with cloud microphysics and other cloud properties, or upon deposition on snow or ice covered surfaces thereby altering their albedo and contributing to climate feedback. Atmospheric aerosols, whether natural or anthropogenic, originate from two different pathways: emissions of primary particulate matter (PM), and formation of secondary PM from gaseous precursors. The bulk of aerosols are of natural origin. Some scientists use group labels that refer to the chemical composition, namely: sea salt, organic carbon, black carbon (BC), mineral species (mainly desert dust), sulphate,

nitrate, and ammonium. These labels are, however, imperfect as aerosols combine particles to create complex mixtures.

See also Short-lived climate forcers (SLCF), and Black carbon (BC).

Afforestation

Planting of new forests on lands that historically have not contained forests. [Footnote: For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as afforestation, reforestation and deforestation, see the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000), information provided by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2013) and the report on Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human-induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types (IPCC, 2003).]

See also Reforestation, Deforestation, and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+).

Agreement

In this report, the degree of agreement within the scientific body of knowledge on a particular finding is assessed based on multiple lines of evidence (e.g., mechanistic understanding, theory, data, models, expert judgement) and expressed qualitatively (Mastrandrea et al., 2010).

See also Evidence, Confidence, Likelihood, and Uncertainty.

Air pollution

Degradation of air quality with negative effects on human health, the natural or built environment, due to the introduction by natural processes or human activity in the atmosphere of substances (gases, aerosols) which have a direct (primary pollutants) or indirect (secondary pollutants) harmful effect.

See also Aerosol, and Short-lived climate forcers (SLCF).

Albedo

The fraction of solar radiation reflected by a surface or object, often expressed as a percentage. Snow-covered surfaces have a high albedo, the surface albedo of soils ranges from high to low, and vegetation-covered surfaces and the oceans have a low albedo. The Earth's planetary albedo changes mainly through varying cloudiness, snow, ice, leaf area and land cover changes.

Ambient persuasive technology

Technological systems and environments that are designed to change human cognitive processing, attitudes and behaviours without the need for the user's conscious attention.

Anomaly

The deviation of a variable from its value averaged over a reference period.

See also Reference period.

Anthropocene

The 'Anthropocene' is a proposed new geological epoch resulting from significant human-driven changes to the structure and functioning of the Earth System, including the climate system. Originally proposed in the Earth System science community in 2000, the proposed new epoch is undergoing a formalization process within the geological community based on the stratigraphic evidence that human activities have changed the Earth System to the extent of forming geological deposits with a signature that is distinct from those of the Holocene, and which will remain in the geological record. Both the stratigraphic and Earth System approaches to defining the Anthropocene consider the mid-20th Century to be the most appropriate starting date, although others have been proposed and continue to be discussed. The Anthropocene concept has been taken up by a diversity of disciplines and the public to denote the substantive influence humans have had on the state, dynamics and future of the Earth System.

See also Holocene.

Anthropogenic

Resulting from or produced by human activities.

See also Anthropogenic emissions, and Anthropogenic removals.

Anthropogenic emissions

Emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), precursors of GHGs and aerosols caused by human activities. These activities include the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, land use and land use changes (LULUC), livestock production, fertilisation, waste management, and industrial processes.

See also Anthropogenic, and Anthropogenic removals.

Anthropogenic removals

Anthropogenic removals refer to the withdrawal of GHGs from the atmosphere as a result of deliberate human activities. These include enhancing biological sinks of CO₂ and using chemical engineering to achieve long term removal and storage. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) from industrial and energy-related sources, which alone does not remove CO₂ in the atmosphere, can reduce atmospheric CO₂ if it is combined with bioenergy production (BECCS).

See also Anthropogenic emissions, Bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS), and Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS).

Artificial intelligence (AI)

Computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence, such as visual perception and speech recognition.

Atmosphere

The gaseous envelope surrounding the earth, divided into five layers — the troposphere which contains half of the earth's atmosphere, the stratosphere, the mesosphere, the thermosphere, and the exosphere, which is the outer limit of the atmosphere. The dry atmosphere consists almost entirely of nitrogen (78.1% volume mixing ratio) and oxygen (20.9% volume mixing ratio), together with a number of trace gases, such as argon (0.93 % volume mixing ratio), helium and radiatively active greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as carbon dioxide (CO₂) (0.04% volume mixing ratio) and ozone (O₃). In addition, the atmosphere contains the GHG water vapour (H₂O), whose amounts are highly

variable but typically around 1% volume mixing ratio. The atmosphere also contains clouds and aerosols.

See also Troposphere, Stratosphere, Greenhouse gas (GHG), and Hydrological cycle.

Atmosphere-ocean general circulation model (AOGCM)

See Climate model.

Attribution

See Detection and attribution.

Baseline scenario

In much of the literature the term is also synonymous with the term business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, although the term BAU has fallen out of favour because the idea of business as usual in century-long socio-economic projections is hard to fathom. In the context of transformation pathways, the term baseline scenarios refers to scenarios that are based on the assumption that no mitigation policies or measures will be implemented beyond those that are already in force and/or are legislated or planned to be adopted. Baseline scenarios are not intended to be predictions of the future, but rather counterfactual constructions that can serve to highlight the level of emissions that would occur without further policy effort. Typically, baseline scenarios are then compared to mitigation scenarios that are constructed to meet different goals for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, atmospheric concentrations or temperature change. The term baseline scenario is often used interchangeably with reference scenario and no policy scenario.

See also Emission scenario, and Mitigation scenario.

Biochar

Stable, carbon-rich material produced by heating biomass in an oxygen-limited environment. Biochar may be added to soils to improve soil functions and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from biomass and soils, and for carbon sequestration. [Footnote: This definition builds from IBI (2018)]

Biodiversity

Biological diversity means the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems (UN, 1992).

Bioenergy

Energy derived from any form of biomass or its metabolic by-products.

See also Biomass and Biofuel.

Bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS)

Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) technology applied to a bioenergy facility. Note that depending on the total emissions of the BECCS supply chain, carbon dioxide can be removed from the atmosphere.

See also Bioenergy, and Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS).

Biofuel

A fuel, generally in liquid form, produced from biomass. Biofuels currently include bioethanol from sugarcane or maize, biodiesel from canola or soybeans, and black liquor from the paper-manufacturing process.

See also Biomass, and Bioenergy.

Biomass

Living or recently-dead organic material.

See also Bioenergy, and Biofuel.

Biophilic urbanism

Designing cities with green roofs, green walls and green balconies to bring nature into the densest parts of cities in order to provide green infrastructure and human health benefits.

See also Green infrastructure.

Black carbon (BC)

Operationally defined aerosol species based on measurement of light absorption and chemical reactivity and/or thermal stability. It is sometimes referred to as soot. BC is mostly formed by the incomplete combustion of fossil fuels, biofuels, and biomass but it also occurs naturally. It stays in the atmosphere only for days or weeks. It is the most strongly light-absorbing component of particulate matter (PM) and has a warming effect by absorbing heat into the atmosphere and reducing the albedo when deposited on snow or ice.

See also Aerosol.

Blue carbon

Blue carbon is the carbon captured by living organisms in coastal (e.g., mangroves, salt marshes, seagrasses) and marine ecosystems, and stored in biomass and sediments.

Burden sharing (also referred to as Effort sharing)

In the context of mitigation, burden sharing refers to sharing the effort of reducing the sources or enhancing the sinks of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from historical or projected levels, usually allocated by some criteria, as well as sharing the cost burden across countries.

Business as usual (BAU)

See Baseline scenario.

Carbon budget

This term refers to three concepts in the literature: (1) an assessment of carbon cycle sources and sinks on a global level, through the synthesis of evidence for fossil-fuel and cement emissions, land-use change emissions, ocean and land CO₂ sinks, and the resulting atmospheric CO₂ growth rate. This

is referred to as the global carbon budget; (2) the estimated cumulative amount of global carbon dioxide emissions that that is estimated to limit global surface temperature to a given level above a reference period, taking into account global surface temperature contributions of other GHGs and climate forcers; (3) the distribution of the carbon budget defined under (2) to the regional, national, or sub-national level based on considerations of equity, costs or efficiency.

See also Remaining carbon budget.

Carbon cycle

The term used to describe the flow of carbon (in various forms, e.g., as carbon dioxide (CO₂), carbon in biomass, and carbon dissolved in the ocean as carbonate and bicarbonate) through the atmosphere, hydrosphere, terrestrial and marine biosphere and lithosphere. In this report, the reference unit for the global carbon cycle is GtCO₂ or GtC (Gigatonne of carbon = 1 GtC = 10¹⁵ grams of carbon. This corresponds to 3.667 GtCO₂).

Carbon dioxide (CO₂)

A naturally occurring gas, CO₂ is also a by-product of burning fossil fuels (such as oil, gas and coal), of burning biomass, of land use changes (LUC) and of industrial processes (e.g., cement production). It is the principal anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) that affects the Earth's radiative balance. It is the reference gas against which other GHGs are measured and therefore has a Global Warming Potential (GWP) of 1.

See also Greenhouse gas (GHG). See also Land use and land-use change. See also Global Warming Potential (GWP).

Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)

A process in which a relatively pure stream of carbon dioxide (CO₂) from industrial and energy-related sources is separated (captured), conditioned, compressed and transported to a storage location for long-term isolation from the atmosphere. Sometimes referred to as Carbon Capture and Storage. See also Carbon dioxide capture and utilisation (CCU), Bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS), and Sequestration.

Carbon dioxide capture and utilisation (CCU)

A process in which CO₂ is captured and then used to produce a new product. If the CO₂ is stored in a product for a climate-relevant time horizon, this is referred to as carbon dioxide capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS). Only then, and only combined with CO₂ recently removed from the atmosphere, can CCUS lead to carbon dioxide removal. CCU is sometimes referred to as Carbon dioxide capture and use.

See also Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS).

Carbon dioxide capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS)

See Carbon dioxide capture and utilisation (CCU).

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR)

Carbon Dioxide Removal methods refer to processes that remove CO₂ from the atmosphere by either increasing biological sinks of CO₂ or using chemical processes to directly bind CO₂. CDR is classified as a special type of mitigation.

See also Mitigation (of climate change), Greenhouse gas removal (GGR), Negative emissions, Sink.

Carbon intensity

The amount of emissions of carbon dioxide (CO₂) released per unit of another variable such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), output energy use or transport.

Carbon neutrality

Achieving net zero carbon dioxide emissions at a global scale through the balance of residual carbon dioxide emissions with the same amount of carbon dioxide removal.

See also Climate neutrality.

Carbon price

The price for avoided or released carbon dioxide (CO₂) or CO₂-equivalent emissions. This may refer to the rate of a carbon tax, or the price of emission permits. In many models that are used to assess the economic costs of mitigation, carbon prices are used as a proxy to represent the level of effort in mitigation policies.

Carbon sequestration

The process of storing carbon in a carbon pool.

See also Blue carbon, Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), Uptake, and Sink.

Carbon sink

See Sink.

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)

A mechanism defined under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol through which investors (governments or companies) from developed (Annex B) countries may finance greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction or removal projects in developing countries (Non-Annex B), and receive Certified Emission Reduction Units (CERs) for doing so. The CERs can be credited towards the commitments of the respective developed countries. The CDM is intended to facilitate the two objectives of promoting sustainable development (SD) in developing countries and of helping industrialized countries to reach their emissions commitments in a cost-effective way.

Climate

Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the average weather, or more rigorously, as the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period of time ranging from months to thousands or millions of years. The classical period for averaging these variables is 30 years, as defined by the World Meteorological Organization. The relevant quantities are most often surface variables such as temperature, precipitation and wind. Climate in a wider sense is the state, including a statistical description, of the climate system.

Climate-compatible development (CCD)

A form of development building on climate strategies that embrace development goals and development strategies that integrate climate risk management, adaptation and mitigation. Source: (Mitchell and Maxwell, 2010)

Climate change

Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings such as modulations of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions and persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use. Note that the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in its Article 1, defines climate change as: 'a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods'. The UNFCCC thus makes a distinction between climate change attributable to human activities altering the atmospheric composition and climate variability attributable to natural causes.

See also Climate variability, Global warming, Ocean acidification, and Detection and attribution.

Climate change commitment

Climate change commitment is defined as the unavoidable future climate change resulting from inertia in the geophysical and socio-economic systems. Different types of climate change commitment are discussed in the literature (see subterms). Climate change commitment is usually quantified in terms of the further change in temperature, but it includes other future changes, for example in the hydrological cycle, in extreme weather events, in extreme climate events, and in sea level.

Constant composition commitment

The constant composition commitment is the remaining climate change that would result if atmospheric composition and hence radiative forcing were held fixed at a given value. It results from the thermal inertia of the ocean and slow processes in the cryosphere and land surface.

Zero emissions commitment

The zero emissions commitment is the climate change commitment that would result from setting anthropogenic emissions to zero. It is determined by both inertia in physical climate system components (ocean, cryosphere, land surface) and carbon cycle inertia.

Constant emissions commitment

The constant emissions commitment is the committed climate change that would result from keeping anthropogenic emissions constant.

Feasible scenario commitment

The feasible scenario commitment is the climate change that corresponds to the lowest emission scenario judged feasible.

Infrastructure commitment

The infrastructure commitment is the climate change that would result if existing greenhouse gas and aerosol emitting infrastructure were used until the end of its expected lifetime.

Climate extreme (extreme weather or climate event)

The occurrence of a value of a weather or climate variable above (or below) a threshold value near the upper (or lower) ends of the range of observed values of the variable. For simplicity, both extreme weather events and extreme climate events are referred to collectively as ‘climate extremes.’

See also Extreme weather event.

Climate feedback

An interaction in which a perturbation in one climate quantity causes a change in a second and the change in the second quantity ultimately leads to an additional change in the first. A negative feedback is one in which the initial perturbation is weakened by the changes it causes; a positive feedback is one in which the initial perturbation is enhanced. The initial perturbation can either be externally forced or arise as part of internal variability.

Climate governance

See Governance.

Climate justice

See Justice.

Climate model

A numerical representation of the climate system based on the physical, chemical and biological properties of its components, their interactions and feedback processes and accounting for some of its known properties. The climate system can be represented by models of varying complexity; that is, for any one component or combination of components a spectrum or hierarchy of models can be identified, differing in such aspects as the number of spatial dimensions, the extent to which physical, chemical or biological processes are explicitly represented, or the level at which empirical parametrizations are involved. There is an evolution towards more complex models with interactive chemistry and biology. Climate models are applied as a research tool to study and simulate the climate and for operational purposes, including monthly, seasonal and interannual climate predictions.

See also Earth system model (ESM).

Climate neutrality

Concept of a state in which human activities result in no net effect on the climate system. Achieving such a state would require balancing of residual emissions with emission (carbon dioxide) removal as well as accounting for regional or local biogeophysical effects of human activities that, for example, affect surface albedo or local climate.

See also Carbon neutrality.

Climate projection

A climate projection is the simulated response of the climate system to a scenario of future emission or concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and aerosols, generally derived using climate models. Climate projections are distinguished from climate predictions by their dependence on the emission/concentration/radiative forcing scenario used, which is in turn based on assumptions concerning, for example, future socioeconomic and technological developments that may or may not be realized.

Climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs)

Trajectories that strengthen sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities while promoting fair and cross-scalar adaptation to and resilience in a changing climate. They raise the ethics, equity, and feasibility aspects of the deep societal transformation needed to drastically reduce emissions to limit global warming (e.g., to 1.5°C) and achieve desirable and liveable futures and well-being for all.

Climate-resilient pathways

Iterative processes for managing change within complex systems in order to reduce disruptions and enhance opportunities associated with climate change.

See also Pathways, Climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs), Development pathways, and Transformation pathways.

Climate services

Climate services refers to information and products that enhance users' knowledge and understanding about the impacts of climate change and/or climate variability so as to aid decision-making of individuals and organizations and enable preparedness and early climate change action. Products can include climate data products.

Climate sensitivity

Climate sensitivity refers to the change in the annual global mean surface temperature in response to a change in the atmospheric CO₂ concentration or other radiative forcing.

Equilibrium climate sensitivity

Refers to the equilibrium (steady state) change in the annual global mean surface temperature following a doubling of the atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO₂) concentration. As a true equilibrium is challenging to define in climate models with dynamic oceans, the equilibrium climate sensitivity is often estimated through experiments in AOGCMs where CO₂ levels are either quadrupled or doubled from pre-industrial levels and which are integrated for 100-200 years. The climate sensitivity parameter (units: °C (W m⁻²)⁻¹) refers to the equilibrium change in the annual global mean surface temperature following a unit change in radiative forcing.

Effective climate sensitivity

An estimate of the global mean surface temperature response to a doubling of the atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO₂) concentration that is evaluated from model output or observations for evolving non-equilibrium conditions. It is a measure of the strengths of the climate feedbacks at a particular time and may vary with forcing history and climate state, and therefore may differ from equilibrium climate sensitivity.

Transient climate response

The change in the global mean surface temperature, averaged over a 20-year period, centered at the time of atmospheric CO₂ doubling, in a climate model simulation in which CO₂ increases at 1% yr⁻¹

from pre-industrial. It is a measure of the strength of climate feedbacks and the timescale of ocean heat uptake.

Climate-smart agriculture (CSA)

Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) is an approach that helps to guide actions needed to transform and reorient agricultural systems to effectively support development and ensure food security in a changing climate. CSA aims to tackle three main objectives: sustainably increasing agricultural productivity and incomes; adapting and building resilience to climate change; and reducing and/or removing greenhouse gas emissions, where possible (source: FAO).

Climate system

The climate system is the highly complex system consisting of five major components: the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the cryosphere, the lithosphere and the biosphere and the interactions between them. The climate system evolves in time under the influence of its own internal dynamics and because of external forcings such as volcanic eruptions, solar variations and anthropogenic forcings such as the changing composition of the atmosphere and land-use change.

Climate target

Climate target refers to a temperature limit, concentration level, or emissions reduction goal used towards the aim of avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. For example, national climate targets may aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by a certain amount over a given time horizon, for example those under the Kyoto Protocol.

Climate variability

Climate variability refers to variations in the mean state and other statistics (such as standard deviations, the occurrence of extremes, etc.) of the climate on all spatial and temporal scales beyond that of individual weather events. Variability may be due to natural internal processes within the climate system (internal variability), or to variations in natural or anthropogenic external forcing (external variability).

See also Climate change.

Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC)

Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) is a key principle in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that recognises the different capabilities and differing responsibilities of individual countries in tackling climate change. The principle of CBDR-RC is embedded in the 1992 UNFCCC treaty, The convention states: "... the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions." Since then the CBDR-RC principle has guided the UN climate negotiations.

CO₂ equivalent (CO₂-eq) emission

The amount of carbon dioxide (CO₂) emission that would cause the same integrated radiative forcing or temperature change, over a given time horizon, as an emitted amount of a greenhouse gas (GHG) or a mixture of GHGs. There are a number of ways to compute such equivalent emissions and choose

appropriate time horizons. Most typically, the CO₂-equivalent emission is obtained by multiplying the emission of a GHG by its Global Warming Potential (GWP) for a 100 year time horizon. For a mix of GHGs it is obtained by summing the CO₂-equivalent emissions of each gas. CO₂-equivalent emission is a common scale for comparing emissions of different GHGs but does not imply equivalence of the corresponding climate change responses. There is generally no connection between CO₂-equivalent emissions and resulting CO₂-equivalent concentrations.

Conference of the Parties (COP)

The supreme body of UN conventions, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), comprising parties with a right to vote that have ratified or acceded to the convention.

See also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Confidence

The robustness of a finding based on the type, amount, quality and consistency of evidence (e.g., mechanistic understanding, theory, data, models, expert judgment) and on the degree of agreement across multiple lines of evidence. In this report, confidence is expressed qualitatively (Mastrandrea et al., 2010). See Section 1.6 for the list of confidence levels used.

See also Agreement, Evidence, Likelihood, and Uncertainty.

Co-benefits

The positive effects that a policy or measure aimed at one objective might have on other objectives, thereby increasing the total benefits for society or the environment. Co-benefits are often subject to uncertainty and depend on local circumstances and implementation practices, among other factors. Co-benefits are also referred to as ancillary benefits.

Conservation agriculture

A coherent group of agronomic and soil management practices that reduce the disruption of soil structure and biota.

Constant composition commitment

See Climate change commitment.

Constant emissions commitment

See Climate change commitment.

Coping capacity

The ability of people, institutions, organizations, and systems, using available skills, values, beliefs, resources, and opportunities, to address, manage, and overcome adverse conditions in the short to medium term. [Footnote: This glossary entry builds from the definition used in UNISDR (2009) and IPCC (2012a).]

See also Resilience.

Cost-benefit analysis

Monetary assessment of all negative and positive impacts associated with a given action. Cost-benefit analysis enables comparison of different interventions, investments or strategies and reveal how a given investment or policy effort pays off for a particular person, company or country. Cost-benefit analyses representing society's point of view are important for climate change decision making, but there are difficulties in aggregating costs and benefits across different actors and across timescales.

See also Discounting.

Cost-effectiveness

A measure of the cost at which policy goal or outcome is achieved. The lower the cost the greater the cost-effectiveness.

See also Integrated models.

Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP)

The Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) is a climate modelling activity from the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP) which coordinates and archives climate model simulations based on shared model inputs by modelling groups from around the world. The CMIP3 multi-model data set includes projections using SRES scenarios. The CMIP5 data set includes projections using the Representative Concentration Pathways. The CMIP6 phase involves a suite of common model experiments as well as an ensemble of CMIP-endorsed model intercomparison projects (MIPs).

Cumulative emissions

The total amount of emissions released over a specified period of time.

See also Carbon budget, and Transient climate response to cumulative CO₂ emissions (TCRE).

Deforestation

Conversion of forest to non-forest. For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as afforestation, reforestation and deforestation, see the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000). [Footnote: See also information provided by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2013) and the report on Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human-induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types (IPCC, 2003).]

See also Afforestation, Reforestation, and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+).

Demand and supply-side measures*Demand-side measures*

Policies and programmes for influencing the demand for goods and/or services. In the energy sector, demand-side management aims at reducing the demand for electricity and other forms of energy required to deliver energy services.

Supply-side measures

Policies and programmes for influencing how a certain demand for goods and/or services is met. In the energy sector, for example, supply-side mitigation measures aim at reducing the amount of greenhouse gas emissions emitted per unit of energy produced.

See also Mitigation measures.

Demand-side measures

See Demand and supply-side measures.

Detection

See Detection and attribution.

Detection and attribution

Detection of change is defined as the process of demonstrating that climate or a system affected by climate has changed in some defined statistical sense, without providing a reason for that change. An identified change is detected in observations if its likelihood of occurrence by chance due to internal variability alone is determined to be small, for example, <10%. Attribution is defined as the process of evaluating the relative contributions of multiple causal factors to a change or event with a formal assessment of confidence.

Discounting

A mathematical operation that aims to make monetary (or other) amounts received or expended at different times (years) comparable across time. The discounter uses a fixed or possibly time-varying discount rate from year to year that makes future value worth less today (if the discount rate is positive). The choice of discount rate(s) is debated as it is a judgement based on hidden and/or explicit values.

Discount rate

See Discounting.

(Internal) Displacement

Internal displacement refers to the forced movement of people within the country they live in. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are "Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border." (UNCHR, 1998).

See also Migration.

Distributive equity

See Equity.

Distributive justice

See Justice.

Downscaling

Downscaling is a method that derives local- to regional-scale (up to 100 km) information from larger-scale models or data analyses. Two main methods exist: dynamical downscaling and empirical/statistical downscaling. The dynamical method uses the output of regional climate models, global models with variable spatial resolution, or high-resolution global models. The empirical/statistical methods [are based on observations and] develop statistical relationships that link the large-scale atmospheric variables with local/ regional climate variables. In all cases, the quality of the driving model remains an important limitation on quality of the downscaled information. The two methods can be combined, e.g., applying empirical/statistical downscaling to the output of a regional climate model, consisting of a dynamical downscaling of a global climate model."

Drought

A period of abnormally dry weather long enough to cause a serious hydrological imbalance. Drought is a relative term (see Box 3-3), therefore any discussion in terms of precipitation deficit must refer to the particular precipitation-related activity that is under discussion. For example, shortage of precipitation during the growing season impinges on crop production or ecosystem function in general (due to soil moisture drought, also termed agricultural drought), and during the runoff and percolation season primarily affects water supplies (hydrological drought). Storage changes in soil moisture and groundwater are also affected by increases in actual evapotranspiration in addition to reductions in precipitation. A period with an abnormal precipitation deficit is defined as a meteorological drought.

See also Soil moisture.

Megadrought

A megadrought is a very lengthy and pervasive drought, lasting much longer than normal, usually a decade or more.

Decarbonisation

The process by which countries, individuals or other entities aim to achieve zero fossil carbon existence. Typically refers to a reduction of the carbon emissions associated with electricity, industry and transport.

Decoupling

Decoupling (in relation to climate change) is where economic growth is no longer strongly associated with consumption of fossil fuels. Relative decoupling is where both grow but at different rates. Absolute decoupling is where economic growth happens but fossil fuels decline.

Deliberative governance

See Governance.

Development pathways

See Pathways.

Direct air carbon dioxide capture and storage (DACCS)

Chemical process by which CO₂ is captured directly from the ambient air, with subsequent storage. Also known as direct air capture and storage (DACS).

Disaster

Severe alterations in the normal functioning of a community or a society due to hazardous physical events interacting with vulnerable social conditions, leading to widespread adverse human, material, economic or environmental effects that require immediate emergency response to satisfy critical human needs and that may require external support for recovery.

See also Hazard.

Disaster risk management (DRM)

Processes for designing, implementing, and evaluating strategies, policies, and measures to improve the understanding of disaster risk, foster disaster risk reduction and transfer, and promote continuous improvement in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery practices, with the explicit purpose of increasing human security, well-being, quality of life, and sustainable development.

Disruptive innovation

Disruptive innovation is demand-led technological change that leads to significant system change and is characterized by strong exponential growth.

Double dividend

The extent to which revenues generated by policy instruments, such as carbon taxes or auctioned (tradeable) emission permits can (1) contribute to mitigation and (2) offset part of the potential welfare losses of climate policies through recycling the revenue in the economy by reducing other distortionary taxes.

Early warning systems (EWS)

The set of technical, financial and institutional capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organizations threatened by a hazard to prepare to act promptly and appropriately to reduce the possibility of harm or loss. Dependent upon context, EWS may draw upon scientific and/or Indigenous knowledge. EWS are also considered for ecological applications e.g., conservation, where the organisation itself is not threatened by hazard but the ecosystem under conservation is (an example is coral bleaching alerts), in agriculture (for example, warnings of ground frost, hailstorms) and in fisheries (storm and tsunami warnings). This glossary entry builds from the definitions used in UNISDR (2009) and IPCC (2012a).

Earth system feedbacks

See Climate feedback.

Earth system model (ESM)

A coupled atmosphere–ocean general circulation model in which a representation of the carbon cycle is included, allowing for interactive calculation of atmospheric CO₂ or compatible emissions. Additional components (e.g., atmospheric chemistry, ice sheets, dynamic vegetation, nitrogen cycle, but also urban or crop models) may be included.

See also Climate model.

Ecosystem

An ecosystem is a functional unit consisting of living organisms, their non-living environment and the interactions within and between them. The components included in a given ecosystem and its spatial boundaries depend on the purpose for which the ecosystem is defined: in some cases they are relatively sharp, while in others they are diffuse. Ecosystem boundaries can change over time. Ecosystems are nested within other ecosystems and their scale can range from very small to the entire biosphere. In the current era, most ecosystems either contain people as key organisms, or are influenced by the effects of human activities in their environment.

See also Ecosystem services.

Ecosystem services

Ecological processes or functions having monetary or non-monetary value to individuals or society at large. These are frequently classified as (1) supporting services such as productivity or biodiversity maintenance, (2) provisioning services such as food or fibre, (3) regulating services such as climate regulation or carbon sequestration, and (4) cultural services such as tourism or spiritual and aesthetic appreciation.

Effective climate sensitivity

See Climate sensitivity.

Effective radiative forcing

See Radiative forcing.

Electric vehicle (EV)

A vehicle whose propulsion is powered fully or mostly by electricity.

Battery electric vehicle (BEV)

A vehicle whose propulsion is entirely electric without any internal combustion engine.

Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV)

A vehicle whose propulsion is mostly electric with batteries re-charged from an electric source but extra power and distance are provided by a hybrid internal combustion engine.

El niño-southern oscillation (ENSO)

The term El Niño was initially used to describe a warm-water current that periodically flows along the coast of Ecuador and Peru, disrupting the local fishery. It has since become identified with warming of the tropical Pacific Ocean east of the dateline. This oceanic event is associated with a fluctuation of a global-scale tropical and subtropical surface pressure pattern called the Southern Oscillation. This coupled atmosphere–ocean phenomenon, with preferred time scales of two to about seven years, is known as the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO). It is often measured by the surface pressure anomaly difference between Tahiti and Darwin and/or the sea surface temperatures in the central and

eastern equatorial Pacific. During an ENSO event, the prevailing trade winds weaken, reducing upwelling and altering ocean currents such that the sea surface temperatures warm, further weakening the trade winds. This phenomenon has a great impact on the wind, sea surface temperature and precipitation patterns in the tropical Pacific. It has climatic effects throughout the Pacific region and in many other parts of the world, through global teleconnections. The cold phase of ENSO is called La Niña.

Emission scenario

A plausible representation of the future development of emissions of substances that are radiatively active (e.g., greenhouse gases (GHGs), aerosols) based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about driving forces (such as demographic and socio-economic development, technological change, energy and land use) and their key relationships. Concentration scenarios, derived from emission scenarios, are often used as input to a climate model to compute climate projections.

See also Baseline scenario, Mitigation scenario, Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) (under Pathways), Shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs) (under Pathways), Scenario, Socio-economic scenario, and Transformation pathway.

Emissions trading

A market-based instrument aiming at meeting a mitigation objective in an efficient way. A cap on GHG emissions is divided in tradeable emission permits that are allocated by a combination of auctioning and handing out free allowances to entities within the jurisdiction of the trading scheme. Entities need to surrender emission permits equal to the amount of their emissions (e.g., tonnes of CO₂). An entity may sell excess permits to entities that can avoid the same amount of emissions in a cheaper way. Trading schemes may occur at the intra-company, domestic, or international level (e.g., the flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol and the EU-EUTS) and may apply to carbon dioxide (CO₂), other greenhouse gases (GHGs), or other substances.

Emission trajectories

A projected development in time of the emission of a greenhouse gas (GHG) or group of GHGs, aerosols, and GHG precursors.

See also Pathways.

Enabling conditions

Conditions that affect the feasibility of adaptation and mitigation options, and can accelerate and scale-up systemic transitions that would limit temperature increase to 1.5°C and enhance capacities of systems and societies to adapt to the associated climate change, while achieving sustainable development, eradicating poverty and reducing inequalities. Enabling conditions include finance, technological innovation, strengthening policy instruments, institutional capacity, multi-level governance, and changes in human behaviour and lifestyles. They also include inclusive processes, attention to power asymmetries and unequal opportunities for development and reconsideration of values.

See also Feasibility.

Energy efficiency

The ratio of output or useful energy or energy services or other useful physical outputs obtained from a system, conversion process, transmission or storage activity to the input of energy (measured as kWh kWh⁻¹, tonnes kWh⁻¹ or any other physical measure of useful output like tonne-km transported). Energy efficiency is often described by energy intensity. In economics, energy intensity describes the ratio of economic output to energy input. Most commonly energy efficiency is measured as input energy over a physical or economic unit, i.e. kWh USD⁻¹ (energy intensity), kWh tonne⁻¹. For buildings, it is often measured as kWh m⁻², and for vehicles as km liter⁻¹ or liter km⁻¹. Very often in policy "energy efficiency" is intended as the measures to reduce energy demand through technological options such as insulating buildings, more efficient appliances, efficient lighting, efficient vehicles, etc.

Energy security

The goal of a given country, or the global community as a whole, to maintain an adequate, stable and predictable energy supply. Measures encompass safeguarding the sufficiency of energy resources to meet national energy demand at competitive and stable prices and the resilience of the energy supply; enabling development and deployment of technologies; building sufficient infrastructure to generate, store and transmit energy supplies and ensuring enforceable contracts of delivery.

Enhanced weathering

Enhancing the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through dissolution of silicate and carbonate rocks by grinding these minerals to small particles and actively applying them to soils, coasts or oceans.

(Model) Ensemble

A group of parallel model simulations characterising historical climate conditions, climate predictions, or climate projections. Variation of the results across the ensemble members may give an estimate of modelling-based uncertainty. Ensembles made with the same model but different initial conditions only characterize the uncertainty associated with internal climate variability, whereas multi-model ensembles including simulations by several models also include the impact of model differences. Perturbed parameter ensembles, in which model parameters are varied in a systematic manner, aim to assess the uncertainty resulting from internal model specifications within a single model. Remaining sources of uncertainty unaddressed with model ensembles are related to systematic model errors or biases, which may be assessed from systematic comparisons of model simulations with observations wherever available.

See also Climate projection.

Equality

A principle that ascribes equal worth to all human beings, including equal opportunities, rights, and obligations, irrespective of origins

Inequality

Uneven opportunities and social positions, and processes of discrimination within a group or society, based on gender, class, ethnicity, age, and (dis)ability, often produced by uneven development. Income inequality refers to gaps between highest and lowest income earners within a country and between countries.

See also Equity, Ethics, and Fairness.

Equilibrium climate sensitivity

See Climate sensitivity.

Equity

Equity is the principle of fairness in burden sharing and is a basis for understanding how the impacts and responses to climate change, including costs and benefits, are distributed in and by society in more or less equal ways. It is often aligned with ideas of equality, fairness and justice and applied with respect to equity in the responsibility for, and distribution of, climate impacts and policies across society, generations, and gender, and in the sense of who participates and controls the processes of decision making.

Distributive equity

Equity in the consequences, outcomes, costs and benefits of actions or policies. In the case of climate change or climate policies for different people, places and countries, including equity aspects of sharing burdens and benefits for mitigation and adaptation.

Gender equity

Ensuring equity in that women and men have the same rights, resources and opportunities. In the case of climate change gender equity recognizes that women are often more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and may be disadvantaged in the process and outcomes of climate policy.

Inter-generational equity

Equity between generations that acknowledges that the effects of past and present emissions, vulnerabilities and policies impose costs and benefits for people in the future and of different age groups.

Procedural equity

Equity in the process of decision making including recognition and inclusiveness in participation, equal representation, bargaining power, voice and equitable access to knowledge and resources to participate.

See also Equality, Ethics and Fairness.

Ethics

Ethics involves questions of justice and value. Justice is concerned with right and wrong, equity and fairness, and, in general, with the rights to which people and living beings are entitled. Value is a matter of worth, benefit, or good.

See also Equality, Equity, and Fairness.

Evidence

Data and information used in the scientific process to establish findings. In this report, the degree of evidence reflects the amount, quality, and consistency of scientific/technical information on which the Lead Authors are basing their findings.

See also Agreement, Confidence, Likelihood, and Uncertainty.

Exposure

The presence of people; livelihoods; species or ecosystems; environmental functions, services, and resources; infrastructure; or economic, social, or cultural assets in places and settings that could be adversely affected.

See also Hazard, Risk, and Vulnerability.

Extratropical Cyclone

Any cyclonic-scale storm that is not a tropical cyclone. Usually refers to a middle- or high-latitude migratory storm system formed in regions of large horizontal temperature variations. Sometimes called extratropical storm or extratropical low.

See also Tropical cyclone.

Extreme weather or climate event

See Climate extreme (extreme weather or climate event).

Extreme weather event

An extreme weather event is an event that is rare at a particular place and time of year. Definitions of rare vary, but an extreme weather event would normally be as rare as or rarer than the 10th or 90th percentile of a probability density function estimated from observations. By definition, the characteristics of what is called extreme weather may vary from place to place in an absolute sense. When a pattern of extreme weather persists for some time, such as a season, it may be classed as an extreme climate event, especially if it yields an average or total that is itself extreme (e.g., drought or heavy rainfall over a season).

See also Heat wave, and Climate extreme (extreme weather or climate event)

Fairness

Impartial and just treatment without favouritism or discrimination in which each person is considered of equal worth with equal opportunity.

See also Equity, Equality and Ethics.

Feasible scenario commitment

See Climate change commitment.

Feasibility

The degree to which climate goals and response options are considered possible and/or desirable. Feasibility depends on geophysical, ecological, technological, economic, social and institutional conditions for change. Conditions underpinning feasibility are dynamic, spatially variable, and may vary between different groups.

See also Enabling conditions.

Feedback

See Climate feedback.

Flexible governance

See Governance.

Flood

The overflowing of the normal confines of a stream or other body of water, or the accumulation of water over areas that are not normally submerged. Floods include river (fluvial) floods, flash floods, urban floods, pluvial floods, sewer floods, coastal floods, and glacial lake outburst floods.

Food security

A situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (FAO, 2001).

Food wastage

Food wastage encompasses food loss (the loss of food during production and transportation) and food waste (the waste of food by the consumer) (FAO, 2013).

Forcing

See Radiative forcing.

Forest

A vegetation type dominated by trees. Many definitions of the term forest are in use throughout the world, reflecting wide differences in biogeophysical conditions, social structure and economics. For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as afforestation, reforestation and deforestation, see the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000). [Footnote: See also information provided by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2013) and the Report on Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human-induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types (IPCC, 2003).]

See also Afforestation, Deforestation, and Reforestation.

Fossil fuels

Carbon-based fuels from fossil hydrocarbon deposits, including coal, oil, and natural gas.

Framework Convention on Climate Change

See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Gender equity

See Equity.

General purpose technologies (GPT)

General Purpose Technologies can be or are used pervasively in a wide range of sectors in ways that fundamentally change the modes of operation of those sectors (Helpman, 1998). Examples include the steam engine, power generator and motor, ICT, and biotechnology.

Geoengineering

In this report, separate consideration is given to the two main approaches considered as ‘geoengineering’ in some of the literature: solar radiation modification (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR). Because of this separation, the term ‘geoengineering’ is not used in this report. See also Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and Solar radiation modification (SRM).

Glacier

A perennial mass of ice, and possibly firn and snow, originating on the land surface by the recrystallisation of snow and showing evidence of past or present flow. A glacier typically gains mass by accumulation of snow, and loses mass by melting and ice discharge into the sea or a lake if the glacier terminates in a body of water. Land ice masses of continental size (>50 000 km²) are referred to as ice sheets.

See also Ice sheet.

Global climate model (also referred to as general circulation model, both abbreviated as GCM)

See Climate model.

Global mean surface temperature (GMST)

Area-weighted global average of land surface air temperature over land and sea surface temperatures, unless otherwise specified, normally expressed relative to a specified reference period.

See also Land surface air temperature, and Sea surface temperature (SST).

Global warming

An increase in global mean surface temperature (GMST) averaged over a 30-year period, relative to 1850-1900 unless otherwise specified. For periods shorter than 30 years, global warming refers to the estimated average temperature over the 30 years centred on that shorter period, accounting for the impact of any temperature fluctuations or trend within those 30 years.

See also Climate change, Climate variability, and Global mean surface temperature (GMST).

Governance

A comprehensive and inclusive concept of the full range of means for deciding, managing, implementing and monitoring policies and measures. Whereas government is defined strictly in terms of the nation-state, the more inclusive concept of governance recognizes the contributions of various levels of government (global, international, regional, sub-national and local) and the contributing roles of the private sector, of nongovernmental actors, and of civil society to addressing the many types of issues facing the global community.

Adaptive governance

An emerging term in the literature for the evolution of formal and informal institutions of governance that prioritize social learning in planning, implementation and evaluation of policy through iterative social learning to steer the use and protection of natural resources, ecosystem services and common pool natural resources, particularly in situations of complexity and uncertainty.

Climate governance

Purposeful mechanisms and measures aimed at steering social systems towards preventing, mitigating, or adapting to the risks posed by climate change (Jagers and Striiple, 2003).

Deliberative governance

Deliberative governance involves decision making through inclusive public conversation which allows opportunity for developing policy options through public discussion rather than collating individual preferences through voting or referenda (although the later governance mechanisms can also be preceded and legitimated by public deliberation processes).

Flexible governance

Strategies of governance at various levels, which prioritize the use of social learning and rapid feedback mechanisms in planning and policy making, often through incremental, experimental and iterative management processes.

Governance capacity

The ability of governance institutions, leaders, and non-state and civil society to plan, co-ordinate, fund, implement, evaluate and adjust policies and measures over the short, medium and long term, adjusting for uncertainty, rapid change and wide ranging impacts and multiple actors and demands.

Multi-level governance

Multi-level governance refers to negotiated, non-hierarchical exchanges between institutions at the transnational, national, regional and local levels. Multi-level governance identifies relationships among governance processes at these different levels. Multi-level governance does include negotiated relationships among institutions at different institutional levels and also a vertical 'layering' of governance processes at different levels. Institutional relationships take place directly between, transnational, regional and local levels, thus bypassing the state level (Peters and Pierre, 2001).

Participatory governance

A governance system that enables direct public engagement in decision-making using a variety of techniques for example, referenda, community deliberation, citizen juries or participatory budgeting. The approach can be applied in formal and informal institutional contexts from national to local, but is usually associated with devolved decision making. [Footnote: This definition builds from Fung and Olin Wright (2003) and Sarmiento and Tilly (2018).]

Governance capacity

See Governance.

Green infrastructure

The interconnected set of natural and constructed ecological systems, green spaces and other landscape features. It includes planted and indigenous trees, wetlands, parks, green open spaces and original grassland and woodlands, as well as possible building and street level design interventions that incorporate vegetation. Green infrastructure provides services and functions in the same way as

conventional infrastructure. This definition builds from Culwick and Bobbins (2016).

Greenhouse gas (GHG)

Greenhouse gases are those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and emit radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of terrestrial radiation emitted by the earth's surface, the atmosphere itself, and by clouds. This property causes the greenhouse effect. Water vapour (H₂O), carbon dioxide (CO₂), nitrous oxide (N₂O), methane (CH₄) and ozone (O₃) are the primary GHGs in the earth's atmosphere. Moreover, there are a number of entirely human-made GHGs in the atmosphere, such as the halocarbons and other chlorine- and bromine-containing substances, dealt with under the Montreal Protocol. Beside CO₂, N₂O and CH₄, the Kyoto Protocol deals with the GHGs sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs).

See also Carbon dioxide (CO₂), Methane (CH₄), and Ozone (O₃).

Greenhouse gas removal (GGR)

Withdrawal of a GHG and/or a precursor from the atmosphere by a sink.

See also Carbon dioxide removal (CDR), and Negative emissions.

Gross domestic product (GDP)

The sum of gross value added, at purchasers' prices, by all resident and non-resident producers in the economy, plus any taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products in a country or a geographic region for a given period, normally one year. GDP is calculated without deducting for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources.

Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF)

One component of the GDP that corresponds to the total value of acquisitions, minus disposals of fixed assets during one year by the business sector, governments and households, plus certain additions to the value of non-produced assets (such as subsoil assets or major improvements in the quantity, quality or productivity of land).

Halocarbons

A collective term for the group of partially halogenated organic species, which includes the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), halons, methyl chloride and methyl bromide. Many of the halocarbons have large Global Warming Potentials. The chlorine and bromine-containing halocarbons are also involved in the depletion of the ozone layer.

Hazard

The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical event or trend that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, as well as damage and loss to property, infrastructure, livelihoods, service provision, ecosystems and environmental resources.

See also Disaster, Exposure, Risk, and Vulnerability.

Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)

Heating, ventilation and air conditioning technology is used to control temperature and humidity in an indoor environment, be it in buildings or in vehicles, providing thermal comfort and healthy air quality to the occupants. HVAC systems can be designed for an isolated space, an individual building or a distributed heating and cooling network within a building structure or a district heating system. The latter provides economies of scale and also scope for integration with solar heat, natural seasonal cooling/heating etc.

Heat wave

A period of abnormally hot weather. Heat waves and warm spells have various and in some cases overlapping definitions.

See also Extreme weather event.

Holocene

The Holocene is the current interglacial geological epoch, the second of two epochs within the Quaternary period, the preceding being the Pleistocene. The International Commission on Stratigraphy defines the start of the Holocene at 11,650 years before 1950.

See also Anthropocene.

Human behaviour

The way in which a person acts in response to a particular situation or stimulus. Human actions are relevant at different levels, from international, national, and sub-national actors, to NGO, firm-level actors, and communities, households, and individual actions.

Adaptation behaviour

Human actions that directly or indirectly affect the risks of climate change impacts.

Mitigation behaviour

Human actions that directly or indirectly influence mitigation.

Human behavioural change

A transformation or modification of human actions. Behaviour change efforts can be planned in ways that mitigate climate change and/or reduce negative consequences of climate change impacts.

Human rights

Rights that are inherent to all human beings, universal, inalienable, and indivisible, typically expressed and guaranteed by law. They include the right to life, economic, social, and cultural rights, and the right to development and self-determination (based upon the definition by the UN Office of the High Commissioner).

Procedural rights

Rights to a legal procedure to enforce substantive rights.

Substantive rights

Basic human rights, including the right to the substance of being human such as life itself, liberty and happiness.

Human security

A condition that is met when the vital core of human lives is protected, and when people have the freedom and capacity to live with dignity. In the context of climate change, the vital core of human lives includes the universal and culturally specific, material and non-material elements necessary for people to act on behalf of their interests and to live with dignity.

Human system

Any system in which human organizations and institutions play a major role. Often, but not always, the term is synonymous with society or social system. Systems such as agricultural systems, urban systems, political systems, technological systems, and economic systems are all human systems in the sense applied in this report.

Hydrological cycle

The cycle in which water evaporates from the oceans and the land surface, is carried over the Earth in atmospheric circulation as water vapour, condenses to form clouds, precipitates as rain or snow, which on land can be intercepted by trees and vegetation, potentially accumulates as snow or ice, provides runoff on the land surface, infiltrates into soils, recharges groundwater, discharges into streams, flows out into the oceans, and ultimately evaporates again from the ocean or land surface. The various systems involved in the hydrological cycle are usually referred to as hydrological systems.

Ice sheet

A mass of land ice of continental size that is sufficiently thick to cover most of the underlying bed, so that its shape is mainly determined by its dynamics (the flow of the ice as it deforms internally and/or slides at its base). An ice sheet flows outward from a high central ice plateau with a small average surface slope. The margins usually slope more steeply, and most ice is discharged through fast flowing ice streams or outlet glaciers, in some cases into the sea or into ice shelves floating on the sea. There are only two ice sheets in the modern world, one on Greenland and one on Antarctica. During glacial periods there were others.

See also Glacier.

Impacts (consequences, outcomes)

The consequences of realized risks on natural and human systems, where risks result from the interactions of climate-related hazards (including extreme weather and climate events), exposure, and vulnerability. Impacts generally refer to effects on lives, livelihoods, health and wellbeing, ecosystems and species, economic, social and cultural assets, services (including ecosystem services), and infrastructure. Impacts may be referred to as consequences or outcomes, and can be adverse or beneficial.

See also Adaptation, Exposure, Hazard, Loss and Damage, and loss and damages, and Vulnerability.

(climate change) Impact assessment

The practice of identifying and evaluating, in monetary and/or non-monetary terms, the effects of climate change on natural and human systems.

Incremental adaptation

See Adaptation.

Indigenous knowledge

Indigenous knowledge refers to the understandings, skills and philosophies developed by societies with long histories of interaction with their natural surroundings. For many Indigenous peoples, Indigenous knowledge informs decision-making about fundamental aspects of life, from day-to-day activities to longer term actions. This knowledge is integral to cultural complexes, which also encompass language, systems of classification, resource use practices, social interactions, values, ritual and spirituality. These distinctive ways of knowing are important facets of the world's cultural diversity. This definition builds on UNESCO (2018).

Indirect land-use change

See Land-use change.

Industrial revolution

A period of rapid industrial growth with far-reaching social and economic consequences, beginning in Britain during the second half of the 18th century and spreading to Europe and later to other countries including the United States. The invention of the steam engine was an important trigger of this development. The industrial revolution marks the beginning of a strong increase in the use of fossil fuels, initially coal, and hence emission of carbon dioxide (CO₂).

See also Pre-industrial.

Industrialized/developed/developing countries

There are a diversity of approaches for categorizing countries on the basis of their level of development, and for defining terms such as industrialized, developed, or developing. Several categorizations are used in this report. (1) In the United Nations system, there is no established convention for designating of developed and developing countries or areas. (2) The United Nations Statistics Division specifies developed and developing regions based on common practice. In addition, specific countries are designated as Least Developed Countries (LCD), landlocked developing countries, small island developing states, and transition economies. Many countries appear in more than one of these categories. (3) The World Bank uses income as the main criterion for classifying countries as low, lower middle, upper middle, and high income. (4) The UNDP aggregates indicators for life expectancy, educational attainment, and income into a single composite Human Development Index (HDI) to classify countries as low, medium, high, or very high human development.

Inequality

See Equality.

Information and communication technology (ICT)

An umbrella term that includes any information and communication device or application, encompassing: computer systems, network hardware and software, cellphone, etc.

Infrastructure commitment

See Climate change commitment.

Institution

Institutions are rules and norms held in common by social actors that guide, constrain and shape human interaction. Institutions can be formal, such as laws and policies, or informal, such as norms and conventions. Organizations - such as parliaments, regulatory agencies, private firms, and community bodies - develop and act in response to institutional frameworks and the incentives they frame. Institutions can guide, constrain and shape human interaction through direct control, through incentives, and through processes of socialization.

See also Institutional capacity.

Institutional capacity

Institutional capacity comprises building and strengthening individual organisations and providing technical and management training to support integrated planning and decision-making processes between organisations and people, as well as empowerment, social capital, and an enabling environment, including the culture, values and power relations (Willems and Baumert, 2003).

Integrated assessment

A method of analysis that combines results and models from the physical, biological, economic and social sciences and the interactions among these components in a consistent framework to evaluate the status and the consequences of environmental change and the policy responses to it.

See also Integrated assessment model (IAM).

Integrated assessment model (IAM)

Integrated assessment models (IAMs) integrate knowledge from two or more domains into a single framework. They are one of the main tools for undertaking integrated assessments.

One class of IAM used in respect of climate change mitigation may include representations of: multiple sectors of the economy, such as energy, land use and land use change; interactions between sectors; the economy as a whole; associated GHG emissions and sinks; and reduced representations of the climate system. This class of model is used to assess linkages between economic, social and technological development and the evolution of the climate system.

Another class of IAM additionally includes representations of the costs associated with climate change impacts, but includes less detailed representations of economic systems. These can be used to assess impacts and mitigation in a cost-benefit framework and have been used to estimate the social cost of carbon.

Integrated water resources management (IWRM)

A process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources in order to maximise economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.

Inter-generational equity

See Equity.

Inter-generational justice

See Justice.

Internal variability

See Climate variability.

Internet of Things (IoT)

The network of computing devices embedded in everyday objects such as cars, phones and computers, connected via the internet, enabling them to send and receive data.

Iron fertilisation

See Ocean fertilisation.

Irreversibility

A perturbed state of a dynamical system is defined as irreversible on a given timescale, if the recovery timescale from this state due to natural processes is substantially longer than the time it takes for the system to reach this perturbed state.

See also Tipping point.

Justice

Justice is concerned with ensuring that people get what is due to them setting out the moral or legal principles of fairness and equity in the way people are treated, often based on the ethics and values of society.

Climate justice

Justice that links development and human rights to achieve a human-centred approach to addressing climate change, safeguarding the rights of the most vulnerable people and sharing the burdens and benefits of climate change and its impacts equitably and fairly. This definition builds upon the one used by the Mary Robinson Foundation - Climate Justice.

Distributive justice

Justice in the allocation of economic and non-economic costs and benefits across society.

Inter-generational justice

Justice in the distribution of economic and non-economic costs and benefits across generations.

Procedural justice

Justice in the way outcomes are brought about including who participates and is heard in the processes of decision making.

Social justice

Just or fair relations within society that seek to address the distribution of wealth, access to resources, opportunity, and support according to principles of justice and fairness.

See also Equity, Ethics, Fairness, and Human rights.

Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an international treaty adopted in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, at the Third Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP3) to the UNFCCC. It contains legally binding commitments, in addition to those included in the UNFCCC. Countries included in Annex B of the Protocol (mostly OECD countries and countries with economies in transition) agreed to reduce their anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄), nitrous oxide (N₂O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆)) by at least 5% below 1990 levels in the first commitment period (2008-2012). The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005 and as of May 2018 had 192 Parties (191 States and the European Union). A second commitment period was agreed in December 2012 at COP18, known as the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, in which a new set of Parties committed to reduce GHG emissions by at least 18% below 1990 levels in the period from 2013 to 2020. However, as of May 2018, the Doha Amendment had not received sufficient ratifications to enter into force.

See also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and Paris Agreement.

Land surface air temperature

The near-surface air temperature over land, typically measured at 1.25-2 m above the ground using standard meteorological equipment.

Land use

Land use refers to the total of arrangements, activities and inputs undertaken in a certain land cover type (a set of human actions). The term land use is also used in the sense of the social and economic purposes for which land is managed (e.g., grazing, timber extraction, conservation and city dwelling). In national greenhouse gas inventories, land use is classified according to the IPCC land use categories of forest land, cropland, grassland, wetland, settlements, other.

See also Land-use change.

Land-use change (LUC)

Land-use change involves a change from one land use category to another.

Indirect land-use change (iLUC)

Refers to market-mediated or policy-driven shifts in land use that cannot be directly attributed to land use management decisions of individuals or groups. For example, if agricultural land is diverted to fuel production, forest clearance may occur elsewhere to replace the former agricultural production.

Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)

In the context of national greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories under the UNFCCC, LULUCF is a GHG inventory sector that covers anthropogenic emissions and removals of GHG from carbon pools in managed lands, excluding non-CO₂ agricultural emissions. Following the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National GHG Inventories, “anthropogenic” land-related GHG fluxes are defined as all those occurring on “managed land”, i.e., “where human interventions and practices have been applied to perform production, ecological or social functions”. Since managed land may include CO₂ removals not considered as “anthropogenic” in some of the scientific literature assessed in this report (e.g., removals associated with CO₂ fertilisation and N deposition), the land-related net GHG emission estimates included in this report are not necessarily directly comparable with LULUCF estimates in National GHG Inventories.

See also Afforestation, Deforestation, Reforestation and the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000).

Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)

See Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF).

Lifecycle assessment (LCA)

Compilation and evaluation of the inputs, outputs and the potential environmental impacts of a product or service throughout its life cycle. This definition builds from ISO (2018).

Likelihood

The chance of a specific outcome occurring, where this might be estimated probabilistically.

Likelihood is expressed in this report using a standard terminology (Mastrandrea et al., 2010). See Section 1.6 for the list of likelihood qualifiers used.

See also Agreement, Evidence, Confidence, and Uncertainty.

Livelihood

The resources used and the activities undertaken in order to live. Livelihoods are usually determined by the entitlements and assets to which people have access. Such assets can be categorised as human, social, natural, physical, or financial.

Local knowledge

Local knowledge refers to the understandings and skills developed by individuals and populations, specific to the places where they live. Local knowledge informs decision-making about fundamental aspects of life, from day-to-day activities to longer term actions. This knowledge is a key element of the social and cultural systems which influence observations of, and responses to climate change; it also informs governance decisions. This definition builds on UNESCO (2018)

Lock-in

A situation in which the future development of a system, including infrastructure, technologies, investments, institutions, and behavioural norms, is determined or constrained (“locked in”) by historic developments.

Long-lived climate forcers (LLCF)

Long-lived climate forcers refer to a set of well-mixed greenhouse gases with long atmospheric lifetimes. This set of compounds includes carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide, together with some fluorinated gases. They have a warming effect on climate. These compounds accumulate in the atmosphere at decadal to centennial timescales, and their effect on climate hence persists for decades to centuries after their emission. On timescales of decades to a century already emitted emissions of long-lived climate forcers can only be abated by greenhouse gas removal (GGR).

See also Short-lived climate forcers (SLCF).

Loss and Damage, and losses and damages

Research has taken Loss and Damage (capitalized letters) to refer to political debate under the UNFCCC following the establishment of the Warsaw Mechanism on Loss and Damage in 2013, which is to “address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.” Lowercase letters (losses and damages) have been taken to refer broadly to harm from (observed) impacts and (projected) risks (see Mechler et al., 2018).

Maladaptive actions (Maladaptation)

Actions that may lead to increased risk of adverse climate-related outcomes, including via increased GHG emissions, increased vulnerability to climate change, or diminished welfare, now or in the future. Maladaptation is usually an unintended consequence.

Market exchange rates (MER)

The rate at which a currency of one country can be exchanged with the currency of another country. In most economies such rates evolve daily while in others there are official conversion rates that are adjusted periodically.

See also Purchasing power parity (PPP).

Market failure

When private decisions are based on market prices that do not reflect the real scarcity of goods and services but rather reflect market distortions, they do not generate an efficient allocation of resources but cause welfare losses. A market distortion is any event in which a market reaches a market clearing price that is substantially different from the price that a market would achieve while operating under conditions of perfect competition and state enforcement of legal contracts and the ownership of private property. Examples of factors causing market prices to deviate from real economic scarcity are environmental externalities, public goods, monopoly power, information asymmetry, transaction costs, and non-rational behaviour.

Measurement, reporting and verification (MRV)*Measurement*

“The process of data collection over time, providing basic datasets, including associated accuracy and precision, for the range of relevant variables. Possible data sources are field measurements, field observations, detection through remote sensing and interviews.” Source: UN REDD

Reporting

“The process of formal reporting of assessment results to the UNFCCC, according to predetermined formats and according to established standards, especially the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Guidelines and GPG (Good Practice Guidance).” Source: UN REDD

Verification

“The process of formal verification of reports, for example, the established approach to verify national communications and national inventory reports to the UNFCCC.” Source: UN REDD

Megadrought

See Drought.

Methane (CH₄)

One of the six greenhouse gases (GHGs) to be mitigated under the Kyoto Protocol and is the major component of natural gas and associated with all hydrocarbon fuels. Significant emissions occur as a result of animal husbandry and agriculture and their management represents a major mitigation option.

Migration

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines migration as “The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.” (IOM, 2018).

Migrant

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines a migrant as “any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.” (IOM, 2018).

See also (Internal) Displacement.

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

A set of eight time-bound and measurable goals for combating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, discrimination against women and environmental degradation. These goals were agreed at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000 together with an action plan to reach the goals by 2015.

Mitigation (of climate change)

A human intervention to reduce emissions or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases. Note that this encompasses carbon dioxide removal (CDR) options.

Mitigation behaviour

See Human behaviour.

Mitigation measures

In climate policy, mitigation measures are technologies, processes or practices that contribute to mitigation, for example renewable energy (RE) technologies, waste minimization processes, public transport commuting practices.

See also Policies (for mitigation and adaptation).

Mitigation option

A technology or practice that reduces GHG emissions or enhances sinks.

Mitigation pathways

See Pathways.

Mitigation scenario

A plausible description of the future that describes how the (studied) system responds to the implementation of mitigation policies and measures.

See also Emission scenario, Pathways, Socio-economic scenarios, and Stabilisation (of GHG or CO₂-equivalent concentration).

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E)

Monitoring and evaluation refers to mechanisms put in place at national to local scales to respectively monitor and evaluate efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and/or adapt to the impacts of climate change with the aim of systematically identifying, characterizing and assessing progress over time.

Motivation (of an individual)

An individual's reason or reasons for acting in a particular way; individuals may consider various consequences of actions, including financial, social, affective, and environmental consequences. Motivation can arise from outside (extrinsic) or inside (intrinsic) the individual.

Multi-level governance

See Governance.

Narratives

Qualitative descriptions of plausible future world evolutions, describing the characteristics, general logic and developments underlying a particular quantitative set of scenarios. Narratives are also referred to in the literature as “storylines”.

See also Scenario, Scenario storyline and Pathways.

Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)

A term used under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) whereby a country that has joined the Paris Agreement outlines its plans for reducing its emissions. Some countries NDCs also address how they will adapt to climate change impacts, and what support they need from, or will provide to, other countries to adopt low-carbon pathways and to build climate resilience. According to Article 4 paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement, each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDCs that it intends to achieve. In the lead up to 21st Conference of the Parties in Paris in 2015, countries submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). As countries join the Paris Agreement, unless they decide otherwise, this INDC becomes their first Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC).

See also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and Paris agreement.

Negative emissions

Removal of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from the atmosphere by deliberate human activities, i.e. in addition to the removal that would occur via natural carbon cycle processes. For CO₂, negative

emissions can be achieved with direct capture of CO₂ from ambient air, bioenergy with carbon capture and sequestration (BECCS), afforestation, reforestation, biochar, ocean alkalization, among others.

See also Net negative emissions, Net-zero emissions, Carbon dioxide removal (CDR), and Greenhouse gas removal (GGR).

Net negative emissions

A situation of net negative emissions is achieved when, as result of human activities, more greenhouse gases are removed from the atmosphere than are emitted into it. Where multiple greenhouse gases are involved, the quantification of negative emissions depends on the climate metric chosen to compare emissions of different gases (such as Global warming potential, Global temperature change potential, and others, as well as the chosen time horizon).

See also Negative emissions, Net-zero emissions and Net-zero CO₂ emissions.

Net-zero CO₂ emissions

Conditions in which any remaining anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions are balanced globally by anthropogenic CO₂ removals. Net-zero CO₂ emissions are also referred to as carbon neutrality.

See also Net-zero emissions, Carbon neutrality and Net negative emissions.

Net-zero emissions

Net-zero emissions are achieved when emissions of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere are balanced by anthropogenic removals. Where multiple greenhouse gases are involved, the quantification of net-zero emissions depends on the climate metric chosen to compare emissions of different gases (such as Global warming potential, global temperature change potential, and others, as well as the chosen time horizon).

See also Net-zero CO₂ emissions, Negative emissions, Net negative emission, and Carbon neutrality

Nitrous oxide (N₂O)

One of the six greenhouse gases (GHGs) to be mitigated under the Kyoto Protocol. The main anthropogenic source of N₂O is agriculture (soil and animal manure management), but important contributions also come from sewage treatment, fossil fuel combustion, and chemical industrial processes. N₂O is also produced naturally from a wide variety of biological sources in soil and water, particularly microbial action in wet tropical forests.

Non-overshoot pathways

See Pathways.

Ocean acidification (OA)

Ocean acidification refers to a reduction in the pH of the ocean over an extended period, typically decades or longer, which is caused primarily by uptake of carbon dioxide (CO₂) from the atmosphere, but can also be caused by other chemical additions or subtractions from the ocean. Anthropogenic ocean acidification refers to the component of pH reduction that is caused by human activity (IPCC,

2011, p. 37).

Ocean fertilisation

Deliberate increase of nutrient supply to the near-surface ocean in order to enhance biological production through which additional carbon dioxide from the atmosphere is sequestered. This can be achieved by the addition of micro-nutrients or macro-nutrients. Ocean fertilisation is regulated by the London Protocol.

Overshoot

The temporary exceedance of a specified level of global warming, such as 1.5°C. Overshoot implies a peak followed by a decline in global warming, achieved through anthropogenic removal of CO₂ exceeding remaining CO₂ emissions globally.

See also Pathways (Subterms: Overshoot pathways, Non-overshoot Pathways).

Overshoot pathways

See Pathways.

Ozone (O₃)

Ozone, the triatomic form of oxygen (O₃), is a gaseous atmospheric constituent. In the troposphere, it is created both naturally and by photochemical reactions involving gases resulting from human activities (smog). Tropospheric ozone acts as a greenhouse gas. In the stratosphere, it is created by the interaction between solar ultraviolet radiation and molecular oxygen (O₂). Stratospheric ozone plays a dominant role in the stratospheric radiative balance. Its concentration is highest in the ozone layer.

Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted on December 2015 in Paris, France, at the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC. The agreement, adopted by 196 Parties to the UNFCCC, entered into force on 4 November 2016 and as of May 2018 had 195 Signatories and was ratified by 177 Parties. One of the goals of the Paris Agreement is “Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”, recognising that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. Additionally, the Agreement aims to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change. The Paris Agreement is intended to become fully effective in 2020.

See also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Kyoto Protocol, and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

Participatory governance

See Governance.

Pathways

The temporal evolution of natural and/or human systems towards a future state. Pathway concepts range from sets of quantitative and qualitative scenarios or narratives of potential futures to solution-oriented decision-making processes to achieve desirable societal goals. Pathway approaches typically

focus on biophysical, techno-economic, and/or socio-behavioural trajectories and involve various dynamics, goals, and actors across different scales.

1.5°C-consistent pathway

A pathway of emissions of greenhouse gases and other climate forcers that provides an approximately one-in-two to two-in-three chance, given current knowledge of the climate response, of global warming either remaining below 1.5°C or returning to 1.5°C by around 2100 following an overshoot.

Adaptation pathways

A series of adaptation choices involving trade-offs between short-term and long-term goals and values. These are processes of deliberation to identify solutions that are meaningful to people in the context of their daily lives and to avoid potential maladaptation.

Development pathways

Development pathways are trajectories based on an array of social, economic, cultural, technological, institutional, and biophysical features that characterise the interactions between human and natural systems and outline visions for the future, at a particular scale.

Mitigation pathways

A mitigation pathway is a temporal evolution of a set of mitigation scenario features, such as greenhouse gas emissions and socio-economic development.

Overshoot pathways

Pathways that exceed the stabilization level (concentration, forcing, or temperature) before the end of a time horizon of interest (e.g., before 2100) and then decline towards that level by that time. Once the target level is exceeded, removal by sinks of greenhouse gases is required.

See also Overshoot.

Non-overshoot pathways

Pathways that stay below the stabilization level (concentration, forcing, or temperature) during the time horizon of interest (e.g., until 2100).

Representative concentration pathways (RCPs)

Scenarios that include time series of emissions and concentrations of the full suite of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and aerosols and chemically active gases, as well as land use/land cover (Moss et al., 2008). The word representative signifies that each RCP provides only one of many possible scenarios that would lead to the specific radiative forcing characteristics. The term pathway emphasizes the fact that not only the long-term concentration levels, but also the trajectory taken over time to reach that outcome are of interest (Moss et al., 2010). RCPs were used to develop climate projections in CMIP5.

RCP2.6

One pathway where radiative forcing peaks at approximately 3 W m⁻² and then declines to be limited at 2.6 W m⁻² in 2100 (the corresponding Extended Concentration Pathway, or ECP, has constant emissions after 2100).

RCP4.5 and RCP6.0

Two intermediate stabilisation pathways in which radiative forcing is limited at approximately 4.5 W m⁻² and 6.0 W m⁻² in 2100 (the corresponding ECPs have constant concentrations after 2150).

RCP8.5

One high pathway which leads to >8.5 W m⁻² in 2100 (the corresponding ECP has constant emissions after 2100 until 2150 and constant concentrations after 2250).

See also CMIP, and Shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs).

Shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs)

Shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs) were developed to complement the RCPs with varying socio-economic challenges to adaptation and mitigation (O'Neill et al., 2014). Based on five narratives, the SSPs describe alternative socio-economic futures in the absence of climate policy intervention, comprising sustainable development (SSP1), regional rivalry (SSP3), inequality (SSP4), fossil-fueled development (SSP5), and a middle-of-the-road development (SSP2) (O'Neill, 2000; O'Neill et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017). The combination of SSP-based socio-economic scenarios and Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP)-based climate projections provides an integrative frame for climate impact and policy analysis.

Transformation pathways

Trajectories describing consistent sets of possible futures of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, atmospheric concentrations, or global mean surface temperatures implied from mitigation and adaptation actions associated with a set of broad and irreversible economic, technological, societal, and behavioural changes. This can encompass changes in the way energy and infrastructure are used and produced, natural resources are managed and institutions are set up and in the pace and direction of technological change (TC).

See also Scenario, Scenario storyline, Emission scenario, Mitigation scenario, Baseline scenario, Stabilisation (of GHG or CO₂-equivalent concentration), and Narratives.

Peri-urban areas

Peri-urban areas are those parts of a city that appear to be quite rural but are in reality strongly linked functionally to the city in its daily activities.

Permafrost

Ground (soil or rock and included ice and organic material) that remains at or below 0°C for at least two consecutive years.

pH

pH is a dimensionless measure of the acidity of a solution given by its concentration of hydrogen ions ($[H^+]$). pH is measured on a logarithmic scale where $pH = -\log_{10}[H^+]$. Thus, a pH decrease of 1 unit corresponds to a 10-fold increase in the concentration of H^+ , or acidity.

Policies (for climate change mitigation and adaptation)

Policies are taken and/or mandated by a government - often in conjunction with business and industry within a single country, or collectively with other countries - to accelerate mitigation and adaptation measures. Examples of policies are support mechanisms for renewable energy supplies, carbon or energy taxes, fuel efficiency standards for automobiles, etc.

Political economy

The set of interlinked relationships between people, the state, society and markets as defined by law, politics, economics, customs and power that determine the outcome of trade and transactions and the distribution of wealth in a country or economy.

Poverty

Poverty is a complex concept with several definitions stemming from different schools of thought. It can refer to material circumstances (such as need, pattern of deprivation or limited resources), economic conditions (such as standard of living, inequality or economic position) and/or social relationships (such as social class, dependency, exclusion, lack of basic security or lack of entitlement).

See also Poverty eradication.

Poverty eradication

A set of measures to end poverty in all its forms everywhere.

See also Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Precursors

Atmospheric compounds that are not greenhouse gases (GHGs) or aerosols, but that have an effect on GHG or aerosol concentrations by taking part in physical or chemical processes regulating their production or destruction rates.

See also Aerosol, and Greenhouse gas (GHG).

Pre-industrial

The multi-century period prior to the onset of large-scale industrial activity. The reference period 1850-1900 is used to approximate pre-industrial global mean surface temperature (GMST) in this report.

See also Industrial revolution.

Procedural equity

See Equity.

Procedural justice

See Justice.

Procedural rights

See Human rights.

Projection

A projection is a potential future evolution of a quantity or set of quantities, often computed with the aid of a model. Unlike predictions, projections are conditional on assumptions concerning, for example, future socio-economic and technological developments that may or may not be realized.

See also Climate projection, Scenario, and Pathways.

Purchasing power parity (PPP)

The purchasing power of a currency is expressed using a basket of goods and services that can be bought with a given amount in the home country. International comparison of, for example, gross domestic products (GDP) of countries can be based on the purchasing power of currencies rather than on current exchange rates. PPP estimates tend to lower the gap between the per capita GDP in industrialised and developing countries.

See also Market exchange rate (MER).

Radiative forcing

Radiative forcing is the change in the net, downward minus upward, radiative flux (expressed in W m^{-2}) at the tropopause or top of atmosphere due to a change in an driver of climate change, such as a change in the concentration of carbon dioxide or the output of the Sun. The traditional radiative forcing is computed with all tropospheric properties held fixed at their unperturbed values, and after allowing for stratospheric temperatures, if perturbed, to readjust to radiative-dynamical equilibrium. Radiative forcing is called instantaneous if no change in stratospheric temperature is accounted for. The radiative forcing once rapid adjustments are accounted for is termed the effective radiative forcing. Radiative forcing is not to be confused with cloud radiative forcing, which describes an unrelated measure of the impact of clouds on the radiative flux at the top of the atmosphere.

Reasons for concern (RFCs)

Elements of a classification framework, first developed in the IPCC Third Assessment Report, which aims to facilitate judgments about what level of climate change may be dangerous (in the language of Article 2 of the UNFCCC) by aggregating risks from various sectors, considering hazards, exposures, vulnerabilities, capacities to adapt, and the resulting impacts.

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)

An effort to create financial value for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable development (SD). It is therefore a mechanism for mitigation that results from avoiding deforestation. REDD+ goes beyond deforestation and forest degradation, and includes the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. The concept was first introduced in 2005 in the 11th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Montreal and later given greater recognition in the 13th Session of the COP in 2007 at Bali and inclusion in the Bali Action Plan which called for 'policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD) and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stock in developing countries'. Since then, support for REDD has increased and has slowly become a framework for action supported by a number of countries.

Reference period

The period relative to which anomalies are computed.

See also Anomalies.

Reference scenario

See Baseline scenario.

Reforestation

Planting of forests on lands that have previously contained forests but that have been converted to some other use. [Footnote: For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as afforestation, reforestation and deforestation, see the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000), information provided by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2013), the report on Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human-induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types (IPCC, 2003).]

See also Deforestation, and Afforestation, and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+).

Region

A region is a relatively large-scale land or ocean area characterized by specific geographical and climatological features. The climate of a land-based region is affected by regional and local scale features like topography, land use characteristics and large water bodies, as well as remote influences from other regions, in addition to global climate conditions. The IPCC defines a set of standard regions for analyses of observed climate trends and climate model projections (see Fig. 3.2; AR5, SREX).

Remaining carbon budget

Cumulative global CO₂ emissions from the start of 2018 to the time that CO₂ emissions reach net-zero that would result in a given level of global warming.

See also Carbon budget.

Representative concentration pathways (RCPs)

See Pathways

Resilience

The capacity of social, economic and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganising in ways that maintain their essential function, identity and structure, while also maintaining the capacity for adaptation, learning and transformation. [Footnote: This definition builds from the definition used by Arctic Council (2013).]

See also Hazard, Risk, and Vulnerability.

Risk

The potential for adverse consequences where something of value is at stake and where the occurrence and degree of an outcome is uncertain. In the context of the assessment of climate impacts, the term risk is often used to refer to the potential for adverse consequences of a climate-related hazard, or of adaptation or mitigation responses to such a hazard, on lives, livelihoods, health and wellbeing, ecosystems and species, economic, social and cultural assets, services (including ecosystem services), and infrastructure. Risk results from the interaction of vulnerability (of the affected system), its exposure over time (to the hazard), as well as the (climate-related) hazard and the likelihood of its occurrence.

Risk assessment

The qualitative and/or quantitative scientific estimation of risks.

See also Risk, Risk management, and Risk perception.

Risk management

Plans, actions, strategies or policies to reduce the likelihood and/or consequences of risks or to respond to consequences.

See also Risk, Risk assessment, and Risk perception.

Risk perception

The subjective judgment that people make about the characteristics and severity of a risk.

See also Risk, Risk assessment, and Risk management.

Runoff

The flow of water over the surface or through the subsurface, which typically originates from the part of liquid precipitation and/or snow/ice melt that does not evaporate or refreeze, and is not transpired.

See also Hydrological cycle.

Scenario

A plausible description of how the future may develop based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about key driving forces (e.g., rate of technological change (TC), prices) and relationships. Note that scenarios are neither predictions nor forecasts, but are used to provide a view of the implications of developments and actions.

See also Baseline scenario, Emission scenario, Mitigation scenario and Pathways.

Scenario storyline

A narrative description of a scenario (or family of scenarios), highlighting the main scenario characteristics, relationships between key driving forces and the dynamics of their evolution. Also referred to as ‘narratives’ in the scenario literature.

See also Narratives.

Sea ice

Ice found at the sea surface that has originated from the freezing of seawater. Sea ice may be discontinuous pieces (ice floes) moved on the ocean surface by wind and currents (pack ice), or a motionless sheet attached to the coast (land-fast ice). Sea ice concentration is the fraction of the ocean covered by ice. Sea ice less than one year old is called first-year ice. Perennial ice is sea ice that survives at least one summer. It may be subdivided into second-year ice and multi-year ice, where multiyear ice has survived at least two summers.

Sea level change (sea level rise/sea level fall)

Sea level can change, both globally and locally (relative sea level change) due to (1) a change in ocean volume as a result of a change in the mass of water in the ocean, (2) changes in ocean volume as a result of changes in ocean water density, (3) changes in the shape of the ocean basins and changes in the Earth's gravitational and rotational fields, and (4) local subsidence or uplift of the land. Global mean sea level change resulting from change in the mass of the ocean is called barystatic. The amount of barystatic sea level change due to the addition or removal of a mass of water is called its sea level equivalent (SLE). Sea level changes, both globally and locally, resulting from changes in water density are called steric. Density changes induced by temperature changes only are called thermosteric, while density changes induced by salinity changes are called halosteric. Barystatic and steric sea level changes do not include the effect of changes in the shape of ocean basins induced by the change in the ocean mass and its distribution.

Sea surface temperature (SST)

The sea surface temperature is the subsurface bulk temperature in the top few meters of the ocean, measured by ships, buoys, and drifters. From ships, measurements of water samples in buckets were mostly switched in the 1940s to samples from engine intake water. Satellite measurements of skin temperature (uppermost layer; a fraction of a millimeter thick) in the infrared or the top centimeter or so in the microwave are also used, but must be adjusted to be compatible with the bulk temperature.

Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 outlines seven clear targets and four priorities for action to prevent new, and to reduce existing disaster risks. The voluntary, non-binding agreement recognizes that the State has the primary role to reduce disaster risk but that responsibility should be shared with other stakeholders including local government, the private sector and other stakeholders, with the aim for the substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries.

Sequestration

See Uptake.

Shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs)

See Pathways.

Short-lived climate forcers (SLCF)

Short-lived climate forcers refers to a set of compounds that are primarily composed of those with short lifetimes in the atmosphere compared to well-mixed greenhouse gases, and are also referred to as near-term climate forcers. This set of compounds includes methane, which is also a well-mixed greenhouse gas, as well as ozone and aerosols, or their precursors, and some halogenated species that are not well-mixed greenhouse gases. These compounds do not accumulate in the atmosphere at decadal to centennial timescales, and so their effect on climate is predominantly in the first decade after their emission, although their changes can still induce long-term climate effects such as sea-level change. Their effect can be cooling or warming. A subset of exclusively warming short-lived climate forcers is referred to as short-lived climate pollutants.

See also Long-lived climate forcers (LLCF).

Short-lived climate pollutants (SLCP)

See Short-lived climate forcers (SLCF).

Sink

A reservoir (natural or human, in soil, ocean, and plants) where a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored. Note that UNFCCC Article 1.8 refers to a sink as any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.

See also Sequestration, and Uptake.

Small Island Developing States (SIDS)

Small Island Developing States (SIDS), as recognised by the United Nations OHRLLS (Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States), are a distinct group of developing countries facing specific social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities (UN-OHRLLS, 2011). They were recognized as a special case both for their environment and development at the Rio Earth Summit in Brazil in 1992. Fifty eight countries and territories are presently classified as SIDS by the UN OHRLLS, with 38 being UN member states and 20 being Non-UN Members or Associate Members of the Regional Commissions (UN-OHRLLS, 2018).

Social costs

The full costs of an action in terms of social welfare losses, including external costs associated with the impacts of this action on the environment, the economy (GDP, employment) and on the society as a whole.

Social cost of carbon (SCC)

The net present value of aggregate climate damages (with overall harmful damages expressed as a number with positive sign) from one more tonne of carbon in the form of carbon dioxide (CO₂), conditional on a global emissions trajectory over time.

Social inclusion

A process of improving the terms of participation in society, particularly for people who are disadvantaged, through enhancing opportunities, access to resources, and respect for rights (UN, 2016).

Social justice

See Justice.

Social learning

A process of social interaction through which people learn new behaviours, capacities, values, and attitudes.

Social value of mitigation activities (SVMA)

Social, economic and environmental value of mitigation activities that include, in addition to their climate benefits, their co-benefits to adaptation and sustainable development objectives.

Social-ecological systems

An integrated system that includes human societies and ecosystems, in which humans are part of nature. The functions of such a system arise from the interactions and interdependence of the social and ecological subsystems. The system's structure is characterized by reciprocal feedbacks, emphasising that humans must be seen as a part of, not apart from, nature. [Footnote: This definition builds from Arctic Council (2016) and Berkes and Folke (1998).]

Societal (social) transformation

See Transformation.

Socio-economic scenario

A scenario that describes a possible future in terms of population, gross domestic product (GDP), and other socio-economic factors relevant to understanding the implications of climate change.

See also Reference scenario, Emission scenario, Mitigation scenario and Pathways.

Socio-technical transitions

Socio-technical transitions are where technological change is associated with social systems and the two are inextricably linked.

Soil carbon sequestration (SCS)

Land management changes which increase the soil organic carbon content, resulting in a net removal of CO₂ from the atmosphere.

Soil moisture

Water stored in the soil in liquid or frozen form. Root-zone soil moisture is of most relevance for plant activity.

Solar radiation management

See Solar radiation modification (SRM).

Solar radiation modification (SRM)

Solar radiation modification refers to the intentional modification of the Earth's shortwave radiative budget with the aim of reducing warming. Artificial injection of stratospheric aerosols, marine cloud brightening and land surface albedo modification are examples of proposed SRM methods. SRM does not fall within the definitions of mitigation and adaptation (IPCC, 2012b, p. 2). Note that in the literature SRM is also referred to as solar radiation management or albedo enhancement.

Stabilisation (of GHG or CO₂-equivalent concentration)

A state in which the atmospheric concentrations of one greenhouse gas (GHG) (e.g., carbon dioxide) or of a CO₂-equivalent basket of GHGs (or a combination of GHGs and aerosols) remains constant over time.

Stranded assets

Assets exposed to devaluations or conversion to ‘liabilities’ because of unanticipated changes in their initially expected revenues due to innovations and/or evolutions of the business context, including changes in public regulations at the domestic and international levels.

Stratosphere

The highly stratified region of the atmosphere above the troposphere extending from about 10 km (ranging from 9 km at high latitudes to 16 km in the tropics on average) to about 50 km altitude.

See also Atmosphere, and Troposphere.

Subnational actor

Subnational actors include state/provincial, regional, metropolitan and local/municipal governments as well as non-party stakeholders, such as civil society, the private sector, cities and other subnational authorities, local communities and indigenous peoples.

Substantive rights

See Human rights.

Supply-side measures

See Demand and supply-side measures.

Surface temperature

See Global mean surface temperature (GMST), Land surface air temperature, and Sea surface temperature (SST).

Sustainability

A dynamic process that guarantees the persistence of natural and human systems in an equitable manner.

Sustainable development (SD)

Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987) and balances social, economic and environmental concerns.

See also Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Development pathways (under Pathways).

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

The 17 global goals for development for all countries established by the United Nations through a participatory process and elaborated in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including

ending poverty and hunger; ensuring health and wellbeing, education, gender equality, clean water and energy, and decent work; building and ensuring resilient and sustainable infrastructure, cities and consumption; reducing inequalities; protecting land and water ecosystems; promoting peace, justice and partnerships; and taking urgent action on climate change.

See also Sustainable development (SD).

SDG-interaction score

A seven-point scale (Nilsson et al., 2016) used to rate interactions between mitigation options and the SDGs. Scores range from +3 (indivisible) to -3 (cancelling), with a zero score indicating ‘consistent’ but with neither a positive or negative interaction. The scale, as applied in this report, also includes: direction (whether the interaction is uni- or bi-directional), and confidence as assessed per IPCC guidelines.

Technology transfer

The exchange of knowledge, hardware and associated software, money and goods among stakeholders, which leads to the spread of technology for adaptation or mitigation. The term encompasses both diffusion of technologies and technological cooperation across and within countries.

Tipping point

A level of change in system properties beyond which a system reorganizes, often abruptly, and does not return to the initial state even if the drivers of the change are abated. For the climate system, it refers to a critical threshold when global or regional climate changes from one stable state to another stable state.

See also Irreversibility.

Transformation

A change in the fundamental attributes of natural and human systems.

Societal (social) transformation

A profound and often deliberate shift initiated by communities toward sustainability, facilitated by changes in individual and collective values and behaviours, and a fairer balance of political, cultural, and institutional power in society.

Transformation pathways

See Pathways.

Transformational adaptation

See Adaptation.

Transformative change

A system wide change. This requires more than technological change to consideration of social and economic factors that with technology can bring about rapid change at scale.

Transient climate response

See Climate sensitivity.

Transient climate response to cumulative CO₂ emissions (TCRE)

The transient global average surface temperature change per unit cumulative CO₂ emissions, usually 1000 GtC. TCRE combines both information on the airborne fraction of cumulative CO₂ emissions (the fraction of the total CO₂ emitted that remains in the atmosphere, which is determined by carbon cycle processes) and on the transient climate response (TCR).

See also Transient climate response (TCR) (under Climate sensitivity).

Transit-oriented development (TOD)

An approach urban development that maximizes the amount of residential, business and leisure space within walking distance of efficient public transport, so as to enhance mobility of citizens, the viability of public transport and the value of urban land in mutually supporting ways.

Transition

The process of changing from one state or condition to another in a given period of time. Transition can be in individuals, firms, cities, regions and nations, and can be based on incremental or transformative change.

Tropical cyclone

The general term for a strong, cyclonic-scale disturbance that originates over tropical oceans. Distinguished from weaker systems (often named tropical disturbances or depressions) by exceeding a threshold wind speed. A tropical storm is a tropical cyclone with one-minute average surface winds between 18 and 32 m s⁻¹. Beyond 32 m s⁻¹, a tropical cyclone is called a hurricane, typhoon, or cyclone, depending on geographic location.

See also Extratropical cyclone.

Troposphere

The lowest part of the atmosphere, from the surface to about 10 km in altitude at mid-latitudes (ranging from 9 km at high latitudes to 16 km in the tropics on average), where clouds and weather phenomena occur. In the troposphere, temperatures generally decrease with height.

See also Atmosphere, and Stratosphere.

Uncertainty

A state of incomplete knowledge that can result from a lack of information or from disagreement about what is known or even knowable. It may have many types of sources, from imprecision in the data to ambiguously defined concepts or terminology, incomplete understanding of critical processes, or uncertain projections of human behaviour. Uncertainty can therefore be represented by quantitative measures (e.g., a probability density function) or by qualitative statements (e.g., reflecting the judgment of a team of experts) (see IPCC, 2004; Mastrandrea et al., 2010; Moss and Schneider, 2000).

See also Confidence, and Likelihood.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

The UNFCCC was adopted in May 1992 and opened for signature at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. It entered into force in March 1994 and as of May 2018 had 197 Parties (196 States and the European Union). The Convention's ultimate objective is the "stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system". The provisions of the Convention are pursued and implemented by two treaties: the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.

See also Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement.

Uptake

The addition of a substance of concern to a reservoir.
See also Carbon sequestration and Sink.

Vulnerability

The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt.

See also Exposure, Hazard, and Risk.

Water cycle

See Hydrological cycle.

Wellbeing

A state of existence that fulfils various human needs, including material living conditions and quality of life, as well as the ability to pursue one's goals, to thrive, and feel satisfied with one's life. Ecosystem well-being refers to the ability of ecosystems to maintain their diversity and quality.

Zero emissions commitment

See Climate change commitment.

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Changes to the Underlying Scientific-Technical Assessment to ensure consistency with the approved Summary for Policymakers

1. Background

Consistent with Section 4.5 of Appendix A to the Principles Governing IPCC Work, Coordinating Lead Authors have identified some changes to the underlying report to ensure consistency with the language used in the approved Summary for Policymakers or to provide additional clarification as agreed at the Joint Working Group Session. These changes do not alter any substantive findings of the final draft of the underlying report as distributed to governments on 29 August 2018.

Note that the final draft of the underlying report is also subject to copy-editing and corrections in proof as normally applied to scientific reports.

2. Changes to be made to the underlying report

The following table lists those changes that will be made in the underlying report following the line by line approval of its Summary for Policymakers.

Note that page and line numbers for the SPM are based on the numbering used in the revised final draft as distributed to Governments on 30 September 2018; page and line numbers for the underlying report are based on the numbering used in the final draft as distributed to Governments on 29 August 2018.

SPM Page:Line or Section	Chapter	Chapter Page:Line	Summary
5:20	1	4:30	Reconcile confidence assessment to medium for general statement about past emissions committing us to 1.5C on all timescales.
4:8	1	7:40	Avoid the use of 1.5C-consistent pathways throughout Chapter 1, clarifying whether statements are referring to no-or-limited-overshoot versus high-overshoot in all cases.
14:2	1	32:1	CDR is considered distinct from the above mitigation activities", or some equivalent usage that does not imply explicitly that CDR is considered a type of mitigation. Propagate throughout chapter.
7	1	1:46	Revise figure in FAQ and associated TA description including table of parameters in simple model used to ensure precise consistency with final production version of SPM1. Revisions are of the order of individual line thicknesses and hence do not affect the visual impact and message of the figure.
5:22-23	1	26:11	"Around 2040" was revised to "likely between 2030 and 2052" requires traceability to the chapter. Insert on page 26, line 11, following "immediately": "Applying a similar approach to the multi-dataset average GMST used in this report, now at 1.04°C, increasing at 0.215°C per decade, and accounting for correlated uncertainties between estimated warming level and warming rate, gives a one-standard-error range for warming reaching 1.5°C of 2030 to 2052.
13:40	2	13:12	At end of sentence after "both CO2 and non-CO2 emissions" add "(see glossary)" due to trickleback of new footnote on non-CO2 emissions that's related to the final C1.2 but is related to the non-CO2 discussion that occurs here in the FGD SPM.
3:24	2	8:53	after "emission pathway" add "(see glossary)" due to trickleback of new definition that may now be added to glossary
C2.3	2	55	Table 2.6: split to distinguish "no or low overshoot" and "high overshoot" pathways
C2.3	2	55	Table 2.7: split to distinguish "no or low overshoot" and "high overshoot" pathways

C2.2	2	Page 51-57	Section 2.4.2: Include ranges for subset of pathways consistent with their use in SPM
C2.3	2	Page 57-67	Section 2.4.3: Include ranges for subset of pathways consistent with their use in SPM
C1	2	4	2030 emissions, interquartile emission ranges and year ranges estimated from Table 2.4 need adding to ES
C1	2	23	2010 emissions, interquartile emission ranges and year ranges calculated from from Table 2.4 need adding to Section 2.3
C1.3	2	22	Insert surface air temperature based remaining budgets into Table 2.2 through extra rows at 0.53C and 1.03. These remaining carbon budgets for 0.53°C are 840, 560, and 420 GtCO ₂ for a 33, 50, and 66% probability, respectively, given a historical GSAT warming of 0.97°C (and thus 1.5°C from 1850-1900); and 2030, 1500, and 1170 GtCO ₂ for a 33, 50 and 66% probability, respectively, for 1.03°C (or 2°C from 1850-1900).
C1.3	2	17:21	41GtCO ₂ needs to be 43 +/-3 GtCO ₂ - and add high confidence
C1.3	2	17	show AR5 budget and ranges from 2018 start of with surface air temperature from new table row
C1.3	2	5	show AR5 budget and ranges from 2018 start of with surface air temperature from new table row in ES
C1.3 (footnote)	2	17	introduce framing of total carbon budget context in 2.2.2 and historic emissions to date from Table 2.1 and give medium confidence to historic emissions to date. Matching footnote 1 for C1.3
C1.3 - footnote 2	2	17	explain reason for 300 GtCO ₂ difference from AR5 and level of confidence
C1.3	2	17	Add sentence on ar5 difference in Executive Summary, explicitly mentioning the 300GtCO ₂
C1.3	2	20:53	Add "more thereafter" to ES feedbacks estimate
C.13	2	18	Update Figure 2.3 for baselines from both budget estimates
C1.3	2Annex	99	Replace figure 2.A.3 illustrating two types of temperature change
C1.3	2	5:33	Add "more thereafter" to ES feedbacks estimate
C1.3	2	5:34	Exchange 50% uncertainty range in budgets with absolute uncertainty range
SPM3a	2	29	Include scenario selection in caption Figure 2.5
14: 27	2	75: 10	Replace "avoiding the need" with "reducing the reliance"
19:36-37, 48	2	78: 37	Add the following sentence at the end of the 1st paragraph of section 2.5.2.1: "Explicit carbon pricing is briefly addressed here to the extent it pertains to the scope of Chapter 2. For detailed policy issues about carbon pricing see Section 4.4.5."
19:36-37, 48	2	79:1-3	Delete last sentence "Considering incomplete..... (see section 4.4.5.2)."
19:36-37, 48	2	79:39-44	Move sentences "In addition, the revenue recycling effect.....is achieved (Sands, 2018)." to p.80 line 16 and insert them right after "(Sonnenschein et al., 2018)."
19:36-37, 48	2	80:10	Replace "price of carbon" with "carbon price"
19:36-37, 48	2	80:21	Delete "would need to" and add "s" to "increase"
19:36-37, 48	2	80:24	Replace "the price of carbon" with "carbon pricing"
19:20	2	83:25	Add "including conditional" to ("NDC") in the caption. ie. ("NDC", including conditional NDCs)
25:35	2	24:5	Change 1.5°C-consistent pathway to 1.5°C pathway
SPM3b	2	25:Table 2.3	Adjust wording in description of SSP narratives for consistency with SPM3b

C3	2	2.3.4	Adjust ranges to pathways limiting warming with no or limited overshoot
C1	2	2.3.2	Adjust ranges to pathways limiting warming with no or limited overshoot
C1, D1	2	2.3.5	Adjust ranges to pathways limiting warming with no or limited overshoot
25:35	2	27:1	Change 1.5°C-consistent pathway to 1.5°C pathway
25:35	2	28:35	Change 1.5°C-consistent pathway to 1.5°C pathway
25:35	2	28:54	Change 1.5°C-consistent pathway to 1.5°C pathway
25:35	2	39:11	Change 1.5°C-consistent pathway to 1.5°C pathway
25:35	2	39:37	Change 1.5°C-consistent pathway to 1.5°C pathway
25:35	2	44:22	Change 1.5°C-consistent pathway to 1.5°C pathway
25:35	2	46:8	Change 1.5°C-consistent pathway to 1.5°C pathway
C1.3	2	17	give footnote explaining that the table left column is globally surface air temperature from a base of either GMST or surface air temperature
C1.3	2	48	Update Figure 2.10 with budgets mentioned in SPM.
C2.3	2	54	Figure 2.16: split to distinguish "no or low overshoot" and "high overshoot" pathways
C2.3	2	56	Figure 2.17: split to distinguish "no or low overshoot" and "high overshoot" pathways
C2.2	2	6	Update ranges in ES to pathway definitions used in SPM
C2.3	2	6	Update ranges in ES to pathway definitions used in SPM
	3	131:2	Figure 3.20 & Figure 3.21 add confidence to embers bars
	3	131:2 & 133:1	Correct caption of Figure 3.20 & 3.21 to match approved version of SPM2 caption
	3	131:2 / 132:28	Titles, Figure caption and subtitles in embers figures in Ch 3 need to be modified to match the SPM version.
7:38 (B4.2)	3	p8 (ES), p52	Changes to allow indicative range to be given in (new) B2.1. Text that allows indicative range for GMSLR for 1.5C at 2100. Reword ES accordingly.
7:38 (B4.1)	3	p8	Reword final line of ES statement on GMSLR on threshold temperatures.
9:6 (B2.3)	3	p9, p165, p136	Reword ES statement and subsection summary on permafrost to include projected range; amend range given in on 3.5.2.5 RFC1
9:14 (B3.1)	3	p 8, p50	Clarify timescale on sea ice recovery (decadal) in summary of subsection and ES
9:14 (B3.1)	3	p 8, p50	Add definition for ice-free Arctic in section and ES (as footnote). AR5 "nearly ice-free when the sea ice extent is less than 106 km ² for at least five consecutive years."
10:39 (B5.7)	3	p 140-1	Update confidence associated with RCF5 (medium)
B3.2	3	p.68:23	Change 7 to 6.5% (and consider ES statement p. 9: 110)
	3	6:27	Replace "Changes in temperature extremes and heavy precipitation indices are detectable in observations for the 1991-2010 period compared with 1960-1979, when a global warming of approximately 0.5°C occurred (<i>high confidence</i>). The observed tendencies over that time frame are consistent with attributed changes since the mid-20th century (<i>high confidence</i>) {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3}." with "Trends in intensity and frequency of some climate and weather extremes have been detected over time spans during which about 0.5°C of global warming occurred (<i>medium confidence</i>). This assessment is based on several lines of evidence, including attribution studies for changes in extremes since 1950. {3.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4}."
	3	6-31	Add: "Several regional changes in climate are assessed to occur with global warming up to 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels, including warming of extreme temperatures in many regions (<i>high confidence</i>), increases in frequency, intensity and/or amount of heavy precipitation in several regions (<i>high confidence</i>), and an increase in intensity or frequency of droughts in some regions (<i>medium confidence</i>). {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, Table 3.2}"

	3	7:5	Replace "Substantial changes in regional climate occur between 1.5°C and 2°C [...]" with "Climate models project robust [^] FOOTNOTE#5 differences in regional climate between present-day and global warming of 1.5 [^] FOOTNOTE#6, and between 1.5°C and 2°C#6"; FOOTNOTE#5: "Robust is here used to mean that at least two thirds of climate models show the same sign of changes at the grid point scale, and that differences in large regions are statistically significant [...]."; FOOTNOTE#6: "Projected changes in impacts between different levels of global warming are determined with respect to changes in global mean surface air temperature" (This is not strictly a trickle back since it was proposed by the authors prior to the approval session following comments on the FGD version of the SPM, but it is required to support changes in SPM; Exception: "mean" in "global mean surface air temperature" was added as a result of a comment from the floor)
	3	7:24	Replace "Tropical cyclones are projected to increase in intensity (with associated increases in heavy precipitation) although not in frequency (low confidence, limited evidence)" with "Tropical cyclones are projected to decrease in frequency but with an increase in the number of very intense cyclones (limited evidence, low confidence). Heavy precipitation associated with tropical cyclones is projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C global warming (medium confidence)"
	3	7:25	Add "Heavy precipitation when aggregated at global scale is projected to be higher at 2.0°C than at 1.5°C of global warming (<i>medium confidence</i>)."
	3	7:26	Replace "drought and risks associated with water availability" with "drought, precipitation deficits, and risks associated with water availability"
	3	17:12	Add "It should also be noted that attributed changes in extremes since 1950 that were reported in the IPCC AR5 report (IPCC, 2013) generally correspond to changes in global warming of about 0.5°C (see 3.SM.1)"
	3	19:19	Add "This in particular also applies to attributed changes in extremes since 1950 that were reported in the IPCC AR5 report (IPCC, 2013; see also 3.SM.1)"
	3	38:28	Add "These analyses suggest that increases in drought, dryness or precipitation deficits are projected at 1.5°C or 2°C global warming in some regions compared to the pre-industrial or present-day conditions, as well as between these two global warming levels, although there is substantial variability in signals depending on the considered indices or climate models (Lehner et al. 2017, Schleussner et al. 2017, Greve et al. 2018) (<i>medium confidence</i>). Generally, the clearest signals are found for the Mediterranean region (<i>medium confidence</i>)."
	3	59 (Table 3.2, row "drought and dryness")	Add in column "projected changes at 1.5°C [...]": "Increases in drought, dryness or precipitation deficits projected in some regions compared to the pre-industrial or present-day conditions, but substantial variability in signals depending on considered indices or climate model (<i>medium confidence</i>)."

	3	59 (Table 3.2, row "drought and dryness")	Add in column "projected changes at 2°C [...]": "Increases in drought, dryness or precipitation deficits projected in some regions compared to the pre-industrial or present-day conditions, but substantial variability in signals depending on considered indices or climate model (<i>medium confidence</i>)."
	3	63 (Table 3.2, row "tropical and extra-tropical cyclones")	The text for the "observed change" column should stay the same. However, the remaining text (currently a single column for 1.5 degrees C of warming, 2 degrees C of warming and differences between 1.5 and 2 degrees C of warming) should be removed. Text should then be added to the three different columns as follows: changes at 1.5°C [...] "Increases in heavy precipitation associated with tropical cyclones (<i>medium confidence</i>)"; changes at 2°C [...] "Further increases in heavy precipitation associated with tropical cyclones (<i>medium confidence</i>)"; Differences between 2°C and 1.5° [...] "Heavy precipitation associated with tropical cyclones is projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C global warming (<i>medium confidence</i>); Limited evidence that the global number of tropical cyclones will be lower under 2°C of global warming compared to under 1.5°C of warming, but an increase in the number of very intense cyclones (<i>low confidence</i>)".
SPM2	3	131	Figure 3-20 - Change text: 'Risks for specific natural, managed and human systems' to 'Risks and/or impacts for specific natural, managed and human systems'
SPM2	3	131	Figure 3-20 -Text describing colours here needs to be same as that is SPM figure (which it currently is)
SPM2	3	131	Figure 3-20 - Delete the text "Assessment of risks at 2°C or higher are beyond the scope of the present assessment" as in SPSM2
SPM2	3	131	Figure 3-20 - Remove 2.5°C from both y-axes as in SPM-2
SPM2	3	131	Figure 3-20 - Remove text '0.87°C' and add grey band labelled '2006–2016' in top and bottom figures – like in SPM-2.
SPM2	3	131	Figure 3-20 - Remove text: "The average global surface temperature was converted to GMST for marine related embers (warm water corals, mangroves, and small scale fisheries, low latitude) by adjusting for the small difference between GMST and SST across a range of CMIP5 climate models" - Just like in SPM2
SPM2	3	131	Figure 3-20 - Change text: 'y axes (top and bottom) need to be: 'Global mean surface temperature change above pre-industrial levels (oC).' Just like in SPM2
SPM2	3	131	Figure 3-20 - Edge of all embers above 0.87°C need to be dashed as in SPM-2 figure.

SPM2	3	131	Figure 3-20 - Add confidence levels as letters as per figure SPM-2. The lines connect the transition temperatures - as in SPM2.
SPM2	3	88	Figure 3-18 - Change text: 'Risks and adaptation limits for specific marine and coastal organisms, ecosystems and sectors' to 'Risks and/or impacts for specific marine and coastal organisms, ecosystems and sectors'
SPM2	3	88	Figure 3-18 -Text describing colours here needs to be same as that is SPM figure (which it currently is)
SPM2	3	88	Figure 3-18 -Delete the text "Assessment of risks at 2°C or higher are beyond the scope of the present assessment" as in SPSM2
SPM2	3	88	Figure 3-18 - Remove 2.5°C from both y-axes as in SPM2
SPM2	3	88	Figure 3-18 - Remove text '0.87°C' and add grey band labelled '2006–2016' in top and bottom figures – like in SPM-2.
SPM2	3	88	Figure 3-18 - Change text: 'y axes (top and bottom) need to be: 'Global mean surface temperature change above pre-industrial levels (oC).' Just like in SPM2
SPM2	3	88	Figure 3-18 - Edge of all embers above 0.87°C need to be dashed as in SPM-2 figure.
SPM2	3	88	Figure 3-18 - Add confidence levels as letters as per figure SPM-2. The lines connect the transition temperatures - as in SPM2.
SPM2	3	132	Figure 3-21 - Change text: 'Risks associated with Reasons for Concern' to 'Risks and/or impacts associated with Reasons for Concern'
SPM2	3	132	Figure 3-21 - Text describing colours here needs to be same as that is SPM figure (which it currently is)
SPM2	3	132	Figure 3-21 - Remove 2.5°C from both y-axes as in SPM2
SPM2	3	132	Figure 3-21 - Remove text '0.87°C' and add grey band labelled '2006–2016' in top and bottom figures – like in SPM-2.
SPM2	3	132	Figure 3-21 - Change text: 'y axes (top and bottom) need to be: 'Global mean surface temperature change above pre-industrial levels (oC).' Just like in SPM2
SPM2	3	132	Figure 3-21 - Edge of all embers above 0.87°C need to be dashed as in SPM-2 figure.
SPM2	3	132	Figure 3-21 - Add confidence levels as letters as per figure SPM-2. The lines connect the transition temperatures - as in SPM2.
SPM2	3	131	Figure 3-21 - Delete the text "Assessment of risks at 2°C or higher are beyond the scope of the present assessment" as in SPSM2
	3	3-11:6-13	Change "Any increase in global temperature (e.g., +0.5°C) is expected to affect human health (high confidence). Risks are lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C for heat-related morbidity and mortality (very high confidence), particularly in urban areas because of urban heat island effects (high confidence). Risks of ozone-related mortality would also be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C of global warming assuming that emissions related to the formation of ozone remain the same (high confidence), and the same applies to risks of undernutrition (medium confidence). Risks are projected to change for some vector-borne diseases, such as malaria and dengue fever (high confidence), with positive or negative trends

			occurring depending on the disease, region and extent of change (high confidence). Incorporating estimates of adaptation into projections reduces the magnitude of risks (high confidence). {3.4.7, 3.4.7.1} " to "Any increase in global warming is projected to affect human health, with primarily negative consequences (high confidence). Lower risks are projected at 1.5°C than at 2°C for heat-related morbidity and mortality (very high confidence) and for ozone-related mortality if emissions needed for ozone formation remain high (high confidence). Urban heat islands often amplify the impacts of heatwaves in cities (high confidence). Risks from some vector-borne diseases, such as malaria and dengue fever, are projected to increase with warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, including potential shifts in their geographic range (high confidence). {3.4.7, 3.4.8, 3.5.5.8}"
	3	3-10:7-8	Change "Global warming of 1.5°C (as opposed to 2°C) is projected to reduce climate induced impacts on crop yield and nutritional content in some regions (high confidence)." to "Limiting warming to 1.5°C, compared with 2°C, is projected to result in smaller net reductions in yields of maize, rice, wheat, and potentially other cereal crops, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central and South America; and in the CO2 dependent, nutritional quality of rice and wheat (high confidence)."
	3	3-10:12-13	Change "Risks of food shortages are lower in the Sahel, southern Africa, the Mediterranean, central Europe, and the Amazon at 1.5°C of global warming when compared to 2°C (medium confidence)." to "Reductions in projected food availability are larger at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming in the Sahel, southern Africa, the Mediterranean, central Europe, and the Amazon (medium confidence). "
	3	3-9:45-46	Change "Risks to water scarcity are greater at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming in some regions (medium confidence)." to "Depending on future socioeconomic conditions, limiting global warming to 1.5°C, compared to 2°C, may reduce the proportion of the world population exposed to a climate-change induced increase in water stress by up to 50%, although there is considerable variability between regions (medium confidence). "
	3	3-9:46 to 3:10:1-3	Delete the text "Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would approximately halve the fraction of world population expected to suffer water scarcity as compared to 2°C, although there is considerable variability between regions (medium confidence). Socioeconomic drivers, however, are expected to have a greater influence on these risks than the changes in climate (medium confidence)"
	3	3-11:28-32	Change "Globally, the projected impacts on economic growth in a 1.5°C warmer world are larger than those of the present-day (about 1°C), with the largest impacts expected in the tropics and the Southern Hemisphere subtropics (limited evidence, low confidence). At 2°C substantially lower economic growth is projected for many developed and developing countries (limited evidence, medium confidence), with the potential to also limit economic damages at 1.5°C of global warming." to "Risks to global aggregated economic growth due to climate change impacts are projected to be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C by the end of this century (medium confidence). This excludes the costs of mitigation, adaptation investments and the benefits of adaptation. Countries in the tropics and Southern Hemisphere subtropics are projected to experience the largest impacts on economic

			growth due to climate change should global warming increase from 1.5°C to 2 °C (medium confidence)."
	3	3-7:37-41	Change "Some regions are projected to experience multiple compound climate-related risks at 1.5°C that will increase with warming of 2°C and higher (high confidence). Some regions are projected to be affected by collocated and/or concomitant changes in several types of hazards. Multi-sector risks are projected to overlap spatially and temporally, creating new (and exacerbating current) hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities that will affect increasing numbers of people and regions with additional warming." to "Exposure to multiple and compound climate-related risks increases between 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming, with greater proportions of people both exposed and susceptible to poverty in Africa and Asia (high confidence). For global warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, risks across energy, food, and water sectors could overlap spatially and temporally, creating new and exacerbating current hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities that could affect increasing numbers of people and regions (medium confidence) "
9:6 (B2.3)	3	p9, p165, p136	Reword ES statement and subsection summary on permafrost to include projected range; amend range given in on 3.5.2.5 RFC1 as well as in Table 3.7 (p 3 -151)
A3.2	3		The ES FGD text used to read 'Future risks at 1.5°C will depend on the mitigation pathway and on the possible occurrence of a transient overshoot (high confidence). The impacts on natural and human systems would be greater where mitigation pathways temporarily overshoot 1.5°C and return to 1.5°C later in the century, as compared to pathways that stabilizes at 1.5°C without an overshoot. The size and duration of an overshoot will also affect future impacts (e.g. loss of ecosystems, medium confidence). Changes in land use resulting from mitigation choices could have impacts on food production and ecosystem diversity {Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, Cross-Chapter boxes 7 and 8 in this Chapter}.' in ES. In the SPM, the statement A3.2 reads A3.2. Future climate-related risks depend on the rate, peak and duration of warming. In the aggregate they are larger if global warming exceeds 1.5°C before returning to that level by 2100 than if global warming gradually stabilizes at 1.5°C, especially if the peak temperature is high (e.g., about 2°C) (high confidence). Some impacts may be long-lasting or irreversible, such as the loss of some ecosystems (high confidence). {3.2, 3.4.4, 3.6.3, Cross-Chapter Box 8}'. To make the ES consistent, the statement should be edited to read "Future risks at 1.5°C will depend on the mitigation pathway and on the possible occurrence of a transient overshoot (high confidence). The impacts on natural and human systems would be greater where mitigation pathways temporarily overshoot 1.5°C and return to 1.5°C later in the century, as compared to pathways that stabilizes at 1.5°C without an overshoot (high confidence). The size and duration of an overshoot will also affect future impacts (e.g. irreversible loss of some ecosystems, high confidence). Changes in land use resulting from mitigation choices could have impacts on food production and ecosystem diversity {Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, Cross-Chapter boxes 7 and 8 in this Chapter}.'
B3 and B3.1	3		Edit ES statement to make the confidence levels consistent with the SPM and specify the exact numbers as in the SPM. This means to edit from "Risks of local species losses and, consequently, risks of extinction are much less in a 1.5°C versus a 2°C warmer world (medium confidence). The number of species projected to lose over half of their

		<p>climatically determined geographic range (about 18% of insects, 16% of plants, 8% of vertebrates) is reduced by 50% (plants, vertebrates) or 66% (insects) at 1.5°C versus 2°C of warming (high confidence). Risks associated with other biodiversity-related factors such as forest fires, extreme weather events, and the spread of invasive species, pests, and diseases, are also reduced at 1.5°C versus 2°C of warming (high confidence), supporting greater persistence of ecosystem services {3.4.3.2, 3.5.2}.' to 'Risks of local species losses and, consequently, risks of extinction are much less in a 1.5°C versus a 2°C warmer world (high confidence). The number of species projected to lose over half of their climatically determined geographic range at 2°C warming (18% of insects, 16% of plants, 8% of vertebrates) is projected to be reduced to 6% of insects, 8% of plants and 4% of vertebrates at 1.5°C warming (medium confidence). Risks associated with other biodiversity-related factors such as forest fires, extreme weather events, and the spread of invasive species, pests, and diseases, are also reduced at 1.5°C versus 2°C of warming (high confidence), supporting greater persistence of ecosystem services {3.4.3.2, 3.5.2}.'. It will also be important to ensure that the confidence levels in the underlying text also match this.</p>
<p>A3.2</p>	<p>3</p>	<p>For consistency with A2, in the ES the statement 'Overshooting poses large risks for natural and human systems, especially if the temperature at peak warming is high, because some risks may be long-lasting and irreversible, such as the loss of many ecosystems (high confidence).' should be edited to read 'Overshooting poses large risks for natural and human systems, especially if the temperature at peak warming is high, because some risks may be long-lasting and irreversible, such as the loss of some ecosystems (high confidence)'. Also check underlying text.</p>

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B3.2	3		<p>The SPM wording is B3.2. "Approximately 4% (interquartile range 2–7%) of the global terrestrial land area is projected to undergo a transformation of ecosystems from one type to another at 1°C of global warming, compared with 13% (interquartile range 8–20%) at 2°C (medium confidence). This indicates that the area at risk is projected to be approximately 50% lower at 1.5°C compared to 2°C (medium confidence). {3.4.3.1, 3.4.3.5}" and the FGD ES wording was 'The terrestrial area affected by ecosystem transformation (13%) at 2°C, which is approximately halved at 1.5°C global warming (high confidence)' . In the ES, this latter sentence needs to be edited to read "The global terrestrial land area projected to be affected by ecosystem transformation (13%, interquartile range 8–20%) at 2°C, is approximately halved at 1.5°C global warming to 4% (interquartile range 2–7%) (medium confidence)."</p>
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B3.3	3		<p>In ES add B3.3, add and will proceed with further warming' after "High-latitude tundra and boreal forests are particularly at risk of climate change-induced degradation and loss, with woody shrubs already encroaching into the tundra (high confidence)".</p>
A3.2	3		<p>The ES FGD text used to read 'Future risks at 1.5°C will depend on the mitigation pathway and on the possible occurrence of a transient overshoot (high confidence). The impacts on natural and human systems would be greater where mitigation pathways temporarily overshoot 1.5°C and return to 1.5°C later in the century, as compared to pathways that stabilizes at 1.5°C without an overshoot. The size and duration of an overshoot will also affect future impacts (e.g. loss of ecosystems, medium confidence). Changes in land use resulting from mitigation choices could have impacts on food production and ecosystem diversity {Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, Cross-Chapter boxes 7 and 8 in this Chapter}.' in ES. In the SPM, the statement A3.2 reads A3.2. Future climate-related risks depend on the rate, peak and duration of warming. In the aggregate they are larger if global warming exceeds 1.5°C before returning to that level by 2100 than if global warming gradually stabilizes at 1.5°C, especially if the peak temperature is high (e.g., about 2°C) (high confidence). Some impacts may be long-lasting or irreversible, such as the loss of some ecosystems (high confidence). {3.2, 3.4.4, 3.6.3, Cross-Chapter Box 8}'. To make the ES consistent, the statement should be edited to read "Future risks at 1.5°C will depend on the mitigation pathway and on the possible occurrence of a transient overshoot (high confidence). The impacts on natural and human systems would be greater where mitigation pathways temporarily overshoot 1.5°C and return to 1.5°C later in the century, as compared to pathways that stabilizes at 1.5°C without an overshoot (high confidence). The size and duration of an overshoot will also affect future impacts (e.g. irreversible loss of some ecosystems, high confidence). Changes in land use resulting from mitigation choices could have impacts on food production and ecosystem diversity {Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, Cross-Chapter boxes 7 and 8 in this Chapter}.'</p>
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B3.3	3		In ES add B3.3, add and will proceed with further warming' after "High-latitude tundra and boreal forests are particularly at risk of climate change-induced degradation and loss, with woody shrubs already encroaching into the tundra (high confidence)" .
B5.7	3		In ES the text read 'There are multiple lines of evidence that there has been a substantial increase since AR5 in the levels of risk associated with four of the five Reasons for Concern (RFCs) for global warming levels of up to 2°C (high confidence). The word 'assessed' should be inserted before 'risk'
B5.7	3		Replace RFC text with text in SPM
6:26	4	33:42	Replace '>70%' with 'to between 75 and 90% (interquartile range)'
13:6	4	Across the chapter	Replace '1.5°C-consistent pathways' with 'pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot'.
14:9	4	Across the chapter	Replace '2°C-consistent pathways' with 'pathways limiting global warming to below 2°C'. [NOTE: In the approved SPM this is in C2.7, second sentence, as an example.]
22:40	4	87:6	Change 'over 2015-2035' to 'between 2016-2035'. [NOTE: In the approved SPM this is in the line under D4.3]
22:49-50	4	13:35	Change 'threefold' to '3-4 times' [NOTE: This bullet is C2.7 in the approved SPM]
25:20	4	44:35	In the context of 1.5°C pathways (Chapter 2), they serve to offset residual emissions that take longer to abate or to reduce emissions after overshooting the 1.5°C carbon budget' CHANGE TO 'In the context of 1.5°C pathways (Chapter 2), they serve to offset residual emissions and, in most cases, achieve net-negative emissions to return to 1.5°C from an overshoot.'
SPM3b	4		Update Table 4.1: update numbers to be consistent with SPM
C2.3	4		Update Table 4.1 for pathway classification used in SPM
12:14	5	15:17-18	Include Table 3.5 in traceability count (see Chapter 3.....)
SPM4	5		Update Figure 5.2: red coloured circle segment corresponding to SDG9 in, circle Trade-offs (negative interaction) energy demand options, to be replaced by white
25:3	Glossary	25:22	Global mean surface temperature (GMST) - replace glossary definition with version in SPM Box 1: Estimated global average of near-surface air temperatures over land and sea-ice, and sea surface temperatures over ice-free ocean regions, with changes normally expressed as departures from a value over a specified reference period. When estimating changes in GMST, near-surface air temperature over both land and oceans are also used.

			[FOOTNOTE] FOOTNOTE: Past IPCC reports, reflecting the literature, have used a variety of approximately equivalent metrics of GMST change.
25:3	Glossary	N/A (New)	Add the following definition for Global mean surface air temperature (GSAT) - Global average of near-surface air temperatures over land and oceans. Changes in GSAT are often used as a measure of global temperature change in climate models but are not observed directly.
25:8	Glossary	42:16	Pre-industrial - replace glossary definition with version in SPM Box 1: The multi-century period prior to the onset of large-scale industrial activity around 1750. The reference period 1850–1900 is used to approximate pre-industrial global mean surface temperature (GMST).
25:12	Glossary	25:29	Global warming - replace glossary definition with version in SPM Box 1: The estimated increase in global mean surface temperature (GMST) averaged over a 30-year period, or the 30-year period centered on a particular year or decade, expressed relative to pre-industrial levels unless otherwise specified. For 30-year periods that span past and future years, the current multi-decadal warming trend is assumed to continue.
25:20	Glossary	8:49	Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) - replace glossary definition with version in SPM Box 1: Anthropogenic activities removing CO ₂ from the atmosphere and durably storing it in geological, terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in products. It includes existing and potential anthropogenic enhancement of biological or geochemical sinks and direct air capture and storage, but excludes natural CO ₂ uptake not directly caused by human activities.
25:20	Glossary	36:24	Mitigation (of climate change) - Remove "Note that this encompasses carbon dioxide removal (CDR) options."
25:20	Glossary		Negative emissions - Remove "For CO ₂ , negative emissions can be achieved with direct capture of CO ₂ from ambient air, bioenergy with carbon capture and sequestration (BECCS), afforestation, reforestation, biochar, ocean alkalization, among others."
25:31	Glossary	39:1	Overshoot - change name of term to 'Temperature overshoot' to be consistent with SPM Box 1